5852

[redacted] ~~W L Crosthwait~~

78th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - House Document No. 339

Papers Relating to the
Foreign Relations
# of the
United States

Japan: 1931–1941

(In Two Volumes)

Volume II

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

United States
Government Printing Office
Washington : 1943

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
PUBLICATION 2016

For sale by the
Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D. C.
Price $1.75 (Buckram)


U. S. S. R.
KAMCHATKA
Petropavlovsk
SAKHALIN
KARAFUTO
Blagoveshchensk
Khabarovsk
Harbin
MANCHURIA
OUTER MONGOLIA
Mukden
Vladivostok
Hakodate
EMPIRE
OCEAN
Peiping
Tientsin
CHOSEN
Dairen
Keijo (Seoul)
Tsingtao
Tokyo
Yokohama
Kyoto
Osaka
Lanchow
CHINA
Sian
Nanking
Shanghai
Hankow
Kagoshima
Chengtu
Lhasa
Chungking
Hangchow
Changsha
Foochow
Taihoku
JAPANESE
Kunming
Canton
Macao
Hong Kong
TAIWAN
PACIFIC
Mandalay
BURMA
Hanoi
FRENCH INDOCHINA
Haiphong
HAINAN
Rangoon
THAILAND
MARIANAS IS.
Bangkok
Manila
PHILIPPINE IS.
GUAM (U.S.A.)
ANDAMAN IS.
Saigon
Camranh Bay
SPRATLY
YAP
MANDATE
NICOBAR IS.
Davao
PALAU IS.
JAPANESE
ISLANDS
TRUK IS.
MALAY STATES
Singapore
SUMATRA
BORNEO
CELEBES
Padang
NEW GUINEA
Batavia
Soerabaja
JAVA
TIMOR
Port Moresby
Darwin
INDIAN OCEAN
AUSTRALIA
Brisbane
Perth
Newcastle
Sydney
Canberra
Melbourne
Hobart
0
1000
2000 MILES
0
1000
2000
3000 KILOMETERS
Ge. Feb. 6, 1943 W.W.R.
90
105
120
135
150
165
180
45
30
15
0
15
30
75
90
105
120
135
150

CONTENTS

Page

List of Papers VII

Growing tension between the United States and Japan arising from Japanese military aggression:

1939 1

1940 53

1941 131

Relations of Japan with the European Axis Powers 153

Abrogation by the United States of the treaty of commerce and navigation between the United States and Japan signed February 21, 1911 . . . 189

Economic measures by the United States affecting trade with Japan . . . 201

Extension of Japanese penetration into Southern Asia and South Pacific territories 277

Informal conversations between the Governments of the United States and Japan, 1941:

Summary of conversations 325

Record of conversations 387

Index 799

LIST OF PAPERS

[Unless otherwise specified, the correspondence is *from* or *to* officials in the Department of State.]

GROWING TENSION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN ARISING FROM JAPANESE MILITARY AGGRESSION

1939

Date and number	Subject	Page
1939 May 18 (234)	*From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)* Message for the Secretary of State from the Prime Minister, for delivery by the Ambassador during his forthcoming visit to the United States (text printed), expressing concern at the existence among European nations of antagonism which may lead to open conflict; belief that it is the duty of the United States and Japan, owing to their situation outside the scope of European conflict, to exert efforts to prevent the occurrence of the casualty envisaged; and ardent wish of Japan that nations should have their own proper places in the world and thus true world peace might be established and maintained.	1
May 18 (235)	*From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)* Report of farewell conversation with the Foreign Minister in which were discussed the proposed anti-communistic agreement between Japan, Germany, and Italy, Japanese interference with American rights and interests in China, the "new order" in East Asia, and the so-called "South Sea advance."	1
June 21 (*Go* 13, Asia I)	*From the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the American Chargé in Japan* Information that operations begun May 21, 1939, on the coast of Kwangtung Province, China, are purely military in character; expression of hope that the U. S. Government will cooperate with Japanese forces to avoid accidental damage to American interests and the occurrence of unfortunate incidents.	5
July 8 (1767)	*To the Chargé in Japan* Communication for the Prime Minister (text printed), conveying the Secretary of State's interest in being informed definitively of the Prime Minister's concept as to steps which might be taken toward moderating the situation in Europe.	5
Aug. 30	*Memorandum by the Secretary of State* Conversation with the departing Counselor of the Japanese Embassy, in which the Secretary of State reiterated the general principles of American policy with regard to international conduct.	8
Sept. 5 (458)	*From the Chargé in Japan (tel.)* Foreign Office note to diplomatic representatives of the European belligerents and to the American and Italian Ambassadors for their information (text printed), giving "friendly advice" to the belligerents to withdraw their naval vessels and troops from Japanese-controlled areas of China in order to avoid unfortunate incidents. Information that this is intended to include foreign concessions and international settlements such as the French concession and the International Settlement at Shanghai.	9

GROWING TENSION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1939 Sept. 6 (459)	*From the Chargé in Japan (tel.)* Suggestion that the U. S. Government express its unqualified disapproval of Japan's action of September 5 as calculated to prejudice the position in China of non-Oriental powers. Request for authorization to make a statement of personal opinion to the Foreign Minister.	10
Sept. 6 (276)	*To the Chargé in Japan (tel.)* Authorization to indicate to Foreign Minister that in the Chargé's opinion any action to force withdrawal of armed forces of France and Great Britain from China would be interpreted in the United States as a step toward elimination of Western influence from China and the consequent reaction would be seriously prejudicial to Japanese-American relations.	12
Sept. 7	*Memorandum by the Secretary of State* Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador in which the Secretary of State expressed his concern regarding the effect on Japanese-American relations of the Japanese notes to the belligerent nations and asked for an indication of the Japanese Government's reaction to his discussion of the subject, which had dealt particularly with the situation at Shanghai.	12
Sept. 7 (463)	*From the Chargé in Japan (tel.)* Conversation with the Foreign Minister who expressed regret at the state of Japanese-American relations, declaring he would endeavor to improve them, and, in connection with the notes of September 5, emphasized Japan's determination to prevent the extension of the European hostilities to the Far East.	15
Sept. 15	*Memorandum by the Secretary of State* Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador in which the Ambassador stated that his Government had no idea or purpose to invite the guards of the U. S. Government to leave Shanghai and promised to present the Secretary's views to his Government for further consideration.	15
Oct. 19	*Address Delivered by the Ambassador in Japan Before the America-Japan Society at Tokyo* Report on the Ambassador's recent visit in the United States and the nature of American public opinion regarding the Far Eastern situation in general and U. S.–Japanese relations in particular.	19
Oct. 23 (544)	*From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)* Report of press interview granted by the Foreign Office spokesman (text printed), regarding the American Ambassador's speech and other phases of Japanese-American relations.	29
Oct. 28 (560)	*From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)* Foreign Minister's statement to the Cabinet meeting of October 27 (text printed), pointing out that, because of the state of Japanese-American relations, it must be expected that upon the expiration of the commercial treaty on January 25, 1940, those relations may reach the worst state possible.	30

GROWING TENSION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1939 Nov. 4	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Conversation with the Foreign Minister in which the Ambassador expressed the opinion that the first steps toward improvement of Japanese-American relations are (1) cessation of bombings, indignities, and other interferences with American rights and interests in China, and (2) action of a positive nature which would be concrete evidence of Japanese intention to improve relations.	31
Nov. 4	*Press Release Issued by the Department of State* Information that the Ambassador in Japan has reported by telegraph that in his talk with the Foreign Minister on November 4 he made no threats of economic sanctions.	34
Nov. 13 (349)	*To the Ambassador in Japan* (tel.) Opinion that the central regime in China, proposed to be set up under Wang Ching-wei with Japanese armed support, will only serve to render an adjustment of Japanese-American relations more difficult.	34
Nov. 21	*Press Statement by the Japanese Prime Minister* Outlining various aspects of Japan's future relations with the proposed new regime in China.	35
Nov. 24	*Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State* Conversation between the Japanese Ambassador and the Secretary of State, in which the former expressed his desire to improve Japanese-American relations, and the latter stated that the first move as to the practical manner of removing obstacles to friendly relations must come from the Japanese Government.	36
Dec. 4 (656)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* (tel.) Conversation with the Foreign Minister in which the Minister reiterated the assurances of his predecessors that Japanese forces in China have not the slightest intention to drive out American interests, and suggested that Foreign Office and Embassy officials constitute themselves a permanent committee to deal with pending matters.	40
Dec. 6	*Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan* Conversation with the Director of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office regarding procedure for dealing with pending matters, in which were discussed the Japanese classification of the various problems and the negative and positive measures to be taken by Japan.	43
Dec. 8 (392)	*To the Ambassador in Japan* (tel.) Comments on the Foreign Minister's remarks during conversation with the Ambassador on December 4, for possible assistance in further conversations.	46
Dec. 12 (687)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* (tel.) *Pro memoria* read by the Foreign Minister during his conversation with the Ambassador on December 18 (text printed), outlining progress of Japanese efforts to solve pending difficulties, and expressing the hope that, in view of imminent expiration of the commercial treaty, negotiations might be entered into to make possible the continuance of normal commercial relations.	48

GROWING TENSION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1939 Dec. 18 (688)	*From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)* Further information as to conversation with the Foreign Minister, in which the Ambassador conveyed the reactions of the Department as transmitted in telegram No. 392 of December 8.	51
	1940	
1940 Jan. 8 (13)	*To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)* Instructions, in the event that Foreign Minister should mention his Government's decision to sponsor a new regime in China under Wang Ching-wei, to express the opinion that the proposed new regime would seem to be designed primarily to serve the purposes of Japan and would operate to deprive third countries of long-established rights in China.	53
Jan. 31	*Memorandum by the Secretary of State* Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador, in which the Ambassador inquired regarding violation of a gasoline contract between Japanese agencies and American citizens, and the Secretary of State expressed his views concerning the proposed new puppet government in China.	53
Feb. 29 (147)	*From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)* Statement by the Foreign Minister on February 28, in reply to a parliamentary interpellation (substance printed) regarding difficulties with the United States and Japan's purpose to establish a new order in East Asia.	55
Mar. 15 (179)	*From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)* Statement by the Prime Minister, March 13 (text printed), expressing gratification over the formation of the Wang Ching-wei government and pledging wholehearted assistance.	56
Mar. 23 (199)	*From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)* Statement by the Foreign Minister, in reply to a parliamentary interpellation (text printed) to the effect that the fundamental cause of unsatisfactory Japanese-American relations is the American failure to understand Japanese thought and action relating to the China incident, and that every effort is being exerted in this connection.	57
Mar. 24 (200)	*From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)* Statement by the Prime Minister, March 23, in reply to a parliamentary interpellation (text printed) expressing doubt that the United States would risk applying a general embargo upon Japan. Statement by the Foreign Minister on the same occasion (text printed), referring to relations between the U. S. and Chungking Governments and recommending that every opportunity be taken to make the United States understand the Japanese attitude in East Asia.	58
Mar. 30	*Statement by the Secretary of State* Declaration that, with respect to the setting up of a new regime at Nanking, the U. S. attitude toward the Far Eastern situation remains unchanged and the U. S. Government continues to recognize the government at Chungking as the Government of China.	59

GROWING TENSION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1940 Mar. 30 (215)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* (*tel.*) Statement by the Japanese Government upon the occasion of the establishment of the new Nanking government in China (text printed).	60
Apr. 1 (222)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* (*tel.*) Remarks by the Foreign Office spokesman (substance printed), commenting unfavorably on the statement made on March 30 by the Secretary of State.	61
Apr. 26	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Informal conversation with the Foreign Minister in which the Ambassador expressed his discouragement concerning the recrudescence of bombings and other interferences with American rights and the absence of visible efforts to implement Japanese assurances already given with regard to equal opportunity and respect for American interests in China.	62
May 16 (154)	*To the Ambassador in Japan* (*tel.*) Instructions to advise the Japanese Government informally of U. S. gratification concerning the understanding reached between commanders of European treaty forces in China to maintain the peaceful *status quo* in event the European war should spread.	65
June 4 (413)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* (*tel.*) Summary of remarks of the Foreign Minister at the Pacific Society meeting on June 3, in which he stated that Japan was concerned not only with continental China but also with the South Seas areas because of close economic relations, and queried whether nations so situated can avoid friction if such things as trade and immigration barriers exist.	66
June 10 (191)	*To the Ambassador in Japan* (*tel.*) Information that in reply to an inquiry at the press conference of June 8 the Under Secretary of State stated that the United States was always hopeful that friendly relations might be created and maintained with Japan.	66
June 10	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Conversation with the Foreign Minister in which relations between Japan and the United States were explored in general; Foreign Minister's remark that the continued stay of the American Fleet in Hawaiian waters constitutes an implied suspicion of the intentions of Japan vis-à-vis the Netherlands East Indies and the South Seas.	67
June 10	*Oral Statement by the American Ambassador in Japan to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs* Emphasizing that Japanese-American relations cannot improve so long as interference with American rights and interests continues, and advising that when Japan gives definite evidence of reorientation of policy and efforts, foregoing the use of force as an instrument of national policy, the United States will be disposed to view such efforts with sympathy.	71
June 10	*Oral Statement Off the Record by the American Ambassador in Japan to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs* Remarks concerning the Foreign Minister's address before the Pacific Society on June 4; the Ambassador's view that if the Japanese Government would associate itself with the U. S. Government in bringing about a free flow of commodities between nations, substantial progress might be made toward removing the causes for unrest reflected in the Far Eastern and European conflicts.	73

Growing Tension Between the United States and Japan—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1940 June 10	*From the American Ambassador in Japan to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs* Remarks on general relations between Japan and the United States, with the observation that until Japanese assurances of cessation of interference with American rights and interests are implemented, it is not seen how Japanese-American relations can improve.	75
June 11 (437)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* (tel.) Foreign Office note to the Italian Chargé (text printed) giving "friendly advice" to withdraw troops and warships from Japanese-controlled areas of China. Information that similar communications repeating the advice of September 5, 1939, were handed to the British and French Ambassadors, and that copies of the note to the Italian Chargé were sent to the American and German Ambassadors for their information.	77
June 11 (438)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* (tel.) Informal Foreign Office communication (text printed) stating that the position taken in September 1939, regarding withdrawal of Far East forces of European belligerents, must be maintained; oral observations by the Foreign Office (text printed) stating Japanese Government's displeasure at action of the American Admiral in taking steps to obtain agreement of the European commanders at Shanghai without first consulting the Japanese Admiral as senior officer.	78
June 12 (448)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* (tel.) Confidential oral statement by the Foreign Minister (text printed), declaring that a termination of the China incident is essential to the improvement of Japanese-American relations, suggesting the study of Japanese economic problems, and inquiring as to the possibility of the conclusion of a commerical *modus vivendi*, cessation of aid to Chiang Kai-shek, and recognition of new conditions in East Asia.	79
June 18 (82)	*From the Consul at Tsingtao* (tel.) Remarks of the American Admiral to the effect that he was in fact the senior officer but that he acted primarily as a representative of a power entirely unengaged in hostilities.	80
June 19	*Oral and Informal Statement by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan* Suggestion that uneasiness among the foreign community in Shanghai due to rumors regarding changes in administration of the International Settlement and the French Concession would be dispelled if the Japanese authorities were to make a public statement along the lines of the assurances given to the American Ambassador at Tokyo on May 13, 1939, to the effect that Japan had no intention of occupying the International Settlement in Shanghai. (Footnote: Information that this oral statement was handed to the Director of the American Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office and that the Ambassador took up the same matter with the Foreign Minister on June 20.)	80
June 19	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Conversation with the Foreign Minister in which the Ambassador presented an oral statement and an informal list of certain points meriting consideration (texts printed *infra*) and discussed them at length.	81

Date and number	Subject	Page
1940 June 19	*Oral Statement by the American Ambassador in Japan to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs* Restatement of the general position of the U. S. Government.	83
Undated	*From the American Ambassador in Japan to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs* "List of points meriting special consideration," handed to the Foreign Minister during the conversation of June 19.	85
June 22 (215)	*To the Ambassador in Japan* (tel.) Instructions to call upon the Foreign Minister and explore the question of entering into an exchange of notes regarding maintenance of the *status quo* in respect to the Pacific territories and possessions of belligerent European countries.	86
June 22 (217)	*To the Ambassador in Japan* (tel.) Instructions to advise the Foreign Office informally that the commanders of the British, Italian, and American forces at Shanghai are acting under a signed agreement in regard to liberty areas, drawn up at the request of the Italian commander, and that liberty parties are operating in Peiping and Tientsin; further instructions to explain the circumstances concerning the action of the American commander regarding the agreement for the maintenance of the peaceful *status quo* at Shanghai.	87
June 24	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Information that the suggestion for exchange of notes regarding maintenance of *status quo* of the Pacific possessions and territories of European belligerents was presented to the Foreign Minister.	88
June 28	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Conversation with the Foreign Minister during which the Foreign Minister discussed and presented oral statements (texts printed *infra*) concerning the American oral statement of June 19 and the U. S. suggestion regarding exchange of notes.	89
June 28	*Oral Statement by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador in Japan* Belief that, in order to preserve peace, the principles of national sovereignty, justice, law, and order should be respected, but also that all countries should appreciate one another's position in the light of the world's changes and actual conditions.	90
June 28	*Oral Statement by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador in Japan* Doubt that exchange of formal notes regarding Pacific possessions of European belligerents would be advisable at present.	91
June 29 (518)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* (tel.) Radio address by the Foreign Minister entitled "International situation and Japan's position" (text printed).	92

GROWING TENSION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1940 July 11	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Conversation with the Foreign Minister in which the Ambassador presented oral statements (texts printed *infra*), and in which the Foreign Minister commented on the statement regarding U. S. policy of continuing to support the Chinese Government at Chungking.	94
July 11	*Oral Statement by the American Ambassador in Japan to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs* Comments on the Foreign Minister's oral statements of June 12 and 28; exposition of several basic and comprehensive reasons why it lies in Japan's best interests to follow a course of good relations with the U. S. Government.	95
July 11	*Oral Statement by the American Ambassador in Japan to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs* Suggestion that Japanese Government clarify its attitude with respect to various fundamental questions in order to accelerate the conversations.	99
July 16	*Press Release Issued by the Department of State* Opinion of the Secretary of State that the reported prohibition by the British Government, at the instance of the Japanese Government, of the movement of certain commodities over the Burma Route into China would constitute unwarranted interposition of obstacles to world trade.	101
July 22 (671)	*From the Consul at Shanghai* (tel.) Official letter from Colonel D. Peck, Commanding Officer, Fourth Marines, to Major General Miura, Commanding Officer of Gendarmes (text printed), asserting that an investigation of the incident of July 7 in which Japanese gendarmes in plain clothes were arrested as a precautionary measure against possible terrorism during an unannounced tour of the American defense sector by the Japanese General Nishio has failed to sustain Japanese charges of undue force and maltreatment.	101
July 26	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Report of the Ambassador's reception by the new Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, during which the Ambassador presented a copy of the record of his last talk with the Foreign Minister's predecessor, in order to afford a useful basis for their next conversation.	104
July 26 (620)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* (tel.) Private message from the Foreign Minister to the President of the United States (text printed), expressing his interest in the maintenance of world peace and stating that a new order must come about in the world and world peace must be based on adaptations to growth and changed conditions in world affairs.	105

GROWING TENSION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1940 July 30 (712)	*From the Consul at Shanghai* (tel.) Information that Major General Miura's reply of July 25 practically accuses Colonel Peck of bad faith, that letter of July 28 from Lieutenant Commander General Fujita to Rear Admiral Glassford (summary printed) asks for an immediate settlement of the incident, and that Admiral Glassford's reply of July 29 (text printed) restates the circumstances and points out that an apology for alleged wrongs cannot be expected. (Footnote: Information that local negotiations failed to bring about any settlement of the incident and the issue was dropped.)	106
July 31 (286)	*To the Ambassador in Japan* (tel.) Informal comments by the President (text printed) on the Foreign Minister's private message, for communication to the latter.	108
Aug. 1	*Statement by the Japanese Government* Summary of fundamental national policies.	108
Aug. 1	*Statement by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs* Declaration that immediate aim of Japanese foreign policy is to establish "a great East Asian chain of common prosperity with the Japan-Manchoukuo-China group as one of the links."	111
Sept. 4	*Statement by the Secretary of State* Information to press correspondents that, in view of the notification of withdrawal of British defense forces at Shanghai and dissent of the commanding officer of Japanese forces to an agreement for assumption of Sector B by American forces and Sector D by Japanese forces, negotiations are now in progress with the Japanese Government with regard especially to Sector B.	111
Sept. 28	*Extract From Address by the Under Secretary of State on "Our Foreign Policy and National Defense," at Cleveland* Remarks concerning the Far Eastern situation.	112
Oct. 8	*Extract From Radio Bulletin No. 239 Issued by the Department of State* Information to press correspondents that, in view of the abnormal situation continuing in the Far East, the Department has suggested that especially women and children, and men not detained by essential considerations, consider coming out of various disturbed areas.	114
Oct. 9 (962)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* (tel.) Report of a conversation held at urgent request of the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding reports of a total U. S. embargo against Japan and orders to American citizens to evacuate the Far East. Ambassador's opinion that the Foreign Minister is seriously disturbed by developments in the United States resulting from the Japanese Government's recent actions and statements.	114
Oct. 17	*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State* Conversation with the departing Japanese Ambassador in which both men expressed regret for the difficult relations prevailing between the United States and Japan and the hope that conditions would improve.	115

GROWING TENSION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1940 Nov. 30	*Treaty and Agreements Between Japan and the Wang Ching-wei Regime in Japanese-occupied China* (1) Treaty concerning the basic relations between Japan and China; (2) annexed protocol; (3) agreed terms of understanding between the plenipotentiaries of Japan and China concerning the annexed protocol.	117
Nov. 30	*Joint Declaration by the Governments of Japan, "Manchukuo", and the Wang Ching-wei Regime in Japanese-occupied China* Pledging cooperation in the establishment of a new order in East Asia.	122
Dec. 1 (595)	*From the Ambassador in China* (tel.) Statement by the Chinese Foreign Minister at Chungking, November 30 (text printed), declaring that the so-called treaty signed at Nanking between Japan and the puppet organization of Wang Ching-wei is illegal and without binding force.	122
Dec. 19	*Address Delivered by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs at the America-Japan Society Luncheon at Tokyo* Remarks regarding Japanese-American relations.	123
Dec. 19	*Address Delivered by the Japanese Ambassador to the United States at the America-Japan Society Luncheon at Tokyo* Desire to improve Japanese-American relations in his capacity as newly appointed Ambassador to the United States.	128
Dec. 19	*Remarks by the Ambassador in Japan at the America-Japan Society Luncheon at Tokyo* Comments on the Foreign Minister's address.	129

1941

Date and number	Subject	Page
1941 Jan. 15	*Statement by the Secretary of State Before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives* Remarks dealing with conditions in the Far East and the Sino-Japanese conflict.	131
Jan. 27 (125)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* (tel.) Report of rumors of Japanese plans for a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor in event of trouble with the United States.	133
Jan. 27 (126)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* (tel.) Summary of press report of the Foreign Minister's reply to a parliamentary interpellation on January 26, in which he commented on the statement by the U. S. Secretary of State on January 15 regarding the Sino-Japanese conflict and declared that if America does not understand Japan's rightful claims and actions, there is not the slightest hope for improvement of Japanese-American relations.	133
Feb. 4 (80)	*To the Ambassador in Japan* (tel.) Instructions to compare available press reports of the Foreign Minister's remarks to determine whether he indicated that the attackers at Marco Polo Bridge were the Japanese.	135

Growing Tension Between the United States and Japan—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1941 Feb. 5 (167)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* (*tel.*) Summary of press reports of the Foreign Minister's reply to a parliamentary interpellation on February 4, in which he stated that Japan must clarify its true intentions and national power, that American illusions regarding Japan must be dissipated, and that every effort to avoid a Japanese-American clash must be exerted.	135
Feb. 10 (196)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* (*tel.*) Information that through an unfortunate error in translation the Liutiaokow and Lukouchiao incidents were confused and that the Foreign Minister's reference was not to the Marco Polo Bridge incident but actually to the incident at Liutiaokow on September 18, 1931, using phraseology which does not necessarily assert that the Japanese made the original attack.	136
Feb. 15 (235)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* (*tel.*) Cabinet Information Bureau statement (text printed) appealing to Japanese living in the Americas to remain calm in the face of propaganda intended to worsen Japanese-American relations.	136
Feb. 26 (5397)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* Memorandum of conversation between the Counselor of the Embassy and the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs on February 14 (text printed) in which were discussed the war in Europe, the effect on Japanese-American relations of any occupation of strategically important British and Dutch areas in the Southwest Pacific, responsibility for the Sino-Japanese conflict, Japanese participation in the Tripartite Pact, and commercial negotiations being carried on by Japan with Indochina and the Netherlands Indies.	137
Feb. 27 (334)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* (*tel.*) Information that on February 26 the Ambassador told the Foreign Minister of his entire concurrence in the remarks made by the Counselor on February 14 and was much surprised when the Foreign Minister stated his entire agreement with the Counselor's remarks.	143
Mar. 24 (581)	*From the Ambassador in the Soviet Union* (*tel.*) Conversation with the Japanese Foreign Minister, on special mission to the Soviet Union, who stated that under no circumstances would Japan attack Singapore or any of the American, British, or Dutch possessions, that Japan had no territorial ambitions, and that any time the President of the United States wanted to bring the Sino-Japanese conflict to an end on terms satisfactory to all concerned he was in a position to do so by bringing his influence to bear upon Chiang Kai-shek.	143
May 14 (673)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* (*tel.*) Conversation with the Foreign Minister subsequent to his return from Berlin, in which he criticized the United States for "engaging in acts of war under cover of neutrality," and stated in connection with Japan's policy concerning the southward advance in Asia, that it would be carried out by peaceful measures unless circumstances rendered this impossible.	145

Growing Tension Between the United States and Japan—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1941 Dec. 1 (1869)	*From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)* Public message by Premier Tojo, November 30, on the first anniversary of the Japan-China-Manchukuo declaration (extract printed) stating that certain countries are trying to obstruct the East Asia co-prosperity sphere, that Chiang Kai-shek is being aided in his futile resistance against Japan by Great Britain and the United States because they wish to pit East Asiatic peoples against each other and grasp the hegemony of East Asia, and that this practice must be purged from East Asia.	148
Dec. 1 (1870)	*From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)* Address by the Foreign Minister, November 30 (extract printed), in which he stated that Japan, Manchukuo, and China must proceed to the establishment of a new order in East Asia which has the co-existence and co-prosperity of East Asiatic peoples as its basic principle, and declared that the United States is inclined not to recognize the real situation in East Asia and shows a disposition to apply coercively to East Asia fanciful principles not adapted to the actual world situation.	149

Relations of Japan With the European Axis Powers

Date and number	Subject	Page
1936 Nov. 26 (2159)	*From the Chargé in Japan* (1) Anti-Comintern agreement and supplementary protocol between Japan and Germany, signed at Berlin on November 25, (2) statement by the Japanese Foreign Office on the same date concerning reasons for Japan's entrance into the pact, and (3) memorandum by the American Chargé of a conversation with the Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs on November 23 in which the latter declared that the agreement under negotiation was not an alliance and contained no secret military or economic arrangements (texts printed).	153
1937 Nov. 6	*Protocol Concluded by Italy, Germany, and Japan* Containing the adherence of Italy to the anti-Comintern pact and supplementary protocol of November 25, 1936.	159
Nov. 13 (2660)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* Observation that the present triangle combination of states is bent upon upsetting the *status quo* as opposed to those states who wish to preserve it, and that anti-communism is merely the banner under which they are rallying.	160
1939 Feb. 8 (73)	*From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)* Information that Japan is negotiating with Germany and Italy for a definite military and political alliance, and that the Ambassador has acted through informal channels to convey to the Foreign Minister the idea that Japan will do well to consider, before taking an irrevocable step, the possible effects upon relations with the United States.	161
Feb. 10 (33)	*To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)* Instructions to use his own discretion regarding the form and substance of any further approach; opinion that whatever approach the Ambassador makes should be on his own responsibility.	162

RELATIONS OF JAPAN WITH THE EUROPEAN AXIS POWERS—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1939 Feb. 14 (89)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* (tel.) Information that the Ambassador has conveyed his personal views to the Foreign Minister and is convinced that the Japanese will consider all factors before reaching a decision.	163
Mar. 7 (120)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* (tel.) Statement by the Foreign Minister at a meeting of the budget committee of the Lower House on March 6 (text printed), concerning the erroneous character of the impression existing in Great Britain, United States and various other countries that the present relation between Japan, Germany, and Italy is an association of totalitarian states opposed to the democracies.	163
1940 Sept. 27 (909)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* (tel.) Receipt from the Foreign Office of four documents concerning the three-power pact between Japan, Germany, and Italy, signed at Berlin September 27: (1) summary of the pact, (2) radio address by the Foreign Minister, (3) Imperial rescript by the Emperor, and (4) message of the Prime Minister.	164
Undated [Rec'd Sept. 27]	*Summary of the Three-Power Pact Between Japan, Germany, and Italy, Signed at Berlin, September 27, 1940* Agreement to cooperate in the establishment and maintenance of a new order in their respective regions and to render mutual assistance, political, economic, and military, if any one of the contracting parties should be attacked by an outside power not at present involved in the European war or in the China affair.	165
Sept. 27 (910)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* (tel.) Radio address by the Foreign Minister (text printed), concerning Japan's participation in the three-power pact.	166
Sept. 27 (911)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* (tel.) Imperial rescript (text printed), calling upon Japanese subjects to unite in heart and strength to surmount the present emergency and thereby assist the promotion of the Imperial fortune.	168
Sept. 28 (912)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* (tel.) Message of the Prime Minister of September 27 (text printed), expressing confidence that the Japanese people, in obedience to the Imperial will, will overcome any and every obstacle in order to surmount the present emergency.	168
Sept. 27	*Press Release Issued by the Department of State* Statement by the Secretary of State that announcement of the alliance merely makes clear to all a relationship that has long existed in effect and to which the U. S. Government has repeatedly called attention.	169
Sept. 29 (916)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* (tel.) Information that, in an off-the-record talk with the Foreign Minister, the Ambassador expressed the opinion that Japan by tying herself to the Reich would become merely a satellite of Germany, however the European war turned out. Observation that the pact is primarily aimed at the United States and that it is the German-Italian hope that it will increase American fears of developments in the Pacific.	169

Relations of Japan With the European Axis Powers—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1940 Oct. 2 (929)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* (tel.) Report that the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs told certain diplomatic representatives that the pact is specifically directed against the United States.	171
Oct. 5 (948)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* (tel.) Japanese statement to the United States (text printed), declaring that the three-power alliance is not aimed at any particular country and that it further clarifies Japan's intention to establish a new order in Greater East Asia, including the South Seas; stating, also, that if the United States understands the conditions and circumstances and Japan's intentions with regard to the establishment of a new order in East Asia, there will be no change whatever in the relationship between Japan and the United States following conclusion of the treaty.	171
Oct. 26 (4466)	*From the Chargé in Germany* (tel.) Information that the first indication of implementation of the pact has been the dispatch of a German commission to assist in the construction of air and naval fuel bases on Japanese islands.	173
Dec. 29	*Radio Address by President Roosevelt* Concerning national security.	173
1941 Mar. 29 (200)	*To the Ambassador in Japan* (tel.) Transmittal of information received from the Embassy in Germany concerning the forthcoming visit of the Japanese Foreign Minister to Berlin.	182
Mar. 29 (201)	*To the Ambassador in Japan* (tel.) Information that during the Japanese Foreign Minister's visit in Moscow he declared to diplomatic representatives of Germany, Italy, and powers associated with the Axis, that Japan was with the Axis 100 percent, that after Britain's collapse the United States would not continue the struggle but would withdraw and devote its attention to its own affairs and interests, and that peace would be assured in the Balkans once Greece had made peace.	183
Apr. 11 (738)	*From the Ambassador in the Soviet Union* (tel.) Conversation with the Japanese Foreign Minister in which the Foreign Minister categorically approved the Ambassador's report of their conversation on April 8 in which the Foreign Minister stated that he had made no commitments to Berlin or Rome, that Japan's reason for entering the Tripartite Pact was preservation of the peace, that her obligations under the pact would be adhered to, and that he desired the trust of President Roosevelt and the Secretary of State.	184
Apr. 14 (551)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* (tel.) Statement by the Prime Minister issued by the Board of Information on April 13 (text printed), announcing the signature of the neutrality pact between Japan and the Soviet Union and the joint declaration providing that each would respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the People's Republic of Mongolia and of Manchukuo.	186
Apr. 14	*Press Release Issued by the Department of State* Statement by the Secretary of State that the significance of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact could be overestimated and that it would seem to be descriptive of a situation which has in effect existed for some time past.	186

ABROGATION BY THE UNITED STATES OF THE TREATY OF COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN SIGNED FEBRUARY 21, 1911

Date and number	Subject	Page
1939 July 26	*To the Japanese Ambassador* Notification of U. S. desire to abrogate, 6 months from date, the treaty of commerce and navigation signed with Japan on February 21, 1911, in order to give new consideration to certain provisions and to better safeguard U. S. interests as new developments require.	189
July 28 (366)	*From the Chargé in Japan (tel.)* Foreign Office statement of July 27 (text printed), declaring that the reasons given by the United States fail to explain why the notice of abrogation should have been given in such a hasty and abrupt manner and suggesting that this action is highly susceptible of being interpreted as having political significance.	189
Dec. 18 (402)	*To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)* Statement (text printed) defining U. S. position concerning the question of the negotiation of a new commercial agreement or treaty, for use if approached by the Japanese Government concerning U. S. attitude toward such negotiation.	190
Dec. 19 (404)	*To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)* Observation that although the statement of U. S. position deals only with the commercial aspect of Japanese-American relations, that fact does not signify any modification in U. S. position with regard to other aspects of Japanese-American relations.	193
Dec. 20 (405)	*To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)* Information that the Department is not in a position to commit itself to entering upon negotiations, although it is felt advisable not to return a categorical negative in response to the initiative taken by the Japanese Foreign Minister.	193
Dec. 21 (410)	*To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)* Instructions to present to the Foreign Minister two oral statements (substance printed): (1) Containing statement transmitted in telegram No. 402, December 18; and (2) advising that upon expiration of the treaty the U. S. Government will refrain from collecting the 10 percent discriminatory duties on goods entering the United States in Japanese ships and also the discriminatory tonnage duties.	194
Dec. 22	*Press Release 19–75 Issued by the Treasury Department* Circular instructions, December 21, issued to collectors of customs (text printed), advising them that the 10 percent ad valorem discriminating duties are not to be collected unless and until further instructions are issued.	195
1940 Jan. 23 (32)	*To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)* Information that the Japanese Ambassador has been advised that the expiration of the treaty would not of itself bring about changes in import duties and tonnage rates, that the possibility of an exchange of notes defining treaty status of the two countries would have to be held open, and that Japanese treaty merchants doing business in the United States may be permitted to qualify as temporary visitors.	196

Abrogation by the United States of the Treaty of Commerce—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1940 Jan. 25 (48)	*From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)* Foreign Office statement to the press (text printed) advising that, although negotiations to prevent the treatyless situation are still in progress, no agreement has been reached thus far, that the U. S. and Japanese Governments have taken steps so that in practice commercial relations will be subject to no change, and that it is hoped that Japanese-American relations will be restored to a normal state with a treaty basis.	197
Jan. 25 (34)	*To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)* Note to the Japanese Ambassador, January 24, containing a statement (text printed) that the Japanese merchants in the United States under treaty provisions need not, upon termination of the treaty, take any action towards changing their status and that administrative authorities will, for the time being, take no action in the matter provided there are no violations of the terms of admission under section 3 (6) of the Immigration Act of 1924, as amended.	198

Economic Measures by the United States Affecting Trade With Japan

Date and number	Subject	Page
1937 Sept. 14	*Press Release Issued by the Department of State* Announcement by the President (text printed) that Government-owned merchant vessels will not be permitted to transport arms, ammunition, or implements of war to China or Japan and that any other American merchant vessels attempting to transport such articles to China and Japan will do so at their own risk.	201
1938 July 1	*From the Chief of the Office of Arms and Munitions Control, Department of State, to 148 Persons and Companies Manufacturing Airplane Parts* Information that the Department would with great regret issue any licenses authorizing exportation, direct or indirect, of any aircraft, aircraft equipment, or aerial bombs to countries which are making use of airplanes for attack upon civilian populations.	201
1939 Dec. 2	*Press Release Issued by the White House* Statement by the President (text printed), expressing the hope that manufacturers and exporters of airplanes, airplane equipment, and materials essential to airplane manufacture will bear in mind the U. S. Government's condemnation of unprovoked bombing and machine-gunning of civilian populations from the air, before negotiating contracts for exportation of such articles to nations obviously guilty of such unprovoked bombing.	202
Dec. 15	*Press Release Issued by the Department of State* Letter to American manufacturers and exporters of aircraft, aircraft equipment, and aerial bombs (text printed), expressing the Department's hope that it will not receive any applications for licenses for exportation, direct or indirect, of any such articles to countries engaged in bombing or machine-gunning of civilian populations from the air; similar letter to producers of molybdenum and aluminum (text printed).	202

Economic Measures by the United States Affecting Trade With Japan—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1939 Dec. 20	*Press Release Issued by the Department of State* Information that it has been decided that there should be no further delivery to certain countries of plans, plants, manufacturing rights, or technical information required for the production of high-quality aviation gasoline, and that this decision has been communicated to the interested American oil companies.	203
1940 Jan. 6	*Memorandum by the Secretary of State* Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador concerning the moral embargo against Japan.	204
Jan. 6 (2)	*From the Japanese Ambassador* Protest against steps taken by the U. S. Government which have made it virtually impossible for Japanese firms to import American airplanes and airplane parts and have prevented consummation of negotiations for manufacturing rights to high-quality gasoline processes; declaration that no bombing or machine-gunning has been resorted to against civilian populations as such; belief that U. S. measures are in contravention of the commercial treaty of 1911 and that their continuance may affect efforts to improve Japanese-American relations.	205
Jan. 27	*To the Japanese Ambassador* Observation that trustworthy reports have been received which indicate that Japanese forces in China have resorted to bombing and machine-gunning of civilians from the air at places near which there were no military objectives and that aerial bombs have damaged clearly marked American properties, hence the U. S. policy had to be extended to withhold technical processes for high-quality aviation gasoline. Inability to agree that the U. S. Government has infringed either the letter or spirit of the commercial treaty.	208
July 2	*Proclamation No. 2413* Vesting execution of section 6 of the Export Control Act of July 2, 1940, in an Administrator of Export Control, listing certain articles and materials which shall not be exported except by license on and after July 5, 1940, and making provision for the issuance of licenses.	211
July 2	*Regulations Governing the Exportation of Articles and Materials Designated in the President's Proclamation of July 2, 1940* Definition of terms used in proclamation; forms for use in applying for and issuing licenses; and specific rules concerning licenses.	213
July 2	*Press Release Issued by the White House* Information concerning the signature by the President of the Export Control Act and the proclamation of July 2; military order signed by the President (text printed) designating Lt. Col. Russell L. Maxwell, U. S. A., as Administrator of Export Control.	216
July 26	*Proclamation No. 2417* Putting the exportation of petroleum products, tetraethyl lead, and iron and steel scrap under the licensing system.	216

ECONOMIC MEASURES BY THE UNITED STATES AFFECTING TRADE WITH JAPAN—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1940 July 26	*Regulations Governing the Exportation of Articles and Materials Designated in the President's Proclamation of July 2, 1940* Additional regulations governing the exportation of petroleum products, tetraethyl lead, and iron and steel scrap.	217
July 31	*Press Release Issued by the White House* Announcement by the Administrator of Export Control, with the President's approval, that export of aviation gasoline is being limited to nations of the Western Hemisphere.	218
Aug. 3	*From the Japanese Embassy* View that the limitation on export destinations of aviation gasoline singles out Japan for discriminatory treatment; registration of a protest against U. S. policy, while reserving all rights of further action.	218
Aug. 9	*To the Japanese Embassy* Statement that the action regarding aviation gasoline is necessary in the interest of national defense and that the U. S. Government, accordingly, considers a protest by any foreign government to be unwarranted.	219
Sept. 12	*Proclamation No. 2423* Putting the exportation of equipment and plans for the production of aviation motor fuel, of tetraethyl lead, and of aircraft or aircraft engines, under the licensing system.	220
Sept. 13	*Press Release Issued by the White House* Information that the proclamation of September 12, taken with previous proclamations, has the effect of putting under the President's control for export purposes not only aircraft and engines but also the plans and designs for building them.	221
Sept. 25	*Press Release No. 48 Issued by the Federal Loan Agency* Announcement that the Metals Reserve Company has agreed to buy $30,000,000 of tungsten from China and that a $25,000,000 loan to China by the Export-Import Bank will be liquidated through the sale of the tungsten; information concerning previous R. F. C. and Export-Import Bank loans to China.	222
Sept. 26	*Press Release Issued by the White House* Information that on October 15, all outstanding balances of licenses for exportation of No. 1 heavy melting steel scrap will be revoked, and that on October 16 the exportation of all grades of iron and steel scrap will be placed under the licensing system; also that under the new regulations licenses will be issued to permit shipments to countries of the Western Hemisphere and Great Britain only.	222
Sept. 30	*Regulations Governing the Exportation of Articles and Materials Designated in the President's Proclamation of July 26, 1940* Additional regulations, to become effective October 16, defining iron and steel scrap as designated in the proclamation of July 26 to include such scrap of every kind and description.	223
Oct. 7 (235)	*From the Japanese Embassy* Objection to the regulations of September 30 and the announcement of September 26 on the ground that they can hardly be solely in the interest of national defense of the United States and cannot fail to be regarded as directed against Japan, and, as such, to be an unfriendly act.	223

ECONOMIC MEASURES BY THE UNITED STATES AFFECTING TRADE WITH JAPAN—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1940 Undated [Rec'd Oct. 8]	*From the Japanese Embassy* Observation that, in the event of continuation of the present attitude toward Japan in matters of trade restriction, or further measures of curtailment, future relations between Japan and the United States will be unpredictable.	224
Oct. 8	*Memorandum by the Secretary of State* Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador in which the Secretary of State declared that it was unheard of for one country engaged in aggression and seizure of another country to turn to a third peacefully disposed nation and seriously insist that it would be guilty of an unfriendly act if it should not cheerfully provide some of the necessary implements of war to aid the aggressor nation in carrying out its policy of invasion.	225
Oct. 15	*Press Release Issued by the White House* Information concerning the act of Congress approved October 10 and the Executive order and regulations issued October 15 with regard to requisitioning by the Government of arms, ammunition, implements of war, machine tools, and other articles needed for national defense.	228
Oct. 23	*To the Japanese Embassy* Statement that the restrictions on exportation of iron and steel scrap have been found necessary in the interest of national defense and that the U. S. Government perceives no warrantable basis for a raising of question by any other government.	229
Nov. 19	*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State* Conversation with the Japanese Chargé in which the Chargé stated that the Embassy understood that certain machine tools would be permitted export licenses unless they were needed in the domestic market, but that licenses had been denied, and the Assistant Secretary replied that he would have the matter looked into.	229
Nov. 30	*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State* Conversation with the Japanese Chargé in which the Chargé pointed out that although export licenses were not required for certain machine tools, notably cutters and grinders, nevertheless collectors of customs were not permitted to allow the tools to go forward.	230
Dec. 9	*To the Japanese Chargé* Information that applications for licenses to export machine tools are considered in the light of needs of the defense program and the policy expressed by the President on December 2, 1939; that instructions to collectors of customs regarding nonrequirement of export licenses for tools had been "until further notice;" and that certain specific cases referred to by the Chargé on November 19 are being studied by the interested agencies of the Government.	231
Dec. 10	*Press Release Issued by the Department of State* Announcement by the White House that as of December 30 export licenses will be required for iron ore, pig iron, ferro alloys, and certain iron and steel manufactures and semimanufactures; that licenses will be granted for exports to the British Empire and the Western Hemisphere, and, for the present, so far as interests of national defense permit, to other destinations in quantities approximating usual or pre-war exports.	232

ECONOMIC MEASURES BY THE UNITED STATES AFFECTING TRADE WITH JAPAN—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1940 Dec. 10	*Proclamation No. 2449* Putting the exportation of iron and steel under the licensing system, effective December 30.	232
Dec. 10	*Executive Order No. 8607* Regulations governing the exportation of articles and materials designated in proclamation No. 2449.	233
Dec. 17	*To the Japanese Chargé* Explanation that the Department's communication of November 25 to collectors of customs and manufacturers advised that licenses would be required in certain individual cases for export of certain specific tools of the types previously exempted, and that this action accounts for the course pursued in the cases brought up by the Embassy.	235
Dec. 20	*Proclamation No. 2451* Putting the exportation of certain articles and materials including bromine, strontium metals and ores, abrasives, specific kinds of machinery, and equipment and plans for the production of aviation lubricating oil, under the licensing system.	236
Dec. 21 (316)	*From the Japanese Embassy* Protest against the restrictions of December 10 governing the exportation of iron and steel as being discriminatory against Japan.	237
1941 Jan. 7	*To the Japanese Embassy* Information that the statements concerning the interests of national defense contained in the Department's notes of August 9 and October 23, 1940, apply fully to the considerations raised in the Embassy's note of December 21, 1940.	237
Jan. 10	*Proclamation No. 2453* Putting the exportation of copper, brass and bronze, zinc, nickel, and potash under the licensing system.	238
Jan. 10	*Executive Order No. 8631* Regulations governing the exportation of articles and materials designated in proclamation No. 2453.	239
Undated	*Article Concerning Control of Exports in National Defense* Telegram from the Secretary of State to collectors of customs, January 29, 1941 (text printed), announcing that licenses will be required for export of aluminum foil. Information that applications for certain articles and materials, for destinations other than the British Empire, must be accompanied by affidavits giving statistics regarding exports to the country concerned since January 1, 1937, in addition to a copy of order from the foreign purchaser.	241
Feb. 4	*Proclamation No. 2456* Putting the exportation of well and refining machinery, radium, uranium, and calf and kip skins under the licensing system.	241
Feb. 4	*Executive Order No. 8668* Regulations governing the exportation of articles and materials designated in proclamation No. 2456.	242
Feb. 4	*Executive Order No. 8669* Regulations governing the exportation of iron and steel.	243

Economic Measures by the United States Affecting Trade With Japan—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1941 Feb. 25	*Proclamation No. 2460* Putting the exportation of belladonna, atropine, sole leather, and belting leather under the licensing system.	248
Feb. 25	*Executive Order No. 8693* Regulations governing the exportation of articles and materials designated in proclamation No. 2460.	249
Feb. 25	*Proclamation No. 2461* Putting the exportation of beryllium, graphite electrodes, and aircraft pilot trainers under the licensing system.	250
Feb. 25	*Executive Order No. 8694* Regulations governing the exportation of articles and materials designated in proclamation No. 2461.	251
Mar. 4	*Proclamation No. 2463* Putting the exportation of certain articles and materials including cadmium, carbon black, coconut and other oils, glycerin, shellac, and titanium, under the licensing system.	252
Mar. 4	*Proclamation No. 2464* Putting the exportation of jute, lead, borax, and phosphates under the licensing system.	253
Mar. 4	*Proclamation No. 2465* Putting the exportation of any model, design, photographic negative, document, or other article containing a plan, or technical information of any kind which can be used in connection with any process or operation of any articles or materials whose exportation is now restricted in accordance with the act of July 2, 1940, under the licensing system.	254
Mar. 4	*Executive Order No. 8702* Regulations governing the exportation of articles and materials designated in proclamation No. 2463.	255
Mar. 4	*Executive Order No. 8703* Regulations governing the exportation of articles and materials designated in proclamation No. 2464.	257
Mar. 27	*Proclamation No. 2468* Putting the exportation of 51 additional items, including certain oils, chemicals, and drugs, under the licensing system.	258
Apr. 14	*Proclamation No. 2475* Putting the exportation of all machinery under the licensing system.	260
Apr. 14	*Proclamation No. 2476* Putting the exportation of vegetable fibers and manufactures, theobromine, caffein, sodium cyanide, calcium cyanide, and casein under the licensing system.	261
May 28	*Press Release Issued by the Department of State* Announcement that the President has signed a joint resolution of Congress authorizing the extension to the Philippines of export control of strategic and critical articles and materials.	261
May 28	*Proclamation No. 2488* Establishing export control in the Philippine Islands, the Canal Zone, and the District of Columbia.	262

Economic Measures by the United States Affecting Trade With Japan—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1941 July 18	*Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State* Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador regarding the holding-up at Cristobal of three Japanese ships wishing to transit the Panama Canal, in which the Acting Secretary stated that he would investigate but that he understood repairs were being made and merchant shipping through the Canal would be prohibited or severely restricted for an indefinite period.	263
July 25	*Excerpt From Radio Bulletin No. 176, Issued by the White House* President's remarks to the Volunteer Participation Committee, July 24, 1941, stating that U. S. policy of permitting oil shipments to Japan had succeeded in keeping war out of the South Pacific.	264
July 25	*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs* Conversation with the Japanese Minister who requested assurances that the U. S. Government would not detain or seize the Japanese vessels which were reported to be standing out at sea and not coming into port, and the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs stated he was not in a position to give assurances.	265
July 25	*Press Release Issued at Poughkeepsie, New York, by the White House* Announcement of the issuance of Executive Order No. 8832, freezing Japanese and Chinese assets in the United States.	266
July 26	*Executive Order No. 8832* Amending Executive Order No. 8389 of April 10, 1940, to include China and Japan.	267
July 29 (440)	*To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)* Information that on July 28 the Japanese Ambassador inquired concerning the effect of the freezing order on Japanese vessels in American waters, and was advised that for the time being the Treasury would grant prompt clearances and would grant licenses for the necessary food supplies and fuel.	267
July 29	*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs* Conversation with the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy who inquired whether the *Tatuta Maru* might be permitted to clear without discharge of cargo, or, if this should not be possible, what would happen to the cargo and whether it would be "frozen."	268
July 30	*Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State* Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador concerning cargoes of Japanese ships waiting to enter American ports, in which the Ambassador was informed that specific and individual licenses for cargoes would have to be applied for to the Treasury Department, which would decide each case in accordance with the policy of the Government and upon the merits of the individual application.	268
July 30	*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs* Record of two telephone conversations with the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy in which the Counselor was informed that the Treasury Department would permit Japanese ships entering American ports before August 2 to leave without discharging cargo and that if a ship did not wish to discharge cargo the manifest should be corrected at sea to show that no cargo was destined for discharge at an American port.	269

ECONOMIC MEASURES BY THE UNITED STATES AFFECTING TRADE WITH JAPAN—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1941 July 31	*Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State* Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador in which the Acting Secretary stated that libel actions against the Japanese steamer at San Francisco were brought by private individuals, that the Department's statements regarding willingness to grant prompt clearance were in no way modified, and that the appropriate officials would be glad to be helpful to the Japanese Embassy or Consulate General in San Francisco.	270
Aug. 1	*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State* Conversation with the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy in which the Assistant Secretary assured him that the matter of ballast for the *Tatuta Maru* would be taken care of within the limits of export restrictions, and informed him that, while the Government had no intention of interfering with Japanese ships, no assurance could be given regarding cargoes on account of action of private parties in filing libel suits.	271
Oct. 28 (694)	*To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)* Information that on October 15 the Japanese Embassy requested immunity from the jurisdiction of U. S. courts for three vessels, including the *Tatuta Maru*, on the ground of their official status as a consequence of having been requisitioned by the Ministry of Communications; that the Attorney General has been informed that the statements in the Japanese note were accepted by the Department as true and the Japanese Government's claim of immunity was allowed; and also that the Attorney General has been requested to bring the matter to the attention of the appropriate courts.	272
Dec. 5	*To the Japanese Ambassador* Notification that the Ambassador's statements have been accepted as true and the claim of immunity has been recognized and allowed, and that steps have been taken to bring the matter to the attention of the appropriate courts.	273

EXTENSION OF JAPANESE PENETRATION INTO SOUTHERN ASIA AND SOUTH PACIFIC TERRITORIES

1939 Mar. 31	*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs* Conversation with the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy in which the Counselor informally presented a memorandum (text printed *infra*) and accompanying map announcing his Government's incorporation as of March 30, 1939, of the Sinnan Islands in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Government General of Formosa; and advised that the Foreign Office announcement of annexation March 31, 1939, of the Spratly Islands referred to a second group.	277
Undated [Rec'd Mar. 31]	*From the Japanese Embassy* Announcement of the incorporation of the Sinnan Islands into the territory under the jurisdiction of the Government General of Formosa as of March 30, 1939.	278
May 17	*To the Japanese Ambassador* Statement that the United States does not consider that all the islands within the area delimited in the Japanese memorandum can properly be treated as one group nor that the Japanese action has any international validity.	280

Extension of Japanese Penetration Into Southern Asia and South Pacific Territories—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1940 Apr. 15	*Press Release Issued by the Japanese Embassy* Statement by the Foreign Minister that because of the economic interdependence of East Asia, his Government cannot but be deeply concerned over any European war development that may affect the *status quo* of the Netherlands East Indies.	281
Apr. 17	*Press Release Issued by the Department of State* Statement by the Secretary of State that any change in the *status quo* of the Netherlands East Indies would directly affect the interests of many countries; information that doctrine of maintenance of *status quo* was embodied in notes exchanged between the United States and Japan in 1908 and reaffirmed in 1921 by the British Empire, France, Japan, and the United States.	281
Apr. 20	*Memorandum by the Secretary of State* Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador regarding the Japanese quota under the Philippine immigration laws; Ambassador's opinion that U. S. press misinterpreted Foreign Minister's views on the *status quo* of the Netherlands East Indies; Secretary of State's observations as to the differences between U. S. interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine and apparent application of Japan's so-called Monroe Doctrine.	283
May 11	*Press Release Issued by the Department of State* Statement by the Secretary of State that during recent weeks a number of governments, including Great Britain, Japan, and the United States, have made clear in official public utterances their attitude of continued respect for the *status quo* of the Netherlands East Indies.	285
May 16	*Memorandum by the Secretary of State* Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador during which the Ambassador inquired at great length concerning policy with respect to the Netherlands West Indies; and the Secretary of State expressed concern over continued Japanese press discussion of "special interests" in the Netherlands East Indies. Opinion that the Ambassador's visit was to develop a pretext to support Japanese plans and purposes in the Netherlands East Indies.	285
June 29 (516)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* (tel.) Press release issued by the Foreign Office June 28, 1940 (text printed) announcing an agreement regarding exportation of commodities from the Netherlands East Indies and negotiations to assure exports of the desired quantities.	289
Aug. 6 (293)	*To the Ambassador in Japan* (tel.) Instructions to express to the Foreign Minister the U. S. Government's concern regarding reported Japanese secret demands on France with respect to French Indochina.	289
Aug. 7	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Representations to the Foreign Minister regarding reported secret demands with respect to Indochina; the Foreign Minister's statement that the Japanese demands had already been accepted in principle by the French Government.	290

EXTENSION OF JAPANESE PENETRATION INTO SOUTHERN ASIA AND SOUTH PACIFIC TERRITORIES—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1940 Sept. 3 (334)	*To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)* Instructions to discuss with the Foreign Minister a reported Japanese ultimatum to French authorities in Indochina in connection with military operations against China. (Repeat to Shanghai, to be repeated to Peiping and Chungking.)	291
Sept. 4 (789)	*From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)* Denial by Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs of knowledge of ultimatum; admission, however, that Japanese armed forces do intend to seek passage through French Indochina.	292
Sept. 14	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Oral statement by the Foreign Office (translation printed) regarding reported Japanese demands on French Indochina, advising that satisfactory local negotiations are continuing progressively.	293
Sept. 19 (357)	*To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)* Report that the Japanese commanding general has presented demands to the Governor General of Indochina for the occupation of Hanoi, Haiphong, and five airports by armed forces of Japan and has threatened invasion on September 22 unless demands are accepted. Instructions to make representations to the Foreign Minister, expressing the U. S. Government's great surprise and requesting assurances that the reports are unwarranted and represent the intentions neither of the Japanese military authorities at Hanoi nor of the Japanese Government. (Instructions to inform British and French colleagues and to repeat to Hanoi.)	294
Sept. 20	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Conversation with the Foreign Minister regarding the ultimatum presented to the Governor General of Indochina and U. S. Government's attitude thereon; reply to oral statement of the Vice Minister of September 14, 1940 (text printed), pointing out inconsistency between Japanese Government's announced desire to maintain the *status quo* and stipulations made in Indochina.	295
Sept. 23	*Press Release Issued by the Department of State* Opinion of the Secretary of State (excerpt printed) that the *status quo* in Indochina is being upset under duress; U. S. disapproval of French concessions to Japan.	297
Nov. 14	*Press Release Issued by the Department of State* Details of an agreement for the export of petroleum products, initialed in Batavia on November 12, 1940, by Japanese oil importers and representatives of local oil companies.	297
Nov. 20 (5157)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* Oral statement left at the Foreign Office November 15, 1940 (text printed) stating that certain American-owned merchandise was being refused re-export permits from Indochina by Indochinese authorities as a result of Japanese pressure, and requesting that appropriate steps be taken to end this unwarranted interference.	298
Dec. 17	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Further representations in the matter of shipment of American-owned goods from Indochina, and presentation of a signed note (text printed *infra*).	299

EXTENSION OF JAPANESE PENETRATION INTO SOUTHERN ASIA AND SOUTH PACIFIC TERRITORIES—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1940 Dec. 17 (1714)	*From the American Ambassador in Japan to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs* Observation that there has been no alleviation of the situation with respect to shipment of American-owned goods from Indochina; protest at such continued and unwarranted interference.	299
Dec. 30	*From the First Secretary of the American Embassy in Japan to the Acting Director of the American Bureau of the Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs* Oral statement by the Ambassador to the Foreign Minister (text printed), expressing the opinion that it would not be consistent with humanitarian considerations to interfere with the movement of Red Cross supplies at present in Indochina.	300
Dec. 31 (5256)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* Transmittal of copy of treaty between Japan and Thailand signed June 12, 1940, and ratified by the Emperor on December 27, 1940.	301
1941 Jan. 7	*From the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador in Japan* Statement that Japanese authorities interfere in no way whatsoever with granting of permits by Indochinese Government for export of articles the ownership of which is determined to be American; but that American firms who intend to export merchandise will be required to produce evidence of ownership.	301
Jan. 24 (1732)	*From the American Ambassador in Japan to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs* Advice that the U. S. Government is not aware of any right of Japanese forces in French Indochina to engage in confiscation or to require or request that American firms produce evidence of ownership of merchandise for export.	302
Feb. 8	*From the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador in Japan* Advice that Japanese authorities seize or confiscate only merchandise whose ownership rests clearly with the Chiang Government and that if evidence of ownership is not produced, the matter is determined by Japanese authorities after independent examination.	303
Feb. 10 (5363)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* Report on recent pronouncements of Japanese officials setting forth Japan's present policy regarding the Netherlands East Indies, and its divergence from Netherlands policy. Statement by the Foreign Minister on January 29, 1941 (text printed) in reply to a parliamentary interpellation.	303
Feb. 13 (1744)	*From the American Ambassador in Japan to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs* Further representations regarding the actions of Japanese officials in Indochina and request for cessation of their interference with the granting of re-export permits.	308
Feb. 27 (317)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* (tel.) Conversation with the Foreign Minister regarding reported British defensive measures in Singapore and Malaya and the facts and actions relating to Japan's southward advance.	308

EXTENSION OF JAPANESE PENETRATION INTO SOUTHERN ASIA AND SOUTH PACIFIC TERRITORIES—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1941 Mar. 2 (346)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* (tel.) Foreign Minister's draft of his remarks in the Diet regarding Asiatic expansion in Oceania.	309
Apr. 8 (220)	*To the Ambassador in Japan* (tel.) Information that during the Foreign Minister's visit at Berlin, the German Government assented to his request for war-planes on condition that Germany receive raw materials from the Dutch East Indies as compensation.	311
Apr. 15 (562)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* (tel.) Denial by Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs and by deputy spokesman for the Cabinet Information Board of any Japanese intention to send a naval or military force against or to Singapore.	311
June 3 (1812)	*From the American Ambassador in Japan to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs* Protest against actions of Japanese military authorities at Haiphong in removing American-owned cargo in Indochina for shipment elsewhere; request that cargo be released without delay to the companies holding title to it.	312
June 24 (1829)	*From the American Embassy in Japan to the Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs* Request reiterated that Japanese authorities return seized American cargoes named on lists supplied to the Japanese Military Mission at Haiphong.	313
June 24	*From the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador in Japan* Reasons why seized merchandise accumulated at Haiphong is being transported elsewhere; assurance that goods will be saved concerning which evidence is produced that they belong to third powers or third power nationals.	313
July 8	*Oral Statement by the American Ambassador in Japan to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs* Representations regarding Japanese seizure of American cargo at Hanoi as well as at Haiphong.	315
July 24	*Press Release Issued by the Department of State* Statement by the Acting Secretary of State that the Japanese Government is giving clear indications of its determination to expand by force or threat of force, thereby endangering the peaceful use by peaceful nations of the Pacific.	315
July 25	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Conversation in which the new Foreign Minister presented a statement regarding the agreement reached with the Vichy Government and in which the Ambassador spoke of the fallacy of the Japanese charge of "encirclement".	317
July 25	*From the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador in Japan* Advance announcement of an agreement reached July 2, 1941, between the Japanese and Vichy Governments concerning the joint protection of French Indochina.	318
July 25	*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs* Conversation with the Japanese Minister who left a statement from his Government in regard to the Indochina situation (text printed *infra*).	319

EXTENSION OF JAPANESE PENETRATION INTO SOUTHERN ASIA AND SOUTH PACIFIC TERRITORIES—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1941 July 25	*Statement by the Japanese Government* Official announcement of Franco-Japanese agreement for the joint defense of French Indochina; assurances of Japanese respect for Indochinese sovereignty and territorial integrity.	320
Aug. 2	*Press Release Issued by the Department of State* Statement by the Acting Secretary of State asserting the U. S. Government's inability to accept the explanation that necessities of "common defense" justified the agreement between the French and Japanese Governments regarding French Indochina.	320
Sept. 30 (1542)	*From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)* Information regarding the attitude and behavior of Japanese armed forces in French Indochina and the reported endeavor of Japanese military authorities there to prejudice the success of conversations between the U. S. and Japanese Governments.	322

INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, 1941

SUMMARY OF CONVERSATIONS

1942 May 19	*Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State* An account of informal conversations between the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan during 1941.	325

RECORD OF CONVERSATIONS

1941 Feb. 14	*Memorandum by the Secretary of State* Conversation between the President and the new Japanese Ambassador, during which the President expressed U. S. concern about the Japanese situation and suggested that the Ambassador and the Secretary of State and Department officials re-examine important phases of Japanese-American relations to see if they could not be improved.	387
Mar. 8	*Memorandum by the Secretary of State* Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador during which the Secretary of State pointed out that U. S. efforts to bring about organization of the world along liberal commercial lines had been impeded by movements of military conquest; and the Ambassador expressed his approval of the effort to liberalize international commercial relations, affirmed Japan's desire to reach a peaceful settlement with the Chinese and establish friendly relations with the United States, and denied that Japan was committed to a course of conquest.	389
Mar. 14	*Memorandum by the Secretary of State* Conversation between the President, the Secretary of State, and the Japanese Ambassador in which the President emphasized the dangerous effects of the Tripartite Agreement, the Secretary observed that the initiative and responsibility for serious discussion rests with Japan; and the Ambassador expressed the belief that his country would not go south with force.	396

INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, 1941—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1941 Apr. 9	*Proposal Presented to the Department of State Through the Medium of Private American and Japanese Individuals* Draft of a proposal for a general settlement in the Pacific area.	398
Apr. 14	*Memorandum by the Secretary of State* Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador during which the Ambassador stated that he had known about and had collaborated in the preparation of the proposals which certain Japanese individuals had been formulating, and expressed his belief that his Government did not intend to invade the southwest Pacific area; and the Secretary of State suggested that they proceed with certain preliminary discussions to ascertain whether there was any basis for negotiations.	402
Apr. 16	*Memorandum by the Secretary of State* Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador during which the Secretary remarked that the one paramount preliminary question was a definite assurance, in advance, of the Japanese Government's willingness and ability to go forward along the lines of the proposals of April 9, 1941, formulated by Japanese and American individuals, to abandon the doctrine of conquest by force, and to adopt four broad principles enumerated; and the Ambassador replied that his Government desired peace, that he wished to discuss the questions raised by the Secretary, and that he would consult his Government in regard to the four points.	406
May 2	*Memorandum by the Secretary of State* Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador who implied that Japanese politics had delayed the reply to his application for instructions to negotiate along lines of the document of April 9, 1941.	411
May 7	*Memorandum by the Secretary of State* Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador during which the Secretary stated that he could not give assurances of further patience in the event of further Japanese delays; also that it seemed incomprehensible that the Foreign Minister could represent his Government in giving utterances to such opposing and threatening expressions while at the same time his Government was supporting the Ambassador here and the principles contained in his document.	411
May 11	*Memorandum by the Secretary of State* Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador who presented certain documents, which the Secretary received in a purely unofficial way with a view to ascertaining whether they might afford a basis for a step in negotiations. (Footnote: Information that the documents were returned, upon request, to the Japanese Ambassador on May 12, 1941, before complete copies had been made.	415
May 12	*Memorandum by the Secretary of State* Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador who presented official documents (texts printed *infra*) in place of the May 11, 1941, documents; their unofficial and informal acceptance by the Secretary.	418

INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, 1941—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1941 May 12	*Draft Proposal Handed by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State* Confidential memorandum to be agreed upon between the U. S. and Japanese Governments and an annexed oral explanation for proposed amendments to the original draft proposal.	420
May 14	*Memorandum by the Secretary of State* Conversation with the Ambassador who presented a proposed amendment to the original draft proposal.	425
May 16	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador and his associates, Colonel Iwakuro, Japanese Assistant Military Attaché, and Mr. Okumura, Second Secretary of the Japanese Embassy, during which the Secretary handed the Ambassador an informal and unofficial oral statement (text printed *infra*).	427
May 16	*Informal and Unofficial Oral Statement Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador* Preliminary comments upon the Japanese draft proposal. Also four annexes (texts printed) consisting of extracts from an address by the Secretary of State, April 24, 1941, and draft suggestions concerning attitudes toward the European war, the China affair, and economic activity in the Southwestern Pacific area.	428
May 20	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between the Secretary of State, the Japanese Ambassador, Colonel Iwakuro, Mr. Wikawa, an officer of the the Cooperative Bank of Japan, and Mr. Hamilton, Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, during which the Secretary inquired whether it might not be possible to cover under some broader provision the questions of joint defense against communism and the stationing of Japanese troops in China; Japanese reply that settlement of China affair was incidental and concerned only China and Japan; the Secretary's statement that the settlement of the China affair was an essential element in the affair.	434
May 21	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between the Secretary of State, the Japanese Ambassador, Colonel Iwakuro, Mr. Wikawa, and Mr. Hamilton regarding the proposed withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, redraft of section VI of the proposal in regard to peace in the Pacific area, and reference to Wang Ching-wei treaties in section III.	437
May 23	*Statement Handed by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State* Errata for the confidential memorandum of May 12, 1941.	439
May 28	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador concerning questions involving relations of Japan and the United States toward the European War and the question of the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China.	440

INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, 1941—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1941 May 30	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Ballantine, of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Colonel Iwakuro, and Mr. Wikawa concerning Japan's contemplated arrangement for stationing troops in China as a defense against communism; U. S. inability to divest itself of a certain degree of responsibility inasmuch as the Japanese proposal called for U. S. presentation to China of Japan's terms for peaceful settlement.	444
May 31	*American Draft Proposal Handed to the Japanese Ambassador* Suggested amendments to the Japanese draft, submitted as unofficial, exploratory, and without commitment; three annexes (texts printed).	446
May 31	*American Statement Handed to the Japanese Ambassador* Oral explanation for suggested amendments to the Japanese draft proposal.	451
May 31	*American Informal and Unofficial Oral Statement Handed to the Japanese Ambassador* Advice that the U. S. Government will at some appropriate stage, prior to any definitive discussion, talk over with the Chinese Government the general subject matter involved in the discussions.	454
June 2	*Memorandum by the Secretary of State* Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador who expressed agreement with the American draft proposal, dated May 31, 1941; the Secretary's inquiry whether Japan seriously and earnestly desired to enter into a settlement for peace and nondiscriminatory relations in the Pacific area; the Ambassador's affirmation.	454
June 4	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Ballantine, Mr. Wakasugi, the Japanese Minister-Counselor, Colonel Iwakuro, and Mr. Matsudaira, Second Secretary of the Japanese Embassy, regarding Japanese revisions to draft proposal of May 31, 1941; Japanese unwillingness to be bound by U. S. interpretation of self-defense, or to pledge non-discrimination in international commercial relations, or to accept U. S. mediation of China affair.	455
June 6	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between the Secretary of State, the Japanese Ambassador, Colonel Iwakuro, and Mr. Wikawa during which the Secretary handed the Ambassador an oral statement (text printed *infra*) on U. S. reaction to Japanese revisions; Secretary's opinion that the President should have an agreement in clear-cut and unequivocal terms before approaching the Chinese Government.	465

INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, 1941—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1941 June 6	*Informal and Unofficial Oral Statement Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador* Disappointment that successive Japanese revisions have narrowed the proposal down and carried it away from fundamental points U. S. Government considers are involved in establishing and preserving peace in the Pacific; suggestion that the Ambassador review the suggestions proposed by his associates. Impression of the Secretary that the Japanese Government was disposed: (1) To stress Japan's alignment with the Axis; (2) to avoid giving a clear indication of an intention to place Sino-Japanese relations on a basis contributing to a lasting peace, and (3) to veer away from clear-cut commitments in regard to policies of non-discriminatory treatment.	467
June 9	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between Mr. Ballantine, Colonel Iwakuro, and Mr. Wikawa during which Colonel Iwakuro inquired about the Department's attitude, and commented on U. S. right of self-defense, and his Government's desire that the President on his own initiative propose to China that China make peace with Japan.	468
June 15	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador and his associates in which the Secretary declined the Ambassador's request for an understanding as to what points in the Japanese proposal the United States was agreed on; the Ambassador's opinion that if the United States withdrew its help, Chiang Kai-shek would be obliged to accept Japanese terms.	471
June 15	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Ballantine, Colonel Iwakuro, Mr. Wikawa, and Mr. Matsudaira regarding the application to Japanese practices in China of the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations; informal presentation of redraft of Japanese draft of June 8 (text printed *infra*).	472
June 15	*Draft Document Received Informally From Associates of the Japanese Ambassador* Redraft of Japanese draft proposal of June 8, 1941, together with an annex (text printed).	473
June 16	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Ballantine, Colonel Iwakuro, Mr. Wikawa, and Mr. Matsudaira continuing the discussion concerning non-discrimination in commercial relations, and exploring further the question of retention of Japanese troops in China in resistance against communistic activities and a formula covering relations of United States and Japan with the European war.	476

INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, 1941—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1941 June 17	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Ballantine, Mr. Schmidt, of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Colonel Iwakuro, and Mr. Wikawa, at the close of which Mr. Hamilton pointed out as questions outstanding the economic discrimination in China, stationing of troops in China, and the two Governments' attitudes toward the European war; and added that Colonel Iwakuro's request for a statement that the United States has no ambitions for new political or military bases in East Asia presented an additional serious problem.	478
June 21	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador during which the Secretary handed the Ambassador an oral statement and a redraft of the proposed understanding with four annexes appended (texts printed *infra*).	483
June 21	*Oral Statement Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador* Advice that the Secretary of State has reluctantly come to the conclusion that the United States must await some clearer indication than has yet been given that the Japanese Government as a whole desires to pursue courses of peace such as constitute the objectives of the proposed understanding. (Footnote: Acceptance by Mr. Hamilton of return of this document from the Japanese Minister on July 17, 1941.)	485
June 21	*Draft Proposal Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador* Complete revision of the proposed understanding, submitted as unofficial, exploratory, and without commitment; together with four annexes (texts printed).	486
June 22	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador regarding Japanese objections to certain provisions in U. S. draft proposal of June 21, 1941; Ambassador's presentation of oral statement (text printed *infra*).	492
June 22	*Informal and Unofficial Oral Statement Handed by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State* Suggestions that exchanges of letters attached to draft proposal presented by the Secretary of State, June 21, 1941, either be omitted or be suitably modified.	494
July 2	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between Mr. Ballantine, Mr. Schmidt, Colonel Iwakuro, Mr. Wikawa, and Mr. Matsudaira, with Mr. Hamilton arriving late; Japanese insistence upon reaching an understanding first and settling detailed questions later; U. S. insistence upon some practical evidence of Japan's peaceful intentions.	495

INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, 1941—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1941 July 4	*From the Japanese Ambassador* Foreign Minister's assurances that there is no divergence of views in the Japanese Government regarding its fundamental policy of adjusting Japanese-American relations on a fair basis.	499
July 5	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Ballantine, and the Japanese Ambassador in which Mr. Hamilton explained that U. S. oral statement of June 21, 1941, adverted only to evidence that certain elements in the Japanese Government favored courses of support of Hitler and not courses of peace, suggested that Japan make more appropriate response to meet fundamental points of the Secretary's oral statement, and expressed U. S. desire for prompt denial or frank confirmation of reported Japanese plans toward Siberia, Indochina, and Thailand.	499
July 6	*Statement Handed by the American Ambassador in Japan to Mr. Tomohiko Ushiba, Private Secretary of the Japanese Prime Minister* Message sent by the Secretary of State at the specific request of the President for delivery to the Prime Minister, expressing desire for assurances that reports of Japanese intention to enter upon hostilities against the Soviet Union are not based upon fact.	502
July 8	*Statement Handed by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador in Japan* Message sent at the request of the Prime Minister for delivery to the President, dated July 7, 1941, advising that the Japanese Government have not so far considered the possibility of joining hostilities against the Soviet Union; inquiring whether it is really the intention of the President or the U. S. Government to intervene in the European war; and enclosing an oral statement handed by the Foreign Minister to the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo on July 2, 1941 (text printed) advising that the Japanese Government does not at present feel compelled to modify their policy toward the U. S. S. R.	503
July 8	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Statement read to the Foreign Minister at the direction of the Secretary of State (text printed), advising that any American aid to Russia will have as its sole aim the defense of American security and will in no manner threaten the security of nations which have not joined the conflict on Hitler's side.	505
July 14	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Ballantine, and the Japanese Ambassador in which the latter stated there was no divergence in views among important Government leaders in regard to desire to improve relations with the United States; U. S. question whether Japanese Government was willing to assert control over certain elements to ensure future pursuit of a policy of peace.	505

INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, 1941—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1941 July 15	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Ballantine, and the Japanese Ambassador who in reply to Mr. Hamilton's inquiries stated: (1) That the oral statement of June 21, 1941, had been misunderstood by his Government as indicative of an attempt on the part of the U. S. Government to cause a change in the Japanese Cabinet and of U. S. interference in the internal affairs of Japan; (2) that, with respect to rumors that Japan is planning to acquire naval and air bases in French Indochina, he was without information from his Government as to its intentions; and (3) that he believed Japan retained freedom of action under the Tripartite Pact and was under no commitment to take up arms against the United States in the event of U. S. involvement in the European war, except as provided in article 3 of the pact.	506
July 16	*Oral Statement Handed by the American Ambassador in Japan to the Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs* Advice that U. S. attitude toward the European war is based on the inalienable right of self-defense, in pursuance of which the United States will take such measures as may be deemed necessary to resist the Nazi movement toward world conquest and that any suggestions or intimations that the United States should desist from its policy of self-defense would range those making the suggestions or intimations on the side of the aggressors.	509
July 16	*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs* Conversation with the Japanese Minister whom the Ambassador had asked to call to return the oral statement of June 21, 1941, inasmuch as his Government had misunderstood it and a governmental crisis had occurred; its non-acceptance by Mr. Hamilton without instructions; presentation to the Minister of a marked copy of the Secretary of State's statement of July 16, 1937, on U. S. non-interference in internal affairs of other nations.	511
July 17	*Oral Statement Handed by the Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador in Japan* Acknowledgement of oral statement of July 16, 1941; inability to let pass unnoticed any U. S. suggestion or intimation to invoke unlimitedly the so-called right of self-defense; non-concurrence in indictment of Germany; and refusal to accede to U. S. claim with respect to those who intimate or suggest that the United States desist from its policy of self-defense.	513
July 17	*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs* Conversation with the Japanese Minister who returned the original copy of the oral statement of June 21, 1941, after having received an oral statement of the U. S. position (text printed *infra*).	513
July 17	*Statement by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs to the Japanese Minister* Acceptance of the oral statement of June 21, 1941; reiteration of U. S. interest in the broad general question of attitude of Japanese Government as a whole, as manifested in utterances and acts.	514

INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, 1941—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1941 July 18	*Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State* Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador who said the Russo-German war had isolated Japan and admitted it was the second time that Germany had omitted to notify Japan of her intentions; his hope for improvement of U. S.-Japanese relations in view of installation of the new Government in Tokyo.	515
July 21	*The Director of the War Plans Division of the Navy Department to the Chief of Naval Operations* Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador who discussed in detail the points which Japan considered essential for an agreement between the United States and Japan and conveyed the information that Japan expects to occupy French Indochina within the next few days. The Director's opinion that the Ambassador was apprehensive that the United States would take further action, economic or military, against Japan as soon as Japanese troops occupied French Indochina.	516
July 21	*Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State* Conversation with the Japanese Minister during which the Acting Secretary of State stated that should Japan embark upon a policy of the kind demonstrated by the occupation of Indochina, the United States would be forced to reconsider its own position; the Minister's denial that his Embassy had any knowledge of intention on the part of the Government to occupy Indochina, while inquiring point-blank whether occupation of Indochina would interfere with successful conclusion of the informal conversations.	520
July 23	*Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State* Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador in which the Ambassador announced the conclusion of the agreement with the Vichy Government for the occupation of Indochina and set forth Japan's reasons for the occupation; and the Acting Secretary of State stated that the agreement could only have resulted from German pressure on Vichy, that the occupation constituted notice of Japanese intent to pursue a policy of force and conquest and expansion into the South Seas, and that the Secretary of State, therefore, could not see any basis for the pursuit of the conversations in which he and the Ambassador had been engaged.	522
July 24	*Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State* Conversation between the President and the Japanese Ambassador at which the Acting Secretary of State and Admiral Stark were present; the President's proposal that if Japan would refrain from occupying Indochina, or withdraw if such steps had already been taken, he would seek to obtain from the British, Chinese, and Netherlands Governments, and of course the United States, a binding declaration to neutralize Indochina, provided Japan would give similar commitment.	527

INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, 1941—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1941 July 25	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between Mr. Ballantine, Colonel Iwakuro, and Mr. Wikawa during which Colonel Iwakuro attributed Japanese action in Indochina to the delay in reaching an understanding with the United States, and, in suggesting resumption of conversations, stated that such resumption would not influence Japan to revoke its action in Indochina but would be effective in stopping Japan from moving further south, provided that the United States did not take measures such as embargoes or freezing of assets against Japan.	530
July 26	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Conversation with the Foreign Minister concerning the situation which had come about as a result of the establishment by Japan of bases in Indochina and the action of U. S. Government in freezing Japanese assets in the United States; the Foreign Minister's concern at the rupture of the Washington conversations and his concern whether the U. S. Government would adopt further retaliatory measures.	532
July 27	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Conversation with the Foreign Minister in which the Ambassador, on his own initiative, conveyed orally the gist of the President's proposal of July 24, 1941, to the Japanese Ambassador at Washington for the neutralization of French Indochina, and strongly urged the Foreign Minister to take advantage of the proposal; Foreign Minister's advice that no report on the President's proposal had been received from the Japanese Embassy at Washington.	534
July 28	*Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State* Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador during which the Ambassador inquired concerning U. S. policy with regard to the freezing order in connection with Japanese ships in American territorial waters; and suggested that the objective of the United States and Japan should now be some compromise proposal, which the Acting Secretary rejected.	537
July 31	*Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State* Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador who was informed that, in view of the reports that Japan was making demands upon Thailand, the President desired Japan to know that the previous proposal with respect to Indochina be regarded as embracing Thailand as well.	539
Aug. 4	*Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State* Conversation with the Japanese Minister who called prior to his departure from the United States to request an analysis of the present state of U. S.-Japanese relations, to which request the Acting Secretary responded.	540
Aug. 6	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador during which the latter read an oral statement and presented a proposal (texts printed *infra*); the Secretary's expressed pessimism over prospect of getting anywhere with such a proposal.	546

INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, 1941—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1941 Aug. 6	*Oral Statement Handed by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State* Transmission of a proposal to serve as a reply to the President's proposal of July 24, 1941, and to provide a fresh basis for Japanese-American understanding.	548
Aug. 6	*Proposal by the Japanese Government Handed by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State* Japanese undertaking with respect to the southwestern Pacific area in return for a number of specific undertakings on the part of the United States.	549
Aug. 8	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador during which the Secretary presented the U. S. reply (text printed *infra*) to the latest Japanese proposal; the Ambassador's suggestion that heads of the two Governments meet in Honolulu; the Secretary's opinion it remained with the Japanese Government to decide whether it could find means of shaping its policies along lines of the U. S. reply and then to endeavor to evolve some satisfactory plan.	550
Aug. 8	*Document Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador* Opinion that Japanese proposals of August 6, 1941, are lacking in responsiveness to the President's proposal.	552
Aug. 16	*Memorandum by the Secretary of State* Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador who suggested a resumption of conversations and a mid-Pacific meeting of high officials.	553
Aug. 17	*Memorandum by the Secretary of State* Conversation between the President and the Japanese Ambassador in which the Ambassador conveyed the Prime Minister's offer to meet the President midway between the countries, and the President handed the Ambassador two documents (texts printed *infra*).	554
Aug. 17	*Oral Statement Handed by President Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassador* Notification that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a program of domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the U. S. Government will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps deemed necessary toward safeguarding its legitimate rights and interests and toward insuring its security.	556
Aug. 17	*Statement Handed by President Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassador* Conditions under which the United States would be willing to resume the informal exploratory discussions interrupted in July, 1941.	557
Aug. 18	*Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan* Interview with Mr. Terasaki, Director of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office, who conveyed a message for the Ambassador (text printed), expressing the hope that the interview between the Ambassador and the Foreign Minister, to be held that afternoon, would initiate a series of conversations which would eventually yield a satisfactory adjustment of U. S.-Japanese relations.	559

INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, 1941—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1941 Aug. 18	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Interview with the Foreign Minister who disclosed in an oral statement the Japanese proposal for a meeting between the President and the Prime Minister at Honolulu, and suggested that U. S. economic pressure against Japan be immediately stopped in order to avoid the impression in Japan and elsewhere that the Japanese Government has entered into negotiations as a result of U. S. pressure.	560
Aug. 18	*From the Ambassador in Japan* Strong recommendation that the Japanese proposal for a meeting between the President and the Prime Minister be given careful consideration. Information that the proposal has the approval of the Emperor and the highest authorities in the land.	565
Aug. 23	*Memorandum by the Secretary of State* Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador who called attention to the problem of the shipment of oil to Vladivostok through Japanese waters; U. S. determination to aid every country resisting Hitler.	565
Aug. 23	*Memorandum by the Secretary of State* Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador who stated that his Government desired the meeting of responsible heads of the two Governments to be held earlier than October 15, 1941, the date on which the President had indicated it might be arranged.	568
Aug. 27	*Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan* Conversation with Mr. Terasaki who delivered an oral message for the Ambassador (substance printed) expressing hope that the Ambassador would find it possible to support the Japanese Ambassador's request that American oil tankers now en route to Soviet Russia be recalled pending a decision on the proposed meeting between the President and the Prime Minister, and to urge holding the meeting as soon as possible.	568
Aug. 27	*Memorandum by the Secretary of State* Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador who protested against two oil tanker shipments to Soviet Russia through Vladivostok; the Secretary's reply that the shipments were entirely legitimate.	569
Aug. 27	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador who left with the Secretary a copy of a statement he desired to present to the President the following day, and stated that he felt it represented the maximum in concession his Government under present circumstances was in position to make.	571
Aug. 28	*Memorandum by the Secretary of State* Conversation between the President and the Japanese Ambassador regarding two communications presented by the Ambassador (texts printed *infra*); the President's interest in meeting the Prime Minister at Juneau, Alaska, rather than in Hawaii.	571

INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, 1941—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1941 Aug. 28	*From the Japanese Prime Minister to President Roosevelt* Urgent suggestion that the two heads of Governments meet first to discuss from a broad standpoint all important problems between Japan and the United States covering the entire Pacific area, leaving the adjustment of minor items to negotiations between competent officials of the two countries, following the meeting.	572
Aug. 28	*Statement by the Japanese Government Handed by the Japanese Ambassador to President Roosevelt* Assurances, with several qualifications, of Japan's peaceful intentions; also assurances that Japan is seeking a program for the Pacific area consistent with principles to which the United States has long been committed.	573
Aug. 28	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador in which the Secretary indicated that prior to the meeting of the President and the Prime Minister there should be an agreement in principle on outstanding questions of importance and that the meeting should therefore have as its purpose the ratification of essential points already agreed to in principle; brief discussion of outstanding questions.	576
Aug. 29 (1342)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* Press release issued by the Information Board (text printed), stating that on August 8, 1941, Ambassador Nomura had delivered a message from the Prime Minister to the President of the United States.	579
Aug. 29	*From the Japanese Ambassador* Japanese Government's feeling that secrecy is essential for the success of the conversations; request for U. S. cooperation in this regard.	579
Aug. 29	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Conversation with Mr. Terasaki who deplored the unfortunate publicity in Washington regarding the Prime Minister's message which revealed to the Japanese public that the Prime Minister had taken the initiative in what was obviously a conciliatory move; and conveyed an appeal from the Foreign Minister that the meeting of the heads of the two Governments take place at once, that the sending of the tankers to the Soviet Union be postponed, and that the order freezing Japanese assets in the United States be suspended.	579
Aug. 30	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Record of his dispatch to the Foreign Minister of an excerpt from the Secretary of State's press conference August 28, 1941 (text printed) when the Secretary parried questions of the correspondents concerning the delivery of the Prime Minister's message to the President which the Japanese Ambassador had revealed as he left the White House.	582
Sept. 1	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between the Secretary of State, the Japanese Ambassador, and Mr. Obata, his interpreter-associate, in which were discussed possible Chinese reaction toward a settlement with Japan, the three outstanding questions between Japan and the United States, publicity concerning the proposed meeting of the heads of the two Governments, and a possible change in the propaganda line of the Japanese press.	583

INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, 1941—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1941 Sept. 2	*To the Japanese Ambassador* Assurance of conformity to Japanese desire for secrecy at this time regarding the conversations.	586
Sept. 3	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Conversation with Mr. Terasaki who conveyed a message to the Secretary of State from the Foreign Minister suggesting that, in view of press reports in American newspapers of the proposed meeting, a joint public announcement be made of the meeting, its approximate date, and the place of meeting as "somewhere in the Pacific"; and statement of Japanese intention should the meeting fail to materialize.	586
Sept. 3	*Memorandum by the Secretary of State* Conversation between the President, the Secretary of State, and the Japanese Ambassador during which the President read an oral statement and a letter to the Japanese Prime Minister (texts printed *infra*).	588
Sept. 3	*Oral Statement Handed by President Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassador* U. S. desire for an indication of the present attitude of the Japanese Government toward the fundamental questions respecting which there were divergences of views and which remained unsettled when conversations were interrupted in July 1941; inability of U. S. Government to enter into any agreement not in harmony with the principles in which its people believe.	589
Sept. 3	*President Roosevelt's Reply to the Japanese Prime Minister, Handed to the Japanese Ambassador* Desire to collaborate with the Prime Minister and proceed as rapidly as possible with arrangements for meeting; inability to avoid taking cognizance of concepts in Japan which, if widely entertained, would seem capable of raising obstacles to successful collaboration; suggestion for immediate preliminary discussions of fundamental questions.	591
Sept. 4	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Telephone conversation with Mr. Terasaki who desired to retract that portion of the Foreign Minister's message to the Secretary of State which dealt with the statement of Japanese intention should the meeting fail to materialize.	592
Sept. 4	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Conversation with the Foreign Minister who presented certain new proposals which also were being transmitted to the Japanese Ambassador at Washington; Foreign Minister's belief that the proposals contain the solution of the divergence of views not solved when conversations in Washington were interrupted. The Ambassador's comments (text printed).	593
Sept. 4	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador during which the Ambassador presented new draft proposals, and was informed, in reply to his inquiry, that the Secretary felt strongly that announcement in regard to negotiations should be deferred until preliminary discussions were completed and other interested Governments had been approached.	595

INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, 1941—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1941 Sept. 4	*Statement Handed by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State* Redraft of Japanese proposals for a mutual understanding and declaration of policy; and annexes and supplements thereto (texts printed). (Footnote: Information that the document was submitted without approval of the Japanese Government and was subsequently withdrawn by the Ambassador.)	597
Sept. 5	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Conversation with the Foreign Minister in which the Ambassador informed the Foreign Minister that he did not feel free at this time to discuss with him the divergence of views which had not been solved when the conversations at Washington were interrupted. The Ambassador's comments (text printed) containing the information that the Foreign Minister preferred to have conversations regarding the proposed meeting carried on at Tokyo rather than at Washington.	600
Sept. 6	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Conversation with Mr. Terasaki during which the Ambassador conveyed the information that the U. S. Government could not accede to the suggestions to suspend sailing of American tankers to Vladivostok and to suspend the freezing order pending the proposed meeting; also discussion of Axis influence in Japan.	603
Sept. 6	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Conversation with the Prime Minister, during which the Prime Minister gave further assurances and promises of satisfactory commitments.	604
Sept. 6	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador who handed the Secretary a draft proposal (text printed *infra*); Ambassador's opinion that it was the maximum by way of concessions that Japan could offer at this time; Secretary's reiteration of desirability of preparing the public to insure public support.	606
Sept. 6	*Draft Proposal Handed by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State* Proposed reciprocal undertakings by the Governments of the United States and Japan.	608
Sept. 8	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Conversation with Mr. Terasaki who expressed the Foreign Minister's concern over the *Greer* incident, which he mentioned as further proof of the necessity of expediting the suggested meeting between the Prime Minister and the President.	609
Sept. 10	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Conversation with the Foreign Minister and Mr. Terasaki in which the Ambassador presented a statement (text printed *infra*), and made clear that the inquiries were of an exploratory and preliminary nature and that further questions might emerge.	610

INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, 1941—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1941 Sept. 10	*Statement Handed by the American Ambassador in Japan to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs* Reaffirmation that U. S. Government has in view an agreement conforming to principles and methods it has put forward; that a fair and just settlement of their differences by China and Japan is an essential condition; that the United States intends to confer with other interested powers before embarking on definitive negotiations. Request for further clarification of Japanese interpretation of proposed commitments.	610
Sept. 10	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between the Secretary of State, the Japanese Ambassador, and Mr. Obata in which the Ambassador expressed the hope that the President's forthcoming speech would not furnish ammunition for pro-Axis elements; the Secretary's opinion that new Japanese proposals narrow down the scope and spirit of the proposed understanding, and his suggestion that Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine meet with the Ambassador and Mr. Obata to clear up doubtful points.	613
Sept. 10	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Ballantine, Mr. Schmidt, the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Obata, and Mr. Matsudaira regarding the intent of the Japanese Government and the meaning of various points in the Japanese proposals of September 6, 1941; redraft of section 5 of the proposed agreement given to Mr. Obata (text printed).	614
Sept. 13	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Conversation with the Foreign Minister, Mr. Terasaki, Mr. Inagaki of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office, and Mr. Dooman in which the Foreign Minister read his instructions to the Ambassador at Washington (text printed *infra*), setting forth replies to Mr. Hamilton's questions of September 10, 1941; Mr. Terasaki read a statement of the Japanese Government's intentions; and the Foreign Minister made oral answers to the Ambassador's questions of September 10, 1941, and emphasized the urgency of a meeting between the heads of the two Governments.	620
Sept. 13	*Proposed Instructions to the Japanese Ambassador Handed by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador in Japan* Replies to questions raised by Mr. Hamilton in conversation of September 10, 1941.	623
Sept. 17	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Conversation with Mr. Shigemitsu, the Japanese Ambassador to England, who asserted that while the Japanese Government was united in support of current endeavors to adjust relations, the time factor was of the greatest importance and that should the Prime Minister fail, no other statesman could bring about the desired solution; confidential advice that initiative in the direction of an understanding with England and the United States had come from the Emperor personally.	624

INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, 1941—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1941 Sept. 18	*Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan* Conversation with Mr. Ushiba who explained that the Japanese Ambassador's confusing document of September 4 was unauthorized and that Japan still desired the good offices of the President, suggested that U. S. Government request Japan's basic peace terms for China, and promised satisfactory assurance regarding Tripartite Pact from the Prime Minister orally and directly to the President. (Footnote: Memorandum by the Counselor on September 18, 1941, noting that Mr. Ushiba telephoned that the Prime Minister would within the next day or two convey to the Ambassador the terms of peace which the Japanese Government is willing to offer China.)	626
Sept. 19	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador in which the Ambassador inquired whether the principal difficulty was not the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China; the Secretary's reply that it was an important one, but there was also the question of getting the proposal back to the broad basis covering the entire Pacific area, and hope that the Ambassador might communicate Japan's basic peace terms.	629
Sept. 22	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Conversation with the Foreign Minister who made an oral statement (substance printed) regarding the proposed meeting and his unanswered statement of September 4, 1941, and presented the basic terms Japan is prepared to offer China (text printed *infra*).	631
Undated	*From the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador in Japan* Text of basic Japanese terms of peace with China. (Footnote: Information that points 1–5 were handed to the Secretary of State by the Japanese Ambassador on September 23, 1941, while points 6–9 were added on October 1, 1941.)	633
Sept. 23	*Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan* Conversation with Mr. Terasaki who made an oral statement supplementary to the Foreign Minister's statements to the American Ambassador the previous day.	634
Sept. 23	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador who made an oral statement, and presented a copy of Japan's basic terms of peace with China and a reply to the American communication of September 10, 1941.	634
Undated [Rec'd Sept. 23]	*Document Handed by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State* Japanese definition of "equitable basis"; assertion, however, that Japan is not the sole judge in determining what constitutes "equitable basis".	636
Sept. 27	*From the Japanese Ambassador* Redraft of Japanese proposals as presented to the American Ambassador in Japan on September 25, 1941 (text printed); also Japanese translation of oral statement made to the American Counselor of Embassy in Japan on September 23, 1941 (text printed).	636

INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, 1941—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1941 Sept. 27	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Conversation with the Foreign Minister who conveyed his Government's anxiety lest the proposed meeting of heads of the two Governments be indefinitely delayed, and presented orally various considerations regarding Japan's position in connection with present informal conversations.	641
Sept. 29 (1529)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* Observations respecting U. S.–Japanese relations; opinion that U. S. objectives will not be reached by insisting during preliminary conversation that Japan provide specific commitments such as appear in any final formal convention or treaty.	645
Sept. 29	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador who presented a document (text printed *infra*), and pressed for an answer to the Japanese proposal.	651
Sept. 29	*Document Handed by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State* Gist of what the Foreign Minister said in his conversation with the American Ambassador at the Foreign Office on September 27, 1941.	652
Oct. 2	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador during which the Secretary presented an oral statement (text printed *infra*), containing views of the U. S. Government with respect to the Japanese proposals; the Ambassador's fear that his Government would be disappointed and his opinion that his Government could go no further at the present time.	654
Oct. 2	*Oral Statement Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador* Review of significant developments in conversations and explanation of U. S. Government's attitude toward various points in the Japanese proposals which appear inconsistent with the principles to which the United States is committed.	656
Oct. 3	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador who advised that his Government was now preparing a statement for public release regarding the Secretary's reply to the Japanese proposals.	661
Oct. 7	*Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan* Conversation with Mr. Ushiba concerning the failure of the preliminary conversations to make any progress.	662
Oct. 7	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Conversation with the Foreign Minister who inquired whether the Ambassador could comment on the U. S. memorandum of October 2, 1941; the Ambassador's personal reaction to the memorandum; the Foreign Minister's comment that it was his impression the United States wished Japan to revert to the *status quo* which prevailed four years ago.	663

Informal Conversations Between the Governments of the United States and Japan, 1941—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1941 Oct. 8	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Conversation with Mr. Terasaki who inquired whether the Ambassador would give his personal, off-the-record impressions of the U. S. memorandum of October 2, 1941; the Ambassador's private and informal observations, and suggestion that U. S. official interpretation be obtained through the Japanese Ambassador at Washington.	666
Oct. 9	*Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan* Conversation with Mr. Terasaki who inquired whether the Counselor would give his off the record impressions of the U. S. memorandum of October 2, 1941; discussion of need for Japan's manifesting evidence of intention to withdraw troops from Indochina and China.	667
Oct. 9	*Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan* Conversation with Mr. Terasaki in which the Counselor called attention to the report that 50,000 additional troops were to be landed in Indochina about October 15, 1941,and conveyed the Ambassador's unofficial opinion that the Japanese Government should expect the current conversations to suffer serious, adverse effects should the proposed landing be carried out.	669
Oct. 9	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between the Secretary of State, the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Ballantine, and Mr. Obata in which the Ambassador, at the express and repeated instruction of his Government, requested an expression of the Secretary's views in regard to the points on which there remained divergence of view; the Secretary's suggestion that Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine meet with the Ambassador to see whether points in the respective documents could be clarified and shades of meaning brought out.	670
Oct. 9	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Ballantine, Mr. Schmidt, the Japanese Ambassador, the Japanese Minister, Mr. Obata, Mr. Matsudaira, and Mr. Okumura in which the Japanese displayed a desire to take up point by point their proposals of September 6, 1941, or the redraft of September 25, 1941, and the Americans limited themselves to a discussion and clarification of the points in the U. S. memorandum of October 2, 1941.	672
Oct. 10	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Conversation with the Foreign Minister who requested that the U. S. Government set forth in precise terms the obligations which the United States wishes the Japanese Government to undertake; intimation that Japan contemplates sending to the United States a diplomat of wide experience to assist the Ambassador, and inquiry concerning airplane reservations from Manila to San Francisco.	677
Oct. 13	*Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State* Conversation with the Japanese Minister who gave an account of his impressions during the two weeks he spent in Japan, and with whom the Under Secretary explored at length the status of U. S.-Japanese relations.	680

INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, 1941—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1941 Oct. 15	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Conversation with the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs on the status of the exploratory conversations at Washington; intimation of Germany's pressure upon Japan to issue a statement to the effect that Japan will declare war upon the United States in the event of war between the United States and Germany.	686
Oct. 16 & 17	*Memorandum by the Secretary of State* Conversation with the Under Secretary of State, and the Japanese Minister which consisted mainly of a rehash of previous conversations, with elaborations with respect to certain phases of the two documents which had been exchanged between the Secretary and the Ambassador.	687
Oct. 17	*Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan* Conversation with Mr. Ushiba who stated that the U. S. memorandum of October 2, 1941, had been a great disappointment to the Cabinet; that the Prime Minister was resigning and the succeeding Cabinet would be headed by an Army officer, since no civilian statesman would undertake the task. Personal letter from the retiring Prime Minister to the Ambassador and the Ambassador's reply (texts printed).	689
Oct. 24	*Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State* Conversation with the Japanese Minister who stated that his Government desired to pursue the policy of the preceding Government and to continue the conversations without delay, and inquired whether the U. S. Government had any counterproposals to make and whether the Under Secretary would be willing to meet with him and a Chinese official; the Under Secretary's belief that the U. S. position needed no clarification.	692
Oct. 25	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Information received from a reliable Japanese informant to the effect that the Emperor's definite stand against war with the United States had necessitated the selection of a Prime Minister who could control the Army, hence the resignation of Prince Konoye and the appointment of General Tojo who is committed to the policy of attempting to conclude successfully the current U. S.-Japanese conversations.	697
Oct. 25	*Memorandum of Comment by the Ambassador in Japan* Opinion that Japanese leaders are willing to give up their expansionist plans if a workable understanding can be reached with the United States; anticipation of some more positive Japanese attempt to render the conversations more concrete.	698
Oct. 30	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Conversation with Mr. Togo, the new Japanese Foreign Minister, and Mr. Kase, the new Chief of the First Section of the American Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which the Foreign Minister expressed his desire that the U. S.-Japanese conversations be brought to a successful conclusion without delay.	699

INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, 1941—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1941 Nov. 3	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Information received from the reliable Japanese informant who reported that the Government, supported by the Army and Navy, had reached a definite decision as to how far it was prepared to go for an adjustment of relations with the United States; that not later than November 7, 1941, the Foreign Minister probably would ask the Ambassador to call since the question of relations with the United States would have to be clarified before the Diet met November 15, 1941.	700
Nov. 3 (1736)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* Estimate of Japan's position; opinion that a resort by Japan to measures of war with the United States may come inevitably with dangerous and dramatic suddenness.	701
Nov. 4	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Conversation with Mr. Kurusu, former Japanese Ambassador to Germany, who said he was going to Washington simply to help the Japanese Ambassador by bringing a fresh point of view and in order to leave no stone unturned in an endeavor to bring the conversations to a successful conclusion.	704
Nov. 7	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Interview with a leading Japanese who called to convey a message from the Foreign Minister to the effect that the Government had decided the limits to which it will go in meeting U. S. desires, but that, should these concessions be regarded as inadequate, it is of the highest importance that the Washington conversations be continued and not permitted to break down.	705
Nov. 7	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between the Secretary of State, the Japanese Ambassador, and the Japanese Minister in which the Ambassador conveyed his Government's desire to resume the conversations, advised that Mr. Kurusu was coming at his request to assist him, and presented a document (text printed *infra*); the Secretary's suggestion with respect to mutual conciliation between China and Japan.	706
Nov. 7	*Document Handed by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State* Proposals with respect to the stationing of Japanese forces in China and Indochina and the withdrawal thereof, and the principle of non-discrimination.	709
Nov. 10	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Conversation with the Foreign Minister, Mr. Kase, and Mr. Dooman, in which the Foreign Minister inquired whether the time had not come to enter into formal and official negotiations; and handed the Ambassador the text of the new Japanese proposals, which he said were the maximum concessions.	710
Nov. 10	*Memorandum by the Secretary of State* Conversation between the President and the Japanese Ambassador, with the Secretary of State and the Japanese Minister present, during which the Ambassador read a communication explaining the salient points of the new Japanese proposals and made an oral statement urging the conclusion of a satisfactory understanding, to which the President replied (texts printed).	715

INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, 1941—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1941 Nov. 10	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between Mr. Ballantine and the Japanese Minister who said the Ambassador would like to take up with the Secretary immediately his Government's desire to hasten the conversations and the Secretary's suggestion regarding means for development of a new relationship of conciliation and friendship between China and Japan.	719
Nov. 12	*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan* Conversation with Mr. Kase who called at the request of the Foreign Minister to make clear the urgency of successfully concluding the current conversations without delay.	719
Nov. 12	*Memorandum of Comment by the Ambassador in Japan* Doubt as to the credibility of the alleged message from the Foreign Minister passed on to the Ambassador by a leading Japanese on November 7, 1941.	722
Nov. 12	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between the Secretary of State, the Japanese Ambassador, and the Japanese Minister in which the Secretary presented two oral statements (texts printed *infra*); and the Ambassador emphasized his Government's desire to expedite a settlement.	722
Nov. 12	*Oral Statement Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador* Amplification of the Secretary's suggestion regarding mutual exchanges of pledges between China and Japan for the establishment of real friendship and collaboration between the two countries.	726
Nov. 12	*Oral Statement Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador* Recapitulation of statements of the Japanese Government in regard to its position; inquiry if the present Japanese Government would confirm that its position is unchanged; request for certain clarifications.	727
Nov. 13	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between Mr. Ballantine and the Japanese Minister who stated that Mr. Kurusu was expected in Washington on November 15, 1941, expressed the hope that the Secretary would give the Ambassador the next day a clear-cut answer accepting or rejecting the Japanese proposals, and intimated that the Japanese consider that formal negotiations had been entered upon.	729
Nov. 15	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between the Secretary of State, the Japanese Ambassador, and the Japanese Minister in which the Secretary presented an oral statement and a declaration of economic policy (texts printed *infra*), which latter document the Secretary affirmed to be a reply to the Japanese proposal on nondiscrimination; the Secretary's insistence that the conversations were still merely exploratory, not formal negotiations, and his expressed feeling, in view of the nature of Japanese pressure for replies, that the U. S. Government should not be receiving such representations, suggestive of ultimatums, from the Japanese Government.	731

INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, 1941—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1941 Nov. 15	*Oral Statement Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador* Review of U. S. experience with unconditional most-favored-nation policy; belief that adoption of non-discrimination policy would be a long, forward step toward attaining Japanese Government's stated objective; annexed joint declaration on economic policy (text printed).	734
Nov. 17	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation in which the Japanese Ambassador presented Mr. Kurusu to the Secretary of State; Mr. Kurusu's statement that the Japanese Prime Minister is sincerely desirous of reaching a peaceful settlement with the United States; presentation by the Ambassador of two documents (texts printed *infra*), in reply to points raised by the United States on Japan's peaceful intentions and narrowing down the scope of the proposed understanding.	738
Nov. 17	*Oral Statement Handed by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State* Statement that the Japanese Government has no objection to confirming, as expressing the general purport of Japanese policy, certain statements made on August 28, 1941, by the preceding Prime Minister and in documents transmitted to the U. S. Government; and that various qualifying phrases were not intended to limit in any way the peaceful intentions of the Japanese Government.	739
Nov. 17	*Oral Statement Handed by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State* Statement that the Japanese Government has no objection whatever to applying the principle of political stabilization to the entire Pacific area and is willing to eliminate the word "southwestern" from the text of article VI of September 25th proposal.	740
Nov. 17	*Memorandum by the Secretary of State* Conversation between the President, the Secretary, the Japanese Ambassador, and Mr. Kurusu in which nothing new was brought out by the Japanese, although Mr. Kurusu constantly made the plea that there was no reason why there should be serious difficulties between the two countries and that ways must be found to solve the present situation.	740
Nov. 17 (1814)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* Advice that there is need to guard against sudden Japanese naval or military actions in areas not now involved in the Chinese theater, with the probability of the Japanese exploiting every tactical advantage such as surprise and initiative; and caution not to depend upon the Embassy's ability to give substantial prior warning.	743
Nov. 18	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between the Secretary of State, the Japanese Ambassador, and Mr. Kurusu in which questions outstanding were discussed at length; and the Japanese Ambassador suggested the restoration of the status which existed prior to July, 1941, when, following the Japanese move into southern Indochina, the U. S. freezing measures were put into effect.	744

INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, 1941—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1941 Nov. 19	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between the Secretary of State, the Japanese Ambassador, and Mr. Kurusu concerning the Ambassador's suggestion in regard to a return to the status which prevailed in July prior to the Japanese move into Indochina, and concerning the situation in Russia and Germany's prospects.	751
Nov. 20	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between the Secretary of State, the Japanese Ambassador, and Mr. Kurusu in which Mr. Kurusu presented new Japanese proposals (text printed *infra*); the Secretary's comments on the general situation.	753
Nov. 20	*Draft Proposal Handed by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State* Proposal using as a basis for settlement the return to the status which prevailed prior to the Japanese advance into south Indochina and the freezing of Japanese assets in the United States.	755
Nov. 21	*Memorandum by the Secretary of State* Conversation with Mr. Kurusu, who presented a draft letter dated November 20 (text printed) clarifying Japanese interpretation of Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact.	756
Nov. 22	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between the Secretary of State, the Japanese Ambassador, and Mr. Kurusu in which the Secretary stated that the representatives of certain other Governments had been consulted concerning the Japanese proposals and there was a general feeling that relaxing the freezing to some extent could be settled if Japan could give satisfactory evidence of a peaceful intent, and that the United States would consider helping Japan out on oil for civilian requirements only as soon as peacefully-minded Japanese could control the situation in Japan; inconclusive discussion of the troop situation in Indochina.	757
Nov. 24 (1839)	*From the Ambassador in Japan* Conversation with the Foreign Minister concerning the Japanese proposals of November 20, 1941, and the fact that the Secretary of State and representatives of interested Governments considered unsatisfactory the item with respect to the withdrawal of Japanese troops from southern Indochina.	762
Nov. 26	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between the Secretary of State, the Japanese Ambassador, and Mr. Kurusu in which the Secretary presented an outline of a proposed basis of an agreement and an explanatory oral statement (texts printed *infra*); Mr. Kurusu's depreciatory remarks in regard to the contents of the documents and comment that this response to their November 20, 1941, proposals could be interpreted as tantamount to meaning the end of the conversations.	764
Nov. 26	*Oral Statement Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador* Explanatory statement concerning and in regard to the outline of proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan.	766

INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, 1941—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1941 Nov. 26	*Document Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador* Outline of proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan.	768
Nov. 27	*Memorandum by the Secretary of State* Conversation between the President, the Secretary of State, the Japanese Ambassador, and Mr. Kurusu in which the President discussed the situation at some length, expressing U. S. disappointment that during the conversations Japanese leaders continued to express opposition to fundamental principles of peace, calling attention to U. S. patience in dealings with the Far East situation, and U. S. conviction that Japan's best interests will not be served by following Hitlerism and courses of aggression; the Ambassador's expressed disappointment that it had been impossible to reach agreement regarding a *modus vivendi.*	770
Dec. 1	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between the Secretary of State, the Japanese Ambassador, and Mr. Kurusu in which were discussed as factors in the situation the bellicose utterances emanating from Tokyo, especially the speech by the Prime Minister broadcast on November 30, 1941, and the Japanese military moves into Indochina; Mr. Kurusu's statement that he had been directed to inquire what was the ultimate aim of the United States in the conversations and to request the U. S. Government to make "deep reflection of the matter."	772
Dec. 2	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between Mr. Schmidt and Mr. Terasaki in which Mr. Terasaki stated that he had been greatly distressed by newspaper reports of the speech, on November 30, 1941, attributed to the Japanese Prime Minister, and presented a document in explanation of the matter (text printed *infra*).	777
Dec. 2	*Statement Handed by the First Secretary of the Japanese Embassy to Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine* Explanation that the so-called speech of the Prime Minister was originally drafted by the office staff of the East Asia Restoration League for delivery on Sunday, November 30, 1941, and had been given to reporters by the League staff the night of November 26 before it had been examined by the Prime Minister or other Government officials; that the Prime Minister made no speech on November 30; that part of the draft was translated incorrectly, anyway.	778
Dec. 2	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between the Under Secretary of State, the Japanese Ambassador, and Mr. Kurusu during which the Under Secretary read a statement from the President (text printed), inquiring what the actual reasons might be for reported continued Japanese troop movements to southern Indochina.	778
Dec. 5	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between the Secretary of State, the Japanese Ambassador, and Mr. Kurusu, in which the Ambassador read a statement in reply to the President's inquiry concerning Japanese troops in Indochina (text printed *infra*); the Secretary's indication that the reply was completely unsatisfactory.	781

INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, 1941—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1941 Dec. 5	*Statement Handed by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State* Advice that Japanese troops, with the object mainly of taking precautionary measures against Chinese border movements, have been reinforced to a certain extent in the northern part of French Indochina and that certain movements have been made among troops in the southern part as a consequence.	784
Dec. 6	*From President Roosevelt* Instructions to rush to the Ambassador in Japan the accompanying message to the Emperor of Japan (text printed *infra*).	784
Dec. 6	*From President Roosevelt to Emperor Hirohito of Japan* Message calling attention to the serious situation created in the southwestern Pacific by the continued movement of Japanese troops into Indochina, conveying assurances of U. S. peaceful intent toward Indochina, and expressing the hope that the Emperor may give thought in this definite emergency to ways of dispelling the dark clouds. (Footnote: Information that this message was transmitted in telegram No. 818, December 6, 1941, 9 p. m., to the Ambassador in Japan for delivery to the Emperor at the earliest possible moment.)	784
Dec. 7	*Memorandum of a Conversation* Conversation between the Secretary of State, the Japanese Ambassador, and Mr. Kurusu at 2:20 p. m., in which the Ambassador stated he had been instructed to deliver at 1 p. m. the document which he handed to the Secretary (text printed *infra*), but had been delayed in decoding; the Secretary's observation that in all his fifty years of public service he had never seen a document more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions. (Footnote: Information that the attack on Pearl Harbor took place on December 7, 1941, at 1:20 p. m. Washington time (7:50 a. m. Honolulu time) which was December 8, 3:20 a. m. Tokyo time; that on December 8 at 6 a. m., Tokyo time (December 7, 4 p. m., Washington time), the Japanese Imperial headquarters announced that war began as of "dawn" on that date.)	786
Dec. 7	*Memorandum Handed by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State at 2:20 p. m.* Notification that in view of the attitude of the U. S. Government, the Japanese Government cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.	787
Dec. 7	*Statement by the Secretary of State* Observations in connection with release to the press of the text of the statement of principles governing U. S. policy which the Secretary handed to the Japanese Ambassador November 26, 1941, and the text of the Japanese reply, December 7, 1941.	793
Dec. 8	*Message by President Roosevelt to Congress* Request that Congress declare that since Sunday, December 7, 1941, a state of war has existed between the United States and the Japanese Empire.	793
Dec. 8	*Declaration by the United States of America of a State of War With Japan* Joint resolution of Congress declaring that a state of war exists between Japan and the United States.	795

GROWING TENSION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN ARISING FROM JAPANESE MILITARY AGGRESSION

1939

740.00/1531 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, May 18, 1939—5 p. m.
[Received May 18—7:10 a. m.]

234. At my conference today with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Arita handed me the following message which the Prime Minister requested me to deliver personally to the Secretary of State on my forthcoming visit to Washington in the hope that the message may also be brought to the attention of the President:

"At present there is a serious antagonism among the nations of Europe and no one can assure that there will be no clash in the near future. If, by mischance, war is to break out, its consequences would be practically beyond our imagination and that [*the*] indescribable sufferings of hundreds of millions of people as well as the complete destruction of civilization would ensue. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary for us to exert our effort to prevent the occurrence of such casualty, and, I believe, that is the duty mainly incumbent on the United States and Japan since these two powers are situated outside the scope of European conflict.

Then what are the causes of this antagonism in Europe? There may be contentions on both sides, but on cool scrutiny of the European situation since the World War we come to the conclusion that, although Germany and Italy may be advised to be more patient, Great Britain and France also have a great deal to reconsider.

Undoubtedly the intention of the United States Government is to prevent the occurrence of such catastrophe and thus to save Europe from the misery of war. Similarly, it is the ardent wish of Japan that nations should have their own proper places in the world and thus the true world peace might be established and maintained. I, for myself, am doing my utmost to realize this ideal, and on this point, I believe, will be found the possibility of much closer cooperation between Japan and America as well as the foundation of a deeper mutual understanding between the two nations."

Grew

894.00/856 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, May 18, 1939—7 p. m.
[Received May 18—10:03 a. m.[1]]

235. 1. Before departing tonight on leave and confiding the Embassy to the effective hands of Dooman in whose judgment and an-

---

[1] Telegram in six sections.

alytical ability I have full confidence and whose views on policy and procedure coincide very closely with mine, I wish to submit the following analysis of the political situation in Japan as I estimate it up to date.

2. In a long farewell conversation this morning with the Foreign Minister and in a talk which he had with Dooman yesterday, Arita said that the new agreement now under discussion with Germany and Italy[2] will contain no military or political commitments except such as may apply directly to combating communistic activities. Japan desires to avoid European entanglements. Nevertheless, Japan regards the Soviet Government and the Comintern as identical and if Soviet Russia should become involved in a European war Japan herself might find it impossible to avoid involvement. If Great Britain and France conclude an alliance with Soviet Russia, Japan may be obliged to reconsider her position vis-à-vis the totalitarian states. Apart from the specific field of combating communistic activities, it will be the careful aim of Japan in every other field to maintain an attitude of strict neutrality between the democratic and totalitarian states.

Arita spoke with some bitterness of the efforts of Great Britain to draw Russia into a military alliance. It was all very well to say, as Craigie[3] had said to him, that the proposed British plan would not be applicable in the Far East, but the fact is that Russia straddles both Europe and Asia; even if the British plan were specifically to exclude the Far East, the close association which it would bring about among Great Britain, France, and Russia would inevitably lead to the closest collaboration in the pursuit of their policies in the Far East. Japan, as before stated, has every desire to avoid involvement in every instance and to maintain a neutral position between the two groups, but if the British plan goes through and thus prepares a basis for concerted action in the Far East by the democracies, Japan would necessarily have to reconsider her position vis-à-vis Germany and Italy. In this connection, he went on to say that if war were to break out in Europe—and he believes that there is no immediate danger—and the United States becomes involved, the position which Russia might take might conceivably decide whether peace could be maintained between the United States and Japan.

3. The Minister made to me the following confidential oral statement:

> "Japan is bound to Germany and Italy by the tie of anti-communism and as we deem it necessary, further strengthening of

---

[2] For documents concerning the relations of Japan with the European Axis Powers, see pp. 153 ff.

[3] British Ambassador in Japan.

this bond is being seriously considered. But if any one should regard Japan, because she had taken such a measure, as joining into the camp of totalitarian nations in opposition to the democratic nations, he would surely be misunderstanding the true intention of the Japanese Government. Japan is not a totalitarian, no more than a democratic, state. She has an original constitution of her own which is centered around the Imperial family, and is based on the spirit of levying [*allowing?*] everything to have its own proper place, surpassing all ideas of antagonism. In joining hands with Germany and Italy we have no other purposes than to combat the destructive activities of Comintern. If the United States, not understanding the true intention of Japan on this point, should base her future policies on such misunderstanding, it would bring about a deplorable situation not only respecting the relations between the United States and Japan but also in respect of the peace of the world."

4. Arita said to me, and I believe his statement to be accurate, that there is now no substantial opposition in the Government to the proposed arrangement with Germany and Italy as now formulated. At the present moment the Cabinet appears to have weathered the recent storm and to be momentarily secure. I do not, however, believe that this present security can be regarded as permanent because [of] many divergent forces active within the country.

5. In my conversation with the Foreign Minister I then turned to the question of America's legitimate rights and interests in China which are now subject to serious interference by Japan and I stated that Japanese-American relations could not be expected to improve until these interferences were removed. I also emphasized the deplorable effects of the bombing operations.[4] What might I tell my Government on these points?

6. The Minister's reply was ambiguous and vague. He said that most of the interferences of which we complained were temporary and would disappear as military necessity permitted but that certain measures, such as exchange control in North China, might be permanent. There is no intention, he said, to limit American trade beyond the requirements of military necessity or to discriminate against American commerce.[5] There is also no intention to take over the International Settlements in Shanghai[6] or Kulangsu but greater cooperation on the part of the Settlement authorities is hoped for. In connection with the general question of economic rights and interests in China, he said that the feeling of resentment in this country against Great Britain is so strong that it was hopeless to try to improve relations with that country. He would be satisfied if his efforts were successful to prevent these relations from becoming worse than

---

[4] See vol. I, pp. 487 ff.

[5] See *ibid.*, pp. 757 ff.

[6] See *ibid.*, pp. 838–848.

they now are. The position with regard to relations with the United States was an entirely different one, as there is a general call for improvement. He was making a strong effort along those lines and hoped to be able to show concrete results before long.

7. The Minister then made to me the following confidential oral statement:

"I have previously stated frankly my opinion regarding the new order in East Asia and we have had occasions of exchanging views on this question. However, I regret to say that Japan's position does not seem to have been fully understood.

I wish to take this opportunity to emphasize once again that the Japanese Government in establishing the new order have no intention of excluding trade and other legitimate economic activities in China of the countries of Europe and America. The establishment of a new order is not exclusive in character as is thought in some quarters, but is the means by which trade and other economic relations between East Asia and the European and American countries will eventually prosper on a sound basis.

As Japan is now carrying on large-scale military operations, and has only recently embarked upon the undertaking of realizing the ideal of the establishment of a new order, the military or economic necessity require some measures which may cause inconveniences to nationals of the third powers and affect their rights and interests. But, since such measures are, as a rule, exceptional and temporary in character, any judgment formed on the basis of the present abnormal conditions is apt to lead to misunderstanding of the real intention of Japan. Such an outcome is much to be regretted as being likely to disturb the foundation of the relations between Japan and the United States, the two countries which should always remain friendly to each other. Therefore it is earnestly desired that, in dealing with various questions arising between our two countries with regard to China, the United States will understand that large-scale military operations are in progress over an extremely wide area and will at the same time consider the new situation in East Asia on a broader perspective so that she will arrive at a balanced judgment."

He amplified this statement by reverting to one of his favorite themes: National defense has an economic as well as a military aspect. The United States is well equipped in both respects; however, while Japan has an army and navy strong enough to meet any military threat, her economic defense is inadequate; and she cannot enjoy a sense of security until the deficiencies in the latter respect have been made good.

8. The Minister on his own initiative then turned to the subject of the so-called "South Sea advance" and made to me the following confidential oral statement:

"We understand that, since the military occupation of Hainan Island by Japan and the placing of the Sinnan Gunto (Spratly Islands) under the jurisdiction of the Formosan Government General,[6a] rumors have spread, giving the impression as though Japan entertained some territorial designs toward the South Seas; that as a result certain interested countries are apprehensive, and that even some Americans have a similar apprehension with regard to the Philippines. The Japanese Government consider it regrettable from the standpoint of Japanese-American friendship that such apprehension has been aroused. They are, therefore prepared, if the United States Government should desire that some step be taken by the Japanese Government for the purpose of dispelling such apprehension, to enter into conversation with the United States Government."

Cipher texts by mail to Shanghai, Chungking, Peiping.

GREW

393.115/697

The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Arita) to the American Chargé in Japan (Dooman)

[Translation]

Go No. 13, Asia I TOKYO, June 21, 1939.

SIR: The operations begun on May 21 on the coast of Kwangtung Province, China, by the Imperial armed forces are purely military in character and are for the purpose of wiping out enemy forces belonging to the Chiang régime [6b] and dealing that régime a deathblow. While the Imperial armed forces will exert every effort to avoid damage to interests of third powers, it is hoped that your government as well as your authorities in China will cooperate fully in the efforts of the Imperial armed forces to eliminate or reduce to a minimum accidental damage to interests of your country and will take special measures to avoid the occurrence of unfortunate incidents. At the same time it is requested that every precaution be taken against stratagems of the Chiang Régime aimed to draw third powers into the conflict.

With respect to the Japanese government's basic desire to prevent the occurrence of incidents special reference is made in addition to a note under date October 12, 1938, *Go*-No. 37, Asia I, from the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Prince Konoe.[7]

I avail myself [etc.] HACHIRO ARITA

740.00/1531

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Japan (Dooman)

No. 1767 WASHINGTON, July 8, 1939.

SIR: Reference is made to the Embassy's telegram no. 234, May 18, 5 p. m., in which there is given the text of a message from the Prime

---

[6a] See pp. 277 ff.

[6b] Chinese Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Executive Yüan (premier), December 1935–January 1, 1938, and November 1939–.

[7] See telegram No. 664, October 13, 1938, 4 p. m., from the Ambassador in Japan, vol. I, p. 623.

Minister which was handed to Ambassador Grew by the Minister for Foreign Affairs with the request that Mr. Grew deliver the message personally to me. There is enclosed a reply to this message.

. . . .

Very truly yours, CORDELL HULL

[Enclosure]

The Secretary of State to the Japanese Prime Minister (*Hiranuma*)

On his return to Washington Ambassador Grew delivered to me personally the message which Your Excellency was so good as to place in his hands through the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs. I have read with unusual interest the expressions of Your Excellency's concern at the existence among the nations of Europe of antagonism which may lead to open conflict, and of Your Excellency's concern as to what the consequences might be to millions of people and to civilization should such antagonism lead to an outbreak of war. In this situation Your Excellency sees it as the duty of the Governments of our two countries, owing to their situation "outside the scope of European conflict" to exert efforts to prevent the occurrence of the casualty envisaged.

I have carefully noted also the statements pertaining to the causes of strained relations in the European situation, the interest of my Government in the preservation of peace, and finally the "ardent wish of Japan" that the relations of nations might be so arranged that true world peace would be established and maintained.

Your Excellency will have no doubt, in the light of the published utterances of the President and myself and of the principles we have advocated and supported, that the Government of the United States wholeheartedly desires to see established and maintained upon the basis of fair dealing and fair play between and among nations a condition of true world peace. With especial reference to the situation in Europe, Your Excellency will be apprised of the recent earnest efforts of this Government: the President's identic messages sent on September 26, 1938, to the heads of several European governments which had reached an alarming crisis in their relations;[8] identic messages addressed on April 14, 1939, by the President and myself respectively to the Chancellor of the German Reich and to the Premier of Italy with regard to the possible removal of the pervading threat or fear of a European war.[9]

---

[8] Department of State, *Press Releases*, October 1, 1938 (vol. XIX, No. 470), p. 219.

[9] *Ibid.*, April 15, 1939 (vol. XX, No. 498), p. 291.

It would be most gratifying to me, and I may also speak for the President, if there could be found ways for the use of your Government's influence toward discouraging among European governments, especially those governments with which your Government may have special relations, the taking of any action, or the pursuance of any policy, that might endanger the general peace. I am confident that any such contribution as this would constitute a high service to those great sections of humanity which live in fear of the devastation of war.

In further reference to Your Excellency's expressed desire to see a true world peace established and maintained, I venture to observe, in a spirit of frankness which I trust will not be misunderstood, that this objective is made the more remote by the existence and the continuance of armed conflict and consequent political disturbances in the Far East today. Just as the unfolding of events in the European sphere have their repercussions in the Far East, so, it appears, the prolongation of abnormal conditions in the Far East contribute to causes of unrest in Europe. American opinion is therefore perturbed by the trend of events in the Far East, especially with regard to various declared Japanese aims and to various methods and instrumentalities which various Japanese agencies employ in pursuit thereof.[10]

If, therefore, it should prove impracticable or inexpedient to make effective contribution at once to the settlement of problems arising in the European area, there nevertheless would be urgent need for the exertion of efforts in connection with disturbed conditions in other geographical areas, especially by those nations which may unhappily now be engaged in armed conflict. It is my view that each peaceful settlement, in whatever geographical sphere, constitutes a stabilizing element and an important step toward improvement in the general world situation.

Your Excellency may be assured of the genuine desire of the President and myself to do all within our power to convert into practical results those principles and hopes to which we have frequently given expression in connection with the foreign relations of the Government of the United States. While this Government does not perceive any practicable steps which it might usefully take at this time in addition to those already taken, this Government is sincerely interested in the suggestion contained in Your Excellency's message, and in giving further consideration to that suggestion would be pleased to have such further information as Your Excellency may find it agreeable to offer by way of amplifying and making more definitive Your Excellency's concept as to the steps which might usefully be taken toward moderating the situation in Europe.

---

[10] The last phrase, beginning with the word "especially", has been corrected in accordance with instructions in telegram No. 239, August 2, 1939, 9 p. m., to the Chargé in Japan.

711.94/1293

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] August 30, 1939.

The Japanese Counselor came to say goodbye. After an exchange of the usual remarks on such occasions, Mr. Suma referred to the differences now existing between our countries after a long-standing friendship. He proceeded to add that the new Japanese Government would have as a chief purpose the restoration of good relations between our two countries. He then inquired if I had anything to say that he might repeat to his Government officials upon his return to Tokyo. I replied that I had nothing particularly in mind more than what I had said to the Japanese Ambassador on August 26th[11] when he called here. I went on to state that I had heretofore already said about all I could say on this general subject; that I was mindful of the long friendship between the people of Japan and the people of the United States; that my Government, during the present period when international law is being kicked aside and ignored, treaty obligations violated with impunity, and an increasing state of international lawlessness is in evidence in so many parts of the world, all the more vigorously upholds the integrity of international law, of treaty observation, of friendly relations with every other nation alike, including Japan, based also on the rule of fair play and fair dealing; that my Government, of course, is very desirous of a resumption of normal international relations everywhere based on the foregoing principles and rules of conduct, which would include the principle of equality of treatment and opportunity both commercially and industrially.

I then said to the Counselor that I might repeat the message I sent to his country by a previous Counselor who called some two years ago to say goodbye before returning home, and that was that I would have him say to his statesmen that some of these days the fact will dawn upon the three or four most powerful nations of the world, including his country and mine, that there is room enough on this planet for sixteen or eighteen such nations to live and thrive, maintaining all of those normal and peaceful and other worthwhile relations that would make possible the fullest measure of human progress; that when that fact was realized the human race would be just ten times better off than it is or will be otherwise in the future. The

---

[11] See memorandum by the Secretary of State, vol. I, p. 851.

Counselor strove to be most agreeable in his conversation and demeanor and took no issue on anything I said, but made it clear that his Government now would undertake to restore mutually desirable relations between our two countries.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

793.94/15340 : Telegram

The Chargé in Japan (Dooman) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

TOKYO, September 5, 1939—7 p. m.
[Received September 5—10: 50 a. m.[12]]

458. Sawada, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, summoned me to the Foreign Office and informed me that, on behalf of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, he (Sawada) had handed a note to the diplomatic representatives of the belligerent countries. Sawada gave me a copy of the note, of which the following is a substantial translation:

"Confronted by the recent outbreak of a European war, the Government of Japan plans to avoid becoming involved in that war and to devote its energies to settling the China incident. In connection with this intention and in view of the profound concern with which the Government of Japan regards the attitude toward the situation in China taken by other nations, the Government of Japan desires to ask that, in deference to the Japanese Government's above-mentioned intention, no measures of a character likely to affect injuriously the position of Japan with reference to the China affair be taken by the Government.

With respect, moreover, to areas of China controlled by Japanese forces, it is to be feared that the presence in such areas of naval vessels and troops belonging to powers participating in the conflict in Europe might result in unfortunate incidents and in a condition of affairs ill-adapted to Japan's noninvolvement policy. The Government of Japan accordingly believes that it is incumbent upon it to proffer to the belligerent nations in question friendly advice that they effect—as a voluntary act—the withdrawal of their naval vessels and troops from the above-mentioned areas; and, it may be added, the Japanese authorities, upon the removal of these vessels and troops, will be prepared to exert every possible effort toward safeguarding lives and properties of citizens of the belligerent nations."

Later I was told by the Foreign Minister's private secretary that to the British, French, Polish, and German Ambassadors, representing the belligerent nations, and to the Italian Ambassador and myself as representatives of neutral nations, had been handed the above quoted note.

In handing the copy of this note to me the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to communicate it to the Government of the United States for "its information." With reference to the note, he orally added that his Government considered it of primary importance to avoid the development of any situation in territory of China under the control of forces of Japan which might ultimately result in Japan's becoming involved in the European war. I remarked that the possible breaking out in occupied territories of China of a conflict between the armed forces or citizens of the warring nations of a nature to cause Japan to become involved in the war in Europe was exceedingly difficult for me to visualize. The Vice Minister stated that on the morning of September 5 an incident was reported involving invasion by British naval ratings of the German Club in the Shanghai International Settlement and that the prevention of further such incidents and of cases even more serious was desired. I then asked if the Japanese request in regard to removal of forces in China of belligerent nations was to be construed as applicable to forces which the warring countries maintain in the foreign concessions and international settlements—if, for instance, the withdrawal by the British and French of their forces from the Shanghai International Settlement and French Concession, respectively, was desired by the Japanese Government. To this Sawada answered "Yes" without qualification, and discussion of the subject thereupon ceased.

---

[12] Telegram in three sections.

Utilizing the occasion presented, I inquired as to the accuracy of a statement to the effect that no formal proclamation of neutrality would be published by the Japanese Government, which appeared in the press on the morning of September 5. The Vice Minister's reply was to the effect that the statement issued by the Japanese Cabinet the evening of September 4 had made clear the Japanese Government's attitude and that for the present no further steps in that direction were envisaged.

Dooman

793.94/15349 : Telegram

The Chargé in Japan (Dooman) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

Tokyo, September 6, 1939—7 p. m.
[Received September 6—11:08 a. m.[12a]]

459. With reference to the Japanese note, a translation of which was telegraphed the Department yesterday (Embassy's No. 458), only the first paragraph of the note has been published here. There has been no disclosure here of the "friendly advice" statement, as to the withdrawal of British and French warships and troops from

---

[12a] Telegram in two sections.

China, or of any other part of the important second paragraph. There is probably some significance in the concealment from the Japanese public that the Japanese Government has made what amounts to a drastic demand on the Governments of Great Britain and France.

I think that the Japanese move is intended either to permit a graceful retreat if their advice is found unacceptable, or else that the people of Japan are not to be enlightened until they find themselves faced with a situation from drastic action already taken. In either the one case or the other, I am of the firm opinion that nothing would have a more healthy effect than a statement from the American Government expressing its unqualified disapproval of Japan's action as calculated to prejudice both directly and indirectly the position in China of non-Oriental powers.

Tomorrow afternoon I am to make a formal call on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, on his appointment. The thought occurs to me that I might say at that time, informally and as an expression of my personal opinion, that Japan is at present more dependent upon the United States as a source of supply for machinery, raw materials, etc., than ever before in order to meet the increasing demand which the European war has created for Japanese goods. I should continue by saying that what is, actually, a demand that British and French forces in China be withdrawn from China cannot fail to raise the query whether, bearing in mind the fact that there are no German forces whatever in China, Japan's real intention may not be the elimination from China of Western influence; and, in conclusion, that any action taken by Japan which would tend to confirm the foregoing view would not be helpful in disposing the American public to help Japan to benefit economically or commercially from the European situation now existing.

Is any objection perceived to the making of the above statement in the manner suggested? In Japanese history the term "friendly advice" has had sinister associations; first, when Japan was pressed by continental European powers to return Kwantung to China after the war between China and Japan in 1894,[13] and next when Japan used it in August 1914 in the Japanese note to Germany demanding the return of the German leasehold in Shantung to China.[14]

Repeated to Shanghai for transmission to Peiping and to Chungking.

DOOMAN

---

[13] For the text of the notes presented to Japan by Russia, Germany, and France on April 23, 1895, see *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871–1914*, vol. IX, No. 2244 and No. 2252. Also see the Japanese proclamation respecting the retrocession to China of the ceded districts of the Fengtien Peninsula, May 10, 1895, *British and Foreign State Papers*, LXXXVII, p. 805.

[14] For the text of the note, see telegram dated August 15, 1914, midnight, from the Ambassador in Japan, *Foreign Relations*, 1914, supp., p. 170.

793.94/15348 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Japan (Dooman)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, September 6, 1939—6 p. m.

276. With reference to the first paragraph of your telegram No. 458, September 5, 7 p. m., the Department yesterday addressed inquiries on the subject referred to therein to the British and the French Ambassadors in Washington.

With reference to the suggestion contained in paragraph two of your telegram No. 459, September 6, 7 p. m., final sentence, the Department has it under consideration.

Referring to the third paragraph of your telegram No. 459, we do not feel that it would be advisable, in your conversation with Arita, to make any reference to Japan's dependence upon this country for materials or to the effect that the Japanese action to which you refer might possibly have upon the commercial relations between Japan and the United States. No objection is perceived by the Department, however, to your pointing out to Arita that it is your opinion that any action on the part of the Government of Japan to force the withdrawal of armed forces of France and Great Britain in China from that country, would be interpreted in the United States as a direct step toward the elimination of Western influence from China; and that in the United States the consequent reaction as regards Japanese-American relations would certainly be seriously prejudicial.

HULL

893.0146/722

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] September 7, 1939.

The Japanese Ambassador called at my request. I said that in the light of our recent conversations, which emphasized his desire, and in a general sense of course my desire, to improve relations on a basis of friendliness and fair play between our two countries, just as between ours and all other countries, I was genuinely surprised to receive a copy, through official channels, of the notice given to the British and French to take their naval vessels out of Shanghai waters and their guards out of the Shanghai area, and presumably out of all other localities in China where they are stationed. I then spoke orally to the Ambassador from a prepared manuscript, substantially as follows:

The American Government has received from the American Embassy in Tokyo a text of the note presented by the Japanese Government to the governments of belligerent nations, in which the Japanese

Government advises the belligerents to withdraw their troops and warships from regions in China which are under the control of the Japanese armed forces, a copy of which was handed to the American Chargé for communication to this Government for purposes of information.

I find it necessary to bring to the attention of the Japanese Government the fact that the advice thus given to the governments of belligerent powers directly affects rights and interests of the United States. For the moment, I shall speak only of the situation at Shanghai. At that port several foreign countries, including both Japan and the United States, maintain landed armed forces. These forces are there for the purpose of assistance in the protection of the lives of the nationals respectively of the various countries concerned, and, in connection with that duty, the maintaining of order in general. The powers have in that connection both individual and common responsibilities. In the opinion of the American Government, the fact that some of these powers have become belligerents in other parts of the world affords no more sound a basis for advice by Japan that those powers withdraw their forces from Shanghai than would the fact that Japan is engaged in hostilities afford for a similar giving of advice by some other power to Japan that Japan withdraw her forces from the same area. In passing, I may point out that no such demands were made by any power in 1914, at which time Japan was a belligerent.

If, in the presence of the Japanese advice, the British and the French forces are withdrawn, it will create a situation fraught with extreme difficulties of many practical kinds both for Japan and the United States.

I proceeded to speak orally from a supplementary manuscript, substantially as follows:

The International Settlement at Shanghai has grown up in consequence of efforts and activities begun by nationals of various powers—prominent among whom were and have been Americans, British subjects and French subjects—more than a century ago. The foundations of the port were laid and its prosperity was developed long before Japan began to take an active interest in world commerce. The International Settlement is an area wherein persons of all nationalities reside and which is governed by the locally created and locally maintained agency whose officers are elected by and are responsible to its own taxpayers regardless of nationality. Interests of the various powers there are interwoven. Not since the middle of the nineteenth century has any one power claimed a right of preponderance or predominance of influence there. The United States has its rights and interests there just as has Japan. The respective rights and interests of the various powers there are interdependent. Shanghai is international. For several other powers to be forced out would mean to the United States that all powers are being forced out. The American Government cannot and does not admit any right on the part of any power to force it out. The rights of the United States have in many ways been impaired by acts of Japanese authorities during recent years. There are many ways in which the United States is capable of taking action of retaliation. The American Government would view with great regret and disapproval action by the Japanese Government in consequence of which the international character of the port of Shanghai would be destroyed.

In further conversation, in addition to the foregoing, I re-emphasized the utter lack of right or reason or consistency on the part of the Government of Japan to order these other Governments out of Shanghai and to break up the International Settlement and its government—for, I added with emphasis, the proposed action of Japan would result in just that—and I said, therefore, he must understand that my Government is very much concerned with respect to the definite rights and interests thus threatened. I said that in view of the action of the Japanese military authorities in China in insisting on exclusive occupation of the Yangtze River to all practical intents and purposes, with its immense deprivation of commercial rights and interests of Americans, and similar action in many cities and localities throughout China, and in the light of the so-called Japanese preachment of "a new order in Asia or eastern Asia", this Government must make clear its conclusion that the purpose behind the Japanese notice to the British and French is not a mere innocent, friendly purpose, but a purpose further to exclude first one set of nationals of another country, and then another set of nationals of still another country, until the Shanghai situation would be on a parity with the Yangtze River situation and others like it in China. I then said, "How does your Government expect us to prevent the Congress and the country, if we should attempt to do so, from taking up the question of our monetary and financial and trade relations with your country and dealing with it in a way that you can well imagine in the light of all the circumstances?"

The Ambassador made no defense except to quietly suggest that Japan through friendly motives was giving this notice for the avoidance of possible friction in China. I re-emphasized what I had already said in relation to this phase and stated that we could not possibly give that interpretation to the notice.

I stated that I would like to have an indication of the Japanese Government's reaction in the light of the exposition of the subject which I had made to the Ambassador, as recorded above.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

793.94/15351 : Telegram

The Chargé in Japan (Dooman) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

TOKYO, September 7, 1939—6 p. m.
[Received September 7—10:03 a. m.[15]]

463. . . .

(2) As the Japanese Foreign Minister this afternoon received all chiefs of mission in turn, interviews were necessarily very brief. The Foreign Minister expressed regret that Japanese-United States relations are not marked by the mutual friendship and confidence which he would desire for them and that incidents arousing American feeling against Japan had occurred in spite of the Japanese Government's efforts to prevent injury to American interests in China. He stated that he would sincerely endeavor to improve Japanese relations with the United States.

Mentioning the Japanese Government's notes communicated to the belligerent European powers on September 5, the Foreign Minister said he wished to emphasize Japan's determination against becoming involved in the European war and in favor of doing simultaneously what was possible to prevent extension of the hostilities to the Far East. Japan would be glad, he added, to cooperate with nations which were animated equally by a desire to confine the war to the present belligerents.

(3) Replying, I said I would not fail to report the Foreign Minister's observations to my Government. It had been the endeavor of the United States, I said, to cooperate with Japan along with other nations in order to promote peace in the Far East; but that the differences in American and Japanese objectives and policies were militating against cooperation, a particularly unfortunate condition at this time when mutual friendship and trust were needed so badly between nations not engaged in the European war for the purpose of terminating as soon as possible the war in Europe.

Repeated to Shanghai for transmission to Chungking and Peiping.

DOOMAN

893.0146/702

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] September 15, 1939.

The Ambassador of Japan called at his own request. He said that he had had a number of dispatches from his Government since our conference a week ago yesterday, at which time we discussed the reported plans or threats of Japan to push the British and French guards or troops out of Shanghai, thus leaving the British and French sectors unguarded. The Ambassador prefaced his statement by bringing into the scope of our discussion the guards or troops located at Tientsin and Peking. I interrupted to say that, while our conversation of last week related primarily to the International Settlement situation at Shanghai, I had also in mind the Tientsin and Peking situations but assumed that no discussion of them was necessary for the reason that the rights of all foreign governments, including those of Japan and the United States, were definitely and firmly fixed by the Boxer Protocol;[16] that I further assumed that this international agreement would not be violated, and, hence, no particular reference to those two situations appeared to be as urgent as the Shanghai question. The Ambassador told me his Government had instructed him to elaborate on what he had said to me last week in our conference.

---

[15] Telegram in two sections.

He then proceeded to relate, more or less in the way of repetition, in fact, that the British and French troops in China were more or less of a menace to peace and might involve Japan in the European war situation; that if Italy should enter the war, the Italian troops at Shanghai might clash with the British and French troops; that German nationals in Shanghai might easily be attacked by British troops or at least a clash might occur between them; that Japan was very desirous of remaining neutral in the European war situation, and that these steps, in the way of friendly advice, to get the British and French to withdraw their troops would clarify the peace situation and remove possible dangers of clashes and military complications, as already stated. The Ambassador finally added that, of course, his Government had no idea or purpose to invite the guards or troops of my Government to leave Shanghai. This was the substance of his comment, which was chiefly a repetition of what he had said last week. It was all in a friendly tone and conveyed nothing resembling threats on the part of his Government towards this Government, but, on the contrary, he indicated that our two governments would or might be in key positions to promote peace when and if the psychological occasion should present itself.

I said that I desired first to draw the attention of his Government to what my Government considers a definite, clean-cut distinction between regular military forces and the guards or troops of my Government, the Japanese and other governments which were first installed in China in connection with the Boxer Rebellion and also in connection with the International Settlement at Shanghai. I said that the primary function of these armed guards is to protect their respective nationals against mob violence or violence from other uncontrolled forces in those areas of China which the regular police protection could not cope with; that these are really guards and not forces intended to perform the regular functions of military forces; that, therefore, I thought the Government of Japan was not now in a position to justify a proposal, apparently serious, to induce these British and French guards to retire, on the theory that their functions are those of regular military forces; that I would request the Government of Japan to give this point further consideration and also to keep in mind the fact that these local questions pertaining to guards of my Government and the Japanese and other governments in China are not legitimately related, certainly to any major or serious extent, to whatever plan or program Japan has in China at present, whether it be a program of preserving order or of absolute subjugation; that, therefore, I considered it to the interest of both my Government and that of Japan as well to take the position that these questions have no legitimate relationship to the controversy between Japan and China for the reason that they are essentially international in their nature and separate from Japanese-Chinese controversies, just as they have been considered as separate from purely Chinese governmental affairs in the past. I emphasized the view of this Government that should the Japanese get the British and French guards out of Shanghai, it would have the effect of disrupting the whole government situation, would seriously affect the rights and interests of Americans there, and would be calculated to create the impression among the people of the United States that there was basis to reports already rife, to the effect that Japan's purpose is to sweep all foreigners out of China; that, furthermore, compared to any trivial advantage a change in the Shanghai situation might be to Japan, the misunderstanding and the feeling aroused among the American people against Japan would result in an immense net loss to his country. I said that I need not remind the Ambassador that this Government had publicly announced that its policy was to remove its guards from China as soon as the Chinese authorities became able to preserve order and to afford protection to our nationals and their interests; that this Government was virtually reaching the stage when this step would be deemed feasible at the precise time that Japan moved her military forces into China, and that, of course, we had not been in a position since that time to bring our guards out. I said that so far as the Shanghai situation was concerned, while the armed forces which my Government and other governments have there are for guard purposes primarily, yet when it came to removing them by any threat of force or undue insistence bordering on duress, they would become a symbol of their respective nations, which, in the psychological effect is of immeasurably greater importance than any small benefits Japan might acquire by forcing the moving out of these guards.

---

[16] Final protocol between China and other powers, signed September 7, 1901, *Foreign Relations*, 1901, appendix (Affairs in China), p. 312.

The Ambassador remarked that the Japanese were undertaking by amicable discussion to settle all these matters. I expressed my gratification at this assurance, and emphasized the definite policy of this Government to settle all matters with other governments by amicable and friendly discussion and not to cease until ways were found to that end. I then said to the Ambassador, as he kept repeating his foregoing statement, that he, of course was aware of the reports, already referred to, to the effect that his Government seeks to clear out all foreigners from China, and I then said that I would like to bring his attention especially to this fact, namely, that on yesterday when Mr. Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State, was in the act of leaving for the Pan American Conference at Panama, which would deal with phases of commerce and finance, the President and I gave special instructions that in any resolutions we presented, absolute equality of industrial rights and opportunities should be preserved and kept open as heretofore to Japan, Germany, Great Britain, France, and all other nations of the world alike, and I then said, "Why is it that your Government does not pursue this spirit as well as this policy and make it known to all so there can be no misunderstanding?" The Ambassador straightened up in his chair but offered no particular reply except to say that of course he understood the idea I was undertaking to emphasize. He then said that, of course, his Government had no idea of inviting this Government to take its guards out of Shanghai, much less of threatening force for that purpose; that his Government would expect to confer with this Government about the policing situation in so far as the guards were concerned, and he indicated that that would be its policy with respect to the guards in other places. I again came back to the proposition that in my profound belief the ideas I had expressed for this Government were virtually of the same interest to the Government of Japan; that I was satisfied the Japanese proposal to oust guards of the British and French would have the definite result of breaking down and destroying the International Settlement with the resultant serious practical difficulties which would arise between our two countries and that I simply could not follow the reasoning of his Government in its efforts to link these almost purely international phases with whatever program the Japanese Government might have in China from a military standpoint. I again requested the Ambassador to bring up these differing and opposing viewpoints with his Government and to urge it to give them further consideration. The Ambassador spoke about his Government acting without special relations with other governments, and I replied that I was speaking only for my Government, which at all times maintains the fullest freedom of action, and I added that, of course, there were instances where there were common interests and common purposes, etc., when parallel action with other governments would be natural. When the Ambassador said that his Government would expect to confer with this Government in regard to the policing situation at Shanghai, I made no comment. I then added that, of course, taking the genesis of the entire situation there and considering all of its phases, past and present, my Government could not bring out its guards on the basis of an unwarranted suggestion or threat by another government. The Ambassador made no comment on this. He left with the promise that he would take the matters up further as I had requested.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

123G861/839

Address Delivered by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Before the America-Japan Society at Tokyo on October 19, 1939

MR. CHAIRMAN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: First of all, permit me to express my great satisfaction on returning from leave of absence to learn that there has been improvement in the health of our beloved President, Prince Tokugawa. I well know that I am reflecting the hopes of all of us in most heartily wishing that he may before long find complete recovery and return to the chair which he so long has occupied with distinction and great helpfulness. I beg that our Chairman today may be good enough to convey to the Prince an expression of this deep feeling.

Your welcome today is genuinely appreciated. Last spring we were going "home" to the United States, and this autumn, when we left America, we were going "home" to Japan. When one has remained for seven years at a post, one can hardly regard it as other than "home". At any rate, that is the way my wife and I feel about Japan and especially about Tokyo, and that same feeling extends to our friends here, both Japanese and American. To come once again to a gathering of this Society is to come into a homelike atmosphere, and that in itself gives us a very warm feeling. We thank you for your welcome.

I have been told of rumors that have been flitting about here and there to the effect that we were not returning to Japan. If there have been such rumors, they just have been based on speculation, pure and simple, for at no moment has there been the slightest doubt about our returning. Having been on the job here for approximately three years without a day of furlough, I was very considerately given an extra month of leave, over and above the usual sixty days in the United States. Some of you with whom I talked before our departure may remember that I said at that time that I expected to be back in September or October, and here we are, right on schedule. Our plans have undergone no change and no thought of change.

We have had a pleasant and interesting time. Much of our furlough was spent at our place at Hancock in the refreshing hills and woods of New Hampshire where we were surrounded by our three daughters, occasionally some sons-in-law and six grandchildren, which inevitably made me feel something like an old patriarch, but we had time for visits also and we saw both the New York and the Golden Gate worlds fairs which, of course, were thrilling. I visited Washington on three occasions.

With regard to the Worlds Fairs in New York and in San Francisco I think that Japan has every reason to be proud of her pavilions and exhibits. I spent much time studying them in both places. The Japanese pavilion in the New York Fair is of great beauty. The Japanese exhibit in the Division of Pacific Cultures at the Golden Gate International Exposition and the effective way in which it is presented is past all praise. These objects, portraying the historical sequence of Japanese art and culture, have most courteously been lent not only by many of the foremost Japanese collectors, many of them personal friends of mine, but also by the Imperial Household Museum. As Mr. K. Sato wrote in the *Official Catalogue* of the Department of Fine Arts of the Exposition:

> "It will be a surprise to us if you do not read from these material objects the spirit of the race that made them, so like and so different from your own.
>
> "Surely America, newly come to join us on the rim of the Pacific Ocean, will feel the splendid lift of the same tides that wash our beaches."

Yes, we in America do feel the lift of the same tides that wash the beaches of Japan. I hope that both our nations will always and progressively feel the lift of those tides of friendship. I have returned to Japan to devote all that I have to give, now and in future, to try to inspire new life in those tides.

As for the future, Mrs. Grew and I are going to try to return to the United States as often as possible—every year or two if it is feasible, although such a plan must necessarily depend upon many unpredictable factors and is perhaps just a bit optimistic. But there is no doubt in my mind that an Ambassador can do more helpful work and can more intelligently and effectively represent his Government and can better contribute to clear international understanding upon which good international relations are built when given frequent opportunity for personal contact with his Government and the people of his own country. As I have often said, indeed as I said not long ago before this distinguished Society, an ambassador is essentially an interpreter, an interpreter of official and public opinion as they exist in his own country and in the country of his residence. By going home this year I was able to do a great deal of interpreting of Japan and of Japanese opinion both to my Government and to the American people. A number of addresses were made to important groups and I talked with a large number of people. I hope and believe that my interpretations were fair and accurate. It was made very clear that the Japanese picture has many sides and many angles, and that without a comprehension of these many sides and angles, it is difficult if not impossible for another people far away to arrive at a clear and accurate conception of the basic causes and incentives that lead to Japanese thought and policy and action. Those talks aroused much interest.

I enjoyed several constructive talks with my good friend Ambassador Horinouchi who is ably representing Japan in our country, and with other Japanese visiting or residing in the United States.

In the same way, there can be no doubt that as a result of my stay in the United States and my personal contacts with a large number of Americans, both official and unofficial, my interpretations here of American thought and policy and action are going to be much more complete and accurate than they could have been had this summer's furlough not taken place. We have a phrase in English "straight from the horse's mouth." I never knew why the particular animal chosen was a horse, especially as most horses are generally not very communicative. But the meaning is clear enough. What I shall say in Japan in the ensuing months comes "straight from the horse's mouth" in that it will accurately represent and interpret some of the current thoughts of the American Government and people with regard to Japan and the Far East. I had the privilege of also conferring repeatedly with the President and with the Secretary of State during my stay at home.

But here I am constrained to pause before passing on, to pause in sadness, in deepest sorrow, yes and in impotent bitterness, at the dreadful holocaust that has broken loose in Europe, a holocaust not of God's doing but of man's. That we, in our lifetime, should have to pass through another such frightful disaster seems an intolerable burden for one generation of humanity. I shall not try to deal with that subject today; indeed, what could possibly be said to alter in any infinitesimal degree the blackness of the cloud that has descended upon us? I say "us" advisedly. I pray with all my heart and mind that we in America may be spared from participation again in armed conflict, but in this modern world of ours no nation and no people can emerge unscathed from the effects, direct or indirect, of warfare anywhere. When the structure of international good faith, when the reliance of mankind and government upon the inviolability of the pledged word becomes undermined and collapses, when might makes right and force becomes an instrument of national policy rather than discussion and settlement of disputes by peaceful means, then civilization crumbles also and chaos intervenes.

I turn now to some of the thoughts of the American Government and of the American people with regard to the situation in East Asia in general and to our relations with Japan in particular. It is trite to say—but all too often the fact is overlooked—that in our democratic system the policies and measures of our Government reflect, and inevitably must reflect, public opinion. If therefore in any given case or situation we search for the underlying causation of American policy, or of any specific measure or series of measures taken by our Government, we must first try to analyze the state of public opinion in the United States and the developments which have induced that state of public opinion, factors which in turn have given rise to some specific policy or some specific measure or measures of our Government. In this connection I have not for a moment lost sight of the force of public opinion in Japan.

Obviously American public opinion is frequently divided; seldom is it unanimous. In the face of a divided public opinion, the Government must choose between acting according to its judgment as to what will best serve the interests of the country and withholding action altogether. But when public opinion is unanimous, or nearly unanimous, then governmental policy and action must and will reflect the opinion and wishes of the people as a whole. For the American Government is the servant of the American people. American public opinion with regard to recent and current developments in the Far East is today very nearly unanimous, and that opinion is based not on mere hearsay or on propaganda but on facts.

Among the conditions existing in the United States which impress me more and more vividly each time I return to my country are, first, the freedom which prevails in public discussion, and second, the demand for knowledge of facts and the intelligent appraisal of those facts by men and women in every walk of life. Especially is this true today in regard to foreign affairs. It is not alone the Government official or the student or the business man or the manufacturer or the financier who keeps his finger on the pulse of our foreign relations. This interest—and it is a keen, living interest—extends to the masses—the factory hand, the servant in the house, the taxi driver in the street. In the past few months at home I have been immensely impressed by the intelligent grasp by people in every quarter of what is going on in every corner of the world. I have been drawn into discussion of foreign affairs not only by men and women in important and influential positions but by travelers in the smoking compartment of railroad trains, by the stewards in airplanes, by the men and women behind the counters in the stores and shops, by the attendants at gasoline stations, by the drivers of taxis who were taking me to some destination. And what impressed me most was that these people not only knew what was going on abroad but had formed their own individual opinions of those events and of what the United States should or should not do about it. Those people, mostly, are widely read. My chiropodist, when I entered his room, was reading an important book on Japan, and we discussed that book throughout the session. A farmer in the small New England village where we live lent me another recent book on Japan. In the many talks which I had with many, many people, I received the distinct impression that those people are sufficiently well-informed and sufficiently wide-awake to distinguish between fact and propaganda. I do not suppose that any country in the world is better served today, by press and radio, with accurate foreign information than is the United States. In every country there are of course certain elements of the press inclined toward sensationalism, but the vast majority of the American people today read and demand the despatches and comments of correspondents and commentators of proved reliability for accurate reporting. Propaganda not based on fact, or distorting fact, is anathema to the average American. And the senseless propaganda with which foreign countries sometimes try to influence public opinion in our country does the countries of its origin and the interests of those countries far more harm than good. The average American, knowing the facts, sees through it and will have none of it.

Here, then, is the stuff of which public opinion in the United States is built. It is only through such individual contacts as I enjoyed this summer that one comes to appreciate the tremendous force of public opinion in our country and to realize its fabric and its power. When such opinion tends toward unanimity in any given issue, it is a force to be reckoned with, a force which the Government cannot possibly overlook and will not fail to reflect in its policies and actions.

What am I to say to you today? Would it be the act of a friend of Japan, a friend of the members of this Society, would it be in the interests of Japanese-American relations which this Society steadily labors to build up and improve, if I were to misstate the truth or try to obscure it by painting an inaccurate picture of my observations at home? If an Ambassador is in effect an interpreter, mustn't he interpret correctly on the basis of facts known to him? And on returning from a long stay in America, would it not insult your intelligence if I were to talk of trivialities? I suppose that there is not a person here who does not know that American public opinion strongly resents some of the things that Japan's armed forces are doing in China today, including actions against American rights and legitimate interests in China. On that subject public opinion in the United States is unanimous. And, mind you, I know whereof I speak, from personal talks with a very large number of people in diverse walks of life throughout our country, constituting a reliable cross-section of the American public.

If we then accept as a regrettable fact this state of American public opinion, and we must accept it as a fact, then isn't it from every point of view, especially from the point of view of statesmanship, reasonable and logical that we should in all frankness examine the basic causes of that state of public opinion? I know those causes in general and in detail. It would be harmful to overlook them. I earnestly believe that those causes must be removed and that by their removal only constructive good can come to both our nations. The attainment of such mutually constructive good, needless to say, is and has been and always will be the fundamental purpose of my ambassadorship to Japan.

Before I left for America last May a Japanese friend of mine begged me to tell my friends in America the situation in Japanese-American relations as he conceived it. It ran somewhat as follows:

American rights and interests in China are suffering some minor and unimportant inconveniences in China as a result of Japanese military operations; the Japanese military take every possible precaution to avoid inconvenience to American interests; reports published in the United States in regard to damage to American interests by the Japanese in China are intentionally exaggerated in order to inflame the American people against Japan; in large measure those activities of the Japanese to which Americans object are the result of differences in customs, differences in language, and a legalistic attitude which has been adopted by the United States; the attitude of the Government of the United States in regard to impairment of American rights and interests in the Japanese-occupied areas of China is in large part due to internal political conditions in the United States; in the near future the situation in the occupied areas of China will be so improved that the United States will no longer have any cause for complaint. That was the point of view of my Japanese friend.

Alas, the truth is far otherwise. The facts, as they exist, are accurately known by the American Government. They are likewise known by the American people, and in the interests of the future relations between Japan and the United States those facts must be faced. Only through consideration of those facts can the present attitude of the American Government and people toward Japan be understood; only through consideration of those facts, and through constructive steps to alter those facts, can Japanese-American relations be improved. Those relations *must* be improved.

Having said all this I do not propose today to deal in detail with the causations which have brought about that feeling in my country. This is not the occasion to enter any "bill of particulars." Those facts, those difficulties between our nations, are matters for consideration by the two Governments; indeed, some of them are matters which I have been discussing with the Japanese Government during the past two years, and I shall continue to approach these matters. But I believe that the broad outline of those facts and difficulties are known to you. Some of those difficulties are serious.

Now many of you who are listening to me may well be thinking: "There are two sides to every picture; we in Japan also have our public opinion to consider." Granted. In America, as I have already said, I did my best to show various angles of the Japanese point of view. But here in Japan I shall try to show the American point of view. Without careful consideration of both points of view we can get nowhere in building up good relations. I wish you could realize how intensely I wish for that most desirable end and how deeply I desire, by pure objectivity, to contribute to a successful outcome. Let me therefore try to remove a few utterly fallacious conceptions of the American attitude as I think they exist in Japan today.

One of these fallacies is that the American approach to affairs in East Asia is bound by a purely "legalistic" attitude, a conception which widely prevails in this country today. What is meant by a "legalistic" attitude? If we mean respect for treaties, official commitments, international law, yes; that respect is and always will be one of the cardinal principles of American policy. But the very term "a legalistic attitude", as it has often been used in my hearing in Japan, seems to imply a position where one cannot see the woods for the trees, where one's vision of higher and broader concepts is stultified. Let me therefore touch briefly on a few of the cardinal principles of American policy and objectives, moulded to meet the requirements of modern life, which, it is true, are fundamentally based upon but which seem to me far to transcend any purely "legalistic" approach to world affairs.

The American people aspire to relations of peace with every country and between all countries. We have no monopoly on this desire for peace, but we have a very definite conviction that the sort of peace which, throughout history, has been merely an interlude between wars is not an environment in which world civilization can be stably developed or, perhaps, can even be preserved. We believe that international peace is dependent on what our Secretary of State has characterized as "orderly processes" in international dealing.

The American people desire to respect the sovereign rights of other people and to have their own sovereign rights equally respected. We have found by experience that the successful approach to the resolving of international disputes lies not so much in merely abstaining from the use of force as in abstaining from any thought of the use, immediately or eventually, of the methods of force. Let cynics look about them and contemplate the consequences of resort to menacing demands as a process in the conduct of international relations! Is it being purely "legalistic" to put to wise and practical use the finer instincts common to all mankind?

The American people believe that the day is past when wars can be confined in their effects to the combatant nations. When national economies were based upon agriculture and handcraft, nations were to a large extent self-sufficient; they lived primarily on the things which they themselves grew or produced. That is not the case today. Nations are now increasingly dependent on others both for commodities which they do not produce themselves and for the disposal of the things which they produce in excess. The highly complex system of exchange of goods has been evolved by reason of each nation's being able to extract from the ground or to manufacture certain commodities more efficiently or economically than others. Each contributes to the common good the fruits of its handiwork and the bounties of nature. It is this system of exchange which has not only raised the standard of living everywhere but has made it possible for two or even three persons to live in comfort where but one had lived in discomfort under a simple self-contained economy. Not only the benefits of our advanced civilization but the very existence of most of us depends on maintaining in equilibrium a delicately balanced and complex world economy. Wars are not only destructive of the wealth, both human and material, of combatants, but they disturb the fine adjustments of world economy. Conflict between nations is therefore a matter of concern to all the other nations. Is there then any stultification through "legalistic" concepts when we practice ourselves and urge upon others the resolving of international disputes by orderly processes, even if it were only in the interests of world economy? How, except on the basis of law and order, can these various concepts in international dealing be secured?

The American people believe in equality of commercial opportunity. There is probably no nation which has not at one time or other invoked it. Even Japan, where American insistence on the open door is cited as the supreme manifestation of what is characterized as a "legalistic"

American attitude—even Japan, I say—has insisted upon and has received the benefits of the open door in areas other than China, where, we are told, the principle is inapplicable except in a truncated and emasculated form. That highly complicated system of world economy of which I have just spoken is postulated upon the ability of nations to buy and sell where they please under conditions of free competition—conditions which cannot exist in areas where preemptive rights are claimed and asserted on behalf of nationals of one particular country.

I need hardly say that the thoughts which I have just expressed are of universal applicability.

Another common fallacy which I am constrained to mention is the charge that the American Government and people do not understand "the new order in East Asia". Forgive me if I very respectfully take issue with that conception. The American Government and people understand what is meant by the "new order in East Asia" precisely as clearly as it is understood in Japan. The "new order in East Asia" has been officially defined in Japan as an order of security, stability and progress. The American Government and people earnestly desire security, stability and progress not only for themselves but for all other nations in every quarter of the world. But the new order in East Asia has appeared to include, among other things, depriving Americans of their long established rights in China, and to this the American people are opposed.

There's the story. It is probable that many of you are not aware of the increasing extent to which the people of the United States resent the methods which the Japanese armed forces are employing in China today and what appear to be their objectives. In saying this, I do not wish for one moment to imply that the American people have forgotten the long-time friendship which has existed between the people of my country and the people of Japan. But the American people have been profoundly shocked over the widespread use of bombing in China, not only on grounds of humanity but also on grounds of the direct menace to American lives and property accompanied by the loss of American life and the crippling of American citizens; they regard with growing seriousness the violation of and interference with American rights by the Japanese armed forces in China in disregard of treaties and agreements entered into by the United States and Japan and treaties and agreements entered into by several nations, including Japan. The American people know that those treaties and agreements were entered into voluntarily by Japan and that the provisions of those treaties and agreements constituted a practical arrangement for safeguarding—for the benefit of all—the correlated principles of national sovereignty and of equality of economic opportunity. The principle of equality of economic opportunity is one to which over a long period and on many occasions Japan has given definite approval and upon which Japan has frequently insisted. Not only are the American people perturbed over their being arbitrarily deprived of long-established rights, including those of equal opportunity and fair treatment, but they feel that the present trend in the Far East if continued will be destructive of the hopes which they sincerely cherish of the development of an orderly world. American rights and interests in China are being impaired or destroyed by the policies and actions of the Japanese authorities in China. American property is being damaged or destroyed; American nationals are being endangered and subjected to indignities. If I felt in a position to set forth all the facts in detail today, you would, without any question, appreciate the soundness and full justification of the American attitude. Perhaps you will also understand why I wish today to exercise restraint.

In short, the American people, from all the thoroughly reliable evidence that comes to them, have good reason to believe that an effort is being made to establish control, in Japan's own interest, of large areas on the continent of Asia and to impose upon those areas a system of closed economy. It is this thought, added to the effect of the bombings, the indignities, the manifold interference with American rights, that accounts for the attitude of the American people toward Japan today. For my part I will say this. It is my belief, and the belief of the American Government and people, that the many things injurious to the United States which have been done and are being done by Japanese agencies are *wholly needless.* We believe that real security and stability in the Far East could be attained without running counter to any American rights whatsoever.

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen: I have tried to give an accurate interpretation of American public opinion, most carefully studied and analyzed by me while at home. The traditional friendship between our two nations is far too precious a thing to be either inadvertently or deliberately impaired. It seems to me logical that from every point of view—economic, financial, commercial, in the interests of business, travel, science, culture and sentiment—Japan and the United States forever should be mutually considerate friends. In the family of nations, as between and among brothers, there arise inevitable controversies, but again and again the United States has demonstrated its practical sympathy and desire to be helpful toward Japan in difficult times and moments, its admiration of Japan's achievements, its earnest desire for mutually helpful relations.

Please do not misconstrue or misinterpret the attitude which has prompted me to speak in the utmost frankness today. I am moved first of all by love of my own country and my devotion to its interest:

but I am also moved by very deep affection for Japan and by sincere conviction that the real interests, the fundamental and abiding interests of both countries, call for harmony of thought and action in our relationships. Those who know my sentiments for Japan, developed in happy contacts during the seven years in which I have lived here among you, will realize, I am sure, that my words and my actions are those of a true friend.

One Japanese newspaper queried, on my return from America, whether I had concealed in my bosom a dagger or a dove. Let me answer that query. I have nothing concealed in my bosom except the desire to work with all my mind, with all my heart and with all my strength for Japanese-American friendship.

Today I have stated certain facts, straightforwardly and objectively. But I am also making a plea for sympathetic understanding in the interests of the old, enduring friendship between our two great nations. In a world of chaos I plead for stability, now and in the long future, in a relationship which, *if it can be preserved*, can bring only good to Japan and to the United States of America.

711.94/1323 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, October 23, 1939—10 p. m.
[Received October 23—1:17 p. m.]

544. Our 543, October 23, 7 p. m.[17] Yakichiro Suma, newly appointed Foreign Office spokesman and formerly Counselor in Washington, gave a long interview to the foreign correspondents today in regard to Japanese-American relations. While these correspondents are understood to have cabled the significant portions thereof to their papers in the United States, in view of Mr. Suma's position, it is believed that the Department may wish to have the contents of his interview as reported here which were substantially as follows:

Question: Are you handling Ambassador Grew's address given at the Imperial Hotel as an official protest or have you received an official protest with similar contents?

Answer: We do not regard it as an official protest nor have we received such an official protest.

Question: What is Japan's view in regard to that speech?

Answer: For a diplomat to report accurately the feeling of his country to the country to which he is accredited takes an unusual amount of courage and I am deeply impressed with Mr. Grew's action. However, it is difficult to agree with the Ambassador's statement that the American public has a correct grasp of the situation in East Asia. From my own experiences in America there has been deplorable ignorance among the people concerning conditions in the Far East. Recently I read Hugh Wilson's book entitled "Memoirs of a Diplomat" in which he states that as the American people are geographically too well blessed, public opinion in regard to foreign affairs is not of a serious character and I am in agreement with him. American views with regard to the Far East are completely directed by emotion. The American Government and people should pay full attention to actual facts of the situation in East Asia and their opinion should be more constructive and practical.

---

[17] Not printed.

Question: As the treaty expires next January,[18] the view is strong here United States will cease buying Japanese silk and Japan will cease buying American cotton. What do you think of that?

Answer: I heard this sort of view quite often while in the United States. I even heard that all trade relations would cease. However, this would amount to aggressive action against Japan and as it would not bring the result desired by the United States the majority of opinion inclined to the view that it could be spoken of lightly. As Walter Lippmann has said, the responsibility for the adjustment of Japanese-American relations rests not only with Japan; the United States also must exert every effort to observe the road to adjustment.

Question: What do you think about the rumor that a four-power conference including Japan, England, France and the United States will be held to discuss the question of opening the Yangtze River to navigation.

Answer: That is purely conjecture. France and England would not have to be mentioned. If necessary, discussions could be carried on with the United States. In any case the question of opening the Yangtze to navigation is not to be dismissed lightly.

Copies by air mail to Shanghai and Peiping. Shanghai requested to repeat to Chungking by naval radio.

Grew

711.94/1326: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

Tokyo, October 28, 1939—7 p. m.
[Received October 28—9:15 a.m.]

560. Our 555, October 26, 5 p. m.[19]

1. According to the press the Foreign Minister made the following statement in regard to Japanese-American relations at yesterday's Cabinet meeting:

"Recent opinion in the United States toward the China affair, both official and unofficial, is extremely unfavorable and in the course of the coming negotiations looking toward the adjustment of Japanese-American relations it is doubtful whether Japan's wishes can be realized. Accordingly, the Imperial Government must anticipate that with the expiration on January 25 next year of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Japan and the United States, Japanese-American relations may reach the worst state possible and must take into consideration at once counter-measures with respect to imports and exports, plans for commodity mobilization and similar problems."

---

[18] See pp. 189 ff.

[19] Not printed.

. . . .

Grew

711.94/1363

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[Tokyo,] November 4, 1939.

I held today with the Minister for Foreign Affairs the first important conversation since returning from leave of absence, an interview which had been delayed owing to the recent troubles in the Foreign Office. Our conversation today lasted an hour. I spoke to the Minister in English but he himself spoke through Mr. Okumura, as interpreter.

The Minister opened the conversation by expressing regrets for the delay in receiving me on the ground that he had only recently taken office and had had to familiarize himself with some of the problems thereof. He said he knew what I had done during the past seven years in the interests of Japanese-American relations and of the report of my recent visit in the United States as expressed in my speech of October 19 before the America-Japan Society. He said that he fully shares my desire for better relations between our two countries. Both sides must have full appreciation of the standpoint and views of each other, an action which of course applies to all international relations. Both Japan and the United States are stabilizing factors in their respective regions and both wish to remain away from the disastrous effects of the war.

The Minister referred to my last brief talk with him and said he fully shared my views that informal conversations were better and more effective than the writing of official documents. I said immediately that this represented my own feeling as I had already told him but of course he must realize that notes sometimes had to be written apart from conversations and that I might still have to write many notes in future but that I would always try to limit them to a minimum.

The Minister then said that our views were already partially known to him through the various notes we had written to his predecessors and from my speech before the America-Japan Society but that he would now be glad to listen to what I had to say.

In opening my side of the conversation I said that wishing to present the American point of view as clearly and concretely as possible I had prepared three manuscripts which I would leave with the Minister not as official documents but as informal papers and I requested him to be good enough to read them carefully because they would give him in fairly concentrated form a clear picture of the situation as its exists between our two countries. These manuscripts are:[20]

(1) A chronological statement of the Embassy's written representations to the Japanese Government since the commencement of the present hostilities in China showing which of these representations have been answered and which have not been answered.

(2) A series of excerpts from memoranda of some of my conversations with the Minister's predecessors, showing the representations made and the assurances repeatedly given that American rights and interests in China would be respected.

(3) Certain passages from the original draft of my speech before the America-Japan Society on October 19 which had been omitted from the speech.

With regard to the first paper, I said that this list does not necessarily present a complete accounting of instances in which American citizens or American rights or interests have suffered interference, discrimination, indignities or damage as a result of Japanese activities. The recapitulation shows that of 382 written representations made, 256 have not been acknowledged. I pointed out to the Minister that not all or many of the 116 replies received could be regarded by us as satisfactory. In the case of 10 representations, replies were not necessarily required.

With regard to the second paper, I asked the Minister to observe the specific assurances which had been given me by his predecessors that American rights and interests in China would be respected, assurances which are not being carried out in practice.

With regard to the third paper, I said that the material therein included embraced statements which were contained in the original draft of my speech before the American-Japan Society on October 19 but that I had omitted those statements from the speech with a view to avoiding any possible embarrassment to His Excellency or to the Japanese Government. Those statements were however important as specifying and clarifying some of the difficulties existing between the United States and Japan. I also pointed out that I had carefully avoided giving to the press the text of the speech as actually delivered until the Foreign Office itself had asked me to release the text to the press. The Minister acknowledged this point with a smile and a nod.

I then said that in my opinion the coming months might be critical in Japanese-American relations. There is at present in the United

---

[20] None printed.

States a strong demand for an embargo against Japan when our Treaty of 1911 expires next winter and it is my earnest hope that steps will be taken by Japan which will relieve this pressure of public opinion. I said that I desired to make it perfectly clear that I was presenting certain objective facts and that no other implication should be drawn from my remarks. I was not used to what might be called the old-school diplomacy and believed that perfect frankness in such conversations as the present one was highly desirable in the interests of both sides. (Neither the substance nor the tone of my remarks conveyed any threat whatsoever and there was no indication that the Minister took my remarks as a threat). I said that certain fundamental differences between our two countries would presumably some day have to be faced but I felt that the first thing to do was to clear the atmosphere. For this purpose, in my opinion, two things were necessary: first, cessation of the bombings, indignities and more flagrant interferences with American rights and interests in China which were causes of current irritation in the United States; second, some step or steps of a positive nature which would convince the American Government and people by concrete evidence that Japan intends to improve our relations. In this connection I mentioned the opening of the Yangtze River to American navigation as the sort of positive step I had in mind.

In reply to this presentation the Minister said that there appears to be a misunderstanding on the part of the United States that Japan intends to drive American interests out of China. I replied that quite apart from any future intention the fact remains that American interests are being driven out of China. The Minister observed that American assistance in the reconstruction of China is going to be absolutely indispensable.

The Minister requested us to bear in mind the following points:

a. Japan is engaged in warfare on a scale unprecedented in Japanese history and great stakes including the expense of many lives and much treasure are involved. Japan's paramount object is to convert an anti-Japanese China into a China sympathetic to Japan. In the Minister's personal opinion Japan and China must live in good neighborhood and prosper in a common way. If third powers help China to antagonize Japan, stabilization will be impossible.

b. The Minister expressed the hope that the United States will give better appreciation of the extent to which the Japanese authorities in China are endeavoring to protect American property in China. They are doing their best under abnormal and difficult conditions. The United States is evidently not satisfied but the Minister hopes to give concrete facts of the care taken. This referred to bombings and other encroachments. I mentioned the subject of Japanese monopolies. The Minister said he thought that such monopolies were set up purely for purposes of price control.

At the end of the conversation the Minister said that he was now discussing these various matters with his colleagues in the Cabinet and with the Prime Minister.

We then agreed on a communiqué to the Japanese press stating simply in effect that we had explored the field of Japanese-American relations in a mutually constructive spirit. He however authorized me to tell the American press correspondents that I had presented the American point of view in general and in detail. This was done.

At no point in the conversation was the question of negotiating a new treaty between the United States and Japan touched upon either by the Minister or myself.

The atmosphere of the conversation was excellent and at the end of the official exchanges of views the Minister and I indulged in pleasant personal reminiscences.

Joseph C. Grew

Press Release Issued by the Department of State on November 4, 1939[21]

In reply to inquiries by press correspondents for comments on press despatches from Tokyo to the effect that Mr. Joseph C. Grew, American Ambassador to Japan, informed the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs on November 4 that Japan was in danger of economic pressure from the United States if it continued its present program in China, the Department informed the correspondents that the American Ambassador to Japan has reported by telegraph that his talk with the Foreign Minister today dealt with objective facts and that he wished to say categorically that no threats of economic sanctions were made either in the substance or in the tone of what he said.

793.94/15485a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

Washington, November 13, 1939—8 p. m.

349. For your information.

1. On October 11 the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy, when calling on an officer of the Department, expressed the opinion that a central regime would be set up very soon under Wang Ching-wei;[21a] that the regime would not be a puppet one; that it would be a fully independent and well-established government; but that it would prob-

---

[21] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, November 4, 1939 (vol. I, No. 19), p. 465.

[21a] Formerly a member of the Chinese Government.

ably be necessary, from the point of view of combating communist activities, for Japanese forces to remain at certain points in China for a period of time. On November 7, during a call on another officer of the Department, the Counselor again referred to the proposed regime, stating that the Japanese placed great hopes in its establishment; that the Japanese expected the regime to become a stable and independent one like "Manchukuo"; that he did not expect the Japanese to raise questions of *de jure* recognition of the new regime by the United States and other powers but it was hoped that, as a solution to many difficulties, foreign governments would deal and cooperate with the new regime. In regard to the question of Japanese troops, the Counselor stated that it was hoped that the time would come when they could withdraw but that of course was a very difficult question.

2. It is our opinion that the proposed regime, if set up, would be a purely artificial creation, and that its existence would depend upon Japanese armed support; that the regime would lack any spontaneous or genuine broad support on the part of the Chinese public; and that it would be designed primarily to serve the special purposes of Japan which, as in the case of the regimes established during recent years under Japanese auspices in Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, at Peiping and at Nanking, would result in depriving the people and the Government of the United States, and the people and governments of other third countries, of long-established rights of equal opportunity and fair treatment in China which are legally and justly theirs. We could not regard the setting up of such a regime as evidence of a disposition on Japan's part to pursue a course in and with regard to China which would be in accord with fundamental principles and policies in which this Government believes. The setting up of such a regime would therefore in our opinion serve to render more difficult rather than to facilitate an adjustment of American-Japanese relations.

Sent to Tokyo. Repeated to Peiping and Chungking.

HULL

894.00 P.R./144

Press Statement by the Japanese Prime Minister (Abe), November 21, 1939 [22]

In a press interview on November 21, the Prime Minister outlined at some length various aspects of Japan's future relations with the proposed new regime in China, and he said that the Government expected to follow in settling the China "incident" the principles laid down by Prince Konoe in the latter's statement of December 22, 1938.[23] He said he believed that the new regime would eventually assimilate the Chungking Government, thus obviating any need for Japan to have any future dealings with the latter. He reiterated the Japanese contention that North China and Inner Mongolia should be a special zone for Japan, both politically and economically, and that Japan would show more concern over those areas than over any other part of China. He said that Japan probably would conclude an anti-Comintern pact with reborn China along the lines of the Japanese-German-Italian anti-Comintern accord,[23a] and that Japan would, in all probability, keep troops in China as long as that pact was in force.

---

[22] Reprinted from enclosure in covering despatch No. 4377, December 28, 1939, from the Ambassador in Japan; received February 5, 1940.

711.94/1366

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[WASHINGTON,] November 24, 1939.

The Japanese Ambassador called this afternoon to see me at his request and in view of the return of the Secretary of State the Ambassador was received by the Secretary in the latter's office.

After the customary preliminary exchanges of courtesies the Secretary waited for the Ambassador to commence the conversation. The Ambassador stated that he was calling solely of his own initiative and not by instruction of his Government and that the purpose of his call was to undertake a general exchange of views in as much as the Ambassador believed that there was considerable, and perhaps increasing, misunderstanding on the part of public opinion in the United States of the course pursued by Japan in China and of the policy of the Japanese Government in its relations with China. The Ambassador stated that the two principles of Japanese policy towards China were, first, the desire of Japan to guard against the spirit of communism in China, and second, the need of Japan to assure herself of satisfactory economic relations between China and Japan. The Ambassador went on to say that the Government of Japan had made every effort to satisfy these two objectives through negotiations with the government of General Chiang Kai Shek, but that unfortunately negotiations had proved fruitless and there had arisen the major conflict now going on between Japan and China. As a result of this conflict many areas in China were under the occupation of the Japanese Army and as a result of this situation "inconvenience", as the Ambassador phrased it, had resulted to American nationals and to American business interests. At the same time, the Japanese Government had given the most positive instructions to its military authorities in China that such impediments to American nationals and business interests should be avoided in so far as might be possible and it was the belief of the Government of Japan that as soon as hostilities ceased these obstacles to American nationals and commercial interests could be immediately lessened and eventually removed. The Ambassador stated that the Government of Japan abided by the principles of the Open Door in China and that the impediments and prejudices from which American nationals and business interests in China were now suffering should be regarded as only temporary in character.

---

[23] Vol. I, p. 482.

[23a] For text, see p. 159.

The Ambassador said that he realized that relations between Japan and the United States were somewhat "strained" and that it was his earnest desire as Ambassador here to do everything that might be possible to improve relations, but that he did not feel that a satisfactory result in this sense could be obtained if the two governments devoted themselves to a discussion of "principles". On the contrary he felt that an effort should be made to discuss a practical solution of the problems which had arisen. The Ambassador then went on to say that the liberal elements in Japan as well as the business interests in Japan were sincerely friendly to the people of the United States and earnestly desired an improvement in relations between the two countries, but that if no such improvement were forthcoming they would unquestionably become "disappointed"; and if no means of obtaining economic cooperation from the United States were found, these elements in Japan would possibly find it necessary to look elsewhere for these means of economic cooperation, and that arrangements between Japan and Soviet Russia for economic cooperation might consequently be the inevitable result.

When the Ambassador had concluded, the Secretary replied by saying that he, of course, was confident of the Ambassador's individual desire to bring back relations between the two countries to that standard of friendship which the two peoples had enjoyed for a period of two generations. He said that he felt sure that the Japanese Government must appreciate that no country had pursued a policy of greater friendship towards Japan than the United States, and that while at times both Governments felt that developments had occurred which were not to their liking, he nevertheless believed that the Japanese people must appreciate the fact that the Government of the United States had no ambitions for territorial expansion in the Far East, nor was it pursuing any policy actuated by selfish motives which could be construed as prejudicial to Japan. He said that the innumerable incidents involving the infringement of the rights of the United States in China and the legitimate treaty interests of American nationals in China were a matter of legitimate concern to the American people and that this Government felt that this condition could not go on for an indefinite period. The Secretary stated that it was particularly disappointing to this Government, when it called attention to these infringements of its legitimate rights and of the interests of its nationals in China, to obtain the impression from the Japanese Government that such action on our part was likely to create a feeling on the part of the Japanese people that they wished to replace their relations with the United States by closer relations with another power. The Secretary added that whatever surprise might be created in the United States by the development of closer relations between Japan and another power, it would not be equivalent to the surprise which was created when Hitler entered into closer relations with that same foreign power.[23b]

The Ambassador was much taken aback with this remark, of which he undoubtedly gained the full significance.

The Secretary then inquired whether it was correct that Japan had some 800,000 troops now engaged in hostilities in China. The Ambassador replied that he was not precisely informed on that point, but that he thought that if the Secretary referred to the troops stationed in Manchuria as well as in China proper, that might be a correct estimate.

The Secretary then inquired what was the intention of the Japanese Government with regard to that number of troops in China. The Ambassador replied that after hostilities had ceased undoubtedly the major part of the troops would be removed. The Ambassador went on to say that after the kidnapping of General Chiang Kai Shek [23c] a deal had been made by his wife and other friends with the communist leaders in China so that General Chiang would no longer attack the communists and would attack Japan, and that it was for that reason that Japan found it impossible to negotiate with General Chiang's government. He said, however, that the Japanese Government believed that a new Chinese Government would soon be installed with which the Japanese Government could undertake negotiations providing for settlement of all the matters at issue.

The Secretary inquired whether the retention of Japanese troops in China by Japan would be for the purpose of bolstering up that government and maintaining it in power. The Ambassador answered that undoubtedly Japanese troops would be maintained after the creation of this new Chinese government for a sufficient time in order to obtain assurance that order would be maintained, et cetera, but that eventually the number left would be very small.

[23b] For text of the German-Soviet nonaggression treaty, signed at Moscow, August 23, 1939, see Department of State, *Bulletin*, August 26, 1939 (vol. I, No. 9), p. 172.

[23c] In December 1935, during an inspection trip in Shensi Province.

The Secretary then inquired whether the retention of Japanese troops in China would mean that the same measures of discrimination against American trade, exchange control, et cetera, would likewise be kept in force because of the continued presence of Japanese troops in China. The Ambassador answered that while the war was being waged in China by Japan measures such as the imposition of exchange control, et cetera, were required in order to make it possible for the Japanese forces to obtain food supplies, clothing, et cetera, but that after hostilities had ceased these measures would be greatly relaxed and the "inconvenience" to American interests would be correspondingly diminished.

The Secretary then inquired whether this Government was to take as accurate the interpretations given to the "new order in the East" enunciated by Japanese statesmen in Japan. The Ambassador replied that he believed that the interpretation given by Prince Konoye was to be regarded as accurate, as were the bases for peace with China enunciated by Prince Konoye in December 1938. The Secretary stated that the implications of such interpretations of the new order in the East were necessarily of very great concern to the American public because of the impressions thereby created that the rights of the United States in China and the rights and interests of its nationals were to be determined as the Japanese Government saw fit and not as treaties and international law laid them down.

The Ambassador again referred to the belief he had expressed before that a satisfactory solution of these problems could be found in a practical way provided the two Governments did not limit themselves to a consideration of principles.

The Secretary then stated that if that was the case, it seemed to him that the first move must legitimately and logically come from the Japanese Government in order that this Government might be advised as to the practical manner in which the Japanese Government proposed to remove the obstacles to friendly relations between the two Governments in accordance with the Ambassador's expressed desire. It was made very clear to the Ambassador that this Government expected the Japanese Government to present concrete evidence of the manner in which the legitimate grounds for complaint on the part of this Government were to be removed and that this Government did not feel called upon to take the initiative in making any suggestions of this character.

The Secretary concluded the conversation by telling the Ambassador that he should feel free to come in to see him at any time should he have any suggestions of this character to offer.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

711.94/1373 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, December 4, 1939—10 p. m.
[Received December 4—5:40 p. m.[24]]

656. My 655, December 4, 8 p. m.[25] Following is the memorandum of my conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs today which lasted for one hour and a half. In view of the probability of inaccurate press speculation it seems preferable to send this telegram direct to Washington rather than via naval radio through Shanghai. Owing to the importance of the subject and in order adequately to convey the tone of the Minister's remarks I do not feel justified in curtailing this long telegram.

The Minister said that he was glad to resume our talks, the last of which had occurred on November 4, and that he was sorry for the delay in continuing them. He said that he had carefully studied the statements which I had made at our last meeting as well as the documents left with him. He considered very valuable the suggestions which I had made to him with regard to the importance of furnishing direct evidence of the intention of the Japanese authorities to put an end to the bombings of American property, the insults to American citizens and the encroachments on American commercial activities in China which must be removed. Admiral Nomura realizes that the impression exists in the United States that these various acts have been deliberate and that there is an intention on the part of the Japanese authorities to expel American interests from China. He desired to give me categorical assurances that such an impression is a misunderstanding and contrary to fact. Military operations on an unprecedentedly gigantic scale over extensive areas are going on in China and all of the incidents and cases of which we have complained have been accidental. The Japanese forces have been ordered to pay every possible attention in their power to protect and respect American property and citizens in China. The Minister said that he had discussed this matter with his competent colleagues in the Cabinet and he could tell me as a fact that the personnel of the military commands in China has been so arranged as to ensure this protection and respect.

The Minister desired to say that such limitations to the commercial activities of Americans in China as have occurred are a result of the military operations including control of the occupied areas, such operations not being consonant with the peaceful enjoyment of ordinary commercial rights. These limitations are however exceptional and temporary and our rights will be restored when peace comes. It will only lead to misunderstanding and confusion to generalize and to forecast future conditions on the basis of these temporary circumstances.

---

[24] Telegram in three sections.
[25] Not printed.

At this point I mentioned some of the different ways in which American commercial rights and interests were being injured including the setting up of monopolies which had resulted in ruining the business of various American interests. It seemed to me difficult to explain these monopolies and other restrictions as due to military necessity. The Minister said that in war time it became necessary to control commodities and that the monopolies and other handicaps could be explained on this basis. I countered, however, with the observation that many of these measures gave the American Government and people the impression that they were intended to be permanent and that I would welcome concrete evidence to the contrary.

The Minister then said that he desired to repeat the assurances given me by his predecessors that the Japanese forces in China have not the slightest intention to drive out American interests and that they have the strictest orders to the contrary. He said that our commercial problems in China should be dealt with both in Tokyo and in the field and he requested that American officials in the field should keep in close touch with local Japanese officials. The Minister said that the cases both of bombings of American property and insults to American citizens were decreasing. In Pakhoi and Nanning for instance he has heard of no case of the damaging of American property in that area. Briefly, measures were also being taken to facilitate American commerce, as in the case of shipments of wood oil from Hankow and of lace and drawn work from Swatow. The Minister was thus in a position, he says, to point out that positive measures were being taken in line with the valuable suggestions which I had made at our last meeting. He appreciated my honest desire to improve relations and by the way of reciprocating this attitude he was now studying with the proper authorities such measures as could properly be taken.

The Minister expressed the regret that while he and I were making joint efforts to improve relations these efforts were being injured by the sometimes too liberal expressions of opinion by important people in the United States, including statements with regard to a possible embargo against Japan.

At this point I interpolated some pertinent observations with regard to the freedom of the American press and of public discussion and that we had found by experience that measures to control the utterances of the press or of individuals often defeated their own object by causing an intensification of those utterances. I added that the public statements of individuals outside of the Government even though those individuals might be in close touch with the Government did not necessarily represent the Government's views. The Minister smilingly observed that the same situation, especially with regard to the press, obtained also in Japan.

The Minister then said that he desired to present certain figures which he thought I would find welcome as meeting some of my representations in our last conference and wait for concrete proposals for the settlement of pending questions. He said that the list of cases which I had presented to him had been carefully analyzed and a résumé drawn up on the basis of available documents. He thereupon handed me an informal document in Japanese which he thought I would probably wish to have translated and he read to me the following résumé:[26] (*a*) Representations acknowledged or answered—179; (*b*) representations not acknowledged or answered—203 (1) no acknowledgment or reply required 22, (2) not acknowledged but the contents dealt with by communication to the appropriate officials in China 27, (3) not answered but settled locally or dealt with 8, (4) investigations still going on but not yet answered 110, (5) miscellaneous 36.

The Minister expressed regret that some of our representations had not been acknowledged or answered owing to clerical oversight but he could assure me that all of our representations were receiving attention and that the competent officials were seeking solutions.

Some cases had been settled or were about to be settled such as the Nyhus case and the cases of bombings around Shanghai and Nanking which amounted to 39.[26a] In these cases the investigations had been completed and the Japanese officials were in touch with our own officials in Shanghai with the view to finding solutions. The Minister said that Mr. Yoshizawa [26b] would explain either to Mr. Dooman or to me the details of the informal document which he had handed to me and would also be glad at all times to discuss pending questions. He said he thought it would be well for us to have periodical and frequent talks with Mr. Yoshizawa and he recommends that the officials of the Foreign Office and the Embassy constitute themselves as a sort of permanent committee to deal with these pending matters. Thus speedy settlement of these questions could be made or agreement reached as to how to solve them and this should lead to more stable relations between Japan and the United States.

The Minister alluded to the press reports that there are over 600 cases awaiting solution. Such incorrect reports mislead the public and injure our relations. He thought it would be useful to publish the actual facts and suggested Mr. Yoshizawa get in touch with us with that end in view.

---

[26] Entitled "Table B"; not printed.

[26a] For details, see vol. I, pp. 487 ff.

[26b] Director of the American Bureau of the Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

The Minister said that this completed his official observations and that he would now like to talk "off the record." With regard to our treaty of commerce and navigation he said that "even if the treaty expires I hope that relations may be maintained in a normal way and that there will be no cause for the people of both countries to get excited about." Japan's trade with the United States represented a very large percentage of Japan's entire trade and if commerce with the United States should be impaired Japan would obviously have to seek other commercial channels.

[Paraphrase.] It appeared to me that an implied threat of an understanding with the Soviet Government was contained in the foregoing remark of Nomura and that the remark might be considered as seeking indirectly an opportunity for bringing up the matter of negotiations for a *modus vivendi* or for a new treaty. I therefore took occasion to inform Nomura of the Secretary's views (expressed on November 24 to Ambassador Horinouchi[27] and cabled me on November 27), emphasizing the consideration that this Government did not feel obligated to assume the initiative in offering for consideration practical measures for removing the impediments to friendly relations between the United States and Japan.

Thereupon I took up several individual cases with Nomura, as reported separately. [End paraphrase.]

The following press release was agreed upon:

> "The Minister for Foreign Affairs and the American Ambassador today continued their talks covering the general field of Japanese-American relations in a mutually constructive spirit."

The interview thereupon terminated.

Code text to Peiping and Shanghai by air mail. Shanghai please repeat to Chungking via naval radio.

GREW

711.94/1395

Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)

[TOKYO,] December 6, 1939.

Mr. Yoshizawa asked whether I would be interested in hearing the report of the Japanese Ambassador at Washington on his last conversation, that of November 24, with the Secretary of State. Upon my reply that I would, Mr. Yoshizawa read the telegraphic report, which followed that of the report received by us from the Department. The former was, however, much longer and gave a more detailed account of the conversation. It was interesting to note that Mr. Horinouchi completely missed the Secretary's observation with regard to the lack of surprise which would attend any treaty arrangement between Japan and the Soviet Union: he understood the Secretary to say that the United States would be *more* surprised by such an arrangement than it was by the non-aggression treaty between the Soviet Union and Germany.

---

[27] See memorandum by the Under Secretary of State, *supra*.

Mr. Yoshizawa then referred to the desire expressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs during the course of his conversation on December 4 with the Ambassador, that members of the Foreign Office and of the Embassy meet at frequent intervals to discuss China problems and that they constitute themselves into an informal standing committee. With that statement in mind, Mr. Yoshizawa had asked me to call so that we might informally talk over matters of procedure.

He said that the Foreign Office had closely studied the list of "cases" presented by the Ambassador to Admiral Nomura on November 4, and that the position was somewhat more favorable than that indicated by our list. This could be explained largely by the fact that a number of cases had been settled "on the spot", as he put it, that is, following negotiations in China, without such settlements having been recorded in correspondence between the Embassy and the Foreign Office. The number of cases of bombings, including cases of machinegunning by Japanese airplanes, stands now at 144, and the number of cases of occupation of American properties, destruction, looting, et cetera, at 73. He regarded these two groups of cases as constituting one category.

There were then a number of cases and problems with a politico-economic complexion. They involved in varying degrees high policy and did not, therefore, lend themselves readily to solution. They were:

1. Shanghai International Settlement.
2. Customs and currency.
3. The maintenance of the Salt Gabelle and the servicing of loans secured by the salt tax.
4. Chefoo Harbor Improvement Committee.
5. Navigation of the Yangtze River.
6. Moneys due for goods sold on credit to the Peiping–Suiyuan Railway.
7. Taxes imposed at Kaifeng and Tatung on oil brought in by the Standard Oil Company.
8. Prohibition on exports from North China on hides and skins.
9. Control of trade at Chefoo.
10. Purchases of leaf tobacco in Central China and Shantung by the Universal Leaf Tobacco Company.

These were admittedly difficult questions, as military operations, the suppression of financial and other forms of assistance to the Chinese Government, et cetera, had to be considered with a view to terminating the hostilities in China as soon as possible. Given goodwill on both sides, however, he thought that discussions could be carried on in a constructive spirit and that substantial progress could be made.

There were finally the basic and fundamental problems. Obviously there was little that could be done now in the way of examining principles of policy, such as the territorial and administrative integrity of China, but Mr. Yoshizawa hoped that we could put forward our respective views for purposes of clarification. Such clarification would be helpful against the time when conditions would make possible a search for definitive adjustment of views.

Having classified the various problems, Mr. Yoshizawa proceeded to discuss measures which might be taken by Japan to meet the American position. He divided these into two categories: negative and positive. The negative measures covered the stopping of action on the part of the Japanese directly injurious to American lives and property, such as bombings, looting, forcible occupation of mission premises, et cetera, and compensation in some form for damage already done. He said that the committee set up to examine claims had completed investigation of 39 cases which occurred in the area between Shanghai and Nanking. Mr. Yoshizawa had his assistant bring in the documents, and he showed me the stack of papers about a foot high as evidence of the work which the committee had already done. The committee had recommended the payment in a number of instances of moneys as *ex gratia* donations, scaled according to the strength of the evidence of Japanese responsibility for the damage done. These cases would be shortly taken up with the American Consul General at Shanghai with a view to settlement.

Mr. Yoshizawa said that the plan which he presented about two weeks ago to Admiral Nomura for the conversation with Mr. Grew which eventually took place on December 4 contemplated that the conversation cover only the "negative" measures which Japan could take, but that Admiral Nomura was insistent that indication be given at the same time of the "positive" measures which the Japanese Government was prepared to take to improve or ameliorate conditions in China affecting the exercise by Americans of their rights. He had, however, represented to Admiral Nomura that it was necessary for the Japanese Government to keep its feet on the ground and to await developments which would make possible the implementation of promises to take positive action calculated to improve conditions. The first of these developments must be the setting up of the new central regime under Wang Ching-wei, and that was to take place in the near future. It was his intention, then, to propose a further conversation between Admiral Nomura and Mr. Grew in order that the plan of the Japanese Government for the further meeting of the American position could be presented. Such measures as could be taken would touch largely on the cases of a politico-economic character above listed as the second category of outstanding questions.

Mr. Yoshizawa then expressed disappointment over the unfavorable publicity in the United States with regard to the steps already taken by the Japanese to improve the situation. It was a fact that bombings had practically stopped, that American properties had been evacuated, and that some claims had been settled, and he thought that it might be advisable for the Foreign Office to give out some facts. I said to Mr. Yoshizawa that, in my opinion, the giving out of publicity at this time would be a mistake, as it would be difficult for the Japanese to make any correct statement which could have any beneficial result. I referred to the large number of replies that we had recently received from the Foreign Office on bombing cases, and I pointed out that mere mention of the fact that replies had been recently made in 59 cases of bombing would probably give the public the impression that progress was being made, whereas in point of fact the replies contained in every instance disclaimer of Japanese responsibility. Every statement given out by the Foreign Office would, I felt certain, require further counter publicity to put it in accurate perspective. Mr. Yoshizawa said that there was no pretense that the replies which I mentioned were conclusive and final. The Foreign Office had failed thus far to take cognizance of our various notes, and the replies which had been sent were intended to discharge the obligation of the Foreign Office to indicate that it was seized of these matters. So far as the question of publicity was concerned, the last thing he wished to do was to start a controversy in the press of both countries.

In concluding the conversation I said that I would report to the Ambassador the general line of procedure proposed. Mr. Yoshizawa suggested that we meet again early next week.

711.94/1373 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (*Grew*)

[Substance]

WASHINGTON, December 8, 1939—8 p. m.

392. Reference is made to conversations between the Ambassador and the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs on December 4 (see telegram 656, December 4, 10 p. m.) and between the Counselor of Embassy and the Director of the American Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office on December 6 (see telegram 666, December 7, 2 p. m.[28]).

---

[28] Not printed; see memorandum of December 6, 1939, *supra.*

(1) The two telegrams cited were read with interest in the Department, which approves the Ambassador's attitude during his conversation and concurs in his points made at that time.

(2) With reference to the Ambassador's request for the Department's comment and instructions, it is suggested that the attitude and position of the United States Government continue to be accurately represented by the viewpoint and desiderata which were set forth in the Department's telegraphic instructions prior to the Ambassador's conference with General Ugaki on July 4, 1938,[28a] and in the American notes to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs on October 6 and December 30, 1938.[29] The Department expresses confidence in the Ambassador keeping in mind this attitude and position

(3) Respecting the procedure outlined by Director Yoshizawa, the Department states that naturally it has no objection to classifying problems in such manner as may seem helpful to the Japanese Foreign Office in considering the situation, but the Ambassador is asked to avoid an expression of approval of or agreement to any special classification. The various problems involved are conceived by the Department to be integral parts of a single larger problem, which is unwarranted interference with American rights and interests in and concerning China. With reference especially to Yoshizawa's proposed categories, it is the opinion of the Department that without involving in a fundamental fashion "basic principles" there could scarcely be effected a fair adjustment of problems which have to do with Yangtze River navigation, Shanghai's International Settlement, Chinese maritime customs, Chinese currency, etc.

(4) Reactions of the Department to statements made by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs are indicated in the comments given below, while the Department's reaction to his statements regarding American claims has been telegraphed separately.[30]

Regarding the Minister's reference to a decrease in instances of American properties in China being bombed by Japanese military airplanes and of instances of American citizens being insulted and affronted, the Department observes that, although a complete cessation of these occurrences naturally is essential to improving Japanese-American relations, the stopping of direct physical attacks on American citizens and property would be purely a negative development.

Regarding commerce, it was pointed out with some evidence of satisfaction by the Foreign Minister that certain shipments of lace and drawn work from Swatow and of wood oil from Hankow indicated a Japanese wish to facilitate American enterprise in China. If viewed in a perspective that includes the normal free movement of Chinese-American trade, to call attention especially to the isolated instances just mentioned of cargo shipments (which were subject to various restrictive conditions) is to emphasize the enormous damage inflicted and continuing to be inflicted by Japanese military operations in China upon general American interests in and concerning China.

[28a] See memorandum of July 4, 1938, by the Ambassador in Japan, vol. I, p. 605.

[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 785 and 820.

[30] Not printed.

Regarding the Minister's indication that military operations have resulted in limitations being placed upon American commercial activities in China, that such limitations are temporary and exceptional, and that upon the coming of peace these American rights will be restored, does he suggest that official companies under Japanese Government control (namely, the North China Development Company and the Central China Promotion Company) and the growing and extensive monopolistic control by these companies of various phases of Chinese economic life are only incidental to Japanese military operations and upon cessation of such operations will vanish, together with their subsidiaries in China? The Japanese authorities, or régimes which function with their support and under their guidance, are attempting the establishment in China of currencies which are linked with the Japanese yen in such manner and with such trade controls discriminatory in character that, though there is comparative freedom of movement for commodities and funds between Japan and its occupied areas in China, there is a serious disruption of the normal flow of Chinese-American trade. Is it suggested by the Foreign Minister that these developments also are temporary in nature?

While the United States Government appreciates fully the efforts being made by the Japanese Government to ameliorate the material damage being done in China to American interests, it is constrained to observe that these efforts thus far are felt to have little more than touched the fringe of the problem.

(5) The above suggestive comments are offered to the Ambassador as of possible assistance in his further conversations with Japanese Foreign Office officials.

Repeated to Chungking and Peiping.

Hull

711.942/388: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, December 18, 1939—10 p. m.
[Received 10:08 p. m.[31]]

687. My 686, December 18, 6 p. m.[32] Following is our translation of the *pro memoria* read and handed to me by the Minister for Foreign Affairs today:

---

[31] Telegram in four sections.

[32] Not printed.

December 18, 1939.

1. On two previous occasions I have had the opportunity of consulting with Your Excellency on the problem of opening the way for improvement in the existing condition of relations between Japan and the United States. Today is our third meeting. On the occasion of our first interview, November 4, Your Excellency expressed the hope that in order to open the way for the improvement of existing conditions in the relations between Japan and the United States, Japan would on its part take such measures as would directly indicate to the American people that Japan desires improved diplomatic relations. These measures were to be not only of a negative but also of a positive nature. The summarized table which you presented at our meeting on November 4[33] has been carefully analyzed, the true conditions of the pending problems and questions have been made clear and a policy for their solution has been set forth. It is desired in the first place to present an outline of the progress, based on this policy, which has been made toward a solution.

I should like to call to Your Excellency's attention the following facts with regard to the so-called negative measures of which you have spoken:

> (1) Bombings. An examination of the number of recent cases reveals one during September, two during October and none during November.
>
> (2) Indignities. No cases have been heard of recently.
>
> (3) Questions concerning commercial rights and interests. While two or three cases have recently been reported by your Embassy, it is our policy to take appropriate and just measures for each case as soon as circumstances have been carefully examined.

Further, as it has been frequently stated, Japan is not in a position requiring it to assume responsibility for so-called compensation in such cases as are given under (*a*) on table B which was presented to Your Excellency last December 4. Nevertheless I am in a position again to declare that it is our policy to reimburse, as a solatium and token of sympathy, nationals of third countries promptly and in just and appropriate relation to the actual losses. If there is not complete agreement with regard to this point there is the possibility of further consideration. Among the items listed under (*b*), I can inform you that it is expected in the not distant future a settlement will be reached on the Western Roads Areas question which you seemed to view with particular seriousness in connection with the problems of the International Settlement at Shanghai. There are also prospects of readjustment at the same time of the question of the opening of the area north of Soochow Creek. I am sure that Your Excellency has also been informed by local Government [*sic*] reports that the question of the purchase of leaf tobacco in Shantung by the Universal Leaf Tobacco Company has been provisionally settled.

With respect to customs, currency, Salt Administration and other general problems relating to China, while exhaustive study must be given these matters in view of changing situations and future effects, in so far as the adjustment of these points with the interested countries is concerned, full consideration is being given to their interests, and a practical, fair settlement should be reached. Study is now being undertaken to this end.

---

[33] Table not printed.

2. The second point I should like to mention is the problem of navigation of the Yangtze River which has long been under consideration by the Japanese military. It is the intention of the military to open the lower reaches of the Yangtze River as far as Nanking. While military operations continue in that area, and opening of the river will cause various difficulties and inconveniences, it is possible gradually to moderate military requirements. Moreover, with the inauguration of the period for gradual building up of China, it is the intention of the military to open up a portion of China despite the military inconveniences which will have to be endured. However in dealing with the opening of the military [*river*] to navigation, consideration must be given to the need for consolidating various military establishments in that area and to the continued carrying on of military operations even at the present time along the banks of the river as far as Nanking, not to mention the upper reaches of the river; it therefore follows that there will be restrictions based upon military necessity. However, these restrictions should gradually be relaxed with the passage of time.

While it is desired to effect the opening of the river as early as possible in order to prevent any disturbances to the economic life of the area and to forestall any adverse effects upon the building up of the area, it is a matter [*sic*] anticipated, in the light of the preparation mentioned above and the necessity of consultation with various powers, that about two months will be required. The matter of the Pearl River is also being considered along the above lines.

3. On the occasion of my conversation with Your Excellency on November 4, I stated that in order to improve international relations a precise understanding on the part of one side of the views and position of the other was essential and Your Excellency concurred. In so far as we are concerned, we are doing all that we can along the lines above indicated to improve Japanese-American relations and we intend to continue this policy. In our previous conversation Your Excellency spoke of the utterances by certain types of persons in American official life and of the difficulty of suppressing these utterances or newspaper comment. As you are aware there occur in Japan as well statements criticizing or opposing the actions of the Government, and when the public is moved by these statements, the Government is unable to restrain it.

With special reference to the question of reopening the Yangtze River, the view is held in certain quarters that the Japanese forces having made enormous sacrifices to reopen the river after it had been closed by the Chinese, no obligation rests on the Japanese to throw the river open to all. Consequently, as above stated, if at a time when progress is being made toward the adjusting of pending questions and concrete preparations are being made for the throwing open of the Yangtze River, no effective results are seen from the standpoint of improving international relations, the Government would be attacked by public opinion. In such contingency, adverse criticisms and attacks would certainly arise not only in connection with the reopening of the river but with the settlement of other pending questions, and difficulties would develop in putting such plans of settlement into effect. The result would be that relations between Japan and the United States, instead of improving would, it is feared, [tend toward the opposite direction and so proceed to a point which it would be difficult to estimate. I earnestly hope that Your Excellency will appreciate these considerations.][34]

During our conversation on November 4, Your Excellency referred to measures both negative and positive and I recall Your Excellency's observation that "In my view it is possible to bring about a speedy reversal of public opinion in the United States[35] and there is possibility of improvement in our relations if these measures can be taken immediately." It is my expectation that the American Government will especially appreciate the fact that the Imperial Government is overcoming innumerable difficulties and as above stated is exerting its utmost efforts with a view to opening the way for improvement in American-Japanese relations, and that the American Government will in the same spirit reciprocate the efforts being put forward on our side. It goes without saying that more than anything else the termination of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation casts the darkest shadow over American-Japanese relations. There remains but a little more than one month before the treaty expires. On the occasion of our previous conversation I said I personally hope that if it is to be that the treaty must expire, commerce between the two countries may continue in a normal manner so that there may occur nothing which will cause the peoples of the two countries to be penalized. To meet this situation some means must be devised; formalities of various kinds must first be taken, but we cannot afford to postpone due [*giving thought*] to the time required for these formalities and nearly [*other*] related matters. I therefore believe that there is need for arranging to enter into negotiations before the Christmas holidays begin and request Your Excellency's consideration of this point."

Grew

711.942/386 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

Tokyo, December 18, 1939—11 p. m.
[Received December 18—7:15 p. m.[36]]

688. Reference my 686, December 18, 6 p. m.[37] My 687, December 18, 10 p. m., transmitted in translation the *pro memoria* upon which were based the Japanese Foreign Minister's remarks in his conversation today with me. The following points were also touched upon:

---

[34] Section inserted in brackets is missing from file copy of telegram; addition is made from copy of *pro memoria* transmitted in despatch No. 4367, December 22, 1939, from the Ambassador in Japan. (File No. 711.942/458.)

[35] See par. 2 of telegram No. 688, December 18, 1939, 11 p.m., from the Ambassador in Japan, *infra*.

[36] Telegram in two sections.

[37] Not printed.

(1) When the Foreign Minister divided Japanese-American problems into two categories, "negative" and "positive," I pointed out the existence of certain differences of opinion between Japan and the United States involving questions of fundamental principles, which might not fall within either category mentioned, as he apparently supposed. I said that these basic considerations had been presented clearly in documents which were left with him at the meeting on November 4.

(2) I do not recollect having spoken on November 4 to the Foreign Minister of a possible bringing about of "a speedy" reversal of American public opinion.

(3) Following completion by the Foreign Minister of his statement and expression by me of my personal appreciation of the Japanese Government's efforts to improve Japanese-American relations, I conveyed orally, informally, and fully to the Foreign Minister as under my Government's instruction the reactions of the Department to the statements made to me on November 4 by the Minister (see Department's 392, December 8, 8 p. m., paragraph 4) and with regard to American claims (see Department's 390, December 8, 6 p. m.[38]). Included was the observation by the Department that it feels the efforts of the Japanese authorities have thus far little more than "touched the fringe of the problem."

(4) Concerning monopolies in China, the Foreign Minister said it had become necessary to organize "economic blocs" of Japan, China, and "Manchukuo" in order to overcome difficulties in national defense questions. However, exclusion of other countries is not intended, while Japan is "quite ready to welcome foreign capital." To this, I inquired: "On a non-discriminatory basis?" and the Foreign Minister replied merely that foreign participation in these groupings would be welcome.

(5) Regarding currency questions, he commented that the Japanese Army had to be financed but that discriminations would be modified when fighting had stopped and a Chinese Government had been established. He said all of these "inconveniences" would be modified gradually.

(6) In concluding the conversation, the Foreign Minister spoke "off the record" to the effect that Japan and the United States must in their own interest prevent the European war's spread to the Far East and that conciliation between Japan and the United States will powerfully assist to avoid such a contingency.

GREW

---

[38] Not printed.

1940

793.94/15587a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

WASHINGTON, January 8, 1940—7 p. m.

13. The *New York Times* of January 8 contains a United Press story under Tokyo date line January 8 to the effect that it is understood that the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs is prepared to resume his discussions with you and to make in the course of such discussions a statement to you in regard to the Japanese Government's decision to sponsor the setting up of a new regime in China under Wang Ching-wei. Should the Foreign Minister in the course of conversation make such a statement to you, it is suggested that it would be advisable for you to express the view that the proposed regime, if set up, would seem to be an artificial creation and that, judged by the experience of regimes established during recent years under Japanese auspices in various parts of China, we cannot escape the conclusion that the proposed new regime would seem to be designed primarily to serve the special purposes of Japan and would operate toward depriving the people and the Government of the United States, and the people and governments of other third countries, of enjoyment—or even opportunity to enjoy—various long established rights in China which are legally and justly theirs. (See Department's telegram 349, November 13, 8 p. m., paragraph 2.)[39]

HULL

711.94/1407

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] January 31, 1940.

The Ambassador of Japan called at his own request. He began to approach matters of difference between our two Governments but I interrupted him to say that we were deferring all these matters to Ambassador Grew and the Japanese Foreign Minister at Tokyo.

The Ambassador then said that he had not come to discuss the various questions pending, but that he did wish to make inquiry regarding the violation of a contract between Japanese agencies and American citizens in connection with certain kinds of the most desirable gasoline. I replied that I was a little surprised that his Government, with a long list of violations of treaties, agreements and American interests all over China, would so much as take notice of a single minor matter such as the question he had in mind. I then said, suppose this small single matter be filed away in a pigeon-hole as has been done in so many cases of injury to American rights and interests in China, so that it could at some time in the future be taken up and discussed to a more or less extent. I remarked that so many countries were engaged in fighting in various parts of the world, either for conquest or for some other unknown and unthinkable purpose, that my Government felt that it should undertake to conserve quite a number of commodities and products in order to be able better to defend itself in case it should be attacked and that the gasoline proposition was a part of this conservation.

---

[39] *Ante*, p. 34.

I elaborated generally by saying to the Ambassador that, of course, he knew how earnestly I and others have pled with his Government since 1933 to pursue a peaceful law-abiding course of cooperation, economically and financially, with this nation; that it should be five times more desirable and more beneficial to Japan both from the long and short view, but the Army people in particular seemed to brush aside this sort of sound peaceful advice and pleading with the result that they moved into China with their military forces back in July 1937. I stated that my Government was under no illusion as to what was going on over there and what was the real purpose so far as violations, not only of treaties but especially the principle of equality of industrial and commercial rights and opportunities, were concerned; that in due time everyone would be elbowed out, as in the case of Manchuria, so that a preference for Japanese could be established throughout continental Asia. The Ambassador said that exports to Manchuria had increased, to which I replied that 85 to 90 percent were temporary exports in the way of military supplies and implements.

I then brought up the proposed new puppet government and said it was currently believed that this was being organized by Japanese military forces with the result that it would be conducted as in Manchuria altogether for and in the interests of Japan and at the expense of other nations. The Ambassador rather mildly denied this view but not even to his own satisfaction, as it seemed to me. He sought also to indicate that his Government did not expect to deny other nations their rights under the open door policy, or especially the principle of equality of commercial and industrial rights. I brushed aside this theory in view of the concrete facts, adding that the Japanese Government could in short order, if and when it might so desire, make clear to the world its position to this effect, but, of course, there was no real disposition so far for it to do so.

The Ambassador again referred to the alleged breach of the gasoline contract. I said that an additional reply or comment on the matter might well be that, in the language of the Japanese Government relating to the Nine Power Treaty, the gasoline understanding has become "obsolete". The Ambassador appeared a little amused but not much.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

711.94/1432 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

TOKYO, February 29, 1940—4 p. m.
[Received February 29—8:58 a. m.]

147. Replying to an interpellation in a committee meeting of the Lower House yesterday afternoon, the Foreign Minister made a statement with regard to Japanese-American relations of which the following is reported to be the substance:

> "Even though the United States does not understand the object of Japan's Holy War with China, opposes the establishment of a new order in East Asia on all fronts, and even though the United States should insist upon carrying through its demands, the Japanese Government is not afraid of the future. The situation has not reached that stage, however. With respect to the problem of opening the Yangtze to navigation, the Japanese Government, as I have repeatedly stated, does not entertain for a moment the idea that a new commercial treaty can be had in return for the opening of the Yangtze River. The question of the opening of the Yangtze and other problems pending between the United States and Japan which are capable of settlement will be dealt with appropriately, that is to say, they will be handled in accordance with Japan's 'independent' policy which is, after all, what we mean by 'Imperial way' diplomacy. To leave unsettled those problems which are capable of being settled and to employ them to obtain advantages in dealing with other problems is a policy contrary to the spirit of the Imperial way. We do not know precisely what the American Government has under consideration, but if it is determined to ignore completely the object of Japan's Holy War and to refuse to lift a finger, Japan should display an attitude of resolution. The purpose of Japan's Holy War is clear: it is the establishment of a new order in East Asia. From whatever angle this may be viewed it is open and aboveboard. With respect to the American attitude there is some misunderstanding among the Japanese people. The United States contends that Japan has ignored the Nine Power Treaty, etc., but the Japanese Government does not admit this contention. Neither the Japanese Government nor the Minister for Foreign Affairs have recognized this contention from the outset. If an attempt should be made to get Japan to recognize this contention by force of arms, a real problem would arise. As it is plain that Japan would not yield to the United States under such circumstances, I think it is a little early to argue that the Foreign Minister is yielding to the United States."

Cipher text by air mail to Shanghai and Peiping.

GREW

793.94/15767: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, March 15, 1940—8 p. m.
[Received March 16—9:07 p. m.]

179. Department's 92, March 14, 6 p. m.[41] The following is translation by the Foreign Office of the Prime Minister's statement:

"To free the world from contentions and conflicts and to make peace and good will prevail among mankind is an aim consonant with the great ideal upon which our Empire was founded. It is to that end that a new order in East Asia is contemplated. Every country should be enabled to find its proper place of peace and contentment; there should be amity and harmony among neighbors and there should be mutual respect for one another's natural endowments and common prosperity and progress for all.

In the performance of the sacred task of reconstructing East Asia, the first step to be taken is to create and insure a new international relationship between Japan, Manchukuo, and China. Needless to say, this new relationship should of necessity conform to the deal [*idea?*] underlying the construction of the new order in East Asia. That is why neighborly amity and good will, common defense against the Comintern and economic cooperation were advocated in the statement of Premier Konoye.[42] Our goal is plain as day. The concrete program for the construction of the new order which the Japanese Government proposes to accomplish in concert with the new Central Government of China is formulated on that very statement. It is devoted to no other purpose than that the nations concerned shall respect one another's racial and national endowments and shall cultivate friendly relations of natural aid and good fellowship, stand guard against the menace of communism so as to insure the peace of East Asia, and practice the principle of ministering to one another's needs by setting up a reciprocal economic system. That Japan will respect China's independence and freedom has been made clear in the successive statements issued by our Government, and it will be proved in fact as the present disturbances subside.

Although Japan and China are now engaged in hostilities, the two peoples retain in their hearts the spoils [*sic*] of mutual sympathy and tolerance. The longer the hostilities last, the greater will be the sacrifice imposed upon East Asia. But certainly the great timeless mission of our Empire cannot be abandoned simply because of the sacrifices of this conflict. The determination of our Government and people is firm as ever, and the strength of our nation has been replenished according to plan, so that we are all ready to carry on our campaign, no matter how long, until the eyes of China's anti-Japanese and pro-Communist regime are finally opened.

Farsighted men are not lacking among the 400 million people of China. Some enlightened leaders have long advocated peace and national salvation. In order to rescue their nation from suffering and distress, they are fearlessly standing for right and dedicating their lives to their cause. These men who share in the same solicitudes toward the general welfare of East Asia are our comrades. We cannot but admire them for their high purpose and their unselfish enterprise.

---

[41] Not printed; it requested report of statement by the Japanese Prime Minister (Yonai) on March 13, 1940.

[42] Of December 22, 1938, vol. I, p. 482.

Mr. Wang Ching-wei is an outstanding figure of this group. He could not endure to see the actual state of affairs by which his people are needlessly plunged into the depth of misery owing to the mistaken policy of the Chungking regime, which in the last analysis only hastened the Sovietization of his country. He came out for national salvation through opposition to communism and conclusion of peace with Japan. In the face of all manners of pressure and persecution by Chungking, he pursued the path of his conviction, bringing light to his people lost in darkness. Thus has he won the confidence and the following of his nation. His peace and national salvation movement as well as the preparation for a new central government have made rapid headway since the Sixth Kuomintang National Congress which was held in Shanghai in August of last year.

For the sake of the peace of East Asia, we are truly gratified to know that the Central Political Council is to meet soon and a new central government will be brought to being with the united support and cooperation of both regimes at Peiping and Nanking and also of many leaders representing the various political groups and various sections of society. Japan will, of course, render wholehearted assistance toward the formation of the new government and is prepared speedily to extend recognition following its establishment.

In this connection I should add that I am deeply impressed by the fact that in full accord with Mr. Wang those leading statesmen in the Peiping and Nanking Government who have for the past two and a half years devoted every ounce of their energy to the reconstruction and rehabilitation of their respective areas, are now going forward with the work of restoring peace and building up a new China.

On the eve of the establishment of a new central government of China, I express my ardent hope that Mr. Wang and all those other men of vision and leadership, united in purpose and resolute in action, will proceed with the great task for the regeneration of Asia. I am convinced that their earnest endeavors will meet with approval and support, both in and out of China, and that the misfortune brought on by the present Sino-Japanese conflict will be turned into an eternal blessing."

Repeated to Peiping and Chungking.

Grew

711.94/1454 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, March 23, 1940—7 p. m.
[Received March 23—10:40 a. m.]

199. The press reports that the Foreign Minister made the following reply to an interpellation in regard to Japanese-American relations in the Budget Committee of the Lower House this morning:

"With respect to Japanese-American relations, we have been concerned that they have not been satisfactory of late. However, we by no means think that improvement is impossible. We are making and are determined to continue to make every effort toward improvement. The fundamental cause of Japanese-American relations reaching their present state, the focal point of which is the China incident, lies in the failure of the American Government and people fully to understand Japanese thought and action relating to the incident. The Government has exerted every effort in this connection but has not succeeded in having the United States recognize our real intentions or the new world situation. Each country has its own viewpoint and interests, and in some instances these cannot be understood no matter how they are explained. Present day Japanese-American relations are in a stage, I think, where the United States because of its relations with China or because of traditional habits of thought is not yet able to understand the Imperial Government's thought and actions. Nevertheless, the Imperial Government will exert every effort towards such understanding. It is of greater importance that not only should the Government and its representatives make every endeavor to explain in order that American public opinion may receive a correct understanding of the situation but that the Japanese people from all classes and quarters should discuss the problem from every angle in order that they too may convey correct understanding. In short, the Government does not think that Japanese-American relations are stalemated and that nothing can be done. We intend to make every possible effort to change the conception prevailing in public and private circles in the United States."

Shanghai please repeat to Peiping and Chungking.

GREW

711.94/1455 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

TOKYO, March 24, 1940—4 p. m.
[Received March 25—1:55 p. m.]

200. 1. Replying to an interpellation in the Budget Committee of the Lower House yesterday afternoon with regard to the attitude of the United States towards Japan, the Prime Minister is reported to have stated *inter alia* as follows (our translation of press stenographic record):

"As for the problem of a general embargo this is a serious matter for the country imposing the embargo, [as well as?] the country upon which it is imposed. If one false step is taken, danger lies ahead for both countries. I do not believe that the United States would risk applying a general embargo upon Japan. However, we must be prepared for any eventuality. The Government is giving every consideration to this point. However, the question of the danger to the two countries through the imposition of an embargo is more than important—it is pure supposition—and I must refrain from giving 'yes' or 'no' replies to questions based on supposition."

2. Significant portions of a reply by the Foreign Minister on the same occasion follow:

"As for relations between the Chungking Government and the United States the fact must be admitted that the United States, which recognizes the Chiang regime, aids that regime indirectly in various fields of trade. The loan of 25 million dollars [42a] and now the loan of 20 million [42b] may be placed in that category. The United States is supplying certain types materials to the Chiang regime none of which are supplied to Japan. In other words, indirect aid to the Chiang regime has the effect of a moral embargo. The United States would deny this, but that is the way it appears to Japan.

The United States does not fully grasp the real significance of the so-called new order in East Asia. As I have often stated, the United States harbors the misunderstanding that foreign rights and interests and American rights and interests and economic activity in China and in East Asia are to be ousted. As you are also aware the United States persistently advocates the application of the principle of the open door and equality of opportunity. I do not deny that the American attitude toward Japan has become stronger with the progress of the China incident and that Japanese-American relations have become progressively worse. As I have frequently declared we are making every effort to explain Japan's ideas with regard to the new order, the open door, equality of opportunity, etc. However, we have been unable up to the present time to convince the United States. The state of affairs is such that so long as hostilities endure in China misconceptions will be announced of the right of Americans and it will be impossible for Japan's real intentions to be understood. I trust, however, that with the progress of the incident, the diminution of hostilities, and the advent of peace it will be possible to predict [that] the United States [will] recognize the new situation. These considerations preclude the thought that relations between Japan and the United States are bound to become aggravated. We must exert every effort to perfect our policy and obtain recognition for it. Accordingly I believe that the Japanese Government should seize every opportunity to make the Japanese attitude fully understood by the American Government."

Repeated to Shanghai. Shanghai please repeat to Chungking and Peiping.

GREW

Statement by the Secretary of State, March 30, 1940 [43]

In response to inquiries with regard to the attitude and position of the Government of the United States in the light of the setting up at

---

[42a] See statement by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation on December 15, 1938, issued as press release No. P–1463.

[42b] See statement by the Federal Loan Administrator (Jones) on March 7, 1940, issued as press release FLA–18.

[43] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, March 30, 1940 (vol. II, No. 40), p. 343.

Nanking of a new regime, the Secretary of State made a statement as follows:

"In the light of what has happened in various parts of China since 1931, the setting up of a new regime at Nanking has the appearance of a further step in a program of one country by armed force to impose its will upon a neighboring country and to block off a large area of the world from normal political and economic relationships with the rest of the world. The developments there appear to be following the pattern of other regimes and systems which have been set up in China under the aegis of an outside power and which in their functioning especially favor the interests of that outside power and deny to nationals of the United States and other third countries enjoyment of long-established rights of equal and fair treatment which are legally and justly theirs.

"The Government of the United States has noted statements of high officials of that outside power that their country intends to respect the political independence and the freedom of the other country and that with the development of affairs in East Asia this intention will be demonstrated. To this Government the circumstances, both military and diplomatic, which have attended the setting up of the new regime at Nanking do not seem consistent with such an intention.

"The attitude of the United States toward use of armed force as an instrument of national policy is well known. Its attitude and position with regard to various aspects of the situation in the Far East have been made clear on numerous occasions. That attitude and position remain unchanged.

"This Government again makes full reservation of this country's rights under international law and existing treaties and agreements.

"Twelve years ago the Government of the United States recognized, as did other governments, the National Government of the Republic of China. The Government of the United States has ample reason for believing that that Government, with capital now at Chungking, has had and still has the allegiance and support of the great majority of the Chinese people. The Government of the United States of course continues to recognize that Government as the Government of China."

893.01/699 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, March 30, 1940—8 p. m.
[Received March 31—6:30 a. m.]

215. Following is Domei translation of the Government's statement issued today:

"Statement of the Imperial Japanese Government upon the occasion of the establishment of the new Central Government:

March 30, 1940. Life is a constant progression, and conditions change from time to time. The relations between nations are regulated in accordance with these changes. It is in conformity with such actualities that Japan is exerting her utmost efforts for the [omission] manifestation of international justice and the firm establishment of peace among mankind.

Now that a new Central Government of China has been established, and the construction of a renascent China begun, the full [*sic*] Japanese Government wish to offer their congratulations, they must extend to this new government their wholehearted cooperation and support for its development, in accordance with their repeated declarations.

It is Japan's earnest expectation that the various powers will come to a clear understanding of this solemn reality, and will forthwith contribute toward the establishment of peace in East Asia.

What Japan asks of China is that she make complete her independence and freedom on a moral basis, and that she proceed, in cooperation with Japan, towards the construction of a new order in Asia, thereby mutually participating in the resulting peace and prosperity.

In order that Japan, and the other countries of East Asia, may preserve their existence, it is only natural that she should show special concern and desire for the development and utilization of the resources of China. Japan has no intention, however, of excluding such peaceful economic activities of third powers as conform with the new situation in East Asia. On the contrary it is her desire to cooperate with these powers and thereafter share with them the benefits of international amnesties [*amenities?*]. It is for this reason that Japan, despite the abnormal conditions arising out of continued military operations, has sustained numerous inconveniences in order to protect the rights and interests of third powers. The Imperial Japanese Government are confident that the new China will pursue a similar policy.

A renascent China has just set out on the road to progress; a new defence is about to commence in East Asia. So long, however, as the remaining pro-Communist and anti-Japanese forces fail to awaken from their illusory dreams, Japan will not lay down her arms: nor will she relax her vigilance and her firm determination to surmount any obstacles that may arise in the future."

Sent to the Department via Shanghai. Shanghai please repeat to Chungking and Peiping.

GREW

893.01/706: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

TOKYO, April 1, 1940—7 p. m.
[Received April 1—10:45 a. m.]

222. According to the press, the Foreign Office spokesman at his press conference today with the foreign correspondents made *inter alia* the following remarks in regard to the Secretary's statement of March 30 concerning the Nanking regime (there is of course no actual written record of the remarks made at these conferences):

"The statement is natural, considering the attitude of the United States toward the China affair. It is very important, however, in two respects. The first is that from the conversations held last year between Ambassador Grew and the then Foreign Minister Admiral Nomura the United States Government gave us to understand that it was ready to enter into talks in a constructive spirit. But Mr. Hull in his statement makes it clear that the United States Government will not recognize the new government and on the other hand that it will continue to recognize as the National Government of China the Chungking Government with which Japan is engaged in hostilities. Such an attitude will instigate anti-Japanese groups such as the Committee for Nonparticipation in Japanese Aggression, headed by Henry L. Stimson,[44] to greater activities, and will also be a factor in immensely encouraging the Chungking Government. The second point is that of the efforts we have been making and the assurances we have given to ameliorate Japanese-American relations. Mr. Hull's statement, without waiting a reasonable length of time for those assurances to materialize, disregards them. The Hull statement charges Japan with setting up an economic bloc against the rest of the world. This is not a fact. Economic obstacles experienced by foreign powers are only a temporary phenomenon during the transitory period from hostilities to peace. We cannot nor can any other country be blind to the facts as they are. Our troops are occupying a smaller area of China and Chinese are fewer in number in that area than in the areas paying allegiance to Chungking. But substantially speaking, more than 90% of the total customs revenue of China is being collected in the areas under the new government. And more than half of the administrative organs of the country are under the new government. Mr. Hull's statement ignores new developments taking place in China and is inconsistent with the statement in the American Government's note of December 30, 1938,[45] to the Japanese Government that 'it is well aware of the changes that are taking place in the Far East.' [Apparent omission] the Japanese Government regards the attitude of foreign countries toward the new China regime with grave concern from the standpoint of peace and stability in the Far East. Japan can not cooperate with the powers who disregard this. We are doing our best to improve Japanese-American relations. Most of the issues have arisen out of the China affair. If that is the case, the United States should be a little more patient. If the United States desires peace and order in China, it should wait a little while longer and help us to establish peace and order there."

GREW

711.94/1552

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[TOKYO,] April 26, 1940.

When Mr. Arita came to the Embassy this evening I asked whether he desired our conversation to be formal or informal. He replied, "Entirely informal." He then said he wished to apologize for having failed to carry out his intention expressed to me when he took office last January* to continue the conversations begun with me by his predecessor. After studying the situation he had come to the conclusion that because of the wide discrepancy in the views of our two countries in matters of principle a continuance of the conversations looking toward the negotiation of a new commercial treaty at this juncture would be futile. (The Foreign Minister had said the same thing to the British Ambassador a few days ago, but had used the expression "owing to the rigidity of the American position".)

---

[44] Secretary of State during the Hoover administration.
[45] Vol. I, p. 820.

I agreed with Mr. Arita that important discrepancies in questions of principle existed in the views of our two Governments, but I added that more acute phases of the difficulties between the United States and Japan centered in the continued and recently aggravated interference on the part of the Japanese armed forces with American rights and interests in China which I felt should be obviated before the problems involving questions of principle could successfully be solved. At this point I showed to the Minister and read the headings of a statement of more than twenty typewritten pages covering the instances of current interference with American business, trade, and commerce through monopolistic measures and exchange control, and import and export control restrictions in China. (As this was an informal conversation I did not hand this document to the Minister but shall consider the advisability of sending it to him subsequently in support of my oral statement.) I said that I had become greatly discouraged by this recrudescence of bombings and other acute cases of interference with American rights and by the absence of visible effort to implement the assurances continually given us with regard to the intention of the Japanese Government to ensure in practice the principle of equal opportunity and respect for American commercial and other interests in China. The Minister replied that Mr. Tani had informed him of my recent representations concerning the bombings and the difficulties at the barriers in Tientsin,[46] and that he was doing his best to ameliorate these conditions. He hoped that the barriers in Tientsin would soon be raised. At least some of our complaints regarding monopolistic measures and exchange control and import and export restrictions would be solved when the hostilities in China were terminated. The Minister referred to his efforts to settle claims for damages in China which, even though the results might not be entirely satisfactory to the claimants, nevertheless represented an effort made in good faith to meet these claims.[47] I acknowledged these efforts but added that thus far they had barely touched the fringe of the whole problem.

---

*Reference Embassy's telegram No. 28, January 18, 1940. [Footnote on original memorandum; telegram under reference not printed.]

[46] See *pro memoria* of April 23, 1940, vol. I, p. 678, and Japanese reply of May 10, 1940, *ibid.*, p. 680.

The Minister then spoke of the rumors of my return to the United States on leave of absence. I replied that the question of leave of absence arose annually and that my plans for this year were not yet settled but that frankly, after waiting in vain for the last several months for some evidence of implementation of the assurances given me with regard to an improvement in the situation of American rights and interests in China and seeing only a recrudescence and intensification of interference with those rights and interests, I was becoming doubtful of my ability to accomplish constructive work here and felt that personal contact with my Government at this time might be more helpful than remaining in Tokyo. I said that I had already made the position and attitude of my Government perfectly clear to the Japanese Government and that we were now waiting patiently but apparently futilely for results. The Minister said that he hoped that I would not leave Japan at this juncture because the Japanese public, which at present is very much disturbed at the worsening of Japanese-American relations, would interpret my departure as a partial rupture of relations and that the public reaction might be "very serious". I replied that I would consider the matter in the light of the Minister's views and would let him know of my decision shortly. If I should decide to abandon my leave of absence I hoped that the decision would prove to be justified through a positive improvement in the situation of American interests in China.

The Minister then spoke of the forthcoming visit to Japan of the High Commissioner to the Philippines, Mr. Sayre, who, with Mrs. Sayre, is to visit us at the Embassy on April 30 for several days. He alluded to the proposed immigration bill and referred to certain alleged difficulties between the High Commissioner and the Japanese Consul General in Manila. I said that these matters could be discussed when Mr. Sayre arrives and in the meantime I read to him the immigration figures given in a telegram from the Department dated April 22.[48]

Mention was made of Admiral Taussig's [48a] recently reported remarks before a committee of the Senate and their effect on Japanese public opinion. I said that the one-sidedness of publicity in Japan was well illustrated by the importance attached by the Japanese press to the observations of an American officer, who had announced that he was speaking for himself alone and not on behalf of the Government, while not one word appeared in the Japanese press about the bombings and other serious incidents in derogation of American rights and interests continually occurring in China. I referred in this connection to past public utterances of Japanese officials, notably a speech by General Araki, then Minister of War, quoted in the press several years ago (and not subsequently withdrawn or denied in spite of my official protest) which included the phrase: "The United States and Soviet Russia are like ravening wolves and castaway cats, baring their teeth and claws for attack." The Minister made no comment.

---

[47] See report of May 10, 1940, from the Consul at Shanghai, vol. I, p. 682.

[48] Not printed.

[48a] Rear Admiral Joseph K. Taussig, Commandant of the 5th Naval District and Naval Operating Base at Norfolk, Va.

There ensued a desultory discussion of the war in Europe. In spite of the acrid nature of some of the comments advanced in the conversation, which lasted approximately one hour, it was conducted in friendly vein and tone. I ended on the note that statesmanship must look to the long future rather than to the immediate present and that the reasons for Japanese-American friendship are fundamental and must win out in the long run simply because, in the long run, Japan cannot get along without the friendship of the United States.

893.0146/768 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[Substance]

WASHINGTON, May 16, 1940—6 p. m.

154. In connection with the matter of the retention in China of British, French and Italian armed forces, the Ambassador is instructed to approach the Japanese Government informally to the following effect:

> According to information received from the Commander in Chief of the United States Asiatic Fleet, the commanders of all European forces in the neighborhood of Shanghai have orally and informally agreed that in case the European war should unfortunately spread they would maintain the peaceful *status quo* now existing at Shanghai. Information in regard to the agreement is understood to have been given to the Japanese authorities. Further information has been received from the American Embassy at Peiping to the effect that the officers in command of European armed detachments at Peiping evinced an altogether cooperative attitude in conformity with the agreement arrived at at Shanghai. The American Government takes for granted that the European forces at Tientsin are included in this attitude. As a party to various international agreements, including the Boxer Protocol, under the provisions of which the American Government and other governments keep bodies of naval and military forces in China, this Government expresses its gratification on account of this development, which, in its opinion, will further the interests of both neutral and belligerent nations.

The Ambassador is instructed to use his discretion in informing the British, Italian and French Ambassadors of the contemplated action before he approaches the Japanese Foreign Office.

HULL

794.00/176 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

TOKYO, June 4, 1940—8 p. m.
[Received June 5—5:30 a. m.]

413. The following is a summary of the press reports of [address by?] Minister for Foreign Affairs at Pacific Society last night:

> Fundamental policy of Japanese Empire based upon mission as stabilizing force East Asia. Obviously Japan concerned not only with China continent but also with South Seas areas. Economic relations between Japan and other countries East Asia very close. These countries' territories mutually dependent for prosperity. Japan has deep concern not only for political *status quo* Netherlands East Indies but also for economic resources, trade, industry, and development those islands.[48b] Can nations avoid conflict friction when there exist tariff walls, immigration restrictions, other barriers preventing smooth interchange of goods between nations which are complementary in economic sense? Construction new world order to come after present European war will require basic settlement of this issue.

Repeated by naval radio to Chungking and Peiping.

GREW

711.94/1525a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

WASHINGTON, June 10, 1940.

191. In the press conference on June 8 the Under Secretary, in reply to an inquiry as to whether there might be efforts under way to improve our relations with Japan, said that, as the correspondents knew, there had been continued conversations over a period of many months with regard to matters in which American nationals and this Government were interested, but that he had nothing particular in mind at the present moment. The correspondent mentioned a recent editorial in the *New York Daily News* and a column by Walter Lippmann declaring that this might be an opportune time for friendlier relations with Japan, and press reports of June 8 from Shanghai intimating that Japan was interested in the same question. The Under Secretary answered that he had seen a great many articles of this kind. He said that this Government was always anxious to maintain and create the most friendly relations with all countries, provided of

---

[48b] See also pp. 277 ff.

course that conditions and the policies of the other countries made it possible. Asked whether he was more hopeful of this being possible with regard to Japan at the present time, the Under Secretary said that we were always hopeful.

HULL

711.94/1603

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[TOKYO,] June 10, 1940.

In compliance with the Department's telegraphic instruction No. 180, June 4, 11 p. m.,[49] I met the Minister for Foreign Affairs today privately at the house of a mutual friend in order to reduce the risk of publicity. My conversation in general was based upon the tenor of paragraphs 7 and 8 of our telegram No. 400, June 3, noon; the Department's telegraphic instructions No. 172, May 30, 2 p. m.; and No. 180, June 4, 11 p. m.[50] During the course of my remarks I made a particular effort to obviate the possibility of the Minister's drawing any inference that either the American Government or I inclined toward any compromise or abandonment of policy or principle. The approach which I made was of a broad nature and not in specific terms.

I prefaced my remarks to the Foreign Minister by reading a press report [51] quoting Mr. Welles as declaring on June 8, in part, that our Government is desirous of attaining friendlier relations with all other countries, including Japan, provided internal conditions in those countries make such improvement feasible—observing at the same time that, although I had received no confirmation of the accuracy of the text, I knew that its general tenor reflected my Government's attitude. Mr. Arita commented that he had read the report with much pleasure.

After this introductory remark I referred to the Minister's request at our last meeting, on April 26, that the conversation at that time be regarded as entirely informal, and suggested that the same characterization apply to our talk today. The Minister concurred in this. I said that I was acting today upon my own initiative and speaking my own thoughts, and that I had asked for this meeting because it seemed to me important and possibly helpful that the Minister and I should from time to time explore the relations between our two countries. I said that I would like to develop our talk in two main phases: on the one hand, the past and the present; and on the other, the future.

Referring to the Minister's remark to the British Ambassador on May 27, quoting me as saying that there could be no possibility of an improvement of American-Japanese relations so long as the China conflict continued, I conveyed my impression, derived from our interview which took place on April 26, that the Minister himself shared that view. I said that although I did not remember ever having expressed my views to the Minister in exactly those terms, it must nevertheless be made clear with all the emphasis at my command that our relations cannot be expected to move into fundamentally happier channels so long as Japanese interference with American rights and interests in China continues and so long as Japan continues to endeavor to achieve various positive national objectives through measures of force. I elaborated on this theme at some length. On the other hand, I said that the American Government and people would welcome the fulfillment of their desire for an early return to mutually good and helpful relations with Japan; that the world situation now more than ever dictates the importance of our building up such relations; and that definite evidence of a reorientation of Japanese policy and efforts foregoing the use of force as an instrument of national policy would be viewed with sympathy by the United States. I declared that "I have every confidence that by proceeding along the course I have suggested, it may be possible in due course to open the way to a new era in American-Japanese relations."

---

[49] Not printed.
[50] None printed.
[51] See telegram No. 191, June 10, to the Ambassador in Japan, *supra*.

Speaking further and "off the record," I alluded to the address which the Minister had made before the Pacific Association on June 3 (reported in our telegram No. 413, June 4, 8 p. m.), and said that I had been especially struck by the earnestness of Mr. Arita's plea for the removal of barriers to trade as a prerequisite to the creating, after the present war in Europe, of a new world order, and that I could not restrain the feeling that if the Japanese Government could associate itself with the American Government in bringing about a free flow of commodities between nations, substantial progress might be made toward removing the causes of unrest, reflected in the conflicts both in Europe and in the Far East. I spoke at length of the unsoundness of economic blocs and of the creation of barriers to trade, devices which can never constitute a permanent basis for a progressive world economy. I repeated the remarks made to the Minister during our talk on April 26 to the effect that statesmanship must look to the long future rather than to the immediate present and that the reasons which dictate the maintenance of friendship between our two countries are fundamental and must prevail in the long run. I said that the confidence which I repose in that belief is stronger now than ever before. After then discussing the situation in Europe, the menace to civilization which has there arisen, and the unprecedented program of rearmament in the United States for defense and security after years of earnest effort to bring about world disarmament, I ended my remarks on the following note: "The confident knowledge that Japan, a nation for which the American people have entertained for more than eighty years feelings of the friendliest character, is prepared to align its policy and attitude with those of the United States would, in my carefully studied opinion, contribute far more to the future security and well-being of Japan than the achievement of objectives in the Far East by means which the American people have renounced."

I then read to the Minister, as an indication of the historic attitude of the American Government and people toward Japan, the message of the Secretary of State to Mr. Hirota on March 3, 1934,[52] and finally handed to him the statement prepared in the Embassy,[53] of which I made mention in paragraph two of my telegram No. 289, April 27, 2 p. m.,[53] comprising a partial list of infractions of American rights in China which had been revised and, in so far as possible from the information in the Embassy's possession, brought up to date.

After I had completed the presentation of my views Mr. Arita said, "I agree in spirit and in principle with everything you have said." He remarked "off the record" on the difficulties experienced by the Japanese Government in endeavoring to cope with various elements in this country which advocate a *rapprochement* with the totalitarian nations, and although he spoke in guarded language he conveyed beyond a doubt that the Government (mentioning especially the Prime Minister and himself) wished to see a different orientation developed. Judging by remarks which he made previously and subsequently, it was evident that this reference was to a desire on their part for closer relations between our two countries.

After his opening remark above referred to, the Minister had commented that the bulk of the United States fleet remains in Hawaiian waters. My reply was that Hawaii is American territory and that one of our most important naval ports is that of Pearl Harbor, and I went on to say that the fact that our fleet remains in Hawaiian waters represents no threat whatsoever to Japan. The Minister, however, replied that the continued stay of our fleet in those waters constitutes an implied suspicion of the intentions of Japan vis-à-vis the Netherlands East Indies and the South Seas, and he desired categorically to assert that Japan entertains no territorial ambitions. Quite to the contrary, he added, Japan is exerting her best efforts to promote good relations with her neighbors, and he cited as an example that a non-aggression pact is to be signed within a few days with Thailand. The emphasis which the Minister placed upon this matter is an indication of the important effect on Japanese consciousness of the stay of our naval forces in Hawaii.

---

[52] Vol. I, p. 127.

[53] Not printed.

Replying to my own observations, the Minister inquired what suggestions of a concrete nature the United States Government could propose looking to an improvement in the relations between our two countries. I stated that the whole tenor of my remarks had given plain indication as to the nature of the reply which my Government would make to such an inquiry. He, however, requested me to transmit his inquiry to the Department and said that he hoped for an answer. (It may be that the Minister wishes for some specific reason to obtain a formal statement from me "as under instructions".)

Mr. Arita next said that he assumed that I was informed of the subject of the talks which he had had with Mr. Sayre. He said that the High Commissioner had suggested the possibility of a meeting taking place either in Manila or in Hong Kong between representatives of the Japanese Government and of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, but that as Mr. Sayre feared publicity, the matter had subsequently not been pursued. The Minister stated that his Government was prepared to deal with Chiang Kai-shek on the basis of the terms contained in Prince Konoye's statement.[54] I was left in no doubt that the Minister was exploring the possibility of an extension of good offices by the United States, although he made no request therefor. My only comment was that it was my assumption that should the Japanese Government desire to get in touch with Chiang Kai-shek it should be very easy to do so without intermediation and privately. In reply the Minister merely mumbled something in a low tone to the effect that the Japanese military were difficult. The subject was not pursued.

During the course of our conversation Mr. Arita inquired in a casual manner as to the possibility of concluding a *modus vivendi* between our two Governments but did not broach the subject in the form either of a proposal or of a request. I limited my observations to the remark that most of the elements of such a *modus vivendi* are now operative in fact if not in name, and he did not pursue the subject. Should the moment arrive when the consideration of a *modus vivendi* would appear opportune, we can properly refer to the Minister's having raised this question in the course of this informal conversation.

The conversation closed with a few remarks regarding the war in Europe and the Minister's expectation of hearing at any moment that Italy had entered the war.

I must here record my impression that the Minister, who is ordinarily rather reserved and reticent, was unusually friendly and that as I was departing after more than an hour of conversation he shook my hand with marked cordiality. I felt indeed that I could sense a new and unusual attitude on his part. He requested that I leave with him the notes of an informal nature on which I had based my remarks since he said that he might desire to make further comment on my presentation. Summing up the net results of our meeting, my view is that, although our attitude toward the present course of Japanese policy, which involves the continued employment of force, has once more been made clear in emphatic terms, leaving no possible doubt regarding our policy and our intention unequivocally to abide by that policy without compromising or abandoning any of our fundamental principles, a note has been struck nonetheless regarding the "long haul" which probably will receive careful consideration by the Japanese Government.

---

[54] Apparently refers to statement of December 22, 1938, vol. I, p. 482.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

711.94/1603

Oral Statement by the American Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Arita), June 10, 1940

1. I have asked for a talk with Your Excellency because it seems to me important, and possibly helpful, that we should from time to time explore the relations between our two countries.

2. Today I am acting on my own initiative and speaking my own thoughts.

3. I think it important that in today's talk we should avoid all publicity, and it was for that reason that I suggested a meeting which would not be reported in the press.

4. For some time I have had the impression that Your Excellency has not been especially hopeful that rapid and substantial progress can be made toward improving the relations between our two countries.

5. The impression gained from the statements which you made during our conversation at the Embassy on April 26 was that although efforts were being made by the Japanese Government to put a stop to the bombings by the Japanese forces of American properties in China, and to settle certain claims of American citizens, there was nevertheless a fundamental cleavage between the policies and views of our respective countries which precludes the expectation that constructive action can be taken toward improving our relations before the conflict in China is ended.

6. Indeed, indications have appeared in the Japanese press and in talks that I have had with prominent Japanese that good relations between our two countries are generally regarded in Japan as impossible under present circumstances.

7. Sir Robert Craigie tells me that during a conversation which he had with you after the luncheon of the Pan-Pacific Club on May

27, Your Excellency quoted me as saying that there could be no possibility, so long as the conflict in China continued, of an improvement in the relations between the United States and Japan.

8. So far as I know I have never presented the situation to you in precisely those words or in precisely that form, but I am prepared to admit that the logical implications of the observations which I have made on various occasions to you and to your predecessors are substantially along the lines of the statement which Sir Robert attributes to you.

9. I do remember very clearly saying on innumerable occasions that cessation of bombings of American property in China, of depredation against American property, of the inflicting of indignities on American citizens and of interference with American commercial activities in China, must precede any positive steps looking toward the restoring of friendly relations between the United States and Japan.

10. On the other hand, I can perceive that to you our requiring the cessation of interference with the normal activities of American merchants in China by means of the establishment of monopolies, control of foreign exchange, etc., is equivalent to asking that Japan abandon those objectives in China of which monopolies, exchange and trade control and so on are the instruments of achievement.

11. I wish at this time again to emphasize that relations between our two countries cannot improve so long as there is continuance of interference in the various forms which I have just indicated with American rights and interests in China.

12. I would not have you believe, however, that the cessation of interference with American rights and interests in China is alone capable of opening the way to the improvement of relations: I must make it clear with all the emphasis at my command that we cannot expect the fundamentally friendly relations which Your Excellency and I equally desire so long as Japan continues to endeavor to achieve national objectives by the use of force.

13. The American Government and people have been in the forefront in striving for the bringing about of naval and military disarmament, the relinquishment of force as an instrument of national policy, and the general conduct of relations among nations by orderly and peaceful processes.

14. We regard as a catastrophe the fact that there should exist both in Europe and in Asia conflicts which affect practically all the nations of the world.

15. Having striven so earnestly, ever since the conclusion of the first war in Europe, to avert the recurrence of similar catastrophes, it is not within the power of any Government of the United States

to deal on terms of confidence and good relations, even if it desired to do so, with a nation which, by resorting to force as an instrument of national policy, is indifferent to principles to which the American people are firmly and unequivocally committed.

16. On the other hand the American Government and the American people would welcome the fulfillment of their desire for an early return to mutually good and helpful relations with Japan.

17. The importance to both countries of the building up of such relations is dictated now more than ever before by the state of affairs existing in various parts of the world today.

18. It is my confident belief that as soon as definite evidence is forthcoming that it is the genuine desire and intention of Japan to forego the use of force as an instrument of national policy and to direct its efforts and policy toward achieving its objectives by peaceful and orderly means, the United States, for its part, will be disposed to view such reorientation of policy and efforts with sympathy.

19. I have every confidence that by proceeding along the course I have suggested it may be possible in due course to open the way to a new era in American-Japanese relations.

711.94/1603

Oral Statement Off the Record by the American Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Arita), June 10, 1940

1. I read the accounts of Your Excellency's address before the Pacific Association[55] with a great deal of interest. I was especially struck by the earnestness of your plea for the removal of barriers to trade as a prerequisite to the creating after the present war in Europe of a new world order, and I could not restrain the feeling that, if the Japanese Government could associate itself with the American Government in bringing about a free flow of commodities between nations, substantial progress might be made toward removing the causes for unrest which are reflected in the conflicts both in the Far East and in Europe.

2. I am, of course, well aware of the view of the Japanese Government that, so long as the trend was toward exclusive economies, thus making it impossible for other nations to buy freely the raw materials which they need and to sell freely the commodities which they manufacture, it would be necessary for Japan to safeguard sources of raw materials in China and to assure herself of markets in that country.

3. So long as the trend was toward the formation of economic blocs and the creation in increasing numbers of barriers of trade, perhaps

---

[55] See telegram No. 413, June 4, 1940, 8 p. m., from the Ambassador in Japan, p. 66.

a case might be made out for the need of Japan for securing sources of supply of raw materials and markets for her finished products by orderly processes.

4. I can hardly believe, however, that it would be contended by anyone that the world could continue to develop as it has in the past under conditions of closed economies throughout the world.

5. Such a device as that of economic blocs is at best only effective as an expedient in extraordinary times such as those through which we have passed during the last ten years, but we believe that it can never constitute a permanent basis for any kind of progressive world economy.

6. I consider it the supreme tragedy that the nations of the world were unable to perceive after the first World War that they could not continue cut-throat competition and other manifestations of closed nationalism.

7. They retained resources which unfortunately tempted them to think that each nation could afford to develop its own industrial and economic resources at the expense of other nations, but I feel confident that the present war will leave the nations of Europe so impoverished that the alternative to cooperation will be chaos.

8. If the civilization which we have built up so laboriously over a period of centuries is not to collapse, a new world order such as Your Excellency suggested in your speech before the civic association is essential, especially between those nations whose trade is complementary.

9. You will remember that during the course of our conversation on April 26 I emphasized that statesmanship must look to the long future rather than to the immediate present and that the reasons which dictate the maintenance of friendship between our two countries are fundamental and must prevail in the long run. The confidence which I impose in that belief is stronger now than ever before.

10. For a long time the American people have looked forward to the firm and permanent establishment of peace and the American Government has made efforts in every way possible toward bringing about disarmament.

11. However, the American people are now convinced that certain European governments have made their countries a menace to civilization and to the security of the United States. The United States is now engaged in a program of rearmament on an unprecedented scale, for defense and security.

12. The confident knowledge that Japan, a nation for whom the American people have entertained for more than eighty years feelings of the friendliest character, is prepared to align its policies and attitude with those of the United States would, in my carefully studied opin-

ion, contribute far more to the security and the well-being of Japan than the achievement of objectives in the Far East by means which the American people have renounced.

711.94/1603

The American Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Arita)[56]

General Relations

The American Government is awaiting concrete evidence of the steps, and the results thereof, which the Japanese Government is taking towards giving practical effect to its continual assurances that it intends to respect American rights and interests in China, long established in legality and justice.

The American Government has in no way modified its position with regard to various aspects of American relations with Japan. The American Government continues to adhere to the full import of its position as set forth on numerous occasions in communications to the Japanese Government, notably in my conversation with the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, General Ugaki, on July 4, 1938, at which time I left with the Minister a full typewritten statement of my representations,[57] and also in our notes of October 6 and December 30, 1938.[58]

While there has been a diminution, but not a complete cessation, of the bombing of American properties in China by Japanese military planes and of instances of insults and affronts to American citizens, we feel that this diminution has been a purely negative development. Complete cessation of such occurrences is of course essential to improvement in Japanese-American relations.

The former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Admiral Nomura, was good enough to indicate to me in the course of our several conversations that limitations upon commercial activities of Americans in China have been the result of military operations and that these limitations are exceptional and temporary and that American rights will be restored when peace comes. My Government queries whether this indication implies that the North China Development Company and the Central China Promotion Company, official companies controlled by the Japanese Government, and the extensive and growing monopolistic control of these companies over various phases of the economic life of China, are merely incidental to military operations and will, with their subsidiaries in China, disappear when military operations cease.

---

[56] Handed to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs by the American Ambassador on June 10, 1940.

[57] Vol. I, p. 605.

[58] *Ibid.*, pp. 785 and 820.

My Government has further inquired, after referring to the attempts of the Japanese authorities over regimes functioning under their guidance and with their support, to establish in China currencies linked with the Japanese yen in such a way and with such trade controls of a discriminatory character, that while commodities and funds move with comparative freedom between Japan and Japanese occupied areas in China the normal flow of commerce between Japan and the United States is seriously disrupted—my Government inquires whether the Japanese Government suggests that these developments are also of a temporary nature.

While the American Government fully appreciates the efforts which the Japanese Government is now making toward amelioration of the material damage being done to American interests in China, it is constrained to observe that it feels that thus far these efforts have little more than touched the fringe of the problem.

From all available evidence the framework has been laid for the eventual expulsion of all non-Japanese trade, industry and investment in the occupied areas in China. Japanese relations with the United States have steadily deteriorated due to continued interference with American interests.

The Foreign Minister is reported on March 23 as having replied to an interpellation in regard to Japanese-American relations in the Budget Committee of the Lower House of the Diet in which the following statement occurred:

> "The fundamental cause of Japanese-American relations reaching their present state, the focal point of which is the China incident, lies in the failure of the American Government and people fully to understand Japanese thought and action relating to the incident. The Government has exerted every effort in this connection but has not succeeded in having the United States recognize our real intentions of [*or*] the new situation."

I can only point out in this connection that the American Government's conception of Japanese thought and actions must necessarily depend upon concrete evidence and according to that evidence it has been found by experience that the definite assurances repeatedly given by the Japanese Government in good faith have not been and are not being carried out in practice. Until implementation is given to these assurances it is not seen how Japanese-American relations can materially improve.

It is such implementation that the American Government is constantly and patiently awaiting.

893.0146/786 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

TOKYO, June 11, 1940—6 p.m.
[Received 11:20 p. m.[59]]

437. 1. The Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs today handed to the Italian Chargé d'Affaires a communication offering friendly advice to withdraw Italian troops and warships from those parts of China under Japanese control. Similar communications were also handed to the British and French Ambassadors today repeating the Japanese advices of last September.[60] A copy of the communication to the Italian Chargé which was furnished to us at 5 p.m. today and to the German Embassy by the Foreign Office follows:

"(*a*) On September 5, 1940 [*1939*], following the outbreak of war in Europe, the Japanese Government, as you are aware of from the communication transmitted to Ambassador Auriti for his information, offered an advice to Great Britain, France, Germany, and Poland concerning voluntary withdrawal of the troops and warships of the belligerent powers in China.

(*b*) In that advice the Japanese Government stated their view that the presence of the troops and warships of the belligerent powers in those regions in China under the control of Japanese forces was liable to 'give rise to untoward incidents and to a situation not in keeping with Japan's policy of non-involvement.' This view the Japanese Government have continued to maintain ever since.

(*c*) Now, as the result of Italian participation in the European war on the side of Germany and against Great Britain and France there has arisen a situation in China which greatly intensifies the apprehension of the Japanese Government by reason of the presence in close proximity of the troops and warships of the opposing powers that are stationed in Shanghai, Peiping, and Tientsin.

(*d*) Accordingly, the Japanese Government find it necessary to offer a friendly advice that Italian troops and warships be voluntarily withdrawn from the above-mentioned regions.

(*e*) After the withdrawal of Italian troops and warships Japanese authorities, it should be added, will exercise their best efforts toward the protection of the lives and property of Italian nationals in China.

(*f*) I should add that the present advice is to be tendered simultaneously to Great Britain and France and the matter is to be communicated to the Governments of the United States and Germany for their information.

June 11, 1940."

2. In the communications to the British and French Ambassadors the following slight changes in wording occur:

(*a*) Reads as follows: "Upon the outbreak of war in Europe September last the Japanese Government, as Your Excellency is aware of, offered a friendly advice to the four powers—namely Great Britain, France, Germany, and Poland—etc."

---

[59] Telegram in two sections.
[60] See telegram No. 458, September 5, 1939, 7 p.m., from the Chargé in Japan, p. 9.

Paragraphs (*b*), (*c*), and (*f*) are unchanged.

Paragraph (*d*) reads as follows: "Accordingly, the Japanese Government feel keenly the need of urging in a friendly manner that British and French troops and warships should be withdrawn voluntarily, and they desire to repeat their advice of last year."

Paragraph (*e*) is omitted.

Repeated to Shanghai.

GREW

893.0146/787: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

TOKYO, June 11, 1940—10 p. m.
[Received June 11—1:32 p. m.]

438. Department's 154, May 16, 6 p. m.; our 355, May 20, 5 p. m.[61]

1. The Foreign Office today made informal reply on an undated sheet of paper to our informal representations of May 20. The following is our translation:

"A. Although the Imperial Government understands the intentions of the American Government, the position taken in the representations made by the Imperial Government in September of last year to the countries concerned with regard to doing away with armaments and the withdrawal of Far East boats and troops stationed in China by belligerent powers must be strictly maintained at the present time as it was then. From this point of view the Imperial Government reserves the right to take indicated action.

B. It is stated in the American communication that Italy also expressed agreement. According to the verified information of this Government, however, the above, at least insofar as Shanghai is concerned, is contrary to the facts."

2. The Foreign Office made to us the following further observations orally:

"That the Japanese Government was displeased at the action of the American Admiral in taking action to obtain the agreement of the commanders of the European forces in the vicinity of Shanghai without first consulting with the commander of the Japanese forces; that the Japanese Government were surprised that Admiral Hart[61a] should have acted contrary to precedent in not first consulting with the senior naval officer, who is the Japanese Admiral."

3. The Foreign Office, when asked, stated that it would prefer not to put these oral observations into writing.

Repeated to Shanghai.

GREW

---

[61] Latter not printed.

[61a] Rear Admiral Thomas C. Hart, Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Asiatic Fleet.

711.94/1532 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

TOKYO, June 12, 1940—11 p. m.
[Received June 12—6 : 12 p. m.]

448. Our 429, June 10, 6 p. m.[62] Strictly confidential oral statement (off the record):

1. In digesting the remarks which Your Excellency made during our conversation on June 10 I am filled with a spirit to endeavor to improve at this time Japanese-American relations and am also prepared to respond with a similarly friendly spirit.

2. I gain the impression from Your Excellency's remarks, however, that the use of military force by Japan in China is the cause of injury to Japanese-American relations. That the United States is not similarly using military force as an instrument of national policy requires no explanation and it is abundantly clear that in view of the causes of the China incident and actual conditions at present Japan is unavoidably using military force. Accordingly, as has been frequently announced, Japan, should reasonable terms be available, is prepared to bring this incident to a close at any time.

3. Therefore, if some way to improve Japanese-American relations is to be found it is essential on the one hand, realizing the necessity of quickly bringing to a close the China incident, to endeavor at every opportunity to effect its termination, and on the other hand, at the same time it is necessary to devote great effort to the solution of other problems. To accomplish this end problems of common interest to Japan and the United States should be studied dispassionately and open-heartedly and I believe the time to be opportune to reach proper settlement of those questions.

4. From the above point of view the following problems are worthy of particular study:

(*a*) Is Japan's economic policy to be to adopt an entirely closed economy? If conditions give the appearance of a closed economy wherein do the causes lie?

(*b*) Once the hostilities in China have been terminated, actually to what extent will there remain measures of an exclusive nature in the economic field?

(*c*) Solution of the Tientsin question. Is Japan's peaceful policy adequately attested to by such measures as our policy toward the Netherlands Indies and the neutrality treaty with Thailand?

Further, upon study of the above questions and in view of general Japanese-American relations, the following points should be borne in mind:

(*a*) May it not be necessary in order to rectify the treatyless condition which is the greatest cause of uneasiness in the relations between our two countries at least to conclude as a temporary measure a commercial *modus vivendi.*

---

[62] Not printed; it reported the conversation of June 10 between the American Ambassador in Japan and the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(*b*) May it not be within the realm of possibility to cease material and financial assistance to Chiang Kai-shek and to cooperate in the reconstruction of China.

(*c*) May it not be possible to recognize new conditions in East Asia and may not Japan and the United States, each preserving its sphere of influence on the Pacific Ocean and acting in concert, contribute to the peace of the world."

GREW

893.0146/798 : Telegram

The Consul at Tsingtao (Meyer) to the Secretary of State

TSINGTAO, June 18, 1940—2 p. m.
[Received June 18—12:31 p. m.]

82. Shanghai's June 16, 4 p. m.[63] In reply to Department's 258, March [*June*] 13, 6 p. m., concerning Tokyo's 438, June 11, 10 p. m., and Shanghai's 527, June 15, 3 p. m.,[64] Admiral Hart comments as follows:

"All European commanders belligerent forces Shanghai, Tientsin, Peiping, including Italians, are loyally carrying out their agreements maintain peaceful *status quo* and working arrangements are complete. American Admiral was in fact the Senior Officer but acted primarily in behalf of naval, military representative of a power entirely unengaged in hostilities. Japanese Admiral was so informed immediately on completion informal conversations which resulted in the agreements."

Repeated to Shanghai, Tokyo, Peiping, and Chungking.

MEYER

893.102S/2140

Oral and Informal Statement by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman), June 19, 1940[65]

Of late, and no doubt due to some extent to the intensification and spread of hostilities in Europe, there has been a deluge of rumors in regard to the International Settlement and French Concession at Shanghai. Amongst these was a baseless report released by Domei on June 5 that negotiations were in progress looking towards the transfer from the French to the American authorities of administrative and police duties in the French Concession. Other rumors have been to the effect that the Japanese military forces at Shanghai might attempt to take over the International Settlement and the French Concession. Needless to say, the Government of the United States does not credit these rumors. In view, however, of the persistence of the rumors and of the consequent uneasiness amongst American citizens and others at Shanghai, the Government of the United States offers for consideration by the Japanese Government the suggestion that the alarm caused by those rumors would be dispelled, and reassurance to the foreign communities at Shanghai would be afforded if the Japanese authorities were to make a public statement, in whatever manner they might deem appropriate, in reference to the foreign-administered areas at Shanghai along the general lines of the clear and categorical assurances given by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador at Tokyo on May 13, 1939.[66]

---

[63] Not printed.

[64] Telegrams No. 258 and No. 527 not printed.

[65] Handed to the Director of the American Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office. The American Ambassador in Japan on June 20 personally took up the same matter with the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs.

711.94/1599

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (*Grew*)

[Tokyo,] June 19, 1940.

Because of the satisfactory nature of the observations of the Foreign Minister regarding the communication made to the British Military Attaché by the Japanese Director of Military Intelligence, referred to in our telegram No. 470, June 19, 5 p. m., and No. 473, June 19, 7 p. m.,[67] I deemed it desirable to carry out the Department's instructions and accordingly met the Minister for Foreign Affairs again privately this afternoon at the home of a mutual friend.

In line with the suggestion contained in paragraph 8 of my telegram No. 400 of June 3, noon,[68] to the effect that without making any commitments whatsoever it might be useful at this crucial period in world affairs to convey to the Foreign Minister and to others with whom I might have occasion to talk certain general thoughts with regard to the possible opening in future of a new and mutually helpful era in the relations between the United States and Japan, and in line also with the Department's desire, as expressed in paragraph 3 of its telegram No. 203 of June 15, 2 p. m.,[68] that the door be kept open for exploring constructive possibilities, I prefaced my remarks to the Minister today by reading to him two excerpts from my instructions which seemed to me to strike the note which underlay my entire presentation, and I felt that these points should be emphasized before proceeding to deal with the bases upon which any such future program could be developed with profit. These two points were as follows:

> As soon as reasonably clear indications emerge that the aims and intentions of Japan are of a character consistent with the underlying policies and principles believed in by the United States and to which the United States hopes that Japan will decide to adhere, my Government believes that many practical avenues will develop which can be explored to mutual advantage.

---

[66] Memorandum not printed.

[67] Neither printed.

[68] Not printed.

> As developments take place conformably to the principles indicated, we might anticipate a multiplication of means of cooperation along many avenues in the general direction of the economic development in countries in need of and requesting such development.

I then read to the Minister an "oral statement"[69] drafted in close conformity both with the substance and with the spirit of the Department's telegraphic instruction No. 203, June 15, 2 p. m., and a separate informal list of certain points meriting special consideration,[70] and afterward discussed them at length with the Minister in the light of the instructions referred to, taking care to omit no important point or consideration. Later the Minister slowly and carefully read the papers to himself with a view to obtaining a thorough and correct impression of their contents. He requested me, as had been the case at previous interviews, to leave the papers with him in order that he might give them careful study, and I complied, as I had previously done, on the understanding that the papers were to be considered merely informal records of a presentation made orally.

I also took occasion to bring to the Minister's attention the substance of portions of the letter of January 8, 1938, from the Secretary of State to the Vice President with regard to the Far Eastern situation,[71] particularly the following portion:

> The letter dated January 8, 1938, from the Secretary to the Vice President asserts that the interest and concern of the United States in the Far Eastern situation and in other similar situations are not measured by the number of American citizens residing in a particular country at a particular moment, nor by the amount of American investments therein, nor by the volume of trade. There is a broader and more fundamental American interest—that relating to the maintenance of orderly processes in international relationships. The United States is deeply interested in supporting by peaceful means influences contributory to the preservation and encouragement of such processes in the Far East—an area containing half the population of the world. This interest far transcends in importance the value of American trade with China or American investments in China. It transcends even the question of safeguarding the immediate welfare of American citizens in China.

I added, however, that the welfare of American citizens and the protection of American just and legal rights in China are also of important concern to the American Government and that I could not visualize any marked improvement in American-Japanese relations until Japanese interference with our citizens and interests in China should cease.

The only response made by the Minister, other than to express his appreciation at the opening of these conversations, was that in view of "the great importance" of the communication which I had just made, he considered it best to refrain from comment until he had had a chance to give it further study, and stated that he would reply in due time.

---

[69] *Infra.*

[70] *Post*, p. 85.

[71] Vol. I, p. 429.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

711.94/1599

Oral Statement by the American Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Arita)

I have transmitted to my Government a report of my conversation with Your Excellency on June 10 and have been authorized to say that my Government is giving careful study to it and that it has been impressed by the serious interest which you have displayed in the general subject matter which was under discussion. I have also transmitted to my Government a copy of the text of your strictly confidential statement made to me orally on June 12, which is also being studied by my Government.[72]

My Government is of the opinion that before the specific details of any feasible program can be developed with profit, bases therefor should be established by considering carefully the underlying policies and principles which flow from the point of view of each Government, as well as the objectives and hopes of each Government. Superficially it might seem that by laying emphasis upon principles of an abstract nature we are losing from sight the practical aspects. It is our feeling, nevertheless, that if we can first define and take into consideration general objectives and principles, the tendency of this will be to make easier progress in the future looking to a development of measures of a specific nature. For this reason we believe that it might be best for the present to defer specific comment regarding the contents of your statement, and that it would be helpful at this time for my Government to restate broadly its general position.

As has been declared before, the hope of my Government has been and continues to be that the unfortunate results of the European war may be reduced to a minimum, not only vis-à-vis the American continent but also as regards Asia, by means of an intensive endeavor on the part of the Governments and peoples of both areas to make secure and to foster their national interests along peaceful lines and by peaceful means, as well as by greater application of those principles and policies which have as their purpose and call for a lowering or the abolition of excessive and artificial obstacles to the movement of trade. We believe it of importance in giving shape to a future trend to look further than considerations of minor and transitory advantage and to keep our attention fixed upon long-range and broad policies based upon the interest which is common to all forward-looking nations. According to our belief, certain fundamentals would unavoidably result from that sort of an approach, some of which are the following:

---

[72] See telegram No. 448, June 12, 1940, 11 p. m., from the Ambassador in Japan, p. 79.

A. A supreme need exists for order, peace, and stability. Our strong conviction is that the worsening of the general situation occasioned by the present armed conflicts and those which are spreading can be halted only by means of an enlightened and tenacious resistance to such deterioration on the part of those peoples which hope and have the intention that principles of national sovereignty, of justice, and of law and order shall endure; and that principles providing for economic freedom shall be effective. Provided that Governments and peoples perceive the essential nature of these principles, and provided that Governments and peoples desire and are determined to give them effect, situations of a specific nature in various regions, at variance with those principles, should, it goes without saying, be duly rectified and brought into proper adjustment therewith.

B. Also of importance is the matter of what economic principles and methods of procedure may be deemed best calculated to cause conditions of general order and safety to prevail and endure. My Government is committed to a commercial policy which has as its fundamental basis the principle of non-discriminatory treatment, and we hold that restrictions upon the exchange of commodities in international trade should be removed or lowered. Forward-looking nations might adopt a policy wherein each country would forego endeavoring to obtain for itself or its nationals trade rights, commerce or economic exploitation of third countries of a preferential type, as well as from employing such influence as it might possess vis-à-vis a third country to effect the adoption by that country of measures which might act to withdraw from other countries equality of commercial opportunity or which might preclude the satisfaction of legitimate needs of an economic nature.

In order to make progress, it goes without saying, each country concerned must be penetrated with the proper spirit, not excepting a readiness to make sacrifices for the purpose of attaining broad and permanent objectives, and there must accordingly exist, in so far as each country is concerned, the requisite willingness and intention to render possible a realization of basic principles.

Every nation without exception is beyond doubt entirely justified in taking all legitimate and reasonable safeguards to enhance and conserve its own security and safety. The fact of taking measures of this sort nevertheless cannot reasonably be made a ground to interfere in other countries or to set up therein systems of special privilege and preferences of an economic nature. My Government has an interest in the commerce and economic development of Far Eastern countries just as has Japan. My Government, accordingly—just as Japan—would not view favorably the infiltration into or the growth in those countries of subversive influences. A general adaptation of the above set forth line of thinking and viewpoint would, we believe, make unnecessary interference in the internal affairs of other nations by any nation, as well as acts by any country in the territory of another looking to the establishment therein of monopolies and other types of special rights. As developments took place conformably to the principles indicated, we might anticipate a multiplication of means of cooperation along many avenues in the general direction of the economic development of countries in need of and requesting such development. The policies and point of view of my Government are so well known and have become so firmly established in the traditional thought and ideals of our people that the intentions and purposes of my country are not difficult to evaluate correctly, nor is the course of action which my Government is likely to pursue under any given set of circumstances. That attitude and the policies mentioned are grounded upon fundamental principles and we are of the belief that a general adherence to those principles which are of universal application would redound to the best interests of my country, of Japan, and of other nations.

[TOKYO,] June 19, 1940.

711.94/1599

The American Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Arita) [73]

[LIST OF POINTS MERITING SPECIAL CONSIDERATION]

1. The United States is committed to the general proposition that its own well-being is dependent on the well-being of all the nations of the world; and to persuade other nations to associate themselves with that proposition is one of the major functions of American diplomacy.

2. That form of international cooperation which we seek is predicated on an identity of foreign policies, objectives and methods. We would welcome the cooperation by Japan, not only with the United [States] but with all other nations, on the basis of policies and methods to which we are committed. Can Japan's policy, objectives and methods be formulated in terms which will make possible that form of cooperation which the United States desires?

3. If the various statements which I have made to Your Excellency and to your predecessors during the last three years will be reviewed, it will be seen that there has been no modification whatever of the basic

---

[73] Handed to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs by the American Ambassador in Japan during conversation of June 19, 1940.

attitude of the American Government with regard to problems in the Far East, along with problems which exist in other parts of the world.

4. In line with American traditions which have been followed for more than 150 years, we seek no concerting with Japan of measures which would be prejudicial to the legitimate rights of third countries. In view of the situation now existing in Europe today, I cannot sufficiently emphasize the importance of these facts.

5. The wise man does not enter into business and other close relations with those whose principles and objectives are radically different from his own. No nation, especially in times like these, can afford to assume that economic interest, without identity of principles and objectives, affords a stable basis of friendship.

6. The United States has never deceived Japan, it has never threatened Japan, it has always fulfilled its promises to Japan, and it has never held out promises of benefit to Japan beyond its power or right to confer. The only benefits which we can promise are those which would naturally flow from cooperation on the basis of friendship and of mutual respect for the rights of each other and for the rights of others.

711.94/1539a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, June 22, 1940—noon.

215. 1. Unless you perceive any objection, it is my desire that at an early moment you call upon the Foreign Minister and in strictest confidence explore with him in continuation of your conversations of June 10 and June 19, the question of possibly arriving at an understanding between the American Government and the Japanese Government through an exchange of notes along the following lines:

> The interest of both countries in keeping to a minimum the adverse effects of the war in Europe is the basis upon which the understanding would be premised. The understanding would refer to this interest. In the proposed notes there would be expressed the agreement between the Government of the United States and the Japanese Government that they have a common desire that the *status quo*, except as it may be modified by peaceful means, be maintained with regard to the possessions and territories of belligerent European powers in the Pacific area. There might also be in the proposed notes a provision for consultation between the Governments of the two countries should any question arise involving the *status quo* in respect to the Pacific possessions and territories of belligerent European powers which renders consultation desirable in the opinion of either the Japanese Government or the Government of the United States.

2. In the proposed exchange of notes this Government envisages and would understand the phrase relating to possessions and territories in the Pacific area of belligerent European powers to cover and include their possessions and territories in all parts of the Pacific Ocean.

3. This suggestion relates to a particular and definite problem, that of averting an introduction of new complications and new possibilities of difficulty and friction into the general situation in the Pacific. As you will realize and will keep constantly in mind, it does not involve and should not be inferred to imply any withdrawal from positions heretofore taken regarding any specific problems in the relationships between the two countries. It is intended as a preventive rather than a curative measure. At the same time, it is our belief, and we hope it will be that of the Japanese, that the possibility of contributing substantially toward making situations better is within procedures which tend to prevent situations from becoming worse. If adopted, we believe this procedure would tend to turn public thought toward consideration of peaceful and constructive processes. It would tend to dissipate various suspicions which apparently prevail among the public and to curtail various types of inflammatory discussion and agitation. It would take care of the particular present and future problem to which it would expressly relate, and, although it would in no way dispose of the many and various specific questions which have been and are the subject matter of current and past discussion between our two Governments, it might facilitate solution of some of them.

Hull

893.0146/798 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

Washington, June 22, 1940—6 p. m.

217. Reference your 438, June 11, 10 p. m., Shanghai's 527, June 15, 3 p. m.,[74] and Tsingtao's 82, June 18, 2 p. m. Unless you perceive objection the Department suggests that you make informal comment to the Japanese Foreign Office, stating that the Japanese Government is now doubtless aware that the commanders of the British, Italian, and American forces at Shanghai are acting under a signed agreement in regard to liberty areas which was drawn up at the request of the Italian Commander in Chief. The Japanese Government is no doubt also aware of the arrangements made at Peiping and Tientsin in regard to liberty parties which are operating to prevent any disturbance between the Italian forces on the one hand and the British and French forces on the other in those places. Please say also that the American Commander in Chief, in reference to the agreement of the

---

[74] Telegram No. 527 not printed.

commanders of the British, French, and Italian forces in the vicinity of Shanghai, was acting primarily, in the interests of all concerned, as the representative of a power unengaged in hostilities although he also considered himself to be the senior officer present.

You might add that the Government of the United States is confident that the Government of Japan will share its satisfaction that these amicable and beneficial arrangements have been made.

Sent to Tokyo via Peiping. Repeated to Chungking and Shanghai.

HULL

711.94/1626

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[TOKYO,] June 24, 1940.

When I called on the Foreign Minister at 11 o'clock this morning at the private house of a common friend, we discussed in strictest confidence the suggestion proposed in the Department's telegram No. 215, June 22, noon, with reference to an exchange of notes regarding upholding the *status quo* with regard to the Pacific territories and possessions of belligerent European countries.

The Minister gave his close attention to the diverse points in my oral argument and all the questions he put to me were covered in the Department's instructions. When asked whether the Pacific mandated islands were included in our proposal, I answered that if he desired I would submit the point to my Government, but he did not pursue the subject.

The Minister said finally that the suggestion would be given his close study and that he would reply soon. He stated further that, unless a number of the many outstanding differences between the United States and Japan were first solved, he, offhand and in his own opinion, thought that the suggestion might be difficult to accept. When asked to which difficulties he referred in particular, the Minister replied that the absence of a commercial treaty was the outstanding difficulty.

In view of some of his comments I made clear at the conclusion of our talk that our present proposal must not be misunderstood to imply any retreat from positions previously held regarding any particular problems between Japan and the United States, but I added that I found it significant in my own opinion that our exploration today was regarded by my Government as the continuance of the conversations of June 10 and 19, which were entered into with the express intent of discovering means to ameliorate American-Japanese relations.

Mr. Arita said that the Japanese press must have called my attention to the trend of public opinion in Japan, which was strongly for closer relations with Germany and Italy and was continually growing in strength. He claimed that he was personally, as I well knew, in favor of a *rapprochement* with the United States, but that the situation today opened him to severe criticism, and that the problem was extremely difficult.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

711.94/1628

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[TOKYO,] June 28, 1940.

At the request of the Foreign Minister I called on him at nine o'clock this evening at the official residence of the Vice Minister (in order to elude the newspaper correspondents who were then at the official residence of the Minister), and in the ensuing conversation the Minister replied both to my oral statement to him of June 19 and also to the suggestion advanced to him on June 24 concerning an exchange of notes for the purpose of recording the intentions of the two Governments with regard to maintenance of the *status quo* with respect to the possessions in the Pacific area of the belligerent European powers.

As to the conversation of June 19, Mr. Arita said that he had given our oral statement the most careful study and in reply he desired to say that while at first sight it might be held that there were differences between our two Governments, he felt nevertheless that there were "no differences in opinion practically" when one considered the existence of the hostilities now going on in China. The Minister had before him the record of my oral statement of June 19 in which he had underlined certain passages.

With regard to the Department's paragraph marked "A" the Minister emphasized his agreement with the views as expressed down to the phrase "shall survive". (In the paraphrased text presented to the Minister on June 19 and sent to the Department by mail this phrase reads "shall endure"). With regard to the Department's paragraph marked "B" the Minister expressed agreement with the first two sentences. He said that Japan also has the same policy of non-discrimination.

At that point I observed that Japan is not following such a policy toward the United States. The Minister replied that apart from China there is no discrimination against us and that as soon as the hostilities in China cease most but not necessarily all of our grounds for complaint will be removed.

Mr. Arita then handed me his own "oral statement" in reply to my oral statement of June 19 and he said that the Japanese Government entirely agrees with the views of the American Government as therein presented except in so far as those views might be considered as modified by the statement which he was now handing me. This statement was cabled to the Department in our 510, June 28, 11 p. m.[75]

The Minister then turned to our conversation of June 24 and said that in consideration of the fact that neither Japan nor the United States is a belligerent, the carrying out of the suggestion for an exchange of notes concerning the maintenance of the *status quo* in reference to the possessions and territories in the Pacific area of belligerent European powers would in his opinion be a somewhat delicate matter. Mr. Arita then handed to me a statement in the Japanese language a translation of which we cabled to the Department in our 512, June 29, 1 a. m.[76]

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

711.94/1628

Oral Statement by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (*Arita*) *to the American Ambassador in Japan* (*Grew*)

On the occasion of Your Excellency's departure for America last year our then Prime Minister, Baron Hiranuma, asked you to carry a message to your Secretary of State,[77] in which he stated that to save Europe from a disastrous war that would result in indescribable suffering of hundreds of millions of people as well as the complete destruction of civilization was the duty, he believed, of Japan and the United States situated outside the scope of European conflict. Unfortunately the cooperation of our two countries regarding the prevention of war was not realized. However, I am in full agreement with you in the view that we should now exert the greatest efforts toward minimizing the unfortunate results of the European war vis-à-vis America and Asia. In fact, it is because of this conviction on the part of our Government, that they declared their policy of non-involvement immediately following the outbreak of war in Europe last September, and they have strictly adhered to that policy ever since.

Japan desires to see all nations enjoy their proper places, and peace established and maintained throughout the world. That is the underlying policies and principles of our foreign relations, and all our efforts are concentrated upon the attainment of these objectives. And in order to preserve peace, it is necessary of course that the principles of national sovereignty, justice, law and order, should be respected, but also, I believe, that all countries should appreciate one another's position in the light of the world's changes and actual conditions. The message of Baron Hiranuma to Mr. Cordell Hull contained the following passage regarding the causes of the pre-war antagonism in Europe: "There may be contentions on both sides, but on cool scrutiny of the European situation since the World War we come to the conclusion that although Germany and Italy may be advised to be more patient, Great Britain and France also have a great deal to reconsider." To repeat these words, though they refer to the past beyond remedy, may not be altogether unprofitable.

---

[75] Telegram No. 510 not printed. The statement of the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs is printed *infra*.

[76] Telegram No. 512 not printed. The statement is printed on p. 91.

[77] See telegram No. 234, May 18, 1939, 5 p. m., from the Ambassador in Japan, p. 1.

Japan has always advocated free movement of both men and commodities. This principle, I regret to say, has been frequently violated and Japan has been obliged to undergo bitter experiences. Immigration is restricted, and markets are opened or closed to suit the convenience of the importing countries, while the importation of the necessities into Japan is prohibited or limited at will by the exporting countries. Though these countries may have taken such steps only as temporary measures dictated by their respective needs, the fact remains that Japan which must seek overseas markets because of her limited domestic trade, and which being deficient in various goods and raw materials must depend upon imports from abroad, finds the situation intolerable. In such circumstance, and especially in the abnormal situation brought on by the gigantic hostilities in China now nearly three years old, it is imperative that Japan should endeavour to preserve certain special trade relationships with neighbouring countries and regions, although she upholds as a fundamental basis for trade the principle of non-discrimination.

[Tokyo,] June 28, 1940.

711.94/1628

Oral Statement by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Arita) to the American Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[Translation]

[Tokyo,] June 28, 1940.

1. The views of the Japanese Government concerning the basic policy of the American Government as stated by Your Excellency at the time of our interview on June 19 are as set forth on a separate document.[78] I wish to refer you, as well, to my oral statements of May 18, 1939,[79] and June 12, 1940.[80] While in comparing the two positions, there appear to be differences of opinion between our Gov-

---

[78] *Supra.*

[79] See telegram No. 235, May 18, 1939, 7 p. m., from the Ambassador in Japan, p. 1.

[80] See telegram No. 448, June 12, 1940, 11 p. m., from the Ambassador in Japan, p. 79.

ernments, when consideration is given to the unavoidable conditions accompanying military activities on a large scale, I do not believe that the viewpoints indicated by our two countries are irreconcilable.

2. I have given the most careful study to the proposal which Your Excellency set forth at our meeting on June 24. In view of present international conditions, however, I doubt whether consideration should be given to an exchange of formal notes between our two countries on the basis of a policy of giving effect directly to this proposal. In Europe at the present time hostilities are progressing. Japan is greatly concerned with the effect which the development of the hostilities will have on the status of the possessions and territories in the Pacific area of European belligerent nations. Under this situation, during a transitionary period, for the United States and Japan, which countries are not belligerents, to conclude any sort of an agreement concerning these possessions and territories would, it must be feared, give rise to very delicate relationships for Japan which has taken a position of non-involvement. I am, therefore, endeavoring at this time to offset and to prevent the spread of the European disturbance to the Pacific Ocean and with that purpose in mind and from that point of view, I believe it to be timely and appropriate to consider whether or not there is no room for discussions of problems concerning only the United States and Japan.

3. As I stated on the 24th, however, we cannot consider the American proposal dissociated from conversations which have been held hitherto, and in order to make further progress in our conversations concerning your proposal I believe it to be necessary in the first place to be informed of your Government's views with regard to the statements set forth in my oral statement dated June 12th.

794.00/177 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

TOKYO, June 29, 1940—5 p. m.
[Received June 29—2:40 p. m.]

518. Our 507, June 28, 5 p. m.[81]

1. It is of interest to note that this morning's papers state that an emergency meeting of the Four Ministers' Conference was called yesterday afternoon to discuss the proposed declaration of Japan's policy, that opposition developed among the Ministers to the issuance of such a declaration at this time, and that it was decided that instead of issuing an official declaration of policy the Minister for Foreign Affairs should deliver a radio address this afternoon on the general subject of "Japan's foreign policy in the present situation."

---

[81] Not printed.

2. The text of the radio address as given out today by the Foreign Office is as follows:

"International situation and Japan's position. Japan's ideal since foundation of the Empire has been that all nations should be enabled to find their proper places in world. Our foreign policy has also been based upon this ideal, for which we have not hesitated at times even to fight by staking our national existence. What entire mankind longs for is firm establishment of world peace. But it goes without saying that peace can never endure unless it is a peace in which all nations enjoy their proper places. Unfortunately, however, establishment of world peace in this sense is difficult of speedy realization at present stage of human progress. In order to realize such a great deal, therefore, it seems to be a most natural step that peoples who are closely related with each other geographically, racially, culturally, and economically should first form a sphere of their own for co-existence and co-prosperity and establish peace and order within that sphere, and at same time secure a relationship of common existence and prosperity with other spheres. The cause of strife which mankind has hitherto experienced lies generally in the failure to give due consideration to the necessity of some such natural and constructive world order and to remedy old irrationalities and injustices. The war in Europe brings home the truth of this with special emphasis. Therefore, in order to establish international peace on a permanent foundation every effort must be exerted for rectification of blunders that have been committed in this regard. It is in this spirit that Japan is now engaged in the task of establishing a new order in East Asia. It is extremely regrettable, therefore, that there should be those who not only fail to understand Japan's great undertaking based upon this fundamental principle, but on the contrary, obstruct establishment of peace in East Asia by supporting regime of Chiang Kai-shek. We have urged them to reconsider such an attitude in past, and now we intend further to urge their serious reflection. We are determined to leave no stone unturned in order to eradicate all activities for assisting Chiang Kai-shek. Sometimes there are those who would disapprove a change in the *status quo* by force of arms regardless of the reasons therefor. It is for the purpose of bringing about a just and permanent peace that Japan has been fighting in China for the past 3 years. Her employment of armed force is an act looking beyond the immediate present. The sword she has drawn is intended to be nothing other than a life-giving sword that destroys evil and makes justice manifest. Countries of East Asia and regions of the South Seas are geographically, historically, racially, and economically very closely related to each other. They are destined to help each other and minister to one another's needs for their common well-being and prosperity, and to promote peace and progress in their regions. Uniting of all these regions under a single sphere on the basis of common existence and insuring thereby the stability of that sphere is, I think, a natural conclusion. The idea to establish first a righteous peace in each of the various regions and then establish collectively a just peace for the whole world has long existed also in Europe and America. This system presupposes the existence of a stabilizing force in each region, with which as a center the peoples within that region are to secure their co-existence and co-prosperity and as well the stability of their sphere. It also presupposes that these groups will respect another's individual characteristics, political, cultural, and economic, and they will cooperate and fulfill one another's needs for their common good. When the present European war broke out, the Japanese Government at once declared their policy [of] non-involvement and made it clear that this country did not intend to intervene in Europe and at the same time did not want to see the war spread into East Asia. Quite naturally Japan expects that Eastern [*Western*] [82] powers will do nothing that will exert any undesirable influence upon the stability of East Asia. Japan, while carrying on vigorously her task of constructing a new order in East Asia, is paying serious attention to developments in the European war and to its repercussions in the various quarters of East Asia, including the South Seas region. I desire to declare that the destiny of these regions in any development therein, and any disposal thereof, is a matter for grave concern to Japan in view of her mission and responsibility as the stabilizing force in East Asia."

GREW

711.94/1633

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan

[TOKYO,] July 11, 1940.

At a private meeting today I acquainted the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Arita, fully with the Department's views regarding the oral statements of the Minister on June 12 [83] and June 28. My remarks were prefaced by the observation that it was my opinion that this communication was one of the most important that I had made to the Japanese Government since I had been Ambassador in Tokyo. The conversation lasted for about an hour.

After he had read attentively a second time the record of my oral exposition,[84] Mr. Arita picked out that portion which referred to General Chiang Kai-shek and asked whether our comment signified that no change had taken place in our policy of giving support to the Chinese Government at Chungking. My reply was that the passage referred to had exactly the meaning which it said, viz., that my Government recognizes as the Government of China the Government which is at present at Chungking, and that we wish with entire frankness to express the view that there appears to be no probability of solidarity of a united Government for China other than by recognizing a leadership which has the real support of the large majority of the people of China. Mr. Arita remarked that aid to Chungking from France has now been stopped and that the probability exists that British aid will likewise be stopped, which will leave to Chiang Kai-shek assistance only from the United States and the Soviet Union. I brought to the Minister's attention the obligations of neutrality and stated that the assistance reaching Chungking from my country is a very small proportion of the aid so reaching Japan. The Minister did not pursue the topic further but the fact that he brought it up may be significant of a possible future move in that direction by the Japanese Government.

---

[82] Correction in accordance with an undated, unnumbered telegram from the Ambassador in Japan, received July 1, 1940, 9:50 p. m.

[83] See telegram No. 448, June 12, 1940, 11 p.m., from the Ambassador in Japan, p. 79.

[84] *Infra.*

Mr. Arita said that I might inform my Government that its communication would receive the most careful study both by himself and by the Prime Minister and that he would send us his reply soon. During our conversation I observed that Japan at the present time appeared to be seething with unrest. Mr. Arita acknowledged that that was so and asserted that great pressure is being exerted on the Government to cause it to alter its policy. I replied that I had furnished the Minister today in my communication several basic and comprehensive reasons why it lies in Japan's best interests to follow a course of good relations with my Government.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

711.94/1633

Oral Statement by the American Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Arita), July 11, 1940

My Government has been giving careful thought to the views concerning Japanese-American relations conveyed informally to me by Your Excellency on June 12 [85] and June 28, respectively, and is gratified at the genuinely careful consideration which you have given to my Government's views expressed by me orally on June 19 last.

As I have observed in the course of our recent informal conversations, my Government deems that the situation offered by the present war in Europe, whatever its outcome may be, is a subject for serious concern. Particularly is this so with regard to those countries the prosperity of which depends to a great extent upon foreign commerce. From what you have said to me during our informal conversations, it has become clear that the views of your Government as well as of my own Government are that our foreign trade is of great importance. An examination of the official trade statistics of Japan discloses that during the year 1939, 64.9 percent by value of the total exports of Japan were sent to Asiatic countries, and that 21.5 percent went to countries on the American continent, which leaves for the remainder of the world a balance of 13.6 percent. Of the total imports taken by Japan, 40.5 percent by value were derived from countries in Asia, 42.8 percent from countries on the American continent, there remaining from the rest of the world a balance of 16.7 percent. From these figures it is plainly evident that it is in Japan's interest that there should be averted, in so far as is possible, any extension of developments occasioned by the European hostilities which would bring disturbed conditions from Europe to Asiatic and American countries and diminish the movement of trade between the countries on the continents mentioned and Japan.

---

[85] See telegram No. 448, June 12, 1940, 11 p. m., from the Ambassador in Japan, p. 79.

During the year 1939, of the total exports sent abroad by the United States, Asiatic countries took 17.6 percent by value, and countries on the American continent 35.8 percent. 30.2 percent by value of the total imports into the United States came from Asiatic countries, and 38.7 percent from countries on the American continent. It is clear from the foregoing figures that the United States also has a deep interest in the free flow of commerce between it and the nations in both America and Asia. The similarity of Japanese and American interests in commerce may be enlarged still further. A considerable amount of the commerce between countries in Asia and American countries is constituted by the trade between the United States and Japan. To a large extent this commerce is of a complementary nature. Such a healthy and advantageous commercial relationship as the one which has been in effect between Japan and the United States could not thrive under an autarchical system of economy. Moreover, it is a matter of significance that respect for the rights of private property constitutes both in Japan and in the United States the basis of their social and economic pattern.

A condition having additional bearing upon the commercial and economic relationships between my country, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, nations on the American continent and Asiatic nations, is the fact that certain of the countries referred to are in need of capital funds for their progressive development, and that in the United States there are funds available for investment in foreign countries. It need hardly be mentioned, nevertheless, that capital is by its nature not readily disposed to take risks and seeks its outlet solely in those areas where circumstances of stability, order, progress, and security prevail.

Your Excellency observed in your oral statement of June 28 that, because of Japan's need for markets and sources of supply overseas, it is essential that it should endeavor "to preserve certain special trade relationships with neighboring countries and regions, although she upholds as a fundamental basis for trade the principle of non-discrimination". It would appear to my Government that it would best serve the interests of a country in Japan's position, whose economy has its foundation in foreign commerce, to apply as broadly as possible the principle of equality of trade opportunity and the fullest liberalization of the principle of non-discrimination with relation to trade. An endeavor by one nation to remove particular regions from the applicability of the principles mentioned would unavoidably induce other countries in turn to claim exemption for other areas, resulting in the creation of a number of regional economic blocs having at their foundation discriminations and preferences which could not help being harmful to the interests of the major trading nations. On the contrary, under a system of mutual non-discrimination Japan would not find its commerce restricted to one regional bloc, but would obtain both the profitable results of furnishing to a wide range of markets the wares which Japan is able most efficiently to produce and the corresponding advantage of deriving materials needed by it from the cheapest sources. Under a system of non-discrimination Japan would be better able than under any other international commercial plan to obtain the benefit, in areas in which it has expressed a special interest, arising from the competitive advantage which redounds to it by reason of its geographic propinquity to those areas.

In connection with the matter of Japanese policy toward the Netherlands East Indies referred to in paragraph 4, caption (*c*), of your oral statement of June 12, my Government has noted from a statement issued by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Government of Japan is negotiating with the Netherlands and the Netherlands East Indies Government on the question of commerce, enterprise, and the entry into the Netherlands East Indies of Japanese subjects. My Government has noted particularly that, despite the reported declaration of the Netherlands and the Netherlands East Indies Government that it would take no steps which would result in preventing the exportation to Japan of commodities considered essential by Japan, the Government of Japan has requested that the Netherlands and the Netherlands East Indies Government take suitable measures in order to "definitely assure the export of the desired quantities of required goods".[85a] As the Japanese Government knows, Netherlands East Indies products are important in the economy of many countries. The United States carries on important trade relations with the Netherlands East Indies and a substantial American enterprise exists there. As revealed by the statistics of my Government for the year 1937, which was the most recent year for which complete statistics are available, 15.8 percent by value of the total foreign trade of the Netherlands East Indies was with the United States, compared with

---

[85a] See telegram No. 516, June 29, 1940, noon, from the Ambassador in Japan, p. 289.

11.6 percent with Japan. Accordingly my Government has an important interest in the continuance in the Netherlands East Indies, as well as in other countries, of the principle and the observance of equality of trade opportunity, as well as of that of enterprise. My Government would consequently be appreciative if the Japanese Government would keep it informed as to the manner in which these principles are being applied in the negotiations of the Japanese Government with the authorities of the Netherlands East Indies.

Referring to your oral statement of June 28 in which you mentioned the proposal of my Government that an exchange of notes be concluded regarding the continuance of the *status quo* in the possessions and territories of the belligerent European powers lying in the Pacific region, you indicated your belief that for our two countries, which are not belligerents, to enter into any kind of an agreement on this subject would give rise to very delicate relationships for Japan which has taken a position of non-involvement. It would appear, nevertheless, to my Government that the suggested exchange of notes would contribute substantially to rendering secure Japan's attitude of non-involvement toward the war in Europe, and moreover my Government's proposal was occasioned by a wish to minimize in the Pacific area the harmful effects of the hostilities in progress in Europe. Indeed, it is my Government's conviction that in periods of disturbed international relationships reassertion by Governments of such fundamental principles and policies as was intended in the suggested exchange of notes would operate in favor of stability. The fact of the importance of Japan's commercial relations with the Pacific area, which is indicated by statistics of trade, would appear to my Government to be a cogent reason for the Japanese Government to give favorable consideration to my Government's suggestion. You have stated that you cannot consider our proposal separately from the conversations which have taken place up to now, and have suggested that, with a view to making further progress in these conversations with respect to this proposal, you be acquainted with my Government's views concerning the observations contained in your oral statement of June 12. Three problems are enumerated therein as deserving especial study in connection with bringing about an improvement in relations between our two countries. These problems have to do with the economic policy of Japan, present and future, as well as with recent manifestations of aspects of Japanese policy toward China, the Netherlands East Indies, and Thailand.

My Government also regards these problems as important and believes that a clarification of the questions posed concerning them is requisite to a consideration of the suggestion contained in caption (*a*) of the last paragraph of your oral statement referred to, viz., the matter of the conclusion, as a temporary measure, of a *modus vivendi* between our two Governments. It would therefore be of assistance to have indications as concrete as is possible, concerning the aims and intentions of the Government of Japan regarding points (*a*) and (*b*), that is, "Is Japan's economic policy to be to adopt an entirely closed economy?" et cetera, and "Once the hostilities in China have been terminated, actually to what extent will there remain measures of an exclusive nature in the economic field?" It goes without saying that the earlier there develop manifestations of an implementation by the Japanese Government of its declarations that restrictions at present in existence are of a temporary nature, the more gratified my Government will be.

Referring to caption (*b*) of the last paragraph of the oral statement of June 12 which brings up the question of assistance to Chiang Kai-shek, my Government quite apart from the fact that the National Government now at Chungking is by it recognized as the Government of China, wishes with the utmost candor to express its opinion that there appears to be no prospect of solidarity of a united government for China other than through recognition of a leadership enjoying the real support of the vast majority of the people of China.

My Government has noted the expressed desire contained in your oral statement of June 12, caption (*c*), that our two Governments act together in order to contribute to world peace. It has also noted the ideal expressed by you in the course of your radio address on June 29 last[86] that Japan constitute a stabilizing force in Eastern Asia. My Government, it goes without saying, would view with sympathy policies and methods which give order, justice, and stability in any area of the world, by peaceful means and having due regard for the interests and rights of all countries and peoples involved. Policies and methods of this nature leave every state in any region completely independent and free to seek normal trade and other healthy relations with other nations in any part of the world. Methods and policies of this nature are in antithesis to those aimed at obtaining by force economic or political domination for one country in any region.

711.94/1633

Oral Statement by the American Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Arita), July 11, 1940

I. The United States Government believes that at this point a clarification by the Japanese Government of its attitude with respect to future commercial policy would, if disclosing a compatibility with our own views, contribute to accelerating these conversations. Having settled outstanding difficulties with regard to fundamental and broad questions, the details would have a tendency either to fall into place or possibly to be eliminated.

---

[86] See telegram No. 518, June 29, 1940, 5 p. m., from the Ambassador in Japan, p. 92.

II. It is desired, in connection with the proposed exchange of notes regarding maintenance of the *status quo* of Pacific possessions and territories of belligerent European powers, that there be borne in mind especially the intention to avert new difficulties and friction in the general Pacific situation, and it is hoped that the Japanese Government will share our belief that procedures which tend to prevent situations from deteriorating have within them the germ of contributing materially toward improving situations; that this procedure, if adopted, would tend to dissipate suspicion and curtail inflammatory discussion, thereby turning public thought toward peaceful and constructive processes. It would not only solve the specific problem for which designed, but in addition it might facilitate a solution of some of the other problems between the two Governments.

III. The United States Government believes that Japan must soon come to a decision regarding two fundamental questions:

(1) Will Japan follow a policy and a course of action based upon an attempt to exploit and secure for her own utilization the commerce and resources of territories now impoverished, where living standards are low and capacity for production limited, or will she choose to pursue a course based upon a policy of cooperation with other countries of a similar mind, in order to utilize all available resources of technical skill, capital, and progressive economic leadership with the aim of building up her own economy and that of the more primitive and undeveloped areas?

Viewed in historical perspective, the narrower course can bring no assistance or permanent benefit to any country—whatever benefits might accrue being merely of a temporary character. The broader course would increase many times the purchasing power of peoples, would elevate their standard of living, and would bring lasting advantages.

(2) The second fundamental choice in the opinion of the United States Government, related to the first, is whether Japan will decide to associate herself with countries committed to a policy of acquiring territory by force. Such a policy might of course denude occupied areas of natural and other forms of wealth, but once gathered, no substantial basis would exist on which to build for economic well-being in the future. It would, moreover, tend to preclude co-operation with other nations in a broad program of social and economic development of a progressive nature in which the capital resources and the technical skill of the various countries concerned would be enlisted.

Press Release Issued by the Department of State on July 16, 1940 [86a]

The Secretary of State, in reply to inquiries by press correspondents for comment in regard to reports that, at the instance of the Japanese Government, the British Government would prohibit temporarily the movement of certain commodities through Burma into China over what is known as the Burma Route, said that this Government has a legitimate interest in the keeping open of arteries of commerce in every part of the world and considers that action such as this, if taken, and such as was taken recently in relation to the Indochina railway would constitute unwarranted interpositions of obstacles to world trade.

793.94/16069 : Telegram

The Consul at Shanghai (Butrick) to the Secretary of State

SHANGHAI, July 22, 1940—1 p.m.
[Received 4:01 p. m.[87]]

671. Incident of July 7. Reference my 653, July 18, 4 [*6*] p. m., and previous.[88] Following is text of an official letter dated July 22, delivered today to Major General Miura from Colonel D. Peck:

"Further reference is made to your letter of 8 July. On the morning of 7 July, 1940, General Nishio, accompanied by a large number of Japanese officers, made an official tour of the American defense sector; and the Japanese military held an official reception at the Pelee Hotel, within the American defense sector.

The Commanding Officer, Fourth Marines, although he had received no official notification from the Japanese authorities that the above tour and reception were to take place within the American defense area, personally met General Nishio and welcomed him to the American sector, and provided him with an official military escort.

It must be noted that 12 [*7*] July being the anniversary of the Loukouchiao incident, the Shanghai Municipal Police had requested the Fourth Marines to operate in active support of the police and take special precautions against acts of terrorism or anti-Japanese demonstrations. The unexpected appearance of the Japanese Commander in Chief, accompanied by a large Japanese escort, within the sector on this date created an additional hazard.

While General Nishio was attending the reception at the Pelee Hotel, the Shanghai Municipal Police at about 10:00 notified Marine Headquarters that a number of strange Japanese in civilian clothes, thought to be gendarmes, and apparently carrying concealed weapons, were on Bubbling Well Road, along the route over which the Japanese General Nishio was expected to pass soon. The marines felt a high degree of responsibility for General Nishio's safety as long as he remained in the American sector, and as these men might be terrorists it was necessary to remove them and remove them fast. No time was available to communicate with Japanese authorities to verify these men's identity and orders were issued for their arrest.

[86a] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, July 20, 1940 (vol. III, No. 56), p. 36.

[87] Telegram in seven sections.

[88] None printed.

An officer on patrol accompanied by an interpreter and by an officer of the Shanghai Municipal Police, who pointed out the suspicious characters, effected the arrests. Some resisted arrest. All refused to surrender their guns. Identification cards were produced purporting that the men were members of the Japanese gendarmerie. However, doubt was cast on this because the Marine authorities had not been informed that separate gendarmes would operate in the Marine sector.

The suspicious characters were stationed singly at intervals along Bubbling Well Road, staggered on opposite sides of the road. In all, 16 arrests were made. As stated above, some resisted arrest. All refused to surrender their guns. No force was used other than necessary to arrest these men, and to effect prompt disarmament of the men in order to prevent their causing death or injury by the use of their firearms. The marines effecting the arrests were armed but carried their rifles slung over their shoulders. The Japanese were transported from the places of arrest in trucks of the type used to transport personnel. In many cases the Japanese refused to get into the truck and had to be bodily lifted therein.

General Nishio passed up Bubbling Well Road and left the American defense sector at about 10:45, without incident. Prior to that time all of the above arrests had been effected.

The Japanese were first detained near regimental headquarters in a small building used daily by the marines as a lecture room, gymnasium, and an indoor .22 calibre range. The leader sergeant major was at once permitted to telephone his superiors. He was then questioned by the regimental commander. The men, while detained in this building, were guarded by two sentries within the building and two outside the building, and a corporal stationed in the doorway. Rifles were carried loaded and locked. Bayonets not fixed. No other persons entered this building except an interpreter and the officer of the day. The interpreter entered because it was reported by the guard that the prisoners wanted to say something. It developed that this something was that one wished to go to the lavatory. He was conducted to the lavatory.

At 11:30, after the names of the men had been secured and their pistols listed, and as the indoor range did not have proper facilities, the men were conducted to detention quarters where they were accorded exactly the same facilities and treatment given to marines who are detained. They were offered their noon meal. Some started to eat but were stopped by their leader.

Japanese officers called at Marine headquarters and identified the men as gendarmes. It was explained that the men would be released whenever a responsible officer signed a release for them. A major of gendarmes called in the afternoon and talked to the men and left after praising the fine detention quarters. He refused to sign a receipt for the release, stating that he did not have authority.

Finally at 15:00, Major General Miura, commanding officer of gendarmes, called at Marine headquarters. He expressed his regret over the incident and stated that it was by accident that the marines had not been notified, and gave assurances that the incident would not recur. The men and their arms were released to Japanese authority. It was agreed between Major General Miura and the commanding officer, Fourth Marines, that incident was closed.

While the men were detained in detention quarters they were given the usual routine medical examination. Three had superficial cuts—iodine cases. One complained of a headache—aspirin treatment. The memorandum report reads: "All others were examined carefully, and thoroughly, and there were no other signs of tissue, bone, or large injuries that could be elicited."

On the morning of July 8th, Major General Miura addressed a very courteous letter to the commanding officer, Fourth Marines, expressing his gratitude that the trip of General Nishio through the American sector had been completed without delay or obstruction.

On the afternoon of July 8th the Japanese official spokesman at a press conference made a violent attack against the marines, accusing them among other things of brutality during and after the arrests. This was the first intimation the marines received that there was any thought of undue force having been used.

Later, a letter was received from Major General Miura, written on July 8th, containing practically the same denunciations made by the press spokesman noted above.

An exhaustive investigation was initiated by the Fourth Marines in an attempt to determine whether or not these denunciations had any foundation.

Major General Miura and Colonel Peck had various conferences in an endeavor to settle this incident. Finally it was decided that the settling of the incident would await the termination of the investigation being conducted by the Fourth Marines.

This investigation has now been completed. During the investigation Japanese authorities were freely consulted. We wish to thank you for the cooperation given.

The investigation does not sustain the charges of undue force and maltreatment. The statement that the gendarmes offered absolutely no resistance is not sustained. Most resisted arrest. All refused to surrender their guns, and struggled, some violently—striking, butting and kicking at marines. Some marines received minor injuries such as scratches and bruises. One marine reports that a gendarme attempted to bite his hand.

It is claimed that the gendarmes were forced to squat on the floor of the rifle range. This claim is not substantiated. It is true that they were detained in a small building used daily by the marines as a lecture hall, gymnasium and an indoor .22 calibre rifle range. This building is not provided with chairs, hence the gendarmes were under the necessity of either standing or sitting on the floor. This was unfortunate, but the inconvenience was certainly not great as the men were detained therein not over an hour.

It is claimed that the gendarmes, after being unarmed, were menaced with loaded rifles. It is true that the guards' rifles were loaded and locked. But the guards were under competent command and we can find no verification of the allegation of menacing gestures.

The claim has been advanced that one gendarme had his ear pulled. We can find no verification.

It is claimed that the Japanese gendarmes received unfriendly treatment in the presence of the public in broad daylight. It is true that the gendarmes were unavoidably forcibly arrested in the presence of the public in broad daylight, but the public could not have been generally aware that they were gendarmes inasmuch as they were in plain clothes.

It is claimed that the number of gendarmes injured was 11, in place of the 3 stated by Marine authorities. In this the Gendarme and Marine authorities are at variance. Both authorities are agreed, however, that no serious injuries were inflicted.

Inasmuch as you were kind enough to express to me your regrets that Japanese gendarmes were operating in the American sector without proper authorization on July 7, 1940, and to assure me that the incident would not recur, I have no hesitancy in expressing to you my regrets that, pursuant to measures we were taking to safeguard the Japanese Commander in Chief on that occasion, and under the unusual circumstances then obtaining, the incident occurred, and that some members of the gendarmerie as well as some members of the marines were unavoidably slightly injured.

Assuring you of my high personal esteem, I am, etc."

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Chungking, Peiping, and Tsingtao. Tsingtao repeat to Commander in Chief. Code text together with code text of my 653 and 650 being air mailed to Tokyo.[89]

BUTRICK

711.94/1663

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[TOKYO,] July 26, 1940.

The new Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Matsuoka, today received the diplomatic chiefs of mission individually in the usual purely formal reception. Instead of the customary five minutes he detained me in conversation for the better part of half an hour.

The Minister said at the outset that he had not yet had sufficient opportunity to formulate policy but he wished to say that when the press asked him what his policy was going to be as compared with the Hirota policy and the Arita policy and that of other ministers, he replied that they need look for no so-called Matsuoka policy but only for the policy of Japan.

The Minister then asked me to convey to Secretary Hull, for whom he expresses the greatest respect and admiration, the assurance that he has always attached the greatest importance to Japanese-American relations. The Minister said that he had always been a very frank talker and that in our contacts he might frequently say things which could be regarded as undiplomatic but he believed that much was to be gained by frank and direct speaking. He thereupon referred to an article which he had written some time ago stating that if the United States and Japan ever have to fight each other they should know precisely the causes and reasons for which they were fighting and that war should not develop, as in so many other cases in history, through misunderstanding. I said for my part that I also had no use for old school diplomacy, that I also believed in straight-forward talk, and I believed that the Minister and I would both profit by basing our relations on such an understanding. I thought that we might rule out the word "war".

---

[89] Neither printed.

The Minister then said that history is based largely on the operation of blind forces which in a rapidly moving world cannot always be controlled. I admitted that blind forces have played their part in history but I added that one of the primary duties of diplomacy and statesmanship is to direct those forces into healthy channels and that I hope before long to explore with him the present state of American-Japanese relations in the confident belief that he and I approaching the subject in the right spirit would accomplish a great deal in giving helpful directive to the blind forces which he had in mind.

I then asked the Minister if he would care to read the informal record of my last talk with his predecessor, Mr. Arita, in which I had presented various points of view of the American Government, and I hoped that this record might afford a useful basis for our next conversation. The Minister said that he would be very glad to read the record which he accepted and put in his pocket.

711.94/1609 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

TOKYO, July 26, 1940—6 p.m.
[Received July 26—9:06 a.m.]

620. My 619, July 26, 5 p.m.[90] In my first formal meeting today with the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Matsuoka requested me to convey a private message from him to the President in the following sense:

On passing over the United States after having left Geneva several years ago, Mr. Matsuoka, although he at that time held no position except that of a member of Parliament, had called on the President in Washington in order to pay his respects and to express his friendship arising out of previous association. Mr. Matsuoka wished now to say to the President privately that his lifelong desire and interest had been the maintenance of world peace just as it has been the President's desire and interest. He said he had come to realize, however, that since the world is constantly changing and developing in vivid growth peace cannot be assured by conforming to the world's *status quo*. The League of Nations failed because its members lacked the courage to implement article 19 of the Covenant providing for new adjustments to meet such growth and changed conditions. A new order must come about in the world and world peace must be based on adapting ourselves to the growth and change which must inevitably lead to a new order in world affairs.

---

[90] Not printed; see memorandum of July 26, 1940, *supra*.

GREW

793.94/16085 : Telegram

The Consul at Shanghai (Butrick) to the Secretary of State

SHANGHAI, July 30, 1940—11 a. m.
[Received July 30—10:40 a. m.[91]]

712. Incident of July 7. Reference my 659 [*671?*], July 22, 1 p. m. In a letter dated July 25 which has now been translated, Major General Miura states that Colonel Peck's reply was entirely contrary to his expectations and "absolutely unacceptable for the purpose of settling this incident amicably." General Miura's letter which is lengthy and bombastic practically accuses Colonel Peck of bad faith. For example, reviewing some of Colonel Peck's statements, he says "by these facts, I regret that I have to doubt your sincerity toward the investigation of the facts." While Colonel Peck's reply to General Miura was in course of preparation yesterday Rear Admiral Glassford received a letter dated July 28 from Lieutenant Commander [*General*] Fujita, senior military commander in the Shanghai area. A summary of that letter follows:

> "The outrageous and impolite conduct which the members of the United States Fourth Marine Regiment committed in Shanghai against the Japanese gendarmes on July the 7th of this year injured the prestige of the Japanese Army and, in spite of parleys at which the commander of the Japanese gendarmes did his utmost, we cannot recognize any sincerity or good faith in the measures taken by your authorities.
>
> We are exceedingly regretful that a settlement of this affair has not yet been reached. Does not the attitude of the United States Marine Corps side of [*besides?*] deceiving themselves and others by glossing over and quibbling over very evident facts which are apparent in this incident conflict with the spirit of justice and righteousness which is the traditional character of the American military forces? We believe that the above is extremely deplorable on the part of your

---

[91] Telegram in four sections.

forces. In view of the previous friendly relations we believe that such an attitude may have a great influence on our future relations. For the sake of a settlement of this affair by those responsible, I again call your attention to the fact that it should be settled as speedily as possible."

Admiral Glassford yesterday prepared a reply which after consultation with Colonel Peck and myself was despatched to General Fujita last night. It reads as follows:

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 28th instant in regard to what you describe as the outrageous and impolite conduct which the members of the United States Fourth Marine Regiment committed in Shanghai against the Japanese gendarmes on the 7th instant. You inform me that the prestige of the Japanese Army has been injured thereby and that in spite of [conferences] at which the commander of the Japanese gendarmes did his utmost, you cannot recognize any sincerity or good faith in the measures taken by the American authorities concerned, to whom you impute deceit and quibbling. You call my attention to the fact that this incident should be settled as speedily as possible.

It appears that on the 7th instant Colonel de Witt Peck, United States Marine Corps, commanding the Fourth Regiment of Marines at Shanghai, a contingent of the Shanghai Defense Forces, had occasion personally to order the arrest and temporary detention of 16 members of the Imperial Japanese Gendarmerie who were within the American defense sector under circumstances which in the opinion of Colonel Peck warranted the action he took.

It develops that as a result of detailed investigations by the Japanese authorities that the gendarmes are confidently believed by the Japanese authorities to have been subjected to the use of unnecessary force and to maltreatment at the time of arrest and subsequent to arrest. Furthermore, it is represented that the gendarmes suffered humiliation by their public arrest and thereby, as well as by the above alleged maltreatment, the Japanese Army has suffered loss of prestige at the hands of the United States naval service of which the United States Marine Corps is a unit.

The above allegations of the use of unnecessary force and maltreatment of the 16 gendarmes are not substantiated, as no doubt you are aware, by the investigations of this incident directed by Colonel Peck, who informs me that the investigation has been exhausted [*exhaustive?*] and that accordingly he is satisfied with its findings.

Your imputation of insincerity and lack of good faith in the measures taken by the American authorities concerned, and your imputations of deceit by glossing and quibbling over details of this incident would be intolerable did I not prefer in the interest of preservation our good relations to consider them as unexpressed to a flag officer of the United States Navy by an officer of your high rank, position, and prestige.

As senior United States naval officer on the spot I ask that you permit me to point out that an apology for alleged particular wrongs under these circumstances cannot be expected. Permit me to say further that if the Japanese military authorities feel under all the circumstances of this incident that the Japanese Army has suffered insult or loss of prestige at the hands of the United States naval service, then I wish to express unhesitatingly my wholehearted regret that such should be the case. In these expressions of regret Colonel Peck, United States Marine Corps, joins me, of course.

With these expressions tendered in good faith and all sincerity I trust you may see your way clear to take steps to close the incident.

I am giving no publicity to your letter, hence expect that no publicity will be given to my reply.

I am, Sir, with respect"[93]

Sent to the Department, repeated to Chungking, Peiping, and Tsingtao for the information of Commander-in-Chief. Code text by air mail to Tokyo.

BUTRICK

711.94/1609 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

WASHINGTON, July 31, 1940—noon.

286. Your 620, July 26, 6 p. m.

1. The President appreciated receiving Mr. Matsuoka's private message and commented thereon informally in the following sense:

Mr. Matsuoka's assurance of his desire and interest in maintaining world peace and the candor with which he expressed his view on the need of adaptation to world growth and change as a means of realizing world peace are gratifying. Answering Mr. Matsuoka in the same spirit of candor, real and lasting world peace cannot in our opinion be brought about except by orderly processes and by just and fair dealing, which involve respect for the rights of all concerned and which permit nations to realize their legitimate aspirations. All peoples, including the American people and the Japanese people, naturally and rightly have aspirations for security and progress. Changes brought about for these purposes and by these means are beneficial and are regarded with satisfaction by the United States. The existence among leaders of Japan and the United States of zeal for maintenance of world peace offers opportunity, given mutual sincerity and good will, for constructive exploration toward advancing relations between the Governments and peoples of Japan and the United States.

2. Unless you perceive objection, please communicate the sense of the above informally to Mr. Matsuoka.

WELLES

894.002/422

Statement by the Japanese Government, August 1, 1940[94]

The world stands at a great historic turning point, and it is about to witness the creation of new forms of government, economy, and culture, based upon the growth and development of sundry groups of states. Japan, too, is confronted by a great trial such as she has never experienced in history. In order to carry out fully at this juncture our national policy in accordance with the lofty spirit in which the country was founded, it is an important task of urgent necessity to us that we should grasp the inevitable trends in the developments of world history, effect speedily fundamental renovations along all lines of government, and strive for the perfection of a state structure for national defense. Accordingly, the general lines of the country's fundamental national policies have been formulated as follows:

---

[93] Local negotiations failed to bring about any settlement of this incident and the issue was dropped.

[94] Issued by the cabinet of Prime Minister Prince Konoye. This is an unofficial translation by the Japanese Foreign Office.

SUMMARY OF FUNDAMENTAL NATIONAL POLICIES

1. Basic Policy.

The basic aim of Japan's national policy lies in the firm establishment of world peace in accordance with the lofty spirit of *Hakko Ichiu*, in which the country was founded, and in the construction, as the first step, of a new order in Greater East Asia, having for its foundation the solidarity of Japan, Manchoukuo and China.

Japan will, therefore, devote the total strength of the nation to the fulfilment of the above policy by setting up swiftly an unshakable national structure of her own adapted to meet the requirements of new developments both at home and abroad.

2. National Defense and Foreign Policy.

The Government will strive for the repletion of armaments adequate for the execution of the national policies, by taking into consideration the new developments both at home and abroad, and constructing a state structure for national defense, capable of bringing into full play the total strength of the nation.

Japan's foreign policy, which aims ultimately at the construction of a new order in Greater East Asia, will be directed, first of all, toward a complete settlement of the China Affair, and the advancement of the national fortune by taking a far-sighted view of the drastic changes in the international situation and formulating both constructive and flexible measures.

3. Renovation of Internal Structure.

What is urgently required in internal administration is the laying of the foundation for a state structure for national defense through a complete renovation of the domestic administration in general, for which purpose the Government expects the realization of the following points:

A. Renovation of education thoroughly in harmony with the fundamental principles of the national polity, and also the establishment of ethical principles of the nation stressing, above all, service to the state and eradicating all selfish and materialistic thoughts.

B. Establishment of a powerful new political structure and a unified control of government affairs.

a. Establishment of a new national structure, of which the keynote lies in the service to the state through the co-operation between government and people, every man according to his sphere of profession or business.

b. Renovation of the Diet as an organ for assisting the Throne, so as to adapt it to the new national structure.

c. Fundamental renovation in the operation of administrative organs, and the reformation of the bureaucracy, aimed at the unity and efficiency of those organs.

C. Laying the foundation of national defense economy, of which the keynote is to lie in the autonomous development of the economy of Japan, Manchoukuo and China with Japan as the center.

a. Establishment of a sphere of co-operative economies, with the Japan-Manchoukuo-China group as one of the units.

b. Inauguration of a planned economy through the co-operation between government and people, and especially the perfection of a unitary control system covering the production, distribution and consumption of important commodities.

c. Establishment of a financial scheme and reinforcement of banking control, directed toward the development of the nation's total economic power.

d. Renovation of the foreign trade policy so as to adapt it to the new world situation.

e. Establishment of the measures for self-sufficiency in the people's daily necessities especially in the principal foodstuffs.

f. An epoch-making expansion of the vital industries—especially heavy, chemical and machine industries.

g. An epoch-making promotion of science, and rationalization of production.

h. Perfection and extension of the communication and transportation facilities so as to adapt them to the new developments at home and abroad.

i. Establishment of land development plans aiming at the enhancement of the total national strength.

j. Inauguration of permanent measures concerning the promotion of the stamina and physical strength of the nation, and especially the fundamental measures concerning the security and development of agriculture and agricultural communities.

k. Rectification of the inequality in individual sacrifices incident to the execution of national policies; full operation of various welfare measures, and renovation of the living mode of the nation, and the maintenance of such standard of living as will enable the nation to lead a plain, solid and vigorous life and to surmount the national crisis by persevering truly through years of hardship.

894.002/422

Statement by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Matsuoka), August 1, 1940 [95]

I have always said that the mission of Japan is to proclaim and demonstrate the *kodo* (Imperial way) throughout the world. Viewed from the standpoint of international relations, this amounts, I think, to enabling all nations and races to find each its proper place in the world. Accordingly the immediate aim of our foreign policy at present is to establish, in accordance with the lofty spirit of the *kodo*, a great East Asian chain of common prosperity with the Japan-Manchoukuo-China group as one of the links. We shall thus be able to demonstrate the *kodo* in the most effective manner, and pave the way toward the establishment of an equitable world peace. We should be resolved to surmount all obstacles, both material and spiritual, lying in our path. Furthermore, in concert with those friendly Powers which are prepared to co-operate with us, we should strive with courage and determination for the fulfilment of the ideal and the heaven-ordained mission of our country.

Statement by the Secretary of State, September 4, 1940 [96]

In response to inquiries by press correspondents, the Secretary of State made the following statement:

"On August 15, at a meeting made necessary by notification that the British defense forces at Shanghai would be withdrawn, the Shanghai Defense Committee voted to assign Sector D in the International Settlement Defense Plan to the Japanese defense forces and Sector B to the American defense forces. This decision was reached by a majority vote, the commanding officer of the Japanese forces voting 'No'. The majority vote was subsequently approved by the Shanghai Municipal Council. As the American Consulate General and a considerable number of other important American interests are located in Sector B, which sector lies between the present American sector and the waterfront at which American naval vessels are customarily anchored, the Government of the United States gave its approval and informed the Japanese Government that this plan was agreeable to it.

---

[95] Informal translation by the Japanese Foreign Office.

[96] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, September 7, 1940 (vol. III, No. 63), p. 197.

"In view of the Japanese dissent, neither Sector D nor Sector B has been taken over by the defense forces. Special protection in Sector B is temporarily being provided by the Shanghai Volunteer Corps, pending arrival at an agreement. As this matter is of substantial importance to all concerned, discussions are in progress between this Government and the Japanese Government [96a] with regard especially to Sector B, and it is the hope of this Government that a reasonable settlement, considerate of all interests involved, for assumption of responsibility in Sector D by the Japanese defense forces and in Sector B by the American defense forces will soon be arrived at." [96b]

Extract From Address by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) on "Our Foreign Policy and National Defense" at Cleveland, September 28, 1940 [97]

Unfortunately it is not possible for me to refer with any measure of satisfaction to the course of events in the Far East during these past seven years.

The policy of this Government in the Far East has differed in no way from the policies of this country in relation to other regions of the world. It is true, of course, that the problems which have arisen in our relations with the countries of the Far East have had certain peculiarities because of the earlier rights of extraterritorial jurisdiction accorded to the nationals of occidental powers, along with various other special procedures adopted with special reference to special situations, but as situations have changed, the United States has by processes of negotiation and agreement voluntarily assented to the alteration and removal of these special features.

From time to time the nations directly interested in the Far East have entered into treaties and international agreements which have created a network of common interests, as well as common responsibilities and obligations.

[96a] See par. (2) of telegram No. 334, September 3, 1940, 6 p. m., to the Ambassador in Japan, p. 291.

[96b] For further discussion of this subject, see memorandum by the Under Secretary of State, September 20, 1940, vol. I, p. 877.

[97] Delivered before the Foreign Affairs Council; reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, September 28, 1940 (vol. III, No. 66), p. 243.

In essence the primary requirements of the United States in the Far East may be thus simply set forth: Complete respect by all powers for the legitimate rights of the United States and of its nationals as stipulated by existing treaties or as provided by the generally accepted tenets of international law; equality of opportunity for the trade of all nations; and, finally, respect for those international agreements or treaties concerning the Far East to which the United States is a party, although with the expressed understanding that the United States is always willing to consider the peaceful negotiation of such modifications or changes in these agreements or treaties as may in the judgment of the signatories be considered necessary in the light of changed conditions.

The Government of Japan, however, has declared that it intends to create a "new order in Asia". In this endeavor it has relied upon the instrumentality of armed force, and it has made it very clear that it intends that it alone shall decide to what extent the historic interests of the United States and the treaty rights of American citizens in the Far East are to be observed.

As we here well know, many hundreds of incidents have occurred as a result of which the rights of this country and the rights of our nationals have been violated.

On April 15 of this year, as a result of developments in the European war, the Foreign Minister of Japan, in a public statement, asserted that Japan desired the maintenance of the *status quo* of the Netherlands East Indies.[97a] On April 17 the Secretary of State made a statement on behalf of the United States expressing the belief of this Government that the best interests of all nations called for maintenance of the *status quo* in the entire Pacific area.[97a] On repeated occasions since then official spokesmen for the Japanese Government have reiterated their desire for the maintenance of the present status of the Netherlands East Indies, and have further specifically declared that this policy applied not only to the Netherlands East Indies, but to French Indochina as well. Nevertheless, and notwithstanding these official declarations, we are all familiar with the events of the past week which have culminated in measures undertaken by the Japanese military forces which threaten the integrity of the French colony.[97b]

From the standpoint of reason, of common sense, and of the best practical interests of all of the powers possessing interests in the Far East, there is no problem presented which could not be peacefully solved through negotiation, provided there existed a sincere desire on the part of all concerned to find an equitable and a fair solution which would give just recognition to the rights and to the real needs of all concerned.

[97a] *Post*, p. 281.
[97b] See pp. 294 ff.

Extract From Radio Bulletin No. 239 Issued by the Department of State on October 8, 1940

State Department Press Conference. . . . In reply to inquiries, correspondents had earlier in the morning been informed that in view of the abnormal situation continuing in the Far East, the Department, as it had done heretofore in the Far East and in different parts of Europe, was taking precautionary steps for the safety of American citizens by suggesting that especially women and children, and men who are not detained by essential or urgent considerations, consider coming out of various disturbed areas. It was explained that American consular officials were pointing out to American citizens the advisability of utilizing transportation facilities which are now available, and that the Consuls had been asked to inform the Department of the numbers of Americans who were coming out or considering coming out. It was pointed out that this was a continuation of the policy inaugurated in regard to the Far East in 1937 and in regard to Europe last year. It was explained that it applied to Japan, China, Hong Kong, Indochina, Manchuria, the Kwantung Leased Territory, Korea and Formosa. . . .

711.94/1746 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

Tokyo, October 9, 1940—7 p. m.
[Received October 9—12:35 p. m.[98]]

962. For the first time in several weeks I went to the country on October 9, but the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs (Ohashi) urgently requested me to return to Tokyo so that he might see me, without delay, on behalf of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. We talked for about an hour and it was evident that the Foreign Minister is worried on two points: (*a*) reports received by him through Suma[98a] that a total embargo against Japan has been decided upon by the Government of the United States; and (*b*) reports from Washington that the evacuation of American citizens from the Far East has been

---

[98] Telegram in two sections.

[98a] Of the Japanese Foreign Office; formerly Counselor of the Japanese Embassy in the United States.

"ordered" by the American Government. I stated that I had no information concerning the first point, and that with regard to the second, advice had been given to Americans in the Far East as a precautionary measure but no "order" had been issued. The "embargo" on iron and steel scrap was referred to by the Vice Minister and I informed him of the substance of paragraphs (*a*) and (*b*) of the Department's telegram No. 383 dated October 8, 1940, 6 p. m.[99] I had received this telegram a few minutes before the conversation.

That Japan desires peace with the United States and has no intention of attacking us, was a thesis dwelt upon at length by Mr. Ohashi. I said that the United States feels likewise toward Japan and that, as the Vice Minister knows, the American people are strongly peace-minded, but that both the American Government and people have been made less certain of Japan's real intentions by inflammatory utterances made recently by Japanese statesmen. I added that the American reaction to those utterances is exactly what should have been expected before the statements were made public, and I mentioned our preparedness program and the inevitable effect on it of the Japanese utterances.

Confidentially, I received the clear impression from the nature of the conversation and the marked urgency with which I was called, that the Minister for Foreign Affairs is seriously disturbed by the course of developments in the United States resulting from the Japanese Government's recent actions and statements.

The conversation was called "private and off the record" by Mr. Ohashi.

GREW

711.94/1855

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

[WASHINGTON,] October 17, 1940.

The Japanese Ambassador came in today to say good-bye. He thanked me for my personal courtesies, adding that he regretted the difficult relations now prevailing between this country and Japan, and hoped that they would improve.

I said I hoped so, too. I said that I had nothing of course to add to the statement of our position made by Secretary Hull and Mr. Welles, but I did wish to add a personal word, on my own account.

There appeared to be a feeling in Japan, and also in other countries, that this country could accept regional divisions based on purely Machiavellian considerations. It was not realized, generally, that this country endeavored to govern by principles to which it held quite as tenaciously as any totalitarian government. We did not believe in regional or other arrangements based purely on force politics. We had challenged the domination attempted by Napoleon; and had maintained throughout all our history the hope of a free world in which relations were carried on under law on a basis of common sense, courtesy and kindness. We were totally unable to accept anything else.

---

[99] Not printed; but see memorandum by the Secretary of State, October 8, 1940, p. 225.

The Ambassador said that he knew I was perfectly familiar with the Japanese point of view, namely, that they were not seeking domination but merely seeking cooperation, but that once the struggle had begun, it was difficult for statesmen to find a solution.

I said that without commenting on that I ventured to express my personal regret that Japan had allowed itself to become tied to the exigencies of a European struggle.[1] We had seen the German-Italian alliance, and now saw the Italians in the position almost of prisoner. We had seen the Russo-German agreement, and now Russia was threatened, north, east and west. We saw an apparent domination by force on the continent, and were persuaded that this was the most transitory of arrangements: Europe has seen many such temporary dominations before, and they have never lasted.

The Ambassador alluded to some of the economic difficulties of Japan.

I said that probably the Ambassador was aware that the United States had stood ready at all times, once granted that force politics and conquest were abandoned, to endeavor to assist its neighbor countries so far as possible in all economic ways. We had endeavored to make this clear before the European conflict broke out. I personally hoped that the day might come when once more, dreams of conquest and military power being laid aside, we could begin to discuss possible solutions of economic problems which might ameliorate the life of the individuals for whom governments were, at long last, responsible. I said that I still felt that if that day were ever reached, this country would again stand ready to be of such help as it could.

The Ambassador said, somewhat sadly, that these were difficult times. He hoped relations would improve; meanwhile, he could only hope that those who could look ahead might give wise counsel. Were the war to become a true world war, he felt that it would be not only a tragedy for both countries, but for humanity in general.

A. A. Berle, Jr.

---

[1] For text of the tripartite alliance, see p. 165.

793.94119/718

Treaty and Agreements Between Japan and the Wang Ching-wei Regime in Japanese-occupied China, Signed at Nanking, November 30, 1940 [2]

TREATY CONCERNING THE BASIC RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND CHINA

The Imperial Government of Japan and
The National Government of the Republic of China:

Being desirous that these two countries should respect their inherent characteristics and closely cooperate with each other as good neighbours under their common ideal of establishing a new order in East Asia on an ethical basis, establishing thereby a permanent peace in East Asia, and with this as a nucleus contributing toward the peace of the world in general, and

Desiring for this purpose to establish fundamental principles to regulate the relations between the two countries, have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The Governments of the two countries shall, in order to maintain permanently good neighbourly and amicable relations between the two countries, mutually respect their sovereignty and territories and at the same time take mutually helpful and friendly measures, political, economic, and cultural and otherwise.

The Governments of the two countries agree to eliminate, and to prohibit in the future, such measures and causes as are destructive of the amity between the two countries in politics, diplomacy, education, propaganda and trade and commerce, and other spheres.

Article 2

The Governments of the two countries shall closely cooperate for cultural harmony, creation and development.

Article 3

The Governments of the two countries agree to engage in joint defense against all destructive operations of communistic nature that jeopardize the peace and welfare of their countries.

The Governments of the two countries shall, in order to accomplish the purpose mentioned in the preceding paragraph, eliminate communistic elements and organizations in their respective territories, and at the same time cooperate closely concerning information and propaganda with reference to the defense against communistic activities.

---

[2] Translations by the Japanese Foreign Office. Signatories were General Nobuyuki Abe (Japan) and Wang Ching-wei (Nanking).

Japan shall, in order to carry out the defense against communistic activities through collaboration of the two countries, station required forces in specified areas of Mengchiang[3] and of North China for the necessary duration, in accordance with the terms to be agreed upon separately.

Article 4

The Governments of the two countries undertake to cooperate closely for the maintenance of common peace and order until the Japanese forces sent to China complete their evacuation in accordance with the terms as provided for separately.

The areas for stationing Japanese forces for the period requiring the maintenance of common peace and order and other matters pertaining thereto shall be determined as agreed separately between the two countries.

Article 5

The Government of the Republic of China shall recognize that Japan may, in accordance with previous practices or in order to preserve the common interests of the two countries, station for a required duration its naval units and vessels in specified areas within the territory of the Republic of China, in accordance with the terms to be agreed upon separately between the two countries.

Article 6

The Governments of the two countries shall effect close economic cooperation between the two countries in conformance with the spirit of complementing each other and ministering to each other's needs, as well as in accordance with the principles of equality and reciprocity.

With reference to specific resources in North China and Mengchiang, especially mineral resources required for national defense, the Government of the Republic of China undertake that they shall be developed through close cooperation of the two countries. With reference to the development of specific resources in other areas which are required for national defense, the Government of the Republic of China shall afford necessary facilities to Japan and Japanese subjects.

With regard to the utilization of the resources referred to in the preceding paragraph, while considering the requirements of China, the Government of the Republic of China shall afford positive and full facilities to Japan and Japanese subjects.

The Governments of the two countries shall take all the necessary measures to promote trade in general and to facilitate and rationalize the demand and supply of goods between the two countries. The Governments of the two countries shall extend specially close cooperation with respect to the promotion of trade and commerce in the lower basin of the Yangtze River and the rationalization of the demand and supply of goods between Japan on the one hand and North China and Mengchiang on the other.

---

[3] Inner Mongolian provinces of Chahar, Suiyuan, and Ninghsia.

The Government of Japan shall, with respect to the rehabilitation and development of industries, finance, transportation and communication in China, extend necessary assistance and cooperation to China through consultation between the two countries.

Article 7

According to the development of the new relations between Japan and China under the present Treaty, the Government of Japan shall abolish extraterritorial rights possessed by Japan in China and render to the latter its concessions; and the Government of China shall open its territory for domicile and business of Japanese subjects.

Article 8

The Governments of the two countries shall conclude separate agreements regarding specific items which are necessary to accomplish the object of the present treaty.

Article 9

The present Treaty shall come into effect from the date of its signature.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate, in the Japanese and Chinese languages, at Nanking the 30th day of the 11th month of the 15th year of Syowa, corresponding to the 30th day of the 11th month of the 29th year of the Republic of China.

ANNEXED PROTOCOL

In proceeding this day to the signature of the Treaty concerning the Basic Relations between Japan and China, the Plenipotentiaries of the two countries have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The Government of the Republic of China, understanding that, during the period in which Japan continues the warlike operations it is at present carrying on in the territory of China, there exists a special state of affairs attendant upon such warlike operations, and that Japan must take such measures as are required for the attainment of the object of such operations, shall accordingly take the necessary measures.

Even during the continuation of the said warlike operations, the special state of affairs referred to in the preceding paragraph shall, in so far as there is no obstacle to the attainment of the object of the operations, be adjusted in accordance with the changing circumstances and in conformity with the Treaty and its annexed documents.

Article 2

While the affairs previously administered by the Provisional Government of the Republic of China, the Reformed Government of the Republic of China and others have been taken over and temporarily maintained as they are by the Government of the Republic of China, those which require adjustment but are not yet adjusted shall be adjusted in conformity with the purpose of the Treaty and its annexed documents through consultation between the two countries, as promptly as circumstances may permit.

Article 3

When general peace is restored between the two countries and the state of war ceases to exist, the Japanese forces shall commence evacuation with the exception of those which are stationed in accordance with the Treaty concerning the Basic relations between Japan and China signed today and the existing agreements between the two countries, and shall complete it within two years with the firm establishment of peace and order; and the Government of the Republic of China shall guarantee the firm establishment of peace and order during this period.

Article 4

The Government of the Republic of China shall compensate the damages to rights and interests suffered by Japanese subjects in China on account of the China Affair since its outbreak.

The Government of Japan shall, with respect to the relief of the Chinese rendered destitute by the China Affair, cooperate with the Government of the Republic of China.

Article 5

The present Protocol shall come into effect simultaneously with the Treaty.

In witness whereof the Plenipotentiaries of the two countries have signed this Protocol and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate, in the Japanese and Chinese languages, at Nanking the 30th day of the 11th month of the 15th year of Syowa, corresponding to the 30th day of the 11th month of the 29th year of the Republic of China.

AGREED TERMS OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE PLENIPOTENTIARIES OF JAPAN AND CHINA CONCERNING THE ANNEXED PROTOCOL

In proceeding this day to the signature of the Treaty concerning the Basic Relations between Japan and China, the following understanding has been reached between the Plenipotentiaries of the two countries in connection with the stipulations of Articles 1 and 2 of the Annexed Protocol of the Treaty.

1. With regard to those various organs for collecting taxes in China which are at present in a special condition owing to military necessity, an adjustment shall be made promptly in accordance with the spirit of respecting the financial independence of China.

2. With regard to those industrial, mining and commercial establishments under governmental or private management which are at present controlled by Japanese forces, the necessary measures shall be taken for their prompt transfer to Chinese management in a rational manner, with the exception of those which are of enemy character or under special circumstances of unavoidable character including military necessity.

3. In case any Sino-Japanese joint enterprise requires modification in the evaluation of original assets, the proportion of capital investments and other matters, measures for their rectification shall be taken in accordance with the terms to be agreed upon separately through consultation between the two countries.

4. The Government of the Republic of China shall, in case they find it necessary to institute control on foreign trade, effect such control autonomously. They may not, however, infringe upon the principle of Sino-Japanese economic cooperation mentioned in Article 6 of the Treaty; and they shall consult with Japan with regard to such control during the continuation of the China Affair.

5. With regard to matters pertaining to transportation and communication in China which require adjustment, they shall be adjusted, as promptly as circumstance may permit, in accordance with the terms to be agreed upon separately through consultation between the two countries.

Done in duplicate, in the Japanese and Chinese languages at Nanking the 30th day of the 11th month of the 15th year of Syowa, corresponding to the 30th day of the 11th month of the 29th year of the Republic of China.

793.94119/718

Joint Declaration by the Governments of Japan, "Manchukuo", and the Wang Ching-wei Regime in Japanese-occupied China, Signed at Nanking, November 30, 1940[4]

The Imperial Government of Japan;
The Imperial Government of Manchoukuo; and
The National Government of the Republic of China:

Being desirous that the three countries should respect one another's inherent characteristics and closely cooperate with one another as good neighbours under their common ideal of establishing a new order in East Asia on an ethical basis, constituting thereby the mainstay of a permanent peace in East Asia, and with this as a nucleus contributing toward the peace of the world in general, declare as follows:

1. Japan, Manchoukuo and China will respect mutually their sovereignty and territories.

2. Japan, Manchoukuo and China will bring about general cooperation on a reciprocal basis among the three countries, especially a good neighbourly friendship, common defense against communistic activities and economic cooperation, and for that purpose will take all the necessary measures in every direction.

3. Japan, Manchoukuo and China will promptly conclude agreements in accordance with the present Declaration.

Done at Nanking on this the 30th day of the 11th month of the 15th year of Syowa, corresponding to the 30th day of the 11th month of the 7th year of Kangte, and to the 30th day of the 11th month of the 29th year of the Republic of China.

793.94119/703 : Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, December 1, 1940—10 a. m.
[Received December 1—10 a. m.]

595. Following is English text furnished the Embassy by the Foreign Office of statement issued by the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs on November 30:

"The conclusion by Japan with the puppet organization at Nanking of what purports to be a treaty is but the culmination of series of aggression acts on her part designed to overthrow law and order not only in China, but in the whole Pacific. Having set up a regime to suit their own purposes, the Japanese have now signed with it the so-called treaty to facilitate the execution of their policy of domination and expansion in the Far East. Such a regime is in reality a part of the Government at Tokyo planted on Chinese soil, to be used by the Japanese militarists as an instrument for the realization of their scheme.

---

[4] Translation by the Japanese Foreign Office. Signatories were General Nobuyuki Abe (Japan), Wang Ching-wei (Nanking), and Tsang Shih-yi ("Manchukuo").

The National Government of the Republic of China has repeatedly declared, and desires to reiterate most emphatically, that Wang Ching-wei is the arch-traitor of the Republic and that the puppet regime at Nanking is an illegal organization whose acts of whatever character are null and void in respect of all Chinese citizens and all foreign countries. The so-called treaty just signed at Nanking is totally devoid of legality and has no binding force whatever.

Should any foreign country choose to accord recognition to the puppet organization, the Government and people of China would consider it a most unfriendly act and would be constrained to discontinue their normal relations with such a country.

Whatever Japan may attempt or conspire to do in China or in the Pacific, China is determined to fight on till victory is won, and she is confident of victory because to freedom and right and justice victory inevitably belongs."

Sent to the Department, repeated to Shanghai, Peiping, Nanking. Peiping mail to Tokyo.

JOHNSON

711.94/1939

Address Delivered by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Matsuoka) at the America-Japan Society Luncheon at Tokyo on December 19, 1940[5]

MR. CHAIRMAN, EXCELLENCIES, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN.

It is an honor as well as a pleasure for me to be invited to this distinguished and delightful gathering. I am very happy to take part in this reunion of good old friends who are all devoted to the cause of promoting better understanding between Japan and America. In fact, I feel so comfortably at home among you, that I am tempted to confide you a bit of private information as to how I came to be accorded the treatment, thanks to Admiral Nomura, of a free luncheon in this time of stress and strictly managed economy, and that at the expense of the good members of the America-Japan Society.

When I approached Admiral Nomura for the post of Ambassador to the United States, the Admiral, showing not the slightest consideration for our old friendship, was adamant in his refusal. At first it looked hopeless. The obstinate, I might even say obdurate, Admiral stuck to his guns. But I refused to be scared away. I went back at him again and again, and many a friend of both his and mine levelled guns at him. In truth, I pitted my stubbornness against his stubbornness, and as days sped on I became even curious to see which will rub away, his or mine. Finally, at the end of three months' siege and attack, this stubborn Admiral capitulated. Certainly I was proud of my victory. However, I came very soon to realize that I fought the battle on my own ground, i. e. terra firma, and not in the sailor's element. That was not fair for the Admiral, but it was a thing on which Japan is to be congratulated and may be for America, too. In any case, I wouldn't see myself compelled to meet him on the high seas!

---

[5] Reprinted from the *Japan Times and Advertiser* (Tokyo) of December 19, 1940.

Admiral Nomura needs no introduction. He is referred to in our press as a "Big Gun." You know he is in every sense a "Big Gun," physically and mentally, and feel sure that it is powerful and big enough a gun to shatter any and all possibility or potentiality, if there is any, of clash in the Pacific.

Admiral Nomura is not a professional diplomat, and yet he is a highly gifted diplomat. That has been abundantly demonstrated at Washington, D. C. and other posts abroad as well as during the tenure of his office as Foreign Minister in the Abe Cabinet.[5a] He is, moreover, a distinguished sailor, as you all know. Each sail that skims the horizon braves the dangers of the sea and the skipper is responsible for the safety of the entire crew. The very quality that distinguishes a successful sailor, it appears to me, is also the quality needed for a successful diplomat. The vast and deep ocean upon which stately ships move is eminently suited to cultivate a largeness of mind and foster self-confidence and common sense. It builds up, in short, a character that inspires confidence. In the person of our new Ambassador, the American people will find a true Japanese, every inch of that six footer, but at the same time a vehicle of international trust and confidence. We must recover confidence among nations, that is what the world so badly needs at this moment!

I am confident that Admiral Nomura will prove a worthy successor to Mr. Horinouchi who, ably assisted by his charming wife, has won the heart of the Americans. Might I be permitted to take advantage of this occasion publicly to tender Mr. and Mrs. Horinouchi my deepest appreciation and thanks for their untiring efforts for the cause of American-Japanese friendship?

I think the days of small things are now definitely over. We must think big and act big. It is no time to deal in small change. We must trade in larger currency—or rather, ingots of gold. Namely, we must see eye to eye regarding each other's position and policy. In this connection, it may not be irrelevant to recall a witty French saying: "an equivalent of Napoleon does not make a Napoleon." I admit that it is not quite proper to compare Admiral Nomura to Napoleon but, for obvious reasons, the French never had a coin named after Nelson.

[5a] August 30, 1939–January 14, 1940.

The appointment of Admiral Nomura, I may say, is an eloquent indication of what my Government have in mind in regard to Japan's relations with the United States of America. I owe it to candor to admit that the relations between our two countries are severely strained at this moment. Now, the causes that have brought about the present unfortunate deterioration are, of course, many and manifold, but the fundamental cause, let me be frank, is American misapprehension of Japan's aims and aspirations. I shall forego to explain at length our viewpoint, lest I should spoil your appetite. Only let me observe a few words.

Contrary to impressions current in America and elsewhere, Japan is not waging an imperialist war of greed and aggression in China. It is not a war of conquest or covetous ambitions. We are engaged in a moral crusade. You may, if you like, ladies and gentlemen, laugh or shrug your shoulders at it, but I am sure time will prove it; fifty years hence, or in less a time, history will testify to it. We are fighting not for destruction but for construction. We are endeavouring to initiate an era of enduring peace and unlimited prosperity, based on justice, equity and mutuality, in Greater East Asia where we firmly believe we have a great mission as the civilizing and stabilizing force.

We stand for peace and order. We shut the door nowhere and to none. Any nation that desires to take a hand in this great task is welcome. But mind you, there shall be, "no conquest, no oppression, no exploitation under the New Order which we conceive." We are as much against Japan herself committing these iniquities in the future. We will not be induced to deflect from our settled course, whatever the pressure or whoever the detractor. This, in short, is the basic attitude of my Government. When I say we must trade in larger currency, I mean to imply that rather than quarrel about minor grievances, we should try to look in a big way at the fundamentals of the situation now confronting us.

Japan's ideal, the ideal bequeathed from time immemorial, from the time of the very foundation of the Empire, is to enable all nations to take their proper places in the world. It is my humble opinion that the world should be reorganized and reformed in a more rational way as, for instance, crystals are formed according to the law of nature. Minerals of different nature agree between themselves as to which of them shall give way to the other at their junction, and take their permitted shapes and allotted shares of space, yielding or being yielded to, as they build up a perfect crystal. When the international society is crystalized in a similar manner in accordance with the spirit of justice and equity, then and then only will a genuine and lasting peace prevail throughout the world. The new order we envisage is a realization of such an international society, which we intend to begin by setting up in this part of the world under our leadership. The Pact of Alliance recently concluded by Japan, Germany and Italy points to the same goal.

It seems to me that this world of ours is too wide politically and too narrow economically. While economic activities should be world wide and should suffer no limitation, our political efforts had better be restricted to only those spheres in which we are vitally interested, and not be extended to other people's domains. If regional peace is effectively secured through regional understanding, the world will, by its aggregation, be able to enjoy a universal peace. This has been my idea all through since the adoption of the Covenant of the League of Nations at the Versailles Conference. The recent Havana Conference is a case in point, being an attempt to ensure peace and order in the Western Hemisphere through a regional cooperation.

Speaking of the Three Power Pact, a section of the American people have, wilfully or otherwise,* misunderstood our purpose and are accusing Japan of harboring hostile intentions toward America. Nothing can be more absurd and untrue. Japan has no desire whatsoever to antagonize America, or for that matter, any nation. We want to maintain and even enhance our friendly relations with all nations.

We only desire, on one hand, to be left alone, so that we may carry on our constructive work unhindered, and on the other hand, to see the trouble in China and the war in Europe brought speedily to an end, without adding more participants, particularly such a powerful one as America. Imagine just for a moment that America joined the European war or came to a clash with Japan in the Pacific. What then? If any bit of human feeling or an atom of instinct for self-preservation is left in you, ladies and gentlemen, wouldn't you shudder at the very thought? Would not a kind of ice-water shoot down your spine?

There would loom up every chance of facing at last the Armageddon that would end in a total destruction of our culture and civilization. I do beseech my American friends to think twice, thrice, nay, ten, hundred or thousand times before they take a leap that may prove fatal to all Humanity. In this connection, I wish to leave no doubt whatever in the mind of any American citizen the fact that Japan is, and will remain, loyal to her Allies; that Japan's foreign policy will revolve in the future around the Three Power Pact as its pivot, as it did around the pivot of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in the past when that Alliance was in force. This, of course, implies no threat. It is a simple statement of truism made in order to prevent possible misapprehension. For, an illusion on an issue like this will bring no good to anyone.

---

* In Japanese as "maliciously." [Footnote on file copy evidently inserted by the American Embassy in Japan.]

At this point, permit me to refer only cursorily to the China problem. After all, the fate of China is largely a question of sentiment to the Americans, but to us it constitutes a truly vital issue affecting, as it does, the very existence of our Empire. We are confident regarding the future and are not without hope as to an early restoration of peace in China which by the way, will automatically liquidate the difficult situation which has engendered the present tension between Japan and America. In this sense, the new Chinese Central Government at Nanking may be regarded as the harbinger of better times, "Daffodils that come before the swallow dares." It is my firm conviction that once the basic and broader aspect of the situation is rightly taken in by the Americans, they will not only not oppose our endeavors but will even join efforts with us in furthering our high aims. My proposition is that we, both of us, shall not blink at realities, however unpalatable they happen to be, but shall try earnestly and honestly to understand each other's position with sympathy and in a spirit of mutual accommodation. For this, we must clear our mind of cant and avoid the folly of "rubbing the sore when one should bring the plaster" which sometimes thoughtless, not to say malevolent, people are apt to do.

The public is often the dupe of public opinion. Giddy minds and foreign affairs make an undesirable company. Some people simply cannot think of international relations but in terms of clash and conflict. Somehow they cannot think in terms of concord and co-operation. There are pessimists, not to say alarmists, in both countries who believe in the inevitability of a major conflict in the Pacific. That would surely spell the downfall of mankind. Do we not owe it to Humanity, both Japan and America, to unite our efforts and do our best to avert such an awful calamity?

In wishing God speed to Admiral Nomura, I pray most fervently, that he may successfully fulfill his mission which is to usher in a happier period of mutual trust and better understanding between our two great nations. Waves may rise high in the Pacific Ocean but we trust in the courage and resourcefulness of Admiral Nomura as a skillful and tried seaman safely to take us to the port. Neither shall we forget the fact that although we only see the white sail tossing on the rough sea, the ship does not lose its balance because of the ballast which remains invisible to our eyes. That ballast is the common sense of our two peoples.

And so I close this address with an earnest appeal to the common sense of our two peoples to maintain calm judgment and quiet self-restraint, in the face of the appalling and unprecedented world situation. Let us keep our heads clear and cool. Let us go slow and take time. Let us try to learn and make sure. There is ample time for us to think and make up our mind. Eternity before us, why over-hurry? Half a century is but a passing moment and will fill merely one brief paragraph in a history book.

Is it too much for Japan to ask for so much of a minute, just half a century or even less, in which to prove herself to the world? Time is the great curer of human travail. Let us all have a bit of patience. This is my appeal.

711.94/1939

Address Delivered by the Japanese Ambassador to the United States (Nomura) at the America-Japan Society Luncheon at Tokyo on December 19, 1940

Mr. Chairman, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am a plain sailor. I was brought up amid tall masts and crowded sails, and am accustomed to rough seas. I am, however, a complete stranger to the elegant society, its speech and its manner. In spite of my brief experience as Foreign Minister, I am not meant to be an Ambassador. Indeed, a sailor is quite helpless on the land; he is reduced to perfect impotence, like a stranded boat. In the tangled wood of diplomacy, he would be just as good as lost. Being well aware of my ignorance how to shine in graceful society and how to walk upon the tight rope of diplomacy at this critical juncture, I first declined Mr. Matsuoka's kind offer although I greatly appreciated it as a mark of confidence which I know I hardly deserve. I held out as long as I could and then gave in. I could defeat an Invincible Armada but not Mr. Matsuoka—because he refuses to acknowledge his defeat.

However, both the Foreign Minister and I were agreed to one thing from the first: the necessity of improving drastically the relations between Japan and America which have deteriorated so much of late. I felt frankly disturbed by the ominous trend of affairs which, if left unchecked, may possibly bring about an acute tension between the two countries who have no reason to quarrel but every reason to remain friends. After much hesitation, therefore, I decided to accept the offer, rather in the heroic spirit of a common soldier who is called to the Colours. Swim or sink, survive or perish, I do not care. Only am I anxious to serve—serve the cause of better understanding between our two nations.

When the Four Power Pacific Treaty[5b] was announced at the Washington Conference the late Senator Lodge quoted a well known poet to describe the Pacific islands:—

> "Sprinkled Isles
> Lily over lily that overlaces the sea."

These islands are still there, same as old in spite of swift and surprising changes we have been witnessing in international situation. I believe that God has ordained these "sprinkled isles" to serve not as hostile bases but as stepping stones of goodwill between the two shores of the Pacific Ocean—Japan and America.

Ladies and Gentlemen, Light has gone out in Europe where nations have been thrown into a fearful vortex of a great war. Let us, Japan and America, guard the peace of the Pacific the only bright light of hope that is left to mankind.

711.94/1939

Remarks by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) at the America-Japan Society Luncheon at Tokyo, December 19, 1940

[Extract]

In once more expressing to His Excellency the Foreign Minister the appreciation of the Society of his giving of his valuable time to join us today, I wish to thank the Minister on behalf of us all for his enlightening address. My own comments on his address will be restricted to a minimum.

His Excellency has brought out certain points with which we must all agree, especially with Mr. Matsuoka's expressed desire for peace, his appeal for calm judgment and his good wishes for the success of Admiral Nomura's mission. Other points brought out were of a controversial nature.

I cannot deal severally with those points today. Yet with all due respect I must relieve the Minister of his misapprehension that the interest of the American people in China is largely sentimental. I am particularly glad to take note of the Minister's statement that in the Japanese program the door is to be shut nowhere and to no one and that this program envisages no conquest, no oppression, no exploitation.

The Minister has lived long enough in the United States to know that the American people are fundamentally peace-minded and furthermore that they stand for justice and equity. He also knows that the American people are firmly determined on certain matters among which on the one hand are their obligations and on the other hand their rights. Their profoundest wish is to see peace, prosperity, security, stability and happiness assured to all nations.

[5b] Signed December 13, 1921; *Foreign Relations*, 1922, vol. I, p. 33.

In the present state of world affairs we must inevitably realize that what counts in international relationships today, and what we all have to face in formulating our several opinions, is the concrete evidence of facts and actions, regardless of the persuasive garb in which such facts and actions may be dressed.

Let us say of nations as of men: "By their fruits ye shall know them."

1941

Statement by the Secretary of State Before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, January 15, 1941[5a]

[Extract]

MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS: We are here to consider a bill designed to promote the defense of the United States. I shall not discuss the technical details of the proposed measure, since that will be done by other departments of the Government more directly concerned with these matters. I shall place before you briefly the controlling facts relating to the manner in which the dangers that now confront this Hemisphere and, therefore, this nation have arisen, and the circumstances which render imperative all possible speed in our preparation for meeting these dangers.

During the past eight years, our Government has striven, by every peaceful means at its disposal, to secure the establishment in the world of conditions under which there would be a reasonable hope for enduring peace. We have proceeded in the firm belief that only if such conditions come to exist will there be a certainty that our country will be fully secure and safely at peace. The establishment of such conditions calls for acceptance and application by all nations of certain basic principles of peaceful and orderly international conduct and relations.

Accordingly, in the conduct of our foreign relations, this Government has directed its efforts to the following objectives: (1) Peace and security for the United States with advocacy of peace and limitation and reduction of armament as universal international objectives; (2) support for law, order, justice, and morality and the principle of non-intervention; (3) restoration and cultivation of sound economic methods and relations, based on equality of treatment; (4) development, in the promotion of these objectives, of the fullest practicable measure of international cooperation; (5) promotion of the security, solidarity, and general welfare of the Western Hemisphere.

Observance and advocacy of the basic principles underlying these policies, and efforts toward their acceptance and application, became increasingly important as three nations, one after another, made abundantly clear, by word and by deed, their determination to repudiate and destroy the very foundations of a civilized world order under law and to enter upon the road of armed conquest, of subjugation of other nations, and of tyrannical rule over their victims.

[5a] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, January 18, 1941 (vol. IV, No. 82), p. 85.

The first step in this fatal direction occurred in the Far East in 1931 with forceful occupation of Manchuria in contravention of the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty and of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. The equilibrium in the Far East which had been established by the Washington Conference treaties of 1921–1922 became seriously disturbed by the setting up by forceful means in a part of China of a regime under Japanese control under the name of "Manchukuo". This control over Manchuria has been marked by the carrying out of a policy of discrimination which has resulted in forcing out American and other foreign interests.

During the years that followed, Japan went steadily forward in her preparations for expansion by force of arms. In December 1934, she gave notice of her intention to terminate the naval treaty of February 6, 1922. She then proceeded with intensified construction of military and naval armaments, at the same time undertaking, from time to time, limited actions directed toward an extension of her domination over China and involving disregard and destruction of the lawful rights and interests of other countries, including the United States.

In July 1937, the armed forces of Japan embarked upon large-scale military operations against China. Invading forces of more than a million men occupied large areas along the seaboard and in the central provinces. In these areas there were set up puppet regimes which instituted systems of controls and monopolies discriminatory in favor of the interests of the invading country.

It has been clear throughout that Japan has been actuated from the start by broad and ambitious plans for establishing herself in a dominant position in the entire region of the Western Pacific. Her leaders have openly declared their determination to achieve and maintain that position by force of arms and thus to make themselves masters of an area containing almost one half of the entire population of the world. As a consequence, they would have arbitrary control of the sea and trade routes in that region.

Previous experience and current developments indicate that the proposed "new order" in the Pacific area means, politically, domination by one country. It means, economically, employment of the resources of the area concerned for the benefit of that country and to the ultimate impoverishment of other parts of the area and exclusion of the interests of other countries. It means, socially, the destruction of personal liberties and the reduction of the conquered peoples to the role of inferiors.

It should be manifest to every person that such a program for the subjugation and ruthless exploitation by one country of nearly one half of the population of the world is a matter of immense significance, importance, and concern to every other nation wherever located.

Notwithstanding the course which Japan has followed during recent years, this Government has made repeated efforts to persuade the Japanese Government that her best interests lie in the development of friendly relations with the United States and with other countries which believe in orderly and peaceful processes among nations. We have at no time made any threats.

[The remainder of the statement deals with conditions resulting from the European War.]

711.94/1935 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

Tokyo, January 27, 1941—6 p. m.
[Received January 27—6:38 a. m.]

125. A member of the Embassy was told by my . . . colleague that from many quarters, including a Japanese one, he had heard that a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor was planned by the Japanese military forces, in case of "trouble" between Japan and the United States; that the attack would involve the use of all the Japanese military facilities. My colleague said that he was prompted to pass this on because it had come to him from many sources, although the plan seemed fantastic.

Grew

711.94/1936 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, January 27, 1941—7 p. m.
[Received January 27—9:55 a. m.[6]]

126. Foreign Minister Matsuoka's remarks in the session of the House of Representatives Budget Committee yesterday, first published here this morning, are summarized as follows:

1. The time has passed for Japan and the United States to engage in arguments but since the interpellator has raised the question, certain points in Secretary Hull's statement require clarification. His statement is based on erroneous thinking and his language is violent. The assertion that the Manchurian incident was the first step toward destruction of civilization is based on a superficial point of view.

---

[6] Telegram in three sections.

Rather, the Anglo-Saxon support of the *status quo* in East Asia, except [*sic*] when such *status quo* was injurious to Japan, must be blamed. Chinese resistance must be in large part attributed to Anglo-Saxon encouragement. An extremely generous Japanese policy served only to make the Chinese think that Japan would suffer all insults. Traditional Japanese patience was finally exhausted and the Marco Polo Bridge attack carried out.

2. American statesmen do not want to understand Japan's policy. We are endeavoring unsuccessfully to urge the Americans to reflection. "Since the United States has no correct understanding of Japan's thoughts and actions we have no recourse but to proceed toward our goal. We cannot change our convictions to accommodate the American viewpoint. There is nothing left but to face America, though we shall continue without disappointment or despair to try to correct the fundamental misconceptions held by that nation."

3. During the tenure of the two previous Cabinets there seemed to be some effort on the part of the American Government to reach an understanding with Japan. Mr. Hull is pardoned on this point. However, it has become evident that American conditions are the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and abandonment of [*or?*] 50% curtailment of Japan's continental and southward advance policies. "Not one Japanese in the Empire would assent to the abandonment of these policies." This American demand is equivalent to Japan's offering friendship to America in return for abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine, admission that predominance in the Western Hemisphere is wrong and immediate granting of independence to the Philippines.

4. The United States seems to consider all of Asia and the South Seas as first line of defense. Japan's domination of the Western Pacific is absolutely necessary to accomplish her national ideals. "My use of the word 'dominate' may seem extreme and while we have no such designs, still in a sense we do wish to dominate and there is no need to hide the fact. Has America any right to object if Japan does dominate the Western Pacific?"

"As Minister of Foreign Affairs, I hate to make such an assertion, but I wish to declare that if America does not understand Japan's rightful claims and actions, then there is not the slightest hope for improvement of Japanese-American relations." Japan will still not give up the small hope remaining that a change in American attitude can be brought about.

5. America's stiffened attitude may be partially attributed to an illusion that Japan's military power is weakened, and to the rumors that certain influential quarters in Japan secretly oppose the tripartite pact[8] and say that Japan will not follow its obligations even though the United States should enter the war. However, the provisions of article 3 of the treaty will come into effect in almost every case except that of an overt German attack upon the United States. If the treaty is invoked after consultation of the three powers it is not believed that Japan will without reason take the narrow viewpoint and for its own selfish advantage remain an onlooker in the war even though it means staking the fate of the nation on the outcome.

---

[8] See pp. 165 ff.

6. Relations with Soviet Russia have considerably improved. An agreement has been reached to open negotiations for an important treaty. England and America are watching the progress of Japanese-Soviet relations with the greatest interest.

GREW

711.94/1953a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[Substance]

WASHINGTON, February 4, 1941—11 p. m.

80. Reference is made to your No. 126 of January 27, 7 p. m., final sentence in paragraph No. 1. Assuming that you lack an official text, the Department would be interested in a close comparison by the Embassy of available press reports in order to determine whether Minister Matsuoka indicated that the attackers at Marco Polo Bridge were the Japanese.

HULL

711.94/1949 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

TOKYO, February 5, 1941—6 p. m.
[Received February 5—11:05 a. m.]

167. The Foreign Minister yesterday discussed Japanese-American relations in reply to interpellations in the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives. Since we are informed that the *New York Times* correspondent has cabled a full text of Mr. Matsuoka's remarks, the principal points made by the Foreign Minister as reported in today's vernacular press are summarized. During the course of the interpellation the Foreign Minister emphasized that his statements were not irresponsible remarks but were based on careful thought, that his bold manner of speech was particularly adapted to American consumption. He stated that Japan must clarify its true intentions and national power, that American illusions regarding Japan must be dissipated and that every effort to avoid a Japanese-American clash must be exerted.

1. Most wars are caused by misunderstandings. In the present case American doubts as to Japan's economic strength must be removed and on the other hand the national strength, intentions and resolution of the United States must be explained to the Japanese.

2. Japanese-American relations have greatly worsened since the conclusion of the tripartite pact which, however, aims to prevent an American-Japanese conflict and especially to prevent American entry into the European war.

3. Highly important objectives of the tripartite pact are conciliation between Japan and Soviet Russia and betterment of relations be-

tween the Soviet Union and the other Axis powers. The *Kokumin*, commenting on this phase of the Foreign Minister's remarks, calls it a hint that the Soviet Union may be included in the Axis.

4. The greatest cause of friction between Japan and the United States is Japan's southward advance. Every effort must be made to explain to the United States that the southward advance is not a policy antagonistic to America.

5. The *Kokumin* attributes certain remarks to the Foreign Minister published in no other vernacular to the effect that even if the United States were victorious in a war with Japan and occupied the country the Japanese nation would rise again even as Germany emerged from the harsh conditions imposed at the end of the first World War and the Foreign Minister reportedly reiterated that a clash between the two great Pacific powers must be avoided for the sake of world peace. Following this statement a blank space apparently indicates deletion by the censors of certain of the Minister's remarks.

GREW

711.94/1954 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

[Substance]

TOKYO, February 10, 1941—3 p. m.
[Received February 10—7:48 a. m.]

196. In connection with the last sentence in paragraph No. 1 of telegram No. 126 of January 27 from the Embassy, the Ambassador states that the Liutiaokow and Lukouchiao incidents were confused due to an unfortunate error in translation. The Japanese Foreign Minister's reference was not to the Marco Polo Bridge or Lukouchiao incident of July 7, 1937, but to the incident which occurred at Liutiaokow on September 18, 1931. The following is a translation of the statement: "The traditional patience of the Japanese finally was exhausted and the blow was dealt at Liutiaokow." The phraseology used by Mr. Matsuoka does not necessarily assert that the Japanese made the original attack. There is not available any official text of the statement and the reports appearing in the various newspapers differ slightly from the text sent to the Department.

GREW

711.94/1960 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

TOKYO, February 15, 1941—6 p. m.
[Received February 15—12:09 p. m.]

235. Tonight's vernacular press gives prominence to a statement issued at noon today by the Cabinet Information Bureau appealing to Japanese living in the Americas to remain calm in the face of

propaganda intended to worsen Japanese-American relations, under such headlines as "No Cause Anxiety Japan America; Government Statement Intended Allay Uneasiness"; "Third Country Plot Seen Behind Exaggerated Rumors Japanese-American Crisis." The press states that the Cabinet statement on the Far Eastern situation, the new American evacuation advice, and exaggerated rumors hinting at a Japanese-American crisis have unduly alarmed Japanese living on the American continent. This false propaganda is attributed to a "certain foreign country."

The Embassy's translation of the statement handed to us by the Cabinet Information Bureau follows:

> "Reports indicate that sensational information has been circulated in all parts of the American continent to the effect that Japanese-American relations are becoming extremely critical and that anxiety and uneasiness apparently exist among Japanese living in those areas. Although Japanese-American relations are somewhat strained they have not reached a point where war or hostilities are inevitable. Under the circumstances the governments of both nations are of course acting judiciously that such a contingency does not develop. It is believed that the spreading of extremist propaganda to worsen relations between the two countries is an act (the press version states 'of certain countries') based on an ulterior motive. The Government strongly desires that Japanese living in the various parts of the American continent maintain to the utmost a calm attitude, following their occupations without the slightest anxiety or agitation."

GREW

711.94/1996

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

No. 5397

TOKYO, February 26, 1941.
[Received March 17.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose a copy of a memorandum of conversation which the Counselor of the Embassy had on February 14 with the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, the substance of which was reported to the Department in the Embassy's 230, February 14, 8 p. m.[9]

The presentation by Mr. Dooman of his impressions of the position of the United States as gathered during his recent furlough appeared to cause Mr. Ohashi astonishment. Mr. Ohashi is, for a Japanese, extraordinarily direct and sparing of words. Upon listening attentively to what Mr. Dooman described as the philosophy of the American position, Mr. Ohashi remained perfectly quiet for an appreciable space of time and then burst forth with the question "Do you mean to say that if Japan were to attack Singapore there would be war with the United States?" Mr. Dooman replied, "The logic of the situation would inevitably raise that question." Mr. Ohashi then left that subject and adverted to the character of the reports sent to London by the British Ambassador. Circumstantial evidence that Mr. Ohashi was affected by the interview was given by Sir John Latham, the Australian Minister, who called on Mr. Ohashi a few minutes after Mr. Dooman left. Sir John, without being aware that Mr. Dooman had just called on Mr. Ohashi, told me that he found Mr. Ohashi greatly agitated and distrait.

---

[9] Telegram No. 230 not printed.

I propose to say to Mr. Matsuoka, with whom I have an appointment this morning, that the statements made by Mr. Dooman to Mr. Ohashi were made with my prior knowledge and have my full approval.

Respectfully yours, JOSEPH C. GREW

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)

[TOKYO,] February 14, 1941.

I called this afternoon by appointment on Mr. Ohashi, the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs. He greeted me quite politely, saying that although we had several mutual friends it was, so far as he knew, the first time we had met. I replied that I had on various occasions taken notice of statements which he had made in various capacities of the past, in Manchuria, and elsewhere, but I had, unfortunately, not been able to profit by opportunities which had presented themselves to make his acquaintance. Mr. Ohashi said he understood that I had just returned from leave in the United States and that he supposed I had received a number of interesting impressions in the United States. I replied that my furlough in the United States coincided with one of the most significant and important periods in the history of our country, and that if he had time I would be glad to tell him briefly of what I had seen and heard while at home. Mr. Ohashi said that fortunately he was not busy that day and that I could stay as long as I wished.

I gave Mr. Ohashi a fairly long account of the trends in opinion with regard to the war in Europe as they developed during the election campaign. I dwelt on the remarkably swift crystallization of opinion at home with regard to the question of American aid to England, which I attributed in large part first to the disclosure on the part of the British that they were rapidly approaching the end of the resources in dollar exchange, and second to the belief that the effects on Britain's capacity to produce aircraft and other munitions of German bombing raids had been more serious than the British communiques would lead one to suppose. I said that although the large majority of the American people abhorred the idea of American involvement in war, the fact was that an equally large majority of the American people believed that there was one consideration which transcends even that of avoiding involvement in the war, and that is helping England to the limit of our capacity.

I said that all this was not without direct bearing on relations between the United States and Japan. I had found that American opinion is pretty clearly opposed to the taking of action by the United States which would make war with Japan inevitable. Nevertheless Mr. Ohashi could readily understand that the American people, being an eminently practical people, are quite aware that an adequate supply of airplanes and other munitions is not the only prerequisite to a British victory: the supply to England of foodstuffs and raw materials by the British dominions and colonies and the maintenance of British commerce with the outside world are equally essential to a British victory. It would be absurd to suppose that the American people, while pouring munitions into Britain, would look with complacency upon the cutting of communications between Britain and British dominions and colonies overseas. If, therefore, Japan or any other nation were to prejudice the safety of those communications, either by direct action or by placing herself in a position to menace those communications, she would have to expect to come into conflict with the United States. There are many indications of the Japanese moving down slowly toward Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies. The United States cannot but be concerned by the various initiatives taken by the Japanese in Indo-China and elsewhere, for the reason that if Japan were to occupy these strategically important British and Dutch areas, it could easily debouch into the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific and create havoc with essential British lines of communication. The United States for its part was well aware that an alternative source of supply for Japanese purchase of petroleum and certain other products of the United States is the Netherlands East Indies, and for that reason it has been reluctant to impose embargoes on the sale to Japan of commodities of which it has a surplus; but the Japanese must clearly understand that the forbearance of the United States in this respect springs from a desire not to impel Japan to create a situation which could lead only to the most serious consequences. I recalled the axiom in geometry that two bodies cannot occupy the same space at the same time: However greatly Japan's security might be enhanced by occupying the Netherlands East Indies it must be realized by Japan that any such move would vitally concern the major preoccupation of the United States at this time, which is to assist England to stand against German assault.

Mr. Ohashi then took the floor and launched into an impassioned apologia of Japanese policies in recent years. He started by describing conditions in Japan during the middle 20's, the lack of employment in Japan at that time was driving young Japanese to despair; communism began to spread in amazing fashion, the estimates being that there were at one time more than 50,000 Japanese communists and there was fear of decay and disintegration of the Japanese political system. There developed at the same time a growing antagonism in China toward Japan. General Chiang Kai-shek initiated a series of military campaigns which finally resulted in the downfall of the northern group of Chinese generals, including Feng Yu-hsiang, Yen Hsi-shan, and others. General Chang Tso-lin [9a] made his historic trip to Nanking to consolidate himself with General Chiang Kai-shek, and upon his return to Mukden he raised the flag of Chinese nationalism and proclaimed that his action manifested the complete unification of China and at about this time, Mr. C. T. Wang, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, publicly declared in a speech at Nanking that China was now prepared to "drive Japan off the Continent of Asia". There had occurred elsewhere other events which also gave grounds for complete pessimism in Japan. Pressure by the United States on England had led to the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which England discarded after it had served British purposes; the United States in 1924 excluded Japanese from emigrating to the United States, even though the granting of a small quota of 140 would have amply served to prevent Japanese pride and honor from being injured, and when Australia followed with its White Australia Policy and other parts of the British Empire had also taken action to exclude Japanese, the Japanese had found themselves effectively prevented from expanding into areas which could use their industry and initiative. At the same time the United States and Great Britain encouraged China in every possible way to implement the policy proclaimed by Dr. C. T. Wang to drive Japan off the Asiatic Continent. He recalled travelling with Admiral Kanji Kato in 1930 from Mukden to Japan. Admiral Kato expressed himself as being extremely despondent of the future if matters were allowed to proceed as they were then proceeding, and he disclosed to Mr. Ohashi the determination of certain elements in the Japanese Army and Navy to take action toward opening up a way for Japanese expansion. This determination manifested itself finally in the Mukden Incident of September 18, 1931. Mr. Ohashi said that the League of Nations had placed upon Japan the responsibility for seeking to alter by force the *status quo* in the Far East. However, it was clear that it was China and not Japan which had taken the initiative in seeking to alter the *status quo*, and the responsibility for the deplorable conflict now taking place between China and Japan must largely be borne by those nations which encouraged China to pursue this disastrous policy. The United States and England must also be responsible in some measure for Japan's aligning itself with Germany and Italy, for the present Sino-Japanese conflict would never have occurred if the Anglo-Japanese alliance had not been abrogated. The United States and England had further driven Japan into a position of complete isolation, and it was accordingly necessary for Japan to find friends. Japan has no special friendly feelings towards Germany and Italy and certainly has no ideological association or identity with either of those two countries. Nevertheless Germany, Italy, and Japan have a close identity of interests in revolting against attempts to keep them permanently under subjection. It would be a great mistake to suppose that Japan would not honor its commitments under the alliance if the United States "were to attack Germany".

[9a] Reference is to Chang Hsueh-liang, son and successor of Chang Tso-lin.

I observed that Mr. Ohashi's presentation of Japan's case had the eloquence of one suffering under a sense of grievance. We do not deny that Japan has grievances, but we object to the methods pursued by Japan to rectify those grievances. After the war in Europe is over, there is bound to be a more rational world, and in the creation of the more intelligent world economy which we must earnestly hope will be brought into being after the war, there would be ample room for entirely satisfying Japan's legitimate needs. I then quoted Mr. Churchill's[10] remark "If we allow the past to quarrel with the present, we shall lose the future". As difficult and important as were the problems arising in China, they had not led to a war between the United States and Japan. It was certainly not the intention of the United States to seek a war with Japan, but at the same time I wished to make it clear that it would be idle and extravagant to believe that, so long as Japan remained a partner of Germany and Italy and so long as she was unable to resolve her troubles with China on a mutually satisfactory and equitable basis, a stabilization of relations between the United States and Japan could be hoped for. I believed that it was quite possible to pass over the present critical period without war, but that one essential condition to this more or less happy issue out of our difficulties must be the realization on the part of the Japanese that they cannot substantially alter the *status quo* in Southeast Asia, particularly, without incurring the risk of creating a very serious situation.

Mr. Ohashi asked whether he was correct in understanding me to say that war could be averted only by Japan standing still and allowing itself to be tied hand and feet by the United States and Great Britain. I replied that it was not my intention to give him specifications as to what Japan should or should not do, but I wished to express my opinion that if Japan did not exercise the same degree of restraint and forbearance as that being exercised by the United States, it was very difficult to see how a war could be averted.

---

[10] British Prime Minister.

Mr. Ohashi then asked me whether we had been sending to Washington such extravagant and sensational reports as those being sent by Sir Robert Craigie to London. Without waiting for a reply he said that Mr. Eden [11] had recently called in the Japanese Ambassador at London and had talked to Mr. Shigemitsu very harshly about recent Japanese moves in Siam and Indo-China. Mr. Eden was apparently greatly excited by telegrams which he had received from Sir Robert Craigie. Mr. Ohashi said that he had just had a talk with Sir Robert Craigie and that he had reminded Sir Robert that he had repeatedly given the latter assurances that Japan had no intention whatever of moving toward Singapore and the Dutch East Indies unless Japan was "pressed" by other nations through the imposition of embargoes by the United States or by the sending of an American fleet to Singapore. I said to Mr. Ohashi that, in my opinion, the award by Japan to Siam of the provinces of Laos and Cambodia would undoubtedly lead to the most serious disorders in Indo-China, as the French are strongly opposed to any substantial cession of territory to the Siamese. I asked Mr. Ohashi what Japan would do in the event that the disorders were beyond the French to control. He replied "we shall have to suppress these disorders". I then went on to say "once having occupied Indo-China, Japan would be in a position to control Siam and to undertake operations toward Burma or the Malay States. You see how this intervention in Southeast Asia is capable of having the most widespread consequences". I asked whether he should not consider, in the light of Japanese intervention in the dispute between Indo-China and Siam, whether alarm over Japanese policies in this area is not justified. Mr. Ohashi protested that Japan's interests in Southeast Asia were predominantly economic. Was it our intention to prevent Japan from entering into more satisfactory and closer economic relations with Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies? I replied that we were not concerned with arrangements calculated to be mutually profitable and which were entered into freely and not as a result of demands with menaces, open or implied. He would understand that proposals concerning trade arrangements presented under the guns of naval vessels could hardly be regarded as ordinary trade arrangements. Mr. Ohashi said that no Japanese warships were in the Indies and that the commercial negotiations now being carried on by Japan with the Netherlands Indies and Indo-China were of a normal character.[11a]

---

[11] British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
[11a] For other correspondence, see pp. 277 ff.

Mr. Ohashi said that he was awaiting with great interest reports which Admiral Nomura would be sending in shortly of his forthcoming interviews with the President and the Secretary of State.[11b] I had then been in Mr. Ohashi's office more than an hour. I rose to go. I said that upon my return to Tokyo I asked various colleagues what sort of a man Mr. Ohashi was and that they had all replied that he was extremely frank—that some had added that he was frank to the point of unpleasantness. I went on to say that I was very glad that he had been both frank and courteous with me, and that he could count on me to maintain equal frankness and courtesy with him in our future conversations. A faint smile came to Mr. Ohashi's face and he said that he would be glad to receive me at any time.

E[UGENE] H. D[OOMAN]

711.94/1972 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

[Substance]

TOKYO, February 27, 1941—midnight.
[Received February 27—12:10 p. m.]

334. Yesterday I told Matsuoka that I entirely concurred in and approved of all that Dooman had said to Ohashi on February 14. As the latter had given only an oral report of the conversation to Matsuoka I read him the whole memorandum of it. I was somewhat surprised when the Minister stated his entire agreement with what Dooman had said. Today I am sending Matsuoka for his personal use a copy of the memorandum.

GREW

762.94/484 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase—Extracts]

MOSCOW, March 24, 1941—3 p. m.
[Received March 25—7:30 a. m.[12]]

581. This morning I was given the opportunity, by invitation of the Japanese Ambassador, to talk with Matsuoka[13] for an hour.

. . . .

[11b] See pp. 387 ff.
[12] Telegram in three sections.
[13] Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, on special mission to the Soviet Union.

Matsuoka was emphatic in stating that under no circumstances would Japan attack Singapore or any of the American, British, or Dutch possessions, and he was insistent that Japan has no territorial ambitions. Japan, he said, was ready at any moment to join the United States in a guarantee of the territorial integrity or independence of the Philippine Islands. As an evidence of Japan's lack of territorial ambitions, Matsuoka referred to the outcome of his mediation of the dispute between Thailand and French Indochina. He said that Japan would not go to war with the United States, and added that from his reading of American history it appeared that it was the United States which went to war with other countries; if a conflict should take place, it would come about only as the result of affirmative action by the United States.

Matsuoka said that he desired ardently to liquidate the war in China at the earliest possible date. Chiang Kai-shek was relying upon American help, he said, and any time the President of the United States wanted to bring the Sino-Japanese conflict to an end on terms satisfactory to all concerned, he was in a position to do it by bringing his influence to bear in this direction upon Chiang Kai-shek.

I asked him whether he had in mind terms which he was sure Chiang Kai-shek would be entirely willing to accept and which would meet with the President's approval. He replied that instructions had recently been sent to Nomura [14] to take the subject up with the President and to discuss with the latter the terms on which the Sino-Japanese war could be terminated. Matsuoka said that now was the time when statesmen should take decisive action and that it is the "big things, not the little things" that matter; in his opinion the President is afforded a splendid opportunity "to clear up the entire Far Eastern situation" by discussing with Nomura the terms on which the war in China could be brought to a close. He added that he wished the President and the Secretary of State would trust him; on his record over the past few years, he said, he did not blame them for not having confidence in him, but that if they would give him the opportunity he would prove to them that Japan had no territorial or economic ambition, and that if an understanding were reached regarded by us all as reasonable he would fight to put it through should any elements in Japan oppose it.

In reply to what he had first said, I merely suggested to Matsuoka that he instruct Nomura most explicitly as to exactly what was in his mind as a basis for ending the war with China, and that he leave nothing open either to chance or to misunderstanding. Again he was emphatic at this point in insisting on the acceptability of the terms which he had in mind.

---

[14] Japanese Ambassador in the United States.

Matsuoka characterized as "ridiculous" any fears which were expressed in the United States over interference with supplies of rubber and tin, as these commodities were obviously for consumption in the only market that was large enough to absorb them; namely, the United States. It would be folly, he said, to interfere with the export of these commodities to the United States.

. . . .

He expressed the opinion that it was to the Soviet Union's interest to encourage war between Japan and the United States, and he said that he was well aware of the harm to Japan which would follow from any such conflict.

. . . .

STEINHARDT

740.0011 European War 1939/10905: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

TOKYO, May 14, 1941—5 p. m.
[Received May 14—9:55 a. m.[15]]

673. 1. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, who has been suffering from bronchitis and still coughs badly, received me today for the first time since his return from Berlin and after completing the routine business I asked whether he had any particular thoughts with regard to the present general situation.

2. The Minister's subsequent remarks, which he said he was addressing to me as "an American friend and not as the American Ambassador" were bellicose both in tone and substance. He said that he was exceedingly worried lest the United States should proceed to convoy its ships to Great Britain, which would almost certainly lead to war with Germany. He said that to declare a neutral zone in the Atlantic or any other ocean was contrary to international law and that in the face of our supplying Great Britain with war materials he thought that Hitler had shown great "patience and generosity" in not declaring war on the United States. He said he knew that Hitler desired to avoid such a war but that it was doubtful whether his patience and restraint could continue indefinitely. He said by way of example that if the United States were to convoy its ships in bringing aid to Chiang Kai-shek they would be torpedoed by the Japanese Navy just as he would expect the American Navy to act similarly in a reverse situation. He said that if, in spite of previous forbearance, Hitler should not [*now?*] sink our ships in the Atlantic and if we Americans should then attack the German submarines he would regard this as an act of American aggression which would call for

---

[15] Telegram in four sections.

deliberation as to the applicability of article III of the Triple Alliance Treaty of September 27, 1940,[16] and he thought there was no doubt that such deliberation would lead to war between Japan and the United States.

This issue he said, therefore, lies exclusively in the hands of President Roosevelt. Mr. Matsuoka added that in view of the present American Government and actions he felt that the "manly, decent, and reasonable" thing for the United States to do was to declare war openly on Germany instead of engaging in acts of war under cover of neutrality. He developed the foregoing thoughts at considerable length but the main points brought forward were as stated above.

3. I rebutted each of Mr. Matsuoka's remarks in turn and said that whether he was speaking to me as the American Ambassador or not, I as an American citizen emphatically resented his charge that my country was guilty of unmanly, indecent, and unreasonable conduct. Mr. Matsuoka thereupon said that he would withdraw that remark. To my reference to Japan's actions in attacking China and in ruthlessly bombing undefended cities and populations without a declaration of war (in connection [with] the Minister's observation anent the failure of the United States to declare war on Germany) Mr. Matsuoka merely remarked that the situations were entirely different, and changed the subject. I pointed out the utter fallacy of Mr. Matsuoka's reasoning with regard to our alleged breach of international law, spoke of our consistent policy concerning the freedom of the seas and argued the full justification of such measures as we might put into force in the face of Hitler's continual breaches of international law with special reference to the illegal form of submarine warfare being waged by the Germans. I explained at length our policy of supporting Great Britain and the compelling reasons which had led us to adopt that policy. No point of course by Mr. Matsuoka was allowed to pass unchallenged but we finally agreed that such debate was profitless and that a meeting of minds was impossible.

4. The discussion then turned to Japan's policy in connection with the southward advance and I said that in spite of the Minister's constant assurances of peaceful intentions we realized that there were other schools of thought in Japan as exemplified by the writings and speeches of many highly placed Japanese who were openly advocating that the southward advance should be carried out by force.

The Minister replied that he deplored the sort of utterances which I had mentioned as much as he deplored all anti-foreign agitation in Japan which he was steadily working to put an end to. He said that he was dissatisfied with the lack of energy on the part of Mr. Ito, President of the Information Board, in failing to eliminate the publication of such utterances and he proposed to have a talk with him on this subject shortly. If necessary the Minister said that he was prepared to place a definite ban on the publication of material of this kind. Prince Konoye and he himself were determined that the southward advance should be carried out only by peaceful measures but he added significantly "unless circumstances render this impossible." I asked him what circumstances he had in mind. He replied that he had in mind especially the concentration of British troops in Malaya and other provocative British measures. When I pointed out that such measures were purely of a defensive nature and that Great Britain certainly had no intention of provocative or of aggressive action in the Far East but had been obliged to adopt these defensive measures as a result of concrete evidence indicating that Japan's intentions to the southward might not be peaceful at all, the Minister's reply was that these British measures were regarded as provocative by the Japanese public and if the public should become too much disturbed, pressure might be brought to bear on the government to act. So far as the attitude of the Government of the United States was concerned I pointed out to the Minister situation would be utter folly for us, having adopted a policy of supporting Great Britain, to supply Great Britain by the Atlantic while complacently watching the downfall of Britain through the severance of the British lifeline from the East. The potentialities of this situation were therefore of grave concern to the United States and this concern must be increased in the light of the Minister's remark that Japan's peaceful intentions were dependent upon "circumstances."

---

[16] *Post*, p. 165.

5. In the course of further conversation I said that it was a constant cause of regret to me that Japanese-American relations were for the moment negative and non-constructive; that I had steadily worked to build up something permanently constructive in our relations and had been very hopeful of attaining concrete results during the period of the Yonai Cabinet [16a] and it had been a profound disappointment to me that Japan's complete change of policy had made these efforts abortive. I said I still look forward to the day when only [*once*] again our two countries could begin to reconstruct their relations on a firm basis. The Minister replied that he also was constantly hopeful but he added that the whole future of the world and of civilization now lies in the hands of one single man, President Roosevelt. My last remark before the termination of the interview was that the United States could only be guided by deeds and that our future relations must depend not upon what Japan might say but upon what Japan might do.

6. Just as I was about to despatch this telegram I received a letter from Mr. Matsuoka written in his own hand. The letter (except for

---

[16a] January 16–July 16, 1940.

one paragraph referring to a protection case which I took up with him) reads as follows:

> "Dear Mr. Ambassador . . . I was wondering, to be frank, why you appeared so disturbed when I referred to the American attitude and actions. After Your Excellency's departure, it all suddenly dawned on me that I misused a word (of course I was not speaking in my own language and you must make some allowance for my occasionally making mistake in choosing words, particularly when I speak off hand). Of course, I didn't mean to say 'indecent.' No! I wanted to say 'indiscretion.' What I wished to say (and that not as Foreign Minister but as a man who regarded himself a quasi-American and felt could talk almost as if he were an Ambassador) was that I should have liked to see the American Government exercise more discretion and be careful to give an appearance of 'reasonableness;' in a word, to be more cautious and careful.
>
> I write you the above in order to remove any misapprehension; I'd feel very sorry if I caused any.
>
> Very sincerely yours, Y. Matsuoka."

GREW

793.94/17041 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

TOKYO, December 1, 1941—3 p. m.
[Received December 5—5:03 a. m.]

1869. Extract from Premier Tojo's message to rally held yesterday under sponsorship Imperial Rule Assistance Association and Dai Nippon East Asia League in commemoration first anniversary joint Japan-China-"Manchukuo" declaration[17] follows (from Domei report in *Advertiser*):

> "It is certainly the most fortunate lot of the three powers to have the privilege of collaborating together under this banner for cutting open the thorny way, and 1 year has already gone by since we started this honorable work together, and if it is not the greatest task of the present century what else can it be.
>
> However if we look around we find that there are still many countries who are indulging in actions hostile to us. In fact they are trying to throw obstacles in the way of the construction of the East Asia co-prosperity sphere and are trying to enjoy the dream of exploitation of East Asia at the cost of the 1,000 million populace of the East Asiatic peoples to satisfy their greed of possession.
>
> The fact that Chiang Kai-shek is dancing to the tune of Britain, America, and communism at the expense of able-bodied and promising young men in his futile resistance against Japan is only due to the desire of Britain and the United States to fish in the troubled waters of East Asia by putting [*pitting?*] the East Asiatic peoples against each other and to grasp the hegemony of East Asia. This is a stock in trade of Britain and the United States.

---

[17] *Ante*, p. 122.

For the honor and pride of mankind we must purge this sort of practice from East Asia with a vengeance." [18]

Sent Department via Shanghai.

GREW

793.94/17042 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

TOKYO, December 1, 1941—4 p. m.
[Received December 5—5:14 a. m.]

1870. Excerpt from *Asahi* report Foreign Minister's address at dinner given by him yesterday in celebration first anniversary Japan-"Manchukuo"-China alliance follows:

"The world at present is confronted with unprecedented disturbances. In greater East Asia, however, the close relations among Japan, Manchukuo, and China must be strengthened to the utmost on the basis of the principles of the Japan-China basic treaty and the Japan-Manchukuo-China joint declaration. Needless to say, we must proceed towards the establishment of a new order in East Asia which has the co-existence and co-prosperity of East Asia peoples as its basic principle.

In its negotiations with the United States, the Japanese Government consistently has upheld this principle. The United States, however, is inclined not to recognize the real situation in East Asia. Not only that, but also it most regrettably has shown a disposition to apply coercively to the East Asiatic countries fanciful principles not adapted to the actual world situation and thus to obstruct the construction of the new order.

In undertaking the great mission of firmly establishing a new order in East Asia and thus contributing to the cause of permanent world peace, we must be fully prepared to face difficulties and obstacles greater than ever before.

I firmly believe however that if the three countries, Japan, Manchukuo, and China with iron will strengthen their ties and strive for realization of this great object in perfect cooperation, they will surmount these various obstacles, and that the East Asia peoples have a great future."

Sent Department via Shanghai.

GREW

---

[18] For Japanese explanation of this speech, see statement of December 2, 1941, p. 778.

RELATIONS OF JAPAN WITH THE EUROPEAN AXIS POWERS

RELATIONS OF JAPAN WITH THE EUROPEAN AXIS POWERS

762.94/122

The Chargé in Japan (Dickover) to the Secretary of State

No. 2159 — Tokyo, November 26, 1936.
[Received December 15.]

Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Embassy's telegram No. 241 of November 25, 7 p. m.,[1] regarding the German-Japanese Agreement for co-operation against the Communist International and to enclose copies of the "unofficial translation" in English of the Agreement, which has been compared by the Embassy with the original Japanese text and found to be substantially correct.

There is also enclosed an "unofficial translation" of a statement issued by the Foreign Office in regard to the Agreement which was given out at the same time, as well as a memorandum of a conversation which I had with Mr. Horinouchi, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the subject.

The Embassy will submit a further report on this subject after it has had an opportunity to study the Agreement and the local reactions to it.

Respectfully yours,

E. R. Dickover

[Enclosure 1—Unofficial translation]

Agreement and Supplementary Protocol Between Japan and Germany, Signed at Berlin, November 25, 1936

Agreement Guarding Against the Communistic International

The Imperial Government of Japan and the Government of Germany,

In cognizance of the fact that the object of the Communistic International (the so-called Komintern) is the disintegration of, and the commission of violence against, existing States by the exercise of all means at its command,

Believing that the toleration of interference by the Communistic International in the internal affairs of nations not only endangers their internal peace and social welfare, but threatens the general peace of the world,

---

[1] Not printed.

Desiring to co-operate for defence against communistic disintegration, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The High Contracting States agree that they will mutually keep each other informed concerning the activities of the Communistic International, will confer upon the necessary measures of defence, and will carry out such measures in close co-operation.

ARTICLE II

The High Contracting States will jointly invite third States whose internal peace is menaced by the disintegrating work of the Communistic International, to adopt defensive measures in the spirit of the present Agreement or to participate in the present Agreement.

ARTICLE III

The Japanese and German texts are each valid as the original text of this Agreement. The Agreement shall come into force on the day of its signature and shall remain in force for the term of five years. The High Contracting States will, in a reasonable time before the expiration of the said term, come to an understanding upon the further manner of their co-operation.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have affixed hereto their seals and signatures.

Done in duplicate at Berlin, November 25th, 11th year of Showa, corresponding to November 25th, 1936.

[SEAL] (Signed) VISCOUNT KINTOMO MUSHAKOJI
Imperial Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

[SEAL] (Signed) JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP
German Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

SUPPLEMENTARY PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT GUARDING AGAINST THE COMMUNISTIC INTERNATIONAL

On the occasion of the signature this day of the Agreement guarding against the Communistic International the undersigned plenipotentiaries have agreed as follows:

a) The competent authorities of both High Contracting States will closely co-operate in the exchange of reports on the activities of the Communistic International and on measures of information and defence against the Communistic International.

b) The competent authorities of both High Contracting States will, within the framework of the existing law, take stringent measures against those who at home or abroad work on direct or indirect duty of the Communistic International or assist its disintegrating activities.

c) To facilitate the co-operation of the competent authorities of the two High Contracting States as set out in *a*) above, a standing committee shall be established. By this committee the further measures to be adopted in order to counter the disintegrating activities of the Communistic International shall be considered and conferred upon.

Done at Berlin, November 25th, 11th year of Showa, corresponding to November 25th, 1936.

(Signed) VISCOUNT KINTOMO MUSHAKOJI
Imperial Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
(Signed) JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP
German Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

[Enclosure 2—Unofficial translation]

Statement by the Japanese Foreign Office

[TOKYO, November 25, 1936.]

The Foreign Office issued the following statement at 10:00 p. m. November 25, 1936, on the Japanese-German Agreement and the Supplementary Protocol guarding against the Communist International.

(1) Ever since its establishment the Communist International, or the so-called Comintern, with its headquarters at Moscow, for the purpose of destroying the national and social structures in every country in pursuance of its fundamental policy of world revolution, has been engaged in all sorts of activities, greatly menacing the peace of the world. At its Seventh Congress held in the summer of last year, the Comintern decided upon a policy of organizing a unified front with the Second International to oppose Fascism and imperialism, and at the same time made it plain that the future objectives of Comintern activities were to be Japan, Germany and Poland, etc.; and it further resolved to support the Chinese communist armies in order to fight Japan. The actual operations carried on subsequently by the Comintern have become extremely ingenious, rendering them all the more dangerous. As to the extent to which the Comintern interferes with the internal affairs of all countries and exerts baneful influences on the well-being of the nations and the peace of the

world, a glance at the present disturbances in Spain will be sufficient to convince anybody of its magnitude. At least those countries which lodged protests with the Government of the Soviet Union at the time of the Comintern Congress must certainly have full cognizance of the harmfulness of Comintern activities.

(2) The communist invasion has hitherto been more marked in the Orient, especially in China. The Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang have already suffered from its calamitous effects while China Proper is now being subjected to the depredations of the communist armies. The activities of the Comintern in China have, as a matter of fact, notably increased in vigor since its Seventh Congress.

In Manchukuo, also, the Comintern has been surreptitiously endeavoring through the Manchurian District Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to organize cells, to win over and instigate the bandits, and to direct the raids by partisan troops all over the country.

In Japan, the extreme Leftist movement temporarily showed signs of decline after the Manchurian Incident. But since the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, the movement has again become energetic. It has crept into the channels of lawful agitation in conformance with the resolution of that Congress, and has launched a unified front movement to make it a basis for the revival of the communist movement.

(3) The Japanese Government, who, in order to safeguard Japan's immutable national polity and insure the national security, and to maintain an everlasting peace in East Asia have pursued a clear-cut and consistent policy toward the Comintern, find it necessary to take more rigorous measures of self-defense against its increased menace as stated above. The organization and the activities of the Comintern being of an international character, any program of counter action should necessarily be based upon international cooperation. Now Germany, ever since the establishment of the present regime in 1933, has put into execution drastic anti-communist policies. Last year at the Seventh Congress of the Comintern she was selected together with Japan as a special objective of Comintern operations. Thus Japan and Germany are placed in similar circumstances vis-a-vis the Comintern. Consequently the Japanese Government as the first step of their defensive undertaking conducted negotiations with Germany and concluded an agreement on November 25 to take effect immediately.

(4) This agreement, the fundamental object of which is common defense against the destructive operations of the Comintern, contains provisions for the exchange of information regarding Comintern activities, for the consultation on, and the execution of, de-

fensive measures and for the extension of joint invitations to third Powers. There is, besides, a supplementary Protocol stipulating in concrete terms the manners of executing the present agreement.

(5) The Japanese Government are desirous of co-operating with as many Powers as possible for the purpose of perfecting their defensive measures against the Comintern menace, but for that purpose alone. It should be pointed out that in connection with, or behind, this agreement there exists no special agreement whatsoever, and that the Japanese Government have no intention to form, or join in, any special international bloc, for any other purpose and finally that the present agreement is not directed against the Soviet Union or any other specific country.

[Enclosure 3]

Memorandum by the American Chargé in Japan (Dickover) of a Conversation With the Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs (Horinouchi)

[Tokyo], November 23, 1936.

I called on Mr. Horinouchi at the official residence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs at 5 o'clock at Mr. Horinouchi's request. After the usual greetings Mr. Horinouchi stated that there were many rumors in Tokyo and in the press abroad regarding a German-Japanese agreement—some said a German-Japanese military alliance. Because of these rumors he wished to tell me the facts as they stand at present. He then said that at the last general meeting of the Comintern Japan, as well as Germany and the United States, had been specified by the Comintern as countries against which that organization should direct its activities. As was well known, Japan did not like and was opposed to communistic doctrines and has always defended Japan against the spread of communism. Recently, moreover, the activities of the Comintern apparently have not been directed as much against countries in Europe as against countries in Asia, particularly against China, India, and Manchuria. Now that the activities of the Comintern have assumed an international scope the Japanese Government has adopted the policy that international defense against the activities of the Comintern should be taken by the countries threatened by those activities.

For the reasons which he had just stated, the Vice Minister went on, the Japanese Government has been holding conversations with the German Government during recent months. These conversations have resulted in an agreement. The Vice Minister then gave me the following summary of the German-Japanese agreement:

"The exchange of information in regard to the activities of the Comintern and consultations in regard to defensive measures, as well as provisions for extending joint invitations to third powers, are provided for by the agreement. Concrete provisions concerning the carrying out of the agreement mentioned above, the manner of coöperation between the authorities of the two high contracting parties, the steps to be taken against persons connected with the Comintern, and the establishment of a standing committee, are embodied in a Supplementary Protocol."

The Vice Minister stated that the agreement would probably be concluded sometime during this week and upon conclusion would be published. I asked if the protocol as well as the main agreement would be published. The Vice Minister said that it would.

The Vice Minister went on to say that the agreement was not directed against any particular power. Moreover, he said, the Japanese Government had no intention of permitting the agreement to draw Japan into European politics and Japan had no intention of joining any bloc of nations—for instance any bloc such as a fascist bloc.

I remarked that rumors were current in diplomatic circles in Tokyo to the effect that the agreement included some secret trade or military clause. Mr. Horinouchi immediately said that the agreement was not an alliance and that no secret military or economic arrangement of any kind was included in the agreement.

Mr. Horinouchi then said that he was giving this information about the German-Japanese agreement only to the American and to the British Governments. He said that the British Ambassador, Sir Robert Clive, had informed the Foreign Office that questions had been asked in the House of Commons in regard to the rumors of a German-Japanese agreement and that, for that reason, the Foreign Office had informed the British Ambassador in regard to the agreement. He proceeded to state that the Japanese Government greatly valued its friendship with the American Government and did not wish that any misunderstanding should arise, and consequently he had decided to give the same information to the American Government. I thanked Mr. Horinouchi for the information, which I said I knew would be greatly appreciated by my Government, especially in view of the many conflicting and probably exaggerated press reports which were reaching the United States.

Mr. Horinouchi said that, as the information regarding an agreement was being given only to the above two governments, he had to request that it be kept strictly confidential for the time being. Before the agreement was given to the newspapers, however, he would give me a complete text for transmission to my Government.

E. R. D[ICKOVER]

762.94/204

Protocol Concluded by Italy, Germany, and Japan at Rome, November 6, 1937[2]

[Translation]

The Italian Government, the Government of the German Reich, and the Imperial Government of Japan,

Considering that the Communist International continues constantly to imperil the civilized world in the Occident and Orient, disturbing and destroying peace and order,

Considering that only close collaboration looking to the maintenance of peace and order can limit and remove that peril,

Considering that Italy—who with the advent of the Fascist regime has with inflexible determination combated that peril and rid her territory of the Communist International—has decided to align herself against the common enemy along with Germany and Japan, who for their part are animated by like determination to defend themselves against the Communist International,

Have, in conformity with Article 2 of the Agreement against the Communist International concluded at Berlin on November 25, 1936, by Germany and Japan, agreed upon the following:

ARTICLE 1

Italy becomes a party to the Agreement against the Communist International and to the Supplementary Protocol concluded on November 25, 1936, between Germany and Japan, the text of which is included in the annex to the present Protocol.[3]

ARTICLE 2

The three powers signatory to the present Protocol agree that Italy will be considered as an original signatory to the Agreement and Supplementary Protocol mentioned in the preceding article, the signing of the present Protocol being equivalent to the signature of the original text of the aforesaid Agreement and Supplementary Protocol.

ARTICLE 3

The present Protocol shall constitute an integral part of the abovementioned Agreement and Supplementary Protocol.

---

[2] Copy transmitted to the Department as an enclosure to despatch No. 643, November 12, 1937, from the Ambassador in Italy; not printed. Text taken from official Stefani communiqué.

[3] Annex not printed.

ARTICLE 4

The present Protocol is drawn up in Italian, Japanese, and German, each text being considered authentic. It shall enter into effect on the date of signature.

In testimony whereof, etc. . . .

CIANO—VON RIBBENTROP—HOTTA

762.94/214

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

No. 2660

TOKYO, November 13, 1937.
[Received November 29.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that the adherence of Italy to the German-Japanese anti-Comintern pact took place at Rome on November 6 and that the news was hailed in this country with great enthusiasm. Not only did the press comment extensively and with approval, as reported by telegram,* but streets were decorated and parades were held in celebration of the event. By this step Italy has thus forged the third side of the German-Italian-Japanese anti-communist triangle and has definitely placed Japan in the so-called fascist block of nations. This event further marks the definite termination of Japan's period of political and moral isolation which followed the Manchurian venture in 1931 and also emphasizes the abandonment of Japan's previous and almost traditional alignment with the democratic powers.

The Embassy has, in a previous despatch,† discussed the use of the word "fascist" in connection with Japan, Italy and Germany. The term has come to be used to describe that which is the antonym of communist; therefore any state which is anti-communist is immediately labelled "fascist". If the present triangular combination is analyzed, however, it becomes immediately apparent that not only is the group not merely anti-communist but that its policies and practices equally run counter to those of the so-called democratic powers. Thus it can be seen that the question resolves itself into the simple fact that it is a combination of those states which are bent upon upsetting the *status quo* as opposed to those states which wish to preserve the *status quo*, or, more simply, of the "have-nots" against the "haves", and that anti-communism is merely the banner under which the "have-nots" are rallying.

---

*Telegram No. 528, November 8, 5 p. m., 1937. [Footnote in the original; telegram not printed.]

†Despatch No. 2631, October 15, 1937. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed.]

The threat to England is very real and immediately apparent upon reflection that with the addition of Japan to the Rome-Berlin axis the life-line of the British Empire is threatened from the North Sea through the Mediterranean and beyond Singapore.

It is of some interest to note that in completing this triangular anti-communist pact Japan, instead of signing a separate agreement with Italy, arranged to have Italy adhere to the already existing German-Japanese pact in the expectation of avoiding giving unnecessary and further affront to Moscow such as was given last November when Berlin and Tokyo announced the anti-Comintern pact. This is an example of the greater delicacy with which such matters are handled when arranged by the civil authorities and through the proper channels as compared with the heavy-handedness of the military who engineered the pact with Germany apparently without the knowledge of the Foreign Office and timed it so badly that news of it leaked out only a few days before the settlement of the very troublesome fisheries question with Soviet Russia was to have taken place. Comment from Moscow on Rome's recent action is lacking here but if there has been any it was undoubtedly directed largely against Italy. But it is easy to imagine the nature of the comment directed against Japan if Japan had signed a separate anti-Comintern agreement with Italy.

Respectfully yours, JOSEPH C. GREW

762.94/275 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

[Substance—Extract]

TOKYO, February 8, 1939—4 p. m.
[Received February 8—12:15 p. m.[4]]

73. Japan has entered into negotiations with Germany and Italy for a definite alliance, both military and political. The questions under present consideration concern the exact scope of the understanding; that is, whether it is to be aimed only at Russia or against other nations also. The above is based on reliable reports. Germany and Italy are said to be asking for the broad application while Japan wishes to restrict the scope of the alliance.

Apparently the Germans, and to a less extent the Italians, are seeking an arrangement recognizing and giving effect to the superior strategic position which they hold as compared with the Japanese should a conflict arise between Russia and any member of the alliance. We are reliably informed that the Germans and Italians consider Japan a natural ally because they feel sure that Japan would seize the opportunity to attack Russia should that power become engaged in war with either Germany or Italy or with both of them. That is why they do not wish to make commitments to come to the aid of Japan if only Japan comes into conflict with Russia.

---

[4] Telegram in five sections.

Important moderate influences are in operation to keep the Japanese Government from joining itself completely with the Rome-Berlin Axis. However, strong pressure is being exerted on the other side; the younger army officers are especially keen for this tie-up. It is thought that Foreign Minister Arita favors making the alliance. It was he who sponsored the anti-Comintern Pact.

I have acted through informal channels to convey to Arita the idea that Japan would do well to consider, before taking an irrevocable step, what would be the possible effects upon relations with the United States of such an alliance. My British colleague feels that it would be useful for me to seek an interview with Arita on this question but I am not convinced that a direct approach is desirable. It is my belief that the best course would be to limit myself, should future conversations with Arita bring up this question naturally, to stressing the view that if her ultimate welfare is to be served Japan must cultivate and maintain friendly relations with all nations, and that friendly relations with the United States and Great Britain are of especial value because Japan's rapid development economically and industrially would have been impossible without the liberal American and British trade policies. It seems to me that the principal benefit to which we can invite Arita's attention as an offset to whatever the Japanese expect to gain from an arrangement with the Axis is the value to Japan of British and American markets. No matter what a government's policy may be, a government cannot necessarily control moral sanctions by the people.

The Department can determine better than I the advisability of approaching the Foreign Minister directly on this matter and whether such an approach, if made, should be under instructions or on my own responsibility.

GREW

762.94/275 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (*Grew*)

[Substance]

WASHINGTON, February 10, 1939—6 p. m.

33. With reference to your telegram No. 73 of February 8, 4 p. m., we leave to your discretion the form and substance of any further approach on this subject, but in our opinion whatever approach you make should be on your own responsibility. We agree entirely with

you that it is desirable that Japan should not enter into the proposed alliance. As regards your mention of the desirability of good relations with all countries, especially the United States and Great Britain, we suggest that you merely say with all countries, among which the United States is important. If you think best, you might emphasize the conviction that mutually beneficial and friendly relations among the nations of the world and the general adoption of policies which will serve as a basis for broadening rather than narrowing such relations will serve the best interests of all nations, including Japan. Naturally you will take care not to say anything implying that the United States might give any specific compensation to Japan for giving up the idea of entering the proposed Axis alliance.

Hull

762.94/280 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

[Substance]

Tokyo, February 14, 1939—10 p. m.
[Received February 14—10:45 a. m.]

89. In keeping with your telegraphic instruction No. 33, February 10, 6 p. m., I have told the Foreign Minister my personal views as to the negotiations now under way between Japan and the Axis Powers. This conversation with Arita convinces me that the Japanese will fully consider all factors before reaching whatever decision may be made. Talks with several newspaper men who maintain close relations with Arita confirm this view.

I hear that Japan is still standing out for limiting the proposed alliance so that it will be applied as against Russia only, but this information is not confirmed.

Grew

762.94/295 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, March 7, 1939—6 p. m.
[Received March 7—9:32 a. m.]

120. Our 104, February 21, 8 p. m.[5] Reference Japanese-German-Italian conversations. The Minister for Foreign Affairs is reported to have made the following statement yesterday at a meeting of the Budget Committee of the Lower House:

"The present pivot of Japanese foreign policy today is the relations arising out of the Japanese-German-Italian anti-Comintern Pact which was established to combat the destructive designs of the Comintern. The present conflict with China derives from many causes but the most important of these is the activity in China of the Comintern, a fact which is generally admitted. Accordingly, to bring about an adjustment of the China incident and to establish firmly the new order in China, resistance to the destructive activities of the Comintern is for Japan an extremely important matter. The anti-Comintern Pact was made the pivot of present Japanese policy for this purpose. However, the firm establishment of the new order in East Asia and making secure Japan's general international position is not being left only to the anti-Comintern Pact. In another direction, such as relations with Great Britain and the United States, there is need for bringing about on the part of those countries an understanding of Japan's position and attitude. In Great Britain, the United States, and in various other countries, there is a tendency to look upon present relations between Japan, Germany, and Italy as an association of totalitarian states opposed to the democracies. As pointed out on various occasions by the Prime Minister as well as by myself, that is an absolutely erroneous observation. The reasons for the establishment between Japan and Germany and Italy of relations opposed to communism are merely those which I have already described. I think, therefore, that it is clear these relations contain no implication of opposition to Great Britain, the United States, and other democracies. I have briefly and only in the most general terms outlined Japan's foreign policy. I have also been asked to explain conditions in various other countries but I doubt the wisdom of complying with the request in this place. Perhaps an opportunity will present itself in the near future for me to make a further statement with regard to these matters."

---

[5] Not printed.

Cipher text by mail to Shanghai, Chungking and Peiping.

Grew

762.9411/21 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Toyko, September 27, 1940—10 p. m.
[Received September 27—2:15 p. m.]

909. At 9:45 o'clock tonight we were given by the Foreign Office the following four documents in English translation shortly before their release to the press:

1. Summary of the three-power pact between Japan, Germany and Italy signed on September 27, 1940 at Berlin;
2. Radio address by the Minister for Foreign Affairs;
3. Imperial rescript by the Emperor;
4. Message of the Prime Minister.

In view of the prime importance of these documents in connection with the present critical crisis and being informed that complete texts may not be cabled to the American press, I feel obliged to telegraph documents numbers 2, 3, and 4 in full so that Department may study their tone and substance without delay. The texts follow in three ensuing telegrams. The summary of the pact[6] itself had already been announced on the radio from the United States tonight.

GREW

762.9411/136

Summary of the Three-Power Pact Between Japan, Germany, and Italy, Signed at Berlin, September 27, 1940[7]

The Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy, considering it as the condition precedent of any lasting peace that all nations of the world be given each its own proper place, have decided to stand by and co-operate with one another in regard to their efforts in Greater East Asia and the regions of Europe respectively wherein it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things calculated to promote mutual prosperity and welfare of the peoples concerned. Furthermore it is the desire of the three Governments to extend cooperation to such nations in other spheres of the world as may be inclined to put forth endeavours along lines similar to their own, in order that their ultimate aspirations for world peace may thus be realized. Accordingly the Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe.

ARTICLE 2

Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia.

ARTICLE 3

Japan, Germany and Italy agree to cooperate in their efforts on the aforesaid lines. They further undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three Contracting Parties is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European War or in the Sino-Japanese Conflict.

ARTICLE 4

With a view to implementing the present Pact, Joint Technical Commissions the members of which are to be appointed by the respective Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy will meet without delay.

---

[6] Summary of pact as transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in Japan in his despatch No. 5038, October 5, 1940, is printed *infra*.

[7] Tentative translation as received from the Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs, September 27, 1940.

Article 5

Japan, Germany and Italy affirm that the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the political status which exists at present as between each of the three Contracting Parties and Soviet Russia.

Article 6

The present Pact shall come into effect immediately upon signature and shall remain in force for ten years from the date of its coming into force.

At proper time before the expiration of the said term the High Contracting Parties shall, at the request of any one of them, enter into negotiations for its removal [*renewal?*].

762.9411/25 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, September 27, 1940—11 p. m.
[Received September 27—2 : 30 p. m.]

910. Number 2. Translation radio address by Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, Minister for Foreign Affairs, September 27, 1940:

"Today, on the occasion of the conclusion of the three-power pact between Japan, Germany and Italy, an Imperial rescript—I am profoundly moved to say—has been issued to the nation. What we His Majesty's subjects should do has been plainly indicated by the Prime Minister in his message. I sincerely believe that it is incumbent upon all of us to lay to heart the august will of our Sovereign and put forth our best efforts in order to surmount the current emergency.

Our country is now faced with a most difficult situation, unparalleled in its history. What step we should take at this moment is a grave problem upon which hangs the fate of our nation. The Government, keenly conscious of the gravity of its responsibilities, is seeing to it that nothing shall come amiss.

The objective of Japan's foreign policy is no other than to dispose of the China affair, to construct a sphere of common prosperity in greater East Asia and to contribute thereby to the establishment of true peace for the entire world. But when we look at the actual international situation we find that this intention of Japan is not yet fully understood. There are countries which have the mistaken idea that peace means the mere maintenance of the old order, or those which, while realizing the inevitability of change, are reluctant to part with the old order. Moreover, there are countries which attempt to obstruct, directly or indirectly, our construction of a new order in greater East Asia, and even those who resort to all sorts of stratagem in order to block the path of Japan's advance toward the fulfillment of her great historic mission—that of establishing world peace. The Japanese Government has assiduously striven to remedy this regrettable state of affairs. Nevertheless, I regret to say that the situation has not only failed to improve, but it has even shown signs of aggravation in certain quarters.

Circumstances have now brought Japan to the point where she can no longer permit the international situation to drift as it will. At this juncture there is only one course for Japan to take. That is to say internally we should stand resolutely together—one hundred million people as one—by establishing speedily the new state structure for national defense; and externally, we should first unite with Germany and Italy which have the same aspirations and policy as ours and later with those powers who can cooperate with us. We should thus go fearlessly forward to carry out our conviction, calling at the same time upon those powers that obstruct us to reconsider their attitude. In such manner, the Government expects to achieve the ultimate aim of our Yamato race—namely, the establishment of a new order in East Asia.

Accordingly, we have conducted negotiations with the representatives of Germany and Italy which have resulted in the conclusion of the three-power pact, made public just a short while ago.

The establishment of this historic relationship of alliance between the three countries is of course due to the wisdom of our gracious Sovereign. At the same time it owes much to the judgment and decision of the eminent leaders of Germany and Italy—Chancellor Hitler and Premier Mussolini. Again, the German Foreign Minister, Mr. von Ribbentrop, has earnestly made efforts for German-Japanese cooperation from the very day he assumed his present post, while the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, having been once stationed in East Asia, and understanding fully Japan's position in East Asia, has ceaselessly labored for the promotion of Italo-Japanese friendship. Needless to say, these two Foreign Ministers have played important roles in the conclusion of the present pact.

The pact provides that Japan, Germany and Italy shall cooperate freely with one another toward the construction of a new order, respectively in greater East Asia and in the regions of Europe, in which these powers are at present engaged. It also provides that if any one of the contracting parties should be attacked by an outside power, at present not involved in the European war or in the China affair, the three contracting powers shall render mutual assistance with all possible means, political, economic, and military. Accordingly, it does not mean that because of this pact Japan is to enter the European war at present, nor that she intends to challenge any power without provocation. It may be added also that the present treaty will not affect in any way the existing political status between Japan, Germany and Italy on the one hand and Soviet Russia on the other.

The Treaty also provides that Germany and Italy recognize Japan's position of leadership in regard to the construction of a new order in greater East Asia. We in turn recognize the leadership of Germany and Italy in the European regions where they are now engaged in the establishment of a new order, staking even their national existence in the undertaking. And thus the three powers are to join forces and help one another to the utmost.

With the conclusion of this treaty, Japan's responsibilities as leader of the new order in greater East Asia becomes even greater than before. Although it is the intention of the Japanese Government to fulfill these responsibilities always by peaceful means, there is no telling whether there might not arise occasions and circumstances calling for a momentous decision on the part of our nation. Our future is beset with countless obstacles and difficulties which, it must be fully realized, no ordinary effort will be sufficient to surmount. Our Government and people, united as one and grasping fully the situation both at home and abroad, should be prepared to endure all hardships and sacrifices, and redouble their efforts so as to conform to the august will of our Sovereign."

Grew

762.9411/27 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, September 27, 1940—midnight.
[Received September 27—2:40 p. m.]

911. No. 3. (Translation.) Imperial rescript:

"To enhance justice on earth and make of the world one household is the great injunction, bequeathed by our [Imperial] Ancestors and which we lay to heart day and night. In the stupendous crisis now confronting the world, it appears that endless will be the aggravation of war and confusion, and incalculable the disasters to be inflicted upon mankind. We fervently hope that the cessation of the disturbances and the restoration of peace will be realized as swiftly as possible.

Accordingly, we commanded our Government to deliberate on the matter of mutual assistance and cooperation with the Governments of Germany and Italy which share in the views and aspirations of our empire. We are deeply gratified that a pact has been concluded between these three powers.

The task of enabling each nation to find its proper place and all individuals to live in peace and security is indeed one of great magnitude, unparalleled in history. The goal lies still far distant. Ye, our subjects, clarify evermore the concept of national polity; think deeply and look far; unite in heart and strength, and surmount the present emergency, to assist thereby in the promotion of the Imperial fortune coeval [with] heaven and earth. September twenty-seventh, the fifteenth year of Showa (1940)."

Grew

762.9411/26 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, September 28, 1940—1 a. m.
[Received September 27 (?)—3:47 p. m.]

912. No. 4. (Translation.) Message of the Prime Minister:

"On the occasion of the conclusion of the three-power pact between Japan, Germany and Italy, an Imperial rescript has been issued, setting forth clearly the aims of our empire and pointing the path our nation should follow. I am greatly moved by the boundless benevolence of our Sovereign.

To maintain world peace and to insure the stability of East Asia is indeed the immutable national policy of Japan, firmly rooted in the principle on which our empire was founded.

With war breaking out in Europe last autumn, conflict and confusion have spread increasingly over the world. It is an urgent necessity of this moment to devise a measure for the cessation of the disturbances and the restoration of peace. Germany and Italy share with our empire in the same ideal and aspirations. Accordingly, with a view to joining hands with these powers to establish a new order in the respective regions, and furthermore to cooperating with them toward the restoration of world peace, Japan has now concluded a three-power pact. The time has come for our nation to proceed with fresh resolve to construct a new order in greater East Asia.

However, to carry out fully the conviction of our country and to enable all nations to find each its proper place is indeed a difficult task. The goal lies far. We must expect to encounter numerous obstacles as we go on.

I confidently hope that, in obedience to the Imperial will, our people, in order to surmount the present emergency, will make clear the concept of our national polity; unite heart and soul, and overcome any and every obstacle—and thereby set at ease the august mind of our Sovereign."

GREW

762.9411/63

Press Release Issued by the Department of State on September 27, 1940

At his press conference today, in response to inquiries, the Secretary of State said:

"The reported agreement of alliance does not, in the view of the Government of the United States, substantially alter a situation which has existed for several years. Announcement of the alliance merely makes clear to all a relationship which has long existed in effect and to which this Government has repeatedly called attention. That such an agreement has been in process of conclusion has been well known for some time, and that fact has been fully taken into account by the Government of the United States in the determining of this country's policies."

762.9411/48 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

[Substance]

TOKYO, September 29, 1940—11 a. m.
[Received September 29—6:58 a. m.[8]]

916. The signing of the Japanese-German-Italian alliance is obviously a tremendous Japanese gamble on the defeat of Britain by Ger-

---

[8] Telegram in two sections.

many. In an off-the-record talk with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Grew informally expressed his opinion that Japan by tying herself to the Reich would become merely a satellite of Germany, however the war in Europe turned out. Mr. Grew said that in his opinion the present Japanese course must throw Japan on the rocks; that Germany is not and will not be in any position really to support Japan, no matter what intentions along that line Germany may have expressed. Japan, by tying herself to an economic bloc in East Asia which is economically unsound and sacrificing the flow of free commerce with the world, is putting her financial and economic future in a hopeless position. Matsuoka commented only that these things were matters of opinion. Mr. Grew has heard but is without confirmation that an outright alliance was opposed by the Foreign Minister himself.

Although the alliance with the Axis has of course been a potentiality from the inception of the present government [8a] and its trend of policy, few observers expected it to materialize so rapidly. There was of course considerable speculation prompted by the secretiveness of all the proceedings. However, right up to the last moment some members of the diplomatic corps failed to believe that the pact had actually evolved. Two hours before the pact was to be signed in Berlin a usually well-informed American newspaper correspondent in Tokyo was completely unaware of the development. Stahmer [8b] is believed to have been responsible for actual negotiations in Japan.

The value of the alliance to the European side of the Axis is obvious, but the value of it to Japan is certainly less clear. Obviously the primary aim of the pact is the United States, and the German-Italian hope is naturally that the pact will increase American fears of developments in the Pacific. The proportionate gain to Japan seems to be much less. There may of course be secret provisions to the treaty. Such provisions might be: (1) The agreement of the U. S. S. R. to an arrangement freeing Japan of anxiety on the Russian front, (2) intervention by Germany looking to mediation between China and Japan, (3) Axis support for Japan in the Dutch East Indies and Indochina. With regard to the first point, although there is wide talk of the conclusion of a U. S. S. R.-Japan nonaggression agreement there is no real information available as to Russia's stand. The Ambassador of the U. S. S. R. told a member of the diplomatic corps in Tokyo on September 28 that he had not had any knowledge before the alliance of its terms. With regard to German mediation in the China conflict, it is not seen that that is possible, barring Soviet pressure on the Chiang Kai-shek government. In Indochina the German-controlled government at Vichy is probably able to guarantee Japan's freedom to carry out her plans in Indochina. What is possibly one of the most dangerous potential consequences of the alliance is a possible ruthless application of power by Germany in Holland to bring about changes in the situation in the Dutch East Indies.

[8a] Headed by Prince Konoye as Prime Minister, July 22, 1940.
[8b] Head of the German Economic Mission in Japan.

Yesterday Mr. Grew was told in confidence by an officer of the Gaimusho who is sympathetic to the United States and Britain that if the British were to make a public offer of the use of the Singapore base to America, or if an American squadron were to visit Singapore, this would be the most effective possible counter to the alliance, and, the official believed, would give pause to the extremists in Japan.

GREW

762.9411/77 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

[Substance—Extract]

TOKYO, October 2, 1940—7 p. m.
[Received October 2—2:10 p. m.[9]]

929. Some members of the Diplomatic Corps in Tokyo, in informal conversations with Mr. Ohashi, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, upon asking what advantage Japan expected to gain from the pact, have been told that it was specifically directed against the United States. Mr. Ohashi has told these persons that ever since 1924, the date on which Japanese exclusion was embodied in the American immigration laws, [9a] the United States has been hampering Japan in its inevitable necessity for expansion. Mr. Ohashi pointed out that it was only natural that Japan should secure as allies countries opposed to the present world order and that world totalitarianism would effectively wipe out the nearly bankrupt Anglo-Saxon democracies.

GREW

762.9411/99 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

TOKYO, October 5, 1940—10 p. m.
[Received October 5—5:31 p. m.]

948. The Foreign Minister asked me to come this afternoon to his private residence informally and alone "for a cup of tea" and for two hours and a quarter he talked on a variety of subjects. His discourse was largely of a historical and philosophical nature but outstanding points will be reported in separate telegrams tonight and tomorrow.[10] At the commencement of the talk Mr. Matsuoka com-

---

[9] Telegram in two sections.

[9a] Sec. 13 (*c*) of act approved May 26, 1924; 43 Stat. 153.

[10] Not printed.

municated orally in English and handed to me the Japanese text of "a statement to the United States concerning the three-power alliance" of which our translation follows.

"A statement to the United States concerning the three-power alliance.

The recent three-power alliance is not aimed at any particular country. If Japan, Germany and Italy unite, the probability of being attacked by another country is decreased, the spreading of world disorder may be prevented, and in this sense the alliance contributes to world peace. By this treaty Japan has further clarified its intention to establish a new order in greater East Asia including the South Seas.

The construction of a new order in East Asia means the construction of a new order under which Japan establishes the relationship of common existence and mutual prosperity with the peoples of each and every land in greater East Asia, that is East Asia including the South Seas. In a position of equality with every other country, Japan may freely carry on enterprises, trade and emigration in and to each and every land in greater East Asia and thereby be enabled to solve its population problem. This does not mean these areas are to be exploited and conquered, nor does it mean these areas are to be closed to the trade and enterprises of other countries. Japan has long tried to solve its population problem through emigration, trade and enterprises abroad, but the various countries of Europe and America have nullified Japan's reasonable and peaceful efforts concerning its population problem since those countries have turned back Japanese immigrants to their great territories and have obstructed trade and enterprise.

In the greater East Asia sphere of mutual prosperity, the endeavor is being made to abolish such unnatural restrictions on the free activities of mankind. It is expected that this endeavor will be accomplished insofar as possible through peaceful means and with the least possible undesirable change in the *status quo*.

Japan's policy toward China forms an important part of the above endeavor. However, owing to the lack of understanding on the part of some Chinese people and to the attitude taken by England and the United States in not recognizing Manchukuo, which gave rise to Chiang Kai-shek's hope of recovering Manchukuo, an unfortunate clash of arms broke out. This clash is, in fact, war and therefore it is impossible for the Japanese Army during its activities to avoid affecting rights and interests of the powers in China. This is particularly true when such rights and interests hinder the prosecution of Japan's war against China. Accordingly, if the effects upon these rights and interests are to be brought to an end, it is most desirable to encourage and promote peace between Japan and China. This fact notwithstanding the powers are not only checking Japan's actions through legalistic arguments and treaty pronouncements which have become inapplicable because of changing conditions, but are also oppressing Japan through such means as restriction on the exportation of important commodities to Japan and at the same time are giving positive aid to Japan's enemy, the Chiang Kai-shek regime. These actions spring from hidden motives to keep the Orient under conditions of disorder as long as possible and to consume Japan's national strength. We must believe that these actions are not for the love of peace and are not for the purpose of protecting rights and interests. Japan concluded a defensive alliance with Germany and Italy for no other purpose than to resist such pressure from the powers, and there is not the slightest intention to proceed to attack another country. If the United States understands the aforementioned conditions and circumstances and Japan's intentions with regard to the establishment of a new order in East Asia, there will be no change whatever in the relationship between Japan and the United States following the conclusion of this treaty. Japan is determined to settle all pending questions and to promote and foster friendship with the United States."

Grew

762.9411/133 : Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Substance]

Berlin, October 26, 1940—1 p.m.
[Received 1:50 p.m.]

4466. The first indication of action to implement the Axis pact with Japan has been the sending of a commission, said to be composed of experts on naval affairs, to assist the Japanese to construct in Japanese islands air and naval fuel bases. The despatch of any further military aid to Japan by Germany, however, is not as yet indicated.

Morris

Radio Address by President Roosevelt, December 29, 1940 [10a]

This is not a fireside chat on war. It is a talk on national security; because the nub of the whole purpose of your President is to keep you now, and your children later, and your grandchildren much later, out of a last-ditch war for the preservation of American independence and all of the things that American independence means to you and to me and to ours.

Tonight, in the presence of a world crisis, my mind goes back eight years ago to a night in the midst of a domestic crisis. It was a time when the wheels of American industry were grinding to a full stop, when the whole banking system of our country had ceased to function.

I well remember that while I sat in my study in the White House, preparing to talk with the people of the United States, I had before my eyes the picture of all those Americans with whom I was talking. I saw the workmen in the mills, the mines, the factories; the girl behind the counter; the small shopkeeper; the farmer doing his spring plowing; the widows and the old men wondering about their life's savings.

[10a] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, January 4, 1941 (vol. iv, No. 80), p. 3.

I tried to convey to the great mass of American people what the banking crisis meant to them in their daily lives.

Tonight, I want to do the same thing, with the same people, in this new crisis which faces America.

We met the issue of 1933 with courage and realism.

We face this new crisis—this new threat to the security of our Nation—with the same courage and realism.

Never before since Jamestown and Plymouth Rock has our American civilization been in such danger as now.

For, on September 27, 1940, by an agreement signed in Berlin, three powerful nations, two in Europe and one in Asia, joined themselves together in the threat that if the United States interfered with or blocked the expansion program of these three nations—a program aimed at world control—they would unite in ultimate action against the United States.

The Nazi masters of Germany have made it clear that they intend not only to dominate all life and thought in their own country, but also to enslave the whole of Europe, and then to use the resources of Europe to dominate the rest of the world.

Three weeks ago their leader stated, "There are two worlds that stand opposed to each other." Then in defiant reply to his opponents, he said this: "Others are correct when they say: 'With this world we cannot ever reconcile ourselves.' . . . I can beat any other power in the world." So said the leader of the Nazis.

In other words, the Axis not merely admits but proclaims that there can be no ultimate peace between their philosophy of government and our philosophy of government.

In view of the nature of this undeniable threat, it can be asserted, properly and categorically, that the United States has no right or reason to encourage talk of peace until the day shall come when there is a clear intention on the part of the aggressor nations to abandon all thought of dominating or conquering the world.

At this moment, the forces of the states that are leagued against all peoples who live in freedom are being held away from our shores. The Germans and Italians are being blocked on the other side of the Atlantic by the British, and by the Greeks, and by thousands of soldiers and sailors who were able to escape from subjugated countries. The Japanese are being engaged in Asia by the Chinese in another great defense.

In the Pacific is our fleet.

Some of our people like to believe that wars in Europe and in Asia are of no concern to us. But it is a matter of most vital concern to us that European and Asiatic war-makers should not gain control of the oceans which lead to this hemisphere.

One hundred and seventeen years ago the Monroe Doctrine was conceived by our Government as a measure of defense in the face of a threat against this hemisphere by an alliance in continental Europe. Thereafter, we stood on guard in the Atlantic, with the British as neighbors. There was no treaty. There was no "unwritten agreement".

Yet, there was the feeling, proven correct by history, that we as neighbors could settle any disputes in peaceful fashion. The fact is that during the whole of this time the Western Hemisphere has remained free from aggression from Europe or from Asia.

Does anyone seriously believe that we need to fear attack while a free Britain remains our most peaceful naval neighbor in the Atlantic? Does anyone seriously believe, on the other hand, that we could rest easy if the Axis powers were our neighbors there?

If Great Britain goes down, the Axis powers will control the continents of Europe, Asia, Africa, Australasia, and the high seas—and they will be in a position to bring enormous military and naval resources against this hemisphere. It is no exaggeration to say that all of us in the Americas would be living at the point of a gun—a gun loaded with explosive bullets, economic as well as military.

We should enter upon a new and terrible era in which the whole world, our hemisphere included, would be run by threats of brute force. To survive in such a world, we would have to convert ourselves permanently into a militaristic power on the basis of war economy.

Some of us like to believe that even if Great Britain falls, we are still safe, because of the broad expanse of the Atlantic and of the Pacific.

But the width of these oceans is not what it was in the days of clipper ships. At one point between Africa and Brazil the distance is less than from Washington to Denver—five hours for the latest type of bomber. And at the north of the Pacific Ocean, America and Asia almost touch each other.

Even today we have planes which could fly from the British Isles to New England and back without refueling. And the range of the modern bomber is ever being increased.

During the past week many people in all parts of the Nation have told me what they wanted me to say tonight. Almost all of them expressed a courageous desire to hear the plain truth about the gravity of the situation. One telegram, however, expressed the attitude of the small minority who want to see no evil and hear no evil, even though they know in their hearts that evil exists. That telegram begged me not to tell again of the ease with which our American cities could be bombed by any hostile power which had gained bases in this Western Hemisphere. The gist of that telegram was: "Please, Mr. President, don't frighten us by telling us the facts."

Frankly and definitely there is danger ahead—danger against which we must prepare. But we well know that we cannot escape danger, or the fear of it, by crawling into bed and pulling the covers over our heads.

Some nations of Europe were bound by solemn non-intervention pacts with Germany. Other nations were assured by Germany that they need never fear invasion. Non-intervention pact or not, the fact remains that they were attacked, overrun, and thrown into the modern form of slavery at an hour's notice or even without any notice at all. As an exiled leader of one of these nations said to me the other day: "The notice was a minus quantity. It was given to my government two hours after German troops had poured into my country in a hundred places."

The fate of these nations tells us what it means to live at the point of a Nazi gun.

The Nazis have justified such actions by various pious frauds. One of these frauds is the claim that they are occupying a nation for the purpose of "restoring order". Another is that they are occupying or controlling a nation on the excuse that they are "protecting it" against the aggression of somebody else.

For example, Germany has said that she was occupying Belgium to save the Belgians from the British. Would she hesitate to say to any South American country, "We are occupying you to protect you from aggression by the United States"?

Belgium today is being used as an invasion base against Britain, now fighting for its life. Any South American country, in Nazi hands, would always constitute a jumping-off place for German attack on any one of the other republics of this hemisphere.

Analyze for yourselves the future of two other places even nearer to Germany if the Nazis won. Could Ireland hold out? Would Irish freedom be permitted as an amazing exception in an unfree world? Or the islands of the Azores which still fly the flag of Portugal after five centuries? We think of Hawaii as an outpost of defense in the Pacific. Yet, the Azores are closer to our shores in the Atlantic than Hawaii is on the other side.

There are those who say that the Axis powers would never have any desire to attack the Western Hemisphere. This is the same dangerous form of wishful thinking which has destroyed the powers of resistance of so many conquered peoples. The plain facts are that the Nazis have proclaimed, time and again, that all other races are their inferiors and therefore subject to their orders. And most important of all, the vast resources and wealth of this hemisphere constitute the most tempting loot in all the world.

Let us no longer blind ourselves to the undeniable fact that the evil forces which have crushed and undermined and corrupted so many others are already within our own gates. Your Government knows much about them and every day is ferreting them out.

Their secret emissaries are active in our own and neighboring countries. They seek to stir up suspicion and dissension to cause internal strife. They try to turn capital against labor and vice versa. They try to reawaken long slumbering racial and religious enmities which should have no place in this country. They are active in every group that promotes intolerance. They exploit for their own ends our natural abhorrence of war. These trouble-breeders have but one purpose. It is to divide our people into hostile groups and to destroy our unity and shatter our will to defend ourselves.

There are also American citizens, many of them in high places, who, unwittingly in most cases, are aiding and abetting the work of these agents. I do not charge these American citizens with being foreign agents. But I do charge them with doing exactly the kind of work that the dictators want done in the United States.

These people not only believe that we can save our own skins by shutting our eyes to the fate of other nations. Some of them go much further than that. They say that we can and should become the friends and even the partners of the Axis powers. Some of them even suggest that we should imitate the methods of the dictatorships. Americans never can and never will do that.

The experience of the past two years has proven beyond doubt that no nation can appease the Nazis. No man can tame a tiger into a kitten by stroking it. There can be no appeasement with ruthlessness. There can be no reasoning with an incendiary bomb. We know now that a nation can have peace with the Nazis only at the price of total surrender.

Even the people of Italy have been forced to become accomplices of the Nazis; but at this moment they do not know how soon they will be embraced to death by their allies.

The American appeasers ignore the warning to be found in the fate of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and France. They tell you that the Axis powers are going to win anyway; that all this bloodshed in the world could be saved; and that the United States might just as well throw its influence into the scale of a dictated peace, and get the best out of it that we can.

They call it a "negotiated peace". Nonsense! Is it a negotiated peace if a gang of outlaws surrounds your community and on threat of extermination makes you pay tribute to save your own skins?

Such a dictated peace would be no peace at all. It would be only another armistice, leading to the most gigantic armament race and the most devastating trade wars in history. And in these contests the Americas would offer the only real resistance to the Axis powers.

With all their vaunted efficiency and parade of pious purpose in this war, there are still in their background the concentration camp and the servants of God in chains.

The history of recent years proves that shootings and chains and concentration camps are not simply the transient tools but the very altars of modern dictatorships. They may talk of a "new order" in the world, but what they have in mind is but a revival of the oldest and the worst tyranny. In that there is no liberty, no religion, no hope.

The proposed "new order" is the very opposite of a United States of Europe or a United States of Asia. It is not a government based upon the consent of the governed. It is not a union of ordinary, self-respecting men and women to protect themselves and their freedom and their dignity from oppression. It is an unholy alliance of power and pelf to dominate and enslave the human race.

The British people are conducting an active war against this unholy alliance. Our own future security is greatly dependent on the outcome of that fight. Our ability to "keep out of war" is going to be affected by that outcome.

Thinking in terms of today and tomorrow, I make the direct statement to the American people that there is far less chance of the United States getting into war if we do all we can now to support the nations defending themselves against attack by the Axis than if we acquiesce in their defeat, submit tamely to an Axis victory, and wait our turn to be the object of attack in another war later on.

If we are to be completely honest with ourselves, we must admit there is risk in any course we may take. But I deeply believe that the great majority of our people agree that the course that I advocate involves the least risk now and the greatest hope for world peace in the future.

The people of Europe who are defending themselves do not ask us to do their fighting. They ask us for the implements of war, the planes, the tanks, the guns, the freighters, which will enable them to fight for their liberty and our security. Emphatically we must get these weapons to them in sufficient volume and quickly enough, so that we and our children will be saved the agony and suffering of war which others have had to endure.

Let not defeatists tell us that it is too late. It will never be earlier. Tomorrow will be later than today.

Certain facts are self-evident.

In a military sense Great Britain and the British Empire are today the spearhead of resistance to world conquest. They are putting up a fight which will live forever in the story of human gallantry.

There is no demand for sending an American Expeditionary Force outside our own borders. There is no intention by any member of your Government to send such a force. You can, therefore, nail any talk about sending armies to Europe as a deliberate untruth.

Our national policy is not directed toward war. Its sole purpose is to keep war away from our country and our people.

Democracy's fight against world conquest is being greatly aided, and must be more greatly aided, by the rearmament of the United States and by sending every ounce and every ton of munitions and supplies that we can possibly spare to help the defenders who are in the front lines. It is no more unneutral for us to do that than it is for Sweden, Russia, and other nations near Germany to send steel and ore and oil and other war materials into Germany every day.

We are planning our own defense with the utmost urgency; and in its vast scale we must integrate the war needs of Britain and the other free nations resisting aggression.

This is not a matter of sentiment or of controversial personal opinion. It is a matter of realistic military policy, based on the advice of our military experts who are in close touch with existing warfare. These military and naval experts and the members of the Congress and the administration have a single-minded purpose—the defense of the United States.

This Nation is making a great effort to produce everything that is necessary in this emergency—and with all possible speed. This great effort requires great sacrifice.

I would ask no one to defend a democracy which in turn would not defend everyone in the Nation against want and privation. The strength of this Nation shall not be diluted by the failure of the Government to protect the economic well-being of all citizens.

If our capacity to produce is limited by machines, it must ever be remembered that these machines are operated by the skill and the stamina of the workers. As the Government is determined to protect the rights of workers, so the Nation has a right to expect that the men who man the machines will discharge their full responsibilities to the urgent needs of defense.

The worker possesses the same human dignity and is entitled to the same security of position as the engineer or manager or owner.

For the workers provide the human power that turns out the destroyers, the airplanes, and the tanks.

The Nation expects our defense industries to continue operation without interruption by strikes or lock-outs. It expects and insists that management and workers will reconcile their differences by voluntary or legal means, to continue to produce the supplies that are so sorely needed.

And on the economic side of our great defense program, we are, as you know, bending every effort to maintain stability of prices and with that the stability of the cost of living.

Nine days ago I announced the setting up of a more effective organization to direct our gigantic efforts to increase the production of munitions. The appropriation of vast sums of money and a well-coordinated executive direction of our defense efforts are not in themselves enough. Guns, planes, and ships have to be built in the factories and arsenals of America. They have to be produced by workers and managers and engineers with the aid of machines, which in turn have to be built by hundreds of thousands of workers throughout the land.

In this great work there has been splendid cooperation between the Government and industry and labor.

American industrial genius, unmatched throughout the world in the solution of production problems, has been called upon to bring its resources and talents into action. Manufacturers of watches, of farm implements, linotypes, cash registers, automobiles, sewing machines, lawn mowers, and locomotives are now making fuses, bomb-packing crates, telescope mounts, shells, pistols, and tanks.

But all our present efforts are not enough. We must have more ships, more guns, more planes—more of everything. This can only be accomplished if we discard the notion of "business as usual". This job cannot be done merely by superimposing on the existing productive facilities the added requirements for defense.

Our defense efforts must not be blocked by those who fear the future consequences of surplus plant capacity. The possible consequences of failure of our defense efforts now are much more to be feared.

After the present needs of our defense are past, a proper handling of the country's peacetime needs will require all of the new productive capacity—if not more.

No pessimistic policy about the future of America shall delay the immediate expansion of those industries essential to defense.

I want to make it clear that it is the purpose of the Nation to build now with all possible speed every machine and arsenal and factory that we need to manufacture our defense material. We have the men, the skill, the wealth, and above all, the will.

I am confident that if and when production of consumer or luxury goods in certain industries requires the use of machines and raw materials essential for defense purposes, then such production must yield to our primary and compelling purpose.

I appeal to the owners of plants, to the managers, to the workers, to our own Government employees, to put every ounce of effort into producing these munitions swiftly and without stint. And with this appeal I give you the pledge that all of us who are officers of your Government will devote ourselves to the same whole-hearted extent to the great task which lies ahead.

As planes and ships and guns and shells are produced, your Government, with its defense experts, can then determine how best to use them to defend this hemisphere. The decision as to how much shall be sent abroad and how much shall remain at home must be made on the basis of our over-all military necessities.

We must be the great arsenal of democracy. For us this is an emergency as serious as war itself. We must apply ourselves to our task with the same resolution, the same sense of urgency, the same spirit of patriotism and sacrifice, as we would show were we at war.

We have furnished the British great material support and we will furnish far more in the future.

There will be no "bottlenecks" in our determination to aid Great Britain. No dictator, no combination of dictators, will weaken that determination by threats of how they will construe that determination.

The British have received invaluable military support from the heroic Greek Army and from the forces of all the governments in exile. Their strength is growing. It is the strength of men and women who value their freedom more highly than they value their lives.

I believe that the Axis powers are not going to win this war. I base that belief on the latest and best information.

We have no excuse for defeatism. We have every good reason for hope—hope for peace, hope for the defense of our civilization and for the building of a better civilization in the future.

I have the profound conviction that the American people are now determined to put forth a mightier effort than they have ever yet made to increase our production of all the implements of defense, to meet the threat to our democratic faith.

As President of the United States I call for that national effort. I call for it in the name of this Nation which we love and honor and which we are privileged and proud to serve. I call upon our people with absolute confidence that our common cause will greatly succeed.

762.94/492 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (*Grew*)

[Substance]

WASHINGTON, March 29, 1941—8 p. m.

200. Department has received following information from the Embassy in Germany with regard to Matsuoka's visit to Berlin:

The German Government hopes that, as result of visit of Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Japan will be completely bound to the Axis. An impressive display is to be made in order to convince the Minister of the irresistible force of Germany's military machine and of the absolute assurance of victory over Britain. Germany may also have new military or political successes in Greece or Yugoslavia to show him. Not very long ago a prominent German stated privately that although the Government was highly desirous of obtaining Japan's adherence to Axis, it feared lest advantage might be taken of the alliance by the Japanese to attempt movement of some extreme sort against Britain in the Pacific and get the United States into the war. The same man said that the Axis wants Japan to play the part of a threat which would prevent the United States from giving aid to the British, including all-out naval assistance, but which would stop short of any action that would bring the United States into the war.

If foregoing information is correct, the appearances are that German efforts will be directed toward convincing Japanese Minister that Britain will soon be decisively defeated or disabled and that then Germany will give effective support, either in political or military way, if necessary, to Japan's claims. Matsuoka will certainly discuss Soviet Union's attitude toward Japan. Our Chargé in Germany has not directly heard any speculation in Berlin, however, as to whether German Government is ready to bring pressure to bear on the Soviets to bring the Russians to abandon or modify their anti-Japanese policies, nor has he personally heard it speculated that Germany will be asked to bring the said pressure. The Foreign Office had hoped that arrival of the Japanese Minister in Berlin would take place before passage of our Lend-Lease Bill,[11] and that a declaration might be made likely to affect the measures taken under that act. It seems highly probable that the Germans are apprehensive that new measures may be taken in the United States or continued statements may be made either in the United States or in Britain before Matsuoka arrives that may deter him and Japanese Government from allying Japan more closely with Axis. The Foreign Minister's absence from Japan is taken generally to be silent assurance that Japanese Government will not undertake any provocative action while he is away. His visit to Rome besides being one of courtesy is also to enable him to gain personal impression of Italian people's morale and of Italy's military strength. Observers in Germany have also in mind the possibility that in view of the resolute attitude of the United States toward aggression by totalitarian powers the Japanese Foreign Minister may be designing to evolve a formula for extricating Japan from the folly of its adherence to the Tripartite Pact.

---

[11] H. R. 1776, approved March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31.

WELLES

762.94/485 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (*Grew*)

[Substance]

WASHINGTON, March 29, 1941—9 p. m.

201. The Department has been informed by the American Ambassador in the U. S. S. R. that when Matsuoka was in Moscow the chiefs of the German and Italian diplomatic missions there as well as those of the powers associated with the Axis were received by him on March 24. The substance of his remarks to them is as follows:

1. Japan was with the Axis one hundred per cent.
2. He was going to Rome and Berlin in order to confer with Japan's allies, for no nation acted by itself under conditions as they exist, each nation acts as part of a bloc; and on his return trip here the character of his visit would rest wholly upon the result which his talks in Rome and Berlin would have. The Minister then stated categorically that he did not intend to go anywhere except to Rome and Berlin. (This statement is an interesting contrast to the one he made to the American Ambassador that it was his desire and intention to visit several of the occupied capitals and Vichy.)
3. Japan had entered into the tripartite pact because of her desire for peace, not for the making of war, and specifically because Japan wished to prevent the entry of the United States into the war. Matsuoka said he was convinced that the United States would not join the war, but in the contrary event, Japan would come in likewise on the side of her allies.
4. Matsuoka stated that he was informed that production in the United States could not be substantially increased before June of this year and that the United States would not be in a position to render Britain effective help before the end of the year. By that time Britain will have been defeated, though an empire the size of Britain could not, of course, collapse in a couple of days.
5. After Britain's collapse there would be no continuation of the struggle by the United States, but that country would withdraw and would give its attention to its own affairs and interests. The Minister said that it was chimerical to talk about the war's being continued by the United States with the aid of the British Fleet. He added that

to his personal knowledge it was an illusion to see any possibility of Britain's continuing to carry on the war by transferring the seat of government to Canada or some other place.

When Matsuoka had finished speaking he was asked by the Bulgarian Minister for an expression of his views on the Balkan situation. The Japanese Minister replied that it was his belief that Greece would be persuaded by Italy and Germany to conclude peace for the reason that Yugoslavia is now becoming a member of the tripartite, and that he was unable to think that Greece would continue to wage a hopeless contest with Italy and Germany. Greece could not expect to receive sufficient effective help from Great Britain, in his opinion, to make it possible for Greece to continue to resist, and added, also as his opinion, that the Greeks would think of their own best interests as they were intelligent. He also said that then peace would be assured in the Balkans—as Turkey would be unable to do anything—once Greece had made peace.

The Rumanian Minister made the observation on this point that everything, it seemed to him, hinged upon how Greece would play her cards, and on the conditions of peace which might be offered by Germany. Matsuoka answered that he could state definitely and of his own knowledge that Germany had no desire to force the issue and would do the utmost to convince the Greeks by diplomatic means that to make peace was in their own interest.

WELLES

762.94/519 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

[Substance]

Moscow, April 11, 1941—5 p. m.
[Received 9:50 p. m.[12]]

738. This afternoon I called on Matsuoka and, with reference to the conversation I had with him on April 8, I read to him the following set of excerpts from the report I had drawn up of what he had said in that conversation:

(1) Mr. Matsuoka had made no commitments either to Berlin or to Rome.

(2) Japan's reason for entering the tripartite pact was preservation of the peace.

(3) Japan was not under an obligation to go to war with the United States, but the situation might not be the same were the United States to declare war on Germany.

(4) The Japanese Minister does not expect a declaration of war on the United States by Germany, but if that action does take place, the

---

[12] Telegram in two sections.

Minister hopes that the United States will not make any move in the Pacific until Japan shall have made her position clear.

(5) Japan's obligations under the tripartite pact will be adhered to by that Government.

(6) Both Ribbentrop and Hitler had expressed to the Minister their desire that the sphere of war be limited, and had stated to him that involvement in a war with the United States was not their desire.

(7) The suggestion had been made to the Minister by Ribbentrop and Hitler that steps be taken by him leading to the discouragement of anti-American agitation in Japan.

(8) All three men had expressed desire for peace.

(9) Hitler's personal impression on the Minister had been favorable.

(10) Admiration for the way the British were fighting was expressed by Ribbentrop.

(11) Hitler would not attempt an invasion of Britain unless it became necessary, as his expectation was that he would win the war by aerial and submarine activities against that country.

(12) Mr. Matsuoka was unable to see any possibility that Britain could drive a wedge between Italy and Germany, Italy being in large measure already under German control.

(13) Russian demands had been so excessive that Mr. Matsuoka had not made any real progress in his talks with the Russians.

(14) It was possible for the United States to be indifferent to the U. S. S. R., but Japan's alternatives were either to reach an agreement or to become embroiled.

(15) The Minister desired that the war in China be terminated, and he had suggested that President Roosevelt could bring this about if he indicated to General Chiang Kai-shek that further assistance would not be forthcoming from the United States should the latter refuse a just and honorable peace.

(16) The Minister had expressed his desire for trust in him by President Roosevelt and the Secretary of State.

Matsuoka categorically indicated his approval as I read each statement. The only times he commented was when I read items (3), (8), (10), and (15), of which he gave the following amplifications.

(*a*) Under item (3) Mr. Matsuoka said that in his view Japan is obligated under the tripartite pact to go to war with the United States if the latter should declare war on Germany, but that Japan would first confer with Germany.

(*b*) Under item (8) the Minister said that while they had expressed their desire for peace, Ribbentrop and Hitler had left him in no doubt that at the present time there was no possibility for peace and that several times Hitler had said to him emphatically that unless Britain capitulated there would be no peace.

(*c*) Under item (10) he added that in Ribbentrop's opinion, as expressed to him, Britain at the present moment was in a stronger position defensively than she had been when the war started.

(*d*) Under item (15) he expanded what he had previously said by stating that peace between China and Japan could come only as the result of direct negotiation between them; an intermediary would not be accepted by the Japanese public.

STEINHARDT

761.9411/76 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, April 14, 1941—5 p. m.
[Received April 14—7:30 a. m.]

551. The following statement by Prime Minister Konoye was issued by the Board of Information last night:

"The Japanese Government some time ago made public both at home and abroad their unalterable determination, by concluding the tripartite pact among Japan, Germany and Italy to prevent a world-wide spread of war and to secure the peace of greater East Asia with that pact as the axis of the country's foreign policy. It goes without saying that, in order to realize such a purpose, it is essential that Japan and the Soviet Union, which are neighbors in the Far East, should strengthen their peaceful and friendly relation on a lasting basis, reinforcing thereby the spirit of the said pact of alliance. With this conviction, the Government has for some time been conducting negotiations with the Soviet Government with a view to bringing about a fundamental adjustment of Japan's relation with the Soviet Union. With the present visit to Moscow of the Foreign Minister, Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, as a turning point, the conversations between the two Governments have made rapid progress, resulting in the signature today, April 13, of the pact of neutrality between the Foreign Minister, Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, and Ambassador Lieutenant General Yoshitsugu Tatekawa, and the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Vyacheslav Molotov, which has just been announced. At the same time the joint declaration by the two countries has been issued through which Japan respects the territorial integrity and inviolability of the People's Republic of Mongolia and the Soviet Union respects the territorial integrity and inviolability of Manchukuo, thereby expecting to bring tranquility to the Manchukuo-Soviet and Manchukuo-Outer Mongolian borders.

It is my belief that the present pact has an epoch-making significance in the relations between Japan and the Soviet Union and that it will greatly contribute toward the promotion of world peace. I have no doubt that the pact will serve as a basis for rapid solution in a concrete manner of various pending questions between the two countries."

Grew

761.9411/134

Press Release Issued by the Department of State on April 14, 1941

In reply to inquiries at his press conference today, the Secretary of State made the following statement:

"The significance of the pact between the Soviet Union and Japan relating to neutrality, as reported in the press today, could be overestimated. The agreement would seem to be descriptive of a situation which has in effect existed between the two countries for some time past. It therefore comes as no surprise, although there has existed doubt whether the two Governments would or would not agree to say it in writing. The policy of this Government, of course, remains unchanged."

ABROGATION BY THE UNITED STATES OF THE TREATY OF COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN SIGNED FEBRUARY 21, 1911

ABROGATION BY THE UNITED STATES OF THE TREATY OF COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN SIGNED FEBRUARY 21, 1911[1]

711.942/235

The Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Horinouchi)

WASHINGTON, July 26, 1939.

EXCELLENCY: During recent years the Government of the United States has been examining the treaties of commerce and navigation in force between the United States and foreign countries with a view to determining what changes may need to be made toward better serving the purposes for which such treaties are concluded. In the course of this survey, the Government of the United States has come to the conclusion that the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan which was signed at Washington on February 21, 1911, contains provisions which need new consideration. Toward preparing the way for such consideration and with a view to better safeguarding and promoting American interests as new developments may require, the Government of the United States, acting in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Article XVII of the treaty under reference, gives notice hereby of its desire that this treaty be terminated, and, having thus given notice, will expect the treaty, together with its accompanying protocol, to expire six months from this date.

Accept [etc.] CORDELL HULL

711.942/180 : Telegram

The Chargé in Japan (Dooman) to the Secretary of State

TOKYO, July 28, 1939—11 a. m.
[Received July 28—4:30 a. m.]

366. Our 365, July 27, 3 p. m.[2] last paragraph. The following statement was issued last night by the Foreign Office:

"The American Government has formally notified our Government through our Embassy at Washington its desire to terminate the treaty of commerce and navigation between Japan and the United States. As the step has been taken by the American Government all of a sudden and, moreover, the reasons given therefor are given only very briefly, it is difficult to grasp the true motive underlying the action of the American Government.

---

[1] For text of treaty, see *Foreign Relations*, 1911, p. 315.

[2] Not printed.

It is stated by the American Government that during recent years it has been examining all the existing treaties between the United States and foreign countries with a view to determining what changes should be made and that, having come to the conclusion that the Japanese-American treaty contains provisions which need new consideration and in order to safeguard and promote American interests as new developments may require, it desires the termination of the treaty.

However the above reasons of the American Government which serve equally well for a revision of the treaty fail to explain fully why the American Government should have found it necessary to give notice of the abrogation in such a hasty and abrupt manner.

Although the American Government claims that the notification in question has no connection whatever with the deliberations in the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee on the proposal of Senator Vandenberg for the abolition of the Japanese-American treaty of commerce and navigation, the present action of the American Government coming as it does at the time when the Anglo-Japanese conversations are in progress is highly susceptible of being generally interpreted as having a political significance.

A new situation is now fast developing in East Asia. The Japanese Government has long been hoping that other countries of the world would frankly recognize this fact. In case the American Government desires to conclude a new treaty with Japan in conformity with this new situation in East Asia the Japanese Government will of course be glad to do so."

Cipher text by mail to Chungking and Peiping.

DOOMAN

711.942/392a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, December 18, 1939—2 p. m.

402. A statement has been prepared by the Department for use in reply to an approach by the Japanese Government, if made, asking the United States Government to define its position concerning the question of the negotiation of a commercial agreement or treaty to replace the commerce and navigation treaty of 1911. The paragraphs of the statement, which follows, have been numbered merely for convenience of reference:[3]

"1. The Government of the United States has repeatedly expressed its willingness to enter into commercial treaties or agreements with all countries on the basis of certain well-known principles and procedures which this Government regards as fundamental to sound international relations.

---

[3] Quotation not paraphrased.

2. The Government of the United States regards non-discriminatory treatment as the foundation principle of its commercial policy and considers the rule of equality of commercial rights and opportunity to be the only practicable and desirable basis for concluding commercial treaties or agreements. The history of the commercial policies of the leading trading nations of the world demonstrates conclusively that the negotiation of commercial agreements based upon any other principle leads inevitably to friction and the taking of counter measures by injured third nations, to the stifling of the legitimate trade of all nations, and to chaotic international commercial relations. In the past, when the principal restrictions on trade consisted of tariff duties, non-discriminatory treatment could usually be assured by mutual general pledges of equality of treatment; but in recent years new forms of trade restrictions, such as quantitative limitations, monopolistic instrumentalities, exchange control, and related measures affecting importation and exportation of goods and remittance of funds, have achieved such importance as methods of regulating trade that, to ensure non-discriminatory treatment, it has been found necessary to have new provisions supplementing the standard provision or rule of equality of treatment. For example, with regard to quantitative limitations on trade it has been found essential, in order that non-discriminatory treatment may be established beyond dispute, to have in force an expressly defined procedure assuring exporting countries opportunity to supply fair shares in the total of imports permitted. Similarly, with regard to exchange control, it is important that there be established a procedure providing for the supplying of foreign exchange for trading and other purposes in such a manner as to ensure against discrimination. In the light of modern experience, the Government of the United States regards as a *sine qua non* of entering into negotiations with any country looking toward the conclusion of a commercial treaty or agreement, that it be understood in advance that non-discriminatory treatment is to be made the basis for commercial intercourse and that there are to be established procedures designed to ensure non-discriminatory treatment.

3. In contemplating the negotiation of a commercial treaty or agreement with any country on the foregoing basis, it is naturally appropriate for the Government of the United States to examine not only the policies and practices of the country in question as they are applied within that country's territory but also the policies and practices of that country as they affect American trade with and in third countries. Substantial and continuing discriminations against the commercial interests of the United States brought about by the influence or by agencies of any country within the territory of a third country are obviously injurious to the United States. If such discriminations have been imposed in a third country against that country's wishes it is apparent that the discriminations can be removed most effectively and expeditiously by action on the part of the nation which imposes, or which causes the imposition of, the discriminations. Such discriminations are at present in effect throughout large areas of China occupied by Japanese armed forces. These discriminations have been brought

about by agencies which are directed by the Japanese Government or agents thereof and which exercise control over the economic life of such areas to the special advantage of Japanese interests through such instrumentalities as exchange and currency control, levies upon and restriction of exports and imports, monopolies, and restrictions upon navigation of China's waterways and upon travel and residence and trade in various parts of China.

4. It follows that so long as agencies and instrumentalities of the Japanese Government continue in fact to render inoperative the practice of equality of treatment for American commercial interests throughout large areas of China, there exists a serious obstacle to the conclusion by the United States of a new commercial treaty or agreement with Japan. Entirely apart from the question of existing treaty commitments and treaty rights, this obstacle to the conclusion of a new commercial treaty or agreement would be present by virtue of the discriminatory practices which at present thus prevail in the occupied areas in China.

5. In giving consideration to the question of entering with any other country into a new treaty or agreement for the regulation of commerce, the Government of the United States, in both its executive and its legislative branches, must and does take full account not only of the treatment accorded by the authorities of the other country, in areas under the control of those authorities, to American goods and American enterprises, but also of the treatment accorded by those authorities in such areas to American commerce as a whole, including American nationals, American firms, American investments, and American economic and cultural activities in general. The principle of equality of treatment is applicable in all areas and carries implicit within itself the principles of non-discrimination and fair treatment.

6. The Government of the United States has set forth hereinbefore what it regards as important considerations bearing on the question of the concluding of a new commercial treaty or agreement between the United States and Japan. The Government of the United States hopes that the Japanese Government likewise attaches importance to these considerations, and the Government of the United States will be glad to have evidence of the steps which the Japanese Government is taking toward giving practical effect to its attitude. Certain of these considerations have recently been discussed between the American Ambassador to Japan and the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs in informal conversations in Tokyo, and should the Japanese Government desire further information in regard to them the Government of the United States is of course ready to furnish it."

The statement set forth above is intended for your information and guidance in your discussions with Japanese officials on the subject of Japanese-American relations. If you should be asked by a responsible official of the Japanese Government in regard to the attitude of the United States Government toward the negotiation of a new treaty or agreement for the regulation of commerce, you may reply, in your discretion, along the lines of the above statement. Your taking of an initiative in regard thereto is not contemplated by the Department.

HULL

711.942/381 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, December 19, 1939—6 p. m.

404. Supplementary to and in amplification of the Department's telegram No. 402, December 18, 2 p. m. Although the statement of the United States Government's position, transmitted in Department's telegram No. 402, deals only with the commercial aspects of our relations with Japan, that fact does not signify that the United States Government has in any way modified its position with regard to other aspects of Japanese-American relations. The United States Government continues, of course, to adhere to the full import of its position as stated on numerous occasions in its communications to the Japanese Government, and especially in its communications to the Japanese Government dated October 6, 1938, and December 31 [*30*], 1938.[4]

HULL

711.942/393 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

WASHINGTON, December 20, 1939—7 p. m.

405. Your 686, December 18, 6 p. m., 687, December 18, 10 p. m., 691, December 19, 7 p. m., 692, December 20, 11 a. m.,[5] and related telegrams.

The Department has given careful study to the telegrams under reference. The Department concurs in your view that it would not be advisable in response to the initiative taken by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to return a categorical negative which would serve to close the door to further discussions and to discourage the efforts of the Japanese Government. At the same time we are not in position to commit ourselves now to entering upon a negotiation. We are inclined to feel that the negotiation of a new treaty with the thought of holding ratification of such treaty in abeyance until the Japanese Government should have carried out certain assurances would be likely to produce more potentialities of misunderstanding and of disadvantage than would a treatyless condition. We are receiving numerous inquiries with regard to the effect which termination of the treaty will have upon relations between the United States and Japan. To these inquiries we are replying that the absence of a commercial treaty does not of itself cause an interruption in commercial relations; that in such circumstances those relations are governed in each country by its municipal law or practice, subject, of course, to any applicable principles of international law; that in the opinion of the Department the expiration of the treaty of 1911 with Japan will not produce of itself any changes in the general customs duties or treatment applicable to imports of Japanese goods into the United States; and that, similarily, there does not appear reason to expect that the termination of the treaty will produce of itself any marked changes in the general customs duties or treatment applicable in Japan to imports from the United States.

---

[4] Vol. I, pp. 785 and 820.

[5] No. 687, *ante*, p. 48; others not printed.

With regard to the proposal made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that a *modus vivendi* be entered into, we prefer to leave our attitude toward that proposal open for the time being. We shall give the matter consideration but wish you to know that our tentative thought is that any *modus vivendi* which might upon further study commend itself to us under existing circumstances would have to be of a very limited scope, to relate principally to rights of establishment and not of trade, and to be of a character which would leave this Government free to impose restrictions upon trade in case developments should make such course appear necessary toward better safeguarding American interests.

The Department is hoping to be able to send you tomorrow in continuation of the above a suggested text of a statement which we feel you might helpfully make orally to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Hull

711.942/393 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[Paraphrase]

Washington, December 21, 1939—7 p. m.

410. Department's telegram No. 405, December 20, 7 p. m., last paragraph.

1. I desire that you call upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs and make an oral statement to him substantially as follows, unless you perceive objection, in which circumstance I should of course welcome a statement of your views and an indication of your reasoning:

> The United States Government sincerely appreciates the efforts made by the Japanese Government to remedy the conditions which adversely affect Japanese-American relations and the indication of the intent of the Japanese Government to persist in those efforts.
>
> With reference to the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs regarding the question of entering into negotiations for the conclusion of a new treaty, the United States Government has prepared a statement of its position on this question for the consideration and information of the Japanese Government. (You should then hand

to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as you suggest, the statement transmitted by the Department in telegram No. 402, December 18.)

With reference to the question of concluding a *modus vivendi*, the United States Government suggests that for the time being this question remain open.

The United States Government believes that it would be appropriate at this time for the discussions to be continued which have been going on between the American Ambassador in Japan and the Japanese Foreign Minister with reference to considerations bearing on the question of concluding a new treaty or agreement for the regulation of commerce between Japan and the United States.

2. Please impart to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the course of the same conversation, but as a separate statement, the following information:

In the near future the United States Treasury Department is issuing a communication to customs collectors and others concerned stating that upon the expiration of the treaty the 10 percent ad valorem discriminatory duties provided for in the Tariff Act of 1913[6] are not to be collected on goods which enter the United States in Japanese ships unless and until such time as further instructions shall be issued. The Department of Commerce has reached a decision similar in effect in regard to discriminating tonnage duties on ships.

Hull

711.942/422

Press Release No. 19–75 Issued by the Treasury Department on December 22, 1939

The Commissioner of Customs, in response to inquiries from importers, today issued a circular letter of instructions to collectors of customs advising them that the 10 percent ad valorem discriminating duties under Section IV, paragraph J, subdivision 1 of the Tariff Act of 1913 are not to be collected unless and until further instructions are issued. The question of application of the duties had arisen, according to importers, because of the impending expiration on January 26, 1940, of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan, dated February 21, 1911.

The text of the circular letter is as follows:

December 21, 1939.

Bureau of Customs
Circular Letter No. 2042
To Collectors of Customs and others concerned:

Inquiries have been received concerning the expiration on January 26, 1940, of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan, dated February 21, 1911, with respect to the imposition of discriminating duties under section IV, paragraph J, subsection 1 of the Tariff Act of 1913, 38 Stat. 195 (U. S. C. title 19, sec. 128; title 46, sec. 146), saved from repeal by section 651(d) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 763. Attention is directed to the coordinate provision of the Act of May 24, 1828, 4 Stat. 308, substantially reenacted in section 4228 of the Revised Statutes of 1873, as amended by the Act of July 24, 1897, 30 Stat. 214 (U. S. C. title 46, sec. 141), authorizing the President, under certain conditions, to issue a proclamation suspending discriminating duties. Attention is also directed to a proclamation issued by President Grant on September 4, 1872 (17 Stat. 956), suspending discriminating duties with respect to Japan. Since that proclamation appears not to have been revoked, the Treasury Department has reached the tentative conclusion that the proclamation will again be operative upon the expiration of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan and that no discriminating duties under the statute cited above will be imposed, in the absence of Executive or Congressional action.

---

[6] Approved October 3, 1913; 38 Stat. 114.

In view of the foregoing, no estimated or other duties shall be collected under 38 Stat. 195 (U. S. C. title 19, sec. 128; title 46, sec. 146), unless and until this circular is superseded by further instructions.

Basil Harris
Commissioner of Customs

711.942/501a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

WASHINGTON, January 23, 1940—4 p. m.

32. Department's 26, January 19, 7 p. m.[7] The Japanese Ambassador called today at his request. In view of the Secretary's indisposition, the Ambassador was received by Mr. Berle.[8] Following the call there was made available to press correspondents information not in the form of a release but for background as follows:

"The Japanese Ambassador asked three questions. He asked whether on the expiration of the Japanese treaty on Friday there will be any change in the import duties and tonnage rates. He was told that expiration of the treaty would not of itself bring about any changes. In reply to further inquiries by the Ambassador he was told that as this Government has made clear repeatedly, future commercial relations between the two countries will depend upon developments.

He asked whether there were any possibilities of an exchange of notes between the two Governments defining the status of treaty relations and was told that this would have to be held open and would presumably form a part of the discussions which have been taking place in Tokyo.

He asked the status of Japanese merchants who, under treaty provisions, have been doing business in the United States. He was informed that it has been decided that aliens who in the absence of treaty provisions within the meaning of Section 3 (6) of the Immigration Act of 1924,[9] as amended, cease to have the status of 'treaty merchants' may be permitted to qualify as visitors temporarily admitted for business or pleasure under Section 3 (2) of the Immigration Act of 1924. In the absence of a treaty of commerce between the United States and Japan, it is expected that applications for admission of Japanese nationals who desire to enter the United States temporarily for business or pleasure will be considered in the light of the existing law and regulations applicable to visas for temporary visitors".

---

[7] Not printed.

[8] Assistant Secretary of State.

A further account of the conversation will be sent you in a separate telegram.

HULL

711.942/503 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

TOKYO, January 25, 1940—9 a. m.
[Received 12 noon.]

48. The following statement is to be handed by the Foreign Office to the press at 10 p. m. for release at midnight today Tokyo time:

"On July 26, 1939, the Government of the United States of America through our Ambassador at Washington communicated to the Japanese Government their desire to abrogate on a six months' notice the Japanese-American treaty of commerce and navigation concluded at Washington on February 21, 1911, for the reason that there were provisions in the said treaty requiring new consideration, and for the purpose that the way might be prepared for such consideration and that the treaty be rendered capable of better safeguarding and promoting American interests as new development might require.

It appears that the abrogation was intended by the American Government to be of service in the solution of various questions arising between Japan and America in connection with the China affair.

In view of the importance of the complementary and mutually beneficial trade relations between Japan and America, and because Japan's policy in the present China affair is not aimed at eliminating the just and reasonable interests of third powers in China, but on the contrary there are, it is firmly believed, many fields for cooperation between Japan and third powers in creating a new East Asia, the Japanese Government deemed it appropriate to elucidate further their position to the American Government and to seek readjustment of the relations between the two countries. To this end our Government have continued and are still continuing to exert great efforts. At the same time they have conducted negotiations regarding a new treaty, or at least regarding a measure for preventing the advent of a treatyless situation. While negotiations are still in progress on these matters, unfortunately no agreement has been reached so far, leaving Japan and America without a treaty from today.

On the other hand, the American Government, in order that Japanese-American trade relations should not unduly suffer, took steps through decrees issued toward the end of 1939 by the Treasury and the Department of Commerce to exempt Japanese ships from light dues and from additional tonnage duties and the 10 percent ad valorem discriminatory duties on cargoes brought in by Japanese vessels. The Japanese Government have no intention to discriminate in any way against American goods or vessels, and they have already taken the necessary measure in that regard. Consequently, despite the non-treaty situation, the commercial relations between Japan and America will in practice be subject to no change.

---

[9] Approved May 26, 1924; 43 Stat. 153.

Japanese subjects now residing in, or going to, America in the capacity of the so-called "treaty merchant" are to be treated hereafter by the American Government as temporary visitors. But this is not considered likely to cause any special difficulties.

Though the trade relations between Japan and America, as stated above, will on the whole remain unaltered, a treatyless situation which renders unstable the relations in general as well as the trade between the two countries, is undesirable for both Japan and America.

It is confidently hoped that through the negotiations that are being continued the Japanese-American relations will be restored to a normal state with a treaty basis."

Grew

711.942/522a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

Washington, January 25, 1940—6 p. m.

34. Department's 32, January 23, 4 p. m., penultimate paragraph, status of Japanese treaty merchants.

On the afternoon of January 23 the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy called on an officer of the Department to discuss this matter and urged that the Department agree to initial a minute on the subject. The opinion was expressed to the Counselor that the drawing up and initialing of any minute in reference to such a matter would be inappropriate and would lead to misunderstanding and misinterpretation. The Counselor was informed, however, that the Department's reply to a note which had been received from the Japanese Embassy a few days previously relating to Japanese who made frequent visits from Seattle to Vancouver would contain a statement in substantial conformity with the statement given by Mr. Berle to the Japanese Ambassador.

This reply, which went forward to the Japanese Embassy on January 24, included *inter alia* information along the lines of the penultimate paragraph of the Department's telegram under reference and a statement as follows:

"The appropriate branches of the Government have decided that Japanese merchants now in this country under treaty provisions need not, upon termination of the treaty, take any action toward changing their status as residents of the United States and that the administrative authorities of this Government will for the time being take no action in this matter provided there is no violation of the terms of admission of such Japanese merchants under the provisions of Section 3 (6) of the Immigration Act of 1924, as amended."

Hull

ECONOMIC MEASURES BY THE UNITED STATES AFFECTING TRADE WITH JAPAN

ECONOMIC MEASURES BY THE UNITED STATES AFFECTING TRADE WITH JAPAN

Press Release Issued by the Department of State on September 14, 1937 [1]

Following a conference with the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the United States Maritime Commission, the President today issued the following statement:

"Merchant vessels owned by the Government of the United States will not hereafter, until further notice, be permitted to transport to China or Japan any of the arms, ammunition, or implements of war which were listed in the President's proclamation of May 1, 1937.[2]

"Any other merchant vessels, flying the American flag, which attempt to transport any of the listed articles to China or Japan will, until further notice, do so at their own risk.

"The question of applying the Neutrality Act [2a] remains *in statu quo*, the Government policy remaining on a 24-hour basis."

700.00116/375

The Chief of the Office of Arms and Munitions Control, Department of State (Green), to 148 Persons and Companies Manufacturing Airplane Parts

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1938.

As some misunderstanding appears to have arisen as to the purport of the statement made by the Secretary of State in his press conference on June 11 in regard to bombing civilian populations from the air, I am addressing this letter in regard to the matter to all persons and companies registered as manufacturers or exporters of airplanes or aeronautical equipment.

In view of the fact that the Secretary's statement definitely condemned bombing of civilian populations from the air, it should be clear to all concerned that the Government of the United States is strongly opposed to the sale of airplanes or aeronautical equipment which would materially aid or encourage that practice in any countries in any part of the world. Therefore, in view of this policy, the Department would with great regret issue any licenses authorizing exportation, direct or indirect, of any aircraft, aircraft armament, aircraft engines, aircraft parts, aircraft accessories, aerial bombs or torpedoes to countries the armed forces of which are making use of airplanes for attack upon civilian populations.

---

[1] Reprinted from Department of State, *Press Releases*, September 18, 1937 (vol. XVII, No. 416), p. 227.

[2] Proclamation No. 2237, *ibid.*, May 1, 1937 (vol. XVI, No. 396), p. 288.

[2a] Act approved August 31, 1935, with amendments of February 29, 1936, and May 1, 1937; 49 Stat. 1081, 1152, and 50 Stat. 121.

Should any manufacturer or exporter have already entered into contractual obligations, of which he finds it impossible to divest himself, to sell or export airplanes or aeronautical equipment, for which licenses have been issued or for which he has heretofore intended to apply for licenses, to any country which is engaged in bombing civilian populations from the air, it is suggested that he may wish to inform the Department of the terms of that contract before applying for licenses to export pursuant to it or before exporting under licenses already issued.

Very truly yours, JOSEPH C. GREEN

Press Release Issued by the White House on December 2, 1939

The President, after consultation with the Secretary of State this morning, released the following statement:

> "The American Government and the American people have for some time pursued a policy of wholeheartedly condemning the unprovoked bombing and machine-gunning of civilian populations from the air.
>
> "This Government hopes, to the end that such unprovoked bombing shall not be given material encouragement in the light of recent recurrence of such acts, that American manufacturers and exporters of airplanes, aeronautical equipment and materials essential to airplane manufacture, will bear this fact in mind before negotiating contracts for the exportation of these articles to nations obviously guilty of such unprovoked bombing."

Press Release Issued by the Department of State on December 15, 1939[5]

A letter has been addressed by the Department to all persons and companies registered with the Secretary of State pursuant to the provisions of section 12 of the Neutrality Act[5a] as manufacturers or exporters of the arms, ammunition, and implements of war as defined by the President in his proclamation of May 1, 1937, which fall within the general description of "aircraft, aircraft armament, aircraft engines, aircraft parts, aircraft accessories, aerial bombs or torpedoes" contained in the President's statement of December 2, 1939, relating to the bombing and machine-gunning of civilian populations from the air. The text of the letter follows:

---

[5] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, December 16, 1939 (vol. I, No. 25), p. 685.

[5a] Act approved November 4, 1939; 54 Stat. 4, 10.

> "There is enclosed a copy of a statement in regard to the bombing and machine-gunning of civilian populations from the air which the President made in his press conference on December 2, 1939.
>
> "In view of the policy to which the President referred, the Department hopes that it will not receive any application for a license to authorize the exportation, direct or indirect, of any aircraft, aircraft armament, aircraft engines, aircraft parts, aircraft accessories, aerial bombs or torpedoes to countries the armed forces of which are engaged in such bombing or machine-gunning.
>
> "Should any manufacturer or exporter have already entered into contractual obligations, of which he finds it impossible to divest himself, to sell or export airplanes or aeronautical equipment, for which licenses have been issued or for which he has heretofore intended to apply for licenses, to countries referred to above, it is suggested that he may wish to inform the Department of the terms of the contract before applying for licenses to export pursuant to it or before exporting under licenses already issued.
>
> "Your attention is invited to the fact that the President's statement refers not only to aircraft and those aircraft parts for which an export license is required but also to aeronautical equipment of all kinds and to materials essential to airplane manufacture."

In view of the fact that the President's statement mentioned above refers to "materials essential to airplane manufacture," a letter has been addressed by the Department to all producers of molybdenum and aluminum as follows:

> "There is enclosed a copy of a statement in regard to the bombing and machine-gunning of civilian populations from the air which the President made in his press conference on December 2, 1939.
>
> "I invite your particular attention to the phrase 'materials essential to airplane manufacture' in this statement. Molybdenum and aluminum are included among such materials.
>
> "Should any manufacturer or exporter have already entered into contractual obligations, of which he finds it impossible to divest himself, to sell or export molybdenum or aluminum to countries the armed forces of which are engaged in unprovoked bombing and machine-gunning of civilian populations from the air, he may wish to inform the Department of the terms of his contract."

Press Release Issued by the Department of State on December 20, 1939 [6]

The Department, after consultation with the War and Navy Departments, has decided that the national interest suggests that for the time being there should be no further delivery to certain countries of plans, plants, manufacturing rights, or technical information required for the production of high quality aviation gasoline.

---

[6] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, December 23, 1939 (vol. I, No. 26), p. 714.

This decision has been reached with a view to conserving in this country certain technical information of strategic importance and as an extension of the announced policy of this Government in regard to the sale of airplanes, aeronautical equipment, and materials essential to airplane manufacture to countries the armed forces of which are engaged in unprovoked bombing or machine-gunning of civilian populations from the air.

The interested American oil companies have been informed of the Government's decision in this matter.

711.942/528

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] January 6, 1940.

The Japanese Ambassador called and handed me the attached notes,[7] which are self-explanatory. I inquired whether he desired a written reply to the note in regard to moral sanctions, including an alleged contract between a Japanese company and American citizens concerning technical processes and manufacturing rights for the production of certain petroleum products. He said that the Japanese Government would like to have a written reply. I then remarked that he no doubt was aware of the fact that the so-called moral embargo on all phases of the airplane situation found its origin in and was based on the bombing of civilian populations from the air in China by the Japanese, and that I would probably list a great number of these bombings as reported to this Government and allow them to be published together with the balance of the contents of the note. The Ambassador appeared very startled at this idea, and repeated the request of his Government for a written reply.

With regard to technical processes for high-test gasoline, I stated that this Government, concerned as it is with the increase of war and the use or threat of force in so many parts of the world, feels constrained to conserve a number of the more vital interests it has in defense commodities or materials, and that this, together with our abhorrence of the bombings of civilian populations, is the basis for the conservation of the gasoline manufacturing processes to which the Ambassador referred.

---

[7] These notes apparently consisted of the one printed *infra* and a memorandum of the tentative understandings between the Japan Gasoline Company and Universal Oil Products Company (not printed).

The Ambassador brought up the question of the violation by this Government of the Treaty of Commerce of 1911.[8] I said, without going into the merits of the matter, that I trusted his Government would not forget how many times American commercial rights and interests have suffered injury in China contrary to all treaties and all law, and that notwithstanding this fact, this Government and others perhaps were expected to be perfectly quiescent while being deprived of their right to participate in economic and other undertakings in China, although the Japanese Government would expect to enjoy the benefits of the rule of equality in its economic dealing with all the Western world. I then added that, as I had heretofore stated to the Ambassador, the subject of commercial treaties was under discussion between Mr. Grew and the Foreign Office at Tokyo, and that we were deferring the entire matter to that discussion for the time being.[8a] The Ambassador had nothing further to say.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

711.942/529

The Japanese Ambassador (Horinouchi) to the Secretary of State

No. 2 WASHINGTON, January 6, 1940.

SIR: I have the honor to state that, as the result of a communication through a circular letter of July 1, 1938, addressed by the Department of State to manufacturers and exporters of aircraft and aircraft parts, in which it was mentioned that "the Department of State would with great regret issue any licenses authorizing exportation, direct or indirect, of any aircraft, aircraft armament, aircraft engines, aircraft parts, aircraft accessories, aerial bombs or torpedoes to countries the armed forces of which are making use of airplanes for attack upon civilian populations," it has virtually become impossible for Japanese firms to import any airplanes and airplane parts of American make.

As repeatedly stated by my Government, military operations of the Japanese air forces in China have been directed solely against warlike organizations and establishments of the Chinese. No bombing or machine-gunning has been resorted to against civilian populations as such. The Japanese Government, therefore, cannot but take exception to any treatment of Japan as a country "the armed forces of which are making use of airplanes for attack upon civilian populations."

The above-mentioned measures employed by the Department of State, which, in view of the great influence that can be wielded by a central government upon private manufacturers and exporters, have the effect of a discriminatory export embargo. My Government considers that such measures applied to Japan are in derogation of the provision of Article V, paragraph 3 of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Japan and the United States of February 21, 1911, and at variance with the general purposes of the Treaty as a whole.

---

[8] *Foreign Relations*, 1911, p. 315.

[8a] See pp. 189 ff.

While my Government was keenly alive to the unfortunate consequences of the said communication to American exporters, it did not relinquish the hope that the United States Government, in harmony with its fair and just trade policy, would before long retract it.

However, on December 16, 1939, another letter was addressed by the Department of State to manufacturers and exporters to the effect that the Department hoped that it would not receive any application for a license to authorize the exportation, direct or indirect, of articles enumerated in the letter of July 1, 1938, and, in addition thereto, of aeronautical equipment of all kind and materials essential to airplane manufacture. In order to point out that molybdenum and aluminum should be included among such materials, a letter was addressed by the Department to all producers of these two materials.[9]

Still further, it was announced on December 20, 1939, from the Department of State that the decision had been reached that there should be no further delivery to certain countries of plans, plants, manufacturing rights, or technical information required for the production of high quality aviation gasoline and that this decision had been communicated to the interested American oil companies. The announcement cited the decision as an extension of the United States Government's policy in regard to the sale of airplane, aeronautical equipment, and materials essential to airplane manufacture to countries the armed forces of which were engaged in unprovoked bombing or machine-gunning of civilian populations from the air.

Of late there occurred a number of cases in which the purchase of certain articles and materials under negotiation between Japanese firms and interested American companies has been rendered impossible as the result of the Department of State's letters.

To cite one of the most outstanding cases, a memorandum of a contract was drawn and initialed August 19, 1938, by representatives of Japan Gasoline Company on the one part and Universal Oil Products Company on the other.

It was stipulated that Universal Oil Products Company, which since 1928 had maintained close business connection with Japan Gasoline Company, should grant a license in Japan covering their polymerization processes for the production of iso-octanes and rights under all of their processes in the entire petroleum field, in return for which Japan Gasoline Company should pay $1,000,000 United States funds to Universal Oil Products Company.

---

[9] For texts of the two letters, see press release of December 15, 1939, p. 202.

It was understood that, during the progress of the negotiations in connection with the above agreement, the representatives of Universal Oil Products Company approached and laid the pertinent facts before the Department of State, which made no objection to the transaction.

Under the terms of the agreement Japan Gasoline Company paid to Universal Oil Products Company a sum of $300,000 on October 30, 1938, and $400,000 on July 8, 1939. It was agreed that further payment of $100,000 was to be made at the time of delivery of plans and specifications for a plant and a final payment of $200,000 upon completion and test of such a plant. In essence, Universal Oil Products Company was bound to guarantee, within the limit of the money it was to receive in payment, complete working of the plant in Japan under polymerization processes.

Recently Universal Oil Products Company proposed that a final agreement should be made along the lines of the provisional agreement, and accordingly the two parties continued their negotiations.

On December 19, 1939, however, Universal Oil Products Company informed the representatives of Japan Gasoline Company that they had received a letter from the Department of State which left no alternative for them but to withhold further fulfillment of the terms of the contract.

The consummation of this contract, under which the greater part of the payment involved has already been made and other obligations required have been completely fulfilled by one of the parties, has for all practical purposes been frustrated.

Entertaining the belief that steps taken by your Government, causing a situation not dissimilar in effect to that which might obtain under an export embargo discriminating against Japan, are in contravention to the provisions of Article V, paragraph 3, of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Japan and the United States and at variance with the spirit of the Treaty as a whole and fearing that the continuation of such measures may affect the present earnest efforts of Japan and the United States for the improvement of mutual friendly relations through the maintenance and promotion of commerce between the two countries, my Government greatly deplores the herein referred to actions of the authorities of the United States Government

I avail myself [etc.]

KENSUKE HORINOUCHI

711.942/529

The Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (*Horinouchi*)

WASHINGTON, January 27, 1940.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note No. 2 of January 6, 1940, in which you refer to measures which have been taken by the Government of the United States in pursuance of its policy of condemning and discouraging the bombing and machine-gunning of civilian populations from the air. You state that as a result of these measures it has become virtually impossible for Japanese firms to import any airplanes or airplane parts of American make and that in a number of recent cases the completion of purchases which were already under negotiation between Japanese firms and interested American companies has been rendered impossible. You state further that no bombing or machine-gunning of civilian populations as such has been resorted to by the Japanese forces in China and that the Japanese Government, therefore, cannot but take exception to any treatment of Japan as a country the armed forces of which are making use of airplanes for attack upon civilian populations. You also express the view that the measures taken by this Government caused a situation not dissimilar in effect to that which might obtain under an export embargo against Japan and were in contravention of the provisions of the third paragraph of Article V of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1911 between Japan and the United States and at variance with the spirit of the treaty as a whole.

The attitude and policy of the Government of the United States in connection with the unprovoked bombing and machine-gunning of civilian populations are clearly indicated in the Department of State's press release of June 3, 1938;[10] in the statement released by the President on December 2, 1939; and in the Department's press releases of December 15 and 20, 1939. Copies of the press releases under reference are enclosed for convenient reference. The American people and the American Government have directed the policy outlined in these press releases against a practice, not against specific countries; and its applicability to a particular country is determined not by any arbitrary finding of the American Government, but by the observable acts of the armed forces of such country or countries as may be engaged in military operations.

With reference to your statement that "military operations of the Japanese air forces in China have been directed solely against warlike organizations and establishments of the Chinese" and that no bombing or machine-gunning of civilian populations as such has been resorted to, the Department of State observes that trustworthy, detailed reports have come to this country, some official and some by way of private sources and the public press, which indicate that in their military operations in China the Japanese forces have in a large number of instances resorted to bombing and machine-gunning of civilians from the air at places near which there were no military establishments or organizations. Furthermore, the use of incendiary bombs (which inevitably and ruthlessly jeopardize non-military persons and properties) has inflicted appalling losses on civilian populations. Japanese air attacks in many instances have been of a nature and apparent plan which can be comprehended only as constituting deliberate attempts to terrorize unarmed populations. I would invite attention for example to the large number of air attacks upon the intramural city of Nanking from August 15, 1937, until the occupation of the city in December 1937, and particularly to the air raids of August 27, September 22, and September 25, 1937; to the raid on Hankow and Hanyang on September 24, 1937, and the attacks on Wuchang on July 12, July 19, August 11, and August 12, 1938; to the attacks on Canton on May 28, 29, and 30 and June 4, 5, and 6, 1938; to the attacks on Swatow on June 21, June 22, June 23, July 1, July 2, 1938, and on May 4, May 5, May 6, May 14, May 17, and May 18, 1939; to the repeated aerial attacks carried out on Foochow on April 25, May 1, May 7, May 8, May 15, May 16, May 18, and May 19, 1939; and to the periodic attacks on Chungking which commenced on May 3, 1939, and which have continued down to very recent date. It is positively known that Japanese planes have attacked civilian populations at a large number of other places, which to cite further examples include the following: *Fukien:* Chuanchow, Changchow; *Honan:* Chengchow, Chumatien, Hsuchang, Sinyang, Tungpeh; *Hunan:* Changsha, Changteh, Hengyang, Liling, Yuanling; *Hupeh:* Enshih, Ichang, Kingmen, Shasi; *Kiangsi:* Kuling, Nanchang; *Kiangsu:* Haichow, Hsuchow; *Kwangsi:* Kweilin, Nanning, Wuchow; *Kwangtung:* Chaochow, Luichow [*Linchow?*], Shiuchow; *Shantung:* Laiyang; *Shensi:* Sian; *Szechuan:* Chengtu, Siushan, Wanhsien.

---

[10] See vol. I, p. 595.

It is appropriate to mention also reports received by the Department of State that as recently as January 18, 1940, a number of large Japanese bombing planes attacked a group of undefended fishing villages on Woga Island near Foochow and caused the death and injury of a substantial number of civilians as well as the destruction of a substantial number of dwellings.

That there have been reported to date approximately 200 instances in China of damage by aerial bombs to American properties, the location of the majority of which were previously notified to the Japanese authorities and nearly all of which were marked by American flags, is an indication of the extent and the indiscriminate nature of Japanese aerial bombing operations over widespread areas. The Japanese Government could scarcely expect that the American people would or could look with complaisance upon attacks by the Japanese forces upon non-military objectives with results so disastrous to American interests. Furthermore, the bombing of so large a number of American properties—which were chiefly mission premises in the interior—carries the strong implication that the concurrent loss generally of civilian life and destruction of civilian property in these interior places were appallingly great.

Reference is made to your statement to the effect that the Universal Oil Products Company, upon the receipt by it of a letter from the Department of State, was left no alternative but to withhold further fulfillment of a provisional agreement with the Japan Gasoline Company, and in particular to your statement that the pertinent facts in regard to the proposed transaction were communicated to the Department of State by the Universal Oil Products Company during the progress of negotiations and that the Department made no objection. It is observed that the Department of State's informal indication of non-objection to the installation in plants in foreign countries of certain processes for the production of iso-octane fuel was given before the continued widespread bombing and machine-gunning of civilian populations in certain areas impelled the American people and this Government to extend the policy of condemnation of that practice to include the withholding of delivery of technical processes for the production of high quality aviation gasoline from countries the armed forces of which are engaged in unprovoked bombing and machine-gunning of civilian populations from the air. Furthermore, the Government of the United States, concerned as it is with the increase and spread of war and the use or threat of force in so many parts of the world, has recently felt constrained to conserve vital interests which this Government has in certain commodities and technical processes relating to the national defense.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, the American Government is unable to agree that its action in inviting American exporters voluntarily to cooperate with the policy pursued by the American people and by this Government of condemning and discouraging the bombing and machine-gunning of civilian populations from the air constituted an infringement of either the letter or the spirit of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1911 between the United States and Japan.

Accept [etc.] CORDELL HULL

Proclamation No. 2413, Signed by President Roosevelt, July 2, 1940[11]

WHEREAS section 6 of the act of Congress entitled "AN ACT To expedite the strengthening of the national defense," approved July 2, 1940,[11a] provides as follows:

> "Whenever the President determines that it is necessary in the interest of national defense to prohibit or curtail the exportation of any military equipment or munitions, or component parts thereof, or machinery, tools, or material or supplies necessary for the manufacture, servicing or operation thereof, he may by proclamation prohibit or curtail such exportation, except under such rules and regulations as he shall prescribe. Any such proclamation shall describe the articles or materials included in the prohibition or curtailment contained therein. In case of the violation of any provision of any proclamation, or of any rule or regulation, issued hereunder, such violator or violators, upon conviction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000, or by imprisonment for not more then two years or by both such fine and imprisonment. The authority granted in this Act shall terminate June 30, 1942, unless the Congress shall otherwise provide."

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the said act of Congress, do hereby proclaim that the administration of the provisions of section 6 of that act is vested in the Administrator of Export Control, who shall administer such provisions under such rules and regulations as I shall from time to time prescribe in the interest of the national defense.

AND I do hereby further proclaim that upon the recommendation of the aforesaid Administrator of Export Control, I have determined that it is necessary in the interest of the national defense that on and after July 5, 1940, the articles and materials hereinafter listed shall not be exported from the United States except when authorized in each case by a license as hereinafter provided:

1. Arms, ammunition, and implements of war as defined in my Proclamation No. 2237, of May 1, 1937.
2. The following basic materials and products containing the same:

    a. Aluminum
    b. Antimony
    c. Asbestos
    d. Chromium
    e. Cotton linters
    f. Flax
    g. Graphite
    h. Hides
    i. Industrial diamonds
    j. Manganese
    k. Magnesium
    l. Manila fiber
    m. Mercury
    n. Mica
    o. Molybdenum
    p. Optical glass
    q. Platinum group metals
    r. Quartz crystals

---

[11] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, July 6, 1940 (vol. III, No. 54), p. 12.

[11a] 54 Stat. 712, 714.

s. Quinine
t. Rubber
u. Silk
v. Tin
w. Toluol
x. Tungsten
y. Vanadium
z. Wool

3. Chemicals as follows:

a. Ammonia and ammonium compounds
b. Chlorine
c. Dimethylaniline
d. Diphenylamine
e. Nitric acid
f. Nitrates
g. Nitrocellulose, having a nitrogen content of less than 12 percent
h. Soda lime
i. Sodium acetate, anhydrous
j. Strontium chemicals
k. Sulphuric acid, fuming

4. Products as follows:

a. Aircraft parts, equipment, and accessories other than those listed in my proclamation of May 1, 1937
b. Armor plate, other than that listed in my proclamation of May 1, 1937
c. Glass, nonshatterable or bullet proof
d. Plastics, optically clear
e. Optical elements for fire control instruments, aircraft instruments, etc.

5. Machine tools as follows:

Metal-working machinery for—
(1) Melting or casting
(2) Pressing into forms
(3) Cutting or grinding, power driven
(4) Welding

And I do hereby empower the Secretary of State to issue licenses authorizing the exportation of any of the said articles and materials the exportation of which is not already subjected to the requirement that a license be obtained from the Secretary of State authorizing their exportation and I do hereby authorize and enjoin him to issue or refuse to issue licenses authorizing the exportation of any of the articles or materials listed above in accordance with the aforesaid rules and regulations or such specific directives as may be, from time to time, communicated to him by the Administrator of Export Control.

And I do hereby admonish all citizens of the United States and every person to abstain from every violation of the provisions of section 6 of the act above set forth, of the provisions of this proclamation, and of the provisions of such regulations as may be issued thereunder, and I do hereby warn them that all violations of such provisions will be rigorously prosecuted.

And I do hereby enjoin upon all officers of the United States, charged with the execution of the laws thereof, the utmost diligence in preventing violations of the said act, of this my proclamation, and of any regulations which may be issued pursuant hereto, and in bringing to trial and punishment any offenders against the same.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington this 2nd day of July, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and forty, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and sixty-fourth, at 11 a. m., E. S. T.

[SEAL]

Franklin D. Roosevelt

By the President:
Cordell Hull
Secretary of State

Regulations Governing the Exportation of Articles and Materials Designated in the President's Proclamation of July 2, 1940, Issued Pursuant to the Provisions of Section 6 of the Act of Congress Approved July 2, 1940 [11b]

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 6 of the Act of Congress approved July 2, 1940, entitled "An Act to expedite the strengthening of the national defense", I hereby prescribe the following regulations to govern the exportation of:

Arms, ammunition, and implements of war as defined in my proclamation No. 2237 of May 1, 1937.

The following basic materials and products containing the same:

[Here follow lists printed on pages 211–212.]

1. As used in my proclamation issued on July 2, 1940 pursuant to the provisions of Section 6 of the Act of Congress approved July 2, 1940, and in these regulations, the following terms shall be construed as defined herein:

a. Aluminum.—Metallic aluminum and alloys, crude, semifabricated and scrap, containing in excess of 10% aluminum.
b. Antimony.—Antimony ores, concentrates, metal, alloys in crude and semifabricated form, and antimony compounds.
c. Asbestos.—Asbestos crude and semifabricated, if chiefly of fibers of three quarters of an inch or more in length.
d. Chromium.—Chromite, metallic chromium, chromium bearing alloys containing in excess of 10% chromium, chromite refractories, and chromium compounds.
e. Flax.—Flax and cloth containing flax, except when manufactured into wearing apparel or household goods.

[11b] Reprinted from *Federal Register*, July 4, 1940 (vol. 5, No. 130), p. 2469.

f. Graphite.—Flake graphite and graphite crucibles, retorts and stoppers.

g. Hides.—Cattle and horse.

h. Manganese.—Manganese ores or concentrates containing 45% or more of metallic manganese, and alloys containing in excess of 10% metallic manganese.

i. Magnesium.—Metallic magnesium and alloys, crude, semifabricated, and scrap, containing in excess of 10% magnesium.

j. Mercury.—Mercury ores and concentrates and metallic mercury.

k. Mica.—Mica blocks, sheets and splitting, and semifabricated forms produced therefrom.

l. Molybdenum.—Molybdenum ores, concentrates, metal, alloys containing in excess of 10% molybdenum and molybdenum compounds.

m. Platinum.—Platinum group metals and alloys.

n. Quartz Crystals.—Piezo electric and optical.

o. Quinine.—Quinine barks, cinchona or others from which quinine may be extracted, and quinine sulfate.

p. Rubber.—All forms and types of crude rubber, reclaimed rubber, and scrap rubber containing in excess of 5% rubber.

q. Silk.—Raw silk and waste silk.

r. Tin.—Tin metal, alloys containing in excess of 5% tin in crude and semifabricated form; tin plate scrap and other scrap materials plated with metal containing tin; and other tin or tin alloy scrap and wastes.

s. Toluol.—Toluol and light oil resulting from the distillation of coal tar.

t. Tungsten.—Tungsten ores and concentrates, metal, alloys containing in excess of 5% tungsten and tungsten compounds.

u. Vanadium.—Vanadium ores and concentrates; alloys containing in excess of 10% vanadium, and vanadium compounds.

v. Wool.—Wool in the grease, or washed, wool scoured on the skin, or when pulled or sheared.

Except as otherwise indicated the terms used in these regulations shall not include completely fabricated articles or materials which are ready for ultimate consumption.

2. None of the articles or materials listed above shall be exported unless a license authorizing such export has been issued by the Secretary of State. Blank forms of application for export licenses similar to those printed below will be furnished by the Secretary of State upon request:

[Here follow forms to be used, etc.; for full text, see the *Federal Register* of July 4, 1940 (vol. 5, No. 130), pp. 2469–2471.]

3. The Secretary of State will issue export licenses to authorize proposed shipments of the said articles and materials to applicants who have duly filled out the appropriate form when I have determined that the proposed exportation would not be detrimental to the interests of the national defense.

4. Regulations contained in the pamphlet *International Traffic in Arms—Laws and Regulations Administered by the Secretary of State Governing the International Traffic in Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War and Other Munitions of War*, seventh edition, will continue to govern the exportation of arms, ammunition, and implements of war and tin-plate scrap except that export licenses will not be issued when in any case I shall have determined that the proposed shipment would be contrary to the interests of the national defense.

5. The shipper's export declarations must contain the same information in regard to the nature and value of the articles and materials to be exported as that which appears in the application for license.

6. Export licenses are not transferable and are subject to revocation without notice. If not revoked, licenses are valid for one year from the date of issuance.

7. No alterations may be made except by the Department of State or by collectors of customs or postmasters acting under the specific instructions of the Department of State in export licenses which have been issued under the seal of the Secretary of State.

8. Export licenses which have been revoked or which have expired must be returned immediately to the Secretary of State.

9. The country designated on the application for license as the country of destination shall in each case be the country of ultimate destination. If the goods to be exported are consigned to one country with the intention that they be transshipped thence to another country, the latter country shall be named as the country of destination.

10. Applications for license shall contain adequate descriptions of the articles and materials to be exported, including type and model descriptions if applicable. If an application is submitted in which the articles to be exported are inadequately described, it will be returned to the applicant for completion in this respect.

11. The original license must be presented, prior to exportation, to the collector of customs at the port through which the shipment authorized to be exported is being made. If shipment is made by parcel post, the license must be presented to the postmaster at the post office at which the parcel is mailed.

12. Articles and materials entering or leaving a port of the United States in transit through the territory of the United States to a foreign country will not be considered as imported or exported for the purposes of these regulations.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

THE WHITE HOUSE, July 2, 1940.

Press Release Issued by the White House on July 2, 1940 [12]

The President on July 2 signed H. R. 9850,[12a] providing legal authority for the control of exports from the United States of munitions, materials, and machinery essential to our national defense. A proclamation issued under this authority sets up the controls considered necessary at this time.

The items and materials listed in the proclamation include certain strategic materials as well as semifinished products and machine tools of which there are actual or prospective shortages as a result of the national defense program.

The Materials and Production Divisions of the National Defense Advisory Commission are collaborating with the Administrator of Export Control in the determination of the items to be controlled and the extent and character of the controls to be exercised.

While the control of exports is primarily a national-defense matter, the Department of State provides the machinery for the actual issue of licenses under which any controlled items are released for export.

The President also signed and issued the following military order:

"The administration of section 6 of the act of Congress entitled 'An Act to expedite the strengthening of the national defense,' approved July 2, 1940, is essentially a military function, and by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States and as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, I hereby designate Lieutenant Colonel Russell L. Maxwell, U. S. Army, Administrator of Export Control to administer the provisions of the said section under the direction and supervision of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.

"Franklin D. Roosevelt
"Commander-in-Chief.

"The White House,
"July 2, 1940."

Proclamation No. 2417, Signed by President Roosevelt, July 26, 1940 [13]

Whereas section 6 of the act of Congress entitled "An Act To expedite the strengthening of the national defense," approved July 2, 1940, provides as follows:

[Here follows the text of the act as quoted in proclamation No. 2413 of July 2, 1940, printed on page 211.]

And whereas by my proclamation No. 2413 of July 2, 1940, entitled, "Administration of Section 6 of the Act Entitled 'An Act

---

[12] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, July 6, 1940 (vol. III, No. 54), p. 11.

[12a] 54 Stat. 712.

[13] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, July 27, 1940 (vol. III, No. 57), p. 49.

To Expedite the Strengthening of the National Defense' approved July 2, 1940," I proclaimed that upon the recommendation of the Administrator of Export Control I had determined that it was necessary in he interest of the national defense that certain listed articles and materials should not be exported from the United States except when authorized in each case by a license as provided for in the said proclamation.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the said act of Congress, do hereby proclaim that upon the recommendation of the aforesaid Administrator of Export Control I have determined that it is necessary in the interest of the national defense that on and after August 1, 1940, the additional materials hereinafter listed shall not be exported from the United States except when authorized in each case by a license as provided for in the aforesaid proclamation:

1. Petroleum products
2. Tetraethyl lead
3. Iron and steel scrap

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this 26th day of July, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and forty, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and sixty-fifth.

[SEAL]

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

By the President:
SUMNER WELLES
Acting Secretary of State

Regulations Governing the Exportation of Articles and Materials Designated in the President's Proclamation of July 2, 1940, Issued Pursuant to the Provisions of Section 6 of the Act of Congress Approved July 2, 1940 [14]

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 6 of the Act of Congress approved July 2, 1940, entitled "An Act to expedite the strengthening of the national defense", I hereby prescribe the following additional regulations governing the exportation of:

1. Petroleum products
2. Tetraethyl lead
3. Iron and steel scrap

---

[14] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, July 27, 1940 (vol. III, No. 57), p. 50.

1. As used in my proclamation of July 26, 1940, issued pursuant to the provisions of section 6 of the Act of Congress approved July 2, 1940, and in these regulations, the following terms shall be construed as defined herein:

A. Petroleum Products.—(*a*) Aviation Motor Fuel, i. e. high octane gasolines, hydrocarbons, and hydrocarbon mixtures (including crude oils) boiling between 75° and 350° F. which with the addition of tetraethyl lead up to a total content of 3 c. c. per gallon will exceed 87 octane number by the A. S. T. M. Knock Test Method; or any material from which by commercial distillation there can be separated more than 3% of such gasoline, hydrocarbon or hydrocarbon mixture. (*b*) Aviation Lubricating Oil, i. e. any lubricating oil of 95 or more seconds Saybolt Universal Viscosity at 210° F. with a viscosity index of 85 or more.

B. Tetraethyl Lead.—Pure tetraethyl lead, ethyl fluid, or any mixture containing more than 3 c. c. of tetraethyl lead per gallon.

C. Iron and Steel Scrap.—Number 1 heavy melting scrap.

2. Regulations Nos. 2 to 12, inclusive, of the regulations issued on July 2, 1940, pursuant to the Act of July 2, 1940, are applicable to the exportation of aviation motor fuel, tetraethyl lead, and aviation lubricating oil.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

THE WHITE HOUSE, July 26, 1940.

Press Release Issued by the White House on July 31, 1940 [15]

Col. R. L. Maxwell, Administrator of Export Control, recommends, and the President approves, the issuance of the following announcement:

> In the interests of the national defense the export of aviation gasoline is being limited to nations of the Western Hemisphere, except where such gasoline is required elsewhere for the operations of American-owned companies.

811.20(D)Regulations/233

The Japanese Embassy to the Department of State [16]

The Japanese Government has taken note of the Proclamation, dated July 26, 1940, by the President of the United States of America, for the administration of section 6 of the Act of Congress approved

---

[15] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, August 3, 1940 (vol. III, No. 58), p. 94.

[16] Handed to the Acting Secretary of State by the Japanese Ambassador (Horinouchi) on August 3, 1940.

July 2, 1940, entitled "An Act to expedite the strengthening of the national defense," and the Regulations, dated July 26, 1940, governing the exportation of articles and materials designated in the President's Proclamation of July 2, 1940, and the anouncement of July 31 recommended by Colonel R. L. Maxwell, Administrator of Export Control.

The announcement of July 31, the introduction to which stated that it was issued with the approval of the President, is as follows:

> "In the interests of the National Defense the export of aviation gasoline is being limited to nations of the Western Hemisphere, except where such gasoline is required elsewhere for the operations of American owned companies."

It is the understanding of the Japanese Government that the announcement expresses the policy to be followed by the Government of the United States in applying the above mentioned Proclamations and Regulations to the export of aviation gasoline and that that policy, by limiting the export destinations, is tantamount to an embargo on aviation gasoline so far as countries outside the Western Hemisphere are concerned. As a country whose import of American aviation gasoline is of immense volume, Japan would bear the brunt of the virtual embargo. The resultant impression would be that Japan had been singled out for and subjected to discriminatory treatment.

While reserving all rights of further action, the Government of Japan wishes to protest against the policy of the Government of the United States set forth in the announcement under review.

[WASHINGTON,] August 3, 1940.

811.20(D)Regulations/233

The Department of State to the Japanese Embassy[17]

Reference is made to the Japanese Ambassador's note of August 3, 1940 in regard to action taken by the Government of the United States, in pursuance of section 6 of the Act of Congress approved July 2, 1940 entitled "An Act to expedite the strengthening of the national defense", to restrict the export of aviation gasoline from the United States. The Japanese Ambassador indicates that the impression created by that action, in view of Japan's large imports of American aviation gasoline, is that Japan has been singled out for and subjected to discriminatory treatment. Accordingly, the Japanese Ambassador records the Japanese Government's reservation of rights and its protest against the policy of the Government of the United States involved in the action under reference.

---

[17] Handed to the Japanese Ambassador (Horinouchi) by the Acting Secretary of State on August 9, 1940.

The Government of the United States desires to state that the action under reference, as was mentioned in the proclamation issued by the President of the United States on July 26, 1940, referred to in the Japanese Embassy's note under acknowledgment, is necessary in the interest of the national defense and that, accordingly, this Government considers a protest by any foreign government against that action to be unwarranted.

WASHINGTON, August 9, 1940.

Proclamation No. 2423, Signed by President Roosevelt, September 12, 1940[18]

WHEREAS section 6 of the act of Congress entitled "An Act to expedite the strengthening of the national defense," approved July 2, 1940, provides as follows:

[Here follows the text of the act as quoted in proclamation No. 2413 of July 2, 1940, printed on page 211.]

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the aforesaid act of Congress, do hereby proclaim that upon the recommendation of the Administrator of Export Control I have determined that it is necessary in the interest of the national defense that on and after this date the following-described articles and materials shall not be exported from the United States except when authorized in each case by a license as provided for in Proclamation No. 2413 of July 2, 1940, entitled "Administration of section 6 of the act entitled 'An Act to expedite the strengthening of the national defense' approved July 2, 1940," and in the regulations issued pursuant thereto:

1. Equipment (excluding minor component parts) which can be used, or adapted to use, for the production of aviation motor fuel from petroleum, petroleum products, hydrocarbons, or hydrocarbon mixtures, by processes involving chemical change; and any plans, specifications, or other documents containing descriptive or technical information of any kind (other than that appearing in any form available to the general public) useful in the design, construction, or operation of any such equipment, or in connection with any such processes. Aviation motor fuel shall mean such fuel as is defined in the regulations issued pursuant to Proclamation No. 2417 of July 26, 1940, as may from time to time be amended.

---

[18] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, September 14, 1940 (vol. III, No. 64), p. 213.

2. Equipment (excluding minor component parts) which can be used, or adapted to use, for the production of tetraethyl lead; and any plans, specifications, or other documents containing descriptive or technical information of any kind (other than that appearing in any form available to the general public) useful in the design, construction, or operation of any such equipment, or in connection with any such processes. Tetraethyl lead shall mean such tetraethyl lead as is defined in the regulations issued pursuant to Proclamation No. 2417 of July 26, 1940, as may from time to time be amended.

3. Plans, specifications, and other documents containing descriptive or technical information of any kind (other than that appearing in any form available to the general public) setting forth the design or construction of aircraft or aircraft engines.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this twelfth day of September in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and forty, and [SEAL] of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and sixty-fifth.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

By the President:
CORDELL HULL
Secretary of State

Press Release Issued by the White House on September 13, 1940[19]

In order to further strengthen the national defense, the President, acting upon a recommendation of Col. R. L. Maxwell, the Administrator of Export Control, has issued a proclamation dated September 12, 1940, subjecting the following additional materials to license requirements for export from the United States: Equipment used for the production of aviation motor fuel and tetraethyl lead or [*and*] any plans or specifications useful in the design, construction, or operation of such equipment or in connection with such processes; plans, specifications, and descriptive or technical information of any kind setting forth the design or construction of aircraft or aircraft engines.

These items are in addition to those announced in a previous proclamation by the President, dated July 26, 1940, placing petroleum products, tetraethyl lead, and iron and steel scrap under license requirements for exportation.

The President's proclamation of May 1, 1937, requires that exports of aircraft and aircraft engines be licensed. The present proclamation, taken with the preceding ones mentioned, has the effect of putting under the control of the President for export purposes not only the aircraft and engines but also the plans and designs for building them.

---

[19] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, September 14, 1940 (vol. III, No. 64), p. 213.

Press Release No. 48 Issued by the Federal Loan Agency on September 25, 1940

Jesse Jones, Federal Loan Administrator, announced today that as a part of the National Defense program the Metals Reserve Company has agreed to buy from the National Resources Commission of China tungsten to the value of $30,000,000. The tungsten will be delivered over a period of years at prices to be agreed upon from time to time, in accordance with market conditions, as the tungsten is delivered.

To assist China to meet her present foreign exchange needs the Export-Import Bank has agreed to lend China $25,000,000 that will be liquidated through the sale of the tungsten. The loan will be made to the Government of China with the guarantee of the Central Bank of China.

December 15, 1938, the Bank authorized $25,000,000 credits to the Universal Trading Corporation of New York, a Chinese-owned American corporation, which is being repaid through the importation from China of wood oil, used in the manufacture of paints and varnishes. $20,840,000 of this authorization has been drawn, and $2,993,444 repaid.

March 7, 1940, the Bank authorized additional loans to China of $20,000,000 which is to be repaid through the importation from China of tin. Some tin is already being shipped.

Of all loans heretofore authorized to China, both by the RFC and the Export-Import Bank, $43,824,528 has been disbursed and $13,160,253 repaid, with nothing past due.

Press Release Issued by the White House on September 26, 1940[20]

The President has approved the early establishment of additional controls of the exportation of iron and steel scrap with a view to conserving the available supply to meet the rapidly expanding requirements of the defense program in this country.

Effective October 15, 1940 all outstanding balances of licenses which have been granted pursuant to the existing regulations of July 26,

---

[20] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, September 28, 1940 (vol. III, No. 66), p. 250.

1940 for the exportation of No. 1 heavy melting steel scrap will be revoked. On October 16, 1940 the exportation of all grades of iron and steel scrap will be placed under the licensing system.

Under the new regulations which will be made effective on October 16, 1940, licenses will be issued to permit shipments to the countries of the Western Hemisphere and Great Britain only.

811.20(D)Regulations/589

Regulations Governing the Exportation of Articles and Materials Designated in the President's Proclamation of July 26, 1940, Issued Pursuant to the Provisions of Section 6 of the Act of Congress Approved July 2, 1940

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 6 of the Act of Congress approved July 2, 1940, entitled "An Act to expedite the strengthening of the national defense", I hereby prescribe the following additional regulations governing the exportation of:

IRON AND STEEL SCRAP

1. As used in my proclamation of July 26, 1940, issued pursuant to the provisions of section 6 of the Act of Congress approved July 2, 1940, and in the regulations of July 26, 1940, issued in accordance with that proclamation, the construction and definition of the term "iron and steel scrap", is hereby amended to read:

Iron and Steel Scrap.—All iron and steel scrap of every kind and description, classified or unclassified.

2. Regulations 2 to 12, inclusive, of the regulations issued on July 2, 1940, pursuant to the act of July 2, 1940, are applicable to the exportation of iron and steel scrap.

3. This regulation shall become effective October 16, 1940.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

THE WHITE HOUSE, September 30, 1940.

811.20(D)Regulations/589

The Japanese Embassy to the Department of State

No. 235

The Japanese Government has taken note of the regulations governing the exportation of iron and steel scrap, dated September 30, 1940, amending the construction and definition of the term "iron and steel scrap" included in the regulations of July 26, 1940, and the announcement of September 26, 1940 to the effect that, under the new regulations, licenses will be issued to permit shipments to the countries of the Western Hemisphere and Great Britain only.

The above mentioned regulations refer to the Presidential authority derived from the provisions of section 6 of the Act of Congress approved July 2, 1940, entitled "An Act to expedite the strengthening of the national defense", thereby suggesting that it was determined to be necessary in the interest of national defense to curtail the exportation of iron and steel scrap.

In view of the situation of iron and steel scrap markets, the supply and demand of these materials and the volume shipped to Japan, the Japanese Government finds it difficult to concede that this measure was motivated solely by the interest of national defense of the United States.

In the note of the Japanese Ambassador of August 3 the Japanese Government pointed out that the measure announced on July 26, 1940, in regard to the exportation of aviation gasoline, was tantamount to an export embargo as far as countries outside the Western Hemisphere were concerned. Compared to that announcement, the announcement under review may be said to have gone a step further toward discrimination by specifically excluding Great Britain from the virtual embargo.

In view of the fact that Japan has been for some years the principal buyer of American iron and steel scrap, the announcement of the administrative policy, as well as the regulations establishing license system in iron and steel scrap cannot fail to be regarded as directed against Japan, and, as such, to be an unfriendly act.

The Japanese Government hereby protests against the measures taken by the United States Government in connection with the exportation of iron and steel scrap.

[Washington,] October 7, 1940.

811.20 (D) Regulations/589

The Japanese Embassy to the Department of State [21]

Since iron and steel scrap classified as No. 1 heavy melting scrap was placed under export-licensing system on July 26, 1940, permission of the United States Government was obtained up to August 19 of the same year for 99 percent of applications for shipments to Japan.

In the light of this fact, the sudden enlargement of the iron and steel scrap licensing system to include all grades of these materials is hardly explicable from the standpoint of national defense, on which the regulation of September 30, 1940, is purported to be based.

---

[21] This undated statement was handed to the Secretary of State by the Japanese Ambassador on October 8, 1940.

The discriminatory feature of the announcement, that licenses will be issued to permit shipments to the countries of the Western Hemisphere and Great Britain only, has created a widespread impression in Japan that it was motivated by a desire to bring pressure upon her.

The fact that the majority of essential articles and materials that Japan desires to import from America is placed under licensing system is causing a feeling of tension among the people of Japan, who naturally presume that the system is intended to be a precursor of severance of economic relations between Japan and the United States.

In view of the high feeling in Japan it is apprehended that, in the event of continuation by the United States Government of the present attitude toward Japan in matters of trade restriction, especially if it leads to the imposition of further measures of curtailment, future relations between Japan and the United States will be unpredictable.

It is a matter of course that the Governments of both Japan and the United States should endeavor as best they can to preclude such an eventuality. To this endeavor the Japanese Government will devote itself and trusts that it may have the full co-operation of the United States Government.

811.20(D)Regulations/590

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] October 8, 1940.

The Japanese Ambassador called at his request. He first expressed his regret at the unsatisfactory relations existing between our two countries at this time. I replied that, in my opinion, this was not the fault of the Ambassador and myself, who have been untiring in our efforts to promote and preserve satisfactory relations between the United States and Japan.

The Ambassador then said that he was instructed by his Government to hand me a note dated October 7, 1940 (copy attached)[22] relative to our scrap iron and steel embargo which was recently proclaimed.

He read a statement (copy attached)[23] in support of the note mentioned above.

I replied to the effect that I would see what sort of written reply, if any, might be called for.

I then said that I might at this time, and without delay, state that this Government at all times must determine for itself such internal questions as those material to our program of national defense, as we are doing in the instant case, and that it would be impossible for any country engaged in the serious and urgent undertaking of carrying out a program of national defense to allow every other outside nation to come in and pass upon the question of our needs of given commodities; that the embargo, as the Ambassador knows, applies to all nations except Great Britain and the Western Hemisphere. I remarked that for some years this Government had been criticized for not imposing numerous embargoes, primarily from the standpoint of safety and national defense and peace, and that it was only at the height of our national defense preparations that we were imposing a few embargoes on important commodities.

---

[22] Note No. 235, p. 223.

[23] *Supra.*

I said that it was really amazing for the Government of Japan, which has been violating in the most aggravating manner valuable American rights and interests throughout most of China, and is doing so in many instances every day, to question the fullest privilege of this Government from every standpoint to impose the proposed scrap iron and steel embargo, and that to go still further and call it an unfriendly act was still more amazing in the light of the conduct of the Japanese Government in disregarding all law, treaty obligations and other rights and privileges and the safety of Americans while it proceeded at the same time to seize territory by force to an ever-increasing extent. I stated that of all the countries with which I have had to deal during the past eight years, the Government of Japan has the least occasion or excuse to accuse this Government of an unfriendly act. I concluded with the statement that apparently the theory of the Japanese Government is for all other nations to acquiesce cheerfully in all injuries inflicted upon their citizens by the Japanese policy of force and conquest, accompanied by every sort of violence, unless they are to run the risk of being guilty of an unfriendly act.

The Ambassador again said that he very much regretted the serious differences between our two countries, but that he naturally hoped that trouble may yet be avoided. He added that any Japanese or any American must know that strife between the two countries would be extremely tragic for both alike. To this I replied that, of course, it would be exceedingly unfortunate for such occurrence to take place, but I added that my Government has been patient, extremely patient, and that the Ambassador will bear witness to the long and earnest efforts that he and I have made, and that I have made prior to his coming here, to promote and preserve friendly and satisfactory relations with Japan. I went on to say that we have stood for law and order and treaty observance and justice along with genuine friendliness between our two countries; that it was clear now, however, that those who are dominating the external policies of Japan are, as we here have believed for some years, bent on the conquest by force of all worthwhile territory in the Pacific Ocean area without limit as to extent in the South and in southern continental areas of that part of the world, and that we and all other nations are expected, as stated, to sit perfectly quiet and be cheerful and agreeable, but static, while most of Asia is Manchuria-ized, which would render practically impossible all reasonable or satisfactory relations so far as other nations are concerned; and that corresponding lower levels of existence would be the ultimate lot of the people of most of Asia. The least objection to or taking of issue with Japan with respect to the foregoing matters would be called an unfriendly act, and, as Prime Minister Konoye said recently to the press, it would be the occasion for war so far as Japan was concerned.[23a] I added that, of course, if any one country is sufficiently desirous of trouble, it can always find any one of innumerable occasions to start such trouble. In brief, it is not left to the other country to participate in such decision.

The Ambassador undertook to repeat the old line of talk about how fair Japan proposed to be with respect to all rights and privileges of foreign nations within its conquered territory. He agreed that no purpose would be served now to go over the many conversations we have had with respect to these matters. I held up the succession of injuries to American rights and interests in China whenever he referred to the scrap iron embargo.

I reiterated the view that it was unheard of for one country engaged in aggression and seizure of another country, contrary to all law and treaty provisions, to turn to a third peacefully disposed nation and seriously insist that it would be guilty of an unfriendly act if it should not cheerfully provide some of the necessary implements of war to aid the aggressor nation in carrying out its policy of invasion. I made it clear that it is the view of this Government that two nations, one in Europe and one in Asia, are undertaking to subjugate both of their respective areas of the world, and to place them on an international order and on a social basis resembling that of 750 years ago. In the face of this world movement, extending itself from day to day, peaceful and interested nations are to be held up to denunciation and threats if they dare to engage in any lawful acts or utterances in opposition to such wide movements of world conquest.

The Ambassador had little to say. He said virtually nothing in attempted extenuation except that his Government would expect everybody to receive considerate and fair treatment throughout the conquered areas. He emphasized equal treatment, and I replied that when the best interests of other nations in peace and law and order were being destroyed, it was not a matter of any concern as to whether there was discrimination between the nations which were victims of such movements.

[23a] Apparently reference is to statement of October 4, 1940; not printed.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

Press Release Issued by the White House on October 15, 1940 [24]

The President on October 10 approved an act which confers on him authority to requisition arms, ammunition, implements of war, machine tools, and other articles and materials which are needed for the national defense.

Under the Neutrality Acts of 1935,[25] 1936,[26] 1937,[27] and 1939,[28] and under the Export Control Act of July 2, 1940,[28a] certain articles and materials needed for the national defense have been subject to the export-licensing system. Since the passage of the last-named act, many applications for licenses have been refused as a result of decisions by the Administrator of Export Control that the proposed exportation would be contrary to the interests of the national defense. The articles or materials for which export licenses have been refused have in many cases already been sold and the title has passed to a foreign purchaser. It has been found that, in some of these cases, purchasers did not desire to sell the article or material in the United States or, because they were acting in a representative capacity, they were not legally in a position to do so. This situation has been particularly acute in the case of some exportations of machine tools. A great many of these tools for which export licenses have been refused are especially needed to meet national-defense requirements.

The President on October 15 issued an Executive order [28b] directing the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, acting jointly through the agency of the Army and Navy Munitions Board, to determine the necessity for the requisitioning of any equipment, munitions, or machinery, tools, materials, or supplies necessary for the manufacture of munitions, or the servicing, or operation of facilities for the national defense, and to determine whether in any case it is in the public interest to sell, or otherwise dispose of, any of the articles and materials so requisitioned. The administration of the other provisions of the act has been vested in the Administrator of Export Control.

---

[24] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, October 19, 1940 (vol. III, No. 69), p. 313.

[25] Approved August 31, 1935; 49 Stat. 1081.

[26] Approved February 29, 1936; 49 Stat. 1152.

[27] Approved May 1, 1937; 50 Stat. 121.

[28] Approved November 4, 1939; 54 Stat. 4.

[28a] 54 Stat. 712.

[28b] No. 8567; *Federal Register*, October 18, 1940 (vol. 5, No. 204), p. 4121.

The President at the same time issued the necessary regulations for the carrying out of his Executive order.[28c]

As a result of his approval of this act and the issuance of this Executive order and these regulations, the President is assured the use of the critical articles and materials required in the national-defense program which might otherwise be unobtainable.

811.20(D) Regulations/589

The Department of State to the Japanese Embassy

Reference is made to the note dated October 7, 1940, from the Japanese Embassy at Washington, in which objection is expressed by the Japanese Government to the regulations promulgated by the American Government on September 30, 1940, with regard to the exportation of iron and steel scrap, such objection being placed apparently on the ground that the restrictions to be effected by the regulations are discriminatory and are calculated to be injurious to Japan.

As was pointed out in the first paragraph of the Japanese Embassy's note, the regulations under reference derive from the provisions of section 6 of the Act of Congress approved July 2, 1940, entitled "An Act to expedite the strengthening of the national defense". It having been found by the appropriate agencies and authorities of this Government that the restrictions on exportation to be effected by the regulations under reference are necessary in the interest of national defense, the Government of the United States perceives no warrantable basis for a raising of question by any other government, in the circumstances—not of this Government's making—which prevail today in international relations, with regard to the considerations which necessitate the adoption by this Government of these measures of conservation.

WASHINGTON, October 23, 1940.

811.20(D) Regulations/854

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

[WASHINGTON,] November 19, 1940.

The Japanese Chargé came in to see me, at his request.

He raised the question of export licenses for machine tools, and submitted the attached very lengthy note.[29] His principal points were:

[28c] *Ibid.*, p. 4122.

[29] Not printed.

(1) They were given to understand that machine tools would be allowed a license for export unless they were needed in the domestic market. Export licenses for certain machine tools were denied. Attempts were thereupon made to sell them to the domestic market, but it developed that nobody wanted them. Therefore the Chargé thinks the denial of license must be a mistake.

(2) Certain other machine tools are manufactured in accordance with specifications which fit Japanese machines, measurements, etc., only. Nobody appears to want to recondition them for American business.

(3) Certain other machines, according to the Japanese construction of the export licensing order, need no licenses at all. The manufacturers nevertheless requested licenses for them, which were denied. The Embassy wishes licenses for the whole lot.

I confined myself to the comment that I would have the matter looked into.

A. A. B[ERLE], Jr.

811.20(D)Regulations/890

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

[WASHINGTON,] November 30, 1940.

The Japanese Chargé d'Affaires came in to see me at his request. He had on his mind the fact that his Government had raised the question of export licenses for certain machine tools, and had called to the attention of the Department the fact that certain kinds of machine tools, notably cutters and grinders, were not listed as requiring licenses. Nevertheless, shipments of these tools had been held up.

He now pointed out that in the recent circular to collectors of customs, they were directed not to permit export of tool and cutter grinders until further notice. In other words, though licenses were not required, the collectors of customs were nevertheless not permitted to allow these tools to go forward.

I said I would have the matter looked into, but I called the Counselor's attention to the fact that export of these articles was at all times dominated by our needs for national defense. If the Defense Commission felt such tools were needed, they would undoubtedly require them to be licensed; and, as had happened when the Act was first passed, the first step is to hold up shipment pending a more or less careful examination. I could not, therefore, assure him that arrangements would be made prior to December 10 permitting these tools to go forward. I did agree, however, that the Department would look into the matter.

Attached is the memorandum handed me by the Japanese Counselor.[30]

A. A. BERLE, Jr.

---

[30] Not printed.

811.20(D) Regulations/853

The Secretary of State to the Japanese Chargé (Morishima)

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Japan and acknowledges the receipt of the Japanese Embassy's note of November 19, 1940, in regard to the issuance of export licenses for machine tools.[31]

As the Embassy is aware, each application to export a machine tool is examined by the interested agencies of this Government with a view to determining whether or not the tool in question is needed in the United States defense program. In view of the constant and rapid expansion which this program is undergoing, it frequently becomes necessary to revoke a license already granted, since the tool which it seemed at the time of the issuance of the license could be dispensed with has thereafter been found to be essential to the program. Attention should also be invited to the fact that, even though a particular tool for the exportation of which application is made may not be needed in the defense program, the application may nevertheless be rejected if the manufacture of the tool in question would occupy production capacity needed for the manufacture of other tools which are essential to the program.

It should be pointed out, moreover, that other considerations are also weighed by those agencies of the Government responsible for the issuance of export licenses. On December 2, 1939, the President publicly stated the policy of this Government in regard to the export of materials essential to aircraft manufacture to countries the armed forces of which engage in the unprovoked bombing from the air of civilian populations. This policy is naturally taken into consideration by those officers responsible for the granting or rejection of export license applications.

The Embassy refers to the revocation of licenses for tools which collectors of customs had previously been informed could be exported without the requirement of a license. The attention of the Embassy is invited to the fact that collectors of customs were informed that no license would be required for the export of these types of tools "until further notice". In view of the fact that the expanding defense program of this Government makes the conservation of machine tool production capacity for its own needs constantly more necessary, collectors of customs were recently instructed that licenses will be henceforth required for the export of additional types of machine tools, including those types listed in the enclosure to the Embassy's note.

---

[31] Not printed; see memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State, November 19, 1940, p. 229.

In regard to the specific case referred to in the second numbered paragraph of the first section of the Embassy's note, the Embassy is informed that this application was received by the Department of State on October 3, 1940, and transmitted to the interested agencies of this Government on the same date. It is understood that a decision in this case has now been reached and that it is being communicated to Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha. It is also understood that a decision has been reached in the case referred to in the concluding section of the Embassy's note and that this decision also is being transmitted to Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha.

WASHINGTON, December 9, 1940.

Press Release Issued by the Department of State on December 10, 1940 [32]

The White House today, upon direction of the President, made public the following statement:

"The President announced today that national-defense requirements for iron and steel have increased to such extent that it has become necessary to subject, as of December 30, 1940, iron ore, pig iron, ferro alloys, and certain iron and steel manufactures and semimanufactures to the licensing requirement. Licenses will be granted for exports to the British Empire and the Western Hemisphere; and for the present, so far as the interests of the national defense permit, for exports to other destinations in quantities approximating usual or pre-war exports."

Proclamation No. 2449, Signed by President Roosevelt, December 10, 1940 [32]

WHEREAS section 6 of the act of Congress entitled "AN ACT To expedite the strengthening of the national defense," approved July 2, 1940, provides as follows:

[Here follows the text of the act as quoted in proclamation No. 2413 of July 2, 1940, printed on page 211.]

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the aforesaid act of Congress, do hereby proclaim that upon the recommendation of the Administrator of Export Control I have determined that it is necessary in the interest of the national defense that on and after December 30, 1940, the following-described articles and materials shall not be exported from the United States except when authorized in each case by a license as provided for in Proclamation No. 2413 of July 2, 1940, entitled "Administration of section 6 of the act entitled 'AN ACT To expedite the strengthening of the national defense' approved July 2, 1940.":

---

[32] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, December 14, 1940 (vol. III, No. 77), p. 529.

IRON AND STEEL

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this tenth day of December, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and forty, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and sixty-fifth.

[SEAL]

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

By the President:
CORDELL HULL,
Secretary of State

Executive Order No. 8607, Signed by President Roosevelt, December 10, 1940[33]

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 6 of the Act of Congress approved July 2, 1940, entitled "AN ACT To expedite the strengthening of the national defense," I hereby prescribe the following additional regulations governing the exportation of:

IRON AND STEEL

1. As used in my proclamation of December 10, 1940, issued pursuant to the provisions of sections 6 of the Act of Congress approved July 2, 1940, and in these regulations, the terms "iron" and "steel" shall be construed as defined herein:

Iron and Steel:
  A. Iron ore (6001)
  B. Pig iron (6007)

---

[33] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, December 14, 1940, (vol. III, No. 77), p. 530.

Iron and Steel—Continued
- C. Ferro Alloys
  - Ferromanganese (6213)
  - Spiegeleisen (6213)
  - Ferrosilicon . . . .
  - Ferrochrome . . . .
  - Ferrotungsten . . . .
  - Ferrovanadium . . . . } (6220)
  - Ferrocolumbium . . . .
  - Ferrocarbontitanium . . . .
  - Ferrophosphorus . . . .
  - Ferromolybdenum . . . .
- D. Semi-Finished Products
  - Ingots . . . .
  - Billets . . . .
  - Blooms . . . . } (6016 & 6017)
  - Slabs . . . .
  - Sheet Bars. . . . .
  - Skelp (6032)
  - Wire Rods (6029)
- E. Finished Products
  - Structural Shapes (6045 & 6046)
  - Steel Piling (6050)
  - Plates (6030, 6031.1, 6031.5, 6031.9, 6047)
  - Skelps (6032)
  - Rails (6051, 6052, 6053)
  - Splice Bars and Tie Plates (6054)
  - Bars
    - Merchant (6023, 6025, 6026)
    - Concrete Reinforcing (6022)
    - Cold Finished (6020)
    - Alloy (6020, 6025, 6026)
    - Tool Steel (6023, 6026)
  - Hoops and Bailing Bands (6038.1)
  - Pipe and Tube (6060, 6061, 6062, 6063, 6064, 6067, 6068, 6070, 6071, 6072, 6073, 6077)
  - Drawn Wire (6081, 6082)
  - Nails and Staples (6092, 6095)
  - Barbed and Twisted Wire (6083)
  - Woven Wire Fence (6085)
  - Bale Ties (6038.1)
  - Fence Posts (6209)
  - Black Plate (6035.1)
  - Tin Plate (6041)
  - Sheets (6033, 6034, 6035.1, 6035.5, 6035.9, 6036)
  - Strip (6037.1, 6037.5, 6037.9, 6038.1, 6038.5, 6038.9)
  - Wheels (6105.1, 6105.3)
  - Axles (6105.2, 6105.3)
  - Track Spikes (6058)
  - Castings (6101, 6102, 6104.1, 6104.9)
  - Forgings (6107, 6108)

2. The number or numbers in parenthesis following each material or article designated in paragraph 1 hereof corresponds to the "Commodity Number" prefixed to the "Commodity Description" as set out in Schedule B, "Statistical Classification of Domestic Commodities Exported from the United States," effective January 1, 1939, as amended, issued by the United States Department of Commerce.

3. Paragraphs *d.*, *h.*, *l.*, *t.*, and *u.*, of regulation 1 of the regulations issued July 2, 1940, pursuant to the Act of July 2, 1940, in so far as they apply to ferro alloys, are modified in accordance with the foregoing definitions. Regulations 2 to 12, inclusive, of the regulations issued July 2, 1940, pursuant to the Act of July 2, 1940, are applicable to the exportation of iron and steel.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

THE WHITE HOUSE, December 10, 1940.

811.20(D)Regulations/892

The Secretary of State to the Japanese Chargé (Morishima)

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Japan and refers to the memoranda of November 30 and December 4, 1940, of the Japanese Embassy,[35] in regard to the requirement that licenses be obtained for the export of certain machine tools which collectors of customs had been previously instructed might be exported without a license.

The Secretary of State, in reply, invites attention to the fourth paragraph of his note of December 9, 1940, in which he pointed out that this instruction to collectors of customs contained the stipulation that licenses would not be required for the export of these types of tools "until further notice". On November 25 the Department advised collectors of customs that on and after December 10, 1940, all of these types of tools would be subjected to the licensing requirement. Prior to November 25, however, the Department, pursuant to the desires of the Administrator of Export Control with whom rests full authority in matters of this sort, had had occasion to inform both collectors of customs and manufacturers that licenses would be required in certain individual cases for the export of certain specific tools of the types previously exempted, which tools are pressingly needed in the defense program of the United States. These specific instructions, which amended the instructions of July 27, 1940 and, in contradistinction to the instructions of November 25, took effect immediately, account for the course pursued in the individual cases referred to in the Embassy's memoranda of November 30 and December 4, 1940.

WASHINGTON, December 17, 1940.

---

[35] Neither printed.

Proclamation No. 2451, Signed by President Roosevelt, December 20, 1940[36]

WHEREAS section 6 of the Act of Congress entitled "AN ACT To expedite the strengthening of the national defense," approved July 2, 1940, provides as follows:

[Here follows the text of the act as quoted in proclamation No. 2413 of July 2, 1940, printed on page 211.]

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the aforesaid Act of Congress, do hereby proclaim that upon the recommendation of the Administrator of Export Control I have determined that it is necessary in the interest of the national defense that on and after January 6, 1941, the following-described articles and materials shall not be exported from the United States except when authorized in each case by a license as provided for in Proclamation No. 2413 of July 2, 1940, entitled "Administration of section 6 of the Act entitled 'An Act to expedite the strengthening of the national defense' approved July 2, 1940.":

1. Bromine.
2. Ethylene.
3. Ethylene dibromide.
4. Methylamine.
5. Strontium Metals and Ores.
6. Cobalt.
7. Abrasives and abrasive products containing emery, corundum, or garnet, as well as abrasive paper and cloth.
8. Plastic molding machines and presses.
9. Measuring Machines.
10. Gauges.
11. Testing Machines.
12. Balancing Machines.
13. Hydraulic Pumps.
14. Tools incorporating industrial diamonds.
15. Equipment and plans for the production of aviation lubricating oil.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this 20th day of December, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and forty, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and sixty-fifth.

[SEAL]

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

By the President:
CORDELL HULL
Secretary of State

---

[36] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, December 21, 1940 (vol. III, No. 78), p. 559.

811.20(D)Regulations/1049

The Japanese Embassy to the Department of State

No. 316

The Japanese Government has taken note of the Proclamation, dated December 10, 1940, by the President of the United States of America,[37] governing the exportation of iron and steel under the provisions of Section 6 of the Act entitled, "An Act to expedite the strengthening of the national defense," approved July 2, 1940, and of the "White House announcement" of the same date, stating, in part, that "licenses will be granted for exports to the British Empire and Western Hemisphere, and for the present, so far as the interests of the national defense permit, for exports to other destinations in quantities approximating usual or pre-war exports."

The enforcement of the measure ordered by the President in the Proclamation, especially when carried out in accordance with the policy as announced—that is the granting of licenses for exports exclusively to certain countries while subjecting exports to other countries to the considerations of "the interests of the national defense" and to arbitrary quantitative limitations—constitutes an instance of discriminatory treatment of countries in the latter category, of which Japan, in consideration of the volume of her importation in recent years of the specified commodities, would be one of those most gravely affected.

The Japanese Government, which has had occasion to file protests against discriminations embodied in previous Presidential Proclamations, regulations, and announcements of administrative policy governing the exportation of aviation gasoline and iron and steel scrap, by the Japanese Ambassador's notes of August 3, 1940 and October 8 [*7*], 1940, respectively, is now constrained to protest, under similar circumstances and for similar reasons, against this fresh measure of discrimination reviewed in the above.

[WASHINGTON,] December 21, 1940.

811.20(D)Regulations/1049

The Department of State to the Japanese Embassy

Reference is made to the note, no. 316, dated December 21, 1940, from the Japanese Embassy at Washington, in regard to restrictions recently placed on the exportation of iron and steel.

It is noted that the Embassy refers to its notes of August 3, 1940, and October 7, 1940, in regard to the restrictions placed on the exportation of aviation gasoline and iron and steel scrap. The Embassy's attention is invited to the replies which the Department addressed to those notes on August 9, 1940, and October 23, 1940. The statements therein made concerning the interests of the national defense of the United States apply fully to the considerations raised in the Embassy's note under acknowledgment in regard to the recent restrictions on the export of iron and steel.

---

[37] Proclamation No. 2449, p. 232.

WASHINGTON, January 7, 1941.

Proclamation No. 2453, Signed by President Roosevelt, January 10, 1941 [38]

WHEREAS section 6 of the act of Congress entitled "An Act To expedite the strengthening of the national defense," approved July 2, 1940, provides as follows:

[Here follows the text of the act as quoted in proclamation No. 2413 of July 2, 1940, printed on page 211.]

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the aforesaid act of Congress, do hereby proclaim that upon the recommendation of the Administrator of Export Control I have determined that it is necessary in the interest of the national defense that on or after February 3, 1941, the following-described articles and materials shall not be exported from the United States except when authorized in each case by a license as provided for in Proclamation No. 2413 of July 2, 1940, entitled "Administration of section 6 of the act entitled 'AN ACT To expedite the strengthening of the national defense' approved July 2, 1940.":

1. Copper
2. Brass and Bronze
3. Zinc
4. Nickel
5. Potash

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this 10″ day of January, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and forty-one, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and sixty-fifth.

[SEAL]

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

By the President:
CORDELL HULL
Secretary of State

---

[38] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, January 11, 1941 (vol. IV, No. 81), p. 52.

Executive Order No. 8631, Signed by President Roosevelt, January 10, 1941[39]

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 6 of the Act of Congress approved July 2, 1940, entitled "AN ACT To expedite the strengthening of the national defense," I hereby prescribe the following additional regulations governing the exportation of:

1. Copper
2. Brass and Bronze
3. Zinc
4. Nickel
5. Potash

1. As used in my proclamation of January 10, 1941, issued pursuant to the provisions of section 6 of the Act of Congress approved July 2, 1940, and in these regulations, the above articles and materials shall be construed to include:

A. Copper:	
Ore, concentrates, matte, and unrefined copper including blister, black or coarse, converter, and anodes	6401
Refined copper in bars, billets, cakes, ingots, slabs and other commercial shapes	6412
Old and scrap copper	6413
Pipes and tubes	6422
Plates and sheets	6423
Rods	6424
Wire:	
Bare	6425
Insulated wire and cable:	
Rubber-covered wire	6430
Weatherproof wire	6431
Other insulated wire	6435
Other primary fabrications	6412*
Fabrications for munitions purposes	6439*
Alloys, other than brass and bronze	
B. Brass and Bronze:	
Scrap and old	6440
Ingots and other commercial shapes	6441
Bars and rods	6448
Plates and sheets	6450
Pipes and tubes	6453
Wire (bare or insulated)	6457
Other primary fabrications	6479*
Fabrications for munitions purposes	6479*
C. Zinc:	
Ore, concentrates, and dross	6570
Cast in slabs, plates, or blocks	6571
Rolled in sheets and strips	6572
Other forms including scrap	6573

---

[39] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, January 11, 1941 (vol. IV, No. 81), p. 53.

C. Zinc—Continued	
Alloys	6573
Dust	6586
Manufactures containing 20% or more zinc	6589*
D. Nickel:	
Ores, concentrates, and matte	6545
Metal in any form including ingots, bars, rods, sheets, plates, and scrap	6545
Alloys containing 10% or more nickel including scrap	6545 6610
Nickel compounds (chemical) containing 10% or more nickel	8399*
E. Potash:	
Potassium Salts and Compounds	8356
Potassium hydroxide (KOH)	
Potassium carbonate (K_2CO_3)	
Potassium chlorate ($KClO_3$)	
Potassium perchlorate ($KClO_4$)	
Potassium cyanide (KCN)	
Potassium iodide (KI)	
Potassium nitrate (KNO_3)	
Potassium permanganate (KM_nO_4)	
Potassium acetate ($KC_2H_3O_2$)	
Potassium bicarbonate ($KHCO_3$)	
Potassium bitartrate ($KHC_4H_4O_6$)	
Potassic Fertilizer Materials:	8531
Potassium chloride (KCl)	
Potassium sulphate (K_2SO_4)	
All other potassic fertilizer materials containing 27% or more potassium oxide (K_2O) equivalent	
All combinations and mixtures of any of the foregoing containing potash salts of 27% or more potassium oxide (K_2O) equivalent	

2. The numbers in parenthesis following each material or article designated in paragraph 1 hereof correspond to the "Commodity Number" prefixed to the "Commodity Description" as set out in Schedule B, "Statistical Classification of Domestic Commodities Exported from the United States," effective January 1, 1939, as amended, issued by the United States Department of Commerce. The words are controlling and the numbers are for statistical classification only. An asterisk (*) indicates that the classification herein is not co-extensive with that in said Schedule B.

3. Regulation 1 of the Regulations issued July 2, 1940, pursuant to the Act of July 2, 1940, is modified only in so far as it applies to Copper, Brass and Bronze, Zinc, Nickel, and Potash in accordance with the foregoing classifications. Regulations 2 to 12 inclusive of the Regulations issued July 2, 1940, pursuant to the Act of July 2, 1940, are applicable to exportation of Copper, Brass and Bronze, Zinc, Nickel and Potash.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

THE WHITE HOUSE, January 10, 1941.

Article Concerning Control of Exports in National Defense[40]

The following circular telegram from the Secretary of State was sent to all collectors of customs:

"[Washington,] January 29, 1941.

"Reference is made to the Department's previous circular airmail letters in regard to the interpretation of the regulations issued pursuant to the Export Control Act approved on July 2, 1940.

"It has now been determined that until further notice the term 'Aluminum', as used in the regulations referred to above, shall be interpreted in such manner as to include aluminum foil. Accordingly, licenses shall henceforth be required for the exportation of aluminum foil."

Applications for articles and materials in the following list, for destinations other than the British Empire, must be accompanied by affidavits in addition to a copy of the order from the foreign purchaser.

The affidavits should report statistics regarding exports to the country concerned since January 1, 1937, except as noted by asterisks:

1. Abrasives
2. Aluminum compounds (urea, uramon, ammonium phosphate, ammonium sulphate)
3. Ammonium
4. Antimony
5. Asbestos
6. Bromine
7. Ethylene
8. Ethylene dibromide
9. Chromium
10. Copper*
11. Brass*
12. Bronze*
13. Nickel*
14. Methylamine
15. Nitrates
16. Platinum
17. Quinine
18. Rubber
19. Silk
20. Strontium
21. Tin
22. Toluol
23. Tungsten
24. Zinc*
25. Potash†
26. Cobalt
27. Cotton linters
28. Dimethylaniline
29. Industrial diamonds
30. Iron and steel*
31. Magnesium
32. Manila fiber
33. Manganese
34. Mercury
35. Hides

*Affidavits for exportation since Jan. 1, 1935.
†Also for the Union of South Africa, New Zealand, and Australia.

Proclamation No. 2456, Signed by President Roosevelt, February 4, 1941[41]

Whereas section 6 of the act of Congress entitled "An Act To expedite the strengthening of the national defense," approved July 2, 1940, provides as follows:

---

[40] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, February 1, 1941 (vol. IV, No. 84), p. 128.

[41] Reprinted from *ibid.*, February 8, 1941 (vol. IV, No. 85), p. 157.

[Here follows the text of the act as quoted in proclamation No. 2413 of July 2, 1940, printed on page 211.]

Now, therefore, I, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the aforesaid act of Congress, do hereby proclaim that upon the recommendation of the Administrator of Export Control I have determined that it is necessary in the interest of the national defense that on and after February 10, 1941, the following-described articles and materials shall not be exported from the United States except when authorized in each case by a license as provided for in Proclamation No. 2413 of July 2, 1940, entitled "Administration of section 6 of the Act entitled 'An Act To expedite the strengthening of the national defense' approved July 2, 1940.":

(1.) Well and refining machinery
(2.) Radium
(3.) Uranium
(4.) Calf and kip skins.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington this 4th day of February, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and forty-one and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and sixty-fifth.

[seal]

Franklin D. Roosevelt

By the President:
Cordell Hull
Secretary of State

Executive Order No. 8668, Signed by President Roosevelt, February 4, 1941 [42]

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 6 of the act of Congress approved July 2, 1940, entitled "An Act To expedite the strengthening of the national defense," I hereby prescribe the following additional regulations governing the exportation of the articles and materials named in my proclamation of February 4, 1941:

1. The articles and materials named in my proclamation of February 4, 1941, pursuant to section 6 of the act of July 2, 1940, shall be construed to include the following:

---

[42] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, February 8, 1941 (vol. iv, No. 85), p. 158.

	B	F
(1.) Well and refining machinery:		
Petroleum and gas well equipment and parts, including well drilling machinery and parts	7342 7349	7750*
Petroleum refining machinery, equipment and parts	7349	7750*
(2.) Radium:		
Metal	6640*	6640*
Salts and compounds	8399*	8399*
(3.) Uranium:		
Metal	6640*	6640*
Salts and compounds	8399*	8399*
Minerals	6245*	6640*
(4.) Calf and kip skins:		
Calf skins	0206	0205 0206
Kip skins	0207	0205 0206

2. The numbers appearing in the columns designated B and F in paragraph 1 hereof refer to the numbers in Schedule B "Statistical Classification of Domestic Commodities Exported from the United States", and Schedule F "Foreign Exports (Re-Exports)", respectively, issued by the United States Department of Commerce, both effective January 1, 1941. The words are controlling and the numbers are included solely for the purpose of statistical classification. An asterisk (*) indicates that the classification herein is not co-extensive with that in said Schedules B and F.

3. Regulations 2 to 12 inclusive of the Regulations issued July 2, 1940, pursuant to section 6 of the act of July 2, 1940, are applicable to the exportation of the articles and materials listed in paragraph 1 (1.) through (4.) inclusive.

4. Executive Order No. 8640 is hereby amended to include within its provisions the articles and materials named in my proclamation of February 4, 1941.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

The White House, February 4, 1941.

Executive Order No. 8669, Signed by President Roosevelt, February 4, 1941[43]

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 6 of the act of Congress approved July 2, 1940, entitled "An Act To expedite the strengthening of the national defense," I hereby prescribe the following additional regulations governing the exportation of:

---

[43] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, February 8, 1941 (vol. iv, No. 85), p. 158.

IRON AND STEEL

1. As used in Proclamation No. 2449 of December 10, 1940, issued pursuant to the provisions of section 6 of the act of Congress approved July 2, 1940, and in these regulations, the terms "iron" and "steel" shall be construed to include the following forms, conversions, and derivatives:

	B	F
Iron Ore:		
Iron ore	6001	6640*
Iron and Steel Semimanufactures:		
Pig Iron	6007	6209*
Iron and Steel Scrap:		
No. 1. Heavy melting steel scrap (Category 2)	6010. 2	6209*
No. 2. Heavy melting steel scrap (Category 3)	6010. 3	6209*
Hydraulically compressed and baled sheet scrap (Categories 7 & 8)	6010. 4	6209*
Cast and burnt iron scrap (Categories 1, 9, 10, 11, 12)	6010. 7	6209*
Other (Categories 4, 5, 6, 13) (Includes heavy shoveling steel, selected rail scrap, machine shop turnings, wire shorts, rerolling rails, rejects, etc.)	6010. 9	6209*
Tin-plate scrap (Includes Tin-plate clippings, cuttings, stampings, trimmings, skeleton sheets, and all other miscellaneous pieces of discarded tin plate, which result from the manufacture of tin plate, and of tin-bearing articles from tin plate) (Placed under export control, Executive Order, effective April 16, 1936)	6011	6209*
Tin-plate circles, strips, cobbles, and scroll-shear butts	6013	6209*
Waste-waste tin plate	6014	6209*
Terneplate waste-waste, clippings, and scrap	6015	6209*
Iron and Steel Products:		
Steel ingots, blooms, billets, slabs, sheet bars, and tinplate bars (Include ingot iron, and other iron made in steel-making furnaces):		
Not containing alloy [a,b]	6016	6029
Alloy steel, including stainless	6019	6029
Iron and Steel Bars and Rods (Include rounds, flats, squares, etc.):		
Steel Bars, cold finished	6020	6029
Iron Bars	6021	6029
Concrete reinforcement bars (Include deformed and twisted)	6022	6029

	B	F
Iron and Steel Bars and Rods (Include rounds, flats, squares, etc.)—Continued		
Other steel bars, including drill rods, merchant bars, tool steel bars, and drill steel:		
Not containing alloy	6023	6029
Stainless steel [a]	6025	6029
Alloy steel other than stainless [b]	6026	6029
Wire Rods	6029	6029
Iron and Steel Plates, Sheets, Skelp, and Strips (Include waste and waste-wasteplate, sheet and strip):		
Plates:		
Armor plate, other than that listed in the President's Proclamation of May 1, 1937		
Boiler plate	6030	6209*
Other plates, not fabricated (Include hot and cold rolled):		
Not containing alloy	6031. 1	6209*
Stainless steel [a]	6031. 5	6209*
Alloy steel other than stainless [b]	6031. 9	6209*
Skelp iron and steel (Consists of long strips used in the manufacture of pipes and tubes)	6032	6209*
Iron and Steel, Galvanized:		
Iron Sheets	6033	6209*
Steel Sheets	6034	6209*
Steel Sheets, Black, Ungalvanized (Include hot and cold rolled):		
Not containing alloy	6035. 1	6209*
Stainless steel [a]	6035. 5	6209*
Alloy steel, other than stainless [b]	6035. 9	6209*
Iron Sheets, Black (Include material under ⅛″ in thickness in 6033–6036)	6036	6209*
Strip, Hoop, Band, and Scroll Iron or Steel:		
Cold Rolled:		
Not containing alloy	6037. 1	6209*
Stainless steel [a]	6037. 5	6209*
Alloy steel, other than stainless [b]	6037. 9	6209*
Hot Rolled:		
Not containing alloy	6038. 1	6209*
Stainless steel [a]	6038. 5	6209*
Alloy steel, other than stainless [b]	6038. 9	6209*
Tin plate and Taggers' tin (Include waste tin plate)	6041	6209*
Terneplate (Includes waste terneplate)	6042	6209*
Steel Mill Manufactures:		
Structural iron and steel:		
Water, oil, gas, and other storage tanks complete, and knocked-down material for permanent or temporary installation	6043	6209*

	B	F
Steel Mill Manufactures—Continued		
Structural iron and steel—Continued		
Structural shapes, not fabricated (Include heavy, light, and bar-sized structural shapes)	6045	6209*
Fabricated structural iron or steel	6046	6209*
Plates, fabricated, punched, or shaped.	6047	6209*
Steel piling	6050	6209*
Railway-track materials:		
Rails:		
60 pounds and over per yard	6051	6209*
Less than 60 pounds per yard	6052	6209*
Relaying rails	6053	6209*
Rail joints, splice bars, fishplates, and tieplates	6054	6209*
Switches, frogs, crossings, and derails	6055	6209*
Railroad spikes (Include railroad screw spikes)	6058	6209*
Tubular products and fittings:		
Boiler Tubes:		
Seamless	6060	6209*
Welded	6061	6209*
Casing and oil-line pipe:		
Seamless	6062	6209*
Welded	6063	6209*
Seamless black pipe, other than casing and oil-line	6064	6209*
Cast-iron pressure pipe	6067*	6209*
Cast-iron soil pipe	6068*	6209*
Welded black pipe:		
Steel	6070	6209*
Wrought iron	6071	6209*
Welded Galvanized pipe:		
Steel	6072	6209*
Wrought iron	6073	6209*
Rigid electrical conduit of iron or steel	7094. 1	7099*
All other iron and steel pipe (Include riveted pipe and mechanical steel tubing)	6077	6209*
Wire and manufactures:		
Iron or steel wire, uncoated (Includes plain steel, stainless steel,[a] and alloy steel other than stainless)[b]	6081	6091*
Galvanized wire	6082	6091*
Barbed wire	6083	6091*
Woven-wire fencing	6085	6091*
Wire rope and wire strand:		
Wire rope and cable, not insulated	6087. 1	6091*
Wire strand	6087. 5	6091*
Electric welding rods and wire of iron or steel	6088	6091*
Welding rods and wire of iron or steel (other than electric)	6091*	6091*
Bale ties	6091*	6091*

	B	F
Wire and manufactures—Continued		
Electrical and telephone transmission wires of iron or steel, coated with aluminum, copper, or other metals	6091*	6091*
Insulated wire and cable having an iron or steel core	6091*	6091*
Twisted wire	6091*	6091*
Other coated wire of iron or steel (List galvanized under 6082)	6091*	6091*
Castings and forgings:		
Grey-iron castings (Include semi-steel castings)	6101	6209*
Malleable-iron castings	6102	6209*
Ingot molds	7452*	7485*
Steel-castings:		
Not containing alloy [a] [b]	6104. 1	6209*
Alloy steel, including stainless	6104. 9	6209*
Railway car wheels and axles (Exclude railway car tires, locomotive wheels, tires, and axles):		
Railway car wheels	6105. 1*	6209*
Railway car axles, without wheels	6105. 2	6209*
Railway car axles, fitted with wheels	6105. 3	6209*
Iron and steel forgings (Exclude steel grinding balls):		
Not containing alloy [a] [b]	6107	6209*
Alloy steel including stainless	6108	6209*
Advanced Manufactures:		
Fence posts	6209*	6209*
Metal drums and containers, filled or unfilled, for oil, gas, and other liquids	6205* 6122*	6209* 6209*
Tool bits or tool bit blanks	6209*	6209*
Ferro Alloys:		
Ferrochrome	6220. 5	6220*
Ferrocolumbium	6220. 9*	6220*
Ferromanganese and spiegeleisen	6213	6220*
Ferromolybdenum	6220. 9*	6220*
Ferrophosphorus	6220. 9*	6220*
Ferrosilicon	6220. 9*	6220*
Ferrotitanium and ferro-carbontitanium	6220. 9	6220*
Ferrotungsten	6220. 9	6220*
Ferrovanadium	6220. 9	6220*

[a] Stainless steel: All steel (other than tool steels) containing 9 percent or more of chromium, with or without other alloys, or a combined content of 18 percent or more of chromium and other alloys.

[b] Alloy steel other than stainless: Steel where the minimum of the range specified in any of the elements named exceeds the following percentage: nickel, over 0.40 percent; chromium, over 0.30 percent; copper, over 0.50 percent; manganese, over 1.65 percent; silicon, over 0.50 percent; molybdenum, over 0.10 percent; vanadium, tungsten, cobalt, titanium, and zirconium, any percent.

2. The numbers appearing in the columns designated B and F in paragraph 1 hereof refer to the numbers of Schedule B "Statistical Classification of Domestic Commodities Exported from the United

States", and Schedule F "Foreign Exports (Re-Exports)", respectively, issued by the United States Department of Commerce, both effective January 1, 1941. The words are controlling and the numbers are included solely for the purpose of statistical classification. An asterisk (*) indicates that the classification herein is not co-extensive with that in said Schedules B and F.

3. Paragraphs *d.*, *h.*, *l.*, *t.*, and *u.*, of regulation 1 of the regulations issued July 2, 1940, pursuant to the act of July 2, 1940, so far as they apply to ferro-alloys, are modified in accordance with the foregoing list of forms, conversions, and derivatives. Regulations 2 to 12, inclusive, of the regulations issued July 2, 1940, pursuant to the act of July 2, 1940, are applicable to the exportation of iron and steel.

4. The regulations herein prescribed shall be effective February 15, 1941, and shall supersede those in Executive Order No. 8607 of December 10, 1940.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

THE WHITE HOUSE, February 4, 1941.

Proclamation No. 2460, Signed by President Roosevelt, February 25, 1941 [44]

WHEREAS section 6 of the act of Congress entitled "AN ACT To expedite the strengthening of the national defense," approved July 2, 1940, provides as follows:

[Here follows the text of the act as quoted in proclamation No. 2413 of July 2, 1940, printed on page 211.]

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the aforesaid act of Congress, do hereby proclaim that upon the recommendation of the Administrator of Export Control I have determined that it is necessary in the interest of the national defense that on and after March 10, 1941, the following-described articles and materials shall not be exported from the United States except when authorized in each case by a license as provided for in Proclamation No. 2413 of July 2, 1940, entitled "Administration of section 6 of the Act entitled 'AN ACT To expedite the strengthening of the national defense' approved July 2, 1940":

(1) Belladonna
(2) Atropine
(3) Sole Leather
(4) Belting Leather

---

[44] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, March 1, 1941 (vol. IV, No. 88), p. 219.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the city of Washington this 25th day of February, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and forty-one, and [SEAL] of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and sixty-fifth.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

By the President:
CORDELL HULL
Secretary of State

Executive Order No. 8693, Signed by President Roosevelt, February 25, 1941 [45]

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 6 of the act of Congress approved July 2, 1940, entitled "AN ACT To expedite the strengthening of the national defense," I hereby prescribe the following additional regulations governing the exportation of the articles and materials designated in my proclamation of February 25, 1941:

1. The articles and materials designated in my proclamation of February 25, 1941, pursuant to section 6 of the act of July 2, 1940, shall be construed to include the following:

	B	F
(1.) Belladonna:		
Belladonna Leaves, U. S. P. (Belladonnae Folium):		
Belladonna Plaster, U. S. P. (Emplastrum Belladonnae)	2209*	2209*
Extract of Belladonna, U. S. P. (Extractum Belladonnae)	2209*	2209*
Fluid Extract of Belladonna Leaf, N. F. (Fluid extractum Belladonnae Folii) .	2209*	2209*
Tincture of Belladonna, U. S. P. (Tinctura Belladonnae)	2209*	2209*
Belladonna Ointment, U. S. P. (Unguentum Belladonna)	2209*	2209*
Belladonna Root, U. S. P. (Belladonnae Radix):		
Fluid Extract of Belladonna Root, U. S. P. (Fluid extractum Belladonnae Radicis)	2209*	2209*
Belladonna Liniment, N. F. (Linamentum Belladonnae)	2209*	2209*

---

[45] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, March 1, 1941 (vol. IV, No. 88), p. 220.

	B	F
(2.) Atropine:		
Atropine, U. S. P. alkaloid (atropine, atropia):		
Atropine Hydrobromide	8127.9*	8180*
Atropine Hydrochloride	8127.9*	8180*
Atropine Methylbromide	8127.9*	8180*
Atropine Methylnitrate	8127.9*	8180*
Atropine Nitrate	8127.9*	8180*
Atropine Salicylate	8127.9*	8180*
Atropine Sulfate, U. S. P. (Atropine Sulfae)	8127.9*	8180*
Atropine Sulfuric Acid	8127.9*	8180*
Atropine Valerate	8127.9*	8180*
(3.) Sole Leather. Bends, backs, and sides	0324	0328
(4.) Belting Leather	0330	0359*

2. The numbers appearing in the columns designated B and F in paragraph 1 hereof refer to the numbers in Schedule B "Statistical Classification of Domestic Commodities Exported from the United States," and Schedule F "Foreign Exports (Re-Exports)," respectively, issued by the United States Department of Commerce, both effective January 1, 1941. The words are controlling and the numbers are included solely for the purpose of statistical classification. An asterisk (*) indicates that the classification herein is not coextensive with that in said Schedules B and F.

3. Regulations 2 to 12 inclusive of the Regulations issued July 2, 1940, pursuant to section 6 of the act of July 2, 1940, are applicable to the exportation of the articles and materials listed in paragraph 1 (1.) through (4.) inclusive.

4. Executive Order No. 8640 is hereby amended to include within its provisions the articles and materials designated in my proclamation of February 25, 1941.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

THE WHITE HOUSE, February 25, 1941.

Proclamation No. 2461, Signed by President Roosevelt, February 25, 1941 [46]

WHEREAS section 6 of the act of Congress entitled "AN ACT To expedite the strengthening of the national defense," approved July 2, 1940, provides as follows:

[Here follows the text of the act as quoted in proclamation No. 2413 of July 2, 1940, printed on page 211.]

---

[46] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, March 1, 1941 (vol. IV, No. 88), p. 220.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the aforesaid act of Congress, do hereby proclaim that upon the recommendation of the Administrator of Export Control I have determined that it is necessary in the interest of the national defense that on and after this date the following-described articles and materials shall not be exported from the United States except when authorized in each case by a license as provided for in Proclamation No. 2413 of July 2, 1940, entitled "Administration of section 6 of the Act entitled 'AN ACT To expedite the strengthening of the national defense' approved July 2, 1940.":

(1) Beryllium
(2) Graphite electrodes
(3) Aircraft pilot trainers

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the city of Washington this 25th day of February, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and forty-one, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and sixty-fifth.

[SEAL]

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

By the President:
CORDELL HULL
Secretary of State

Executive Order No. 8694, Signed by President Roosevelt, February 25, 1941[47]

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 6 of the act of Congress approved July 2, 1940, entitled "AN ACT To expedite the strengthening of the national defense," I hereby prescribe the following additional regulations governing the exportation of the articles and materials designated in my proclamation of February 25, 1941:

1. The articles and materials designated in my proclamation of February 25, 1941, pursuant to section 6 of the act of July 2, 1940, shall be construed to include the following:

	B	F
(1.) Beryllium:		
Ores and concentrates (except gem varieties)	6245*	6640*
Metal, alloys and scrap	6249*	6640*
Beryllium salts and compounds	8399. 9*	8399*

---

[47] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, March 1, 1941 (vol. IV, No. 88), p. 221.

	B	F
(2.) Graphite electrodes	5473	5960*
(3.) Aircraft Pilot Trainers:	9190*	9190*
Trainers for ground instruction of pilots, student pilots, and combat crews for aircraft in instrument flying, navigation, bombing, or gunnery.		

2. The numbers appearing in the columns designated B and F in paragraph 1 hereof refer to the numbers in Schedule B "Statistical Classification of Domestic Commodities Exported from the United States," and Schedule F "Foreign Exports (Re-Exports)," respectively, issued by the United States Department of Commerce, both effective January 1, 1941. The words are controlling and the numbers are included solely for the purpose of statistical classification. An asterisk (*) indicates that the classification herein is not co-extensive with that in said Schedules B and F.

3. Regulations 2 to 12 inclusive of the Regulations issued July 2, 1940, pursuant to section 6 of the act of July 2, 1940, are applicable to the exportation of the articles and materials listed in paragraph 1 (1.) through (3.) inclusive.

4. Executive Order No. 8640 is hereby amended to include within its provisions the articles and materials designated in my proclamation of February 25, 1941.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

The White House, February 25, 1941.

Proclamation No. 2463, Signed by President Roosevelt, March 4, 1941[48]

Whereas section 6 of the act of Congress entitled "An Act To expedite the strengthening of the national defense," approved July 2, 1940, provides as follows:

[Here follows the text of the act as quoted in proclamation No. 2413 of July 2, 1940, printed on page 211.]

Now, therefore, I, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the aforesaid act of Congress, do hereby proclaim that upon the recommendation of the Administrator of Export Control I have determined that it is necessary in the interest of the national defense that on and after March 10, 1941, the following-described articles and materials shall not be exported from the United States except when authorized in each case by a license as provided for in Proclamation No. 2413 of July 2, 1940, entitled "Administration of section 6 of the Act entitled 'AN ACT To expedite the strengthening of the national defense' approved July 2, 1940":

---

[48] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, March 8, 1941 (vol. IV, No. 89), p. 243.

(1) Cadmium
(2) Carbon Black
(3) Coconut Oil
(4) Copra
(5) Cresylic Acid and Cresols
(6) Fatty Acids produced from vegetable oils under export control
(7) Glycerin
(8) Palm-Kernel Oil and Palm Kernels
(9) Pine Oil
(10) Petroleum Coke
(11) Shellac
(12) Titanium

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the city of Washington this 4th day of March, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and forty-one, and of the Independence of the United States of America, the one hundred and sixty-fifth.

[SEAL]

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

By the President:
CORDELL HULL
Secretary of State

Proclamation No. 2464, Signed by President Roosevelt, March 4, 1941 [49]

WHEREAS section 6 of the act of Congress entitled "AN ACT To expedite the strengthening of the national defense", approved July 2, 1940, provides as follows:

[Here follows the text of the act as quoted in proclamation No. 2413 of July 2, 1940, printed on page 211.]

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the aforesaid act of Congress, do hereby proclaim that upon the recommendation of the Administrator of Export Control I have determined that it is necessary in the interest of the national defense that on and after March 24, 1941, the following-described articles and materials shall not be exported from the United

---

[49] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, March 8, 1941 (vol. IV, No. 89), p. 244.

States except when authorized in each case by a license as provided for in Proclamation No. 2413 of July 2, 1940, entitled "Administration of section 6 of the Act entitled 'An Act To expedite the strengthening of the national defense' approved July 2, 1940":

(1) Jute
(2) Lead
(3) Borax
(4) Phosphates

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington this 4th day of March, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and forty-one, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and sixty-fifth.

[SEAL]

Franklin D. Roosevelt

By the President:
Cordell Hull
Secretary of State

Proclamation No. 2465, Signed by President Roosevelt, March 4, 1941 [50]

Whereas section 6 of the act of Congress entitled "An Act To expedite the strengthening of the national defense", approved July 2, 1940, provides as follows:

[Here follows the text of the act as quoted in proclamation No. 2413 of July 2, 1940, printed on page 211.]

Now, therefore, I, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the aforesaid act of Congress, do hereby proclaim that upon the recommendation of the Administrator of Export Control I have determined that it is necessary in the interest of the national defense that on and after April 15, 1941, the following-described articles and materials shall not be exported from the United States except when authorized in each case by a license as hereinafter provided:

Any model, design, photograph, photographic negative, document, or other article or material, containing a plan, specification, or descriptive or technical information of any kind (other than that appearing generally in a form available to the public) which can be used or adapted for use in connection with any process, synthesis, or operation in the production, manufacture, or reconstruction of any of the articles or materials the exportation of which is prohibited or curtailed in accordance with the provisions of section 6 of the act of Congress approved July 2, 1940, or of any basic or intermediary constituent of any such articles or materials.

---

[50] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, March 8, 1941 (vol. iv, No. 89), p. 245.

AND I do hereby empower the Administrator of Export Control to issue licenses authorizing the exportation of any of the above-named articles and materials in accordance with rules and regulations prescribed by the President.

Proclamation No. 2423, of September 12, 1940, is hereby superseded except so far as and to the extent that it relates to (1) equipment (excluding minor component parts) which can be used, or adapted to use, for the production of aviation motor fuel (as is defined in the regulations issued pursuant to Proclamation No. 2417, of July 26, 1940, as may from time to time be amended) from petroleum, petroleum products, hydrocarbon, or hydrocarbon mixtures, by processes involving chemical change; and (2) equipment (excluding minor component parts) which can be used, or adapted to use, for the production of tetraethyl lead (as is defined in the regulations issued pursuant to Proclamation No. 2417, of July 26, 1940, as may from time to time be amended).

Proclamation No. 2451, of December 20, 1940, is hereby superseded so far as and to the extent that it relates to plans for the production of aviation lubricating oil.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the city of Washington this 4th day of March, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and forty-one, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and sixty-fifth.

[SEAL]

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

By the President:
CORDELL HULL
Secretary of State

Executive Order No. 8702, Signed by President Roosevelt, March 4, 1941 [51]

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 6 of the act of Congress approved July 2, 1940, entitled "AN ACT To expedite the strengthening of the national defense", I hereby prescribe the following additional regulations governing the exportation of the articles and materials named in my proclamation of March 4, 1941:

1. The articles and materials named in the said proclamation shall be construed to include the following:

---

[51] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, March 8, 1941 (vol. IV, No. 89), p. 246.

	B	F
(1) Cadmium		
Ores and concentrates	6245*	6640*
Metal	6249*	6640*
Alloys	6249*	6640*
Cadmium Salts and Compounds:		
Cadmium chloride	8399. 9*	8399*
Cadmium oxide	8399. 9*	8399*
Cadmium sulfate	8399. 9*	8399*
Cadmium plating salts	8399. 9*	8399*
Cadmium sulfide	8429*	8442*
Cadmium lithopone	8429*	8442*
(2) Carbon Black:		
Carbon black, including gas black	8423*	8442*
(3) Coconut Oil:		
Edible	1420	1449*
Inedible	2230	2230
(4) Copra	2220*	2211
(5) Cresylic Acid and Cresols	8024*	8069*
(6) Fatty Acids produced from vegetable oils under export control	2248*	2662*
(7) Glycerin	8314	8399*
(8) Palm-Kernel Oil and Palm Kernels:		
Palm-Kernel Oil:		
Edible	1449*	1449*
Inedible	2249*	2243*
Palm Kernels	2220*	2220*
(9) Pine Oil	2117	2189*
(10) Petroleum Coke	5048	5048*
(11) Shellac:		
Lac, crude, seed, button, and stick	2189*	2108*
Unbleached shellac	2189*	2108*
Bleached shellac	2185	2108
(12) Titanium:		
Ores and concentrates:		
Ilmenite	6245*	6640*
Rutile	6245*	6640*
Metal	6249*	6640*
Alloys	6249*	6640*
Titanium Salts and Compounds:		
Titanium dioxide	8428	8442*
Titanium tetrachloride	8399. 9*	8399*

2. The numbers appearing in the columns designated B and F in paragraph 1 hereof refer to the numbers in Schedule B "Statistical Classification of Domestic Commodities Exported from the United States", and Schedule F "Foreign Exports (Re-Exports)", respectively, issued by the United States Department of Commerce, both effective January 1, 1941. The words are controlling and the numbers are included solely for the purpose of statistical classification. An asterisk (*) indicates that the classification herein is not co-extensive with that in said Schedules B and F.

3. Regulations 2 to 12 inclusive of the regulations issued July 2, 1940, pursuant to section 6 of the act of July 2, 1940, are applicable to the exportation of the articles and materials listed in paragraph 1 (1)–(12).

4. Executive Order No. 8640 is hereby amended to include within its provisions the articles and materials named in my proclamation of March 4, 1941.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

THE WHITE HOUSE, March 4, 1941.

Executive Order No. 8703, Signed by President Roosevelt, March 4, 1941 [52]

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 6 of the act of Congress approved July 2, 1940, entitled "AN ACT To expedite the strengthening of the national defense", I hereby prescribe the following additional regulations governing the exportation of the articles and materials named in my proclamation of March 4, 1941:

1. The articles and materials named in the said proclamation shall be construed to include the following:

	B	F
(1) Jute:		
Fiber	3499*	3409*
Burlaps, except when used as a covering for other merchandise or as a component part of other products	3229*	3220
Bags, except when used as a container for other merchandise	3224	3224
(2) Lead:		
Ore and matte	6640*	6640*
Pigs and bars	6507	6515*
Sheets and pipes	6508	6515*
Solder	6512	6515*
(3) Borax:		
Boric acid	8308	8309*
Borates, crude and refined	8362	8379*
(4) Phosphates:		
Phosphoric acid	8309*	8309. 9*
Phosphorus (elemental)	8399. 9*	8399*
Phosphate rock containing 20% or more phosphorus pentoxide (P_2O_5) equivalent	8513* 8514*	8551*
Superphosphate containing 40% or more phosphorus pentoxide (P_2O_5) equivalent	8519*	8551*

2. The numbers appearing in the columns designated B and F in paragraph 1 hereof refer to the numbers in Schedule B "Statistical

---

[52] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, March 8, 1941 (vol. IV, No. 89), p. 247.

Classification of Domestic Commodities Exported from the United States", and Schedule F "Foreign Exports (Re-Exports)", respectively, issued by the United States Department of Commerce, both effective January 1, 1941. The words are controlling and the numbers are included solely for the purpose of statistical classification. An asterisk (*) indicates that the classification herein is not co-extensive with that in said Schedules B and F.

3. Regulations 2 to 12 inclusive of the regulations issued July 2, 1940, pursuant to section 6 of the act of July 2, 1940, are applicable to the exportation of the articles and materials listed in paragraph 1 (1)–(4).

4. Executive Order No. 8640 is hereby amended to include within its provisions the articles and materials named in my proclamation of March 4, 1941.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

THE WHITE HOUSE, March 4, 1941.

Proclamation No. 2468, Signed by President Roosevelt, March 27, 1941 [53]

WHEREAS section 6 of the act of Congress entitled "AN ACT To expedite the strengthening of the national defense", approved July 2, 1940, provides as follows:

[Here follows the text of the act as quoted in proclamation No. 2413 of July 2, 1940, printed on page 211.]

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the aforesaid act of Congress, do hereby proclaim that upon the recommendation of the Administrator of Export Control I have determined that it is necessary in the interest of the national defense that on and after April 15, 1941, the following-described articles and materials shall not be exported from the United States except when authorized in each case by a license as provided for in Proclamation 2413 of July 2, 1940, entitled "Administration of section 6 of the act entitled 'AN ACT To expedite the strengthening of the national defense' approved July 2, 1940":

1. Animal, fish and marine mammal oils, fats and greases, edible and inedible.
2. Vegetable oils and fats, edible and inedible.
3. Vegetable oilseeds, and vegetable and other oil-bearing raw materials.
4. Fatty acids.
5. Bristles.

---

[53] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, March 29, 1941 (vol. IV, No. 92), p. 378.

6. Nux vomica.
7. Nylon.
8. Kapok.
9. Purified wood pulp containing 80% or more alphacellulose.
10. Cork.
11. Carbon electrodes.
12. Petrolatum.
13. Alkyd resins.
14. Explosives, in addition to those listed in Proclamation 2237 of May 1, 1937.
15. Detonators and blasting caps.
16. Napthalene.
17. Phenol.
18. Aniline.
19. Phthalic anhydride.
20. Dibutyl phthalate.
21. Diethyl phthalate.
22. Dipropylphthalate.
23. Omega Chloroacetophenone.
24. Styrene.
25. Nitroderivatives of benzene, toluene, xylene, naphthalene, and phenols in addition to those specified in the proclamation of May 1, 1937.
26. Strychnine and salts thereof.
27. Polymers and copolymers of butadiene, acrylonitrile, butylene, chloroprene, styrene, vinylidene, chloride, and synthetic rubber-like compounds, fabricated or unfabricated.
28. Chloropicrin.
29. Tartaric acid.
30. Rochelle salts.
31. Cuprous oxide.
32. Acetic aldehyde.
33. Pentaerythrite.
34. Formaldehyde.
35. Nitroguanidine.
36. Guanidine nitrate.
37. Dicyanodiamide.
38. Monochloroacetic acid.
39. Chloroacetyl chloride.
40. Thiodiglycol.
41. Ethylene chlorhydrine.
42. Hexamethylene tetramine.
43. Acrylonitrile.
44. Butadiene.
45. Butylene.
46. Chloroprene.
47. Sodium chlorate.
48. Sulphur chlorides.
49. Arsenic trichloride.
50. Vinylidene chloride.
51. Iodine.

Item (6) of Proclamation 2463 of March 4, 1941, is superseded by item 4 of this proclamation.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the city of Washington this 27th day of March, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and forty-one, [SEAL] and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and sixty-fifth.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

By the President:
SUMNER WELLES
Acting Secretary of State

Proclamation No. 2475, Signed by President Roosevelt, April 14, 1941 [54]

WHEREAS section 6 of the act of Congress entitled "AN ACT To expedite the strengthening of the national defense", approved July 2, 1940, provides as follows:

[Here follows the text of the act as quoted in proclamation No. 2413 of July 2, 1940, printed on page 211.]

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the aforesaid act of Congress, do hereby proclaim that upon the recommendation of the Administrator of Export Control I have determined that it is necessary in the interest of the national defense that on and after April 15, 1941, the following-described articles and materials shall not be exported from the United States except when authorized in each case by a license as provided for in Proclamation 2413 of July 2, 1940, entitled "Administration of section 6 of the Act entitled 'AN ACT To expedite the strengthening of the national defense' approved July 2, 1940":

MACHINERY

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington this 14'' day of April, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and forty-one, and [SEAL] of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and sixty-fifth.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

By the President:
CORDELL HULL
Secretary of State

---

[54] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, April 19, 1941 (vol. IV, No. 95), p. 475.

Proclamation No. 2476, Signed by President Roosevelt, April 14, 1941[55]

WHEREAS section 6 of the act of Congress entitled "AN ACT To expedite the strengthening of the national defense," approved July 2, 1940, provides as follows:

[Here follows the text of the act as quoted in proclamation No. 2413 of July 2, 1940, printed on page 211.]

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the aforesaid act of Congress, do hereby proclaim that upon the recommendation of the Administrator of Export Control I have determined that it is necessary in the interest of the national defense that on and after May 6, 1941, the following-described articles and materials shall not be exported from the United States except when authorized in each case by a license as provided for in Proclamation 2413 of July 2, 1940, entitled "Administration of section 6 of the Act entitled 'AN ACT To expedite the strengthening of the national defense' approved July 2, 1940":

(1) Vegetable fibers and manufactures
(2) Theobromine
(3) Caffein
(4) Sodium cyanide
(5) Calcium cyanide
(6) Casein

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington this 14" day of April, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and forty-one, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and sixty-fifth.

[SEAL]

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

By the President:
CORDELL HULL
Secretary of State

Press Release Issued by the Department of State on May 28, 1941[56]

Control of the export of strategic and critical articles and materials needed in the national-defense program was extended May 28, by proclamation of President Roosevelt, to the Philippine Islands, as the President signed a joint resolution of Congress authorizing such extension.

---

[55] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, April 19, 1941 (vol. IV, No. 95), p. 475.

[56] Reprinted from *ibid.*, May 31, 1941 (vol. IV, No. 101), p. 657.

Export control was established originally within the United States under the provisions of section 6 of the act of July 2, 1940. It now provides a control over every exit for goods and materials from the United States and insures that all articles and materials needed in the expanding defense program will be held available.

Licenses will be issued in the Philippine Islands by the High Commissioner acting on behalf of the Secretary of State.

Since there is no District Court of the United States in the Philippine Islands, jurisdiction of offenses committed in the Philippine Islands in violation of the Export Control Act has been conferred on the Philippine Courts.

The text of the proclamation follows:

[The proclamation is printed *infra.*]

Proclamation No. 2488, Signed by President Roosevelt, May 28, 1941 [57]

WHEREAS section 6 of the act of Congress entitled "AN ACT To expedite the strengthening of the national defense," approved July 2, 1940, provides as follows:

[Here follows the text of the act as quoted in proclamation No. 2413 of July 2, 1940, printed on page 211.]

AND WHEREAS the joint resolution of Congress approved May 28, 1941 provides as follows:

> "That the provisions of section 6 of the Act of Congress entitled 'An Act to expedite the strengthening of the national defense', approved July 2, 1940 (54 Stat. 714), shall be applicable to all Territories, dependencies, and possessions of the United States, including the Philippine Islands, the Canal Zone, and the District of Columbia, and the several courts of first instance of the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands shall have jurisdiction of offenses committed in the Philippine Islands in violation of the provisions of that section or of any proclamation or of any rule or any regulation, issued thereunder."

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the said act of Congress and the said joint resolution, do hereby proclaim that upon the recommendation of the Administrator of Export Control I have determined that it is necessary in the interests of the national defense that on and after this date the articles and materials described in the proclamations heretofore issued pursuant to the said section 6 shall not be exported from the Territories, dependencies, and possessions of the United States, including the Philippine Islands, the Canal Zone, and the District of Columbia, except when authorized in each case by license. For all Territories, dependencies, and possessions of the United States, including the Philippine Islands, the Canal Zone, and the District of Columbia, licenses shall be issued in accordance with Proclamations 2413 of July 2, 1940 and 2465 of March 4, 1941, and the rules and regulations prescribed by Executive Orders 8712 and 8713 of March 15, 1941, as they may be from time to time amended.

---

[57] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, May 31, 1941 (vol. IV, No. 101), p. 657.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the city of Washington this 28th day of May, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and forty-one, and of [SEAL] the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and sixty-fifth.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

By the President:
CORDELL HULL
Secretary of State

894.85/642

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] July 18, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador called to see me this evening at his request. The Ambassador asked if I would lend my good offices in helping to solve a situation which had been created owing to the fact that three Japanese steamers had been held up at Cristobal on the Atlantic side of the Panama Canal and that some six other Japanese steamers were now headed for the Canal for the purpose of transiting. The Ambassador said that these steamers could not transit, although he had word from Japanese shipping sources that ships of other nationalities were being permitted to transit.

I said to the Ambassador that I would be glad to investigate and if I had any information which would be useful to him, I would be glad to have it transmitted. I said that it was my understanding that about July 11 the Canal authorities had issued an order notifying shipping that repairs had to be undertaken in the Canal and that for that reason merchant shipping which desired to transit the Canal would have to be prohibited or severely restricted for an indefinite period. The Ambassador inquired with regard to the report he had concerning the fact that other flagships were being enabled to come through. I said that if this were in fact the case, I assumed that they must be merchant ships carrying material required for the United States defense program and I said I was of course sure the Ambassador would agree that it was entirely logical to suppose that if any exceptions were made, ships carrying cargoes urgently required for our defense program would be granted preference.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

Excerpt From Radio Bulletin No. 176, Issued by the White House on July 25, 1941

Volunteer Participation Committee. President Roosevelt yesterday received at the White House the Volunteer Participation Committee made up of representatives from all parts of the country who have volunteered for civilian defense activities. Speaking informally to this group President Roosevelt said in part:

"There are lots of things that people don't quite understand. You are an information bureau to all of them. And I will give you the example.

"Here on the East Coast, you have been reading that the Secretary of the Interior, as Oil Administrator, is faced with the problem of not enough gasoline to go around in the East Coast, and how he is asking everybody to curtail their consumption of gasoline. All right. Now, I am—I might be called an American citizen, living in Hyde Park, N. Y. And I say, 'That's a funny thing. Why am I asked to curtail my consumption of gasoline when I read in the papers that thousands of tons of gasoline are going out from Los Angeles—West Coast—to Japan; and we are helping Japan in what looks like an act of aggression?'

"All right. Now the answer is a very simple one. There is a world war going on, and has been for some time—nearly two years. One of our efforts, from the very beginning, was to prevent the spread of that world war in certain areas where it hadn't started. One of those areas is a place called the Pacific Ocean—one of the largest areas of the earth. There happened to be a place in the South Pacific where we had to get a lot of things—rubber—tin—and so forth and so on—down in the Dutch Indies, the Straits Settlements, and Indochina. And we had to help get the Australian surplus of meat and wheat, and corn, for England.

"It was very essential from our own selfish point of view of defense to prevent a war from starting in the South Pacific. So our foreign policy was—trying to stop a war from breaking out down there. At the same time, from the point of view of even France at that time—of course France still had her head above water—we wanted to keep that line of supplies from Australia and New Zealand going to the Near East—all their troops, all their supplies that they have maintained in Syria, North Africa and Palestine. So it was essential for Great Britain that we try to keep the peace down there in the South Pacific.

"All right. And now here is a nation called Japan. Whether they had at that time aggressive purposes to enlarge their empire southward, they didn't have any oil of their own up in the north. Now, if we cut the oil off, they probably would have gone down to the Dutch East Indies a year ago, and you would have had war.

"Therefore, there was—you might call—a method in letting this oil go to Japan, with the hope—and it has worked for two years—of keeping war out of the South Pacific for our own good, for the good of the defense of Great Britain, and the freedom of the seas.

"You people can help to enlighten the average citizen who wouldn't hear of that, or doesn't read the papers carefully, or listen to the radio carefully—to understand what some of these apparent anomalies mean. So, on the information end, I think you have got just as great a task as you have in the actual organization work.

"Now on this organization—to come back to that for a minute—it is amazing the number of letters I get here in the White House—and my wife in the White House—from men and women in literally every County in the United States—who are pleading to be told what they can do to help. They honestly are ready to work.

"So my message to you is: Act as starters of this 'horse race'."

711.94/2213

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton)

[WASHINGTON,] July 25, 1941.

Mr. Wakasugi, the Japanese Minister, called at his request. After taking up what he described as two matters of official business, Mr. Wakasugi said that he wished to speak to me personally in regard to the present state of relations between the United States and Japan. He said that we had known each other for a number of years and that he therefore felt that he could speak frankly. He mentioned the fact that he had been in this country a good many years and he indicated that he was very much disturbed at the present trend of relations between our two countries. He asked whether there was any comment I could make as to how the present trend might be arrested and relations be improved.

I then commented at some length in regard to developments in relations between the United States and Japan, emphasizing the fact that the American people and the American Government had been very patient, that the Government had been subjected to severe criticism from the American people because it had not taken certain steps, that no one had worked harder for or had more on his heart the maintenance of friendly relations with Japan than the Secretary of State, that Japan had nothing to fear from any other country, that if Japan followed a peaceful course it would not encounter trouble with the United States or any other country, and that the question of maintaining and developing friendly relations between two countries was of course a two-way proposition.

Mr. Wakasugi then came to what I regard as the purpose of his approach. He said that he had noted in the papers this morning that a number of Japanese vessels were staying out at sea and were not coming into American ports. He said that he imagined that someone had created a fear in the minds of the steamship companies that the ships might be detained or seized by this Government. He continued that if this Government could give assurances that the ships would not be detained or seized, of course the ships could then come in. He asked whether I could give him such assurances. I replied that I could not; that all I knew about the matter was that I had seen reports in the late papers last evening and again in the papers this morning to the effect that these Japanese ships were standing out at sea; that the idea that it might be advisable for these ships to stay out at sea must have originated from some Japanese source; and that certainly this Government had not asked the Japanese ships to stay out at sea. I repeated, in reply to Mr. Wakasugi's further query, that of course I was not in position to give assurances in as much as all I knew about the matter was what I had read in the papers.

M[AXWELL] M. H[AMILTON]

Press Release Issued at Poughkeepsie, New York, by the White House on July 25, 1941

In view of the unlimited national emergency declared by the President, he has today issued an Executive Order [58] freezing Japanese assets in the United States in the same manner in which assets of various European countries were frozen on June 14, 1941.[58a] This measure, in effect, brings all financial and import and export trade transactions in which Japanese interests are involved under the control of the Government, and imposes criminal penalties for violation of the Order.

---

[58] Executive Order No. 8832, signed July 26, 1941, *infra.*

[58a] Department of State, *Bulletin*, June 14, 1941 (vol. IV, No. 103), p. 718.

This Executive Order, just as the Order of June 14, 1941, is designed among other things to prevent the use of the financial facilities of the United States and trade between Japan and the United States, in ways harmful to national defense and American interests, to prevent the liquidation in the United States of assets obtained by duress or conquest, and to curb subversive activities in the United States.

At the specific request of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and for the purpose of helping the Chinese government, the President has, at the same time, extended the freezing control to Chinese assets in the United States. The Administration of the licensing system with respect to Chinese assets will be conducted with a view to strengthening the foreign trade and exchange position of the Chinese government. The inclusion of China in the Executive Order, in accordance with the wishes of the Chinese government, is a continuation of this Government's policy of assisting China.

Executive Order No. 8832, Signed by President Roosevelt, July 26, 1941 [59]

By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 5 (*b*) of the Act of October 6, 1917 (40 Stat. 415), as amended, and by virtue of all other authority vested in me, I, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, President of the United States of America, do hereby amend Executive Order No. 8389 of April 10, 1940, as amended,[60] by changing the period at the end of subdivision (*j*) of Section 3 of such Order to a semi-colon and adding the following new subdivision thereafter:

> (*k*) June 14, 1941—
> China, and
> Japan.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

THE WHITE HOUSE, July 26, 1941.

611.94231/46b : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (*Grew*)

WASHINGTON, July 29, 1941—10 p. m.

440. On July 28 the Japanese Ambassador called at his request. He said with reference to the freezing order of this Government

---

[59] Reprinted from *Federal Register*, July 29, 1941 (vol. 6, No. 146), p. 3715.
[60] 6 F. R. 2897.

that the question of how Japanese vessels in American waters would be affected was giving his Government great uneasiness and he therefore desired any information I could give him. I told the Japanese Ambassador that under present conditions and for the time being prompt clearance would be granted by the Treasury Department to any Japanese vessels in American ports which wished to clear. In reply to a further inquiry I told the Ambassador that while purchase by those vessels of food supplies and fuel would require specific licenses from the Treasury Department, licenses would be granted for such transactions for the time being and under present conditions in order to enable those ships to clear from ports in this country. The Ambassador expressed satisfaction with my replies.

WELLES

611.94231/57

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton)

[WASHINGTON,] July 29, 1941.

Mr. Iguchi, Counselor of the Japanese Embassy, called this afternoon at his request. He said that the Japanese Ambassador had instructed him to call and make inquiries in regard to questions relating to the cargo on board the Japanese vessel, *Tatuta Maru*. Mr. Iguchi said that when the Japanese Ambassador had seen Mr. Welles yesterday the Ambassador had not raised the question of cargoes aboard Japanese vessels. Mr. Iguchi said that it had now developed that according to U. S. Customs regulations, a clearance permit for a ship would not be issued unless the cargo destined for the port in question should have been discharged. Mr. Iguchi said that this represented the usual American procedure. He said that in this connection he wished, under instruction from the Ambassador, to raise the question whether it would be possible to alter this procedure and permit clearance of the vessel without discharge of cargo or, if this should not be possible, what would happen to the cargo. He asked whether the cargo would be frozen. Mr. Iguchi said that the Ambassador desired that we be so good as to find out the answers to the questions which Mr. Iguchi had asked.

M[AXWELL] M. H[AMILTON]

611.94231/56

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] July 30, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador called to see me this morning at my request. The Ambassador said that he would like to know what decisions this Government might have reached with regard to the cargoes which were on the ships waiting to enter American ports, and whether these cargoes would be "frozen", I said that I had nothing further that I could say to the Ambassador with regard to these ships other than what I had already stated to him, and that with regard to the question of the cargoes specific and individual licenses would have to be applied for to the Treasury Department, which would reach a decision in each case in accordance with the policy of this Government and upon the merits of the individual application.

The Ambassador then said that the reason why he had always had such great admiration for the United States was because he believed that in our dealings with other countries we pursued a policy which was "fair and square". He said that while he recognized the question was one solely for our own determination he had nevertheless hoped that greater "leniency" would be shown with regard to the cargoes on these ships. To this I replied that I appreciated what the Ambassador said concerning the policy of my Government and that I believed that the Ambassador's remarks to the effect that American policy was "fair and square" were entirely accurate. I said I felt that in the specific instance to which he referred our policy had been entirely in line with our traditional policy in that regard. I said further that I wondered if the Ambassador felt that the policy of Japan towards American interests in the Far East during the past four years had been equally "fair and square". Somewhat to my surprise the Ambassador burst into a loud laugh and said, "You have me there". He said that he feared that Japanese policy had not been one to which that phrase could be properly applied.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

611.94231/44

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton)

[WASHINGTON,] July 30, 1941.

I telephoned Mr. Iguchi of the Japanese Embassy and, referring to his call yesterday and the questions he then raised in regard to cargo aboard the *Tatuta Maru*, told him I wished, under instruction, to supplement information communicated by Mr. Welles to the Ambassador this morning when the Ambassador raised the question of the treatment of cargo on board Japanese vessels. I referred to the fact that Mr. Welles had informed the Ambassador that no assurances could be given in regard to whether funds would be released or would not be released to cover any cargo landed from such ships and that applications for licenses would be given appropriate consideration if and as they were individually presented. I said that we understood that the Treasury Department was making arrangements whereby Japanese ships, if they did not wish to discharge their cargo, would be granted clearances and permitted to sail with cargo aboard. I told Mr. Iguchi that I understood that the Treasury Department was communicating information to the foregoing effect to the agents or owners of the Japanese steamship companies in this country.

Mr. Iguchi thanked me for communicating the foregoing information to him and said that he would bring it to the attention of the Ambassador.

Later, following conference with Mr. Acheson[61] and conference by Mr. Acheson with Mr. Foley of the Treasury Department, I telephoned Mr. Iguchi and told him that I wished to give him further information on two points: I said that the first point was that the provision to the effect that Japanese ships could, if they desired, enter American ports and leave without discharging cargoes applies only to Japanese ships coming in before next Saturday (August 2), midnight. I explained that ships coming in before that date and desiring to leave without discharging cargoes would be given a reasonable time to leave. I said that the second point was that if a Japanese ship's manifest showed that cargo aboard the ship was destined to an American port and the ship did not wish to discharge that cargo upon arrival at an American port, the ship should correct the manifest at sea to show that no cargo was destined for discharge at an American port. I told Mr. Iguchi also that if the Japanese Embassy wished further particulars on and clarification of these matters, an officer of the Embassy might care to get in touch with the Commissioner of Customs at the Treasury Department.

I went over the foregoing twice with Mr. Iguchi and he said that he understood.

M[AXWELL] M. H[AMILTON]

311.9454 Tatuta Maru/6

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] July 31, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador called to see me this evening.

I explained to the Ambassador the reasons why Mr. Acheson and officials of the Treasury and Justice Departments had requested Mr.

---

[61] Dean Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State.

Iguchi of the Japanese Embassy to call upon them yesterday afternoon in connection with the libel actions brought by private individuals in the United States against the Japanese steamer now in San Francisco. I explained that these actions were brought by private individuals and that the statements I had officially made to the Ambassador regarding the willingness of this Government to grant prompt clearance to the vessel were in no wise modified. I stated that I thought it extremely important that the Japanese Embassy consult competent counsel in order to take the measures which might be necessary to expedite action concerning these libel actions and that the appropriate officials of this Government, either in Washington or in San Francisco, would be glad to be helpful to the Japanese Embassy and the Japanese Consulate General regarding this question. The Ambassador expressed his appreciation for what I said.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

611.94231/63

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)

[WASHINGTON,] August 1, 1941.

Mr. Iguchi called at his request. He told me that the *Tatuta Maru* would require some cargo to ballast her for the return trip to Japan. I said that I had already been in touch with counsel for the N. Y. K.[62] on this matter and that it would be promptly taken care of within the limits of the export restrictions. He expressed his appreciation.

(At a meeting of the Office of the Administrator of Export Control, Treasury, and State Department officials held in this office Saturday afternoon licenses were granted for the cargo requested, with the exception that lubricating oil requested was restricted within the specifications announced by General Maxwell on Saturday. The cargo chiefly consisted of asphalt and a small quantity of cocoa beans and cotton.)

Mr. Iguchi asked whether the time limit referred to by Mr. Hamilton within which ships might come in with cargo and leave with the same cargo implied that after midnight Saturday Japanese ships would be detained. I said that it did not. I explained that the time limit referred solely to the agreement that ships outside American ports with cargo might come in with the cargo and leave with it without hindrance from the Treasury. I pointed out that this assurance, as a practical matter, was no longer important because of the action of private parties in filing libel suits.

---

[62] Nippon Yusen Kaisha, Japanese steamship company.

I stated to Mr. Iguchi, as I had been instructed to do by the Acting Secretary, that under present conditions this Government had no intention of interfering with Japanese ships; that such ships might come in, might discharge cargo consigned to American ports, would be granted sufficient supplies and fuel for the return voyage and would be given clearance and departure permits. I cautioned him again that on account of libels filed against cargoes it was not possible to give any assurance regarding the cargoes. I also pointed out that the assurance of freedom of departure was predicated on the continuance of existing conditions. He said that he earnestly hoped that there would be no change in these conditions for the worse.

D[EAN] A[CHESON]

894.85/656a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[Substance]

WASHINGTON, October 28, 1941—11 p. m.

694. With reference to your recent telegrams on the subject of requisition orders of the Japanese liners *Tatuta Maru*, *Kikawa Maru*, and *Taiyo Maru:*

A third-person note was sent by the Japanese Ambassador on October 16 to the Department[64] concerning the official status of these ships and requesting on behalf of the Japanese Government the grant to the three vessels of immunity while in ports and waters of the United States and its territories from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States, its states, and its territories. The note enclosed translations of the requisition orders of these ships by the Japanese Ministry of Communications (which you mentioned in one of your telegrams).

A copy of the note was sent by the Secretary of State on October 17 to the Attorney General who was informed that the statements in the note from the Japanese Ambassador were accepted by the Department as true and the Japanese Government's claim of immunity was allowed. The Secretary at the same time requested that the appropriate courts in the ports which the vessels would visit should be advised of this matter and that all proper steps be taken toward recognition by those courts of the immunity of these three Japanese ships.

All the documents mentioned in your telegrams should be sent by mail to the Department for the completion of its record.

HULL

---

[64] Not printed.

311.9454 Tatuta Maru/9

The Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (*Nomura*)

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Japanese Ambassador and has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of his communication No. 330 of December 3, 1941 [65] regarding the proposed visits to United States ports of the steamship *Tatuta Maru*, which has been requisitioned by the Japanese Government.

The Secretary of State has informed the Attorney General that he accepts as true the statements contained in the Ambassador's communication and recognizes and allows the claim of immunity made by the Japanese Government. The Secretary of State has requested the Attorney General to bring the matter to the attention of the appropriate courts having jurisdiction in the ports of this country and of the Panama Canal Zone to be visited by the vessel and to take such steps as may be necessary to the end that its immunity may be recognized by the courts.

WASHINGTON, December 5, 1941.

---

[65] Not printed.

EXTENSION OF JAPANESE PENETRATION INTO SOUTHERN ASIA AND SOUTH PACIFIC TERRITORIES

EXTENSION OF JAPANESE PENETRATION INTO SOUTHERN ASIA AND SOUTH PACIFIC TERRITORIES

851G.014/17

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton)

[WASHINGTON,] March 31, 1939.

Mr. Suma, Counselor of the Japanese Embassy, called at his request. He said that the Japanese Ambassador was absent in Havana where he was presenting his credentials as Japanese Minister to Cuba and that, the Ambassador being away, he had called to communicate on behalf of the Ambassador and under instruction from his Government certain information in regard to the Sinnan Islands. Mr. Suma thereupon handed me the attached paper[1] in which there is described the location of the Sinnan Islands, the Japanese Government's claim in regard to the Islands, action taken by the French Government in reference to the Islands, and the action of the Japanese Government in incorporating the Islands in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Government-General of Formosa as of March 30, 1939. Mr. Suma also handed me the attached map[2] with the statement that the Japanese Embassy here had marked on the map in a red broken line a rough approximation of the area comprising the Islands. I remarked that the Sinnan Island group appeared to be very near to the Philippine Islands. I asked Mr. Suma whether he had ever been to the Islands, to which he replied in the negative. I asked him to what use the Islands could be put and he replied that they were useful chiefly by reason of their phosphate deposits.

Mr. Suma said that in reference to islands which had previously been "no State's land" international law provided that a government desiring to acquire such land must have made known its intentions in the matter and must also have set up certain establishments on the islands. He said that the French Government had set up no establishments on the Islands.

At that moment there came to my desk the ticker report from Tokyo in which it was stated that the Japanese Foreign Office had announced today that it had advised France that Japan was annexing the Spratly Island group off the southeast coast of French Indochina. I read the news report aloud to Mr. Suma. I said that there seemed to be an important difference between the information contained in the news report and the information which Mr. Suma had just communicated, namely, that the news report referred to the Spratly Island group. I asked whether "Spratly" was another name for "Sinnan". Mr. Suma replied in the negative. He said that the Sinnan Islands comprised a much larger area than Spratly Island.

---

[1] *Infra.*
[2] Not printed.

I said that I understood that Mr. Suma was communicating the information set forth in the attached paper informally and for the information of the Department. He replied in the affirmative and said that his Government was doing this in view of the fact that it had as of yesterday incorporated the Sinnan Islands in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Government-General of Formosa.

I said that we would study the information communicated by Mr. Suma; and that I would bring it to the attention of higher officers of the Department.

Mr. Suma said that if there should be any further data which we would like to have he would be glad, upon request, to endeavor to obtain it.

M[axwell] M. H[amilton]

851G.014/17

The Japanese Embassy to the Department of State[8]

1. The Sinnan Islands, situated in the South China Sea between French Indo-China and the Island of Palawan of the Philippine Islands, comprise small coral reefs which lie within the area marked by the line connecting the following points:

12°	north	latitude	and	117°	east	longitude
9°30′	"	"	"	"	"	"
8°	"	"	"	116°	"	"
7°	"	"	"	114°	"	"
7°	"	"	"	111°30′	"	"
9°	"	"	"	"	"	"
12°	"	"	"	114°	"	"
12°	"	"	"	117°	"	"

The names of the principal coral reefs of the Sinnan Islands are: Kitahutagozima, Minamihutagozima, Nisiaozima, Sankakuzima (Thi tu Island), Nakakozima (Loai ta Island), Kikkozima, Nanyoto, Nagasima (Itu Aba Island), Kitakozima, Minamikozima, Asukazima, Nisitorisima (Spratly Island) and Marusima (Amboyna Cay).

2. The Sinnan Islands were no State's land until June, 1921, when

---

[8] This undated memorandum was handed to the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs by the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy on March 31, 1939.

the Rasa Phosphate Co., a Japanese concern, having made extensive investigation of the Islands since 1917, invested a considerable amount of money in the building of permanent establishments for the development of the Islands. Their enterprise received the full authorization and support of the Japanese Government, which dispatched a naval surveying ship, *Koshu*, in 1929. In April of the same year a stone monument was built signifying the Japanese occupation, replacing a wooden marker built in 1919. (A more imposing one was erected in August 1938 with due ceremony conducted by the officers and crew of the minelayer *Katsuriki.*) In 1931, however, the Japanese settlers concerned were obliged to leave the Islands temporarily on account of business depression, but manifested their intention of returning to the Islands by leaving the establishments as they stood. In fact the work of development on the Islands was resumed in 1936 by the Kaiyo Development Co. of Formosa and has continued to date.

3. During the absence of the Japanese settlers, in July, 1933, the French Government dispatched a warship and publicly proclaimed their acquisition, contending that the Islands had previously belonged to no State, and sent a notification to that effect to the Japanese Government.

Finding itself unable to accept the view of the French Government expressed in the said notification, the Japanese Government, in August of the same year, made friendly representations to the French Government to the effect that the proclamation of acquisition should be withdrawn. Upon refusal on the part of the French Government, the Japanese Government made it clear that they do not in any way recognize the French claim to the Islands, and have taken all necessary measures to ensure the acquisition of the Islands as well as to give protection to the rights and interests therein of the Japanese Government and the Japanese nationals concerned. The cruiser *Tatsuta* was dispatched to the Islands in 1935 and the minelayer *Katsuriki* in 1936, 1937 and 1938, and a police officer from the Government-General of Formosa was stationed [there?].

4. In 1937 the French Government, relying solely on the abovementioned proclamation of acquisition, again claimed the sovereignty of the Islands, and in July of 1938 dispatched to the Islands a merchant vessel, landed some men and materials, and commenced to build establishments. The Japanese Government firmly sustained their refusal to recognize the French contention. At the same time the Japanese authorities on the Islands demanded the withdrawal of the French and objected to the hoisting of the French flag and the landing of goods on the Islands.

5. The Japanese Government, basing their action on the close connection that has existed between the Islands and the Japanese Em-

pire and on the right deriving therefrom under International Law, and motivated by their desire to avoid the possibility of further complications with the French Government, incidental to the hitherto vague administrative status of the Islands, have incorporated the Sinnan Islands in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Government-General of Formosa as of the thirtieth of March 1939.

851G.014/17

The Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Horinouchi)

[WASHINGTON,] May 17, 1939.

EXCELLENCY: Reference is made to the memorandum, with an accompanying map, left with the Department on March 31 last by Mr. Suma reporting the incorporation of the so-called Sinnan Islands into the territory under the jurisdiction of the Government-General of Formosa as of March 30, 1939. It is stated in the memorandum that the Sinnan Islands comprise small coral reefs which lie within an area described in the memorandum and delimited on the map aforementioned. There are listed in the memorandum the names of what are stated to be the principal coral reefs of the Sinnan Islands, which are in the main situated along the westerly side of the area delimited. Reference is also made in the memorandum to the claims of France to the Islands.

In 1933 the Government of the United States was informed by the French Government of its claim to sovereignty over certain islands situated along the western side of the area described in the Japanese memorandum. Recently this Government has been informed by the French Government that on February 27, 1939, it had suggested to the Japanese Government that the difference between France and Japan on the subject of the sovereignty of the islands be submitted to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague. Apart from any question as to the merits of the conflicting claims of France and Japan, it may be observed that, as the Japanese Government is aware, the Government of the United States advocates adjustment of problems in international relations by processes of negotiation, agreement or arbitration.

The Government of the United States does not consider that all islands or reefs which might be situated within the extensive area delimited in the Japanese memorandum, and especially within that considerable part of the area lying to the eastward and southeastward of any of the islands named in the Japanese memorandum, can properly be treated as one island group, nor does this Government consider that the action of Japan in blanketing within the territory of Japan islands or reefs, either known or unknown, with respect to which the Japanese Government has heretofore exercised no acts which may properly be regarded as establishing a basis for claim to sovereignty, has any international validity.

Accept [etc.] CORDELL HULL

[For statement by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs concerning the so-called "South Sea advance," see paragraph 8 of telegram No. 235, May 18, 1939, 7 p. m., from the Ambassador in Japan, page 1.]

756.94/39

Press Release Issued by the Japanese Embassy on April 15, 1940 [3a]

On being questioned by newspapermen concerning Japan's position with regard to possible involvement of the Netherlands in the European war and its repercussions in the Netherlands East Indies, Foreign Minister Arita replied as follows:

"With the South Seas regions, especially the Netherlands East Indies, Japan is economically bound by an intimate relationship of mutuality in ministering to one another's needs. Similarly, other countries of East Asia maintain close economic relations with these regions. That is to say, Japan, these countries and these regions together are contributing to the prosperity of East Asia through mutual aid and interdependence.

"Should hostilities in Europe be extended to the Netherlands and produce repercussions, as you say, in the Netherlands East Indies, it would not only interfere with the maintenance and furtherance of the above-mentioned relations of economic interdependence and of co-existence and co-prosperity, but would also give rise to an undesirable situation from the standpoint of the peace and stability of East Asia. In view of these considerations, the Japanese Government can not but be deeply concerned over any development accompanying an aggravation of the war in Europe that may affect the *status quo* of the Netherlands East Indies."

Press Release Issued by the Department of State on April 17, 1940 [3b]

In response to inquiries by press correspondents, the Secretary of State made the following statement:

[3a] Copy received in the Department of State from the First Secretary of the Japanese Embassy (Kase).

[3b] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, April 20, 1940 (vol. II, No. 43), p. 411.

"I have noted with interest the statement by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs expressing concern on the part of the Japanese Government for the maintenance of the *status quo* of the Netherlands Indies.

"Any change in the status of the Netherlands Indies would directly affect the interests of many countries.

"The Netherlands Indies are very important in the international relationships of the whole Pacific Ocean. The islands themselves extend for a distance of approximately 3,200 miles east and west astride of the Equator, from the Indian Ocean on the west far into the Pacific Ocean on the east. They are also an important factor in the commerce of the whole world. They produce considerable portions of the world's supplies of important essential commodities such as rubber, tin, quinine, copra, et cetera. Many countries, including the United States, depend substantially upon them for some of these commodities.

"Intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands Indies or any alteration of their *status quo* by other than peaceful processes would be prejudicial to the cause of stability, peace, and security not only in the region of the Netherlands Indies but in the entire Pacific area.

"This conclusion, based on a doctrine which has universal application and for which the United States unequivocally stands, is embodied in notes exchanged on November 30, 1908,[3c] between the United States and Japan in which each of the two Governments stated that its policy was directed to the maintenance of the existing *status quo* in the region of the Pacific Ocean. It is reaffirmed in the notes which the United States, the British Empire, France, and Japan—as parties to the treaty signed at Washington on December 13, 1921, relating to their insular possessions and their insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean [4]—sent to the Netherlands Government on February 4, 1922,[4a] in which each of those Governments declared that 'it is firmly resolved to respect the rights of the Netherlands in relation to their insular possessions in the region of the Pacific Ocean.'

"All peaceful nations have during recent years been earnestly urging that policies of force be abandoned and that peace be maintained on the basis of fundamental principles, among which are respect by every nation for the rights of other nations and nonintervention in their domestic affairs, the according of equality of fair and just treatment, and the faithful observance of treaty pledges, with modification thereof, when needful, by orderly processes.

"It is the constant hope of the Government of the United States—as it is no doubt that of all peacefully inclined governments—that the attitudes and policies of all governments will be based upon these principles and that these principles will be applied not only in every part of the Pacific area, but also in every part of the world."

[3c] *Foreign Relations*, 1908, p. 510.
[4] *Ibid.*, 1922, vol. I, p. 33.
[4a] *Ibid.*, p. 45.

756.94/65

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] April 20, 1940.

The Japanese Ambassador called at his request. He said he came to discuss the immigration situation as it exists today in the Philippine legislature. He went over the general facts pertaining to the legislative and to the quota situations and then asked that I urge the Philippine Government to allow Japan, along with all other nations, 1,000 immigrants instead of 500, as contemplated by the amendment to the bill on its second reading.[5] I first made it clear to the Ambassador that the Philippine Government has exclusive control over this question of immigration into the Philippine Islands; that this Government, therefore, does not undertake to dictate or otherwise bring material pressure upon the Philippine officials. I then added that I would be glad to go into the details of this matter further and somewhat sympathetically and see whether and what might remain to be properly said by this Government, if anything. The Ambassador remarked that this Government had more or less jurisdiction over this matter, according to Dr. Sayre.[5a] I corrected this wrong impression and also brought to his attention that the bill in its entirety would make possible the admission of about 1,000 Japanese instead of 500 only. I said to him that if anything remained for us to say we would try to get it off today.

The Ambassador then turned about a time or two in his chair and said that in regard to the recent statements of Foreign Minister Arita and of myself in regard to the *status quo* of the Netherlands East Indies, he thought that our press misinterpreted Minister Arita and assumed a more or less critical tone. I interrupted him to say that our press could well have taken the lead given by the Japanese press on the day of and the day after the statement of Minister Arita, which seemed to imply the assumption of leadership and special influence in that area of the world without limitation as to functions and purposes. I said that it may be possible that the Japanese press misinterpreted Minister Arita. The Ambassador then said that Minister Arita and I agree about not disturbing the *status quo* of the Dutch East Indies. I replied in the affirmative and said that the difference between us was that I placed the matter on a far broader ground than one primarily affecting the interests of Japan in the economic Dutch East Indies situation, and that I need not elaborate upon this except to refer to my statement for full understanding of the position this Government took. In that connection I proceeded to say to the Ambassador that I wished

---

[5] Commonwealth Act No. 613 (Second National Assembly, second session), approved August 26, 1940.

[5a] Francis B. Sayre, U. S. High Commissioner, Philippine Islands.

I could get over to him and his Government the fact that there is no more resemblance between our Monroe Doctrine, as we interpret and apply it uniformly since 1823, and the so-called Monroe Doctrine of Japan than there is between black and white. I said our Monroe Doctrine only contemplates steps for our physical safety while the Monroe Doctrine, as practiced by Japan, is seemingly applicable to all other purposes and all objectives, including economic, social, political, et cetera; that thus far the question of a Monroe Doctrine for physical protection has not been needed or invoked by Japan. The Ambassador sought to minimize my description of the Japanese application of their so-called Monroe Doctrine when I reminded him of its application in Manchuria and then, to our great surprise, in China and then implied that it applies economically to the Dutch East Indies.

I said to the Ambassador that his country can trade on absolutely equal terms with mine and with all other nations in every port of every nation in this hemisphere, with a slight modification temporarily in the Cuban trade situation, which grows out of special conditions between the two countries. I again reminded him of my frequent plea to his Government since 1933 to the effect that there should be normal peaceful and other worthwhile relations between important countries in the western world and Japan and China and other countries in the eastern portion. I need not elaborate on the things I have said on this point during past years except to emphasize the great mutual commercial advantages and other extremely valuable advantages in many ways that would follow such a policy of peaceful relationship and mutually cooperative effort. I said if conditions go on as they are, Europe will go bankrupt and cannot get back on its feet until after a long period in the future, while if Asia goes on as she is, both Japan and China will also find themselves bankrupt, while the United States will be greatly handicapped in its normal progress by wholesale bankruptcy in both Europe and Asia. The Ambassador did not seriously dispute this phase of our conversation. He sought to make it appear that Japan was motivated only by innocent purposes, but I said that his Government's formula in this respect does not work out in practice as we have seen from Manchuria, China and other occurrences and experiences; that this is especially true as to economic opportunity.

The Ambassador remarked that we were sending a Consul to Iceland, to which I replied in the affirmative.

He then inquired what new developments there were with respect to Greenland, to which I replied that there were no new developments and no relations about which the slightest question could be raised.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

Press Release Issued by the Department of State on May 11, 1940[6]

In response to inquiries by correspondents concerning press reports from Tokyo relative to the *status quo* of the Netherlands East Indies, the Secretary of State made the following statement:

"I have no full report about the matter referred to in the press despatches from Tokyo. During recent weeks a number of governments, including Great Britain, Japan, and the United States, have made clear in official public utterances their attitude of continued respect for the *status quo* of the Netherlands East Indies. This was in harmony with definite commitments formally made in writing in 1922. This Government assumes that each of the governments which has made commitments will continue to abide by those commitments. On April 17, 1940, in a public statement, I said:

> " 'Intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands Indies or any alteration of their *status quo* by other than peaceful processes would be prejudicial to the cause of stability, peace, and security not only in the region of the Netherlands Indies but in the entire Pacific area.'

"In view of these facts, commitments and expressions of intention to respect the *status quo* of the Netherlands East Indies cannot be too often reiterated."

856B.01/22

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] May 16, 1940.

The Ambassador of Japan called at his own request. He did not mention the Philippine Immigration Bill, or the reported anti-Japanese disturbances in Peru, or, expressly, the Netherlands Indies, or the status of European armed forces in China. At the beginning of the conversation I made reference to the increased state of war and chaos in other parts of the world and the terrible destructive effects of it in every way, adding that it appeared more and more as if no large country, much less a small country, was safe from some aggressive intervention by force in one way or another, and that about the only thing a nation could do was to arm to the teeth and be ready for any serious interference with its rights and interests by the use of military force or the threat of force. I said that, fortunately, as was shown today in Congress, and as was apparent all over the nation since the more recent invasions of helpless peaceful nations for purposes of their destruction, the American people have now become thoroughly awakened, aroused and alert in regard to any threatened injuries to American rights and interests, and that this was a matter of great gratification to those of us in charge of the foreign affairs of the nation.

---

[6] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, May 11, 1940 (vol. II, No. 46), p. 493.

The Ambassador then proceeded at great length to question and cross-examine me about the Netherlands West Indies, comprising Curaçao and Aruba. I said that, of course, my Government and the other twenty-one American Republics would not consider for a moment any departure from their traditional policy relating to the safety of this hemisphere, and if that was what the Ambassador had in mind, I could make that statement together with the further statement that as soon as this Government learned of the fact that British and French vessels patrolling the waters near Curaçao and Aruba were offering potential aid to the Netherlands Government in preventing possible sabotage and possible armed expeditions from the mainland intended to seize the governments on one or both of these possessions, such as governments are often seized in South American countries, this Government proceeded to assemble the facts as expeditiously as possible in regard to the ability of Netherlands guards and citizens in Curaçao and Aruba to protect the islands and their governments from such dangers. I further stated that it was my understanding that the British and French patrols were in no sense interfering with the Netherlands government on these two islands, but were recognizing the authority of these governments during the brief temporary time deemed necessary to aid in safeguarding against the dangers already mentioned, and that they have made it clear that thereafter their patrols will not offer any guards for additional protection in connection with their continued patrol work, and hence there cannot arise the slightest question of interference with the traditional American policy relating to its own protection from possible dangers from abroad. Furthermore, the Netherlands Government would be expected to send from abroad any additional guards that may later be found to be needed. The Ambassador did not seem to be satisfied with any sort of answer I made. He continued with an increasingly minute cross-examination as it were. I suddenly and emphatically interrupted him and with right inquired of him if his Government had sent him to me to ask all these detailed questions about a matter of no importance to his Government or to any other government, and if his Government had sent him to go into this almost interminable examination, I desired now to know what the motive and purpose of his Government was for doing so. I said that there would never be any friction between my Government and any other government on account of anything unlawful or unfair that my Government may do, but that it would be due to something unlawful that another government may do. I added that I had devoted most of the past seven years to efforts at understanding and peaceful relations between our two Governments.

I then picked up two or three pages of material which had come in via the news ticker from Tokyo, in which the Japanese Government is reported to be discussing every day or two some phase of the Netherlands East Indies and its supposed special rights in them. I stated that I had not intended to show him this, that it had just come to my desk as the Ambassador came in, but I remarked with emphasis that it had been thought that the Japanese Government and the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and France had each and all repeated recently their prior commitment that each was obligated to respect the *status quo* in the Netherlands East Indies and I had thought that settled the matter as among our four countries, since each country unequivocally pledged itself to respect the *status quo*, but I added that notwithstanding the efforts of many of us to maintain a thorough understanding with the Government of Japan, there was continually coming out of Tokyo additional discussions of the Netherlands East Indies as though the commitment to respect and preserve the *status quo* had not been made. I said that these were news reports and I myself was slow to accredit them, but that the tenor of the reports interfered with the efforts of the Ambassador and myself and others to preserve understanding and fair play and fair treatment between our two countries by causing misunderstanding and increasing hostility on the part of the people in each country. I said that I would make no complaint now about the matter if that was a part of the newspaper policy in Japan. I added finally that my Government strives for peace year in and year out and it desires at all times to avoid controversy, and, therefore, if controversy arises, the fault will not lie at the door of this Government. I said further that in our constant desire and constant effort to promote and preserve peace, both with other countries and among other countries, I hoped that this attitude of ours would not be misunderstood.

The Ambassador undertook in reply to disclaim any purpose of his Government to send him to me to enter into the long examination to which he was subjecting me when interrupted. He then repeated that his Government was entirely satisfied with the situation following the reiteration of the *status quo* in respect to the Netherlands Indies by each of the four governments interested, and that it had no purpose to raise any further controversy in that connection unless perchance the British or French should land troops there to protect them. I remarked that, since my Government was interested, I had made inquiries of the British and the French, and gathered the unequivocal understanding that they had no idea whatever to intervene in the Netherlands East Indies in any way.

The Ambassador then made some reference to the Monroe Doctrine in connection with the West Indies situation, and I replied that I had seemingly in vain sought to point out to his Government that, under the Monroe Doctrine, his country's merchant ships have equal access to every harbor in the Western Hemisphere (not including a special arrangement between the United States and Cuba), while under the policy which his Government is seeking to impose in the Pacific Ocean area, the United States and other countries are to be denied equality of trade and industrial opportunity in every Chinese port, and yet his Government seems to look with complacency on this conflicting situation.

I again brought to his attention the information contained in the news ticker report today from Tokyo, in which Japanese newspapers, as stated, were undertaking to keep alive and emphasize some supposed special interests of Japan in the Netherlands East Indies. I said it seemed very surprising to observe that, after the Japanese Government had undertaken to spread itself out over the huge republic of China, there was an intimation in the news reports that it would not be content unless it extended itself three thousand miles beyond to modestly take in the great archipelago comprising the East Indies, presumably with a view of shutting out all equality of trade opportunities among nations, while Japan would continue to demand equality of trade opportunities in every other part of the world; that there did not exist any selfish or other reason on the part of other nations to interfere in the least with equality of trade opportunities on the part of Japan. The Ambassador again stated that his Government was satisfied about the Netherlands East Indies situation in the light of the renewed promises of each of the three other governments interested, and that they had no plans or purposes to proceed there to contact the Netherlands East Indies. I expressed my satisfaction with his statement, but again reminded him of my difficulty to understand the policy of the Japanese Government or the Japanese press, whichever it was, to continue various lines of discussion indicating a claim to some sort of special interest of Japan in the Netherlands East Indies situation; that in a recent statement, I had set forth rather comprehensively and succinctly the position of this Government that the *status quo* should be respected and preserved by each of the four governments; that the real question presented actually related to the entire Pacific area and that no further elaboration beyond my recent statement on this subject would appear to add to anything I then said.

I still interpret the Ambassador's visit as one under instructions to develop a pretext to support Japan in connection with its plans and purposes toward the Netherlands East Indies.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

756.94/152: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

TOKYO, June 29, 1940—noon.
[Received June 29—6:50 a. m.]

516. Our 508, June 28, 8 p. m.[6a] The following statement was given out last night to the press by the Foreign Office for release in this morning's papers:

"Some time ago the Foreign Minister, Mr. Hachiro Arita, made a statement that the Japanese Government, from the standpoint of maintaining the peace and stability of East Asia, have deep concern over any development that may affect the *status quo* of the Netherlands East Indies. The said statement was made with regard to various political, economic, and other matters. Since that time our Government have continued negotiations with the Netherlands Government concerning the questions of trade, enterprises, entry of Japanese to the Netherlands East Indies.

As for the trade question, Japan is deeply interested in the maintenance and further promotion of close commercial relations. An amicable settlement of such a question is not only a demand naturally arising from the relationship of administering to the needs of each other but is an essential requirement in removing all apprehensions, and in promoting friendly relations between Japan and the Netherlands East Indies.

In view of this fact, the Japanese Government have as the first step conducted negotiations with the Netherlands Government in order to assure the exports to Japan of those commodities of the Netherlands East Indies which are deemed essential to Japan. The Governments of the Netherlands and the Netherlands East Indies have declared that they would not take measures which would prevent such commodities as mentioned above from being exported to Japan and that they would comply with Japan's desires. The Japanese Government appreciate this sincere attitude.

The Japanese Government however are desirous that the Governments of the Netherlands and the Netherlands East Indies actively take appropriate measures in order to definitely assure the exports of the desired quantities of required goods of the Netherlands East Indies, and also dispose promptly [of] the questions regarding the Japanese enterprises and entry of Japanese. In this connection the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Masayuki Tani, held conversations today, June 28, with the Netherlands Minister, General J. C. Pabst."

GREW

751G.94/14a: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, August 6, 1940—1 p. m.

293. News agencies have carried reports that Japan has made secret demands on France regarding French Indochina. As reported, these

---

[6a] Not printed.

demands include right on part of Japan to move armed forces of Japan through that French possession, the right of armed forces of Japan to use air bases at certain points there, etc.

The statements given by the Secretary of State to the press on April 17 and May 11, 1940, set forth this Government's belief that (1) intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands East Indies, or (2) any alteration, by other than peaceful processes, in their *status quo* would be prejudicial to the cause of security, stability, and peace in the entire Pacific area, not just in the region in question. Also, there was set forth the observation of the Government of the United States that the belief restated in the preceding sentence was based on a doctrine of universal application and that it is a doctrine unequivocally supported by this Government. The same belief and the same observation naturally apply to French Indochina likewise. This Government is seriously perturbed, therefore, over the *démarche* which it is reported that the Government of Japan has made to the French authorities.

If no objection is perceived, it is my desire that at your early convenience you call upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs and that you express to him, as under instruction from your Government and along the lines above indicated, the concern felt by the Government of the United States regarding the reported developments.

WELLES

751G.94/165

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[TOKYO,] August 7, 1940.

This afternoon I called on the Foreign Minister and after calling his attention to the reports that France has received secret demands from Japan in regard to Indochina, I addressed to the Minister the substance of paragraph 2 of the Department's telegram No. 293, August 6, 1 p. m., and conveyed to him, as instructed, the concern with which the Government of the United States regarded the developments reported.

In replying to my opening remarks, the Minister said that (1) he wished to withhold his comment; (2) that admitting certain demands had been made on Indochina, still he could not reveal their precise character; and (3) that in regard to a recent article in the *New York Times*, a cabled report of which he had with him, he considered its various points as either grossly exaggerated or completely unfounded. The Minister declined to comment on the two demands listed in the Department's telegram.

In departing, I presented the Minister with copies of the Secretary's statements of April 17 and May 11, and stressed the attitude of the American Government towards maintaining the *status quo* with regard to the entire Pacific area, including both French Indochina and the Netherlands East Indies.

I was told by the Minister and authorized to inform the Department in strict confidence that the Japanese demands had been already accepted in principle by the French Government.

An official of the Information Bureau, sent by the Foreign Minister, arrived later in the afternoon with the message that it was the wish of the Japanese Government not to disclose the object of my call and therefore the press would be told that I had called about the Gendarmerie case in Shanghai.[6b] I sent back the reply that whereas I was convinced that the Department would not betray any confidence, it might deem it necessary to release to the American public that I had called in connection with alleged Japanese demands concerning Indochina, and that hence it would be understood that in no way could I have committed my Government on this point. Further, to say that I had called in connection with the Shanghai Gendarmerie case would not be true, and therefore I suggested that it be reported that I called for "various routine matters". The Foreign Office informed us, after further telephone conversation that the press release would say that I had called to inquire about press reports published abroad regarding late developments in relations between French Indochina and Japan, and that the reports were declared to be inaccurate by the Foreign Minister.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

751G.94/57a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, September 3, 1940—6 p. m.

334. At earliest moment possible, unless you perceive objection, please obtain further interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs and take up with him the two matters which follow, as under instruction from this Government:

(1) Refer to the conversation you had on August 7 with the Minister (your telegram No. 672, August 7, 10 p. m.[7]) and say to him that within the past few days reports from several sources have come to the Department of State to the effect that the Government of Japan has presented an ultimatum to the French authorities in Indochina

---

[6b] See telegram No. 671, July 22, 1940, 1 p. m., from the Consul at Shanghai, p. 101.

[7] Not printed; see memorandum, August 7, 1940, *supra*.

on Japan's demands for permission to Japanese armed forces, for purposes of military operations against China, to pass through French territory and to use military bases and other facilities. The Government of the United States is reluctant to believe these reports, and it wishes to point out the unfortunate effect on American public opinion from the point of view of Japanese-American relations if these reports prove to be correct. Especially will this be true in view of statement which the press attributed on June 19 to a representative of the Japanese Foreign Office which said, in effect, that Japan attached importance to maintaining the *status quo* in French Indochina.

(2) Please present with emphasis the urgency of settling at an early date the question of defense sectors at Shanghai.[7a] You will say that, several days having elapsed since the representations you made on August 27 and as the Japanese authorities at Shanghai have put forward no new considerations in support of their opposition to decision reached by majority vote of the Shanghai Defense Committee, the Government of the United States confidently hopes for prompt agreement by the Government of Japan to a solution of the controversy along the lines of the Committee's decision. In your presentation, please remind the Minister of what you said to him on August 27 in regard to possible changes in the policy of this Government, adding that position which has been taken by the Japanese authorities at Shanghai and situation which arises from the delays and uncertainties caused by that position is having a bad effect upon American public opinion.

Repeat text of this telegram to Shanghai, to be repeated to Peiping and to Chungking.

HULL

751G.94/60 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

TOKYO, September 4, 1940—9 p. m.
[Received September 4—11:22 a. m.]

789. Department's telegram No. 334, September 3, 6 p. m. Reference to paragraph (1). As the Minister was temporarily ill, I approached the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon on the subject of French Indochina in precise accord with your instructions.

The Vice Minister denied that he knew anything about an ultimatum, but he did not deny that armed forces of Japan did intend to seek passage through French Indochina. Ohashi said that the Japanese intention was a matter of military necessity; that there would be no permanent occupation of French territory; and that

---

[7a] See statement by the Secretary of State, September 4, 1940, p. 111.

Japan would withdraw the forces in question as soon as the military necessity ceased to exist. I spoke with emphasis on the attitude of the American Government; likewise on Japan's expressed attitude toward maintaining the *status quo* in French Indochina, and on the deplorable effect which the execution of the stated intention of Japan's armed forces would have on American public opinion.

Shortly after my interview with the Vice Minister, similar representations were made by the British Ambassador, who received approximately the same reply.

GREW

751G.94/236

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[TOKYO,] September 14, 1940.

At the instance of the Foreign Minister, the Vice Minister asked me to call this afternoon and handed to me a penciled "oral statement" in the Japanese language in reply to my representations to the Foreign Minister on August 7 with regard to the reported Japanese demands on French Indochina. Mr. Ohashi said that he wished to apologize for the delay; that the Minister after our conversation on August 7 had directed that a reply be immediately formulated and that it was due to the changes in Foreign Office personnel that this reply had somehow disappeared and had only now come to light. The Vice Minister's attempt to summarize the Japanese text in English was so inadequate that I said that I would prefer to study the text itself and to submit it to my Government before venturing to comment. Our translation of the statement follows:

"In a conversation on August 7, 1940, Your Excellency made reference to newspaper reports to the effect that the Imperial Government had at that time presented certain demands to the French Government regarding French Indochina and said that the American Government was concerned therewith. The Imperial Government, because of the necessity to construct a new order in East Asia, had theretofore carried out negotiations with regard to French Indochina, and on that basis has continued progressively with satisfactory local negotiations.

In settling the China Incident, Japan seeks the firm preservation of a minimum right to existence; but in accomplishing this objective, however, Japan has been avoiding conquests and exploitation, and has been employing brotherly love, mutual existence and mutual prosperity as guiding principles. Japan has, so far as it does not interfere with the accomplishment of the above objective, been making efforts not to bring about undesirable changes to the *status quo*.

Under the ever-changing conditions of today, past rules and norms rapidly become inapplicable to actual conditions. It is clear that, merely to adhere blindly to such rules and norms is not the way to stabilize world peace. Despite the fact that in the western hemisphere epoch-making changes are actually being made in the *status quo*, Japan has as yet expressed no opinion for or against those changes. It has to be pointed out that intrusion by the United States in an area which is so remote from that country as in this case brings about the same effect upon Japan's public opinion as the meddlesome attitude of a third country toward the policy of the United States concerning third-power territories in the western hemisphere would bring about upon public opinion in the United States."

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

751G.94/124 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[Paraphrase]

WASHINGTON, September 19, 1940—9 p. m.

357. The Consul at Hanoi has informed the Department that the Japanese commanding general has presented demands to the Governor General of Indochina for occupation of Hanoi, Haiphong, and five airports by the armed forces of Japan. According to Mr. Reed, General Nishihara has stipulated that unless Japan's demands are accepted, invasion of French Indochina by Japanese armed forces will start on September 22 at 10 p. m.[7b]

Please try to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs at earliest moment possible; inform him of the report which the Department has received; and express to him, as under instructions from this Government, the great surprise of the Government of the United States that in the light of all the circumstances, among which is Japan's voluntary pledge previously expressed to maintain and to preserve the *status quo* in the Pacific area, the Japanese authorities in French Indochina should have taken action giving rise to this report. You will also say that the Government of the United States assumes that the report which it has received, if it is based on fact, reflects action taken locally exceeding the instructions of the Government of Japan, as was reputedly the case when a previous ultimatum was presented by Japanese military authorities.

You will further say to the Foreign Minister that the American Government would appreciate receiving assurances from the Government of Japan that the reports which have come to the Department are not warranted and that they represent the intentions neither of the Japanese military authorities at Hanoi nor of the Imperial Government.

Inform the British and the French Ambassadors in Japan of your *démarche*, and repeat to Hanoi.

HULL

[7b] See memorandum by the Under Secretary of State, September 20, 1940, vol. I, p. 877.

751G.94/236

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[Tokyo,] September 20, 1940.

An appointment was made with Mr. Matsuoka on the afternoon of September 20, after the Department's telegram (357, September 19, 9 p.m.) had been received and decoded, and I precisely acted upon the instructions of the Department.

Mr. Matsuoka in reply said that apart from some minor changes, the particulars of which were not mentioned, the reports are correct that an ultimatum had been presented to the Governor General of Indochina by General Nishihara. The situation was then explained to be as follows, by the Minister:

The French Ambassador, under instructions of the French Government, and the Japanese Government on August 30 had signed an agreement in Tokyo. Provisions of the agreement were *inter alia* for the movement of troops of Japan through Indochina and the use temporarily of airports. The Governor General of Indochina was on September 6 ready to sign an agreement which would have implemented the agreement signed in Tokyo on August 30, but he refused for reasons not evident to the authorities of Japan and obstructed the implementation of the agreement signed in Tokyo. The Japanese Government felt obliged, although with reluctance, to ask the French Government whether the actions of the Governor General were subject to control by the French Government, since the Governor General continued to be uncooperative, and whether on the basis of the agreement signed in Tokyo the French Government was exhibiting good faith. The French Government said that it was, and as evidently the Governor General was not acting in good faith and as the Japanese authorities were aware that to foreign Consuls stationed in Indochina the Governor had boasted that he was using obstructive tactics, the Japanese ultimatum reported was necessarily presented.

The purpose of the measures taken was, said the Minister, to enable the Japanese forces to attack Chiang Kai-shek and to bring peace to China. As soon as hostilities have ceased, he said, the Japanese forces would be withdrawn at once; the integrity and sovereignty of Indochina would be accorded full respect, and as a consequence there would be no interference in East Asia with the *status quo*. The Minister said that he, Prince Konoye, and other Government members were representative of a minority opinion in Japan and that it was their determination that Japan should not oppress, exploit or interfere with other countries' integrity. He said that a struggle was taking place against extreme elements within the country on this issue. My interruption at this point was to the effect that clauses pertaining to commerce and economics in Indochina were within the scope of the agreement. No denial was made to my statement but I was assured that exploitation would not ensue.

The terms of the agreement between France and Japan signed on August 30 were confidential, said the Minister, and their divulgence by either of the signatories would nullify them. He said he could confidentially tell me, however, that France had broached the subject first and a request was made for a renewal of guarantees pertaining to the integrity of Indochina based on the agreement betweeen France and Japan which was negotiated at approximately the same time as the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was concluded.[8] He did not recall the exact date but said that the agreement was in effect and registered with the League of Nations. (This presumably is the agreement of June 10, 1907, between France and Japan.[9]) The Minister was interrupted with my question as to what country's encroachments France desired guarantees against. Mr. Matsuoka said that this was a moot question. He went on then to say that permission had been asked by Japan for the movement of forces across Indochina and for the use temporarily of airports as "compensation" for complying with the French request. This information was given me in confidence, he emphasized, and its accuracy would of necessity be denied in event of publicity.

The Minister talked lengthily, but in spite of this and his illogical reasoning the meaning of his remarks is reported to the Department with all possible precision. The Minister upon the conclusion of his remarks left at once to fulfill another engagement and I could say only that if Japanese troops moved into Indochina my Government would regard it emphatically as an infringement of the *status quo* which the Japanese Government had already pledged to preserve, and that a further statement of the attitude of my Government was reserved until consideration had been given to my report.

I presented to the Minister the substance of the Department's 355, September 18, 6 p. m.,[10] which replied to the oral statement of the Vice Minister to me of September 14, before I left.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

[Annex]

Statement by the American Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Matsuoka)

My Government has instructed me to make the following observations in reply to the oral statement which was handed to me by the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs on September 14.

---

[8] For text of the Anglo-Japanese agreement signed January 30, 1902, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. xcv, p. 83.

[9] Agreement respecting the integrity of China, etc., signed June 10, 1907, *ibid.*, vol. c, p. 913.

[10] Telegram not printed; see statement by the Ambassador, annexed.

It is the opinion of my Government that the *status quo* of a third country is seriously affected when one of two countries which is engaged in hostilities with another insists, in order to attack the other, upon the right of the use of airdromes and the right of passage for troops through the third country. In the light of the Japanese Government's announced desire that the *status quo* be maintained in the Pacific area there appears to be an inconsistency in connection with the stipulations of this nature which are being made upon the authorities in Indochina by the Japanese Government.

The American Government urges upon all governments the employment of peaceful means only in their relations with all other governments and with all other regions. The attitude of my Government toward the unwarranted use of pressure in international relations is global.

[TOKYO,] September 19, 1940.

Press Release Issued by the Department of State on September 23, 1940[11]

In response to inquiries at the press conference today, the Secretary of State said:

> "Events are transpiring so rapidly in the Indochina situation that it is impossible to get a clear picture of the minute-to-minute developments. It seems obvious, however, that the *status quo* is being upset and that this is being achieved under duress. The position of the United States in disapproval and in deprecation of such procedures has repeatedly been stated."

This Government has not at any time or in any way approved the French concessions to Japan. The attitude of this Government toward developments in French Indochina is as expressed by the Secretary of State this morning and in previous public statements.

Press Release Issued by the Department of State on November 14, 1940[12]

Consul Walter A. Foote at Batavia, Java, Netherlands Indies, has informed the Department that an agreement was initialed in Batavia on November 12 by representatives of Japanese oil importers and representatives of the local oil companies. The agreement provides for the export of 1,800,000 tons of petroleum products per annum to Japan from the Netherlands Indies. These exports will be composed of

---

[11] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, September 28, 1940 (vol. III, No. 66), p. 253.

[12] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, November 16, 1940 (vol. III, No. 73), p. 432.

250,000 tons of motor gasoline, 73,000 tons of fuel oil, 57,000 tons of kerosene, 100,000 tons of crude for lubricants, 540,000 tons of other crude, 120,000 tons of aviation crude, 50,000 tons of gas oil, and 116,000 tons of diesel oil, in addition to the normal import quota of 494,000 tons of petroleum products.

893.24/990

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

No. 5157 TOKYO, November 20, 1940.
[Received December 16.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that in compliance with the Department's telegraphic instruction no. 471, November 13, 1 p. m.,[13] via Shanghai, relating to the refusal by the French authorities of Indochina to permit certain merchandise owned by Americans to be re-exported from Indochina, I instructed Mr. Crocker, First Secretary of the Embassy, to leave with Mr. Terazaki, Chief of the American Section of the Foreign Office, on November 15, 1940, a statement marked "oral" in the sense of the Department's instructions.

Mr. Crocker requested that the statement be regarded as coming from me to the Foreign Minister, and Mr. Terazaki accepted it with that understanding and stated that he would see that it came promptly to the Minister's hands.

During the course of the general conversation which ensued, Mr. Terazaki expressed his concern at the present unfortunate trend in American-Japanese relations and asked in all sincerity what Mr. Crocker thought could be done to improve them. Mr. Crocker replied that Mr. Terazaki had before him in the "oral" statement one of several hundred instances in which the Japanese Government, if it sincerely valued American friendship, could take action to put an end to the almost continuous interference with legitimate American rights and interests in China and elsewhere.

A copy of the "oral" statement under reference is enclosed.

Respectfully yours, JOSEPH C. GREW

[Enclosure]

Oral Statement by the American Ambassador (Grew) to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Matsuoka)[14]

I am informed by our Consul at Hanoi that certain merchandise owned by American interests is being refused re-export permits from

---

[13] Not printed.

[14] Notation: "Left with Mr. Terazaki, Director of the American Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office, by the American First Secretary, Mr. Crocker, November 15, 1940, as from the American Ambassador to the Minister for Foreign Affairs".

Indo-China by the Indo-Chinese authorities chiefly as a result of Japanese pressure brought upon those authorities.

Detailed information regarding such merchandise is known to the Indo-China authorities, to our Consul, and presumably to the Japanese.

I have been instructed to request that appropriate steps be taken to put an end to this unwarranted interference with the shipments of goods and merchandise owned by Americans.

611.51G9/22

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[TOKYO,] December 17, 1940.

During my conversation with the Foreign Minister today I spoke emphatically on the matter of shipment of American-owned goods from Indochina, repeating my representations of November 15 and 30, and in a signed note (no. 1714, December 17, 1940 [15]) decried the continued and unwarranted interference.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

611.51G9/22

The American Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Matsuoka)

No. 1714 TOKYO, December 17, 1940.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to invite the attention of Your Excellency to the fact that on November 15 an oral statement was left with Mr. Terazaki as from the American Ambassador to the Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that, according to information from the American Consul at Hanoi, certain merchandise owned by American interests was being refused re-export permits from Indochina by the Indochinese authorities, chiefly as a result of Japanese pressure brought upon those authorities.

On November 30, in a conversation with Your Excellency, I made further representations in this matter, repeating those made on November 15.

It was requested on both occasions that appropriate steps be taken to put an end to this unwarranted interference with the shipments of goods and merchandise owned by Americans.

I am constrained to observe to Your Excellency that, to date, there has been no alleviation of this condition. In fact, it has been learned that, save under certain special conditions which are unnamed, no cargo can be re-exported from Indochina, and there are indications that envisage either permitting cargo to be sold locally by the owners or requisitioning such cargo as is needed for Indochina. There is no guarantee that the proceeds of the sale or requisition may be converted into foreign exchange and, in any event, the foregoing practice would amount to a forced sale.

---

[15] *Infra.*

Acting under instructions from my Government, I have the honor emphatically to protest this continued and unwarranted interference with the shipment of goods and merchandise owned by Americans.

I avail myself [etc.] JOSEPH C. GREW

611.51G9/22

The First Secretary of the American Embassy in Japan (Crocker) to the Acting Director of the American Bureau of the Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Yuki)

TOKYO, December 30, 1940.

MY DEAR MR. YUKI: At Mr. Terazaki's request, I am transmitting to you an oral statement, a copy of which I read to him this morning, relating to the question of interference with Red Cross supplies in Indochina.

Will you please regard this statement as from the American Ambassador to His Excellency, the Minister for Foreign Affairs?

Sincerely yours, EDWARD S. CROCKER

[Enclosure]

Oral Statement by the American Ambassador (Grew) to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Matsuoka)

Referring to the American Ambassador's note to His Excellency the Imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs, no. 1714 dated December 17, 1940, relating to the interference by the Indochinese authorities, chiefly as a result of Japanese pressure brought upon those authorities, with the shipments of American owned goods and merchandise, the American Ambassador is now instructed to express to His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs the opinion that it would not be consistent with humanitarian considerations to interfere with the movement of supplies of the Red Cross at present in Indochina, in addition to being unwarranted on other grounds. At least a part of the Red Cross supplies under reference, incidentally, was made possible by the contributions of American citizens.

792.9411/9

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

No. 5256

TOKYO, December 31, 1940.
[Received January 28, 1941.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose a copy of the text of the Treaty Between Japan and Thailand Concerning the Continuance of Friendly Relations and the Mutual Respect of Each Other's Territorial Integrity,[16] as appearing in the *Official Gazette* of December 28, 1940. The treaty was signed at Tokyo on June 12, 1940, and ratified by the Emperor on December 27, 1940.

A statement by the Information Board quoted in the *Tokyo Nichi Nichi* on December 25, 1940, declared: "The Treaty is one that makes a valuable contribution toward the political progress of East Asia now that Japan is devoting all her efforts to the establishment of a sphere of common prosperity in Greater East Asia. In view of the fact that the Treaty is not in its spirit and letter such a passive one as the so-called non-aggression treaty, but a progressive one, it is clear that both Japan and Thailand intend to make this treaty a basis of their friendly relations."

Although the language of this statement is somewhat obscure, it plainly expresses the view that the treaty is calculated to assist Japan in its task of establishing the New Order in East Asia, and the view that the new treaty goes beyond the scope of the conventional non-aggression pact.

Respectfully yours,

JOSEPH C. GREW

611.51G9/27

The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Matsuoka) to the American Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[Translation]

No. 3–Confidential
South Seas II

TOKYO, January 7, 1941.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to state that I have carefully perused the contents of the Embassy's *note verbale* of November 15, 1940,[17] and of Your Excellency's note no. 1714, December 17, 1940, setting forth that due chiefly to Japanese pressure brought upon the authorities of French Indo-China, American commercial firms in that country were refused permission by the French Indo-China authorities to re-export certain merchandise belonging to them and protesting emphatically against such a continued and unwarranted interference.

---

[16] Not printed.

[17] See oral statement of November 15, 1940, p. 298.

The Imperial Government immediately instructed Japanese authorities in that area to investigate the actual circumstances of the case, as a result of which it was made clear that absolutely no unwarranted measures such as those mentioned by the American authorities were taken. The Japanese authorities interfere in no way whatsoever with the granting of permits by the Indo-China Government for the export of articles the ownership of which is determined to be American. As a matter of fact, for gasoline, permission to export to Hongkong, Manila and other places has been granted at three different times. Recently, on December 4, permission for the export to Hongkong of 16,500 drums of gasoline was given to the Standard Oil Company upon its request.

It is, however, recognized that there is much merchandise of this type which is of uncertain ownership and it is obvious that Japanese authorities should be able to seize or confiscate merchandise clearly determined to belong to the Chiang[18] Government. Accordingly, the attention of Your Excellency is hereby particularly called to the fact that when American commercial firms intend to export merchandise, they will be required to produce evidence that the ownership of such merchandise is American.

I avail myself [etc.] YOSUKE MATSUOKA

611.51G9/31

The American Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Matsuoka)

No. 1732 TOKYO, January 24, 1941.

EXCELLENCY: Referring to Your Excellency's note No. 3–Confidential/South Seas II, dated January 7, 1941, relating to the interference with the movement of American-owned merchandise in French Indochina, and with specific reference to the last paragraph thereof, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that my Government is not aware of any right on the part of the Japanese forces in French Indochina to engage in procedures of confiscation or to require or to request that American firms produce evidence of their ownership of merchandise in that country in connection with exports or otherwise.

I avail myself [etc.] JOSEPH C. GREW

---

[18] Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Chinese premier (President of the Executive Yüan).

611.51G9/34

The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Matsuoka) to the American Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[Translation]

No. 14–Confidential
South Seas II   TOKYO, February 8, 1941.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to state that I have carefully perused the contents of Your Excellency's note No. 1732, January 24, 1941, reporting that the Government of the United States cannot admit the right of the Imperial Army in French Indochina to engage in procedures of confiscation, or to require evidence to be produced that merchandise to be exported by an American firm is of American ownership, or to take similar actions.

The Japanese authorities, however, do not carry out indiscriminate confiscation of all merchandise. Those authorities, with the understanding of the authorities of French Indochina, seize or confiscate as enemy property only merchandise the ownership of which rests clearly with the Chiang Government. It is therefore natural that if a concerned party claims the right of ownership, he should produce evidence of such ownership. If the evidence is not produced, it must be regarded that the matter is left to the Japanese authorities to be determined on the basis of their independent examination.

I hereby have to inform Your Excellency not only that the Imperial Government finds it difficult to regard the action taken by Japanese authorities in French Indochina as an unjust one, but also that such action must be regarded as a normal measure taken by the Japanese Army whose advance into French Indochina was carried out as a strategical move against Chiang Kai-shek and for the purpose of suppressing all activities aiding Chiang.

I avail myself [etc.]   YOSUKE MATSUOKA

756D.94/125

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

No. 5363   TOKYO, February 10, 1941.
[Received March 3.]

SIR: . . . I have the honor to report for the Department's information and record, the recent pronouncements made by officials of the Japanese Government setting forth Japan's present policy regarding the Netherlands East Indies.

In his speech before the opening session of the Diet on January 21, the Foreign Minister stated that the Netherlands East Indies "lay within the sphere of co-prosperity in Greater East Asia", and that "if only for geographical reasons, they should be in intimate and inseparable relationship with our country." In speaking of the "Co-prosperity Sphere" itself he said that "it is our avowed purpose to bring all the peoples in Greater East Asia to revert to their innate and proper aspect, promoting conciliation and cooperation among them"; that Japan is the leader in East Asia; and that "no other course is left to Japan but . . . to secure an economic life of self-supply and self-sufficiency within the region of Greater East Asia."

There was promptly reported in Japan the official announcement issued by the Netherlands East Indies Government with regard to its attitude concerning Mr. Matsuoka's pronouncement of Japan's policy. An article which appeared in the January 25, English-language issue of the *Tokyo Nichi Nichi*, quoting remarks attributed to Mr. Van Mook, Minister of Economy of the Netherlands East Indies Government, in this respect, is herewith enclosed.[19] The press gave much attention to these remarks and in the Diet various interpellations were made in the matter. Particular attention was directed to the possibility of the successful conclusion of the economic negotiations at Batavia in view of the attitude of the Netherlands authorities. In reply to the interpellations, the Foreign Minister is reported to have stated that it was the Government's intent to continue the negotiations "to the last moment." He admitted that the negotiations were extremely difficult. He stated that the Netherlands authorities were applying unnecessarily harsh restrictions upon Japanese enterprises, trade, and emigrants; and that Japan's trade with the Indies was small because the Netherlands authorities had been placing too many obstacles in Japan's way. He declared, however, that the decline in trade with Europe would favor the conclusion of an agreement for an increase of the Indies trade with Japan, and in any event he did not believe that the Netherlands authorities would refuse Japan's demands to the end.

In further remarks before the Diet, the Foreign Minister is reported to have stated that the Japanese Government has never taken "an irresolute attitude" towards the Netherlands East Indies Government, that Japan was determined to advance its cause embodying "an endeavor to enable all peoples in the sphere of Greater East Asia to enjoy prosperity in proportion to their respective capacities." There is enclosed a clipping of an article which appeared in the January 30, 1941, English-language issue of the *Tokyo Nichi Nichi*, reporting at length these remarks.[20]

---

[19] Not printed.

[20] Text of Foreign Minister's statement printed *infra*.

On January 31, the Netherlands Minister at Tokyo, upon instructions from his Government, made a statement to the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs to the effect that the Netherlands Government wished to make it clear that the people of the Netherlands East Indies could not be expected either to let their actions be guided by the conception of the "New Order" as set forth by the Foreign Minister, or to acquiesce in the consequences of its eventual application. On February 3, the Deputy Spokesman of the Cabinet Information Board referred to the Netherlands Minister's statement describing it as a declaration by the Netherlands Government in London to the effect that that Government would not recognize inclusion of the Netherlands East Indies in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The Spokesman announced that the Japanese Government would not make any formal reply to the communication, but that the Vice-Minister had informally told General Pabst that Japan would adhere to its fixed policy and intended to continue the negotiations at Batavia with the Netherlands East Indies authorities for economic collaboration between that country and Japan. The Spokesman was reported as stating further that Japan's policy would not be affected by the Netherlands Government's declaration of which the Japanese Government could not take serious notice; and that Japan is determined to realize concrete results from the Batavia conference.

The Japanese press gave an appreciable amount of comment to the situation between Japan and the Netherlands East Indies. It stressed the view that cooperation of the Netherlands East Indies with Japan's policy was indispensable to Japan; that the Netherlands East Indies had shown an unfriendly attitude towards this country; and made thinly veiled admonitions to the effect that the Netherlands East Indies should consider the danger to it of opposing its incorporation into the new "Co-prosperity Sphere".

The agenda of the Japanese delegation to the economic conference at Batavia was submitted to the Netherlands delegation in January. No publicity has been given in Japan to the Japanese desiderata. The Embassy has been informed by the Netherlands Legation here that although the tone of the Japanese desiderata is friendly and non-aggressive, the demands themselves are of such a nature that, if acceded to, the Netherlands East Indies would be reduced to the status of a Japanese colony.

It is, of course, impossible to predict at this time the further development of the situation between the two countries, but through these expressions of view the general nature of the policies of the two countries and the divergence between those policies have been made public and in effect placed on record.

Respectfully yours,

JOSEPH C. GREW

[Enclosure]

Statement by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Matsuoka), Before the Japanese Diet, January 29, 1941

Concerning the first point, although the interpellator apprehends that the truce negotiations between Thailand and French Indo-China have not made smooth progress, due to Anglo-United States maneuvers, I am convinced that such apprehension is unwarranted.

Before Thailand and French Indo-China accepted Nippon's offer of mediation in their current dispute, certain powers had conducted intensive operations behind the scenes.

Since the acceptance of Nippon's offer, however, there have been no indications of any maneuvers prejudicial to the peace between Thailand and French Indo-China.

Our consultations with the two parties to the conflict so far have been held secretly. Therefore, I cannot say anything on the matter today. No agreement has yet been reached on the site of the truce negotiations. I hope the consultations will be successfully concluded as soon as possible.

Regarding the second point in the interpellation, it is still premature to reveal the amount of Nippon's oil purchase from the Netherlands East Indies. I hope that the time will soon come when the amount may be made public, so as to reassure the people on the matter.

I apprehend, in this connection, that the contents of the negotiations have already been partly disclosed secretly to some outside powers. Nippon and the N. E. I. recently issued a general statement on the matter. We have not yet reached agreement regarding a more precise announcement.

Before Commerce Minister Ichizo Kobayashi as Nippon's trade delegate to the N. E. I. left Batavia, an agreement was concluded on the oil purchase, the most important item in his negotiations with the N. E. I. authorities.

As we had previously feared, the negotiations encountered difficulties. Despite that, we succeeded in obtaining oil in a quantity surpassing our original expectations. I expect that the purchase may be further increased considerably in the form of ordinary commercial transactions.

As regards the third point in the interpellation, my intention has already been indicated in my speeches in the Diet. It seems difficult for the peoples in Europe and America to understand the idea of "Hakko Ichiu". I know that it is difficult to interpret the Nipponese phrase in foreign languages. Although the peoples in Europe and

America have not yet understood the mission of the Nippon nation, we must continue our efforts to make them understand it. Because of their failure to understand the Nipponese idea, they raise objections thereto.

I take this opportunity to state that the Imperial Government has never taken an irresolute attitude. We are firmly determined to advance our cause.

The construction of the East Asia common prosperity sphere is regarded with misgivings by those nations misinterpreting Nippon's aspirations as a desire for the conquest of Greater East Asia. Such misunderstanding is the product of modern Occidental civilization.

For those nations prosecuting their policies with the use of force along the lines of conquest of foreign territories, it may be difficult to understand our racial idea. Because our intention is misunderstood, I take this occasion to clarify it.

The word "leadership" may sound unpleasant to some persons. However, logically speaking, it is right and proper for the Nipponese to attempt to lead Greater East Asia in accordance with the idea of "Hakko Ichiu" which represents our traditional racial aspiration.

We will endeavor so as to enable all the peoples in the sphere of Greater East Asia to enjoy prosperity in proportion to their respective capacities.

I earnestly desire that Nippon's leadership will be accepted without any prejudice by the peoples in the region and other nations in the world.

Our intention is to develop our traditional racial principle in a manner covering not only Greater East Asia but also all other regions in the world. As the first step in our efforts in that direction, it is planned to lead the peoples in the sphere of Greater East Asia in accordance with the idea of "Hakko Ichiu". I desire that all the nations and peoples in the sphere will cooperate in the prosecution of our holy mission after fully understanding the Nippon cause. Nippon will never refuse to collaborate with those nations in Europe and America sympathizing with Nippon's aspirations.

Concerning the fourth point in the interpellation, I regret that Nippon residents in the N. E. I. have been subjected to outrages in that country. We are determined to put forth our best efforts for remedying the situation.

Because we are conducting economic negotiations with the N. E. I., the Government has taken a calm attitude toward the incidents, requesting the N. E. I. to rectify the situation in accordance with our protests.

Nevertheless, the N. E. I. press has taken an unfriendly attitude to Nippon. As this is highly regrettable, we have striven to enlighten the press regarding the cause of friendship between the two countries.

611.51G9/35

The American Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Matsuoka)

No. 1744 TOKYO, February 13, 1941.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to Your Excellency's note no. 3, South Seas II, dated January 7, 1941, in response to my oral representations on November 15, 1940, and my note no. 1714 of December 17, 1940, to Your Excellency concerning interference by Japanese officials in Indo-China with the issuance of permits by the authorities of French Indo-China for the export of American-owned merchandise from that country.

I regret to have to inform Your Excellency that further reports received by my Government indicate that the actions of the Japanese officials in question are at variance with the statement contained in Your Excellency's note under reference to the effect that "Japanese authorities interfere in no way whatever with the granting of permits by the Indo-China Government for the export of articles the ownership of which is determined to be American."

According to recent information received by my Government not only do Japanese officials in Indo-China continue to interfere with the granting of permits by appropriate authorities of Indo-China for the re-export of American-owned merchandise, but in one instance at least have caused these authorities to revoke a valid permit previously issued for the re-export of petroleum products owned by an American firm, the Standard Vacuum Oil Company.

In the light of the foregoing, I am instructed by my Government to urge that Your Excellency take without delay the necessary measures to bring about the cessation of this unwarranted interference on the part of the Japanese officials in Indo-China with the movement of American-owned merchandise.

I avail myself [etc.] JOSEPH C. GREW

740.0011 Pacific War/134 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

TOKYO, February 27, 1941—2 a. m.
[Received 4:55 p. m.]

317. In the course of my conversation today with the Foreign Minister he went out of his way to accuse the British Government of taking measures in the Far East which were a direct incitement to Japan and which rendered very difficult an improvement in the situation. He referred in this connection to the reported mining of Singapore and the sending of Australian troops to the Malaya-Thailand border.

I said that it seemed to me extraordinary that the Japanese should interpret and characterize obviously defensive measures as measures of offense. As I had said to the Minister at the American-Japan Society luncheon,[21] we must inevitably be guided by "facts and actions" and that certainly the facts and actions relating to Japan's southward advance were concrete causes for serious anxiety not only on the part of Great Britain but of ourselves. Having occupied in succession Waichow, Hainan, the Spratly Islands, and other areas, the Japanese military were now pouring troops into Indo-China and, according to our informer, had occupied the airport in Saigon, quite apart from naval activities in those regions, and that these steps, taken in conjunction with the public utterances of many Japanese statesmen, generals and admirals concerning Japanese intentions to the southward, had created a situation which could hardly be regarded with equanimity either by the United States or Great Britain since they threatened not only our interests but our possessions.

Mr. Matsuoka replied that Japan was not the only country where inflammatory utterances occurred and in this connection he mentioned the names of certain Americans. He denied the truth of the report that the airfield at Saigon had been occupied, merely murmuring something about Tongking, and he said that the Japanese troops in Indo-China were there in strict accordance with the terms of the official agreement with the Vichy Government. I said that according to our own information these troops were very much in excess of the number originally stipulated, but the Minister replied that this was merely a question of replacement.

The conversation then turned into other channels.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Hong Kong. Hong Kong please repeat to Bangkok and Hanoi.

Grew

740.0011 Pacific War/141 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, March 2, 1941—5 p. m.
[Received 5:55 p. m.[22]]

346. Embassy's 310, February 26, 7 p. m.[23] The Minister for Foreign Affairs called me on the telephone this morning and expressed surprise and annoyance at an editorial published today in the *Japan Times and Advertiser* quoting him as having stated in reply to an interpellation in the Budget Committee of the Diet with regard to Japan's policy toward Oceania that "we have a natural right to settle

---

[21] See p. 129.

[22] Telegram in two sections.

[23] Not printed.

in the region. White men occupying Oceania are due to return it to the Asiatics." The Minister said to me that the interpellator, who spoke three times as long as he himself had spoken, had used vehement and heated language and that he, Mr. Matsuoka, had endeavored to temper the exchange of views.

(Having drafted the rest of the Minister's remarks as made to me over the telephone I took the precaution of asking Dooman [23a] to call on the Minister at his private residence "it being Sunday" and to ask if he desired to correct or to amplify my draft. Mr. Matsuoka said that my draft correctly reported what he had said by telephone but that he would prefer, since I had given him the opportunity, to set forth precisely what he had actually said to the Diet. The rest of this telegram is therefore in the Minister's own handwriting.)

The Minister's thesis was that the Japanese people as well as other Asiatics have the natural right to go and settle anywhere in the world.

As for instance, there are the United States and like countries, whose conditions, climatically and otherwise, are very favorable and we'd prefer to go and settle. However, that was only theory and as a matter of practical international politics, there is no use contending about it. We Asiatics are shut door to almost every where. Oceania, 1100 miles north to south, 1000 east to west, was about the only region left. Climatically and otherwise the region is not preferable, but it is not with us Asiatics, including Japanese, a question of obtaining a better living but a question of struggling for mere subsistence. Where may we go? Even of unfavorable tropical and semi-tropical [climate]—the region pointed out is about the only place for us left, and it should be open as field for future expansion of the Asiatics. In winding up his reply the Minister hoped that the white people would agree to his views as set forth. What he pleaded for was merely open door for Asiatics' immigration and enterprises, and he uttered no word to imply in anyway that the white people should leave Oceania or that their possessions should be renounced. Those views represent the Minister's studied thought over a period of 30 years and Mr. Matsuoka adds that the same views have been set forth in a book by a prominent American bishop in Shanghai,[24] some 25 years ago, who was close to President Wilson. The Minister did not recollect the Bishop's name. In many other writings by both Americans and Britishers of some note [*sic*].

The Minister expressed his regret that his statement in the Diet had been distorted in the foreign press and that the editorial under reference was based on a mangled report of his remarks.

GREW

[23a] Eugene H. Dooman, Counselor of Embassy in Japan.

[24] See James W. Bashford, *China: An Interpretation* (New York, Abingdon Press, 1916), p. 396.

762.94/505 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[Substance]

WASHINGTON, April 8, 1941—6 p. m.

220. Department has received following information from Embassy in Berlin:

Circles usually well informed have reported that during Matsuoka's recent visit in German capital, one of the subjects he discussed was that of Germany's supplying war planes to Japan at once. Japanese request is said to have been assented to by German Government on condition that Germany be furnished with shipments of necessary raw materials from Dutch East Indies as compensation. In this connection there is another report that several Government officials who are currently informed on Dutch affairs are in near readiness to leave for Japan.

HULL

740.0011 Pacific War/179 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

TOKYO, April 15, 1941—10 p. m.
[Received April 15—12:40 p. m.]

562. Having in mind the rumors prevailing in Tokyo, which have been reported previously, of an intention on the part of Japan to attack Singapore very soon, a member of the Embassy staff made a point of mentioning these reports to Ohashi [25] at a luncheon on April 15. While very vigorously denying these reports, Ohashi said that an official denial would be issued if the question were raised with the Cabinet Information Board by an American correspondent. On the afternoon of April 15, the deputy spokesman for the Cabinet Information Board (Ishii) declared officially that these reports were untrue, in response to an inquiry from an American correspondent. Ishii said, as Prince Konoye had stated recently, the intentions of Japan in regard to the southern area are altogether economic and peaceful. Ishii declared that he could deny flatly and absolutely that Japan has any intention of sending a naval or a military force against or to Singapore and he characterized the reports as the work of warmongers.

GREW

---

[25] Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs.

893.24/1101

The American Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Matsuoka)

No.1812 TOKYO, June 3, 1941.

EXCELLENCY: With reference to the several formal and informal representations which I have made to Your Excellency concerning certain American-owned cargo in French Indo-China, I have the honor to bring to Your Excellency's attention the fact that the Japanese military authorities in that area, apparently acting on instructions from their Government, have recently commenced removing the cargo to transports for shipment elsewhere. As much of this cargo is of American origin, is owned by American nationals, and as the Government of the United States has extended considerable credits thereon, I have been instructed by my Government to protest against this arbitrary action and to request that the American cargo be returned to its rightful owners immediately.

According to information received from the American Consul at Hanoi, American firms which had cargo stored in Haiphong received communications on May 24 from the Japanese military authorities demanding the keys to the warehouses in which the cargo was stored. The following day, May 25, before the American firms had reached any decision with reference to this demand, the Japanese prevailed on the French authorities to demand of the American firms the surrender of the keys. In the face of this official demand in writing from the duly constituted French authorities, the American firms were forced under protest to relinquish their keys, which in turn were given by the French authorities to the Japanese. As a matter of fact, it is understood that Japanese soldiers broke into certain warehouses even before the keys were handed over.

The American Consul at Hanoi has lodged a protest with his Japanese colleague with reference to this action of the Japanese military.

I have been instructed to inform Your Excellency that the Government of the United States does not recognize any right on the part of the Japanese military in French Indo-China to take the action described above, and that it reserves all rights in regard to property involved in which it or its nationals may have interest. Although my Government does not have full details in regard to all the merchandise involved, it does have a definite interest in much of it because of its American origin and because of American Governmental credits extended thereon. I am further instructed to inform Your Excellency that my Government has an interest in the unimpeded delivery of this cargo to such destination as may be desired by its lawful owners.

Accordingly, it is requested that the cargo be released without delay to the companies which hold title to it.

I avail myself [etc.] JOSEPH C. GREW

893.24/1116

The American Embassy in Japan to the Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs

No. 1829

The American Embassy presents its compliments to the Imperial Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and has the honor to refer to the American Ambassador's note to the Imperial Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, No. 1812 of June 3, 1941, and to the Ambassador's remarks to His Excellency the Minister on June 5, concerning the seizure at Haiphong, French Indo-China, of American-owned merchandise by Japanese military forces.

According to information recently received from the American Consul at Hanoi, who visited Haiphong in connection with the seizure, accurate information concerning the amount of cargo seized is not available because the owners thereof are prevented by the Japanese military from inspecting the docks and warehouses where operations are going on. The representatives of the various American companies at Haiphong were accordingly unable to ascertain exactly the amount and nature of their transit cargo which had been seized, although they knew that a certain amount had been taken away.

The American Consul at Hanoi further stated that the Japanese Military Mission at Haiphong had been supplied, through a French liaison officer, with lists of cargoes which were American-owned or in which there was an American interest.

In transmitting the above information to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the American Embassy has the honor to reiterate the request contained in the American Ambassador's note mentioned above, that immediate steps be taken to return the seized American cargoes to those companies which have titles thereto.

TOKYO, June 21, 1941.

893.24/1116

The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Matsuoka) to the American Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[Translation]

No. 71–Strictly Confidential
South Seas II

TOKYO, June 24, 1941.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to state that I have carefully perused the contents of Your Excellency's note no. 1812, June 3, 1941.

Your Excellency is hereby referred to the matters stated in my note no. 14–Confidential/–South Seas II, February 8, 1941, and in Your Excellency's note no. 1732, January 24, 1941.

The accumulated goods in question are goods which have been kept in custody by the authorities of French Indo-China under the observation of the Japanese. The authorities of French Indo-China in June 1940 prohibited the transit through that country of materials for the assistance of Chiang, and accordingly recognized the despatch of a Japanese military Special Committee to see that the prohibition was carried out. In this manner they wholly cooperated with Japan in its efforts to suppress activities of assistance to Chiang, as a result of which, materials consigned to Chiang which were in French Indo-China at the time have not, as a rule, been permitted to be transported out of that country.

It being natural to regard military materials consigned to the Chungking régime, with which Japan is at present engaged in hostilities, as having a hostile nature, it is also beyond question that this cannot be affected by the place of origin of the goods, or by the presence or absence of credits or other arrangements for the payment of their cost. Furthermore, since the goods are hostile in nature, it is natural for the Japanese to dispose of them as enemy property. The Japanese authorities, however, being anxious to avoid violating the interests of third power nationals, have up to today been making every effort to ascertain in each case whether there was any evidence to disprove the presumption mentioned above; and when as a result thereof there was conclusive proof with respect to any goods, their transportation outside French Indo-China was recognized as appropriate. Thus a very careful attitude has been maintained in dealing with the matter. However, in the meantime, Chungking has on more than one occasion attempted to transport these goods secretly, and it became difficult, under prevailing conditions, to be assured of the safe protection of the accumulated goods while preventing their flow to Chungking. Therefore, it became necessary to transport to other places of safety for the time being those goods which, as a result of the investigations of the Japanese authorities, were determined positively to be enemy property, as well as those goods which, for the reasons mentioned above, were deemed to be enemy property in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

It is, accordingly, regretted that at this juncture Your Excellency was not agreeable, as mentioned in Your Excellency's note referred to above, to cooperate with the Japanese authorities on the ground that there was no obligation on the part of Your Excellency's nationals to produce evidence concerning the ownership of goods they claimed as theirs.

However, it may be added that the Japanese authorities are prepared to save those goods, even after they have been transported elsewhere, concerning which evidence is produced that they belong to third powers or to third power nationals.

I avail myself [etc.] YOSUKE MATSUOKA

893.24/1141

Oral Statement by the American Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Matsuoka)

Reference is made to the frequent oral and written communications between the American Embassy and the Foreign Office concerning merchandise in French Indo-China owned by American citizens or in which there is American interest; the latest of these communications was the Foreign Minister's Note no. 71 dated June 24, 1941.

Since that time, information has been received to the effect that certain cargo at Hanoi as well as at Haiphong has been seized by the Japanese military, but that it was impossible to check the amount and nature of the cargo so seized because the rightful owners were not permitted to inspect the warehouses where their merchandise was stored. Nevertheless, it is known that a substantial amount of American cargo has been taken away.

In bringing this subject again to the attention of the Foreign Office, it is urgently requested that immediate steps be taken to restore the merchandise to its rightful owners. The Government of the United States, as has been stated before, does not recognize the right of the Japanese military to take any action whatsoever in French Indochina against property in which there is an American interest. The American Embassy has been instructed to state that the result of persistence by the Japanese in action such as that described above can only be further deterioration in relations between the United States and Japan.

TOKYO, July 8, 1941.

740.0011 Pacific War/482

Press Release Issued by the Department of State on July 24, 1941

In response to inquiries by press correspondents, the Acting Secretary made the following statement:

"It will be recalled that in 1940 the Japanese Government gave expression on several occasions to its desire that conditions of disturbance should not spread to the region of the Pacific, with special references to the Netherlands East Indies and French Indochina. This desire was expressly concurred in by many other

Governments, including the Government of the United States. In statements by this Government, it was made clear that any alteration in the existing status of such areas by other than peaceful processes could not but be prejudicial to the security and peace of the entire Pacific area and that this conclusion was based on a doctrine which has universal application.

"On September 23, 1940, referring to the events then rapidly happening in the Indochina situation, the Secretary of State stated that it seemed obvious that the existing situation was being upset and that the changes were being achieved under duress. Present developments relating to Indochina provide clear indication that further changes are now being effected under duress.

"The present unfortunate situation in which the French Government of Vichy and the French Government of Indochina find themselves is, of course, well known. It is only too clear that they are in no position to resist the pressure exercised upon them.

"There is no doubt as to the attitude of the Government and people of the United States toward acts of aggression carried out by use or threat of armed force. That attitude has been made abundantly clear.

"By the course which it has followed and is following in regard to Indochina, the Japanese Government is giving clear indication that it is determined to pursue an objective of expansion by force or threat of force.

"There is not apparent to the Government of the United States any valid ground upon which the Japanese Government would be warranted in occupying Indochina or establishing bases in that area as measures of self-defense.

"There is not the slightest ground for belief on the part of even the most credulous that the Governments of the United States, of Great Britain, or of the Netherlands have any territorial ambitions in Indochina or have been planning any moves which could have been regarded as threats to Japan. This Government can, therefore, only conclude that the action of Japan is undertaken because of the estimated value to Japan of bases in that region primarily for purposes of further and more obvious movements of conquest in adjacent areas.

"In the light of previous developments, steps such as are now being taken by the Government of Japan endanger the peaceful use by peaceful nations of the Pacific. They tend to jeopardize the procurement by the United States of essential materials such as tin and rubber which are necessary for the normal economy of this country and the consummation of our defense program. The purchase of tin, rubber, oil or other raw materials in the Pacific area on equal terms with other nations requiring these materials has never been denied to Japan. The steps which the Japanese Government has taken also endanger the safety of other areas of the Pacific, including the Philippine Islands.

"The Government and people of this country fully realize that such developments bear directly upon the vital problem of our national security."

740.0011Pacific War/545

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[TOKYO,] July 25, 1941.

At the request of the new Minister for Foreign Affairs I called on him for a second interview at 9:30 this evening. He said that at noon tomorrow the Japanese Government would issue an official statement of the agreement reached with the Vichy Government concerning Japan's proposed movement into Indochina but that in view of the concern of the United States he wished to explain to me in advance the reasons and intentions of such movement. Admiral Toyoda thereupon handed to me a document in Japanese accompanied by an unofficial English translation the text of which was transmitted to the Department in the Embassy's telegram No. 1088, July 26, 2 a. m.[26]

After reading the document I said that I would transmit it promptly to my Government but that in the meantime I could best reply to certain points contained therein by conveying to the Minister the statement issued to the press by the Acting Secretary of State yesterday. I thereupon read to the Minister such portions of the Acting Secretary's statement as were picked up on the radio today and said that I would send to him tomorrow the complete text when finally received tonight.

In further discussion I emphasized and elaborated certain pertinent points in Mr. Welles' statement. I spoke of the utter fallacy of the charge of "encirclement" and of the concept that Japan was acting for the "safety and protection of Indochina". I said that I was glad to take note of the phrase in the Japanese statement that "Japan has no intention at all of making the southern part of Indochina a base of armed advancement against adjoining areas" but that my Government and I myself had met with so many bitter disappointments during the past several years in the illusory nature of promises and assurances conveyed to me by former Japanese Ministers that we were now unavoidably obliged to rely on facts and actions rather than upon words. The Minister did not attempt to refute this statement but he earnestly begged me to believe him.

---

[26] Telegram No. 1088 not printed; translation of the Japanese document is printed *infra*.

As the conversation continued I spoke in detail of the successive steps of the Japanese southward advance culminating for the present in the proposed occupation of bases in southern Indochina and the consequent endangering of the safety of other areas in the Pacific including the Philippine Islands and I elaborated the practical and logical reasons for our concern in the safety of Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies which were definitely threatened by this advance.

The Minister did not try to refute my argument except to repeat the peaceful intentions of the proposed Japanese move into Indochina and to take issue with our use of the term "occupation" in connection therewith since Japan had no territorial ambitions. I replied that the term "occupation" connoted no question of time.

In closing our conversation the Minister earnestly appealed to me to use my best efforts to convey to my Government Japan's peaceful intentions and the great importance of avoiding at this critical moment measures which would provoke the Japanese people and render difficult the efforts to improve the relations between Japan and the United States. He said that he would convey to Admiral Nomura the substance of our conversation.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

740.0011 Pacific War/545

The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Toyoda) to the American Ambassador in Japan (Grew)[27]

[TOKYO,] July 25, 1941.

Between the Japanese Government and the Vichy Government there was amicably reached an agreement of views on the twenty-first of July, 1941, concerning the joint protection of French Indochina, and an announcement on the agreement is soon to be made.

I asked for an appointment with Your Excellency this evening in order to take this opportunity, on behalf of the Japanese Government, of informing Your Excellency in advance of the measure just referred to, and of making the situation clear so that there may be no unnecessary misunderstanding which may arise from this question, in view of the foreign press reporting unfounded rumors such as that the Japanese Government had sent the Vichy Government an ultimatum.

The relations between Japan and French Indochina have recently become more friendly by the so-called Matsuoka-Henri Pact of August, last year, and several other Franco-Japanese agreements; and in view of the fact that it is to the common interest of both Japan and France to insure the safety of French Indochina and to prevent the disturbance of peace in the same area under the existing complicated international situation, the Japanese and French Governments have, at this time, as already stated, arrived at an understanding as regards joint protection of French Indochina.

---

[27] Unofficial English translation by Japanese Foreign Office of document in Japanese handed to the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Admiral Toyoda, during conversation on July 25, 1941. This translation was later checked by the American Embassy.

It is needless to say that I can affirm to Your Excellency that the Japanese Government will strictly observe all the agreements now existing between Japan and France and especially those relating to the integrity of territory and the respect for sovereignty and refrain from interfering in the domestic affairs of French Indochina, and also that Japan has no intention at all of making the southern part of French Indochina a base of armed advancement against adjoining areas.

As a matter of fact, we are receiving numerous reports that America should adopt more stringent anti-Japanese economic measures such as the freezing of Japanese capital in America and a complete embargo of petroleum oil as retaliatory steps against the measure just mentioned; and if the above should ever be realized, I deeply apprehend that it will be difficult to prevent the unexpected agitation of antagonism among the Japanese people against aid to the Chiang Kai-shek regime and the encirclement campaign against Japan, which antagonism the government has so carefully repressed until today.

It seems that in the United States there is an element which possesses an unpleasant feeling against the measure which I have just mentioned, but viewing it in a fair and composed attitude from an objective standpoint, such a measure is truly unavoidable from a broad viewpoint of maintaining peace in the Pacific by preventing a more serious aggravation of the feelings of the Japanese people, which are steadily being excited by such facts as the unsatisfactory result of the Netherlands East Indies-Japanese negotiations, and as is well known, the almost daily reports from abroad about the tightening of the encirclement campaign against Japan. I earnestly hope that Your Excellency will fully comprehend the disposal at issue as being necessitated by sincere hope for the maintenance of the peace in the Pacific and cooperate in keeping the door open for my hope and further efforts directed toward amicable solution of Japanese-American relations.

740.0011 Pacific War/397

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton)

[WASHINGTON,] July 25, 1941.

Mr. Wakasugi, the Japanese Minister, called this afternoon at 3:15 at his request. He said that he had been instructed by the Ambassador to leave with me as an advance copy a statement which was to be released by the Japanese Government at 10 p. m., tonight, July 25, Washington time, in regard to the French Indochina situation. Mr. Wakasugi said that he had been instructed, in leaving this statement with me, to call special attention to two points: (1) that in what the Japanese Government was doing the Japanese Government would show respect for the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of French Indochina; and (2) that Japan did not intend to interfere with the internal affairs of French Indochina.

Mr. Wakasugi asked that I inform the Acting Secretary of the foregoing.

I replied that I would bring the matter to the attention of the Acting Secretary. I added that the attitude of this Government had of course, as Mr. Wakasugi was aware, been made known clearly by the President [27a] and by Mr. Welles.

Mr. Wakasugi asked that the attached statement of the Japanese Government [28] be regarded as confidential until released by the Japanese Government.

M[AXWELL] M. H[AMILTON]

740.0011 Pacific War/397

Statement by the Japanese Government, July 25, 1941 [29]

In recent times through successive Franco-Japanese agreements, beginning with the Matsuoka-Henri Agreement of August, 1940, the relations between Japan and French Indo-China have grown rapidly intimate. The Governments of Japan and France have now reached a complete agreement of views on the joint defense of French Indo-China under a friendly policy.

While observing strictly all her obligations arising from the existing agreements, especially her solemn pledge to respect the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of French [Indo-]China, Japan will hereafter strive more than ever to promote the friendly relations between Japan and France and thereby to bring about the common prosperity of the two countries.

Press Release Issued by the Department of State on August 2, 1941 [30]

The Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Sumner Welles, issued the following statement on August 2 in reply to inquiries from the press concerning the agreement entered into between the French and Japanese Governments regarding French Indochina:

[27a] See memorandum of July 24, 1941, by the Acting Secretary of State, p. 527.

[28] *Infra.*

[29] Unofficial translation.

[30] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, August 2, 1941 (vol. v, No. 110), p. 87.

"The French Government at Vichy has given repeated assurances to the Government of the United States that it would not cooperate with the Axis powers beyond the obligations imposed on it by the armistice, and that it would defend the territory under its control against any aggressive action on the part of third powers.

"This Government has now received information of the terms of the agreement between the French and Japanese Governments covering the so-called 'common defense' of French Indochina. In effect, this agreement virtually turns over to Japan an important part of the French Empire.

"Effort has been made to justify this agreement on the ground that Japanese 'assistance' is needed because of some menace to the territorial integrity of French Indochina by other powers. The Government of the United States is unable to accept this explanation. As I stated on July 24, there is no question of any threat to French Indochina, unless it lies in the expansionist aims of the Japanese Government.

"The turning over of bases for military operations and of territorial rights under pretext of 'common defense' to a power whose territorial aspirations are apparent, here presents a situation which has a direct bearing upon the vital problem of American security. For reasons which are beyond the scope of any known agreement, France has now decided to permit foreign troops to enter an integral part of its Empire, to occupy bases therein, and to prepare operations within French territory which may be directed against other peoples friendly to the people of France.

"The French Government at Vichy has repeatedly declared its determination to resist all encroachments upon the sovereignty of its territories. However, when German and Italian forces availed themselves of certain facilities in Syria to carry on operations directed against the British, the French Government, although this was a plain encroachment on territory under French control, did not resist. But when the British undertook defense operations in the territory of Syria, the French Government did resist.

"Under these circumstances, this Government is impelled to question whether the French Government at Vichy in fact proposes to maintain its declared policy to preserve for the French people the territories both at home and abroad which have long been under French sovereignty.

"This Government, mindful of its traditional friendship for France, has deeply sympathized with the desire of the French people to maintain their territories and to preserve them intact. In its relations with the French Government at Vichy and with the local French authorities in French territories, the United States will be governed by the manifest effectiveness with which those authorities endeavor to protect these territories from domination and control by those powers which are seeking to extend their rule by force and conquest, or by the threat thereof."

751G.94/384 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

[Paraphrase]

TOKYO, September 30, 1941—3 p. m.
[Received September 30—1:41 p. m.]

1542. From a non-Japanese source of the highest authority the Embassy has been informed as follows in regard to the attitude and behavior of Japan's armed forces in French Indochina:

(1) The Japanese military command presented a number of demands to the Governor General about 10 days ago, asking that certain airfields in Cambodia and French military barracks in various parts of Indochina be transferred to Japanese armed forces. A number of Chinese, alleged to be secret agents of Chinese Government, have also been arrested by the Japanese. The military accompanied their demands for the transfer of airfields and barracks by a threat to take possession of them forcibly if the French authorities failed to return a favorable reply before September 27, noon. Vigorous representations regarding the matter were made by the French Embassy here. Officials of the Japanese Foreign Office emphasized that although the attitude of the Japanese military authorities in French Indochina was not approved by the Government, the latter was not in a position to intervene. In view of the Japanese Government's wholly negative attitude, the Governor General of Indochina replied affirmatively to the Japanese military command before expiration of the time limit stated.

(2) My informant said that officials of the Japanese Foreign Office with whom he had talked very recently, had vaguely hinted to him that the Japanese military authorities in French Indochina were endeavoring to prejudice the success of the conversations reported as taking place between the Governments of the United States and Japan.

GREW

INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, 1941

SUMMARY OF CONVERSATIONS

711.94/2651½

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State

[WASHINGTON,] May 19, 1942.

ACCOUNT OF INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN, 1941

INTRODUCTORY

As the year 1941 opened, a vast movement of political forces throughout the world was intensely active. The Axis grouping among Germany, Italy and Japan had been formalized in September 1940 by the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact.[1] The anti-Axis grouping was not organized. In all countries not at the moment engaged in the hostilities in Europe, there was great rivalry and struggle between opposing groups which in some countries sought to escape, if possible, involvement in that war and which in other countries sought to cast their national fortunes with one side or the other of the conflict in Europe.

The Soviet Union was not at that time actively engaged in the European war on either side. It had, on August 23, 1939, concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany and, on the basis of an exchange of letters between the respective Foreign Ministers on September 28, 1939, had subsequently entered into close economic relations with Germany, whereby in addition to a substantial exchange of supplies carried on between Germany and the Soviet Union there was a considerable transit trade both ways through Russian territory between Germany and the Far East. In this transit trade supplies destined for Germany were assembled by a large German purchasing organization functioning throughout the Far East with at least benevolent Japanese acquiescence. Despite these political and economic arrangements, basic elements of enmity on the part of Germany toward the Soviet Union remained unaffected.

The Soviet Union was also talking with Japan. A political treaty to ease tension between those countries had long been under negotiation and was still under consideration. Russian railways continued carrying German machines and supplies to Manchuria—much of this cargo being en route to Japan—and Manchurian and Japanese products to Germany.

---

[1] See pp. 164 ff.

Italy was suffering severe military losses in Albania and Libya. Germany was vigorously engaged in preparing for a new offensive. These preparations were partly devoted to intensive political and diplomatic activity in the Balkans. Bulgaria and Rumania were brought into the Nazi fold. Germany's efforts to increase its influence in Turkey and particularly in Japan continued at an accelerating pace.

Germany's vast military machine, which included powerful land and air forces built up over a period of years, was intact after riding rough-shod over the greater part of the continent of Europe.

The entire Japanese nation was aware of what its leaders called a "golden opportunity" (resulting from inadequate preparation for defense, confusion and preoccupation on the part of the western "democracies" with the war in Europe and with domestic issues) to fulfill the nation's desire for expansion. Japan was, however, faced with a great internal struggle in regard to methods for taking advantage of the opportunities presented—some groups were insisting that Japan keep out of the war in Europe and gather all possible benefits obtainable by trade and by negotiations and threats short of participation in that war; other groups were determined to strike with force if necessary even at the risk of throwing together the war in China and the war in Europe. The Japanese people were psychologically tired after three and one-half years of war in China. They were being continually told that the Japanese Cabinet had as its primary objective the termination of the "China incident" and the prevention of the spread of the European war to the Far East. Despite diplomatic conversations with Russia, large Japanese forces were maintained in Manchuria. Long lines of communication made further penetration into China by Japanese forces costly. Japan was also faced by growing American aid to China. (On November 30, 1940 it was announced at Washington that the Export-Import Bank would loan $50,000,000 to the Chinese Government and that a fund of $50,000,000 to stabilize Chinese currency was under contemplation.) Although Japan's long efforts had succeeded in rationalizing Japan's heavy industry and in expanding tremendously the output of munitions, Japan's economy was feeling the pinch of restrictions on exports from the United States and other countries. By the early part of 1941, shipments from the United States to Japan of iron, steel, most important metals, machinery, high quality gasoline and blending agents, and plants and plans for the production of high quality gasoline had practically ceased. The tension between the United States and Japan was growing and was affording fuel to the arguments between opposing groups in Japan. Japanese diplomats were beginning attempts to follow in the Far East Germany's pattern in the Balkans and to "Bulgarize" Indochina, Thailand, and the Netherlands East Indies.

The British Empire was desperately engaged in efforts (political, diplomatic, and military) to prepare to meet new military offensives which threatened to break out in any one or several of a number of areas stretching from the British Isles around the world to Australia. At the same time the British Empire was struggling with the momentous problem of bringing to maximum effectiveness its organization of a war economy and expansion of war industries while Great Britain was digging out of the wreckage of German bombing raids on British cities.

China, weakened by the ravages of three and one-half years of military invasion and depredation, was continuing heroically to hold off Japan. China however was confronted with mounting problems of supply and the difficulties of growing inflation. China had been robbed of its great cities and cut off from all normal communication routes with the rest of the world. The prospects of additional aid from Russia were not encouraging, and, after the Japanese move into northern Indochina in the summer of 1940, the Burma Road remained practically the only route available for bringing in sea-borne supplies (except for a precarious smuggling traffic between the occupied and unoccupied areas of China). The amounts of supplies which could be transported by the Burma Road were limited. Moreover, the Burma Road was exposed to Japanese air attack, and there was also the danger that in case Germany should break through in the Near East Japan might take advantage of the situation to advance southward to make contact with the Germans by way of the Indian Ocean and to close the Burma route into China altogether.

The Netherlands East Indies were feeling increasing pressure from Japanese diplomacy to force the Indies to "cooperate" with Japan as Indochina, following negotiations between Japan and Vichy, had agreed to do.

The potential threat from Japan which had continued to grow was forcing all other powers interested in the Pacific to undertake to whatever degree possible reinforcement of their defensive strength in that area. The Netherlands, British Malaya, Burma, India, Australia, New Zealand and the United States, all were feeling keenly the need for more airplanes, more ships, more guns, more ammunition and more of every kind of supplies necessary for defense. The vast scope of this need, combined with other factors, made it necessary to spread dangerously thin the military forces and supplies which those countries were able to provide or obtain. At the same time the heavy need for supplies for Great Britain, for Near Eastern and Mediterranean areas, and for countries of this hemisphere, continued to place greater demands upon the industrial facilities of the United States than could then be met.

The world picture at the opening of 1941 would not be complete without reference to the theater of war in the north Atlantic, where the Germans with a large fleet of submarines and long-range bombers were taking a toll of ships and materials which at the moment were almost impossible to replace. There was at that time a noticeable inadequacy of available shipping to bridge the gap between American factories and the European front.

Another of the important factors in the situation was the information which early in 1941 had come to the knowledge of the Government from reliable and confidential sources that Germany had decided to attack Russia. This Government communicated this information confidentially to the Soviet Ambassador.

The United States had passed through a Presidential election in connection with which both of the great political parties wrote into their respective platforms unequivocal resolutions against involving the United States in foreign wars. The nation was only beginning to put into effect an expanding program of national defense and of aid to the democracies. Industrial plants were continuing to make peacetime goods, although construction of new defense industries and expansion of existing defense plants were under way. Labor disputes were on the increase. The problem of national security, however, was beginning to emerge as a major preoccupation of the United States and there were signs of a growing feeling that our security was inseparable from the security of all free peoples.

The acuteness of the situation in Europe, the constantly growing danger in the Far East, the vast expanse of territory to be defended, the necessity of supplying materials for defense of this hemisphere, of the British Isles, of the Near East and of the Far East, the need for expanding tremendously our output of materials necessary for defense for ourselves and for our friends, the generally divided attitude of the American public toward the world situation, the inadequacy of American production, and growing realization of the far-reaching consequences to the whole world which would follow the extension of the European war and of the hostilities in China to the entire Pacific area and of the importance of averting if possible such a development—all these constituted significant and inescapable factors in the situation which confronted the United States in January 1941.

I. PRELIMINARY PHASE

1. Late in January 1941, through the medium of private Americans and Japanese, there was informally brought to the attention of the President and the Secretary of State a suggestion that the Japanese Government would welcome an opportunity to alter its

political alignments and modify its attitude toward China. It was represented that if an agreement could be achieved with the United States which would offer Japan security this would enable the moderate elements in Japan to gain control of the domestic political situation in Japan. It was further represented that there was adequate support in the Japanese Government for an agreement with the United States which would provide *inter alia* for practical nullification of Japan's alliance with the Axis and for a settlement of the conflict between China and Japan on terms which would give complete recognition by Japan of the "open door" in China provided that Japan received similar treatment elsewhere in the Far East. It was also represented that the Japanese people were weary of the hostilities with China and that most elements in Japan were prepared for a recasting of Japan's policies along liberal and peaceful lines.

2. Under any circumstances it would have been necessary before entertaining representations of such a character to proceed with caution and to examine with deliberate care the sponsorship and contents of a proposal advanced in this way. Such a procedure was at that time especially essential in view of Japan's record during the preceding ten years. In connection with this record, it will be recalled that on January 15, 1941, the Secretary of State, in a statement before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, said:

> " . . . The equilibrium in the Far East which had been established by the Washington Conference treaties of 1921–1922 [2] became seriously disturbed by the setting up by forceful means in a part of China of a regime under Japanese control under the name of 'Manchukuo'. This control over Manchuria has been marked by the carrying out of a policy of discrimination which has resulted in forcing out American and other foreign interests.
>
> "During the years that followed, Japan went steadily forward in her preparations for expansion by force of arms. In December 1934,[3] she gave notice of her intention to terminate the naval treaty of February 6, 1922.[4] She then proceeded with intensified construction of military and naval armaments, at the same time undertaking, from time to time, limited actions directed toward an extension of her domination over China and involving disregard and destruction of the lawful rights and interests of other countries, including the United States.
>
> "In July, 1937, the armed forces of Japan embarked upon large-scale military operations against China. Invading forces of more than a million men occupied large areas along the seaboard and in the central provinces. In these areas there were set up puppet regimes which instituted systems of controls and monopolies discriminatory in favor of the interests of the invading country.

---

[2] See *Foreign Relations*, 1922, vol. I, pp. 1 ff.
[3] See vol. I, pp. 249 ff.
[4] *Foreign Relations*, 1922, vol. I, p. 247.

"It has been clear throughout that Japan has been actuated from the start by broad and ambitious plans for establishing herself in a dominant position in the entire region of the Western Pacific. Her leaders have openly declared their determination to achieve and maintain that position by force of arms and thus to make themselves masters of an area containing almost one-half of the entire population of the world. As a consequence, they would have arbitrary control of the sea and trade routes in that region.

"Previous experience and current developments indicate that the proposed 'new order' in the Pacific area means, politically, domination by one country. It means, economically, employment of the resources of the area concerned for the benefit of that country and to the ultimate impoverishment of other parts of the area and exclusion of the interests of other countries. It means, socially, the destruction of personal liberties and the reduction of the conquered peoples to the role of inferiors.

"It should be manifest to every person that such a program for the subjugation and ruthless exploitation by one country of nearly one-half of the population of the world is a matter of immense significance, importance and concern to every other nation wherever located.

"Notwithstanding the course which Japan has followed during recent years, this Government has made repeated efforts to persuade the Japanese Government that her best interests lie in the development of friendly relations with the United States and with other countries which believe in orderly and peaceful processes among nations. We have at no time made any threats."

3. The trend of contemporary developments in the Far East was such as to discourage belief that the time was opportune for acting upon the suggestion which had been brought to the attention of this Government. For example, in his address before the Japanese Diet on January 21, Mr. Matsuoka, Minister for Foreign Affairs, made clear, in effect, that he sought from the United States realization of the vital concern to Japan of the establishment of an East Asia "co-prosperity sphere", assent to Japan's supremacy in the western Pacific, and cessation of economic restrictions against Japan. He and other Japanese spokesmen were to an increasing extent openly stressing the point that the Tripartite Alliance was the pivot of Japan's foreign policy. Other evidence of growing Japanese intransigence was discernible in their increasing pressure upon Indochina to grant Japan military and naval bases and other new privileges, and in reports of extensive political intrigue by Japanese agents in Thailand. In the light of this situation and of Japan's long previous record of aggression, the initial reaction in this Government to the suggestion that the Japanese Government would welcome an opportunity to alter its political alignments and modify its attitude toward China was one of caution. At the same time, the sponsors of the suggestion insistently represented that the proposal

was acceptable to high Japanese official circles and could be made effective in Japan.

It was felt that before coming to any decision regarding the approach which had been made it would be desirable to await the arrival of the new Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Nomura. He presented his credentials to the President on February 14, and on March 8 the Secretary of State had his first extended conversation with the Ambassador. On that occasion the Secretary pointed out that the efforts of this Government to bring about organization of the world along liberal commercial lines had been impeded by movements of military conquest in various parts of the world and—having in mind press reports that had contained hints—he expressed the hope that the Ambassador might have something definite in mind that would offer a practical approach to dealing with the present course of his Government.

The Ambassador expressed his wholehearted approval of this Government's efforts to liberalize international commercial relations and affirmed the desire of the Japanese Government to reach a peaceful settlement with China and to reestablish friendly relations with the United States. He offered no concrete suggestions for dealing with the Chinese question or for conducting discussions with this Government in regard to matters calling for settlement. Nor did he indicate what his Government was prepared to do to clarify its attitude toward the Tripartite Alliance to which the Secretary called attention. With regard to his Government's present course he said he had nothing to offer other than to disclaim that Japan was committed to courses of conquest.

4. On April 9 there was received by the Secretary of State from the private persons referred to above a document containing a draft of a proposal for a general settlement in the Pacific area. This proposal, although reflecting an attitude less liberal in some respects than the earlier representations had forecast, contained many suggestions with which this Government could readily agree and other suggestions which would require modification or elimination to meet this Government's point of view. On April 14 the Secretary, in a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador, referred to reports which had been coming to the Secretary that certain Japanese had been formulating proposals for improving relations between the United States and Japan and that the Ambassador had been participating in the formulating of those proposals, and said that he did not know whether those reports were accurate but that it would of course be understood that in considering problems outstanding between our two Governments we could deal only with the Ambassador. The Ambassador promptly replied that he had known about the

proposals in question and stated that he had collaborated in the later stages of their preparation. He emphasized his desire to preserve peace between the two countries and his belief that his Government did not intend to invade the southwest Pacific area.

5. On April 16 the Secretary of State, in a further conversation with the Japanese Ambassador, after referring to the proposals of April 9, said that the one paramount preliminary question about which this Government was concerned was a definite assurance in advance that the Japanese Government had the willingness and power to go forward along the lines of the proposal, to abandon its present doctrine of conquest by force, and to adopt four principles which this Government regarded as the foundation upon which relations between nations should rest and which the Secretary of State enumerated as follows:

(1) Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations;
(2) Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries;
(3) Support of the principle of equality including equality of commercial opportunity;
(4) Non-disturbance of the *status quo* in the Pacific except as the *status quo* may be altered by peaceful means.

The Secretary of State expressed to the Japanese Ambassador the willingness of this Government to consider any proposal which the Japanese Government might offer such as would be consistent with the principles which the Secretary of State had enumerated. He also expressed the view that if the Japanese Government should earnestly intend to change its course there should be no reason why a reasonably satisfactory settlement of the problems presented might not be reached.

During this conversation the Ambassador replied to the effect that he believed that his Government desired peace, that he wished to discuss the questions raised by the Secretary of State, and that he would proceed to consult his Government in regard to the four points which the Secretary of State had laid before him.

II. Consideration of the Japanese Proposal of May 12 and Interruption of Conversations Following the Movement of Japanese Troops Into Indochina

6. The presentation on May 12 by the Japanese Ambassador, as under instruction from his Government, of a document containing a proposal for a general setttlement between the two Governments served to reveal authoritatively for the first time what the Japanese Government had in mind as a basis for an agreement. The Ambassador

introduced at this time as his associates Colonel Hideo Iwakuro, a representative of the Japanese Army, and Mr. Tadao Wikawa, an officer of the Cooperative Bank of Japan, who was spoken of as being close to the most influential civilian group in the Japanese Government. These two advisers took part in the subsequent conversations until those conversations were interrupted in July.

The document which the Japanese Ambassador presented on May 12 appeared to carry out a concept of a joint overlordship by Japan and the United States of the Pacific area, with apparently little thought for the rights and interests of countries other than Japan and the United States. The first two sections of the document, which were introductory and general in character, contained affirmations in abstract terms of peaceful intent and of a purpose to promote international cooperation. In reference to Japan's position with regard to its alliance with the Axis, the proposal contained a statement, which, in no way indicating any purpose on Japan's part of loosening its ties with the Axis, was a restatement of Japan's previously proclaimed position that its alliance with the Axis powers was designed to prevent the nations which were not then directly affected by the European war from engaging in that war (thus clearly implying a concept of coercing the United States for Axis purposes).

The proposal also included an undertaking on the part of the United States to request that the Government of China negotiate with Japan a settlement of the hostilities in China; a mutual undertaking by the United States and Japan that each would supply so far as possible commodities which the other required; a mutual undertaking that steps would be taken to bring about resumption of normal trade relations between the United States and Japan; and an undertaking by the United States that, Japan's expansion in the southwestern Pacific being declared to be of a peaceful nature, the United States would cooperate in facilitating the production and procurement by Japan of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, and nickel) which Japan needed. In connection with the undertaking on the part of the United States to request that China negotiate with Japan it was explained separately by the Japanese that the United States would be expected also to agree to discontinue aid to the National Government of the Republic of China in case the latter should decline to enter into such negotiations. The terms which Japan intended to propose to China were indicated only through reference to the "Konoe principles".

(It was separately explained that the "Konoe principles" included "neighborly friendship", "joint defense against Communism" and "economic cooperation"; and those principles were said to imply also mutual respect for sovereignty and territories, withdrawal of Japanese troops from China in accordance with an agreement to be reached between Japan and China, acceptance of the principles of no annexation and no indemnities, and recognition of the independence of "Manchukuo".)[5]

In as much as the "Konoe principles" had been made the basis of a so-called treaty between Japan and the Wang Ching-wei régime in November 1940[6] which had placed Japan clearly in a position of overlordship with respect to the Wang régime, the Secretary of State sought to induce the Japanese to state precisely the terms which they had in mind as a basis of Japan's negotiations with China, but the Japanese Ambassador and his associates consistently avoided making definite commitments by constant resort to vague generalities. (In the course of conversations with officers of the Department, the special military adviser of the Japanese Ambassador explained that the areas where stationing of Japanese troops in China was contemplated under the provision for "defense against communistic activities through collaboration of the two countries [China and Japan]" included Inner Mongolia and the adjacent regions of China proper, comprehending lines of communication to the sea as far south as Tsingtao, which thus meant Japanese military domination of the five northern provinces of Hopei, Shantung, Shansi, Chahar and Suiyuan with an aggregate area of more than 400,000 square miles and an estimated population of more than 80,000,000. The military adviser declared that this stationing of Japanese troops in China was an absolute condition of any settlement with China.)

Notwithstanding the features in the Japanese draft above noted which presented difficulties for this Government, the Japanese proposal appeared to offer possibilities as a basis for informal and exploratory discussions looking to a broad-gauge settlement of Pacific problems along the lines envisaged by this Government. Moreover, many highly placed Japanese, including the Prime Minister, in conversations with the American Ambassador at Tokyo, professed a belief that Japan's best interests lay in adopting courses of peace and of cooperation with this country. It was represented that an agreement with the United States would give such a psychological "lift" to the Japanese people that there would be an assurance of popular support in Japan of programs of peace.

7. This Government's attitude toward these representations was influenced by considerations of the world situation, as already summarized in the opening pages of this review, and of the defensive strategical position of this country and other similarly-minded countries. Great Britain, hard pressed by Germany, was in need of all the assist-

---

[5] See statement of December 22, 1938, by the Japanese Prime Minister, Prince Fumimaro Konoe, vol. I, p. 482.

[6] Signed at Nanking, November 30, 1940; for text, see p. 117.

ance that the United States could render in the Atlantic and Near Eastern theaters of war. With Great Britain and the United States thus preoccupied, and with the Netherlands Indies, Australia, and other British territories in East Asia, including Malaya, Burma, and North Borneo, extremely vulnerable to Japanese attack, it was obviously desirable to avert, or at least to delay as long as possible, any Japanese move which would result in a war on two oceans. It was of course realized that Japanese armed attack on British and Dutch territories in the Far East would immediately and tremendously increase the problems confronting the British, the Dutch, the Chinese and ourselves. In fact, the British, the Australian, and the Netherlands Governments continued to urge upon this Government their unpreparedness for resisting successfully a Japanese thrust in the Pacific. This Government was impressed not only by these representations but also by the consideration that the hope of defeating Hitlerism in Europe would be greatly enhanced if the more conservative elements in Japan should succeed in what was represented as their effort to divert Japan from courses of conquest and to cause Japan to withdraw—even though gradually—from the Axis camp and align itself with the United States. Accordingly, this Government decided to explore thoroughly every possible means, starting with the Japanese proposals, of coming to an agreement. In reaching this decision this Government, while realizing that the prospects of success were slender, was actuated by a sincere desire to reach an agreement if possible and thus act in accordance with the traditional desire of the American people that all peaceful means for settling differences be employed.

The Secretary of State on numerous occasions emphasized to the Japanese Ambassador that this Government was aware of the difficult internal situation which the Japanese Government faced and was prepared to be patient and to give the Japanese Government ample time to bring Japanese public opinion into line in support of a liberal broad-gauge program such as the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador had been discussing in their conversations. The Secretary of State realized thoroughly that Japan's record since 1931 made it clear that there was only a slight chance that Japan would or could change its course so as to make possible an agreement. After weighing all factors in the world situation, however, it seemed wise fully to explore that chance, at the same time adhering firmly to the attitude which this Government was taking of opposition to the course of aggression which Japan was pursuing.

8. On May 20, 1941, in a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador and his associates, the Secretary of State stated that there were two points in regard to the section of the Japanese proposal dealing with China to which he would like to call attention. One was in

regard to the joint defense against communism and the other was in regard to the stationing of Japanese troops in certain parts of Chinese territory. He said that he was not discussing the merits of the two points to which he referred but he felt that if and when this Government should approach Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on the matter of negotiating with Japan the Secretary of State would have to tell Generalissimo Chiang the basis on which Japan would propose to negotiate; and that this basis should be one on which Generalissimo Chiang could carry his country with him. He therefore wished to ask whether it would not be possible to cover these two points under some broader provision, such as a provision which would call for special measures of protection for Japanese nationals and property interests against lawlessness in areas where special measures for safeguarding the rights and interests of nationals of third powers might be necessary.

The Japanese in reply expressed surprise that these points should have been mentioned in as much as they regarded the settlement of the China affair as a matter which concerned only China and Japan.

The Secretary of State pointed out in this and other conversations that a peaceful settlement between Japan and China was an essential element in furthering the objective which the United States and Japan had in mind, namely, the peace of the Pacific. He added that if the United States should suggest that China enter into negotiations with Japan this Government could not divest itself of a certain degree of responsibility with regard to the basis of the proposed negotiations and the general conformity of Japan's proposed terms with principles which this Government supports.

9. On May 28 in response to questions asked by the Secretary of State, the Japanese Ambassador indicated that withdrawal of Japanese troops from China would not include Japanese troops retained in China for "cooperative defense against Communism", and that he was unable to state how many troops Japan would propose retaining or to define the precise areas in which the troops would be stationed. The Secretary thereupon commented that it seemed to him important that relations between China and Japan should be adjusted on a basis which would offer permanent promise of friendship between the two countries; and that the continued presence of Japanese troops in China would be a factor operating against such friendship. He asked whether the Japanese Government would not consider some other means of dealing with the problem than by arrangements such as Japan appeared to be contemplating. The Japanese Ambassador said that he did not believe that the Far East had progressed to a point where other arrangements would be feasible.

In this conversation of May 28, the Secretary of State mentioned that in connection with the question of a possible approach by this Government to the Chinese Government he had it in mind, before entering into any negotiations with Japan, to talk out in strict confidence with the Chinese Government the general subject matter involved in the proposals under discussion. He added that in the meantime conversations between the United States and Japan would continue on a purely informal and exploratory basis. This Government's attitude in regard to this subject was repeatedly presented to the Japanese Government on subsequent occasions.

The Secretary of State also on May 28 made it clear that the Japanese proposed formula with reference to Japanese relations to the Axis did not adequately clarify Japan's peaceful intention toward the United States should the United States through acts of self-defense become involved in war with Germany. He emphasized that such clarification was needed especially to offset statements being made by Japanese officials in defense or justification of Japan's Axis obligations. He said that the Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Matsuoka, since his return from Europe, had, according to widely published press reports, been making declarations on all occasions in regard to Japan's obligation under the Tripartite Alliance to support Germany in the event of American entry into the war in Europe. He said that, if we made an agreement with Japan, critics would, unless the Japanese Government had clarified its attitude toward its obligations under the Tripartite Alliance, assert that there was no assurance as to Japan's position vis-à-vis the United States.

10. In a conversation on June 2 the Secretary of State asked the Japanese Ambassador whether Japan seriously and earnestly desired to enter into a settlement for peace and non-discriminatory commercial relations and friendship in the Pacific area. When the Ambassador replied in the affirmative, the Secretary remarked that, in the light of the statements which Mr. Matsuoka and others were constantly making, one was forced to inquire whether Japan really was seeking this sort of settlement or was only seeking a way to extricate itself from the hostilities with China while otherwise going forward with methods and practices entirely contrary to the principles which would have to underlie any settlement establishing peace, non-discriminatory treatment of commerce and fair and friendly relations in the Pacific area.

The Ambassador reiterated his view that a fair settlement was desired. In reply to an inquiry from the Secretary of State about the Japanese policy with regard to the stationing of troops in China indefinitely, the Ambassador offered no encouraging comment.

The question of what Japan meant by "economic cooperation" between China and Japan was also discussed. Japan at first disclaimed any intention to maintain for itself an economic monopoly in China, but as the informal conversations proceeded it was evident that Japan intended to retain a preferred economic position for itself in China while at the same time trying to obtain for itself in the southwestern Pacific area economic rights such as it was unwilling that third powers should enjoy in China. The Secretary of State made it clear that retention by Japan of a preferred position in China would be inconsistent with the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations to which this Government was committed, which it believed to be essential for a lasting peace in the Pacific, and which the Japanese had said they approved.

11. Throughout the conversations this Government's attitude was repeatedly set forth with regard to these points—the necessity of Japan's making clear its relation to the Axis in case the United States should be involved in self-defense in the war in Europe; application of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another country and withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory; application of the principle of non-discrimination in commercial relations in China and other areas of the Pacific; and assurance of Japan's peaceful intent in the Pacific. The Secretary of State emphasized that what he was seeking was a comprehensive agreement which would speak for itself as an instrument of peace and that he was not interested in an agreement of a temporizing character which would not contain promise for future stability along sound progressive lines.

12. Following a conference on June 4 between officers of the Department and associates of the Japanese Ambassador which revealed on the part of Japan an even more grudging attitude than had heretofore been manifested toward clear-cut commitments on courses of peace, the Secretary of State on June 6 informed the Japanese Ambassador that he had received an impression, from the successive Japanese revisions of their proposal and from recent manifestations of the Japanese Government's attitude, that the Japanese Government was disposed (1) to stress Japan's alignment with the Axis; (2) to avoid giving a clear indication of an intention to place Japan's relations with China on a basis which, in the opinion of the Government of the United States, would contribute to a lasting peace and thus to future stability in the Far East; and (3) to veer away from clear-cut commitments in regard to policies of peace and of nondiscriminatory treatment which were the fundamentals of a sound basis for peace in the Pacific.

13. The Japanese Ambassador continued to insist that the Japanese Government really desired peace and kept urging the Secretary of

State to make a complete reply to the Japanese proposals of May 12. Consequently, on June 21, the Secretary handed the Ambassador a document which would, he explained, serve to bring the current discussions up to date as regarded the American attitude. This draft of June 21 included the following important points:

(*a*) Mutual declarations of the peaceful intent of both countries and their subscription to fundamental principles long advocated by this Government as the only sound basis for relations between nations;
(*b*) A suggested formula making clear that Japan was under no commitment to take action against the United States in the event that this country should be drawn through measures of self-defense into the war in Europe;
(*c*) Subject to the proviso that Japan communicate to the United States the general terms which Japan contemplated proposing to China, and subject to a further proviso that there should be additional discussion between Japan and the United States of these general terms, an agreement that the United States would suggest to China that China and Japan enter into negotiations;
(*d*) Mutual assurances by the two countries that each would supply to the other such commodities as were required by either and were available and that steps would be taken to resume normal trade relations between the two countries;
(*e*) Provision for cooperation between the two countries toward obtaining non-discriminatory access to supplies of natural resources which each needed—such cooperation to be given on the basis of mutual pledges that the activities of the two countries in the Pacific would be carried on by peaceful means and on the basis of non-discrimination in international commercial relations; and
(*f*) A mutual affirmation by the two countries that the basic policy of each was one of peace throughout the Pacific area and a mutual disclaimer of territorial designs there.

14. In the period immediately following June 21 several discussions were held by the Secretary of State or other officials of this Government with the Japanese representatives. The Japanese representatives, while indicating that they were seeking to meet the point of view of the United States upon certain issues, did not indicate a willingness, either through accepting this Government's formulas or otherwise, to alter in any substantial manner the attitude to which they had previously given expression upon the main questions.

Following an Imperial Conference at Tokyo on July 2, in which, according to an official announcement, "the fundamental national policy to be taken toward the present situation was decided" Japan proceeded with military preparations on a vast scale, including the calling up of from one to two million reservists and conscripts. Japanese merchant vessels operating in the Atlantic Ocean were suddenly recalled, a step which an important maritime nation such as Japan would not be likely to take without exceptionally strong reasons. Restrictions were imposed upon travel in Japan, strict censorship of mails and communications was carried out. Conditions approaching those usual only in anticipation of embarking upon a major war were imposed throughout the Empire.

During this period the Japanese press dwelt constantly on the theme that Japan was being faced with pressure directed against it never equalled in all Japanese history. It charged the United States with an intention to establish military bases in Kamchatka and with using the Philippine Islands as a "pistol aimed at Japan's heart". It warned that if the United States took further action in the direction of encircling Japan, Japanese-American relations would face a final crisis. (Later, on August 8 and again on August 15, an official Japanese spokesman declared that encirclement of Japan by the ABCD powers—the United States, Great Britain, China and the Netherlands—was an actual fact. The Japanese press, while affirming its approval of efforts by the Japanese Government to improve relations with the United States, stressed that the basis for any negotiations must be predicated upon there being under no circumstances any change in Japan's policies, namely, the "settlement of the China Incident, the firm establishment of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, and the Axis Alliance".)

15. In July this Government began receiving reports that a Japanese military movement into southern Indochina was imminent. This Government brought these reports to the attention of the Japanese representatives, pointed out the inconsistency between such a military movement and the discussions which were then proceeding looking toward the conclusion of an agreement for peace in the Pacific, and requested information as to the facts of the situation.

On July 23, the Japanese Ambassador, apparently after having received instructions from his Government, stated in explanation of the Japanese movement into southern as well as northern Indochina first that Japan feared that vital supplies including rice, foodstuffs and raw materials from Indochina might be cut off by de Gaullist French agents and Chinese agitators in southern Indochina,* and second that Japan believed that certain foreign powers were determined to encircle Japan militarily and that for that reason occupation of southern Indochina was undertaken purely as a precautionary measure. The Acting Secretary replied that any agreement which might have been concluded between the French Government at Vichy and Japan could only have resulted from pressure exerted on Vichy by Germany; therefore, it was our judgment that this agreement could only be looked upon as offering assistance to Germany's policy of world domination and conquest. He pointed out that the conclusion of the agreement which had been under discussion by the Secretary of State and the Ambassador would bring about a far greater measure of economic security to Japan than she could gain by occupation of Indochina. He said further that the policy of the United States was the opposite of an encirclement policy or of any policy which would be a threat to Japan; that Japan was not menaced by the policy of Great Britain and if an agreement had been concluded, Great Britain, the British Dominions, China, and the Netherlands would have joined the United States and Japan in support of the underlying principles stood for by the United States; that the United States could only regard the action of Japan as constituting notice that Japan intended to pursue a policy of force and conquest, and, as there was no basis apparent calling for filling Indochina with Japanese military and other forces as a measure for defending Japan, the United States must assume that Japan was taking the last step before proceeding on a policy of expansion and conquest in the region of the South Seas. Finally, the Acting Secretary said that in these circumstances the Secretary of State—with whom he had talked a few minutes before—could not see any basis for pursuing further the conversations in which the Secretary and the Ambassador had been engaged.

---

*In an oral statement, however, given by the Japanese Foreign Minister to Ambassador Grew later, on August 18, the stationing of Japanese troops in Indochina was stated to be a measure adopted for the purpose of bringing to an end the hostilities in China.

On the following day, July 24, the Acting Secretary of State made a statement to the press [6a] in regard to the situation in which statement he characterized the Japanese action in Indochina substantially as he had done in his statement of the previous day to the Japanese Ambassador; he pointed out also that these Japanese actions endangered the use of the Pacific by peaceful nations; that these actions tended to jeopardize the procurement by the United States of essential materials such as tin and rubber, which were necessary in our defense program; and that the steps which Japan was taking endangered the safety of other areas of the Pacific, including the Philippine Islands.

16. As it became increasingly clear that Japanese movement into southern Indochina was in progress, the President, on July 24, 1941, orally made to the Japanese Ambassador for transmission to the Japanese Government a proposal that if the Japanese Government would refrain from occupying French Indochina and establishing bases there with its military and naval forces—or, in case such steps had already actually been begun, would withdraw such forces—the President would seek to obtain from the British, the Chinese and the Netherlands Governments—and the United States would itself give—a solemn and binding declaration to regard French Indochina as a "neutralized" country, provided the Japanese Government would

---

[6a] *Ante*, p. 315.

give a similar commitment. Such a declaration would imply that none of the Governments making the declaration would undertake any military act of aggression against French Indochina and that each of these Governments would refrain from exercising any military control within or over French Indochina. The President's proposal also contemplated that the Government of the United States would endeavor to obtain from the other interested powers a guarantee that so long as the present emergency continued the local French authorities in Indochina would remain undisturbed in control of the territory. If these steps were taken, the President said, Japan would be given binding proof that no other power had any hostile designs on Indochina and that Japan would be afforded the fullest and freest opportunity of assuring for itself a source of food supplies and other raw materials which—according to Japan's accounts—Japan was seeking to secure. (On July 31 the Acting Secretary of State informed the Japanese Ambassador that the President desired to extend his proposal with regard to French Indochina to include Thailand as well.)

17. Large Japanese forces, however, soon were moved into southern Indochina. Japan's constant expansion of her military position in the southwest Pacific had already substantially imperiled the security of the United States along with that of other powers. By this further expansion in southern Indochina Japan virtually completed the encirclement of the Philippine Islands and placed its armed forces within striking distance of vital trade routes. This constituted an overt act directly menacing the security of the United States and other powers that were at peace with Japan. It created a situation in which the risk of war became so great that the United States and other countries concerned were confronted no longer with the question of avoiding such risk but from then on with the problem of preventing a complete undermining of their security. No sooner were Japanese military forces moved into southern Indochina than there began to appear evidence that there was in progress a vigorous under-cover movement of Japanese infiltration into Thailand. With Japan's armed forces poised for further attacks, the possibility of averting armed conflict lay only in the bare chance that there might be reached some agreement which would cause Japan to abandon her policy and procedure of aggression. Under those circumstances and in the light of those considerations, the Government of the United States decided at that point, as did certain other governments especially concerned, that discontinuance of trade with Japan had become an appropriate, warranted and necessary step—as an open warning to Japan and as a measure of self-defense.

Thereafter no conversations were held on the subject of an agreement until in August the Japanese Government took a new initiative.

On or about July 25, Colonel Iwakuro and Mr. Wikawa returned to Japan.

18. On July 26, President Roosevelt issued an Executive Order freezing Japanese assets in the United States.[7] This Order brought under control of the Government all financial and import and export trade transactions in which Japanese interests were involved, and the effect of this was to bring about very soon the virtual cessation of trade between the United States and Japan.

19. Just before the Japanese went into French Indochina with large forces late in July, the Japanese Government effected a reconstruction of the Cabinet, under which Admiral Toyoda took over from Mr. Matsuoka the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Matsuoka was relieved of office because he had lost the confidence of Prince Konoe and the dominant elements in Japanese political circles. Prince Konoe remained Prime Minister.

20. Thereafter the Japanese Prime Minister, the new Japanese Foreign Minister and the Japanese Ambassador to the United States (Admiral Nomura) emphatically and repeatedly, both in Tokyo and in Washington, made protestations of Japan's desire for peace and an equitable settlement of Pacific problems. Notwithstanding these protestations of peaceful intent, the Japanese Government went on with mobilization in Japan and stationing of more and more armed forces in Manchuria, in Indochina, and in south China, and with the bombing of American property in China, including bursts (apparently deliberate) which damaged the American Embassy and the U. S. S. *Tutuila* at Chungking.[8]

III. Renewed Insistence by the Japanese Government Upon Its Peaceful Purposes—Resumption of Conversations

21. The Japanese Government did not reply to the President's proposal of July 24 until August 6. On the latter date the Japanese Ambassador presented a proposal which he said was intended to be responsive to the President's proposal.

This Japanese proposal provided *inter alia* for removal of restrictions which the United States had imposed upon trade with Japan, for the "suspension" of "its [the United States'] military measures in the southwest Pacific area", and for the exercise of good offices by the United States for the initiation of direct negotiations between Japan and China. It provided also for withdrawal of Japanese troops from Indochina after a settlement should be reached between Japan and China, and called for recognition by the United States of Japan's special position in Indochina even after the withdrawal of

---

[7] *Ante*, p. 267.

[8] See vol. I, pp. 715 ff.

Japanese troops. Throughout the conversations, it had been specified or implied that the Japanese would expect that the American Government in the proposed exercise of its good offices between China and Japan should discontinue aid to China.

This proposal of August 6 entirely disregarded the President's suggestion for the neutralization of Indochina; it asked *inter alia* either expressly or by implication that the United States (1) remove the restrictions it had imposed upon trade with Japan; (2) suspend its defensive preparations in the Philippines; (3) discontinue furnishing military equipment to Great Britain and the Netherlands for the arming of their Far Eastern possessions; (4) discontinue aid to the Chinese Government; and (5) assent to Japan's assertion and exercise of a special military position and a permanent preferential political and economic status in Indochina, involving, as this would, assent to procedures and disposals which menaced the security of the United States and which were contrary to the principles to which this Government was committed. In return the Japanese Government offered not to station Japanese troops in regions of the southwestern Pacific other than Indochina. It proposed to retain its military establishment in Indochina for an indeterminate period. There thus would still have remained the menace to the security of the United States, already mentioned, as well as the menace to the security of British and Dutch territories in the southwestern Pacific area.

This Government patiently analyzed and discussed with the Japanese representatives this limited and one-sided offer but adhered to its position that an agreement must be based upon broad-gauge liberal principles fair to all nations.

22. The Secretary of State on August 8 informed the Japanese Ambassador that the Japanese Government's proposal was lacking in responsiveness to the suggestion made by the President. The Japanese Ambassador then inquired whether it might not be possible for the responsible heads of the two Governments to meet with a view to discussing means for reaching an adjustment of views between the two Governments. The Secretary, first reviewing briefly the steps which had led to a discontinuance of the informal conversations, said that it remained for the Japanese Government to decide whether it could find means of shaping its policies along lines which would make possible an adjustment of views.

23. Between August 8 and September 6 there took place various developments in consequence of which there was revived in the mind of the American Government a hope that there might be a possibility that the Japanese Government might yet be willing to adopt and to apply in practice a liberal progressive program in relation to the entire Pacific area. Among these developments were assurances

which were given by the Japanese Government, such as the assurances contained in the Japanese Prime Minister's message to the President delivered on August 28 (described in paragraph numbered 25 below), and evidence that the trend of the war in the eastern European theater where Russia had demonstrated a capacity for successful resistance against Germany must have thoroughly upset Axis calculations.

24. On August 17, the President returned to Washington from the Atlantic Conference at which he and the British Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, had discussed among other problems the situation in the Far East. Mr. Churchill stated that the British Government fully supported the proposal made on July 24 by the President to the Japanese Government in regard to the withdrawal of Japanese forces from Indochina and informed the President of the British Government's view that it needed more time to prepare for resistance against any Japanese attack in the Far East. This consideration applied also to the state of our defensive preparations in the Philippine Islands. The President and Mr. Churchill agreed that the American and the British Governments should take parallel action in warning Japan against new moves of aggression. The President and Mr. Churchill agreed also that this Government should be prepared to continue its conversations with the Japanese Government and by such means to offer Japan a reasonable and just alternative to the course upon which Japan was engaged. Accordingly, the President on the day of his return handed to the Japanese Ambassador two documents. In one of these documents it was pointed out that the principles and policies under discussion in conversations between the two Governments precluded expansion by force or threat of force and that if the Japanese Government took any further steps in pursuance of a program of domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, this Government would be compelled to take any and all steps necessary toward safeguarding its legitimate rights and interests and toward insuring the security of the United States. In the second document reference was made to the desire expressed earlier in August by the Japanese Government to resume conversations and to the Ambassador's suggestion, advanced on August 8, that President Roosevelt and the Japanese Prime Minister meet with a view to discussing means for an adjustment of relations between the United States and Japan; and reaffirmation was made of this Government's intention not to consider any proposals affecting the rights of either country except as such proposals might be in conformity with the basic principles to which the United States has long been committed and of its intention to continue to follow its policy of aiding nations resisting aggression. It was pointed out that informal discussions with the Japanese Government relative to a peaceful settlement would naturally

envisage the working out of a progressive program involving the application to the entire Pacific area of the principle of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment, thus making possible access by all countries to raw materials and other essential commodities; and that such a program would envisage cooperation by all nations of the Pacific toward utilizing all available resources of capital, technical skill and economic leadership toward building up the economies of each country and toward increasing the purchasing power and raising the standards of living of the nations and peoples concerned. The opinion was expressed that if Japan was seeking what it affirmed to be its objectives the program outlined was one that could be counted upon to assure Japan satisfaction of its economic needs and legitimate aspirations with much greater certainty than could any other program. The statement was made that, in case Japan desired and was in a position to suspend its expansionist activities, to readjust its position, and to embark upon a peaceful program for the Pacific along the lines of the program and principles to which the United States was committed, the Government of the United States would be prepared to consider resumption of the informal exploratory discussions which had been interrupted in July, and would be glad to endeavor to arrange a suitable time and place to exchange views. It was also stated that, before renewal of the conversations or proceeding with plans for a meeting of the heads of the two Governments, it would be helpful if the Japanese Government would furnish a clearer statement than had as yet been given of its present attitude and plans. If the Japanese Government continued its movement of force and conquest, "we could not," the President said to the Ambassador, "think of reopening the conversations".

25. On August 18 the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs gave to Ambassador Grew an oral statement in which *inter alia* it was affirmed that the only way to prevent the present strained relations between the two countries from further deteriorating into a critical situation would be through a direct meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister and it was proposed that such a meeting be held at Honolulu. The Minister for Foreign Affairs urged upon the Ambassador the need of holding the proposal in strict secrecy on the ground that premature leakage of the fact of the proposal would result in the project being torpedoed by certain elements in Japan.

On August 28 the Japanese Ambassador handed to the President a message from the Japanese Prime Minister urging that a meeting be arranged between the heads of the two Governments to discuss all important problems between Japan and the United States covering the entire Pacific area. Accompanying that message was a statement of the Japanese Government in which there were given assurances with several qualifications of Japan's peaceful intentions and assurances that Japan was seeking a program for the Pacific area consistent with the principles to which the Government of the United States had long been committed. The qualifications were to the following effect: the Japanese Government was prepared to withdraw its troops from Indochina "as soon as the China Incident is settled or a just peace is established in East Asia"; Japan would take no military action against the Soviet Union as long as the Soviet Union remained faithful to the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Treaty and did "not menace Japan or Manchukuo or undertake any action contrary to the spirit of the said Treaty"; the Japanese Government had no intention of using "without provocation" military force against any neighboring nation.

26. On September 3 the President gave the Japanese Ambassador replies to the message and the statement received from the Ambassador on August 28. In formulating his replies, the President could not overlook the attendant circumstances and developments, which have already been described. Because of these circumstances and developments, the President and his consultants felt that, to ensure any hope of the success of a meeting between the President and the Prime Minister, achievement of a prior meeting of minds on basic principles was a necessary condition precedent. Hence, the President in replying expressed a desire to collaborate with the Japanese Prime Minister to see whether there could be made effective in practice the program referred to by the Japanese Government in its message of August 28 and whether there could be reached a meeting of minds on fundamental principles which would make practicable a meeting such as the Japanese Prime Minister had proposed. It was pointed out that cognizance had to be taken of evidence of the existence in Japan of concepts which if dominant in that country would raise serious obstacles to successful collaboration between the heads of the two Governments. It was therefore suggested that it would seem highly desirable for precaution to be taken toward insuring that the proposed meeting if held, would prove a success, by endeavoring to enter immediately upon preliminary discussions of the fundamental and essential questions on which agreement was sought. It was further explained that the Government of the United States could not enter into any agreement which would be inconsistent with the principles in which the American people—and the people of all nations which prefer peaceful methods to methods of force—believe. At no time, then or later, did the Government of the United States reject the Japanese proposal for a meeting; it strove hard to bring about a situation which would make the holding of such a meeting beneficial.

27. On September 4 the Chinese Ambassador called upon the Secretary of State and made inquiry about the reported conversations be-

tween this Government and the Japanese Government. The Secretary informed the Ambassador that exploratory conversations with the Japanese were taking place but that no common basis for negotiations had as yet been revealed. The Secretary repeated what he had told the Ambassador previously in May, namely, that this Government before considering negotiations with Japan affecting the situation in China would expect to discuss the entire subject with the Chinese Government and, he added, with the British, the Dutch and the Australian Governments as well. Furthermore, a few days later the American Ambassador at Chungking, under authorization from the Secretary of State, informed the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs of what the Secretary had already informed the Chinese Ambassador, as indicated above. The American Ambassador also stated, under authorization, that in this Government's conversations with the Japanese relating to a general settlement of Pacific problems no consideration had been given or would be given to any sort of arrangement allowing for continuance of aggression in China and that this Government in the course which it had been and was pursuing in its relations with both Japan and China had no intention of sacrificing the fundamental principles and policies which this Government had long believed constituted the only sound basis for stable relations between nations; that it was not to be expected that those measures which this Government had taken with respect to Japan would be altered or discontinued until the situation which had prompted them had been altered or done away with; and that similarly this Government would continue its policy of aiding any nation resisting aggression, as this policy was based upon fundamental principles including the principle of self-defense and had been fully endorsed by the Congress.

28. Following the making of the President's interim reply of September 3, the Japanese Ambassador on September 6 handed the Secretary of State a new draft of proposals which the Ambassador said he was presenting in consequence of his representations to his Government in regard to the desirability of reaching an agreement in principle on the fundamental questions involved before making arrangements for the meeting between the heads of the two Governments. The provisions put forward in the new draft were much narrower than might warrantably have been expected from the comparatively liberal assurances given in the statement communicated to the President on August 28.

The Japanese draft of September 6 included a statement of Japan's position with regard to the Tripartite Pact, containing the evasive formula "in case the United States should participate in the European War, the interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact by Japan shall be independently decided". As only the United States could be the judge of its self-defense, such a formula offered no assurance that Japan would not interpret its obligations under the Tripartite Pact as impelling it to attack the United States in the event of American involvement through acts of self-defense in war with Germany. The Japanese draft of September 6 included among other points a qualified undertaking that Japan would not "make any advancement from French Indochina against any of its adjoining areas, and likewise will not, without any justifiable reason [underscoring added] resort to military action against any region South of Japan". (The limitation "South of Japan" was suggestive.)

The Japanese Ambassador said definitely that he believed that these formulas regarding these two points represented the maximum which Japan could offer at the time. He continued, however, to emphasize Japan's desire for peace in the Pacific and said that there was more between the lines than could be openly stated. The Japanese endeavored to impress upon representatives of this Government the urgent need of quick action but did not give indication of any intention on Japan's part to accept the fundamental principles and provisions of peace and equity which alone could have made rapid progress possible.

The provisions in the Japanese draft of September 6 contained no commitment in regard to the nature of the terms which Japan would offer to China; they contained no assurance of an intention by Japan to respect China's territorial integrity and sovereignty, to refrain from interference in China's internal affairs, not to station Japanese troops indefinitely in wide areas of China, and to conform to the principle of nondiscrimination in international commercial relations. The formula contained in that draft that "so long as the economic activities of the United States are carried out on an equitable basis [underscoring added], such activities will not be restricted" clearly implied a concept that the conditions under which American trade and commerce in China were henceforth to be conducted was to be a matter for decision by Japan.

While in the Japanese draft of September 6 Japan's peaceful intentions were reaffirmed, the ominously significant qualifications in regard to a general basic settlement remained unaltered.

In what was apparently an effort to make the Japanese proposals appear more attractive, the Japanese Prime Minister in a conversation with the American Ambassador at Tokyo on September 6 indicated that the Japanese Government fully and definitely subscribed to the four principles which the Secretary of State had previously set forth as a basis for the reconstruction of relations with Japan: respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations; support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity; nondisturbance of the *status quo* in the Pacific except as the *status quo* may be altered by peaceful means. However, a month later the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs indicated to Ambassador Grew that, while these four points had been accepted "in principle", certain adjustments would be necessary in applying these principles to actual conditions.

The adjustments which the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs indicated would be necessary to apply to these principles would require that the Secretary of State, in order fully to evaluate the importance of the adjustments, estimate how far the military element in Japan would go toward the adoption of courses which would make an agreement with the United States possible. It is obvious that this Government could not disregard the close relationship between the political ascendancy of the army in Japan and Japan's past and current courses of expansion by force, together with the relationship between expansionist Japan and expansionist Germany as formalized in the Tripartite Alliance, as already described; nor, in gauging the prospects of Prince Konoe's being able to influence the military in the direction of policies of peace, could this Government overlook the Prince's close association with the policies of the military elements at various past stages in the unfolding of Japan's program of conquest in China. The military element in Japan had been embarked upon a course of aggression since 1931 and had become steadily more and more dominant in charting the course of Japan's high policy. Prince Konoe had headed the Japanese Government in 1937 when Japan attacked China; he had proclaimed the basic principles which the Japanese Government presumably would insist upon in any peace agreement with China; the Japanese Government had shown in the "treaty" which Japan had concluded in November 1940 with the Japanese puppet regime at Nanking how it proposed to apply these principles. This "treaty" contained provisions that Japan should, "in order to carry out the defence against communistic activities through collaboration of the two countries, station required forces in specified areas of Mengchiang and of North China for the necessary duration"; that China should "recognize that Japan may, in accordance with previous practices or in order to preserve the common interests of the two countries, station for a required duration its naval units and vessels in specified areas within the territory of the Republic of China"; that "while considering the requirements of China, the Government of the Republic of China shall afford positive and full facilities to Japan and Japanese subjects" with respect to the utilization of resources.

The Japanese had at no time budged from or relaxed their insistence that the Chinese Government would have to accept the preferential position and arrangements for interference in China which Japan had provided for itself in the "treaty" with Wang Ching-wei.

The Government of the United States was fully aware that the leaders of the Japanese armed forces, in causing the Japanese spokesmen to maintain in the exploratory conversations with this Government a rigid attitude and position, were acting in the light of their knowledge or estimate of the internal situation in this country, of the state of comparative military unpreparedness of the United States and of other powers friendly to the United States and possessed of important interests in the Pacific area, and of the commitments of the United States and its friends elsewhere.

As already stated, the Japanese Government had urged that its suggestion of a meeting between the President and Prince Konoe be kept strictly secret—on the ground that premature disclosure would result in the plan being frustrated by elements in Japan hostile to any such move. If this was the true reason for the importance which the Japanese Government attached to secrecy, it would indicate, despite Japanese affirmations to the contrary, that there existed in Japan a substantial opposition to the making of efforts to achieve an improvement in relations with the United States.

Account also had to be taken of the psychological factors and complications, and of relations with other countries.

The very fact of a meeting being held by the President and the Japanese Prime Minister, following on the heels of a meeting between the President and the British Prime Minister, would cause China extreme disquietude.

If the proposed meeting accomplished no more than to give endorsement to general principles, the Japanese would then have been in position to use such endorsement by the United States in support of any interpretation which Japan might choose to place upon those principles in their subsequent application. The United States had had experience of such a procedure in the aftermath of the agreement into which Viscount Ishii had drawn the United States Government in the Lansing-Ishii exchange of notes in 1917.[8a]

If the proposed meeting did not produce an agreement, the leaders of the Japanese armed forces would then have been in position to convince the Japanese people that the United States was responsible for the failure of the meeting and to strengthen public support for a program of all-out aggression.

[8a] See *Foreign Relations*, 1917, pp. 264–265; *ibid.*, 1922, vol. II, pp. 591 ff.; and *ibid.*, 1923, vol. II, pp. 455 ff.

There was no indication that there was any material difference in views as to fundamentals of national objectives between Prince Konoe and the Japanese generals and the admirals who were to proceed with him to the proposed meeting. (From a report by Ambassador Grew of a statement made to him on September 6 by the Japanese Prime Minister this Government learned of Prince Konoe's intention to have certain high army and navy officers accompany him to the proposed meeting with the President.) There was nothing tangible on which to base an expectation that, at such a meeting, Japan's spokesman (Prince Konoe) would be able to commit his country to other than broadly generalized and extensively qualified provisions of agreement.

There were cogent reasons for belief that unless the Japanese could be brought either before such a meeting or at such a meeting to the making of specific and substantially detailed pledges the only real effect of such an agreement as might conceivably be concluded would be to facilitate operations by Japan's military leaders toward achievement of their "New Order" program for eastern Asia and the Western Pacific Area.

These many considerations caused this Government to feel that it could not take so significant a step in reliance solely upon assurances given by the Japanese Premier and his Foreign Office that Prince Konoe would be prepared at the proposed meeting to give directly to the President commitments of a satisfactory character.

In the process of carefully analyzing and evaluating all of the information available to it and bearing on this and related questions, the Government of the United States was driven to the inescapable conclusion that the forces in Japan which were determined to carry on with the course of expansion were so strong that only an advance meeting of minds on the interpretation and to some degree at least the practical application of principles of peace to concrete problems of the Pacific area with respect to which fundamental differences of opinion between the two Governments had developed in the informal conversations would warrant entry upon a full-dress negotiation and reliance thereafter by the United States upon general pledges which might be given by Prince Konoe in the course of conversations and a negotiation between himself and the President.

Neither Prince Konoe nor any of Japan's spokesmen were offering any convincing evidence in support of their affirmation that Japan's leaders were prepared to revert to peaceful courses and would, were the proposed conference held, demonstrate with pledges and then or thereafter by acts that such was their intention.

Under those circumstances, although the President would, as he has said, "have been happy to travel thousands of miles to meet the Premier of Japan", it was felt by him and by the Secretary of State and by their consultants, including officers of the Department of State who are specialists in Far Eastern affairs, that the President could proceed to such a rendezvous only if there were first obtained tentative commitments in harmony with the principles and objectives of American policy and with Japan's professed desire to pursue a peaceful course. Every effort to obtain such commitments proved vain.

After September 6, there followed a series of discussions between representatives of the two Governments, both in Washington and in Tokyo. These, however, did not result in any progress toward overcoming the divergences in the views of the two Governments. On September 27 the Japanese Ambassador presented to the Secretary of State a complete new redraft of the Japanese proposals (identical with the so-called "September 25th proposal" handed by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador at Tokyo) and urged that an early reply be made. The new redraft did not indicate any modification of the attitude of the Japanese Government on fundamental points.

29. On October 2 the Secretary of State gave to the Japanese Ambassador a memorandum of an "oral statement" reviewing significant developments in the conversations and explaining this Government's attitude toward various points in the Japanese proposals which did not appear to this Government to be consistent with the principles to which this country was committed. In this it was stated that it was the President's earnest hope that discussion of the fundamental questions might be so developed that a meeting between the heads of the two Governments could be held, and that it was likewise the President's hope that the Japanese Government shared the conviction of this Government that, if the Governments of Japan and of the United States were resolved to give practical and comprehensive application to the principles upon which the conversations were based, the two Governments could work out a rehabilitation of their relations and contribute to the bringing about of a lasting peace in the Pacific area.

In formulating this Government's reply of October 2 to the Japanese Government, outlined above, this Government reviewed the Japanese proposals as a whole and in the light of the surrounding circumstances. There were certain broad considerations which this Government had to take into account in regard to general questions involved and without reference to any one proposal among those that the Japanese Government had offered. These broad considerations also affected the possibilities of there being achieved by the two Governments a satisfactory agreement.

For years Japanese publicists and leaders had been preaching territorial aggrandizement on the ground that it was essential to Japan's security that Japan have control of additional sources of war materials in order to ensure to Japan economic and military self-sufficiency. The Japanese military leaders were committed to this doctrine and so were many Japanese civilian leaders. Consequently, if, as a result of the increasing gravity of the Axis menace to the security of the

United States, this country had become obliged, even though it might not actually be at war, to divert its principal strength to the Atlantic area, the plain logic of the situation was that the pressure in Japan upon the Government to take advantage of American preoccupation in the Atlantic area by seizing territories in the southwest Pacific region would have become so strong that it would have been practically impossible to deter Japan from embarking upon new activities of conquest.

It was clear that the commitments which the Japanese spokesmen had shown themselves in position to give, even if they were to be carried out to the letter, fell far short of constituting a general renunciation by Japan of courses of aggression, especially in reference to China, failed to clarify Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact in the contingency of involvement by the United States in a war with Germany, and thus failed to provide a sound and adequate basis for an agreement that could be relied upon to contribute to a lasting peace and therefore to stability and security in the Pacific area. The problem which confronted this Government for first consideration was that of eliciting from the Japanese Government clear-cut evidence that that Government really wished to abandon the course of aggression which it had been following and to revert to a peaceful program and peaceful methods. Not until that question had been satisfactorily disposed of would any useful purpose be served by this Government's addressing itself to the problem of means of ensuring that the Japanese Government would implement new commitments to pursue a peaceful course.

In the course of the exploratory conversations this Government had previously given the Japanese Government a full exposition of its policy of self-defense against Germany's movement of world conquest and had endeavored to elicit from the Japanese Government assurances that Japan would not be bound under the Tripartite Pact to attack the United States should the United States become involved in war with Germany through acts of self-defense. The Japanese Government could not be brought to give any assurance on this point but had insisted that it must be the judge in the event that the United States did become involved in war with Germany whether the circumstances were such that the United States could be regarded as having acted in self-defense. This Government repeatedly had pointed out to the Japanese Government the inconsistency between the Japanese Government's position with regard to the Tripartite Pact and Japan's professed desire for an agreement with the United States designed to ensure peace in the Pacific area. This Government also had pointed out to the Japanese Government that the Japanese Government was proposing to this Government an agreement under which Japan, a third country, would be the judge whether any action which this country might be impelled to take in relations with Germany constituted self-defense.

The Japanese spokesmen had made it clear that the Japanese Government would expect as a minimum in an agreement with the United States, among other terms, the removal forthwith by the United States of the restrictions which it had imposed upon trade with Japan, and that the maximum that the Japanese Government was prepared to offer in return was to shift elsewhere the Japanese troops in southern Indochina and to agree not to extend Japanese military moves beyond Indochina southward. As already stated, the Japanese Government had at no time budged from insistence upon an intention to station troops for an unlimited period in wide areas of China, upon retention of a preferential economic position in China and upon maintaining its alliance with the Axis. If the United States were to enter into an agreement with Japan on such terms, this Government at the outset would have to implement immediately a comprehensive concession in the economic field. There would be no method by which the American Government could remove economic pressure upon Japan merely step by step as and when Japan took successive steps away from courses of aggression and toward policies of peace.

This Government also had to consider whether such an agreement would be acceptable to the people of this country. It was evident that no agreement would be acceptable to the United States which would involve a sacrifice of those standards of fair play, integrity and honor which the Government and people of this country have long regarded as fundamental to sound international relationships or which would impair the moral influence exercised by the United States among the nations and peoples of the world.

Moreover, merely negative assurances by Japan of an absence of intention to continue the prosecution of its forward movement did not and could not adequately meet the needs of the situation; it was essential that Japan also give evidence of a positive intention to pursue policies in conformity with the liberal and constructive principles and programs which had been discussed in the conversations. The necessity for this was clearly demonstrated by the contemporary manifestations of Japanese policy and action which ran exactly to the contrary, as, for example, the movement of Japanese armed forces into southern Indochina, the augmentation and speeding up of Japanese military preparations at home, the continuing bombing by Japanese armed forces of Chinese civilian populations, the constant agitation in the inspired Japanese press in support of extremist policies, the unconciliatory and bellicose public utterances of Japanese leaders, and the tactics of covert or overt threat which had become a constant feature of Japanese diplomatic procedure.

This Government fully realized that the Japanese Government could not, even if it wished, bring about an abrupt transformation in Japan's current course of action. It realized that so much was involved in a reconstruction of Japan's position that implementation to any substantial extent by Japan of promises to adopt peaceful courses would require a long time. This Government was therefore prepared to be patient and it had repeatedly so informed the Japanese Government. But there needed to be forthcoming, as an essential prerequisite to an agreement with the United States, evidence in Japan's acts of a serious and sincere purpose on the part of the Japanese Government to desist from aggression and revert to a program of peace.

The Japanese soon after receiving this Government's memorandum of October 2 redoubled their emphasis upon the need of haste. They offered new formulas for dealing with limited and specific problems, and they stated that Japan had now placed all its cards on the table and that they had gone as far as they could in the direction of making so-called "concessions". This Government was unable to discern in their new formulas any evidence that the Japanese Government was moving even one step toward committing itself to courses of peace or that it contemplated receding even one step from insistence upon full attainment of its declared objectives—which were in effect, judging by the evidence of Japanese official utterances and acts, political, economic, and cultural domination of the entire western Pacific and China.

Mr. Wakasugi, the Minister-Counselor of the Japanese Embassy, upon his return to Washington after a two weeks' visit in Japan, on October 13 called on the Under Secretary of State. The Minister said that during his stay in Japan he had conferred with the Prime Minister and with other close advisers of the Emperor as well as with high-ranking officers of the Army and Navy and of the Foreign Office. These persons, Mr. Wakasugi said, had unanimously expressed a desire to maintain peace between Japan and the United States and an earnest and sincere hope that the conversations between the two Governments would produce satisfactory results.

The Minister mentioned the existence of a small but very powerful group in Japan which placed its fortunes on the side of the Axis and which was determined to go to any length to prevent the reaching of any understanding between the United States and Japan and to bring Japan squarely into full activity on Germany's side. He said frankly that German representatives and German agents in Japan, who were undoubtedly increasing their activities, were exceedingly powerful and most effective in their propaganda. He added that although the Japanese Government was backed by the majority of public opinion and by controlling elements in the Japanese Army and Navy, the Government would have to show some results and could not indefinitely continue conversations with the United States. Mr. Wakasugi said that no one could foretell the results which might come if the Japanese Government were to be changed through a *coup d'état* or because that Government could see no hope of reaching a satisfactory arrangement with the United States. Mr. Wakasugi said that in all probability the Government would be replaced by a cabinet of military representatives responsible only to German pressure and that in such an event hope of adjusting relations between Japan and the United States must vanish.

In response to the Minister's inquiry, which he said was made under personal instructions from the Prime Minister, as to the reasons for the delay in reaching an agreement or on what points the Government of the United States still desired clarification, the Under Secretary of State said that it was impossible for him to believe that the Japanese Government did not in fact have a clear and specific understanding of the position of the Government of the United States. The Under Secretary went on to point out that the views of this Government had been fully set forth not only in innumerable conversations between the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador but also more specifically in the documents given the Japanese Ambassador on June 21. The Under Secretary added that this Government believed that the Japanese proposals of September 6 had served to restrict, to limit and to modify materially the broad principles upon which we had felt a basis for an understanding had already been reached. In making this observation the Under Secretary had reference to the assurances of the Japanese Government, already referred to, that Japan was seeking a program consistent with the principles to which the United States had long been committed. The Under Secretary added that the views of this Government with regard to the Japanese proposal of September 6 had once more been very clearly set forth in the statement given the Japanese Ambassador on October 2. He therefore felt that there was little that he could add in clarification of the position of this Government.

During the course of this conversation the Minister asked whether, if a basis for an understanding on all other major principles were reached, it would not be possible to leave the China question in abeyance. The Under Secretary replied that a question of this sort was like asking whether the play "Hamlet" could be given on the stage omitting the character of Hamlet.

In reply to the very insistent question of the Minister whether this Government had any other major desiderata which it had not yet submitted to the Japanese Government, the Under Secretary reiterated his statement that he believed the views of this Government had been fully set forth in the documents of June 21 and other documents subsequently given to the Japanese Ambassador. The Under Secretary said that it was not the policy of the Government of the United States to attempt to deceive or mislead the other party to a negotiation.

There were subsequent conversations with the Japanese Minister on October 16 and 17 in which the Secretary of State as well as the Under Secretary of State participated. No new points were developed in these conversations but the Secretary recorded his definite impression that there were no signs of any disposition on the part of the Japanese Government to revert even to a position approximating that which it had taken before the exploratory conversations were temporarily abandoned at the time when Japan in July went into Indochina. The Secretary, while prepared to afford the Japanese every opportunity to present their proposals, entertained increasingly serious doubt whether further conversations would be productive of an agreement.

IV. Advent of the Tojo Cabinet and Redoubling of Japanese Government's Insistence Upon an Early Acceptance of its Proposals

30. On October 17 a new Japanese cabinet, headed by General Tojo, came into office. The new cabinet was even more insistent than the preceding cabinet had been in urging upon this Government a quick decision on the Japanese Government's proposals. Soon after the new cabinet had come into office, the new Foreign Minister, Mr. Togo, and the Japanese Ambassador came forward with emphatic statements that the new cabinet desired to continue the exploratory conversations looking to peace in the Pacific and to an agreement with the United States. The assurances of peaceful intent given by the previous cabinet were reaffirmed both by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State and by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador at Tokyo as representing in general the position of General Tojo's cabinet.

31. The Japanese Government while thus pressing this Government for a decision showed no willingness to effect any fundamental modification of the Japanese position and no desire to apply practically in actual situations the basic principles of justice and equity essential to the building of a lasting peace in the Pacific. At the same time, the Japanese Government was proceeding with its disquieting military disposals in Indochina and Manchuria, and the agitation in the Japanese press and among Japanese spokesmen for positive action became redoubled.

32. These military activities, the increasingly threatening tone of the Japanese press, and the pressure tactics employed by the Japanese Government toward forcing an acceptance by this Government of

the Japanese proposals all combined to cause to grow fainter any hope that a satisfactory comprehensive agreement might be achieved. Nevertheless the general world situation continued to be very critical, rendering it desirable that every reasonable effort be made to avoid or at least to defer as long as possible any rupture in the conversations. As long as the conversations continued there existed a possibility that Japan might be won over to courses of peace, although it was realized that such possibility was slight. On November 7 the Secretary of State acquainted the cabinet fully with these developments and emphasized that in his opinion a crisis was now imminent in the Far East. The awareness of the administration of the danger which confronted this nation in the general situation was reflected in the President's Armistice Day Address at the Arlington National Cemetery, in the Secretary of the Navy's Armistice Day Address before the Providence Chamber of Commerce, and in the Under Secretary of State's address on the same day at the tomb of President Wilson in the Washington Cathedral.[9] At frequent intervals during this period the Secretary of State had conferences with the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, and officers of their staffs. These conferences sought a full interchange of information and views relative to developments in the Pacific area, and the Secretary took occasion at these conferences to keep the high military and naval authorities of this Government currently informed of significant developments in the conversations with the Japanese.

33. During this period there were several conversations between officials of this Government, including the President and the Secretary of State, and the Japanese Ambassador and his associates. There were exchanged various memorandums and formulas designed to elaborate or clarify specific points which had arisen in the course of the conversations, as for example in regard to future economic policies of the United States and of Japan, the effect of Japan's Axis alliance upon Japan's future relationship to the United States in the event that the United States through acts of self-defense should become involved in the European war, and Japan's intentions with respect to the future stationing of troops in China; but those steps did not lead to material progress toward reconciling basic differences between the respective viewpoints.

34. On November 15 the Secretary of State gave to the Japanese Ambassador an outline for a possible joint declaration by the United States and Japan on economic policy. The Secretary made it clear that this represented but one part of the general settlement envisaged,

---

[9] For text of address by the Under Secretary of State, see Department of State, *Bulletin*, November 15, 1941 (vol. v, No. 125), p. 391.

and that an agreement on this would be subject to arrival at agreement on a general settlement. This outline was prefaced by an introductory statement in which reference was made to the fact that the cornerstone of the commercial policy of the United States has for many years been the principle of unconditional most-favored-nation treatment. Reference was made to the extensive program of commercial agreements upon which the United States has been engaged since 1934. It was further pointed out that the United States in its commercial agreements concluded under that program has sought consistently to further the application of that policy throughout the world and that third governments have benefited by the conclusion of those agreements between the United States and other powers. This program of the United States, it was stated, has given the widest possible effect to the reductions of trade barriers and has made the maximum contribution toward building up world trade for the benefit of all nations.

The tentative draft joint declaration of economic policy was divided into three sections:

(1) The Governments of the United States and Japan were to cooperate in urging all nations to reduce trade barriers, eliminate forms of discrimination and to work toward creation of conditions under which all nations would be given a reasonable opportunity, through peaceful trade processes, to secure the means of acquiring goods and commodities needed by each country.

(2) The Governments of the United States and Japan were to inaugurate as rapidly as practicable measures to restore normal commercial relationships between them; to begin discussions looking toward the negotiation of a reciprocal trade agreement; and to undertake that during the present emergency each would permit export to the other of desired commodities subject to necessary restrictions or limitations required by each for its security and self-defense.

(3) In the Pacific area both Governments were to agree that complete economic, financial, and monetary control would be restored to China; that neither Government would seek preferential or monopolistic commercial or other economic rights in China; and that both would use their influence toward securing from China most-favored-nation treatment and full cooperation of China in the general commercial policy already outlined. Both Governments were to suggest to China the inauguration of a comprehensive program of economic development with most-favored-nation treatment to be given to each in participation in that program. Both Governments were to seek to establish with other Pacific countries relations on the basis of the fundamental principles already set forth and to urge other Pacific governments to undertake comprehensive programs of economic development and to accord to both the United States and Japan most-favored-nation treatment and full opportunity to participate in those programs when foreign participation might be required.

In the formulating of this draft declaration of economic policy it was envisaged that Japan would be accorded an opportunity of joining in a virtual moral partnership with the United States in leading the way toward a general application of economic practices which would give Japan much of what her leaders professed that Japan desired.

35. In the conversation on November 15 with the Japanese Ambassador, the Secretary of State said that if we were to work out a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area, this could be achieved only by continuing the exploratory conversations until we reached a stage where we could go to the other governments concerned and say that the attitudes of Japan and the United States were such as to afford a basis for negotiation. He said that what we had in mind was to reach without delay a wholly satisfactory and broad agreement which would promote mutual trust between nations in the Pacific area and enable them to get away from the expansion of military preparations; that what he desired was a clear-cut unequivocal agreement which would preclude any reasonable suspicion that Japan was trying to face two ways at the same time.

Referring to the Tripartite Pact, the Secretary of State said that so long as Japan remained bound in an alliance with the most flagrant aggressor that has appeared on this planet in the last two thousand years it would be very difficult for him to make the people of the United States and the people of other peaceful nations believe that Japan was pursuing a peaceful course. He said that so long as Japan insisted upon its own interpretation of its obligations under the Tripartite Pact, it would be very difficult for the world to see that Japan's clear intention was to follow a peaceful course in the event that the United States through self-defense became obliged to take up arms against Germany. The Secretary asked whether, if an agreement between the United States and Japan were concluded, Japan's connection with the Tripartite Pact would automatically disappear.

In regard to this question the Japanese Ambassador said only that the question of peace in the entire Pacific was covered in the preamble of the Japanese suggested agreement, and that under the Tripartite Pact Japan had freedom of decision and would make its own interpretation of its obligations.

At no time throughout the course of the conversations did the Japanese give a satisfactory reply to this important question. The Ambassador did, however, on several occasions make vague statements to the effect that if an agreement were reached with the United States, the psychological effect in Japan would be such that there would be no possibility of Japan interpreting its obligations under the Tripartite Pact adversely to friendly relations with the United States. This Government of course had to evaluate such statements in the light of developments and deep-seated trends in the field of actual events with which such statements were inconsistent.

In the conversation of November 15 and in previous conversations the Japanese representatives pressed vigorously for a reply to the already delivered Japanese proposals—so vigorously that the Secretary on the latter occasion, after referring to the attitude which the new Government in Japan had taken in urging that this Government must reply at once and categorically on various points, stated to the Ambassador and the Japanese Minister, Mr. Wakasugi, who was also present on that occasion, that this Government did not feel that it should be receiving such representations, suggestive of ultimatums, from a Government whose contemporary acts were such as were those of Japan.

36. Early in November the Japanese Government decided to send Mr. Saburo Kurusu to Washington to assist Ambassador Nomura in the conversations. In pursuance of the urgent request of the Japanese Government, this Government facilitated Mr. Kurusu's journey by arranging that priority passage on a Pan American plane be given Mr. Kurusu and a Japanese Foreign Office secretary accompanying him and that the departure of the plane from Hong Kong be delayed until Mr. Kurusu and his secretary could reach Hong Kong from Tokyo. Mr. Kurusu reached Washington on November 15, and on November 17 he and the Japanese Ambassador called on the Secretary of State and were later on the same day received by the President. It became clear at the outset of the meetings in which Mr. Kurusu participated with the Japanese Ambassador that Mr. Kurusu had brought no new material or plans or proposals.

37. On November 17 the Japanese Ambassador handed the Secretary of State two documents. In one of these, the statement was made that the Japanese Government had no objection to confirming as expressing the general purport of Japanese policy certain statements which had been made on August 28 by the preceding Japanese Prime Minister and by his Government in documents which had been transmitted to the Government of the United States by the Japanese Ambassador. It was stated also that the various qualifying phrases which the Japanese Government had used in connection with statements of its peaceful intent as expressed in those earlier documents were employed only in order "to express the qualification which is due to and necessary for any sovereign state", and that those phrases were not intended to limit in any way the peaceful intentions of the Japanese Government.

38. On this same date, November 17, the President and the Secretary of State held a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu. The President made clear the desire of the United States to avoid war between the two countries and to bring about a fair settlement assuring peace in the Pacific area. The Japanese Ambassador said that this was also the desire of Japan.

The Secretary of State made clear that so long as Japan was still clinging to the Tripartite Pact, no purported peaceful settlement for the Pacific area would be taken seriously by anyone. He said that ever since Hitler had announced that he was out for unlimited objectives and had started on a march of invasion across the earth with ten million soldiers and myriads of airplanes, the United States had been in danger, and that the danger had grown with each passing week. He said that the United States recognized this danger and was proceeding with measures of self-defense before it should be too late; that this country felt the danger so profoundly that it had committed itself to expenditure of many billions of dollars in self-defense.

Finally, the Secretary of State said the belief in this country was that the Japanese formula of a "new order in greater East Asia" is but another name for a program to dominate all of the Pacific area politically, economically, socially, and otherwise, by military force; that this would include the high seas, the islands and the continents and, if achieved, would place every other country at the mercy of arbitrary military rule just as the Hitler program does in Europe and the Japanese program does in China.

39. Mr. Kurusu said that the Japanese Prime Minister, General Tojo, although an Army man, was very desirous of bringing about a peaceful adjustment. Mr. Kurusu constantly throughout the conversation with the President and the Secretary of State made the plea that there was no reason for serious differences between our two Governments and that ways must be found to resolve the situation. Some specious attempts were made to explain away the Tripartite Pact and efforts were made to defend the Japanese plan of not bringing Japanese troops out of China.

40. The Secretary of State conferred again with the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu on November 18. The Secretary expressed great doubt whether any agreement into which we entered with Japan while Japan had an alliance with Hitler would carry the confidence of our people. He said that a difficult situation was created when, for example, telegrams of congratulation were sent to Hitler by Japanese leaders when he commits some atrocity, and he emphasized that we would have to have a clear-cut agreement making clear our peaceful purpose, for otherwise there would be a redoubled effort by all nations to strengthen their armaments. He pointed out that we were trying to make a contribution to the establishment of a peaceful world, based on law and order. He said that this is what we want to work out with Japan; that we had nothing to offer in the way of bargaining except our friendship. He said that frankly he did not know whether anything could be done in the matter of reaching a satisfactory agreement with Japan; that we can go so far but rather than go beyond a certain point it would be better for us to stand and take the consequences

The Japanese Ambassador said that Japan was hard pressed and was therefore very desirous of reaching some agreement with the United States. Mr. Kurusu said that he felt that what the two Governments should now do would be to achieve something to tide over the abnormal situation and that perhaps after the war it might be possible for Japan to adopt a more liberal policy. The Secretary asked whether Japan could not now agree in principle on commercial policy. Mr. Kurusu made no direct reply.

Turning to the question of the Tripartite Pact, Mr. Kurusu said that while the Tripartite Pact could not be abrogated Japan might do something to "outshine" that pact. The Secretary emphasized the importance of establishing fundamental principles at this time in order to enable peaceful forces in the world, which are now demoralized, to assert a leadership. Mr. Kurusu asked whether the Secretary had in mind a concrete formula for dealing with Japan's relations with the Axis. The Secretary made it clear that this was a matter for Japan to work out, but he asked whether Japan could not work this out in some way that would be convincing to the American people, as the public would be confused by the survival of a relationship between Japan and the Axis while Japan had an agreement with the United States. The Secretary said that he felt that the Tripartite Pact was inconsistent with the establishment of an understanding, and that Japan could not face two ways. Mr. Kurusu observed that a comprehensive solution could not be worked out immediately; that our freezing regulations had caused impatience in Japan and a feeling that Japan had to fight while it still could. If we could come to some agreement now, he said, it would promote an atmosphere which would be conducive to discussing fundamentals. The Ambassador said that he desired to emphasize that Japan would not be a "cat's paw" for Germany and that Japan had entered into the Tripartite Alliance because Japan had felt isolated. The Secretary commented that it would be difficult to get public opinion in this country to understand the situation as Mr. Kurusu had described it.

Having in mind the fact that the Japanese proposals had consistently envisaged keeping relatively large numbers of Japanese troops at key points in large areas of China in disregard of Japan's professed intention to respect China's sovereignty, the Secretary of State asked how many soldiers the Japanese wanted to retain in China. The Ambassador replied that possibly ninety percent of the present forces would be withdrawn. The Secretary asked how long the Japanese intended to keep the remaining ten percent in China. The Ambassador did not reply directly to this but invited attention to the fact that under the existing Boxer Protocol[10] Japan was entitled to retain troops in the Peiping and Tientsin area.

---

[10] *Foreign Relations*, 1901, appendix (Affairs in China), p. 312.

The Secretary pointed out that involved in the question of Japanese troops in China there were many elements of trouble; that American interests had suffered severely from the actions of the Japanese troops in China; that the present situation in the Far East was one of Japan's own making which rendered it incumbent upon Japan to find some way of extricating itself from the difficulty. He pointed out also that the situation was now exceptionally favorable for Japan to put its factories to work in producing goods which were needed by peaceful countries, if only the Japanese people could get war and invasion out of mind.

Mr. Kurusu said that Japan would have to move gradually in China, that one step might lead to another, and that what was important now was to do something to enable Japan to change its course. He suggested that it was felt in Japanese circles that we had been responsible for delay. The Secretary of State pointed out that he had on all occasions received the Japanese Ambassador promptly whenever the Ambassador had sought an appointment, that this Government had from the outset made clear its position, and that when Japan's movement into Indochina in July took place this had caused an interruption of the conversations.

Mr. Kurusu asked whether we wanted the *status quo ante* to be restored or what we expected Japan to do. The Secretary replied that if the Japanese could not now do anything about these three points, namely, withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, the adoption of a liberal commercial policy, and the question of the Tripartite Pact, he could only leave to Japan what Japan could do. He asked to what extent it would enable Japan to adopt peaceful policies if there should be a relaxation of freezing; and he explained that what he had in mind was means of enabling the more conservative leaders in Japan to gain control of the situation there. The Ambassador said that the American position was unyielding and that it was Japan's unyielding attitude toward Chiang Kai-shek which had stiffened Chinese resistance against Japan. He suggested as a small beginning toward realization of our high ideals the possibility of going back to the status which existed before the date in July when, following the Japanese move into southern Indochina, our freezing measures were put into effect. The Secretary said that if we should make some modifications in our freezing regulations we would not know whether Japanese troops withdrawn from Indochina would not be diverted to some equally objectionable locality and that it would be difficult for him to get this Government to go a long way in removing freezing measures until this Government believed that Japan was definitely started on a peaceful course and had renounced purposes of conquest. He observed that it was when Japan's movement into Indochina took place in July that he could no longer defend the continued shipment of petroleum products to Japan especially as he had been under severe criticism in this country for not having cut off those shipments. The Ambassador said that the Japanese were tired of fighting in China and that Japan would go as far as it could along a first step. The Secretary said he would consult with the British and the Dutch to see what their attitude would be toward the suggestion offered by the Ambassador.

V. JAPANESE EFFORTS TO EXTORT AN AGREEMENT ON A NARROW AND ONE-SIDED PROPOSAL

41. In the course of a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu on November 20, the Secretary of State said that Japan could at any moment put an end to the present situation by deciding upon an all-out peaceful course; and that Japan could similarly at any moment bring to an end what Japan chose to call "encirclement". The Secretary further said the American people believed that the purposes underlying our aid to China were the same as those underlying our aid to Great Britain; that there was a partnership between Hitler and Japan aimed at enabling Hitler to take control of one-half of the world and Japan the other half. The existence of the Tripartite Alliance and the continual harping of Japan's leaders upon slogans of the Nazi type served to strengthen the public in this belief. What was needed, the Secretary pointed out, was a manifestation by Japan of a clear purpose to pursue peaceful courses. He said that our people desired to avoid a repetition in East Asia of what Hitler was doing in Europe; that our people did not welcome the idea of a "new order" under military dictatorship; and that the methods adopted by the Japanese military leaders in China were not unlike Hitler's methods.

The Japanese Ambassador in the course of this conversation presented a proposal which read as follows:

> "1. Both the Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to make any armed advancement into any of the regions in the South-eastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area excepting the part of French Indo-China where the Japanese troops are stationed at present.
>
> "2. The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw its troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area.
>
> "In the meantime the Government of Japan declares that it is prepared to remove its troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of the present arrangement which shall later be embodied in the final agreement.

"3. The Government of Japan and the United States shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition of those goods and commodities which the two countries need in Netherlands East Indies.

"4. The Governments of Japan and the United States mutually undertake to restore their commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of the assets.

"The Government of the United States shall supply Japan a required quantity of oil.

"5. The Government of the United States undertakes to refrain from such measures and actions as will be prejudicial to the endeavors for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China."

Mr. Kurusu said that adoption of a proposal such as the Japanese Government had just offered would help develop public opinion in Japan in favor of peaceful courses. He added that Japan was trying to show its peaceful purpose by offering to relieve pressure on Thailand. The Japanese Ambassador said that there was no doubt of Japan's desire for peace, as that desire for peace was made clear by the eagerness of the Japanese Government to reach a settlement with China. Mr. Kurusu asserted that Japan has never committed itself to a policy of expansion and that if the Japanese proposal just presented were adopted, we could then proceed to work out fundamentals.

The plan thus offered called for supplying by the United States to Japan of as much oil as Japan might require, suspension of freezing measures, and discontinuance by the United States of aid to China. It contained a provision that Japan would shift her armed forces from Southern Indochina to Northern Indochina, but placing no limit on the number of armed forces which Japan might send to Indochina and making no provision for withdrawal of the said forces until after either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an "equitable" peace in the Pacific area. It contained no provision for reversion by Japan to peaceful courses and, while there were stipulations against further extension of Japan's armed force into southeastern Asia and the southern Pacific (except Indochina), there were no provisions which would have prevented continued or fresh Japanese aggressive activities in any of the regions of Asia lying to the north of Indochina—for example, China and the Soviet Union.

42. During a conversation on November 22 and in other subsequent conversations the Secretary of State made clear to the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu the American attitude on three points with respect to the Japanese proposal of November 20. He emphasized that while we might consider helping Japan by supplying some oil for civilian requirements as soon as peacefully-minded Japanese could control the situation in Japan, we could not furnish oil to the Japanese for any military purpose; that the presence of

large Japanese forces in any part of Indochina was a source of apprehension to neighboring countries, would lead to intensification of armaments, and would keep immobilized substantial armed forces of this country and of countries friendly to the United States, which forces might otherwise be used for resistance against Nazi Germany; and that the people of the United States considered that aid from this country to China rested on the same basis as the aid given to Great Britain and it was not reasonable for Japan to expect us to discontinue aid to China while Japan was assisting Germany.

The Secretary of State pointed out that moves by Japan, such as its move in Indochina, would give a further impetus to arming. Further, he said that one more such move on Japan's part might extinguish our peace effort.

During this conversation of November 22 the Secretary of State also informed the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu that he had called in representatives of certain other governments concerned in the Pacific area and there had been a discussion of the question whether there could be some relaxation of freezing. He said that those representatives were interested in the subject and there was a general feeling that the matter could be settled if the Japanese could give some concrete evidence that their intentions were peaceful. The Secretary said further that if the United States and other countries should see Japan pursuing a peaceful course, there would be no question about Japan's obtaining all the materials she desired.

Throughout the conversation of November 22, the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu sought to make much of the Japanese offer to transfer its troops from southern French Indochina to northern French Indochina. They gave no indication whatsoever that Japan wished to consider the broad questions and problems that had been under discussion, but merely devoted themselves to urging an immediate reply to their proposals.

Mr. Kurusu said that a great deal of persuasion had been necessary to induce the Japanese Army to agree to abandon its position in southern Indochina, that he and the Ambassador were pleasantly surprised and they considered the agreement by the Army to withdraw from southern Indochina an encouraging sign, but that nevertheless the situation was approaching an explosive point. The Ambassador said that he had not the slightest doubt that Japan desired peace. Mr. Kurusu added that Japan's offer to remove its forces from southern Indochina would set in motion a reverse movement in Japan. He mentioned the abnormal emotional state of the Japanese people as a result of four years of war and the freezing measures of the United States. Mr. Kurusu said the denunciation by the United States of the commercial treaty with Japan had placed Japan in a difficult position. The Japanese Ambassador said that Japan needed a quick settlement, and that the psychological effect of such a settlement would be great.

43. On the day previous, that is to say, on November 21, Mr. Kurusu had called alone upon the Secretary of State and had handed the Secretary a draft of a formula which he offered, he explained, by way of clarification of Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Alliance. The formula was embodied in a draft letter, as follows:

> "Mr. Secretary,
>
> "Through several conversations I have had the honor of holding with Your Excellency, I was rather surprised to learn that a deep-seated misconception prevails among your people about the obligation which Japan assumed under the Tripartite Pact.
>
> "As Your Excellency is fully aware I am the one who signed the said treaty under the instructions of my Government; and I am very happy to make the following statement which I trust will serve to eradicate the aforesaid false impression:
>
> > "It goes without saying that this treaty can not and does not infringe, in any way, upon the sovereign right of Japan as an independent state.
> >
> > "Besides, as Article III of the Pact stands, Japan is in a position to interpret its obligation freely and independently and is not to be bound by the interpretation which the other high contracting parties may make of it. I should like to add that my Government is not obligated by the aforementioned treaty or any other international engagement to become a collaborator or cooperator in any aggression whatever by any third Power or Powers.
> >
> > "My Government would never project the people of Japan into war at the behest of any foreign Power; it will accept warfare only as the ultimate, inescapable necessity for the maintenance of its security and the preservation of national life against active injustice.
>
> "I hope that the above statement will assist you in removing entirely the popular suspicion which Your Excellency has repeatedly referred to. I have to add that, when a complete understanding is reached between us, Your Excellency may feel perfectly free to publish the present communication.
>
> "I have the honor to be, Sir,
>
> "Your Excellency's obedient servant, . . ."

The Secretary of State read the draft letter and then asked Mr. Kurusu whether he had anything more to offer on the subject of a peaceful settlement as a whole. Mr. Kurusu replied in the negative. The Secretary said that he did not think that the formula which Mr. Kurusu had just offered would be especially helpful.

44. In all of the various formulas which the Japanese Government offered in succession during the course of the conversations every statement of pacific intent was qualified and restricted. As

each proposal was explored it became clear that Japan did not intend to budge one iota from the fundamental tenets of its military leaders. Japan manifested no disposition to renounce its association with Hitlerism. It insisted that its obligations under the Tripartite Alliance—a direct threat to this country—would be fulfilled by Japan. Japan was willing to affirm its adherence to the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations, but refused to relinquish in practice the preferential position which it had arrogated to itself in all areas under Japanese occupation. Japan insisted upon obtaining through its use of force in China a victor's peace and upon having our assent in advance to that procedure and that conclusion. It refused to make practical application of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. It insisted upon continuing to maintain its armed forces in large areas of China for an indefinite period—a clear indication of intention to effectuate a permanent control over that country. The Japanese Government made no response whatever to the Secretary of State's proposal of November 15 in regard to economic policy.

It was thus apparent that the Japanese were attempting to maneuver the United States into either accepting the limited Japanese proposals or making some sort of an agreement which would serve no purposes except those of Japan, and that, without giving thought to the solving of basic questions they were intent on evading conclusion of an equitable broad-gauge settlement such as had been under discussion in the earlier stages of the conversations. The only question which remained for exploration was whether, by the conclusion of some temporary arrangement or *modus vivendi* to tide over the immediate crisis, Japan might be deterred from embarking immediately upon new steps of aggression. Delaying of the evil day might put that day off forever. It at least would give the intended victims more time in which to prepare to resist. Consideration was given by the Secretary and by the President to various projects envisaging such possible consummations. This Government felt it most important to exhaust every effort to avert or delay a resort to force, especially as the heads of this country's armed services continued to emphasize the need of time to prepare for resistance to attacks that might be made upon us by way of our territories in the Pacific area. Hope of concluding any arrangement, however, became slender indeed in the light of clear indication given by the Japanese authorities that they had no intention of desisting from the menace which they were creating to the United States, to the British Empire, to the Netherlands East Indies, to Thailand, and to China, by the substantial increasing of their armed forces in Indochina and in adjacent waters. In view of that growing menace, of the continuation of the hostilities in China, of the mobilization of Japanese forces in Manchuria, and of the fact that the Japanese proposal of November 20 offered, as outlined above, no basis for a practical and reassuring settlement, it was obvious that the chance of meeting the crisis by measures of diplomacy had practically vanished. Yet, for the purpose of completely clarifying the issues and of possibly providing material and incentive for a renewed and final effort, it was believed desirable to submit to the Japanese a further draft, comprehensive in terms, which might serve as a basis for possible further discussion.

45. On November 26, the Secretary of State gave to the Japanese Ambassador two documents, the first an outline in a tentative form of a proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan and the second an explanatory statement concerning and in regard thereto.

In those documents there was reviewed briefly the objective sought in the exploratory conversations, namely, that of reaching, if possible, an early settlement of questions relating to the entire Pacific area on the basis of the principles of peace, law and order, and fair dealing among nations. Reference was made to proposals which had been communicated on November 20 by the Japanese Ambassador in regard to arranging temporary measures to be taken by the two Governments respectively and to the fact that the Japanese Ambassador had stated that such a temporary arrangement would be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the informal conversations which the Ambassador said the Japanese Government desired to continue. It was observed that while this Government was desirous of contributing to the promotion of peace in the Pacific area and of affording every opportunity for the continuance of the informal conversations, the Japanese proposals in question contained some features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflicted with the fundamental principles underlying the general settlement under consideration; and that this Government believed that the adoption of such proposals would not be likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives. It was therefore suggested that a further effort be made to resolve the divergences of views between the two Governments, and it was stated that, with this object in view, there was being offered for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a program that could be worked out during further conversations.

46. The texts of the explanatory statement and of the outline of the proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan were as follows:

"The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a settlement if possible of questions relating to the entire Pacific area based upon the principles of peace, law and order and fair dealing among nations. These principles include the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

"It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in reference to the general principles which constitute the basis of a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Recently the Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Government is desirous of continuing the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; that it would be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the conversations if a temporary *modus vivendi* could be agreed upon to be in effect while the conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific were continuing. On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary of State proposals in regard to temporary measures to be taken respectively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to accomplish the purposes above indicated.

"The Government of the United States most earnestly desires to contribute to the promotion and maintenance of peace and stability in the Pacific area, and to afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of peace throughout the Pacific area. The proposals which were presented by the Japanese Ambassador on November 20 contain some features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under consideration and to which each Government has declared that it is committed. The Government of the United States believes that the adoption of such proposals would not be likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives of ensuring peace under law, order and justice in the Pacific area, and it suggests that further effort be made to resolve our divergences of views in regard to the practical application of the fundamental principles already mentioned.

"With this object in view the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a program which this Government envisages as something to be worked out during our further conversations.

"The plan therein suggested represents an effort to bridge the gap between our draft of June 21, 1941 and the Japanese draft of September 25 by making a new approach to the essential problems underlying a comprehensive Pacific settlement. This plan contains provisions dealing with the practical application of the fundamental principles which we have agreed in our conversations constitute the only sound basis for worthwhile international relations. We hope that in this way progress toward reaching a meeting of minds between our two Governments may be expedited."

"OUTLINE OF PROPOSED BASIS FOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

"Section I—Draft Mutual Declaration of Policy.

"The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial designs in that area, that they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using military force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations with each other and with all other governments are based:

"(1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.

"(2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

"(3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

"(4) The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

"The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:

"(1) The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.

"(2) The principle of international economic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.

"(3) The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies.

"(4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.

"(5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries.

"Section II—Steps to be Taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan.

"The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows:

"1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.

"2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherland and Thai Governments an agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indochina.

"3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indochina.

"4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support—militarily, politically, economically—any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.

"5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

"Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

"6. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.

"7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan.

"8. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.

"9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

"10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement."

Mr. Kurusu, after reading these documents, offered various depreciatory comments in regard to their contents. He said that the Japanese Government would be likely to throw up its hands when it received this proposal. He said that he felt that the response which had thus been given to the Japanese proposal of November 20 could be interpreted as tantamount to meaning the end of the conversations and he asked whether the United States was not interested in consummating a *modus vivendi.* The Secretary replied that this Government had fully explored that matter.

47. The President and the Secretary of State received the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu on November 27. The President expressed appreciation of the efforts of the peace element in Japan. Most people in the United States, he said, wanted a peaceful solution of all matters in the Pacific area; he himself had not given up yet, although the situation was serious. This Government, he said, had been very much disappointed by the continued expression of opposition by Japanese leaders to the fundamental principles of peace and order which had been discussed in the exploratory conversations with the Japanese representatives. This attitude, he continued, on the part of the Japanese leaders had created an atmosphere, both in the United States and abroad, which had added greatly to the difficulty of making satisfactory progress in the conversations.

The President then called attention to the fact that this Government had been very patient in dealing with the whole Far Eastern situation; that we were prepared to continue to be patient if Japan's course of action would permit continuance of such an attitude on our part. He said that this country could not bring about any substantial relaxation in its economic restrictions unless Japan gave this country some clear manifestation of peaceful intent. If that occurred, we could take some steps of a concrete character designed to improve the general situation. This Government remained convinced, he added, that Japan's own best interests would not be served by following Hitlerism in courses of aggression and that Japan's own best interests lay along other courses which we had outlined in the conversations.

The Secretary said that everyone knew that the Japanese slogans of war propaganda such as those used in describing the "new order in East Asia" and the "controlling influence" in certain areas, were all terms to express in a camouflaged manner the policy of force and conquest by Japan, and domination by military agencies of the political, economic, social, and moral affairs of each of the populations conquered. As long as the Japanese moved in that direction and continued to increase their military and other relations with Hitler through such instruments as the Anti-Comintern Pact[11] and the Tripartite Pact, no real progress could be made on a program of peaceful solution.

During this conversation the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu said very little. The Ambassador expressed disappointment that it had not been possible to reach an agreement regarding a *modus vivendi.* Mr. Kurusu said that the difficulty did not lie in the fundamentals so much as in the application of those fundamentals.

48. The Secretary of State next conferred with the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu on December 1. The Secretary said that in connection with the informal conversations we had to take into account the bellicose utterances emanating from Tokyo. He referred to Japanese military moves in Indochina and emphasized that we did not intend to go into a partnership with Japan's military leaders; that he had not heard one whisper of peace from them, only bluster and bloodcurdling threats. He said that this Government had no idea of trying to bluff Japan and he saw no occasion for Japan's trying to bluff us; he emphasized that there is a limit beyond which we cannot go and that one of these days there might come a point beyond which the conversations could not be continued.

The Secretary of State said that this Government was anxious to help settle the China affair if the Japanese could reach a settlement in accordance with the basic principles which we had discussed in our conversations, and that under such circumstances we would be glad to offer our good offices. He said that under existing circumstances Japan might just as well ask us to cease aiding Great Britain as to cease aiding China. He said that the United States would supply Japan all the materials she wanted if Japan's military leaders would only demonstrate that Japan intended to pursue a peaceful course.

The Secretary of State observed that the stationing of Japanese troops in Indochina constituted a menace to surrounding areas, irrespective of where in Indochina the troops were stationed; that the stationing of these troops in Indochina was also making it necessary for the United States and its friends to keep large numbers of armed forces immobilized in East Asia; and that in this way Japan's acts were having the effect of aiding Hitler. He called attention to reports of heavy Japanese troop movements into Indochina and again stressed the point that, with a large Japanese army anywhere in Indochina, we had to give that situation more attention when Japanese statesmen were saying that they would drive us out of East Asia.

---

[11] For text, see p. 153.

In making this statement the Secretary had reference to the reported statement by the Japanese Premier on November 30 that Japan must "purge with a vengeance" the influence of the United States and Great Britain in East Asia.[12] The Secretary pointed out that we could not be sure what the Japanese military leaders were likely to do; we did not know where the Japanese army intended to land its forces. He said that we could not sit still while developments, such as Japanese military entrenchment in Indochina, were taking place; that we would not allow ourselves to be driven out of the Pacific.

In view of all the confusion, threats and pressure, the Secretary of State said, he felt that something must be done to clear the atmosphere; we must get back to fundamentals; and these fundamentals were embodied in the proposal presented by this Government to the Japanese on November 26. There was no reason for conflict between the United States and Japan. There was no real clash of essential interests. Japan did not have to use a sword to gain for itself a seat at the head table. In our opinion equality of opportunity was the key to the future peace and prosperity of all nations.

Mr. Kurusu said that the document handed to the Ambassador on November 26 had been communicated to the Japanese Government and a reply would be forthcoming in a few days. He added that the Japanese Government believed that its proposal of November 20 was equitable and gave full consideration to the points of view of both countries; that the Japanese Government had difficulty in understanding the position taken by the Government of the United States; and that the American proposal given to the Japanese representatives on November 26 seemed to fail to take into account the existing conditions in the Far East. He said that the Japanese offer to withdraw its troops from southern French Indochina remained standing and that Japan had shown its extreme desire to promote a peaceful settlement. He was directed, he continued, by the Japanese Government to inquire what was the ultimate aim of the United States in the conversations and to ask the Government of the United States to "make deep reflection of this matter".

49. On November 25 and on November 28, at meetings of the War Council, at which the highest officers of the Army and the Navy of course were present, the Secretary of State emphasized the critical nature of the relations of this country with Japan: he stated at those meetings that there was practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan; that in his opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force;

---

[12] See telegram No. 1869, December 1, 1941, from the Ambassador in Japan, p. 148.

and that the question of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy. At the conclusion the Secretary with due deference expressed his judgment that any plan for our military defense should include an assumption that the Japanese might make the element of surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack at various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination for purposes thereof.

VI. Final Phase

50. During the final phase of these conversations, the Government of the United States learned that new contingents of Japanese armed forces and additional equipment were moving into Indochina. Toward the end of November these movements were intensified. During the first week of December new movements of Japanese forces made it clear that under cover of negotiations such forces were being disposed for some attack on unspecified objectives. These disposals included moving into strategic positions in the Gulf of Thailand. That disposal was apparently designed not merely to intimidate or assault Thailand but also to set up bases for attack southward against Singapore and northward in the direction of the Burma Road.

51. On December 2 the President in a memorandum to the Secretary and the Under Secretary of State directed that inquiry be made at once of the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu in regard to the reasons for the continued Japanese troop movements into Indochina. On the same date the Under Secretary of State, in compliance with the President's instruction, informed the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu of the President's inquiry.

52. On December 5 the Japanese Ambassador called and handed to the Secretary of State a reply to that inquiry, the substantive portion of which reply read as follows:

> "As Chinese troops have recently shown frequent signs of movements along the northern frontier of French Indo-china bordering on China, Japanese troops, with the object of mainly taking precautionary measures, have been reinforced to a certain extent in the northern part of French Indo-china. As a natural sequence of this step, certain movements have been made among the troops stationed in the southern part of the said territory. It seems that an exaggerated report has been made of these movements. It should be added that no measure has been taken on the part of the Japanese Government that may transgress the stipulations of the Protocol of Joint Defense between Japan and France."

53. On this occasion the Secretary of State said to the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu that he, the Secretary, had been under the impression that Japan had been moving forces into northern Indo-

china for the purpose of *attacking* China from there; and that he had never heard before that these troop movements were for the purpose of defense against Chinese attack. He added that it was the first time he had been given to understand that Japan was on the defensive in Indochina.

The Ambassador said that the United States blames Japan for its move into Indochina but that if Indochina were controlled by other powers it would be a menace to Japan.

The Secretary said that we could resolve the difficulties without delay if the Japanese Government would renounce courses of force and aggression. He added that we were not looking for trouble but that at the same time we were not running away from menaces.

Despite the completely unsatisfactory Japanese reply with respect to its operations in Indochina, the United States Government still felt that every possible effort for peace should be exhausted. President Roosevelt on December 6 telegraphed to Tokyo a personal message to the Emperor of Japan in which he stated that developments were occurring in the Pacific area which threatened to deprive the United States and Japan and all humanity of the beneficial influence of the long peace between the two countries, and that these developments contained "tragic possibilities". The President said that we had hoped that the peace of the Pacific could be consummated in such a way that many diverse peoples could exist side by side without fear of invasion, that unbearable burdens of armaments could be lifted, and that all peoples would resume commerce without discrimination against or in favor of any nation. In seeking these great objectives both Japan and the United States "should agree to eliminate any form of military threat". The President said further that during recent weeks it had become clear to the world that Japanese military, naval, and air forces had been sent to southern Indochina in such large numbers as to create a reasonable doubt that this continued concentration in Indochina was defensive in its character; that the people of the Philippines, of the Netherlands Indies, of Malaya, and of Thailand were asking themselves whether these Japanese forces were preparing or intending to make attack in one or more of these many directions; that none of these peoples could sit either indefinitely or permanently "on a keg of dynamite". Finally, the President said that he was addressing the Emperor in the fervent hope that the Emperor might give thought to ways of dispelling the darkening clouds; that both he and the Emperor had "a sacred duty to restore traditional amity and prevent further death and destruction in the world".

54. On Sunday, December 7, at about 12:00 noon, the Secretary of State, in response to a telephoned request from the Japanese Ambas-

sador, made an appointment to receive the Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu at 1 p. m. Shortly after 1 p. m. the Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu asked by telephone that the appointment be postponed until 1:45 p. m. They arrived at the Department of State at 2:05 p. m. and were received by the Secretary at 2:20 p. m. The Japanese Ambassador said that he had been instructed by his Government to deliver a paper at one p. m. but that difficulty in decoding the message had delayed him. He then handed the Secretary a document, the text of which read as follows:

"1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific Area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific Area.

"The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.

"2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace and thereby to enable all nations to find each its proper place in the world.

"Ever since China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy.

"However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking régime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia. Exerting pressure on the Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defence of French Indo-China, both American and British Governments, willfully misinterpreting it as a threat to their own possessions, and inducing the Netherlands Government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the Empire.

"Nevertheless, to facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific Area. However, the American

Government, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental and essential questions.

"3. Subsequently, on September 25th the Japanese Government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American Government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American Government, adhering steadfastly to its original assertions, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.

"Therefore, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points:

> "(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.
>
> "(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with the view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.
>
> "(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.
>
> "The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.
>
> "(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.
>
> "(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific Area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

"As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as 'introducer' of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.

"The American Government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as so-called 'introducer' of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally on November 26th, in an attitude to impose upon the

Japanese Government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American Government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.

"4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties. As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude. As for the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific Area including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis. Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese Government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation.

"It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American Government.

"On the other hand, the American Government, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, caused undue delay in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American Government and the Japanese Government desires to call the attention of the American Government especially to the following points:

> "1. The American Government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese Government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.
>
> "Of the various principles put forward by the American Government as a basis of the Japanese-American Agreement, there are some which the Japanese Government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual conditions, it seems only a utopian ideal on the part of the American Government to attempt to force their immediate adoption.
>
> "Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between Japan, United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, the Netherlands and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.
>
> "2. The American proposal contained a stipulation which states—'Both Governments will agree that no agreement, which

either has concluded with any third power or powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.' It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the War in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.

"The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific Area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy, two powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific Area through peaceful means.

"3. Whereas the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settle international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhumane than military pressure.

"4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in coalition with Great Britain and other Powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that the countries of East Asia for the past hundred years or more have been compelled to observe the *status quo* under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice themselves to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.

"The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. Thus the six countries,—Japan, the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, China and Thailand,—excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the Governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese Government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the Nine Power Treaty structure which is the chief factor responsible for the present predicament of East Asia.

"5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American Government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of

> troops or unconditional application of the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce ignored the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American Government in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any régime other than the régime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking Government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This demand of the American Government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking régime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American Government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.

"5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of yen and dollar exchange, or the abolition of extraterritorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the Empire's existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese Government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.

"6. The Japanese Government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements to be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American Government. However, since the American Government has made the proposal of November 26th as a result of frequent consultation with Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands and Chungking, and presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking régime in the questions of China, it must be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position.

"7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a new order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiation. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

"The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations."

55. The Secretary of State read this paper, turned to the Japanese Ambassador, and said:

"I must say that in all my conversations with you [the Japanese Ambassador] during the last nine months I have never uttered one word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record. In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions—infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any government on this planet was capable of uttering them."

The Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu then took their leave without making any comment.

More than an hour before the delivery of this reply Japanese armed forces had struck without warning at American territory in the heart of the Pacific.

Several hours after the beginning of the Japanese attack Ambassador Grew was informed by the Japanese Foreign Minister that the above-described memorandum, which had been delivered at Washington, was desired by the Emperor to be regarded as the Emperor's reply to the President's message. At the same time, however, the Japanese Foreign Minister made an oral statement to the Ambassador also "as a reply" from the Emperor to the President to the effect that the establishment of peace "in the Pacific and consequently of the world has been the cherished desire of His Majesty for the realization of which he has hitherto made the Government to continue its earnest endeavors".

---

56. In entering into the conversations with the Japanese Government in the spring of 1941 this Government had had in mind doing everything it could to bring about a peaceful, fair and stabilizing settlement of the situation throughout the Pacific area. This course was in accordance with the traditional beliefs and attitude of the American people. It was also consistent with the need of having time to build up the preparations for defense vital not only to the United States but to many other countries resisting aggression. Throughout the course of the conversations, the representatives of this Government had of necessity to consider whether the Japanese Government had the willingness and the power to enter into in good faith an agreement of a character which would be likely to contribute to the establishment of just and stable conditions of peace in the Pacific area. Even though from the outset of the conversations the prospects of success appeared at best to be but slight, the representatives of this Government felt that they must make every possible effort to preserve and promote peace. In this spirit they continued to try to obtain some reliable indication that there was or could be a meeting of the minds and that formal negotiations either at a meeting between the responsible heads of the two Governments or through normal diplomatic channels would bring forth specific and dependable pledges.

While considering it necessary, in the light of Japan's past and contemporary record of aggression, to subject all Japanese proposals to most careful scrutiny and analysis, and to be constantly on guard against qualified and equivocal offers and declarations, the representatives of this Government had endeavored at all times to treat with the Japanese in a spirit of open-mindedness, patience and good-will. At the same time this Government had consistently declined to compromise the principles in which the people of this country believe and to which they and this Government are committed.

The desire and effort of the United States to maintain peaceful relations with Japan and to improve and stabilize on a just basis the situation throughout the Pacific area were frustrated by the determination of Japan to continue its march on the pathway of conquest. Japan's leaders had committed their country to a carefully formulated program for the subjugation and ruthless exploitation of at least one-half of the world's population. The attack by Japan's armed forces upon the United States on December 7 showed conclusively that the military element in Japan had gained complete control of the Japanese Government and was able to override all persons and groups desirous of restoring good relations with the United States and of diverting their country from courses of aggression to courses of peace. That attack brought to an unsuccessful end the intensive effort which the American Government had made to preserve peace.

RECORD OF CONVERSATIONS

711.94/2039

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] February 14, 1941.

I accompanied the new Japanese Ambassador [13] to the President's office and sat through the conference between the President and the Ambassador. The President received the Ambassador in a marked spirit of cordiality and personal friendliness. He referred in pleasing language to their association some twenty-odd years ago, and remarked that he proposed to call him Admiral and consider him as Admiral, rather than as Ambassador. He said that they were friends and they could at all times talk candidly as friends about the relations and related affairs of the two countries.

The President then said that of course it is manifest that the present relations between the two countries are not good; that they are in fact getting worse, or to use a well-known expression, they are "deteriorating"; that the press of Japan—and he said the press of our country might not be an exception—expresses views and circulates reports which are calculated to arouse feeling in this country of 130,000,000 population; that some of the Japanese statesmen talk along similar lines, and that altogether the American people are quite seriously concerned about the Japanese situation. The President affirmed two or three times the view that the American people, while not bitter as yet, are thoroughly and seriously concerned and to a more or less increasing extent, at the course of Japan.

He then referred to the movements of Japan southward down to Indochina and the Spratly Islands and other localities in that area,[14] as having given this country *very* serious concern. He said that the entry of Japan into the Tripartite agreement [15] is likewise giving this country the same serious concern, especially from the viewpoint that Japan is supposed to have divested herself of her sovereign authority to deal with the question of peace and war and to leave it to the Tripartite signatories led by Germany. The President went over this the second time with increased emphasis as to the heavy signs of concern it had created among the American people. He then said that while the American people are peace-minded and peace-loving and peace-observing, and are not unduly wrought up at present, it would be extremely easy for some incident like the sinking of the *Maine* or the destruction and sinking of the *Panay* [16] to cause an overnight uprising, in a more or less explosive sense, of American sentiment against the authors, regardless of the exact facts or details as to the cause . . .

---

[13] Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura.

[14] *Ante*, pp. 277 ff.

[15] *Ante*, p. 165.

The President more than once referred with gratification to the fact that the present Ambassador is here and that the two of them could in the friendliest and frankest manner talk out to the best advantage of both countries ways and means of dealing with such inflammable circumstances and with methods to avoid them. He then said that in view of all these serious conditions which are becoming increasingly worse and which seriously call for attention, it occurred to him that the Japanese Ambassador might find it advisable and agreeable as he, the President, does, to sit down with the Secretary of State and other State Department officials and review and reexamine the important phases of the relations between the two countries, at least during the past four or five years, and frankly discuss all of their phases and ascertain just when and how points of divergence developed and their effects, and bring the whole situation in these respects up to date in order to see if our relations could not be improved. The President said there is plenty of room in the Pacific area for everybody, and he repeated this statement with emphasis. The Ambassador showed no signs of dissent, but somewhat the contrary. The President elaborated a little in order to emphasize this suggestion. The Ambassador bowed and indicated his assent, just as he bowed in an apparently wholehearted and agreeable manner when the President referred to the dangerous situation between the two countries—the *Panay* incident and the Tripartite agreement. One would have thought from his demeanor and manifestations that the Ambassador was in entire harmony with each point the President brought out, including the reexamination of the record of relations between the two countries.

The President finally said it would not do this country any good nor Japan any good, but both of them harm, to get into a war. The Ambassador gave his prompt assent to this.

The Ambassador, having passed in his formal address and the President having laid his reply and address aside, proceeded to speak with every appearance of earnestness about preserving peaceful relations between the two countries. He referred to the military group in control as "Chauvinistic" and he used another similar word to characterize this element without mentioning it by name, but referring to it as presenting the chief difficulty and chief obstacle to the pursuit of the course which the Ambassador and those of his views would be disposed to follow, which course was presumably one that would be acceptable to this country. The Ambassador said that every part of his being would be behind his best possible efforts to promote and preserve peaceful and agreeable relations and a better understanding between the two countries. He left the impression that his Government was in harmony with his purpose thus so earnestly expressed. He made no reference to the points the President brought out, but spoke briefly in a general way about the existence of unsatisfactory relations; the need for their improvement and his every disposition to say and do anything possible to that end.

---

[16] See vol. I, pp. 517 ff.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

711.94/1987

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 8, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador called at my apartment at the Carlton Hotel by an indirect arrangement based on the equal and joint initiative of himself and myself growing out of his talk with the President in my presence some days ago. I expressed my satisfaction and interest at his coming and he said that he had been watching for an opportunity to talk with me. The idea evidently was that he was seeking to do this without appearing to take the initiative in the conference.

I then said that I was not absolutely certain whether he would come; that at all times most countries have some responsible, fine and capable citizens who are seeking earnestly and patriotically to make their respective contributions to better understanding and other desirable relations between their own and other governments; that in the instant situation I deeply appreciate their purposes and their efforts and have sent word to them to that effect. I have also made it clear that on all official questions and problems between our Governments I can only deal with and through him, the duly authorized Ambassador of Japan, and that much as I appreciate their efforts, this must be the course and attitude of my Government. I made this very definite so that the Ambassador could not misunderstand me. I also said to the Ambassador that I had likewise sent word to these good people from his country that I could not confer with them individually relative to these matters pending between our two Governments unless the Ambassador assumed the responsibility and the initiative to that end; that, in other words, everything must come and go through him, the Ambassador of Japan. He merely bowed each time I referred to the matter without saying anything.

Some casual remark then offered the occasion for me to refer to our program of liberal commercial policy and trade agreements and the extreme need for its adoption by all important nations. I reviewed in some detail the course of extreme nationalism during the post-war period and how each nation had sought to live unto itself, blocking the maximum of imports by arbitrary methods of every kind with the result that the sum total of international trade was far below what the annual increase during the past twenty years should have made it; that the processes of distribution and consumption were hopelessly hobbled and handicapped; that as a result world consumption fell at least twenty billions below what it should have legitimately been; that unemployment correspondingly spread in almost every part of the world, with resultant privations, distress and hunger, so that peoples in many countries became a prey to agitators and those seeking dictatorships while the peaceful nations were stagnant and cursed with large dammed up surpluses of their own with nowhere to sell them. I said it was against this movement of what would ultimately be utter disaster that I and others strove for many years in an effort to prevail on important nations to join in a liberal commercial program for vastly increased production and healthy trade in all parts of the world; but that the movement had been just a little too late for us to prevail, especially on Europe, to get in and actively aid in advancing this movement of economic restoration on a sound healthy basis. I said that we were struggling to get forty nations actively and earnestly behind this movement based on equality of treatment and equality of access to raw materials, so that we could then turn to countries like Germany and Italy and let the forty nations assure them that they would be welcome into this program of trade opportunity and trade equality.

I said that, unfortunately, this sound healthy movement was interrupted by military movements and plans and undertakings; that conquest by force accompanied by virtual military rule of conquered peoples, with all of its elements of semi-barbarism, seemed to effectively block for the time being the movement for peaceful commerce and increased consumption and employment throughout most of the world. I said this policy and this movement of my Government are, of course, well known to every government and every statesman in the world; that in our efforts to ward off any pretext for military adventures for purposes of conquest and arbitrary domination of other nations economically, politically or militarily, we for years strove to the utmost not only to advance and secure the acceptance generally of a sound liberal commercial policy and ever-increasing international trade, but along with it the other fundamentals which underlie all other important relations among civilized nations and with which everyone is familiar; that that was our objective and our effort; that these efforts conducted vigorously for many years under this Administration were well known to everybody.

I then said that it would be impossible to describe our surprise and deep disappointment to see a number of nations abandon this peaceful course of understanding and adjustment in accordance with basic rules and laws and policies and move straight in the direction of fastening on the world the opposite and opposing policy of military conquest by force, and threat of force, and the adoption of methods of government of the conquered peoples that are a reversion to those extremely and unspeakably vicious methods of arbitrary rulers and despots of many centuries ago.

I said, therefore, that I am glad to have the Ambassador come in in the hope that he may have something definite and systematic in mind that would offer a practical approach to and consideration of the course and attitude of his Government with respect to its present course.

The Ambassador expressed much interest in what I said about attempts to organize the world on a liberal commercial basis and indicated his whole-hearted approval. He said that his Government, like others at times, may have made some mistakes, and he added that all of the people in Japan with very few exceptions, which included extremists, were very much averse to getting into war with the United States; that he had talked with them generally and this included most of the military officials, but not all of them; that Prime Minister Konoye is not one of the latter type, and is not desirous of moving on such a course as I had mentioned and criticized, namely a course of military expansion; that Matsuoka[17] is a politician and the Ambassador smiled and said that he sometimes uses big words. The Ambassador said that the talk of Matsuoka and other statesmen in Japan along the lines I complained of was really for home consumption. The Ambassador then said that his Government would be very glad to effect peace arrangements with China and hoped that at no distant date such terms might be developed as would give consideration to their puppet government, and would move Chiang Kai-shek[17a] to come into the picture and participate in general peaceful arrangements with China, which the Ambassador emphasized as his country's desire, and which should be on the basis of equality to all nations. In response to inquiries as to further details of the proposed Chinese-Japanese peace or the methods of bringing it about, the Ambassador was silent for the present, but indicated that his adviser, Colonel Iwakuro, is on his way here and that he had intimate details of the whole Chinese-Japanese situation.

---

[17] Yosuke Matsuoka, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[17a] President of the Executive Yüan and Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission of China.

The Ambassador then said that it would be well-nigh unthinkable for our two countries to fight each other on account of the destructive effects that would inevitably result in any event. I here spoke and said that my country entertained the same idea about the destructive effects of a military clash between our two countries. I then inquired of the Ambassador whether the military groups in control of his Government could possibly expect important nations like the United States to sit absolutely quiet while two or three nations before our very eyes organized naval and military forces and went out and conquered the balance of the earth, including the seven seas and all trade routes and the other four continents. Could they expect countries like mine to continue to remain complacent as that movement is going on? I inquired further what countries like mine would have to gain by remaining complacent in the face of a movement to substitute force and conquest for law and justice and order and fair dealing and equality. The Ambassador sought to play down the view that such military conquest was really in the mind of his Government and he then said that embargoes by this country were, of course, of increasing concern, and that he did not believe there would be any further military movements unless the policy of increasing embargoes by this country should force his Government, in the minds of those in control, to take further military steps. To this I replied that this is a matter entirely in the hands of his Government for the reason that his Government took the initiative in military expansion and seizures of territory of other countries, thereby creating an increasingly deep concern on the part of my own and other countries as to the full extent of Japanese conquest by force which was contemplated; that my country has not been at fault and none of the nations engaged in conquest have pretended seriously to charge it with any action of omission or commission in relation to the present movement of world conquest by force on the part of some three nations, including Japan. The Ambassador sought here to minimize and mildly to controvert the idea that Japan is engaged in broad unqualified military conquest. I then repeated the terms of the Tripartite Agreement and the public declaration of Hitler and Matsuoka and other high authorities in Japan to the effect that their countries under the Tripartite arrangement were out by military force to establish a new order not for Asia alone, not for Europe alone, but for the world, and a new order under their control. I said that whatever interpretation the Ambassador might give these utterances and military activities in harmony with them thus far, the American people who were long complacent with respect to dangerous international developments have of late become very thoroughly aroused and awakened to what they regard as a matter of most serious concern in relation to movements by Japan and Germany, presumably to take charge of the seas and the other continents for their own personal arbitrary control and pecuniary profit at the expense of the welfare of all of the peoples, who are victims of such a course and of peaceful nations in general. I said, of course, these apprehensions and this tremendous concern will remain and continue so long as Hitler continues his avowed course of unlimited conquest and tyrannical rule and so long as the Japanese Army and Navy increase their occupation by force of other and distant areas on both land and sea, with no apparent occasion to do so other than that of capture and exclusive use of the territory and other interests of other countries. The Ambassador again sought to allay the idea of military conquest on the part of his country, and I again replied with emphasis that as long as Japanese forces were all over China and Japanese troops and airplanes and naval vessels were as far south as Thailand and Indochina and Saigon, accompanied by such threatening declarations as Japanese statesmen are making week after week, there can only be increasing concern by nations who are vitally interested in international affairs both on land and sea as they are also vitally interested in the halt of world conquest by force and barbaric methods of government.

The Ambassador came back again to the desire of his country for peace with China based on equality to all and the hope that it might combine something of their puppet government with Chiang Kai-shek's government. I pressed the Ambassador to indicate some further definite ideas he might have in mind about the proper steps to take to approach the whole situation. He did not disagree with me when I spoke of the necessity for acts and utterances by Japan, making it clear that in good faith she was not pursuing or intending to pursue a course of expansion and conquest by force such as had been referred to.

I said that I came from the President who sent his regards and said that he would be only too glad at any time to talk further with the Ambassador just as two old friends would talk, and do so officially and unofficially, or individually at times, if desired by either. I pointed out that such a meeting could be arranged unobtrusively and without publicity, and in a manner permitting the initiative to be shared on a 50–50 basis between him and the President. The Ambassador said he might call on the President the next time; that he would hope to continue these conversations. On two or three occasions I inquired of him whether it was still agreeable to pursue the President's suggestion of talking over and discussing the past relations between our two Governments and the questions that have arisen which call for settlement by mutual agreement. He indicated his favorable disposition in regard to the matter, but not in any specific way as to time or as to officials with whom he might talk.

I referred on one or two occasions to the statement reported to have been made to Mr. Churchill[17b] by the Japanese Ambassador in London some days ago to the effect that his Government would not attack Singapore or the Netherlands East Indies, and inquired point-blank what the Ambassador's idea as to this was. In reply to the first inquiry, he was not exceedingly strong in his statement but he did make it fairly definite that he did not believe there would be an attack but added, as heretofore indicated, that if our American embargoes continued to press his Government and the military group in control, they may feel forced to proceed further in a naval or military way. I again said to him that this latter question would not with any consistency or reason arise, in my judgment, because, as already stated to him, the whole responsibility and initiative with respect to military conquest and the departure from laws and treaties and other basic rules of friendly relationship by the Japanese Government rests entirely on that Government.

I again inquired of the Ambassador if he had any further ideas or suggestions which would constitute any plans or purposes for peaceful readjustment additional to that which he had already mentioned in relation to China. The Ambassador did not offer any comment on this except to attempt to convey the impression that later he would give consideration to these further phases.

At an appropriate stage in the conversation I said that the conquest of the world by his country and Germany with the methods of government which were being applied to conquered peoples, all bankrupt, would mean to set not only the world but these very conquering countries back to impossible levels of existence; that the conquering countries themselves would be the losers to an unthinkable extent.

In the course of the conversation I had occasion to remind the Ambassador that few nations were ever on more mutually profitable and genuine friendly relations than our two countries for two generations lasting until about the time of the Coolidge and Hoover Administrations. I said that, speaking in great confidence, when I came to the State Department, one of my greatest ambitions was to work out a mutually satisfactory arrangement with respect to the Quota Limitation Act of 1924,[17c] enacted by our Congress, so as to place the whole matter of immigration on an equal or reciprocal basis, which, of course, would have meant that the number of immigrants both ways would be limited, but this basis of equality would settle the feeling that has existed since 1924. He expressed his gratification at this.

[17b] British Prime Minister.

[17c] 43 Stat. 153. See *Foreign Relations*, 1924, vol. II, pp. 333 ff.

I then added that we would get nowhere if the military group should say that they were not expanding in a military way, as they have often said in China, and at the same time go forward with their expansion plans and activities.

The Ambassador also brought up the question about how the doors of trade had been closed against Japan by other countries, including Indochina, and hence the necessity for some steps looking to the comfortable existence of her people. To this I replied by reminding the Ambassador of what I had said at the outset to the effect that during the twenty years of the post-war period under the reign of extreme nationalism in every country alike, all nations had shut their doors to a large extent against each other, that most nations shut their doors against my country as a part of this universal movement of trade and commercial suicide; that, therefore, Japan is not an exception. I then added that it would be an amazing thing to abandon the whole program of economic rehabilitation on peaceful lines and under the principle of equality, to which I have been referring, and turn away to military force and conquest as a substitute.

I inquired whether Matsuoka was going to Berlin and the Ambassador said he did not believe he would go, that he had been invited there at the time of the signing of the Tripartite Pact.

I proceeded to comment on Japan's line of activities and utterances by saying that this country and most other countries only proclaim and practice policies of peaceful international relationships, political, economic, social and cultural. Sometimes the policy to promote these mutually beneficial relationships is proclaimed, such as our good neighbor policy with special reference to Pan America. And yet all of our acts and programs and policies adopted by the twenty-one American nations in their conferences from time to time are made universal in their application, so that Japan and all other nations receive the same equal opportunities for trade and commerce generally throughout the Americas that each of the American nations receives itself. In striking contrast the new order in greater Eastern Asia is unequivocally believed to be purely a program of military aggression and conquest with entirely arbitrary policies of political, economic and military domination. The Ambassador made no definite promise as to what his Government would do in respect to halting its aggression for purpose of discussions. He did not intimate that it could not and would not do this, no more than he intimated or indicated just what its attitude would be towards the Tripartite Agreement in the future when I definitely brought that phase to his attention in connection with the present and prospective course of the Japanese Government.

During our conversation, I emphasized to the Ambassador that it is the opinion of the President and others of the Administration that the British will beyond any reasonable doubt be able successfully to resist Hitler.

[CORDELL HULL]

711.94/1997

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 14, 1941.

The Ambassador of Japan called at the White House at his request. The President and I were present at the meeting.

The Ambassador proceeded to say that none of his people, with few exceptions, desired war between our two countries; that Matsuoka talks loudly for home consumption because he is ambitious politically, but Japan herself cannot maintain such ambitious plans. He said that Japan desired especially three things in the Chinese situation; the first was good will; the second was economic cooperation; and the third was Comintern defense. He then said that Japan wants raw materials from neighboring countries, and that the "New Order" which contemplates equality of economic opportunity and cooperative prosperity should be given a flexible interpretation. He continued by saying something about the increasingly disastrous situation in Europe, and added that Japan and the United States should cooperate for peace.

The President then emphasized very strongly the deep-seated effect on public opinion in this country arising from the Tripartite Agreement, and he proceeded to emphasize vigorously the dangerous effects of this agreement and the utter lack of any sound reason for Japan to enter into it from every standpoint of her welfare. The Ambassador rather lamely remarked that this country was pressing Japan with embargoes and trade restrictions, and they were in a way forced into this Tripartite arrangement. The President controverted this and again said that from every viewpoint this action was contrary to the interest of Japan; that Hitler would rule over every country if once given the opportunity, just as he is today ruling over Italy and the other countries which had trusted him. The Ambassador did not discuss this phase further.

Then the question arose regarding the threatening nature of Matsuoka's acts and utterances, and the Ambassador said that Matsuoka's trip to Berlin was a mere compliment to the German Government, such as is customary in the existing circumstances for countries like Japan.

The President then proceeded to set forth the sound rules and policies of international trade based on the rule of equality of treatment and elaborated at length with illustrations of the situation facing different countries in various parts of the world. He said that the task would be left to a few important nations like this country and Great Britain, and also Japan if she should be so disposed to reorganize international trade on a sound liberal basis, to cooperate with countries that were weak, or at a disadvantage, to enable them to enjoy all the benefits of economic progress. He said that the United States, for example, desires to aid Brazil to develop her most important lines of production to fit it into the international economic trade situation, and that this country likewise desires to cooperate with Argentina for a like purpose, especially as it relates to Argentine beef and other surplus products.

The President then . . . stressed the close ties existing between Thailand and Japan, adding that the former was more closely related to Japan in many ways than the Argentine was related to the United States. The President said that the suggestion had been made now and then that the United States take over the West Indies, but that the attitude of this Government unreservedly has been to see each country preserve its sovereignty, its territorial integrity and equality of opportunity, and that all the nations of the world can on the same basis come and trade with the nations of this hemisphere. The Ambassador admitted that we had been treating Central and South America extremely well, and that we had developed greatly the good neighbor relationships.

The President again returned to the Tripartite Agreement and said that it had upset the American people because they think that a concerted effort is being made by Germany and Italy to reach the Suez Canal and by Japan on the other hand to approach Singapore, the Netherlands East Indies and the Indian Ocean. The Japanese Ambassador spoke more strongly than he had in his earlier talk with me, expressing his belief that his country would not go South.

The President came back to the matter of the great work the United States has been doing for economic equality of opportunity, and said that if Great Britain wins, she must be willing for Germany to have equal access to all raw materials and equal trade opportunities. He then remarked that the United States and Japan do not produce rubber and tin and numerous other commodities produced in the British Empire, and that by international arrangements, access to each and all of these must be equal to each country alike. The President illustrated the necessity for this broader course by citing the fact that private efforts had been made to control rubber production and had failed; that control of coffee production had been attempted and had failed.

The President finally remarked that, as the Ambassador indicated, matters between our two countries could undoubtedly be worked out without a military clash, emphasizing that the first step in this direction would be the removal of suspicion and fear regarding Japan's intentions. I here remarked that, of course, with Matsuoka astride the Axis on his way to Berlin and talking loudly as he goes, and Japanese naval and air forces in the vicinity of Indochina, Thailand and Saigon, with no explanation but with serious inferences, the Ambassador must realize how acute feeling and opinion in this country have become.

The Ambassador said that Japan had no idea of controlling China . . . The Ambassador joined with the President a number of times in expressing the view that differences between the countries could and should be worked out. The Ambassador did not, however, respond to requests for any additional methods of approach beyond the Chinese-Japanese question. He did not say so, but I inferred that he would probably be returning in due time for another conference. I made it clear that Japan, having departed from the course that both countries have been pursuing, the initiative and the responsibility are hers to suggest what, how and when, she is willing, as a preliminary step, to undertake serious discussions, and that above all she must make it clear by words and acts of her serious intentions in this direction.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

711.94/2066$\frac{6}{8}$

Proposal Presented to the Department of State Through the Medium of Private American and Japanese Individuals on April 9, 1941

The Governments of the United States and of Japan accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement disposing the resumption of our traditional friendly relations.

Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment among our peoples should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences.

It is our present hope that, by a joint effort, our nations may establish a just Peace in the Pacific; and by the rapid consummation of an *entente cordiale*, arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.

For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-suited and weakening. We, therefore, suggest that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general agreement which would bind, meanwhile, both governments in honor and in act.

It is our belief that such an understanding should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory concerns which could be deliberated at a Conference and appropriately confirmed by our respective Governments.

We presume to anticipate that our Governments could achieve harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified or improved; to wit:

1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.
2. The attitudes of both governments toward the European War.
3. The relations of both nations toward the China affair.
4. Naval, aerial and mercantile marine relations in the Pacific.
5. Commerce between both nations and their financial cooperation.
6. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.
7. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific.

Accordingly, we have come to the following mutual understanding subject, of course, to modifications by the United States Government and subject to the official and final decision of the Government of Japan.

I. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations

The Governments of the United States and of Japan might jointly acknowledge each other as equally sovereign states and contiguous Pacific powers.

Both Governments assert the unanimity of their national policies as directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of respectful confidence and cooperation among our peoples.

Both Governments might declare that it is their traditional, and present, concept and conviction that nations and races compose, as members of a family, one household; each equally enjoying rights and admitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound not to destroy for others.

Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to those moral principles and concepts.

II. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European War.

The Government of Japan maintains that the purpose of its Axis Alliance was, and is, defensive and designed to prevent the extension of military grouping among nations not directly affected by the European War.

The Government of Japan, with no intention of evading its existing treaty obligation, desires to declare that its military obligation under the Axis Alliance comes into force only when one of the parties of the Alliance is aggressively attacked by a power not at present involved in the European War.

The Government of the United States maintains that its attitude toward the European War is, and will continue to be, determined by no aggressive alliance aimed to assist any one nation against another. The United States maintains that it is pledged to the hate of war, and accordingly, its attitude toward the European War is, and will continue to be, determined solely and exclusively by considerations of the protective defense of its own national welfare and security.

III. China affairs.

The President of the United States, if the following terms are approved by His Excellency and guaranteed by the Government of Japan, might request the Chiang-Kai-Chek regime to negotiate peace with Japan.

a. Independence of China
b. Withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory, in accordance with an agreement to be reached between Japan and China
c. No acquisition of Chinese territory
d. No imposition of indemnities
e. Resumption of the "Open Door"; the interpretation and application of which shall be agreed upon at some future, convenient time between the United States and Japan
f. Coalescence of the Governments of Chiang-Kai-Chek and of Wang-Ching-Wei
g. No large-scale or concentrated immigration of Japanese into Chinese territory
h. Recognition of Manchukuo.

With the acceptance by the Chiang-Kai-Chek regime of the aforementioned Presidential request, the Japanese Government shall commence direct peace negotiations with the newly coalesced Chinese Government, or constituent elements thereof.

The Government of Japan shall submit to the Chinese concrete terms of peace, within the limits of aforesaid general terms and along the line of neighborly friendship, joint defense against communistic activities and economic cooperation.

Should the Chiang-Kai-Chek regime reject the request of President Roosevelt, the United States Government shall discontinue assistance to the Chinese.

IV. Naval, aerial and mercantile marine relations in the Pacific.

a. As both the Americans and the Japanese are desirous of maintaining the peace in the Pacific, they shall not resort to such disposition of their naval forces and aerial forces as to menace each other. Detailed, concrete agreement thereof shall be left for determination at the proposed joint Conference.

b. At the conclusion of the projected Conference, each nation might despatch a courtesy naval squadron to visit the country of the other and signalize the new era of Peace in the Pacific.

c. With the first ray of hope for the settlement of China affairs, the Japanese Government will agree, if desired, to use their good offices to release for contract by Americans certain percentage of their total tonnage of merchant vessels, chiefly for the Pacific service, so soon as they can be released from their present commitments. The amount of such tonnage shall be determined at the Conference.

V. Commerce between both nations and their financial cooperation.

When official approbation to the present understanding has been given by both Governments, the United States and Japan shall assure each other to mutually supply such commodities as are respectively available or required by either of them. Both governments further consent to take necessary steps to the resumption of normal trade relations as formerly established under the Treaty of Navigation and Commerce between the United States and Japan.[18] If a new commercial treaty is desired by both governments, it could be elaborated at the proposed conference and concluded in accordance with usual procedure.

For the advancement of economic cooperation between both nations, it is suggested that the United States extend to Japan a gold credit in amounts sufficient to foster trade and industrial development directed to the betterment of Far Eastern economic conditions and to the sustained economic cooperation of the Governments of the United States and of Japan.

VI. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.

On the pledged basis of guarantee that Japanese activities in the Southwestern Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means. without resorting to arms, American cooperation and support shall be given in the production and procurement of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which Japan needs.

---

[18] For abrogation of the treaty of February 21, 1911, see pp. 189 ff.

VII. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific.

a. The Governments of the United States and of Japan will not acquiesce in the future transfer of territories or the relegation of existing States within the Far East and in the Southwestern Pacific area to any European Power.

b. The Governments of the United States and of Japan jointly guarantee the independence of the Philippine Islands and will consider means to come to their assistance in the event of unprovoked aggression by any third Power.

c. The Government of Japan requests the friendly and diplomatic assistance of the Government of the United States for the removal of Hongkong and Singapore as doorways to further political encroachment by the British in the Far East.

d. Japanese Immigration to the United States and to the Southwestern Pacific area shall receive amicable consideration—on a basis of equality with other nationals and freedom from discrimination.

Conference.

a. It is suggested that a Conference between Delegates of the United States and of Japan be held at Honolulu and that this Conference be opened for the United States by President Roosevelt and for Japan by Prince Konoye. The delegates could number less than five each, exclusive of experts, clerks, etc.

b. There shall be no foreign observers at the Conference.

c. This Conference could be held as soon as possible (May 1941) after the present understanding has been reached.

d. The agenda of the Conference would not include a reconsideration of the present understanding but would direct its efforts to the specification of the prearranged agenda and drafting of instruments to effectuate the understanding. The precise agenda could be determined upon by mutual agreement between both governments.

Addendum.

The present understanding shall be kept as a confidential memorandum between the Governments of the United States and of Japan.

The scope, character and timing of the announcement of this understanding will be agreed upon by both Governments.

711.94/2052

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] April 14, 1941.

The Ambassador of Japan called at my apartment at the Wardman Park Hotel at my request. I stated that as the Ambassador would recall, both the President and I suggested during our conversations with him that he might care in discussions with me to explore the question of improving relations between the United States and Japan; that such a procedure might involve a review of relations during recent years in an attempt to ascertain where and in what respects the courses of the two countries had diverged; and that this would be done with a view to ascertaining whether something practicable might be done toward restoring the relations of our two countries to that harmonious state which existed for so many decades. I said that I referred to this again at this time because of the reports which have been coming to me that certain of the Ambassador's compatriots have been working on formulation of proposals and plans for improving relations between the United States and Japan. I had been told that the Ambassador's compatriots have been in touch with the Ambassador in connection with their proposals and that the Ambassador has participated in and associated himself with these plans. I added that I did, of course, not know whether these reports are entirely accurate and, as mentioned previously to him, we can deal only with the Ambassador in addressing ourselves to consideration of problems outstanding between our two Governments.

I then emphasized the point that I had sent for the Ambassador primarily to clear up the matter of the extent of his knowledge of the latest document[18b] handed to my associates in the State Department by those Americans and Japanese who are collaborating as individuals in an effort to make some sort of contribution to better relations between the two countries, and as to whether it was his desire to present that officially as a first step in negotiations between the two Governments. I again cited those phases previously referred to, which called for preliminary conversation on certain subjects before a stage of negotiations could be reached, and which discouraged the immediate presentation of the document by the Ambassador in an official way. The Ambassador promptly replied that he did know all about this document and that he had collaborated more or less with the individual Japanese and Americans referred to, and that he would be disposed to present it as a basis for negotiations. He proceeded to refer to his great desire to preserve peace between the two countries and therefore to do anything within his power to that end. He emphasized the utter disaster it would be to both countries to go to war, which would last perhaps for many years with the complete exhaustion of all concerned. He spoke strongly expressing the view that his Government did not intend to invade the South Sea area.

[18b] *Supra.*

We then exchanged some remarks about the general international situation, in which I referred to the fact that it would matter little who wins wars these days unless there is to be a restoration of the principles of justice, order under law, et cetera, which underlie orderly and peaceful international relations, such, for example, as this Government has applied in the upbuilding of the whole fabric of Pan American relations during the past eight years. I elaborated to some extent on the far-reaching improvement in and betterment of all relations between the twenty-one American republics and their respective populations, and concluded by remarking that these same principles could far better be applied in every part of the world, including the Orient than any other doctrines or policies, especially those based on force as an instrument of foreign policy and the intervention in the domestic and internal affairs of one nation or nations by another, and emphasized the view that Japan could well consider the course we had followed instead of the opposite course of force and conquest and arbitrary domination for national aggrandizement. The Ambassador mistook what I said and undertook to go back of the past eight-year period and referred to our difficulties with certain Latin American countries, including Mexico. I soon corrected him and said that this Government had turned over a new leaf, so to speak, especially in 1933 and the following years, in its relations with all nations, including South America. The Ambassador seemed to understand and to get the point. I said that in the present state of world conditions, it was manifest that this war would be followed more or less by chaos and anarchy in international affairs and bankruptcy generally, with the result that new wars would be recurring with increasing frequency in the future. This would be the case unless law-abiding countries should exert every possible effort to prevent wild and reckless groups in every country from dragging the world over the precipice, as was done in many vital respects following the World War when the ablest statesmen in Great Britain, for example, were carrying on a nation-wide campaign on the sole issue of hanging the Kaiser and collecting one hundred billion dollars, or some other fabulous amount, from Germany. I said I desired to repeat that it would not make much difference which way the war goes if such unthinkable conditions of utter destruction are to follow, as is sure to happen, unless safeguarded against by every possible means. The Ambassador commented entirely favorably on this view and emphasized his approval of it.

I then said that today it was reported that Hitler is obliged to keep six or eight hundred thousand troops in Poland in order to hold the population in subjugation in every way, which includes semi-slavery in numerous respects; that the same unquenchable love of liberty that existed in conquered nations throughout Europe still exists; that ninety-nine percent of the people of France, whose liberties have been snuffed out and who have been subjected to every privation and many kinds of ill treatment, are strongly sympathetic with the British cause and its support by the United States as far as is practicable; that all of these conquered peoples are but awaiting the slightest opportunity to throw off the shackles of semi-slavery and destitution, and they can be depended upon to do so, if and when Hitler has some serious reverse or reverses. The Ambassador expressed his acquiescence in this last view without the use of words.

I then said that I had observed every phase of Hitler's conduct and utterances from 1933, each year, each week and each day, and that I, in common with many others, have absolutely no faith in any statement or promise that he makes, but any world, subjected to his methods and his philosophies, which are rooted largely in barbarism, would be an unthinkable world in which to live; that he has no real friends anywhere and that he is not a real friend to anyone; that he would abandon over-night the most solemn obligation taken the day before, if it suited his purpose in the least. I then added that this Government cannot conscientiously sit still and see this unthinkable brand of government fastened on the world; that it wants nothing whatever from anybody, anywhere, but only seeks to aid in preserving an orderly world based on the principles which I have so often recited. The Ambassador did not take issue with this although he did not in any way indicate his approval.

Near the close of the conversation I suggested that, having cleared up these preliminary phases for which I sent for him, we could, if desired on his part, proceed at any time with certain preliminary discussions with a view to ascertaining whether there is a basis for negotiations; that for the purpose of this preliminary discussion there would really be no occasion for either side to present officially any completed documents. The Ambassador raised some question as to why such documents might not be presented in the next conversation, and I replied that there were certain points that my Government would desire to raise prior to negotiations, such as questions pertaining to the integrity and sovereignty of China, to the principle of equality of opportunity in China, et cetera; that he could then communicate with his Government and ascertain whether it agrees that there is a basis for negotiations. The Ambassador readily agreed to this view. He emphasized that he had not yet presented this document to his Government or consulted it concerning concrete terms of settlement, but stated that, in his opinion, his Government would be favorably disposed along such lines as might be made the basis of an agreement.

I said, in conclusion, that I would communicate with the Ambassador later today with a view of agreeing on a time and place for the next conference, adding that it could be at my office or at the White House or in my apartment, although the President was planning on leaving for Warm Springs within a day or two. The Ambassador referred to the interruptions of the press and suggested that he come to my apartment, which he would be ready to do any day from this day on, and he again emphasized the urgency of the situation, saying that events were moving rapidly and that my country is likewise moving rapidly with the result that clashes would become more easily possible from week to week.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

711.94/2112

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] April 16, 1941.

The Ambassador of Japan called at my apartment in accordance with a previous mutual understanding.

I asked him what news he had and he proceeded to say that from all he could see and learn, the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact,[18c] announced two days ago, was not really undertaken because of Germany or for Germany's benefit. I remarked that I had not become unduly concerned about the matter because for some time I have acted on the view that the Soviet policy was not to have war with any country unless in actual self-defense, and that, on the other hand, I did not see wherein Japan could have a policy based on the disposition to attack the Soviet Union. It was one of those circumstances in which I felt that the written document merely reduced to writing the relationships and policies already existing between the two Governments.

I then said that I would speak off the record of the fact that, according to official information of today, the British believe that they will safely hold the Egyptian-North African area from German attack. Another item of information coming to me today was that the people, that is the public, in Denmark, are unanimously in favor and support of the action of this Government and their Minister with respect to Greenland.[18d]

With reference to the question of gradually developing a settlement in the Orient, I said that I had been told that the document on which the Ambassador and the private group of individual Americans and

---

[18c] Signed at Moscow, April 13, 1941.

[18d] For text of agreement signed at Washington, April 9, 1941, see Department of State, *Bulletin*, April 12, 1941 (vol. IV, No. 94), p. 445.

Japanese were collaborating contained numerous proposals with which my Government could readily agree; on the other hand, however, there were others that would require modification, expansion, or entire elimination, and, in addition, there would naturally be some new and separate suggestions by this Government for consideration. I then remarked that the one paramount preliminary question about which my Government is concerned is a definite assurance in advance that the Japanese Government has the willingness and ability to go forward with a plan along the lines of the document we have referred to and the points brought up in our conversation in relation to the problems of a settlement; to abandon its present doctrine of military conquest by force and the taking of title to all property and territories seized, together with the use of force as an instrument of policy; and to adopt the principles which this Government has been proclaiming and practicing as embodying the foundation on which all relations between nations should properly rest.

I said:

"I will, therefore, hand to you as the basis for my preliminary question, the following four points on a blank piece of paper:

1. Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations.
2. Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
3. Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity.
4. Non-disturbance of the *status quo* in the Pacific except as the *status quo* may be altered by peaceful means.

"You can answer the questions or submit them to your Government for its answer through you, as you prefer. You understand that we both agree that we have in no sense reached the stage of negotiations; that we are only exploring in a purely preliminary and unofficial way what action might pave the way for negotiations later. You tell me that you have not submitted the document in question to your Government, but that you desire to do so. Naturally, you are at the fullest liberty to do this, but, of course, this does not imply any commitment whatever on the part of this Government with respect to the provisions of the document in case it should be approved by your Government. I do, of course, recognize individually that, as stated, if the Japanese Government should approve this document and instruct the Ambassador here to propose it to the United States Government, it would afford a basis for the institution of negotiations, with the result that this Government would offer any counter-proposals desired and any independent proposals desired, which, in conjunction with the Japanese proposal, would be fully discussed and talked out to a conclusion in one way or the other in the spirit that unquestionably should and would characterize the conversations."

The Ambassador studied for a few minutes the four points which I handed to him. He then suggested that the principle of equality might well be discussed in connection with the negotiations. I replied promptly that this would be impossible since we could not think of entering into negotiations if his Government should even hesitate in agreeing to this point; that no country in the world would get more from the doctrine of equality, politically, economically, socially and everything worthwhile, than Japan; that the Ambassador knows how successfully this doctrine has operated between the United States and the South American countries, and how successfully this hemisphere has greatly improved the relations between the American republics and improved the conditions of their respective peoples by observing the eight-point program adopted at the Lima Conference,[18e] the development of the program having been initiated at Montevideo.

I thereupon handed to the Ambassador a copy of the eight-point program adopted by the Lima Conference and said that this Government, of course, stands for these principles for the betterment of international relations and is opposed to the doctrine of conquest by force and the seizure and the taking of title by the conqueror which results in the exclusion of all other parts of the world from the conquered areas except by the giving of a preference to Japanese citizens wherever preference would be of any use. I said that throughout any preliminary conversations we have, it must be understood that the foregoing is the well-defined attitude of the United States Government.

The Ambassador remarked that this country has special relations with South America which Japan in a similar way would not be permitted to have in the Orient. I replied that there was a great misapprehension and misunderstanding about this phase. I said that the truth is that the chief South American countries produce large surpluses of wheat and corn and meat, such as we produce, with the result that we have never had a real trade relationship except to a limited extent; that the total commerce of this hemisphere until lately has only been twenty percent of the world commerce between nations; that eight years ago when I went to Montevideo I sought to institute a system of closer relations between our countries, politically, economically, socially and culturally and otherwise, for all worthwhile purposes . . . Then I added that Japan could carry on any and all social, educational, economic and political relations with nations in the Pacific with a view to cultivating them, but that it would get nowhere if she should undertake to segregate and surround herself and them by preferences or assert zones of special controlling influence or movements such as are not dreamed of in this country or this hemisphere and which are utterly inimical to the eight principles which were adopted at the Lima Conference.

[18e] For text of declaration of American principles of December 24, 1938, see Department of State, *Press Releases*, December 31, 1938 (vol. XIX, No. 483), p. 494.

The Ambassador then remarked that the *status quo* point No. 4 would interfere with the Manchurian situation. I replied that the question of non-recognition of Manchuria would be discussed in connection with the negotiations and dealt with at that stage, and that this *status quo* point would not, therefore, affect "Manchukuo," but was intended to apply to the future from the time of the adoption of a general settlement.

The Ambassador then inquired about the immigration provision. I replied that immigration is considered more of a domestic question in this country; that he would recall my former statement to him to the effect that one of my ambitions when I came to the State Department was to confer with the people of California in particular and undertake to bring about a situation which would make possible the establishment of a reciprocal immigration arrangement with Japan that would be reasonably acceptable to both countries, and that, therefore, Japan would have to accept our good faith in this respect rather than to attempt to make it a part of the proposed negotiations.

I was not sure whether the Ambassador fully understood each statement I made in regard to the four points laid before him, and I sought to illustrate by saying to him that the principles underlying a good portion of the proposals in his doctrine were similar to the principles contained in the four points I had handed to him, and that they were an essential part of the eight-point program, which we had recently emphasized in our South American conferences. I added that, if his Government should make up its mind to abandon its present policies of force and invasion, et cetera, and to adopt a peaceful course with worthwhile international relationships, it could find no objection to these four points reasonably applied, nor to the eight points contained in the Lima resolutions; and that, therefore, he could judge the United States attitude toward a Far Eastern settlement in the light of these practices and principles.

The Ambassador desired me to indicate whether I would to a fairly full extent approve the proposals contained in his document, and I again replied that there would be ready approval of several of them while others would have to be modified or eliminated and this Government would offer some independent proposals, but that if his Government is in real earnest about changing its course, I could see no good reason why ways could not be found to reach a fairly mutually satisfactory settlement of all of the essential questions and problems presented. I illustrated what I meant by the modification of some of the proposals in the document by referring to the fact that the navies of the two countries would not menace each other and adding that the proposal should be broadened to the effect that no navies of any countries should menace each other in the Pacific or anywhere else, but in this particular instance especially in the Pacific. I said that the doctrine of equality should be very easily agreed upon and inserted in the proposals regarding China, as contained in his document. I referred to the clause in regard to the economic cooperation between Japan and China and said that to avoid the possibility of special preferential arrangements between the two countries, the doctrine of equality should be inserted in that connection. I referred to another proposal in which the two countries would assure each other of supplying such commodities as are available, and added that during the war period this country would be obliged to embargo many commodities from export to any country, but that it would expect to supply the pre-war volume in any event.

I said that in connection with the proposals referring to Singapore and Hong Kong, there should be a broader provision to the effect that no nation should construct or operate any agency for the purpose of conquest and aggression.

These were illustrations of our wholly informal conversation, in which I sought to get the Ambassador to see what I meant by the statement that some of his other proposals in his document could be accepted, some modified, some rejected, while some new and independent proposals would be made by this Government. The Ambassador seemed not to understand why I could not now agree to some of these proposals in his document. I sought repeatedly to make clear to him, in the first place, that we have not reached the stage of negotiations, he himself agreeing that he thus far has no authority from his Government to negotiate; and in the second place, that if I should thus out of turn agree to a number of important proposals in the document and these proposals should be sent to Japan and the military or extremist groups should ignore them, I and my Government would be very much embarrassed. The Ambassador finally said he fully understood the situation and made clear, I thought, that he would proceed in his own way to consult his Government regarding the four points in the form of a question which I laid before him inferentially with respect to the approval by the Government of his document, by which is meant the document prepared by the group of Americans and Japanese here with the admitted knowledge and more or less cooperation of the Ambassador himself.

The Ambassador then arose and left and I said that if and when he heard from his Government and should then desire a conference, I would be glad for him to advise me at any time.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

711.94/2071

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] May 2, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador called at my hotel apartment at his request. He spoke promptly and said that he came in to say that, notwithstanding the delays in hearing from his Government in regard to his request for instructions to negotiate with this Government along the lines of the document, which has heretofore been explained, he felt satisfied that he would get a favorable reply from his Government within a few days, and, therefore, he hoped that I would not become impatient. He added that there was politics in the situation back in Japan and implied that this was the cause of the "hitch" in his application for instructions.

I did not comment on the matter, but proceeded with one or two general statements in regard to world conditions, and at a convenient point said that we in this country profoundly feel that Hitler and Hitlerism are utterly destructive of everything worthwhile, and that we are determined to see to it that in these circumstances Hitler does not get control of the high seas; that, in the face of this sort of dangerous threat, we have nothing else to do for one, five or ten years except to marshal our resources and see to it that he does not get control of the high seas. The Ambassador, as he often does, smiled and nodded his head in assent. I again repeated, with respect to our relations to Japan and the Pacific area, that it all gets down to the question of whether Japan is willing to move in the direction and on the course outlined by those basic principles of justice and law and equality and fair dealing, such as all nations have practiced much of the time before the present war was started by Hitler. I added that I thought I knew that this was the view of the Ambassador personally. He nodded in assent.

The Ambassador then brought up the question of embargoes and said that this was a rather delicate question with his Government. I replied that it was not nearly as delicate as the extremely harsh treatment his soldiers and his Government have been administering to American nationals and American interests, and that, of course, there was nothing new for me to say on that question.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

711.94/2073

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] May 7, 1941.

The Ambassador of Japan called at my hotel apartment at his request. He first expressed his earnest appreciation of the manner in which I had dealt with the Japanese situation, especially in refraining from making controversial utterances on the occasion of my meetings with the press from day to day while Matsuoka and others were busily doing so. I made no particular comment on this statement.

The Ambassador then proceeded to say that he was also appreciative of the patience which I had displayed in respect to the difficulties he had encountered in his efforts to make progress in these preliminary talks, which difficulties could be traced to certain politicians and others in his country. He then made some references to politicians and Matsuoka with the inference that they were causing the delay and the complications, indicating that the whole matter, having been approved by the Army and the Navy and, if I understood him correctly, by other important Government officials, hinged only on the question of composing their political affairs.

If I understood the Ambassador correctly, and I think I did, he tactfully suggested as coming from his Government a non-aggression pact. I did not hesitate but promptly brushed it aside and said that that was an entirely different matter from the principles contained in the Ambassador's document, and that this Government was not thinking of considering anything except broad principles, such as I had already pointed out, as a basis for any negotiations.

He then said he had something in the way of a manuscript either directly or indirectly from Matsuoka. Unless I misunderstood the Ambassador, he disavowed the so-called peace proposals that emanated from Government-inspired sources in Tokyo some days ago. He said that there were many things in the paper "that were wrong", but that he would be glad to hand it to me, and then inquired if he might do so. I studied a moment and then said that since the paper, as he said, "had many things in it that were wrong", I felt that, if the Ambassador had the discretionary authority to do so, he might well just retain this paper without delivering it, since, as he indicates, it would seem to negative most or much of his document, and hence no progress could be made along the lines of the Ambassador's preliminary talks with me and certain of the principles set forth in the document to which he had referred. The Ambassador then proceeded to read some lines of greeting, all of which I could not clearly understand, and wound up on the first half of the first page with what seemed to be a statement of assurance that with just a little more time the whole matter would develop favorably in line with the Ambassador's document and of his former expressions that his attitude and beliefs represented the attitude of his Government.

I stated that I desired first to pay very high tribute to the Ambassador himself for his conscientious and sincere purposes and his patriotic efforts thus far to bring about a real contribution to more friendly relations between our countries and the mutual benefits which would result therefrom. I said that the Ambassador knows I have been patient thus far and have striven to cooperate to the fullest practical extent with him in his efforts to clear up the political situation at home in order that a stage might be reached where negotiations could be instituted. I then very earnestly proceeded to say that I had striven to be absolutely candid in all of my conversations with the Ambassador, but that I would not be candid if I did not say to him that I could not give any assurances of further patience in the event of further delay for the reason that there were influences that cannot be held back; that this country, as I have heretofore indicated to the Ambassador, is determined that Hitler shall not get control of the high seas; that this means not one sea but the seven seas; that this country, therefore, does not propose to delay all necessary steps of resistance and defense until it is too late; that, as the Ambassador knows, things are moving fast in the direction of resistance, just as Hitler is endeavoring to move fast in his course of continued aggression.

I then said that Matsuoka and others in his country have been talking loudly and acting aggressively; such conduct and action were in the opposite direction of the entire spirit and policy of most of the document which the Ambassador had recently sent to his Government for approval and instructions authorizing him to make it a basis for the beginning of negotiations. I said that it is not comprehensible that Matsuoka, for example, could represent his Government in giving utterance to such opposing and threatening expressions while at the same time his Government was supporting the Ambassador here and the principles contained in his document; that the very idea of Matsuoka sending enthusiastic congratulations to Hitler upon the brutal military attack on the poor little country of Greece and its defenseless people presents an attitude and a philosophy that surpasses my comprehension.

I said that, in the light of all of these circumstances, the Ambassador must realize clearly the accuracy of my statement to the effect that I cannot be responsible a day longer as to the course of my Government in the face of the expanding aggression of Hitler and of our determination to see to it that he does not get control of any of the seven seas.

I then added that the Ambassador undoubtedly understood very clearly that, in this attitude, my Government was acting solely in its necessary self-defense and in defense of its rights and interests, and those of its nationals on the seven seas, just as I would expect Japan to do with respect to its rights and interests and those of its nationals on the seven seas.

I stated that I thought we knew Hitler and Hitlerism better than did Matsuoka and those for whom he speaks. We know that if and when he has his way, he will subject every nation to barbaric methods or methods of complete domination, including those, to all appearances, he once in solemn good faith took in as an equal partner, such as Italy; whereas German spies, German agents and German officials largely control the situation in Italy today, and in my judgment will continue to dominate Italy under typical Hitler methods, so long as Hitler retains military power and strength. I said he will administer the same treatment to Japan or to any other country without reference to past relations, if and as it comes within his power and suits his purposes. I reiterated that I thought we knew much more about Hitler than Matsuoka, and we have the experience of seeing fifteen victims of Hitler's brutality and subjugation, including Italy to the extent indicated, in proof of our appraisal of Hitler and Hitlerism.

I said that it must be clear that my country wants absolutely nothing from any country abroad except the maintenance of those relations that are supported by all the basic principles of law, justice, equality, et cetera. We, in this connection, wish respect to be accorded to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of every country, large and small; that, in brief, we stand for the identical six or eight-point program of basic principles, which the United States and Japan maintained to the great advantage of each over a period of seventy-five years; that these are the identical principles we are maintaining as best we can in the difficult circumstances existing throughout the world, and, for illustration, I might point to the policies and principles maintained between us and the South American countries, under which Japan and all countries have equal access to markets and, generally speaking, equal access politically, economically, and in every way; that, of course, if Japan is at all disposed to turn back on this sound and wise course of peace and progress in lieu of a course in the opposite direction, there would be no difficulty in effecting suitable agreements to the former end. I pointed out the great benefits reaped by all countries and the world from such a policy. I added that it is clear, therefore, that wherever we offer resistance to an avowed movement of world aggression by force, such as Hitler's or any other's on the high seas or elsewhere, we are acting solely in our necessary self-defense against a world-wide movement of military aggression, and there is no other theory of our attitude that can possibly arise and that would not be false, if and as we proceed to resist whenever and wherever such resistance would be most effective.

The Ambassador without talking but a word here and there was constantly bowing and smiling and certainly endeavoring to make me think at least that he was himself approving my statements. In fact, from time to time he would give expression to his approval.

The Ambassador inquired about the possibility of an agreement on the policies contained in his document. I thereupon repeated my statements to him in previous conversations to the effect that from what I had heard about his document, a number of his proposals might be agreed to, while others would need to be broadened to the benefit, I thought, of both countries alike, and some new or substitute suggestions would naturally be offered by us. I then said that, of course, the matter of his sending the document to his Government for instructions was for his own judgment to determine, and that, in the meantime, this Government remained entirely free from any commitments. The Ambassador appeared to understand this, but I never know for certain how fully and accurately we understand each other in given instances.

I concluded by saying that, if all of these basic principles mentioned above were to be saved, it would require the prompt efforts of every nation still disposed to support them in lieu of Hitler and the Hitler methods of the most arbitrary domination of commercial and political relations just as far across the earth as Hitler can possibly extend domination, either military or economic, or other control by force or threats of force; and that, therefore, it was high time that his Government go forward, if it has such a purpose in mind, as I knew the Ambassador himself has; that I must repeat that from this time forward I do not know what steps of resistance may be taken in this country from one day to another.

The Ambassador expressed his full appreciation of the views and observations I set forth and added that he would urge his country at once to go forward with the proposals, as set forth in his document.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

711.94/2086

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] May 11, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador called at my hotel apartment at his request. He promptly proceeded to say that his Government had instructed him to hand me certain documents, of which the attached are copies.[18f] He had still another document, which he said was prepared by his Government and which constituted a part of the written material that he was instructed to deliver to me. The latter document, he stated, was not correctly translated in certain respects, and he added that he would withhold it until the translation was perfected tomorrow, when it would be sent to me in proper form.

[18f] These documents were returned upon request to the Japanese Ambassador on May 12, before complete copies had been made.

I thanked him for coming in and then very clearly and slowly said to him in effect that, in accordance with our past conversations, I was receiving these documents in a purely unofficial way with a view to examining them and ascertaining whether they, accompanied by any suggestions or proposals of our own made in the same unofficial and informal manner, would or might afford a basis for a step in negotiations. I added that, in these circumstances, either Government could deal with any rumors or reports about negotiations by truthfully saying that no negotiations have been instituted; that the rumors or reports on this subject could at the most only relate to a casual reference or remark made at some time by representatives of the United States or Japan regarding some phase of the relations existing between our two Governments, et cetera, et cetera. The Ambassador agreed entirely to the foregoing.

I then inquired whether Matsuoka would conduct the negotiations at Tokyo. The Ambassador replied that he would, but that the Army, the Navy and Konoye would participate in the work of carrying on the negotiations, although Konoye did not make it a habit of interfering materially in such work of the Foreign Office. I said that Matsuoka was, of course, a politician and that he had recently been quoted as making, in a purely gratuitous way, numerous unfriendly remarks about the United States, as well as announcing ideas and doctrines diametrically opposed to most of the fundamental principles set out in the document which the Ambassador prepared some weeks ago, and with the contents of which we were all familiar. I added that, in these circumstances, there will be real difficulty to persuade even my associates of the absolute dependability of Matsuoka's acts and utterances. I said that I mentioned this in order that the Ambassador would fully understand my difficulties in more respects than one. The Ambassador not only did not take issue with anything I said, but I felt that he was really in harmony with the statements I made about Matsuoka.

The Ambassador then said that Japan was very desirous of keeping war out of the Pacific. I remarked very emphatically that many people in this country strongly believe that Japan's real purpose was to secure cooperation to aid her in getting out of China and her disastrous Chinese campaign and that this point would be uppermost in the minds of many and it was one of the most important to be guarded against. The Ambassador said he realized that that would be an exceedingly important matter to be made clear. I emphasized this point a number of times in the conversation.

I then inquired as to whether there were any definite plans in the mind of his Government in regard to when the Japanese troops would come out of China, and what assurances, if any, there were that they would actually come out under a mutually satisfactory arrangement. The Ambassador did not know so much about this, but felt it could and would be worked out to the satisfaction of both sides. I said this would, of course, be a vitally important point for determination.

I asked the Ambassador whether his Government had in mind any method of giving absolute assurances that it would not use either force or threat of force for purposes of conquest in the southwestern area of the Pacific or other countries. The Ambassador had nothing special to offer on this point except to say that his Government had no purpose to use force or threat of force in this entire southwestern area.

I spoke generally then and said that, if his Government really desires a settlement of the Pacific situation on a basis of peace and genuine friendliness, there should be no serious difficulty about the matter; that he and his Government know the relations existing between this country and South America, which offer equal opportunity, politically, economically and every other way, to all countries alike, including the United States and Japan; that my Government treats the smallest countries in this hemisphere, such as Haiti, on a basis of absolute equality in every sense with the largest countries, such as Brazil and the Argentine. I then inquired why it was that Japan, with ample capacity and standing to command influence and recognition, both at home and abroad, persists in an effort to use such high-sounding phrases as the "new order in greater east Asia" and variations of this slogan. I added that, unless Japan uses this slogan not as embodying the principles of law, justice, equality and nonintervention, but as a cloak under which Japan would continue her policy of conquest by force, there was absolutely no reason why this trouble-making slogan should be persistently flaunted before the peaceful and sovereign nations, and that Japan could get all of the benefits from contacts with other nations without this slogan that the United States gets from its association with South American countries without such slogan, and, therefore, I cannot understand why Japan persisted in using it. The Ambassador had little comment to make, but did not take issue with what I said. He emphasized from time to time that his country desired to keep war out of the Pacific, and that it did not intend to use force in the South Sea area.

I again repeated that we were profoundly convinced that Hitler and Hitlerism will prove not only a scourge to other parts of the world, as it has in Europe, but that it will be applied to Japan herself just as quickly as it was applied to friendly countries in Europe who trusted Hitler and his previous guarantees of friendship, safety and freedom from attack and invasion.

I took advantage of a remark of the Ambassador to the effect that it would be an incalculable loss to both Japan and the United States, as well as to civilization, if our two countries should become engaged in war, by saying that unless the civilization of the world is to run the great risk of being destroyed anyhow by the world movements of Hitler, it will require all of the united efforts of civilized nations like Japan, the United States and Great Britain to shape the course of the world in a different direction, and that steps looking towards the gradual development of basic programs both for the transition and the post-war periods cannot be taken too soon. The Ambassador, of course, agreed to this.

In conclusion, I reemphasized that this Government is determined that Hitler shall not get control of the seas and that we would feel obliged without the slightest hesitation to resist to a successful conclusion such efforts on his part whether one year, five years or ten years should be involved. The Ambassador again bowed and smiled approvingly without saying anything. I said that, in these circumstances, with things moving so rapidly, no one could tell, as I remarked to him in our previous conversations, what any day might bring forth, I then repeated my former statement to him that, since Hitler avows his movement to be one of world control, and hence of conquest by force, this country does not propose to commit suicide, as so many countries in continental Europe did, by trusting Hitler and by waiting until it was too late to resist; that we propose to resist, when and where such resistance would be most effective, whether within our own boundaries or on the high seas or in aid of such countries as Great Britain, and that such resistance would be to the maximum extent within the minimum of time, and that this in its very nature would constitute necessary self-defense against an avowed world-wide aggressor, and in no sense could be construed as an act of offense, much less aggression, in the light of the world nature of the movement of aggression on Hitler's part.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

711.94/2117

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] May 12, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador called at my apartment at his request. He came in apparently more or less concerned and said that he had made a mistake when he handed me yesterday his document of instructions from Tokyo, including one to follow entitled "explanations of the original document." He added that he should not have handed to me, along with these official instructions, the copy of Premier

Konoye's statement of December 22, 1938,[19] copies of the Nanking agreement,[19a] or of the "Joint Declaration by the Governments of Japan, 'Manchukuo' and China".[19b] He then handed to me what he said were the proper documents constituting his instructions, copies of which are hereto attached.[19c] At the same time he requested me to return to him the entire set of documents handed to me on yesterday, including that portion of his instructions to which reference has already been made, and copies of which have been placed on file here in the Department.

I thanked him and then proceeded to ask a few oral questions. One question related to modification of the provision in his original document about Japan's keeping out of the South Sea area in a military way. He said that the original language was such as to bind Japan alone, leaving the United States and all other nations free to go in that area if they should see fit, and that the only purpose was to place Japan on a basis of equality with other countries.

I brought up the references to the three principles contained in the statement made by Premier Konoye in December 1938, and inquired if they might not constitute the so-called "new order in greater eastern Asia" declaration, and the Ambassador said that the purpose was only to refer to the three principles set out in the explanation which accompanies this proposal.

The Ambassador was very earnest in his insistence that his Government had no desire or purpose to go to the southern area with force, and he again repeated that Japan desired to keep war out of the Pacific area.

In answer to another question, he said that both documents were official, as stated, and that the purpose in having them separated was to enable his Government to give out to the press only the main document with the other manuscript containing the explanations omitted for the purpose of face-saving.

I again made it very clear that I would receive these papers entirely unofficially and informally and would study them before passing on their merits in any way even in an informal and unofficial way. The Ambassador agreed to this.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

---

[19] Vol. I, p. 482.
[19a] Agreement of November 30, 1940, p. 117.
[19b] *Ante*, p. 122
[19c] *Infra*.

711.94/2086

Draft Proposal Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State on May 12, 1941

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN

The Governments of the United States and of Japan accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement disposing the resumption of our traditional friendly relations.

Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment among our peoples should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences.

It is our present hope that, by a joint effort, our nations may establish a just peace in the Pacific; and by the rapid consummation of an *entente cordiale* [*amicable understanding*],[20] arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.

For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-suited and weakening. Both Governments, therefore, desire that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general agreement which would bind, meanwhile, both Governments in honor and in act.

It is our belief that such an understanding should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory concerns which could be deliberated at a conference and appropriately confirmed by our respective Governments.

Both Governments presume to anticipate that they could achieve harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified or improved; to wit:

1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.
2. The attitude of both Governments toward the European War.
3. The relations of both nations toward the China Affair.
4. Commerce between both nations.
5. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.
6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.

Accordingly, we have come to the following mutual understanding:—

---

[20] For correction, see Japanese document of May 23, 1941, p. 439.

I. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.

The Governments of the United States and of Japan jointly acknowledge each other as equally sovereign states and contiguous Pacific powers.

Both Governments assert the unanimity of their national policies as directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of respectful confidence and cooperation among our peoples.

Both Governments declare that it is their traditional, and present, concept and conviction that nations and races compose, as members of a family, one household; each equally enjoying rights and admitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound not to destroy for others; they further admit their responsibilities to oppose the oppression or exploitation of backward nations.

Both governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to these moral principles and concepts.

II. The attitude of both Governments toward the European War.

The Governments of the United States and Japan make it their common aim to bring about the world peace; they shall therefore jointly endeavour not only to prevent further extension of the European War but also speedily to restore peace in Europe.

The Government of Japan maintains that its alliance with the Axis Powers was, and is, defensive and designed to prevent the nations which are not at present directly affected by the European War from engaging in it.[21]

The Government of Japan maintains that its obligations of military assistance under the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy will be applied in accordance with the stipulation of Article 3 of the said Pact.

The Government of the United States maintains that its attitude toward the European War is, and will continue to be, directed by no such aggressive measures as to assist any one nation against another. The United States maintains that it is pledged to the hate of war, and accordingly, its attitude toward the European War is, and will continue to be, determined solely and exclusively by considerations of the protective defense of its own national welfare and security.

---

[21] For revision of this paragraph, see Japanese document of May 23, 1941, p. 439.

III. The relations of both nations toward the China Affair.

The Government of the United States, acknowledging the three principles as enunciated in the Konoe Statement and the principles set forth on the basis of the said three principles in the treaty with the Nanking Government as well as in the Joint Declaration of Japan, Manchoukuo and China and relying upon the policy of the Japanese Government to establish a relationship of neighborly friendship with China, shall forthwith request the Chiang Kai-shek régime to negotiate peace with Japan.

IV. Commerce between both nations.

When official approbation to the present Understanding has been given by both Governments, the United States and Japan shall assure each other to mutually supply such commodities as are, respectively, available or required by either of them. Both Governments further consent to take necessary steps to the resumption of normal trade relations as formerly established under the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan.[22]

V. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.

Having in view that the Japanese expansion in the direction of the Southwestern Pacific area is declared to be of peaceful nature, American cooperation shall be given in the production and procurement of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which Japan needs.

VI. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.

a. The Government of the United States and Japan jointly guarantee the independence of the Philippine Islands on the condition that the Philippine Islands shall maintain a status of permanent neutrality. The Japanese subjects shall not be supject to any discriminatory treatment.

b. Japanese immigration to the United States shall receive amicable consideration—on a basis of equality with other nationals and freedom from discrimination.

Addendum.

The present Understanding shall be kept as a confidential memorandum between the Governments of the United States and of Japan.

The scope, character and timing of the announcement of this Understanding will be agreed upon by both Governments.

---

[22] For additional paragraph, see Japanese document of May 23, 1941, p. 439.

[Annex]

ORAL EXPLANATION FOR PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE ORIGINAL DRAFT[22a]

II. Par. 2.

Attitude of Both Governments toward the European War.

Actually the meaning of this paragraph is virtually unchanged but we desire to make it clearer by specifying a reference to the Pact. As long as Japan is a member of the Tripartite Pact, such stipulation as is mentioned in the Understanding seems unnecessary.

If we must have any stipulation at all, in addition, it would be important to have one which would clarify the relationship of this Understanding to the aforementioned Pact.

III.

China Affair.

The terms for China-Japan peace as proposed in the original Understanding differ in no substantial way from those herein affirmed as the "principles of Konoe." Practically, the one can be used to explain the other.

We should obtain an understanding, in a separate and secret document, that the United States would discontinue her assistance to the Chaing Kai-shek régime if Chaing Kai-shek does not accept the advice of the United States that he enter into negotiations for peace.

If, for any reason, the United States finds it impossible to sign such a document, a definite pledge by some highest authorities will suffice.

The three principles of Prince Konoe as referred to in this paragraph are:

1. Neighborly friendship;
2. Joint defense against communism;
3. Economic cooperation—by which Japan does not intend to exercise economic monopoly in China nor to demand of China a limitation in the interests of Third Powers.

The following are implied in the aforesaid principles:

1. Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories;
2. Mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation cooperating as good neighbors and forming a Far Eastern nucleus contributing to world peace;
3. Withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory in accordance with an agreement to be concluded between Japan and China;
4. No annexation, no indemnities;
5. Independence of Manchoukuo.

[22a] See p. 398.

III.

Immigration to China.

The stipulation regarding large-scale immigration to China has been deleted because it might give an impression, maybe a mistaken impression, to the Japanese people who have been offended by the past immigration legislation of the United States, that America is now taking a dictating attitude even toward the question of Japanese immigration in China.

Actually, the true meaning and purpose of this stipulation is fully understood and accepted by the Japanese Government.

IV.

Naval, Aerial and Mercantile Marine Relations.

(*a*) and (*c*) of this section have been deleted not because of disagreement but because it would be more practical, and possible, to determine the disposition of naval forces and mercantile marine after an understanding has been reached and relations between our two countries improved; and after our present China commitments are eliminated. Then we will know the actual situation and can act accordingly.

Courtesy visit of naval squadrons.

This proposal, (*b*) of IV. might better be made a subject of a separate memorandum. Particular care must be taken as to the timing, manner and scope of carrying out such a gesture.

V.

Gold Credit.

The proposal in the second paragraph of V. has been omitted for the same reasons as suggested the omission of paragraphs (*a*) and (*c*).

VI.

Activity in Southwestern Pacific Area.

The words, in the first paragraph, "without resorting to arms" have been deleted as inappropriate and unnecessarily critical. Actually, the peaceful policy of the Japanese Government has been made clear on many occasions in various statements made both by the Premier and the Foreign Minister.

VIII. [*VII.*]

Political Stabilization in the Pacific Area.

As the paragraph (*a*) implying military and treaty obligation would require, for its enactment, such a complicated legislative procedure in both countries, we consider it inappropriate to include this in the present Understanding.

Paragraph (*b*) regarding the independence of the Philippine Islands has been altered for the same reason.

In paragraph (*c*) [(*d*)] the words "and to the Southwestern Pacific Area" have been omitted because such questions should be settled, as necessity arises, through direct negotiation with the authorities in the Southwestern areas by the Government of the United States and of Japan respectively.

Conference.

The stipulation for holding a Conference has been deleted. We consider that it would be better to arrange, by an exchange of letters, that a conference between the President and the Premier or between suitable representatives of theirs will be considered when both the United States and Japan deem it useful to hold such a conference after taking into due consideration the effect resulting from the present Understanding.

Announcement.

In regard to the statement to be issued on the successful conclusion of the present Understanding a draft will be prepared in Tokio and cabled to Washington for the consideration of the United States Government.

711.94/2093

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] May 14, 1941.

The Ambassador of Japan called at my hotel apartment at his request. He immediately handed me a proposed amendment, copy attached,[23] to the original draft which we have been discussing for some days.

I, of course, was expecting the Ambassador to have other and more important things to talk about, but he disclosed nothing. We had some general conversation, but there was no real reference to the questions at issue except the question of whether this country would be in danger from the war in Europe. Following this we had some discussion as to the facts constituting self-defense on the part of the United States. The Ambassador indicated his views and that of his country that we would not be in danger. I thereupon repeated to him the facts and circumstances, as set forth in my speech of three weeks ago,[24] as irrefutable evidence of the fact that this hemisphere and this country would be and are in serious and imminent danger; that the attack would come on South America, and that the entire safety of this hemisphere and this country from Hitler's movement of unlimited military conquest would depend on whether he conquers Great Britain with a real probability or possibility that he would then come into control of the high seas. The Ambassador appeared and talked as though he were impressed with these facts and conclusions. He reiterated that nobody in his country wanted war with this country except a few scattered individuals and small groups; that his country did not desire or intend to go south with military force.

---

[23] *Infra.*

[24] For extracts from address by the Secretary of State on April 24, 1941, see p. 430. For complete text, see Department of State, *Bulletin*, April 26, 1941 (vol. IV, No. 96), p. 491.

He then made reference to what he considered the somewhat difficult question of dealing with the attitude of this Government towards the war, and that of Japan towards the war under the Tripartite Agreement.

I remarked that the Ambassador had undoubtedly observed in the press that Ambassador Grew had called on Matsuoka, and I added that Ambassador Grew had reported to me that Matsuoka was more or less offensive in his references to this country.[24a] I added that I, of course, knew the type of politician Matsuoka is and the loose and often bluffing language he uses, and, therefore, I did not know whether he would undertake to hinder, or, if possible, defeat further conversations along the lines that we have been conducting them. The Ambassador laughed at the Matsuoka reference and made some remarks himself about Matsuoka being out for his own interest politically, and laughed again at the idea of Matsuoka controlling the situation so as to defeat any further conversations looking towards the question of whether negotiations would be permissible.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

[Annex]

The Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State

EXPLANATION FOR PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE ORIGINAL DRAFT REGARDING THE CHINA AFFAIR

The paragraph, as amended, does not differ in substance from the original draft excepting the item regarding the question of large-scale immigration of Japanese into China.

[24a] See telegram No. 673, May 14, 1941, 5 p. m., from the Ambassador in Japan, p. 145.

711.94/2133$\frac{7}{18}$

Memorandum of a Conversation[25]

[WASHINGTON,] May 16, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador called at the Secretary's apartment by appointment made at the Secretary's request.[26]

The Secretary went over briefly with the Ambassador the main points of the "Oral Statement" marked "Informal and Unofficial" which he later handed to the Ambassador and of which a copy is attached with its annexes.[27] The Secretary emphasized that we had endeavored in drafting the "Oral Statement" to be fair to all concerned.

In reply to a question by the Ambassador as to whether the Secretary wished to imply that under the American Government's interpretation of self-defense the United States might become involved in the European war even if its territory was not attacked, the Secretary observed that if and as an aggressor in the course of his aggression against other countries makes manifest a purpose of unlimited conquest it is necessary for other countries to take appropriate measures of self-protection and self-defense. Our policy of assistance to Great Britain was an illustration of the kind of measures which he meant. As to what other action this Government might take, this would depend upon what the military authorities of this Government would deem essential to our protection and self-defense in any given circumstances.

The Ambassador said that it went without saying that Japan desired only peaceful relations with the United States, but that at the same time Japan might be faced with the question of carrying out in good faith any obligations it might be called upon to perform under Article III of the Axis Alliance. The Secretary said that in his opinion the explanatory statement, consisting chiefly of excerpts from an address he had made some three weeks ago, would make the attitude of this Government on the matter of self-defense very clear. The Secretary said that he felt that the Japanese would feel the same way as we do under similar circumstances. He referred to the suggestions which we had offered for a formula under Section II of the Japanese proposal in regard to relations of the United States and Japan to the European war as defining our respective relations clearly.

The Ambassador said that it was the earnest hope of Japan that the Government of the United States would find itself able at the earliest possible moment to request the Chinese Government to enter into negotiations with Japan for a peace settlement. He expressed the hope that there would be no dilatory tactics on the part of the Chinese.

---

[25] Memorandum initialed by Joseph W. Ballantine, Foreign Service Officer detailed to the Department on special consultation.

[26] The Japanese Ambassador was accompanied by Col. Hideo Iwakuro, Japanese Assistant Military Attaché, and Mr. Katsuzo Okumura, Second Secretary of the Japanese Embassy.

[27] *Infra.*

The Secretary observed that if we could dispose of these two points which had been brought up in a preliminary way no reason was perceived why we could not then proceed rapidly with consideration of the proposal as a whole.

There was some discussion of the questions of joint defense against communism and the recognition of Manchuria. The Secretary indicated that if China and Japan could agree on the other points listed in the Japanese "Annex and Explanation" he did not believe that difficulties which might arise over these two points would be such as to prevent an agreement between China and Japan.

The Secretary referred briefly to the reciprocal feature of our suggested redraft of Section V of the Japanese proposal, which relates to the economic activity of the Southwest Pacific area, and expressed the hope that subsequently other countries could be brought in. He alluded in this connection to the fact that the benefits of our trade program in South America are enjoyed by all nations.

The Secretary suggested that before proceeding further with our discussion the Ambassador might wish to study the document handed the Ambassador, and he added that he would be ready to see the Ambassador at any time.

The Ambassador and his associates did not offer any critical comment with respect to the Secretary's observations or give any express indication of their attitude toward the Secretary's "Oral Statement". They did not, of course, have an opportunity to examine the document during the interview.

J[OSEPH] W. B[ALLANTINE]

11.94/2133$\frac{3}{18}$

Informal and Unofficial Oral Statement Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on May 16, 1941

There has not yet been time to study carefully the proposal which the Ambassador has presented under instructions from his Government. From such examination as it has been possible to make, however, certain preliminary comments suggest themselves.

It is understood that the purpose of the present discussions and of the proposal presented by the Japanese Ambassador is to work out a formula whereunder Japan and the United States may make manifest their common desire and definite purpose to refrain from any aggressive act by force and to pledge themselves in honor and in act to maintain and preserve peace in the Pacific area.

Keeping in mind this admirable objective, it would seem advisable to dispose of certain fundamental points before attempting to consider the Japanese proposal as a whole.

With reference to the proposed formula in Section II in regard to the relations of Japan and of the United States toward the European war, the United States is, as the Ambassador is aware, engaged in an extensive program of strengthening its national defense, and it regards as an essential part of its program of self-defense aid to Great Britain and to other countries which are resisting the present world-wide movement of conquest and aggression by force. There is annexed a statement [28] which defines clearly the position of the Government of the United States on this subject. The Japanese Government will naturally wish to give careful consideration to the position of the Government of the United States as set forth in the statement.

It is believed that on the basis of the fundamental purpose of pledging themselves in honor and in act to refrain from any aggressive act by force and to maintain and preserve peace in the Pacific area a mutually satisfactory formula defining the relations of the United States and of Japan toward the European war can be arrived at.

In the light of the foregoing, there are offered for the Ambassador's consideration certain suggestions for possible revision of Section II of the proposal.[29]

With reference to the proposed formula in Section III in regard to the relations of the United States and of Japan toward the China Affair, it is noted that in the "Annex and Explanation" it is stated that in Section III of the proposal there are exemplified principles of neighborly friendship; joint defense against communism; economic cooperation free from economic monopoly or limitation of the interests of other countries; mutual respect of sovereignty and territories; mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation cooperating as good neighbors and forming a Far Eastern nucleus contributing to world peace; withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory in accordance with an agreement to be concluded between Japan and China; no annexation and no indemnities; and the independence of Manchuria. While one or two of the points might present difficulties, it is believed that, if China and Japan could come to agreement on the basis of the other points mentioned, the remaining points with some modification need not present insuperable obstacles.

The principles embodied in the Konoe Statement, as defined in the "Annex and Explanation" as relating to neighborly friendship, joint defense against communism, and economic cooperation free from economic monopoly or limitation of the interests of other countries, could, with some modification, it is believed, be acceptable.

---

[28] See annex 1, *infra*.

[29] See annex 2, p. 432.

It is therefore suggested that the Japanese Ambassador might consider substituting for the present draft of Section III of the Japanese proposal a draft which would include a recital of the principles as set forth in the "Annex and Explanation". Would not such a formula be more likely to influence the Chinese Government to agree to negotiate a peace settlement with Japan? Such assent is obviously essential to the conclusion of an agreement such as is proposed between the Governments of the United States and of Japan.

In the circumstances, would there not be more prospect of success in a procedure whereby the President would in advance make known in confidence to Chiang Kai-shek the fundamental terms (or the definitive substance thereof) within the framework of which China and Japan might agree to negotiate a peace settlement?

In the light of the foregoing, there are offered for the Ambassador's consideration certain suggestions, based upon the principles set forth in the "Annex and Explanation", for possible alteration of Section III of the Japanese proposal.[30]

With reference to the proposed formula in Section V in regard to the economic activities of Japan and of the United States in the Southwestern Pacific area, it is suggested that the language of the proposal might advantageously be revised so as (*a*) to make the provisions of this section applicable in common to both Japan and the United States and (*b*) to emphasize the pledge of both countries to maintain and preserve peace in the Pacific area.

In the light of the foregoing, there are offered for the Ambassador's consideration certain suggestions for possible revision of Section V of the Japanese proposal.[31]

[Annex 1]

Extracts From Address by the Secretary of State on April 24, 1941, Handed to the Japanese Ambassador on May 16, 1941

The position of the Government of the United States toward the military movement of conquest inaugurated by Mr. Hitler is set forth in a public address made by the Secretary of State on April 24, 1941. Some extracts which are directly in point and which are basic in relation to the entire situation are as follows:

> ". . . As waged by them (the aggressor powers) this is not an ordinary war. It is a war of assault by these would-be conquerors, employing every method of barbarism, upon nations which cling to their right to live in freedom and which are resisting in self-defense.

---

[30] See annex 3, p. 433.

[31] See annex 4, p. 433.

. . . Such is the movement which is extending rapidly throughout the world.

"If experience shows anything, it shows that no nation anywhere has the slightest reason to feel that it will be exempted from attack by the invader, any more than, in a town overrun by bandits, the wealthiest citizen might expect to be free from attack.

". . . Every thinking man can answer the question for himself by simply calling the roll of the wretched victims of world aggression who are now in a condition of semi-slavery, and whose every hope of again enjoying the blessings of civilization depends only on the defeat or failure of the movement of conquest. So it is in Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Albania, Luxemburg, France, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia.

". . . The conclusion is plain. Now, after some fifteen nations have lost everything that makes life worth living, it is high time that the remaining free countries should arm to the fullest extent and in the briefest time humanly possible and act for their self-preservation.

" . . . Events have shown beyond possible question that the safety of this hemisphere and of this country calls for resistance wherever resistance will be most effective. In my judgment our safety and security require that, in accordance with the declared policy of the legislative and executive branches of the Government, aid must be supplied without hesitation to Great Britain and those other countries that are resisting the sweep of the general conflagration. This policy means, in practical application, that such aid must reach its destination in the shortest of time and in maximum quantity. So—ways must be found to do this.

". . . Those nations that are making resistance are primarily seeking to save themselves, their homes and their liberties. Great Britain for instance is acting primarily for her own safety. The United States both in its direct defense effort and in the aid which it extends to the resisting nations is likewise acting primarily for its own safety. As safety for the nations that are offering resistance means security for us, aid to them is an essential part of our own defense. Every new conquest makes available to the aggressor greater resources for use against the remaining free peoples. Our aid to the resisting nations is not the mere crusading of a world benefactor. It is based on the definite knowledge that every free nation anywhere is a bastion of strength to all the remaining free peoples everywhere.

". . . Those Americans who, in effect, are saying that a British defeat would not matter to us, signally overlook the fact that the resulting delivery of the high seas to the invader would create colossal danger to our own national defense and security. The breadth of the sea may give us a little time. It does not give us safety. Safety can only come from our ability, in conjunction with other peace-loving nations, to prevent any aggressor from attaining control of the high seas.

". . . Some among us, doubtless with the best of intentions, still contend that our country need not resist until armed forces of an invader shall have crossed the boundary line of this hemisphere. But this merely means that there would be no resistance by the hemisphere, including the United States, until the invading countries had acquired complete control of the other four continents and of the high seas, and thus had obtained every possible strategic advantage, reducing us to the corresponding disadvantage of a severely handicapped defense. This is an utterly shortsighted and extremely dangerous view."

The foregoing statements make it clear that the attitude of the Government of the United States is one of resolve to take measures of self-defense in resistance to a movement, which, as has been made unequivocally clear by the acts and utterances of Hitler, is directed to world conquest by force from which no country and no area are excepted. This attitude is based upon a most fundamental consideration—that of the inalienable right of self-defense. The only other attitude this Government could assume would be the suicidal attitude of some fifteen countries in Europe which also were told, as our country is being told, that they would not be molested but that if they should undertake to resist beyond their own boundaries they would be charged with being aggressors and with having assumed the offensive. A similar course by this nation from the standpoint of effective defense against the Hitler movement of world conquest would be absurd, futile and suicidal from the standpoint of reasonable precautions for its safety.

In the light of the existing situation, Hitler is the one person who can promptly remove the necessity for efforts at effective self-defense by this country and other countries similarly situated, whereas for any other nation to request that the United States desist from any such resistance would in its actual effect range the country making such request on the side of Hitler and his movement of aggression by force. Hitler is therefore the person who should be addressed in support of peace, rather than those whom he is attacking for the purpose of bringing about their complete subjugation without color of law, or of right, or of humanity.

"Yes, it makes a difference who wins—the difference whether we stand with our backs to the wall with the other four continents against us and the high seas lost, alone defending the last free territories on earth—or whether we keep our place in an orderly world."

[Annex 2]

Draft Suggestion A Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador on May 16, 1941

II. THE ATTITUDES OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF JAPAN TOWARD THE EUROPEAN WAR

The Government of Japan declares that the purpose of its Axis Alliance was and is defensive and is designed to prevent the nations which are not at present engaged in the European war from participating therein, and declares that its obligations of military assistance under the Tripartite Pact between Germany, Japan and Italy come into force only if and when one of the parties of the pact is aggressively attacked by a power not at present involved in the European hostilities.

The Government of the United States declares that its attitude toward the European hostilities is and will continue to be determined solely and exclusively by considerations of protection and self-defense: its national security and the defense thereof.

The Government of Japan further declares that it is under no commitment under its Axis Alliance or otherwise which is inconsistent with the terms of the present declaration of policy and intention agreed upon between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States.

[Annex 3]

Draft Suggestion B Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador on May 16, 1941

III. CHINA AFFAIRS

When this declaration of policy and intention, including the provisions of this section, is agreed upon and both Governments have given it their approval and commitment, the President of the United States will suggest to the Government of Japan and the Government of China that those Governments enter into a negotiation for a termination of hostilities and resumption of peaceful relations on a basis as follows:

a. Neighborly friendship.
b. Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories.
c. Withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory in accordance with a schedule to be agreed upon.
d. No annexation.
e. No indemnities.
f. Equality of commercial opportunity in terms of and with conditions of fair treatment for all concerned.
g. Parallel measures of defense against subversive activities from external sources.
h. The question of the future of Manchuria to be dealt with by friendly negotiations.

[Annex 4]

Draft Suggestion C Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador on May 16, 1941

V. ECONOMIC ACTIVITY OF BOTH NATIONS IN THE SOUTHWESTERN PACIFIC AREA

On the pledged basis of guarantee that Japanese activity and American activity in the Southwestern Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means, the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States agree to cooperate each with the other toward ensuring on the basis of equality of opportunity equal access by Japan and by the United States to supplies of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which each country needs for the safeguarding and development of its own economy.

711.94/2133$\frac{5}{18}$

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] May 20, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador, accompanied by Colonel Iwakuro and Mr. Wikawa,[32] was received by the Secretary at his apartment at 8:30 this evening by arrangement at the suggestion of the Japanese Ambassador.[33]

The Secretary asked the Ambassador how in the opinion of the Ambassador the prospects now looked in regard to the proposal under consideration. The Ambassador replied that the Japanese Army and Navy as well as the Foreign Office had approved the matter; that the whole Cabinet had approved it; that it had been referred to the Emperor—in fact the matter was one which would have unanimous support in Japan. He went on to say that if now we should fail to carry the proposal through, he would be in a very embarrassing position vis-à-vis his Government. (The implication of this statement was that he had indicated to his Government that agreement of the American Government was assured.) The Ambassador hoped that we would not be disposed to dwell upon technicalities but would look at the proposal from the point of view of its broad spirit. He observed that it would be a pity if we failed to reach an understanding through disagreement on words. The Ambassador endeavored to emphasize that there was no essential difference in substance between the draft proposal which he had first submitted to his Government and the draft which he had been instructed by his Government to present to us.

The Secretary then observed that there were two points in regard to the section dealing with China which he would like to bring up. One was in regard to the joint defense against communism and the other was in regard to the stationing of Japanese troops in certain parts of Chinese territory. He said that he was not discussing the merits of the two points to which he referred but he felt that if and when this Government should approach Chiang Kai-shek on the matter of negotiating with Japan he would have to tell Chiang the basis on which Japan would propose to negotiate; that this basis should be one on which Chiang could carry his country with him; and that if the Chinese Government should be unwilling to proceed with negotiations on the basis proposed the Secretary would be in a very embarrassing position. He therefore wished to ask whether it would not be possible to cover these two points under some broader provision, such as a provision which would call for special measures of protection for Japanese nationals and property interests against lawlessness in areas where special measures for safeguarding the rights and interests of nationals of third powers were necessary.

---

[32] Tadao Wikawa, an officer of the Cooperative Bank of Japan.

[33] Maxwell M. Hamilton, Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, was also present.

Colonel Iwakuro said that it was a matter of surprise to him that we had brought up these points, as it was his conception that the central objective of the proposal which we were discussing was the peace of the Pacific between Japan and the United States and that the settlement of the China affair was incidental and concerned China and Japan.

The Secretary agreed that the central objective was the peace of the Pacific between Japan and the United States but that a peaceful settlement between Japan and China was an essential element in the situation.

Mr. Hamilton commented that in dealing with a proposal such as the one before us it was necessary to consider the general effect upon the public of any arrangement that might be entered into, as the success of such an arrangement would depend upon the broad sweep of the support it received from the public. If, for example, there was in one part of the agreement a provision that Japanese troops would be withdrawn and further down a provision for joint defense against communism, critics might say "Ah—here is the joker; Japanese troops will be retained after all under cloak of the provision 'joint defense against communism' ".

Colonel Iwakuro hastened to renounce any idea that Japanese troops would be retained all over China for joint defense against communism but only in north China along the northern border. He said that in his opinion as between Japan and China the point under discussion would present no difficulty, that Chiang Kai-shek himself was alive to the danger of communism and that, while he could not speak of most recent developments in Chinese governmental attitude toward the subject, his earlier experience in China convinced him that China would be only too ready to collaborate with Japan in this matter.

Colonel Iwakuro then went on to say that the term "joint defense against communism" had become a slogan which had been impressed upon the Japanese public as an essential requisite for some years past, that it had become a cardinal objective in Japan's conflict with China, and that it would be impossible for the Japanese to abandon it. He suggested that it might be possible to cover it under some broader language in an agreement as between Japan and the United States, but he wished to make it clear that Japan would have to retain the term in its negotiations with China.

After some further discussion, the Japanese apparently came to see that the problem presented a real difficulty and they agreed to give the point further study.

The Secretary then said that a problem was presented in drafting the wording of Section III in regard to the China affair, for if we enumerated the Konoe principles, as the Japanese desired, we were confronted by the fact that "joint defense against communism" was the second of the Konoe principles.

Colonel Iwakuro pointed out that if we referred to the Konoe principles without specifying which ones we had in mind we should be endorsing Konoe's exhortation for the destruction of Chiang Kai-shek and the "new order in East Asia".

There was then some discussion of whether the Japanese term which was ordinarily translated "joint defense against communism" was not susceptible of some other translation, and reference was made to the term "inimical foreign ideologies" used in recent Pan-American instruments as a possible suggestion. The Japanese agreed to study this point.

The Secretary suggested that the Document which the Ambassador had presented on May 12 marked "Oral Explanation for Proposed Amendments to the Original Draft" be marked "Annex and Supplement".

The Secretary next took up a suggestion in reference to Section V "activities of the two countries in the Southwestern Pacific area". He asked whether it would not be helpful from the Japanese point of view to insert phraseology recognizing the right of a country to take action to protect itself under international law but qualifying this right in such a way that it would not be used as an occasion for acts of aggression.

Colonel Iwakuro expressed the opinion that to do this would be merely confusing and suggested that it would be unwise to inject any new principles into the proposed agreement. The Secretary then said that he had made this suggestion with the sole idea of being helpful to the Japanese. He then suggested that it would strengthen the proposed agreement very much if language could be put in which would make clear that the central purpose of this agreement was the peace of the Pacific. The Japanese pointed out that this point had already been brought out in the first section of the Japanese proposal "The Concepts of the United States and of Japan Respecting International Relations and the Character of Nations". The Secretary then suggested that references to the peace of the Pacific in the proposal be assembled together in one place in the document where it would be given special emphasis. He pointed out that in this way the public would become impressed with the fact that it was the purpose of Japan and the United States to bring about an era of peace in the Pacific. This would bring about fresh hope in the world and vitalize the proposed agreement itself. He pointed out also as an illustration of how such emphasis would operate that the proposed agreement would appeal to businessmen and develop their confidence and interest in financial and commercial cooperation in the Far East. The suggestion was well taken by the Japanese who said that they would give the matter study. It was agreed to meet again the following evening.

J[OSEPH] W. B[ALLANTINE]

711.94/2133$\frac{7}{18}$

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] May 21, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador, accompanied by Colonel Iwakuro and Mr. Wikawa, called at 8:30 p. m. at the Secretary's apartment in accordance with an arrangement made at the meeting of the previous evening.[34]

The Secretary said that in approaching the question of dealing with China in regard to the matters which we had been discussing he desired to refer briefly to his experience of the last eight years in relations with the American Republics. He then alluded to the distrust which had been built up in the Latin American countries toward the United States as a result of our previous policies calling for the use of our armed forces to support our interests there. He compared the situation which existed up to the time of the Montevideo conference in 1933 with the situation today, and he spoke of the good will toward and confidence in the United States throughout Latin America which has resulted from our policy of putting the Latin American countries on their honor to treat our interests fairly. The Secretary said that it had occurred to him that Chiang Kai-shek would probably have at his disposal numbers of seasoned and trusted troops which could be utilized to protect areas where special arrangements might be needed during a transitional period on account of prevailing lawlessness and of the extent of the interests of third power nationals to safeguard those interests. The Secretary suggested further that consideration might be given to the possibility, in arranging the schedule for the proposed withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, which would presumably involve a period of perhaps twelve months, to plan on having the troops occupying the areas in question come out last; a further idea would be to have a commission to deal with the problem presented by the need for maintaining order in these areas. He said he did not wish to pass upon the merits of these suggestions but was merely raising them for consideration.

---

[34] Mr. Hamilton was also present.

The Secretary then went on to the question which he had raised during the previous evening of strengthening the emphasis in the document that peace in the Pacific was the central purpose of the instrument. He said that the instrument should, in his opinion, be so worded that it would speak for itself and make its nature clear and unequivocal to the public without the necessity of having its purposes explained by those who were its sponsors. He felt that this was especially important in view of the present situation of the world.

At this point a draft which we had prepared of a section numbered VI in regard to peace in the Pacific area was taken up and from this draft there emerged a mutually acceptable tentative formula, after the Japanese had registered their objection to the inclusion of the last sentence of our formula containing provision to the effect that action taken to protect national interests under international law was not to be made the occasion for aggression. The Japanese objection was stated to be on the ground that it might appear that the insertion of such a provision would indicate American suspicion of Japan.

The Secretary raised the question of whether the Japanese would have objection to describing their oral statement of May 12 as an "Annex and Supplement". The Ambassador said he believed there would be none.

The Secretary asked whether objection was perceived to inserting in the "Annex and Supplement" the statement containing excerpts from his speech of April 24 which had been attached to our oral statement of May 16 for the purpose of clarifying our interpretation of what constituted self-defense.

Mr. Wikawa said that he understood that our oral statement had been withdrawn. Mr. Hamilton replied that Mr. Wikawa must have misunderstood. Colonel Iwakuro said he wondered what was the need of supplementing a simple understanding such as was contemplated with an elaborate documentation.

In reply to Colonel Iwakuro's question as to what purpose the Secretary's proposal would serve, the Secretary replied that he thought it would be helpful both to the Japanese and to us as clarifying our attitude on the subject. The Secretary added that Ambassador Grew had read the Secretary's speech in question to Mr. Matsuoka and that Mr. Matsuoka had commented favorably upon it. No indication was given by the Japanese of their attitude on the Secretary's proposal.

Mr. Hamilton asked what was the necessity of a reference in Section III to the Wang Ching-wei treaties, and he pointed out that this would be a source of embarrassment to us as we had not recognized the Wang Ching-wei régime and as they contained features which did not seem to us consistent with the principles under which we now proposed to act. He said that we had appreciated the force of the argument that the Japanese people had come to set store by the Konoe principles, but surely the treaty with the Wang Ching-wei régime was too recent to have a similar place in the minds of the Japanese public.

Colonel Iwakuro argued that the Wang Ching-wei treaty gave practical application to the Konoe principles and he considered reference to them necessary to clarify the position of the Japanese Government and the Japanese public. He said he did not see the relevancy of our non-recognition of the Wang régime to the question of making reference to them in the way proposed. He added that in any case the understanding was a confidential document and therefore he did not see how we would be embarrassed as we need not refer to that treaty in taking up the matter with the Chinese.

Mr. Hamilton endeavored to make it clear to the Japanese that we could not enter with [*into*] any secret arrangement, as such matters would be bound to be known in the course of a few weeks. No decision was reached in regard to the point.

It was arranged that each side would give further study to these points with a view to reconciling our differences. No time was set for the next discussion.

J[OSEPH] W. B[ALLANTINE]

711.94/2133$\frac{10}{18}$

Statement Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State on May 23, 1941

ERRATA FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM [OF MAY 12, 1941]

1. Read "amicable understanding" for "*entente cordiale*" in the 3rd paragraph of page 1.

2. Read the 2nd paragraph of page 4 as follows:

"The Government of Japan maintains that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact was, and is, defensive and designed to prevent the participation of nations in the European War not at present involved in it."

3. Add to the last paragraph of Item IV (Page 6) as follows:

"If a new commercial treaty is desired by both Governments, it would be elaborated as soon as possible and concluded in accordance with usual procedure."

711.94/2133 $\frac{5}{18}$

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] May 28, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador called at the Secretary's apartment at 8:30 by appointment made at the Ambassador's request.

The Secretary said that he had gathered . . . that the Japanese Ambassador was under an impression that the Secretary had said something to someone of a nature indicative that in the Secretary's opinion Mr. Matsuoka did not carry much weight in the Japanese Government. The Secretary stated that he had not said anything of this kind to anyone.

The Ambassador commented that under the Japanese constitutional system other ministers in addition to the Foreign Minister are consulted in matters relating to foreign policy.

The Secretary said that in his consideration of the matters we have been exploring a difficulty has been presented by questions involving the relations of our respective countries toward the European war. Mr. Matsuoka since his return from Europe, according to reports widely published in the press, has been making declarations on every occasion in regard to Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Alliance in the matter of supporting Germany in the event of American entry into the war. He said that, if we went into an agreement with Japan, critics would assert, unless the Japanese Government could clarify its attitude toward its obligations under the Tripartite Alliance in the event that the United States should be drawn into the European war through action in the line of self-defense, that there was no assurance as to Japan's position. The Secretary referred to the President's speech of the previous evening[35] and reviewed what the Secretary had previously said publicly and also to the Ambassador in regard to the attitude of this country toward maintaining the freedom of the seas against Hitler as an essential measure of self-defense.

The Ambassador replied that he had known Mr. Matsuoka for many years, that Matsuoka was given to talking a great deal for domestic consumption in Japan, but that the Ambassador was convinced that Matsuoka desired only friendly relations with the United

---

[35] Radio address of President Roosevelt on May 27, 1941, printed in Department of State, *Bulletin*, May 31, 1941 (vol. IV, No. 101), p. 647.

States. The Ambassador said that in his personal opinion there would be no war between Japan and the United States, as he felt that once the proposed agreement was concluded it would have a profound effect upon Japanese psychology which would cause a weakening in the influence of the jingoes. He added that the Japanese people were heartily sick of the idea of an economic bloc and desired to return to the spirit of the Meiji restoration in which their horizon had been broadened to intercourse and trade with the whole world. He said that the American embargoes had made the Japanese feel that there was no alternative at present to seeking an economic bloc, but they were feeling the pinch of a restricted economy and would welcome a resumption of normal trade.

The Secretary said he felt sure that the Ambassador and many of his associates were sincere in their desire to have friendly relations, but he suggested that it would be helpful if the Japanese Government could offer something by way of clarification on the points which the Secretary had raised.

The Ambassador replied that he doubted very much whether the Japanese Government would be willing to add anything to what it already proposed saying, as the Japanese Government would be placed in a very difficult position vis-à-vis Germany and Italy and there would also be domestic difficulties from the pro-Axis group in Japan. The Ambassador added, however, that the Japanese Government would make its own independent decision and would not be dictated to by Germany and Italy in the matter of interpreting Japan's obligations under the Alliance.

The Secretary then brought up the question of the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and asked the Ambassador to indicate what the Japanese Government had in mind.

The Ambassador said that this was a matter concerning which he could not say precisely what the Japanese army had in mind but would be dealt with in direct negotiations between the Japanese and the Chinese Governments. The Ambassador said he was of the personal opinion that negotiations over this matter might be protracted—say, over a period of six months—and that after that a period of two years would be required before complete evacuation would be effected.

The Ambassador indicated, in reply to specific questions, that such evacuation would not include troops retained in China under the provision of cooperative defense against communistic activities. He contemplated an arrangement being negotiated with China similar to the Boxer Protocol [36] under which Japanese troops would be stationed for an indefinite period in north China and Inner Mongolia. The Ambassador said he could not indicate approximately how many troops it was proposed to station in China under such an arrangement or define precisely the areas in which the arrangement would be operative.

---

[36] *Foreign Relations*, 1901, appendix (Affairs in China), p. 312.

The Secretary commented that it seemed to him important that relations between China and Japan should be adjusted on a basis which would offer permanent promise of friendship between the two countries; that the continued presence of Japanese troops in China would be a factor operating against such friendship, as the presence of these troops tended to produce incidents and friction; and that we had found from our experience in our relations with Latin American countries that a policy of sending troops to settle claims did not pay. The Secretary then outlined briefly the arrangements which have been set up for the adjustment through peaceful means of claims and disputes among the American countries to replace former practices. He said he thought that Japan would find that similar arrangements as between Japan and China would be a progressive step, as the sending to and stationing in China of Japanese troops would not be profitable in the long run to Japan or China. He asked whether the Japanese Government would not consider some other means of dealing with the problems under reference than by arrangements such as seemed to be under contemplation for the stationing of troops.

The Ambassador said that he personally agreed with the Secretary's view that the stationing of troops was productive of incidents and difficulties, but that he did not think that the Far East had progressed to a point where it would be feasible at present to carry out a program such as the Secretary suggested. He said that when Prince Konoe came out with his statement of principles two years ago he was bitterly criticized in Japan for such moderation in the face of the sacrifices that Japan had made. Now, however, the Japanese public after four years of fighting had come to accept Prince Konoe's plan, and a suggestion of further modification in the direction of moderation would present difficulties to the Japanese Government.

The Secretary said that in connection with the question of a possible approach by this Government to the Chinese Government he had it in mind, before entering into any negotiations, talking over in strict confidence with the Chinese Government the general subject matter involved in the proposals under discussion. In the meantime, our conversations would continue, as they had so far on a purely unofficial and informal basis. He explained that he was raising this question in regard to the question of Japanese troops only because our conversations were in this unofficial and informal exploratory stage and that he would not have otherwise brought the question up.

The Ambassador said that he did not expect that the American Government would negotiate this question with the Chinese Government but would merely serve as a bridge to bring the Chinese and Japanese together into direct negotiations. He cited as examples of such action American good offices in connection with the Sino-Japanese peace negotiations of 1895 and the Russo-Japanese peace negotiations of 1905.

In reply to the Secretary's question as to how the Chinese Government would be likely to react to such a proposal as the one in regard to stationing of troops for cooperative defense against communistic activities, the Ambassador said that in his opinion the Chinese Government had become very much weakened as a result of the continued hostilities, that they had lost so much equipment that a Japanese force was a match for a Chinese force twenty times as numerous. He thought that Russian aid was now practically limited to that accorded the Chinese Communists; that British aid was negligible; that the only thing that was now sustaining Chiang Kai-shek was reliance upon American aid; and that, if the United States should discontinue its aid, China would be forced to come to terms with Japan on this matter. The Ambassador added further that Chiang Kai-shek was riding on two horses—the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang; that the only factor which kept the two horses together was Japanese pressure; and that in this situation Chiang Kai-shek would find it very difficult to continue the conflict.

The Secretary repeated that these two points which he had brought out presented difficulties to us and he asked whether the Japanese Government could not give them further consideration. The Ambassador replied that, if he should ask his Government for further instructions in regard to the point about relations of Japan and the United States to the European war, the Japanese Government would probably be unwilling to give any further clarification. He made no definite statement as to further consideration by the Japanese Government of the other point in regard to the question of Japanese troops in China, but said that he would consult further with Colonel Iwakuro. The Secretary said that he also would give further thought to these matters.

As the Japanese Ambassador was leaving the Secretary reiterated the points mentioned by him above that before entering into any negotiations he had in mind to talk over the China matter with the Chinese Government and that in the meantime our conversations would continue on an entirely informal and unofficial basis. He repeated also that it was only because these conversations were of an informal and unofficial character that he had discussed in this way the question of Japanese troops in China.

[JOSEPH W.] BALLANTINE

711.94/2133$\frac{16}{18}$

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] May 30, 1941.

Mr. Hamilton[36a] referred to the previous conversations which the Secretary had had with the Japanese Ambassador in which the Secretary had made mention of two points in the Japanese proposal which presented specially important difficulties to us, and expressed the view that with regard to one of them, the proposed cooperative defense against communistic activities, it might be helpful if Colonel Iwakuro could outline to us what the Japanese Government had in mind as to what was involved in this point.

Colonel Iwakuro reviewed briefly the historical background relating to Japan's efforts to prevent the spread of communism into Manchuria and Japanese territory and discussed the need from the point of view of Japan's security of including in Japan's terms for a peaceful settlement with China provision for cooperative resistance against communistic activities. He drew a rough sketch map of the general region of North China, Mongolia, Manchuria, and Siberia to indicate the strategic problem involved in protecting Manchuria from infiltration across Inner Mongolia and North China of communistic elements. He drew a line along a distance east and west showing the general region in Inner Mongolia where it was proposed to station Japanese troops for protection against the entry of communistic elements from Outer Mongolia. He also drew lines of communication leading southward from this line to the Peiping-Tientsin area with one extension leading southward along what appeared to be the railway to Tsinan and thence through Shantung to Tsingtao. He said it was proposed to station some troops to maintain these lines of communication.

Asked how many Japanese troops it was contemplated stationing under such an arrangement, the Colonel said that he had in mind a number between one tenth and one fifth of the present force garrisoned in North China. He said that the present number of the latter force was a military secret. The Colonel wished to assure us positively that the troops which would be maintained for resistance against communistic activities would not under any circumstances interfere in Chinese internal affairs and that in no circumstances would the provision, if adopted, for cooperation for resistance against communistic activities be made the occasion for the stationing of Japanese troops in areas in China other than specified areas in Inner Mongolia or North China. The Colonel said that there was envisaged, as the Ambassador had previously indicated, an arrangement along lines of the Boxer Protocol to take care of this matter. Asked for how long a period it was envisaged stationing Japanese troops in China for the purpose under reference, Colonel Iwakuro replied that Japan did not intend to make such stationing permanent but only so long as necessary for protection against communistic activities from external sources. He suggested that there was a possibility before many years of a war between Japan and the Soviet Union, the outcome of which might alter the situation with reference to the threat of communistic activities.

[36a] Mr. Hamilton was meeting with Colonel Iwakuro and Mr. Wikawa.

Mr. Hamilton said he wished to make it clear that we did not wish to enter into the merits of the question presented, but that, in as much as the Japanese proposal called for presentation by this Government to the Chinese Government of Japan's terms for a peaceful settlement, we could not divest ourselves of a certain degree of responsibility in the matter, and that the American people being a people devoted to principles as well as a practical people, would expect this Government to adhere to its declared principles. He raised for consideration the question whether it might be possible to work out a formula whereby under the point in regard to defense against communistic activities there would be no reference to stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory and under the point in regard to withdrawal of Japanese troops a statement might be made somewhat to the effect that under a schedule to be arranged with the Chinese Government for the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China evacuation of forces in North China and Inner Mongolia would be left to the last, and that shortly before the due date of completion of evacuation the Japanese Government might propose to the Chinese Government consultation in regard to measures called for by any situation that might exist, including any situation with reference to communistic activities.

Various suggestions were then offered in regard to a possible draft, and the Japanese endeavored to get Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine to collaborate in drafting something on this point, but Mr. Hamilton said that it was already late and that it might be more helpful if each side should give further consideration to this point independently.

Mr. Hamilton also paid a tribute to the frankness which Colonel Iwakuro had manifested in all his talks and said that we had all been much impressed by his broad grasp of the problems involved in our discussions.

J[OSEPH] W. B[ALLANTINE]

711.94/2133$\frac{15}{18}$a

American Draft Proposal Handed to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on May 31, 1941

Unofficial, Exploratory
and Without Commitment

[WASHINGTON,] May 31, 1941.

The Governments of the United States and of Japan accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement of understanding as expressed in a joint declaration.

Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment between their countries should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences.

It is our present hope that, by a cooperative effort, the United States and Japan may contribute effectively toward establishment and preservation of peace in the Pacific area; and, by the rapid consummation of an amicable understanding, arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.

For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-suited and weakening. Both Governments, therefore, desire that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general understanding which would bind, meanwhile, both Governments in honor and in act.

It is the belief of the two Governments that such an understanding should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory concerns which could be deliberated at a conference.

Both Governments presume to anticipate that they could achieve harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified or improved; to wit:

1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.
2. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European war.
3. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.
4. Commerce between both nations.
5. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.
6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.
7. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.

Accordingly, the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan have come to the following mutual understanding and declaration of policy:

I. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.

Both Governments affirm that their national policies are directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of reciprocal confidence and cooperation among our peoples.

Both Governments declare that it is their traditional, and present, concept and conviction that nations and races compose, as members of a family, one household; each equally enjoying rights and admitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound not to destroy for others; they further admit their responsibilities to oppose the oppression or exploitation of other nations.

Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to those moral principles and concepts.

II. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European war.

The Government of Japan maintains that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact was, and is, defensive and is designed to prevent the participation of nations in the European war not at present involved in it. Obviously, the provisions of the Pact do not apply to involvement through acts of self-defense.

The Government of the United States maintains that its attitude toward the European hostilities is and will continue to be determined solely and exclusively by considerations of protection and self-defense: its national security and the defense thereof.

III. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.

The Japanese Government having communicated to the Government of the United States the general terms within the framework of which the Japanese Government will propose the negotiation of a peaceful settlement with the Chinese Government, which terms are declared by the Japanese Government to be in harmony with the Konoe principles regarding neighborly friendship and mutual respect of sovereignty and territories and with the practical application of those principles, the President of the United States will suggest to the Government of China that the Government of China and the Government of Japan enter into a negotiation on a basis mutually advantageous and acceptable for a termination of hostilities and resumption of peaceful relations.

NOTE: (The foregoing draft of Section III is subject to further discussion of the question of cooperative defense against communistic activities, including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory.)

IV. Commerce between both nations.

When official approbation to the present understanding has been given by both Governments, the United States and Japan shall assure each other mutually to supply such commodities as are, respectively, available and required by either of them. Both Governments further consent to take necessary steps to resume normal trade relations as formerly established under the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan. If a new commercial treaty is desired by both Governments, it would be negotiated as soon as possible and be concluded in accordance with usual procedures.

V. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.

On the basis of mutual pledges hereby given that Japanese activity and American activity in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations, the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States agree to cooperate each with the other toward obtaining non-discriminatory access by Japan and by the United States to commercial supplies of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which each country needs for the safeguarding and development of its own economy.

VI. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.

The Japanese Government and the Government of the United States declare that the controlling policy underlying this understanding is peace in the Pacific area; that it is their fundamental purpose, through cooperative effort, to contribute to the maintenance and the preservation of peace in the Pacific area; and that neither has territorial designs in the area mentioned.

VII. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.

The Government of Japan declares its willingness to enter at such time as the Government of the United States may desire into negotiation with the Government of the United States with a view to the conclusion of a treaty for the neutralization of the Philippine Islands, when Philippine independence shall have been achieved.

[Annex 1]

ANNEX AND SUPPLEMENT ON THE PART OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

III. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.

The basic terms as referred to in the above section are as follows:

1. Neighborly friendship.

2. (Cooperative defense against injurious communistic activities—including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory.) Subject to further discussion.

3. Economic cooperation—by which China and Japan will proceed on the basis of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.

4. Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories.

5. Mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation cooperating as good neighbors and forming a Far Eastern nucleus contributing to world peace.

6. Withdrawal of Japanese military and naval forces from Chinese territory and Chinese waters as promptly as possible and in accordance with an agreement to be concluded between Japan and China.

7. No annexation.

8. No indemnities.

9. Amicable negotiation in regard to Manchoukuo.

[Annex 2]

ANNEX AND SUPPLEMENT ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

II. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European war.

The position of the Government of the United States toward the military movement of conquest inaugurated by Mr. Hitler is set forth in a public address made by the Secretary of State on April 24, 1941. Some extracts which are directly in point and which are basic in relation to the entire situation are as follows:

> ". . . As waged by them (the aggressor powers) this is not an ordinary war. It is a war of assault by these would-be conquerors, employing every method of barbarism, upon nations which cling to their right to live in freedom and which are resisting in self-defense. . . . Such is the movement which is extending rapidly throughout the world.
>
> "If experience shows anything, it shows that no nation anywhere has the slightest reason to feel that it will be exempted from attack by the invader, any more than, in a town overrun by bandits, the wealthiest citizen might expect to be free from attack.
>
> ". . . Every thinking man can answer the question for himself by simply calling the roll of the wretched victims of world aggression who are now in a condition of semi-slavery, and whose every hope of again enjoying the blessings of civilization depends only on the defeat or failure of the movement of conquest. So it is in Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Albania, Luxemburg, France, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia.
>
> ". . . The conclusion is plain. Now, after some fifteen nations have lost everything that makes life worth living, it is high time that the remaining free countries should arm to the fullest extent and in the briefest time humanly possible and act for their self-preservation.

". . . Events have shown beyond possible question that the safety of this hemisphere and of this country calls for resistance wherever resistance will be most effective. . . . This policy means, in practical application, that . . . aid must reach its destination in the shortest of time and in maximum quantity. So—ways must be found to do this.

". . . Those nations that are making resistance are primarily seeking to save themselves, their homes and their liberties. Great Britain for instance is acting primarily for her own safety. The United States both in its direct defense effort and in the aid which it extends to the resisting nations is likewise acting primarily for its own safety. As safety for the nations that are offering resistance means security for us, aid to them is an essential part of our own defense. Every new conquest makes available to the aggressor greater resources for use against the remaining free peoples. Our aid to the resisting nations is not the mere crusading of a world benefactor. It is based on the definite knowledge that every free nation anywhere is a bastion of strength to all the remaining free peoples everywhere.

". . . Those Americans who, in effect, are saying that a British defeat would not matter to us, signally overlook the fact that the resulting delivery of the high seas to the invader would create colossal danger to our own national defense and security. The breadth of the sea may give us a little time. It does not give us safety. Safety can only come from our ability, in conjunction with other peace-loving nations, to prevent any aggressor from attaining control of the high seas.

". . . Some among us, doubtless with the best of intentions, still contend that our country need not resist until armed forces of an invader shall have crossed the boundary line of this hemisphere. But this merely means that there would be no resistance by the hemisphere, including the United States, until the invading countries had acquired complete control of the other four continents and of the high seas, and thus had obtained every possible strategic advantage, reducing us to the corresponding disadvantage of a severely handicapped defense. This is an utterly shortsighted and extremely dangerous view."

The foregoing statements make it clear that the attitude of the Government of the United States is one of resolve to take measures of self-defense in resistance to a movement, which, as has been made unequivocally clear by the acts and utterances of Hitler, is directed to world conquest by force from which no country and no area are excepted. This attitude is based upon a most fundamental consideration—that of the inalienable right of self-defense. The only other attitude this Government could assume would be the suicidal attitude of some fifteen countries in Europe which also were told, as our country is being told, that they would not be molested but that if they should undertake to resist beyond their own boundaries they would be charged with being aggressors and with having assumed the offensive. A similar course by this nation from the standpoint of effective defense against the Hitler movement of world conquest would be absurd, futile and suicidal from the standpoint of reasonable precautions for its safety.

In the light of the existing situation, Hitler is the one person who can promptly remove the necessity for efforts at effective self-defense by this country and other countries similarly situated, whereas for any other nation to request that the United States desist from any such resistance would in its actual effect range the country making such request on the side of Hitler and his movement of aggression by force. Hitler is therefore the person who should be addressed in support of peace, rather than those whom he is attacking for the purpose of bringing about their complete subjugation without color of law, or of right, or of humanity.

"Yes, it makes a difference who wins—the difference whether we stand with our backs to the wall with the other four continents against us and the high seas lost, alone defending the last free territories on earth—or whether we keep our place in an orderly world."

[Annex 3]

ANNEX AND SUPPLEMENT ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

IV. Commerce between both nations.

It is understood that during the present international emergency Japan and the United States each shall permit export to the other of commodities in amounts up to the figures of usual or pre-war trade, except, in the case of each, commodities which it needs for its own purposes of security and self-defense.

711.94/2133 16/18a

American Statement Handed to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on May 31, 1941

Unofficial, Exploratory
and Without Commitment

[WASHINGTON,] May 31, 1941.

ORAL EXPLANATION FOR SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS TO THE JAPANESE DRAFT

Introductory statement.

A few minor changes have been made in phraseology with a view to clarifying the meaning.

In the list of points enumerated on page two of the Japanese draft, the title of Section III has been altered to conform more accurately to the subject matter, the word "Southwestern" has been omitted from point numbered five and, in view of the new subject matter under point six (for explanation see *infra*), part of the subject matter under point six in the Japanese draft has been incorporated in an additional section, the title of which is therefore listed, and part of the subject matter in Section VI of the Japanese draft has been omitted (for explanation see *infra*).

I. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.

The first paragraph has been omitted in as much as the statement of fact is a self-evident one.

In the third paragraph of the Japanese draft there has been substituted for the word "backward" the word "other" in order to maintain consistency with principles relating to equality of races and peoples.

II. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European war.

The first paragraph of the Japanese draft has been omitted in order to avoid any implication of inconsistency with statements made by the President to the effect that the present is not an opportune time for the American Government to endeavor to bring about peace in Europe.

To the second paragraph of the Japanese draft a new sentence has been added to emphasize the aspect of self-defense.

The third paragraph has been omitted in as much as the text of the Tripartite Pact has been published and no purpose would appear to be served by express reference to any of its provisions.

The fourth paragraph of the Japanese draft has been revised to emphasize the protective and self-defense character of the attitude of the United States toward the European hostilities.

A statement in the Annex and Supplement on the part of the Government of the United States contains an elaboration of this Government's viewpoint toward the military movement of conquest inaugurated by Chancellor Hitler.

III. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.

As already stated, the title has been altered to describe more accurately the contents.

The statement in the Japanese draft has been rewritten to keep the underlying purport and at the same time to avert raising questions which do not seem fundamental to the basic subject and which are controversial in character and might present serious difficulties from the point of view of the United States.

The statement in the Japanese Annex and Supplement in regard to this section has also been revised in a few particulars in conformity with the considerations mentioned in the preceding paragraph. In addition, point numbered three in regard to economic cooperation has been rephrased so as to make it clear that China and Japan intend to follow in their economic relations the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations, a principle to which it is understood the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government have long subscribed and which principle forms the foundation of the commercial policy of the United States. As it is assumed that the term "troops" in point numbered six is meant to include all armed forces, the language of this point has been slightly rephrased to avoid possible ambiguity.

As already stated, the question relating to communistic activities, including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory, is subject to further discussion.

IV. Commerce between both nations.

A statement is included in the Annex and Supplement on the part of the United States clarifying the point that as a temporary measure during the present international emergency it is understood that each country may restrict export of commodities which it needs for its own purposes of security and self-defense.

V. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.

The language of this section has been rephrased to make the provisions thereof applicable equally to the United States and to Japan.

VI. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.

This section has been revised to make it consist of a clear-cut statement of the fundamental purpose of the understanding. The thought in mind is to give emphasis to this purpose so that the document may speak for itself on this all-important subject.

The statement of fundamental purpose has been assigned a section by itself in order that it may gain added emphasis.

The statement in the Japanese draft in regard to the Philippine Islands has been dealt with in a new section bearing number VII.

The statement in regard to Japanese immigration has been omitted in view of the established position of the United States that the question of immigration is a domestic matter. For that reason, to attempt to include a statement on this subject would stand in the way of the underlying purposes of the agreement.

VII. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.

The phraseology of this section has been altered so as to bring it into conformity with the language of the Tydings-McDuffie Act, approved March 24, 1934.[37]

Addendum.

In view of the traditional policy of the United States and various practical considerations in the United States, important difficulties would be presented should the Government of the United States endeavor to keep secret the understanding under reference together with its annexes. This Government could probably arrange to keep the understanding secret for a period of a few weeks, during which time it believes that the two Governments should work out procedures covering the scope, character and timing of the announcement of the understanding and of at least the definitive substance thereof.

---

[37] 48 Stat. 456.

711.94/2133$\frac{16}{18}$a

American Informal and Unofficial Oral Statement Handed to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on May 31, 1941

The Government of the United States will at some appropriate stage prior to any definitive discussion talk over in strict confidence with the Chinese Government the general subject matter involved in the discussions, especially as it relates to China.

711.94/2198

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] June 2, 1941.

The Ambassador of Japan came to my hotel apartment at his request. He said he merely desired to call for a few minutes to say he thought that he and his associates were in agreement with the document which Mr. Ballantine had handed to him entitled "Unofficial, Exploratory and without Commitment", dated May 31, 1941, with the exception of some of the phraseology. He then said that he would like to have his subordinates and my associates talk over this phase while he was absent in New York during the next few days. I replied that his statement was interesting and that I would be pleased to notify my two associates, Messrs. Hamilton and Ballantine, to the end that the desired conversation might be had.

I then very slowly and deliberately asked the Ambassador whether it was his considered judgment that his Government seriously and earnestly desired to enter into a settlement for peace and non-discriminatory commercial relations and friendship generally in the Pacific area. He promptly replied that that was his judgment. I remarked that, in the light of the loud statements which Matsuoka and others were daily making, the question which I propounded was sharply raised, and that one was forced back to the inquiry of whether Japan really is seeking this sort of settlement, or whether she is only seeking a way to get out of China, and otherwise to go forward with methods and practices entirely contrary to the principles which would have to underlie a settlement establishing peace, non-discriminatory commerce and fair friendly relations in the Pacific area. The Ambassador reiterated his view that an earnest and fair settlement was desired.

I then inquired about the policy of keeping Japanese troops stationed in China indefinitely, and added that this was an extremely important point in the situation and expressed the hope that the Government of Japan was considering the viewpoint we had expressed. The Ambassador did not offer anything encouraging in his comment. I again emphasized the great importance of Japan's giving this matter most serious study before taking the opposite course which is so completely discredited everywhere in the world. The Ambassador added nothing appreciably in his further comment.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

711.94/2162$\frac{1}{14}$

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] June 4, 1941.

In pursuance of an arrangement made by the Japanese Ambassador with the Secretary on June 3, Mr. Wakasugi,[37a] Colonel Iwakuro, Mr. Wikawa, and Mr. Matsudaira[38] met with Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine at the Wardman Park Hotel at three o'clock. Mr. Wakasugi said that it was their desire that we should discuss unofficially and tentatively various points arising in connection with the Japanese proposal and the revision of that proposal which was handed to the Japanese Ambassador on May 31.

Our discussion was made on the basis of the draft of May 31.

With reference to the Preamble, Mr. Wakasugi raised the question whether by the reference to "a joint declaration" in the first paragraph it was intended that there was to be another instrument in addition to the draft now before us. Mr. Hamilton said that it was our understanding that this draft itself constituted the joint declaration. No objection was raised to this explanation. Mr. Wakasugi then asked whether the principle of the *alternat* (rotation in precedence in naming the two countries in the document) would be observed in drawing up the Japanese and the American texts of the understanding. Mr. Hamilton said that he perceived no difficulty in this but that it was his thought that there would be but one document. He added that we would take note of that point which they had raised for further consideration.

[37a] Kaname Wakasugi, Japanese Minister-Counselor.

[38] Koto Matsudaira, Second Secretary of the Japanese Embassy.

Mr. Wakasugi indicated that the Japanese desired to substitute in the fifth line of the second paragraph the word "arrest" for "corrected", as there was an implication in the word "corrected" of censure of the conduct of one or both of the two countries. In the first line of the third paragraph they desired to alter the word "present" to "earnest" or to omit the word "present" altogether, as the implications of the word "present" were not clear. In the fifth paragraph of the Preamble they desired to delete the words appearing in the last line "at a conference" and to substitute the word "later", as they felt that reference to a conference might be interpreted as committing them to a conference.

Mr. Hamilton observed that all of these words which they desired to change were taken over from the Japanese draft, but that we would note their desire to have these changes made.

Mr. Wakasugi said that with reference to the wording of caption five they would like to have a change made which they would take up when we came to a discussion of Section V.

With reference to Section I, relating to the general concepts of Japan and of the United States, Mr. Wakasugi said that they would like to insert after "one household" in line three of paragraph two the phrase "under the ideal of universal concord, justice and equity". Mr. Hamilton raised question whether the Japanese were thinking of some vague idealistic concept or of something which had present-day, practical application. Mr. Wakasugi explained that the purpose of the Japanese suggested addition was to define Japan's ethical concept of a household in the sense used in this document. In the last line of the same paragraph they desired to substitute "peoples" for "nations", as you could, for example, speak of a Malayan people but not of a Malayan nation.

In Section II, relating to the European war, Mr. Wakasugi asked that there be deleted the second sentence of the first paragraph, reading as follows: "Obviously, the provisions of the Pact do not apply to involvement through acts of self-defense." Mr. Wakasugi said that Japan does not want to be bound by our interpretation of self-defense and that Japan cannot commit itself in advance to what action it might take in respect to the acts of some other countries. Mr. Hamilton commented that it might be helpful to us toward gaining an understanding of what the Japanese had in mind in reference to this whole section if they would disregard the text of the proposed section and explain to us in their own words their underlying thought. After some inconclusive statements by Mr. Wakasugi, Mr. Hamilton commented that we had been given to understand by certain persons that the Japanese Government desired gradually to move away from its affiliations with the Axis powers and that one purpose of the proposed understanding between the Japanese and the American

Governments was to create an atmosphere which would facilitate such action on the part of Japan. Mr. Hamilton asked Mr. Wakasugi to comment on this and, if Mr. Wakasugi confirmed the impressions conveyed to us by some other people, to explain how the proposed understanding would accomplish such purpose. Mr. Wakasugi stated categorically that if we had received any such impressions they were not in accord with fact. He said that Japan had no intention of not discharging its obligations under the Tripartite Alliance and that Japan must be left free to make its own decision whether any action by the United States in reference to the European situation would cause Japan to fulfill her obligations under the Pact. Mr. Hamilton then said that he would be interested in hearing Colonel Iwakuro's comment. Colonel Iwakuro explained that it was entirely incorrect to assume that the purpose of the understanding was to enable Japan to drift away from the Tripartite Pact and that, if the United States should become involved in the European war under circumstances such as would call for Japan to act under its interpretation of its obligations, Japan would feel obliged to discharge those obligations, much as Japan would regret taking up arms against the United States. Colonel Iwakuro explained, however, that the situation as he saw it was this: For ten years relations between Japan and the United States had been deteriorating; at the present time there were two sources of possible conflict between the two countries. One source was matters affecting the Pacific region and the other source was through circumstances under which the United States might become involved in the European war. The proposed understanding was designed to take care of the first source. It did not provide freedom from anxiety from the second source. When world affairs are developing as rapidly as they are now it is difficult to tell what contingencies might arise in the future and it is impossible to cover in the text of any agreement all possible contingencies that might arise. The best that we can hope for is that the proposed agreement will improve the atmosphere between the two countries and in this way the two countries might be expected to collaborate toward contributing toward the restoration of world peace.

Mr. Hamilton said that we would take note of the Japanese desire to have deleted the second sentence of the first paragraph of our draft, as the Japanese had already indicated.

Mr. Wakasugi next said that the Japanese would like to have withdrawn our annex containing excerpts from the Secretary's address of April 24, 1941, in elaboration of our Government's position in regard to self-defense. Colonel Iwakuro said that they had no objections to the speech itself, but that if it were placed in the annex Mr. Matsuoka would be likely to ask to have his statements in regard to Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact included in an annex on the part of the Japanese Government. Mr. Wakasugi said that it would be difficult for Mr. Matsuoka to accept the Secretary's statement as an integral part of the agreement. When Mr. Hamilton said that it was our desire to avoid any possible misunderstanding on the part of Japan as to our position, Colonel Iwakuro proposed that the Embassy might communicate the Secretary's statement separately to the Japanese Government as indicating the position of our Government. Mr. Hamilton said that we would take note of this point.

Mr. Wakasugi then proposed the inclusion of an annex on the part of the Government of the United States reading as follows:

> ANNEX AND SUPPLEMENT ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
>
> *II. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European war.*
>
> The Government of the United States declares that, so far as its attitude toward the European war is concerned, it does not and will not resort to any aggression aimed to assist any one nation against another.

Colonel Iwakuro said that the Japanese would be quite prepared to drop the foregoing suggestion if we on our part would be prepared to drop our proposed sentence in the first paragraph reading, "Obviously, the provisions of the Pact do not apply to involvement through acts of self-defense."

Mr. Wakasugi said that they desired to have inserted at the beginning of Section II a new paragraph reading as follows:

> "It being the common aim of both Governments of Japan and the United States to establish world peace, they will join forces with a view to preventing the extension of the European war and restoring peace."

Mr. Hamilton raised for consideration the question of whether the idea underlying the proposed paragraph could not be incorporated in the first section. He pointed out that an express reference of this kind under Section II, which deals with the attitude of the two countries to the European war, might be regarded as inconsistent with the President's declared attitude in regard to the question of a present American effort to bring about peace in Europe. He suggested also for consideration whether it might not serve the purpose desired to change the word "our" to "all" in the first paragraph of Section I, which in our draft reads as follows:

> "Both Governments affirm that their national policies are directed to [*toward*] the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of reciprocal confidence and cooperation among our peoples."

Mr. Wakasugi said that they would leave this point for further consideration and that we might also consider whether the words could not be incorporated in some other section or in a section by itself.

With reference to Section III, Mr. Wakasugi proposed an entirely different formula. The formula in our draft and the formula he proposed are shown in parallel columns as follows:

FORMULA IN OUR DRAFT OF MAY 31	FORMULA PROPOSED BY JAPANESE
The Japanese Government having communicated to the Government of the United States the general terms within the framework of which the Japanese Government will propose the negotiation of a peaceful settlement with the Chinese Government, which terms are declared by the Japanese Government to be in harmony with the Konoe principles regarding neighborly friendship and mutual respect of sovereignty and territories and with the practical application of those principles, the President of the United States will suggest to the Government of China that the Government of China and the Government of Japan enter into a negotiation on a basis mutually advantageous and acceptable for a termination of hostilities and resumption of peaceful relations.	The President of the United States will suggest to the Government of Chiang Kai-shek that it will enter as soon as possible into a negotiation with Japan on the basis of the Konoe three principles and the practical application of these principles for a termination of hostilities and the resumption of peaceful relations.

The reason adduced by Mr. Wakasugi for this change was that it was desired to avoid giving any impression to the Japanese people that there was involved any question of an American mediation between China and Japan.

The Japanese then offered an alternative formula, concerning which they wished to make reservations on minor points, reading as follows:

"The Government of Japan having announced the general terms within the framework of which the Government of Japan will propose the negotiation of a peaceful settlement of the China conflict, which terms are declared by the Government of Japan to be in harmony with the Konoe principles and with the practical application of those principles, the President of the United States, relying upon the policy of neighborly friendship with China, will suggest to the Chinese Government at Chungking that that Government and the Government of Japan enter into a negotiation for a termination of hostilities and resumption of peaceful relations."

Mr. Hamilton then asked Colonel Iwakuro whether it was his conception that upon the conclusion of this agreement it would be the Wang Ching-wei regime or the Government at Chungking which would constitute the Government of China.

Colonel Iwakuro said that the Japanese now recognized the Wang Ching-wei regime as the Government of China and regarded the Government at Chungking as a local regime. The proposed understanding contemplated negotiations by the Japanese Government with Chungking. As regards the outcome of the negotiations, there were three possibilities, which he charted on a piece of paper, attached:[39] (*a*) that the Chungking Government might become absorbed into the Nanking Government of Wang Ching-wei, (*b*) that the Nanking Government of Wang Ching-wei might become absorbed into the Chungking Government, and (*c*) that both the Nanking Government and the Chungking Government might be coalesced into a new government. The Japanese Government proposed to leave this matter to be decided by the Chinese themselves.

Mr. Wakasugi then offered an amended annex on the part of the Japanese Government in connection with Section III. The formulae in the draft of May 31 and in the Japanese redraft are shown in parallel columns:

FORMULA IN OUR DRAFT OF MAY 31	FORMULA PROPOSED BY JAPANESE
The basic terms as referred to in the above section are as follows:	The basic terms as implied in the Konoe three principles and the practical application of those principles are as follows:
1. Neighborly friendship.	1. Neighborly friendship.
2. (Cooperative defense against injurious communistic activities—including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory.) Subject to further discussion.	2. Cooperative defense against communistic activities—including the stationing of Japanese troops in the Inner Mongolia and certain areas of the North China.
3. Economic cooperation—by which China and Japan will proceed on the basis of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.	3. Economic cooperation.
4. Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories.	4. Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories.

---

[39] Not printed.

5. Mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation cooperating as good neighbors and forming a Far Eastern nucleus contributing to world peace.	5. Mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation cooperating as good neighbors and forming an Eastern Asia nucleus contributing to world peace.
6. Withdrawal of Japanese military and naval forces from Chinese territory and Chinese waters as promptly as possible and in accordance with an agreement to be concluded between Japan and China.	6. Withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory in accordance with agreement between Japan and China.
7. No annexation.	7. No annexation.
8. No indemnities.	8. No indemnities.
9. Amicable negotiation in regard to "Manchoukuo."	9. Recognition of "Manchoukuo."

Mr. Wakasugi explained that, with reference to caption three of the foregoing annex, the Japanese did not wish to expand the wording in the caption beyond the mere statement "economic cooperation", as they wished to leave the matter to be dealt with by negotiations between Japan and China. Mr. Hamilton observed that in the Japanese Oral Explanation of May 12 this point had been expanded by the statement "by which Japan does not intend to exercise economic monopoly in China nor to demand of China a limitation in the interests of Third Powers" and that we had substituted the phraseology "by which China and Japan will proceed on the basis of non-discrimination in international commercial relations" in the interest of clarity. Mr. Hamilton here emphasized the importance which this Government attached to the application of the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.

Mr. Hamilton noted that in caption six where we had suggested the wording "military and naval forces" the Japanese in their new draft had restored the term "troops". He asked whether it was not intended by Japan to withdraw their naval forces. Colonel Iwakuro said that in normal international intercourse war vessels visited ports of other countries, and, moreover, at Shanghai foreign powers, including the United States, normally maintained marines or corresponding naval units. They had used the English word "troops" as translation of the Japanese term "guntai" which was not restricted to army forces. He said that it was Japan's clear intention to withdraw all armed forces whether of the army or the navy engaged in the present hostilities, and he had no objection to the use of the term "armed forces" if that would cover better what was meant. He added that it was his understanding that "Chinese territory" included Chinese territorial waters.

Mr. Hamilton said that we would take note of all the points made in connection with Section III and the annex pertaining thereto.

Mr. Wakasugi said that the Japanese had no changes to offer with respect to the text of Section IV, but that they desired the withdrawal of our annex relating to restrictions upon trade during the present international emergency. He stated that such an annex would weaken the force of the stipulation in Section IV. He said that they thought that the word "available" in section IV would cover what we had in mind. Mr. Hamilton said that we would make note of the point.

Mr. Wakasugi said that they wished to offer an alternative wording for Section V. The formulae of our draft of May 31 and of the Japanese alternative draft are shown in parallel columns, as follows:

FORMULA IN OUR DRAFT OF MAY 31	FORMULA PROPOSED BY JAPANESE
V. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.	*V. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.*
On the basis of mutual pledges hereby given that Japanese activity and American activity in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations, the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States agree to cooperate each with the other toward obtaining non-discriminatory access by Japan and by the United States to commercial supplies of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which each country needs for the safeguarding and development of its own economy.	Noting that Japanese expansion in the direction of the Southwestern Pacific area is declared to be of peaceful nature, American cooperation and support shall be given in the production and procurement of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which Japan needs.

Asked what were the reasons for the proposed changes, Colonel Iwakuro explained that Japan had no suspicion that the United States would engage in activities other than peaceful in the Southwest Pacific area, and he felt that the United States should accept Japanese declarations in regard to the peaceful character of their aims. The reason for restricting the application of this section to the Southwestern Pacific area, which we had broadened to include the whole Pacific area, was that it was the Japanese desire to devote this section specifically to the Southwestern Pacific area on account of the special interest which the Japanese people had developed therein. He pointed out that Section VI covered the whole Pacific area. Mr. Hamilton raised the question whether the pledge in regard to peace might be incorporated in Section VI, retaining, however, in Section V a statement pledging both countries to the application of non-discrimination in international commercial relations. He emphasized the importance which this Government attached to such statements. He pointed out in reference to commercial relations that in an earlier draft we had proposed the wording "on the basis of equality of opportunity"; that the Japanese had objected to that phraseology on the ground that Japanese had no clear concept of the implications of the term; and that, as we had been given to understand that the Japanese would not object if we used phraseology contained in a recent speech by the Secretary, we had in our draft of May 31 substituted such phraseology. Mr. Hamilton said that we would make note of the question of a possible change in the draft.

With reference to Section VI, Mr. Wakasugi offered an alternate draft, which includes an additional paragraph. The formulae of our draft of May 31 and of the Japanese alternative draft are shown in parallel columns, as follows:

FORMULA IN OUR DRAFT OF MAY 31	FORMULA PROPOSED BY JAPANESE
The Japanese Government and the Government of the United States declare that the controlling policy underlying this understanding is peace in the Pacific area; that it is their fundamental purpose, through cooperative effort, to contribute to the maintenance and the preservation of peace in the Pacific area; and that neither has territorial designs in the area mentioned.	The Japanese Government and the Government of the United States declare that it is their fundamental purpose, through cooperative effort, to contribute to the maintenance and the preservation of peace in the Pacific area; and that neither has territorial designs in the area mentioned.
	The Government of Japan declares that it has no intention to establish military bases within the area of the Western Hemisphere nor to entertain any political designs therein. Similarly, the Government of the United States declares that it has no intention to establish military

bases in East Asia or in the Southwestern Pacific area; nor to entertain any political designs therein. The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States mutually recognize the defensive position each maintains respectively in the East Asia area and in the Western Hemisphere.

Their objections to the wording of our draft were that they thought the phraseology somewhat redundant and that they did not understand what we meant by the word "controlling". They indicated a willingness to accept the word "basic" for "controlling" after Mr. Hamilton had endeavored to explain. There was no discussion of the second paragraph other than a statement by the Japanese that they would be willing to have the contents embodied in an annex. Mr. Hamilton said that we would take note of the proposal.

Mr. Wakasugi said that they desired to offer no changes with respect to Section VII, but they desired the inclusion of an annex on the part of the Government of Japan reading as follows:

ANNEX AND SUPPLEMENT ON THE PART OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

VII. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.

The Government of the United States will accord in the Philippine Islands to the Japanese subjects a non-discriminatory treatment.

Mr. Matsudaira said that what they had in mind in this point was to provide for non-discrimination in matters both of Japanese immigration and establishment. Mr. Hamilton observed that the quota system in the Philippine Immigration Law was on a non-discriminatory basis. Mr. Matsudaira admitted this, but indicated a desire for a larger quota.

There was no further discussion. Mr. Hamilton said that we would report to the Secretary and it was agreed that Mr. Matsudaira and Mr. Ballantine would keep in touch as to the next step.

J[OSEPH] W. B[ALLANTINE]

[Annex]

Addendum to Memorandum of Conversation of June 4, 1941

The texts of Japanese proposed revisions as given in the memorandum of conversation of June 4 were copied from papers which were handed to Mr. Ballantine. In most cases Mr. Ballantine was allowed to keep the paper, but in a few cases the paper was returned after copy had been made. The papers which were left with Mr. Ballantine are attached.[39a]

[39a] Not printed.

711.94/2162$\frac{2}{13}$

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] June 6, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador called at the Secretary's apartment at 8:30 by appointment made at the Ambassador's request. He was accompanied by Colonel Iwakuro and Mr. Wikawa.

The Ambassador said that when he had examined our draft of May 31 he had felt that our respective views were close together, and he went to New York with the feeling that the "drafting committee" would be able to carry on the work of ironing out the details. He therefore regretted that it was necessary to trouble the Secretary about the matter.

The Ambassador and Colonel Iwakuro both emphasized that not only they individually but the Japanese Government were sincerely desirous of concluding the understanding as speedily as possible. They thought that perhaps there had been some misunderstanding on our part as to the attitude of the Japanese Government. They felt convinced that even Matsuoka, notwithstanding his part in the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, was sincerely desirous of establishing amicable relations with the United States, and that such an attitude was clearly revealed in their instructions.

The Secretary replied that he was glad to hear this; that he had no doubt whatever in his mind about the complete sincerity and the real purpose of the Ambassador and his associates present. He said that he felt that at this juncture when the world was on the brink of collapse our two Governments ought to be able to get together and achieve something to save the world through providing for the restoration of world trade on a sound basis.

The Secretary discussed our desire to lay the foundation for peace in the Pacific, with which question were involved the relations of our two countries to Europe. The Secretary went over again the position of this Government in regard to self-defense. He emphasized our determination to prevent Nazi Germany from getting control of the seas. He expressed the view that Japan in our position would take the same attitude and he added that if Japan were situated where England is we would in the interest of our self-defense feel it necessary to help Japan as we are helping England.

The Ambassador asked whether it would not be possible for the President, having in view not merely America's own interest but a wider interest in the peace of the world, to act on his own initiative in proposing to the Chinese Government that it enter into negotiations with Japan. Colonel Iwakuro added that this suggestion was prompted by the idea that it would better befit Japan's dignity as a great power if there could be avoided any appearance that Japan was coming around to the United States in a suppliant attitude asking the United States to help in settling difficulties between Japan and China. He thought that we might feel the same way about going around to England and asking England to help straighten out, for example, a dispute that might arise between the United States and Panama.

The Secretary replied that in his opinion the President should have an agreement of the character we had in mind to stand on before undertaking to make an approach to the Chinese Government. He dwelt on the need of drawing up the proposed agreement in clear-cut and unequivocal terms so that the agreement would speak for itself. He said that this was especially important at this time when the world has had so much experience with bad faith in international dealings and when there was so much skepticism and suspicion among the public in regard to matters concerned with international relations. The Secretary emphasized that he would like an agreement which would stand out as a monument to wise and farsighted statesmanship and that he was not interested in an agreement of a temporizing character which would not contain promise for future stability along sound progressive lines. The Secretary then reviewed briefly our reactions to the revisions proposed by the Japanese on June 4, along lines set forth in the attached copy of an oral statement[40] the original of which the Secretary handed to the Ambassador. The Secretary referred specifically to the proposed omission both in the section relating to China and in the section relating to the Pacific area of clear-cut provisions in regard to non-discrimination in international commercial relations. He referred also to the weakening effect of the proposed revisions upon the emphasis which we had desired to place upon a pledge of peace in the Pacific area.

The Ambassador and Mr. Wikawa read over together the oral statement and told Colonel Iwakuro of the gist thereof. Colonel Iwakuro then said that he himself was very much surprised to learn that we felt that the two sides were not approaching closer together on a meeting of minds. He himself had felt when he left us on June 4 that we had crossed the mountain and the valley which separated us and that only a ditch remained to be bridged. He wondered whether there was not some misunderstanding on our part as to their attitude and he was now forced to ask himself whether the valley and the mountain had been crossed as he had hoped. The Ambassador said that he had had many talks with the Secretary and felt that he understood perfectly the Secretary's views in regard to the principles and that the Ambassador and his associates were in general agreement with the Secretary in regard to those principles. The Ambassador said that what he now proposed to do was to examine carefully our oral statement which we had given him and review the proposed revisions in the light of the oral statement. . . . No arrangement was made for any further meeting.

---

[40] *Infra.*

Colonel Iwakuro in an aside to Mr. Ballantine made reference to Mr. Wakasugi's having been brought into the meeting on June 4. He said that Mr. Wakasugi had been brought back from retirement by Admiral Nomura. Mr. Ballantine took what Colonel Iwakuro said as a hint that the Colonel feared that perhaps Mr. Wakasugi's presence might have been prejudicial rather than helpful.

[JOSEPH W.] BALLANTINE

$711.94/2162\frac{2}{14}$

Informal and Unofficial Oral Statement Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on June 6, 1941

From the outset of the informal and exploratory conversations which the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador have had, the Secretary of State has consistently pointed out that if the Government of Japan should decide to adopt courses which are in conformity with principles which the Government of the United States believes constitute the only basis for sound international relations the problem of reaching a satisfactory understanding between the United States and Japan should not present insuperable difficulties.

As these conversations have proceeded the practical application of the principles supported by this Government to the concrete problems which affect the relations of the two countries has been gone into. As the Secretary of State has stressed, the basic problem is to insure peace in the Pacific area. Involved in this are the question of the relations of the United States and Japan to the European war and the question of the Chinese-Japanese conflict. After a careful study of the documents which the Japanese Ambassador handed the Secretary of State on May 12, the Secretary of State offered on May 31 certain suggested revisions designed to make stand out the underlying purpose of the proposed understanding as an instrument of peace. It was his thought that in this way the document would speak for itself, and make it unnecessary for the two Governments to explain to those who might be inclined to be critical what the document was intended to mean.

From such study as it has so far been possible to make of the revisions which the associates of the Japanese Ambassador offered on June 4 it is disappointing to note a vast difference between the proposal as it now stands with these revisions and the original document on which earlier discussions were based. The successive Japanese revisions appear to have gradually narrowed down the extent of the advances in the direction of a liberal policy and to have carried the proposal away from the fundamental points which the Government of the United States considers are involved in establishing and preserving peaceful conditions in the Pacific area. The impression that the Secretary of State derives from the proposed revisions as a whole and from recent manifestations of the Japanese Government's attitude is that they evince a disposition (1) to stress Japan's alignment with the Axis, (2) to avoid giving a clear indication of an intention to place Japan's relations with China on a basis which in the opinion of the Government of the United States would contribute to a lasting peace and thus to future stability in the Far East, and (3) to veer away from clear-cut commitments in regard to policies of peace and of nondiscriminatory treatment which are the fundamentals of a sound basis for peace in the Pacific area. As the Secretary of State has indicated, this Government has not wished to take an initiative in commenting upon the merits of the proposed peace terms between Japan and China; comment has been offered upon this matter because under the proposed understanding this Government would be expected to take some action with regard to those terms.

Referring again expressly to the revisions which the associates of the Japanese Ambassador offered on June 4, the Secretary of State is always ready to consider suggestions as to ways in which ideas may be more accurately and effectively expressed. Before proceeding to further consideration of suggested phraseological changes, however, it would seem important that there be a meeting of minds and mutual understanding of the underlying purposes of the proposed understanding. With this in view, it is suggested that the Japanese Ambassador review the suggestions proposed by the Ambassador's associates from the point of view which the Secretary of State has endeavored to bring out in the foregoing comments.

711.94/2162$\frac{4}{14}$

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] June 9, 1941.

At Mr. Wikawa's invitation, which Mr. Ballantine accepted after having consulted Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Hornbeck,[41] Mr. Ballantine lunched with Colonel Iwakuro and Mr. Wikawa at their apartment.

Colonel Iwakuro endeavored to draw Mr. Ballantine out by seemingly casual questions on the attitude of the Department to the Japanese proposal as it now stood, such as, how are things going and has there been any opposition in the Department to an agreement such as is proposed. Mr. Ballantine replied that the Secretary is the State Department and speaks for this Government in matters of foreign policy and that in this way our Government is integrated differently from Japan's. Mr. Ballantine said that he was not in position to add anything beyond what the Secretary said on June 6 to the Colonel and to the Ambassador; that he would be glad to go over any points which were not clear in what the Secretary had said; that he desired at all times to be helpful and would be glad to communicate to the Secretary anything they might wish to say but could not undertake to express an attitude on any points which they might bring up.

---

[41] Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, Adviser on Political Relations, Department of State.

Colonel Iwakuro said that they had understood very well what the Secretary had said on June 6 and the contents of the oral statement left with them. He then proceeded to say that they had given much thought to our proposed sentence in the first paragraph of Section II, reading, "Obviously, the provisions of the Pact do not apply to involvement through acts of self-defense." He said that in suggesting that this sentence be deleted the Japanese did not wish to imply that they did not recognize our right of self-defense; that that right is so universally recognized that its inclusion in the proposed agreement seemed superfluous; and that being superfluous its inclusion would merely raise difficult questions for Japan at home. Moreover, he felt personally that the relations of Japan and the United States to the European war were not an important factor in the relations of the two countries to each other and that the tenor of any interpretation that Japan might have occasion to make in regard to its obligations under the Tripartite Pact as these obligations should relate to Japan's relations with the United States would be influenced by the fact of Japan's having concluded the proposed agreement with the United States. He repeated what he had said on June 4 that Japan could not undertake to provide in any agreement now for all possible situations that might arise in which the United States might consider its self-defense involved. He said that they took no exception in any way to what the Secretary had said in regard to this Government's attitude on the question.

Colonel Iwakuro stated that they now proposed to accept our redraft of the section in regard to peace in the Pacific area. With regard to mutual pledges that the activities of the two countries in the Pacific area should be conducted by peaceful means, he proposed to include something on this in the preamble rather than in Section V, where such phraseology was included in our draft. He did not indicate definitely how they proposed to deal with our suggestion for inclusion in Section V of mutual pledges of respect for the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial intercourse in the Pacific area, but Mr. Ballantine gathered that the Japanese would agree to retaining the pledges. In Section III of the Japanese Annex, in regard to China, he proposed to put back under caption three of Japan's peace terms to China the phraseology originally proposed in the Japanese oral explanation of May 12, namely, "Economic cooperation—by which Japan does not intend to exercise economic monopoly in China nor to demand of China a limitation in the interest[s] of Third Powers". He said that the Japanese desired to retain the language used by Prince Konoe in his statement of the three principles for a settlement of the conflict with China.

Colonel Iwakuro explained more clearly the reference which the Ambassador and he had made on June 6 to an initiative by the President vis-à-vis China. What they meant was that it should be made to appear that, as the United States had now reached an agreement with Japan providing for peaceful relations between them in the Pacific, it only remained to dispose of the conflict between China and Japan to clear up the situation in the Far East and that accordingly the President on his own initiative desired to propose to China that China seek a peaceful settlement with Japan. Colonel Iwakuro did not indicate whether the Japanese had a new formula in mind on this point.

With regard to the question of the retention of Japanese troops in China for the proposed cooperative action with China in resisting communistic activities, Japan could not agree to limit the retention of troops in China for this purpose for one or two years, but he explained that, as the Japanese did not wish to keep troops in China longer than necessary, the troops would be withdrawn as soon as the cause for keeping them there should cease to exist.

The Colonel concluded by saying that he was not holding anything back but would be glad to speak his mind freely to us in regard to any points we might wish to raise.

Mr. Wikawa indicated that the Japanese were preparing new revised drafts which they would give to us. Mr. Ballantine thanked the Colonel and Mr. Wikawa for their frank and detailed comments and said he would report fully to the Secretary.

The atmosphere of the interview was entirely cordial.

[JOSEPH W.] BALLANTINE

711.94/2162 7/12

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] June 15, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador and his associates [41a] called at the Secretary's apartment by appointment made at the Japanese Ambassador's request.

The Ambassador, after some preliminary observations, said that he desired to assure the Secretary that he was absolutely sure that the Japanese Government was sincerely desirous of concluding the proposed understanding with the United States, and that he was also sure that in the higher Army and Navy circles in Japan there was no feeling of hostility toward the United States. The Ambassador then went on to say that he considered it a matter of urgency that he now report to his Government in regard to how matters stood with respect to our conversations and that he would like to come to an understanding with the Secretary as to what were the points in the Japanese proposal on which we were agreed and what were the points on which we differed so that he could inform his Government.

The Secretary replied that he believed that such a procedure might give rise to misundertanding on the part of the Japanese Government and that he thought that in the interest of the Japanese themselves it would be preferable for the Japanese Ambassador in anything he might consider it desirable to report to his Government on the progress of our conversations to base such report on his own judgment as to the situation. The Secretary pointed out that the Ambassador and his associates had had a number of conversations with the Secretary and other officers of this Government, and that in those conversations our attitude in respect to the various points had been made clear.

The Secretary referred also to the fact that there was also involved the question of our sounding out the Chinese Government in regard to this matter before any definitive steps could be taken. In the course of the conversation the Ambassador, in reply to a question by the Secretary as to the Ambassador's estimate of the likelihood that the Chinese Government would find acceptable the Japanese terms as communicated to us, replied in the same tenor as he had done on a previous occasion that the Chungking Government was in a weakened position, and was only being sustained by American help, and that if we withdrew this help, Chiang Kai-shek would be obliged to accept Japanese terms.

[41a] Colonel Iwakuro and Mr. Wikawa.

The Ambassador expressed a wish to have discussions continued between his associates and officers of the Department. The Secretary asked Mr. Ballantine to arrange to keep in touch with the Ambassador's associates.

J[OSEPH] W. B[ALLANTINE]

711.94/2162$\frac{8}{14}$

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] June 15, 1941.

Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine met Colonel Iwakuro and Mr. Wikawa at the latter's apartment in pursuance of an arrangement made earlier in the day after the Japanese Ambassador had expressed to the Secretary the wish that such a meeting might be held as soon as possible for further conversations. Mr. Matsudaira was also present.

The Japanese asked whether we could base our conversation upon a paper[42] which they said they had received the previous day . . . and which we found to be a redraft of the Japanese draft of June 8.[43] As the paper was one which we had not previously seen, it was suggested to the Japanese that we defer discussing it until a subsequent occasion after we had had an opportunity to have copies made and to study the paper. This was agreed to and the Japanese let us have the paper to keep overnight.

The discussion then turned to the subject of the application to Japanese practices in China of the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations. We emphasized that we were not trying to argue points which had been under discussion between our two Governments, but we thought it necessary to explore the subject in order that we might be sure that we had an identity of understanding as to what this principle meant. We referred to the special companies which the Japanese had organized to carry on operations of a monopolistic character, to the system of exchange, currency, and trade control which the Japanese have established in north China and which operates to place Japanese trade and enterprise in that region in a preferential position over the trade and enterprise of third countries, and to the restrictions upon trade and travel in China imposed by the Japanese authorities which operate to interfere with the trade of third countries. The Japanese denied that the two special Japanese companies which we mentioned (the North China Development Company and the Central China Promotion Company) had a monopolistic character, as they averred that there was no restriction upon the purchase of shares of those companies by foreigners; they did not deny that subsidiaries of these companies had exclusive privileges in certain fields of economic activity, but they said that these companies were Chinese with not more than fifty percent Japanese participation. We said that we were not making any point as to whether Japanese companies permitted foreign capital to invest therein, but our contention was that so long as enterprise of third countries was prevented from competing there existed preference in favor of Japan which was contrary to our conception of non-discrimination.

---

[42] *Infra.*

[43] Japanese draft of June 8 not printed.

The Japanese admitted that owing to hostilities there were restrictions upon the movement of goods, but they said that these restricttions would be removed as soon as hostilities should cease. They would not admit that there were general restrictions upon the trade activities of American firms. When we raised the point in regard to difficulties experienced by American firms in obtaining raw silk because of the preferential position occupied by the Central China Silk Company, one of the special Japanese-supported companies to which we had referred, Mr. Wikawa said that he was sure that this company, in the formation of which his bank had had a part, was not monopolistic in character and that there was no reason why its operations should preclude American participation in the silk business in China.

Further discussion was postponed until the following day.

J[OSEPH] W. B[ALLANTINE]

711.94/2162$\frac{\text{[illegible]}}{14}$

Draft Document Received Informally From Associates of the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on June 15, 1941

The Governments of the United States and of Japan accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement of understanding as expressed in a joint declaration for the resumption of traditional friendly relations.

Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment between their countries should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences.

It is our earnest hope that, by a cooperative effort, the United States and Japan may contribute effectively toward the establishment and preservation of peace in the Pacific area and, by the rapid consummation of an amicable understanding, encourage world peace and arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.

For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-suited and weakening. Both Governments, therefore, desire that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general understanding which would bind, meanwhile, both Governments in honor and in act.

It is the belief of the two Governments that such an understanding should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory concerns which could be deliberated later at a Conference.

Both Governments presume to anticipate that they could achieve harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified or improved; to wit:

1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting the international relations and the character of nations.
2. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European war.
3. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.
4. Commerce between both nations.
5. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.
6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.
7. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.

Accordingly, the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan have come to the following mutual understanding and declaration of policy:

I. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.

Both Governments affirm that their national policies are directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of reciprocal confidence and cooperation between our peoples.

Both Governments declare that it is their traditional, and present, concept and conviction that nations and races compose, as members of a family, one household living under the ideal of universal concord through justice and equity; each equally enjoying rights and admitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound not to destroy for others; they further admit their responsibilities to oppose the oppression or exploitation of other peoples.

Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to those moral principles and concepts.

II. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European war.

The Government of Japan maintains that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact was, and is, defensive and is designed to prevent the participation of nations in the European war not at present involved in it.

The Government of the United States maintains that its attitude toward the European hostilities is and will continue to be determined solely and exclusively by considerations of protection and self-defense: its national security and the defense thereof.

III. Action toward a peaceful settlement between Japan and China.

The Government of Japan having declared that the general terms, within the framework of which the Government of Japan will propose the negotiation of a peaceful settlement of the China Affair, are implied in the Konoe principles and in the practical application of those principles, the President of the United States, relying upon the policy of the Government of Japan to establish a relation of neighborly friendship with China, will suggest to the Government at Chungking that it enter with the Government of Japan into a negotiation for a termination of hostilities and resumption of peaceful relations.

IV. Commerce between both nations.

When official approbation to the present understanding has been given by both Governments, the United States and Japan shall assure each other mutually to supply such commodities as are, respectively, available and required by either of them. Both Governments further consent to take necessary steps to resume normal trade relations as formerly established under the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan. If a new commercial treaty is desired by both Governments, it would be negotiated as soon as possible and be concluded in accordance with usual procedures.

V. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific Area.

On the basis of mutual pledges hereby given that Japanese activity and American activity in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations, the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States agree to cooperate each with the other toward obtaining non-discriminatory access by Japan and by the United States to commercial supplies of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which each country needs for the safeguarding and development of its own economy.

VI. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.

Both Governments declare that the controlling policy underlying this understanding is peace in the Pacific area; that it is their fundamental purpose, through cooperative effort, to contribute to the maintenance and the preservation of peace in the Pacific area; and that neither has territorial designs in the area mentioned.

VII. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.

The Government of Japan declares its willingness to enter at such time as the Government of the United States may desire into negotiation with the Government of the United States with a view to the conclusion of a treaty for the neutralization of the Philippine Islands, when Philippine independence shall have been achieved.

[Enclosure]

ANNEX AND SUPPLEMENT ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

IV. Commerce between both nations.

It is understood that during the present international emergency Japan and the United States each shall permit export to the other of commodities in amounts up to the figures of usual or pre-war trade, except, in the case of each, commodities which it needs for its own purposes of security and self-defense. These limitations are mentioned to clarify the obligations of each Government. They are not intended as restrictions against either Government; and, it is understood, that both Governments will apply such regulations in the spirit dominating relations with friendly nations.

711.94/2162$\frac{9}{12}$

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] June 16, 1941.

Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine met Colonel Iwakuro and Mr. Wikawa in pursuance of an arrangement agreed upon the previous evening. Mr. Matsudaira was also present. The conversation of the previous evening was continued at the point at which it had been left off.

With regard to exchange and currency control, Colonel Iwakuro said he felt that upon the conclusion of a peace settlement this matter would rest with the Chinese Government as provided in paragraph four of the "Agreed Terms of Understanding" in connection with the stipulations of the protocol annexed to the treaty concluded by the Japanese Government with the Wang Ching-wei regime. He said, in reply to questions, that the Japanese Government would, of course, in connection with the withdrawal of its troops, enter into arrangements with China providing for the redemption by Japan of the military script issued by the Japanese in central China and also of the Federal Reserve currency issued in north China. When asked how he interpreted the provision in paragraph four of the "Agreed Terms of Understanding" to the effect that control by China of its foreign trade must not affect the principle of Sino-Japanese economic cooperation, Colonel Iwakuro pointed out that the Japanese must be allowed to operate the mines and other economic enterprises which they had acquired in north China and which they had paid for, as Japan depended upon these enterprises for the supply of vital raw materials which Japan lacked and which Japan needed. He said that the economic provisions of the peace terms which they desired to seek from the Chungking Government were along the lines of those in the treaty with the Wang Ching-wei regime. He expressed his conviction that those terms were unprecedentedly generous, that Japan was getting no indemnities and no territory, but he felt that Japan should at least be secure in these mining and other properties and that as Japan had paid for them they should not be in danger of confiscation by the Chinese Government. He hoped that we would consider these properties as lying outside the scope of the principle of non-discrimination. He said, otherwise, so far as trade was concerned, there would be no discrimination or preferences in favor of Japan. Colonel Iwakuro said that the Japanese would be very glad to consider any suggestion that we might have to offer with regard to a formula for dealing with these economic questions. We said that we would consider what the Japanese had said and we might have further questions to ask them at a later meeting.

The conversation then turned to the question of retention of Japanese troops in connection with cooperation with China in resistance against communistic activities. We went over again the same ground that we had previously covered again and again on this subject. Colonel Iwakuro finally said that they could not fix a time limit within which they would undertake to withdraw troops retained in Inner Mongolia and North China for this purpose, that they desired to present this matter to the Chinese Government as a part of the general settlement and not at some future date just prior to completion of withdrawal of their troops, and that the retention of troops in China for resistance against communistic activities was an absolute point on which the Japanese Government would have to insist. He hoped that we could devise some formula in which possible criticisms from the American public might be met.

With regard to the formula covering the relations of Japan and the United States with the European war, Mr. Wikawa offered a tentative thought which he wished us to consider, reading as follows:

> "It is hereby expressedly reserved that the stipulation of this Understanding shall not affect, in any manner whatever, the right of self-defense which each country may exercise vis-à-vis any third power."

He suggested that we might wish to consider whether this thought should be contained in an annex or in an exchange of letters or take some other form.

We said that we would go over carefully the points which had been discussed and would get in touch with the Japanese on the following day with a view to arranging a further discussion.

J[OSEPH] W. B[ALLANTINE]

711.94/2162$\frac{10}{14}$

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] June 17, 1941.

Conformably with an arrangement made earlier in the day, Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Ballantine and Mr. Schmidt [43a] met with Colonel Iwakuro and Mr. Wikawa at the latter's apartment.[44]

Asked by Colonel Iwakuro whether we had any suggestions, Mr. Ballantine suggested a rewording of paragraph one of section two on the basis of wording which the Japanese had proposed in their draft of June 8 [45] for inclusion in the third paragraph of the preamble with the addition of the word "unprovoked" . . . Section two, paragraph one, as reworded would thus read as follows:

> "The Government of Japan maintains that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact was, and is, defensive and is designed to contribute to the prevention of the unprovoked extension of the European war."

In reply to the question whether this represented everything which we desired in this paragraph, Mr. Ballantine said that these suggestions were purely tentative. He added, however, that this rewording was only part of an idea which we wished to discuss. The Japanese had objected to the incorporation of excerpts from the Secretary of State's speech in the Annex and Supplement on the part of the Government of the United States drafted May 31, 1941. It had occurred to us that there might be arranged an exchange of letters in which the Secretary of State would set forth fully the attitude of the United States toward the European war and would incorporate parts of his speech clarifying that attitude. The Japanese would then on their part reply to this letter.

[43a] Max W. Schmidt, of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs.
[44] Mr. Matsudaira was also present.
[45] Not printed.

Colonel Iwakuro said that the reaction in Japan to the incorporation of statements from the Secretary's speech would be unfavorable, whether in the form of an exchange of letters or as an annex and supplement to the agreement, and he urged that this question be set aside for clarification after the agreement had been reached and an atmosphere of cordiality created in the relations between Japan and the United States. He added that they had already fully informed the Japanese Government of the attitude of the United States toward the European conflict as expressed in speeches by the Secretary of State.

Mr. Wikawa asked what type of reply would be expected and whether it would be "secret" or "published". Mr. Hamilton said that he did not believe the reply could be treated as "secret" but that it need not necessarily be published.

Mr. Hamilton inquired if it would be possible, as the Secretary of State had suggested, for Japan by some unilateral act to indicate that it appreciates and understands the attitude of the United States toward the European war and realizes that that attitude is based on self-defense. In reply, Colonel Iwakuro asked whether the United States would entertain an expression by Japan of its own views of self-defense. Mr. Hamilton immediately pointed out that this question was not one merely of self-defense for Japan and that it would not have arisen except for the Japanese attitude toward the European war as expressed by the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. Colonel Iwakuro then said that Japan would want to send a letter incorporating various statements which had been made by Japanese leaders. Mr. Hamilton expressed the opinion that such a reply would probably not lead to a meeting of minds.

Colonel Iwakuro discussed at some length the deterioration of relations between the United States and Japan and the division of opinion in Japanese circles which had preceded the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. The attitude of the United States, Colonel Iwakuro said, had left to Japan no other course than to sign the Tripartite Pact. For this reason, he said, it was most desirable that an improvement in American-Japanese relations be accomplished before taking up the consideration of such detailed controversial issues. He stated emphatically that Japan cannot at this time repudiate the Tripartite Alliance. He felt that once "good feeling" had been restored, other differences would be satisfactorily ironed out.

Mr. Hamilton suggested that we take careful note of what had been said and that we turn to the consideration of economic matters. The question of Japanese special companies, particularly the North

China Development Company and the Central China Promotion Company, was brought up. Speaking hypothetically, Mr. Ballantine inquired whether American companies would be allowed to operate similar enterprises to those engaged in by subsidiary concerns. Colonel Iwakuro replied that Japan's policy was to welcome other companies and that they would be allowed to operate similar enterprises. Regarding present monopolies, Mr. Wikawa said that under Chinese law companies engaged in certain enterprises must necessarily have more than fifty percent Chinese ownership, but that with this exception there were no restrictions or monopolies and that Japan's policy would be strictly in accordance with Chinese law.

Mr. Hamilton pointed out that we are continually receiving reports which indicate that American citizens engaged in business enterprises in occupied China are very bitter because of the Japanese restrictions and obstructions interfering with the prosecution of their business affairs. He inquired how we could justify the Japanese acts to these American businessmen. Colonel Iwakuro replied that this situation prevails but that it is caused by the existence of hostilities and the necessity of taking extraordinary measures for the prosecution of the hostilities. In reply to a question by Mr. Hamilton, Colonel Iwakuro said that all restrictions had been inspired by war conditions and that when peace had been restored these restrictions would all be removed and "fair and square" treatment accorded to nationals of all third powers. In reply to the question whether the Japanese would consider putting in a letter or an annex clarification of Japan's intentions regarding currency, equality of economic opportunity and of treatment, et cetera, the Japanese said that if we would present a letter asking any questions of that nature, the Japanese Government would be glad to reply fully and satisfactorily. The Japanese reiterated assurances that American citizens and companies would be welcomed in China and that there will be no discrimination.

Mr. Ballantine then pointed out that in certain places in occupied China it was possible for American citizens to do business only through the agency of Japanese subjects and Japanese banks. Colonel Iwakuro said that this situation also was the result of war conditions and certain extraordinary circumstances deriving therefrom, for example, the necessity to maintain the value of Japanese military notes circulating in central China. Mr. Hamilton pointed out that our present discussion was directed toward peace and therefore not concerned with the existing situation and conditions. He inquired whether, when peace is restored, these restrictions resulting from war exigencies would disappear at once or after one year or two years and asked for an expression of whatever thoughts the Japanese might have on this subject. Colonel Iwakuro immediately replied that these restrictions would disappear as soon as peace and order were restored. Mr. Hamilton asked for a more specific answer, pointing out that in 1903 the United States had in a treaty with China stated that extraterritorial rights would be given up as soon as conditions were right.[46] Colonel Iwakuro replied that the exact moment of the removal of restrictions would depend upon the type of transaction or commodity involved and cited the example of the military notes in central China which must be taken up and converted into the legal currency of China.

In reply to a question by Mr. Ballantine, Mr. Wikawa said that even some Japanese merchants were complaining of the lack of a free market in China, but that when peace and order were restored free markets would return.

Mr. Ballantine brought up the question of the relations between the Chinese Government at Chungking and the Government of Wang Ching-wei following the negotiation of peace between Japan and the Chinese Government at Chungking. Mr. Ballantine said that in a previous conversation the Japanese had indicated a desire to leave to the Chinese the working out of the relationship between the Government of China at Chungking and the Wang Ching-wei Government at Nanking. Colonel Iwakuro stated that Japan desires that representatives from both Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei be present at the negotiations of peace between Japan and China and that those negotiations were to be preceded by informal conversations with both parties. Mr. Hamilton suggested that such an arrangement would mean that Chiang Kai-shek would probably be required to recognize, at least informally, the position of Wang Ching-wei. Mr. Wikawa replied that the Chinese were very clever politicians and negotiators and that they would be able to get together. He added that even at present, although the two groups are supposed to be entirely separate, the Nanking officials fully inform Chungking of everything the Japanese tell them and in many ways the two "factions" are really one government. Colonel Iwakuro said that such a general peace treaty would be concluded, but that the Governments of Wang Ching-wei and Chiang Kai-shek would coalesce and form one Chinese Government before signatures were affixed to that treaty. Mr. Hamilton said that we would give careful consideration to what had been said with a view to furthering future conversations.

Colonel Iwakuro said that he would like to pose a question as to what we thought of his suggestion for a statement to be incorporated in an annex or an exchange of letters to the effect that the Governments of Japan and of the United States mutually recognize the defensive position each maintains respectively in the East Asia area and in the Western Hemisphere. Mr. Hamilton pointed out that the policy of this Government was to treat each and every nation in the Western Hemisphere as equal sovereign countries in all respects and that an era of good feeling had been created in the Western Hemisphere only after the adoption of our so-called Good Neighbor policy. Colonel Iwakuro's suggestion might offend some of the American Republics and would raise many difficulties. As this suggestion had not been contained in any of the other drafts, Mr. Hamilton believed that it would be better to leave it out.

---

[46] See art. XV of treaty of October 8, 1903, *Foreign Relations*, 1903, pp. 91, 98.

As a second question, the Japanese asked whether a statement could not be made by the United States that it has no ambitions for new political or military bases in East Asia. In reply to a suggestion that the statement in section six to the effect that neither Government has territorial designs in the Pacific area covered this question, Colonel Iwakuro said that there was in that statement no mention of military bases. Mr. Hamilton pointed out that to bring up the question of military bases at the present time might raise many new issues and that such questions might better be left for consideration at a conference after peace had been restored. Colonel Iwakuro agreed that details might be left for later negotiations but urged consideration of a statement of certain broad principles having to do with the question of military bases. Mr. Hamilton agreed that principles which could be generally accepted might be included, but that it would be better to leave all debatable questions for later consideration. Colonel Iwakuro asked whether the United States could make a statement that no *new* bases would be acquired and added that an enunciation on the part of the United States of such a principle would emphasize the peaceful intent of this country. Mr. Hamilton pointed out that Japan has been demanding and moving toward the establishment of bases in Thailand, Indochina, Hainan and other areas in the Southwest Pacific and that the American public would obviously immediately object to the United States' making such a statement limiting its freedom of action under present circumstances. He went on to point out that, if Japan considered the question of acquiring military bases separate and apart from the renunciation of any territorial designs, a new question was brought up. He asked whether Japan would expect to obtain military bases in the Pacific area despite the fact that Japan does not have territorial designs there. He inquired whether the Japanese concept of this question included the possibility of acquiring military bases. Colonel Iwakuro replied that it did not, but that a statement by the United States that no new military bases would be acquired by this country was closely related to Japan's possible need for military bases in the Southwest Pacific. He mentioned in passing the possibility of the United States' acquiring a military base at Singapore and requested that this question be given careful consideration.

The Japanese urged that discussions be carried on with all possible speed and asked when they could telegraph Tokyo. Mr. Hamilton pointed out that there were outstanding three large questions: economic non-discrimination in China, stationing of Japanese troops in China, attitude of the two Governments toward the European war, and added that the question of a statement regarding military bases presented an additional serious question. He said that we would want to consider the possibility of discussing these questions with Mr. Hull, but that Mr. Ballantine would telephone Mr. Wikawa tomorrow with a view to arranging a further discussion.

[MAX W.] SCHMIDT

711.94/2162 11/14

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] June 21, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador called at the Secretary's apartment by appointment made at the Secretary's request. The Secretary handed the Japanese Ambassador a complete rewrite of the draft proposal.[47] The Secretary also handed the Ambassador an oral statement,[48] which he asked the Ambassador to read over. After the Ambassador had read over the oral statement, the Secretary elaborated on the points contained therein along lines as follows:

At a time when Nazi Germany had invaded some fifteen or twenty countries the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs was declaring in effect that measures of resistance by countries not already actually invaded would call for action by Japan under the Tripartite Pact. This would be like saying that if a tiger should break loose in the countryside and if a villager living a mile or so away from where the tiger is committing depredations and killing neighbors should go out and attack the tiger in order to protect his own family the action of the villager would constitute aggression.

With regard to the question which had been raised by the associates of the Japanese Ambassador with Mr. Hamilton in regard to American military bases in the Western Pacific region, Japan had seen this country gradually withdrawing from that region. The Ambassador would recall the treaty into which we had entered with Japan along with other nations in 1922 providing for the nonfortification of our territory in the Western Pacific,[49] which treaty we had expressed our willingness to renew in 1936. How much more evidence was there needed to carry conviction of our peaceful intentions?

---

[47] *Post*, p. 486.

[48] *Infra*.

It seemed to us that the Japanese Government would decide either to assume control of those elements in the Japanese body politic which supported Nazi Germany and its policies of aggression or to allow those elements to take over entire charge of Japan's policies. If the Japanese Government decided before it was too late that Hitler was dangerous to Japan and if then Japan decided to come forward with a program which offered a basis for cooperation along peaceful courses, we should be glad to consider such a program.

The Secretary then dwelt upon the importance of an understanding such as we had been discussing at a time when the world is hovering on the brink of a precipice. He said he was sure that the Ambassador shared the Secretary's views on the need of far-sighted statesmanship which would look beyond just immediate advantages. The Secretary said that he was leaving for the country for a few days to recuperate, but that he would be where he could be reached and he said that his associates would be available for consultation with the Ambassador and his associates should there be any points which the Ambassador might wish to bring up with them. The Ambassador said nothing significant by way of comment other than that he would study the oral statement and the redraft of the proposed understanding and would be glad to take up with the associates of the Secretary any matters on which he might desire to seek their views.

The documents handed to the Japanese Ambassador are as follows:

Oral statement of June 21.[49a]

Redraft of the proposed understanding, dated June 21 and marked "Unofficial, Exploratory and without Commitment",[49b] together with an Annex and Supplement on the Part of the Japanese Government with regard to action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan, an Annex and Supplement on the Part of the Government of the United States with regard to commerce between both nations, a suggested exchange of letters in regard to the attitude of the two countries toward the European war, and a suggested letter from the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador in regard to the application to economic cooperation between China and Japan of the principle of non-discrimination.

[JOSEPH W.] BALLANTINE

---

[49] See art. XIX of naval treaty of February 6, 1922, *Foreign Relations*, 1922, vol. I, pp. 247, 252.

[49a] *Infra.*

[49b] *Post*, p. 486.

711.94/2162 11/14

Oral Statement Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on June 21, 1941[50]

The Secretary of State appreciates the earnest efforts which have been made by the Japanese Ambassador and his associates to bring about a better understanding between our two countries and to establish peace in the Pacific area. The Secretary of State appreciates also the frankness which has characterized their attitude throughout the conversations which have been held. This Government is no less desirous than the Japanese Ambassador to bring about better relations between our two countries and a situation of peace in the Pacific area, and in that spirit the Secretary of State has given careful study to every aspect of the Japanese proposal.

The Secretary of State has no reason to doubt that many Japanese leaders share the views of the Japanese Ambassador and his associates as indicated above and would support action toward achieving those high objectives. Unfortunately, accumulating evidence reaches this Government from sources all over the world, including reports from sources which over many years have demonstrated sincere good will toward Japan, that some Japanese leaders in influential official positions are definitely committed to a course which calls for support of Nazi Germany and its policies of conquest and that the only kind of understanding with the United States which they would endorse is one that would envisage Japan's fighting on the side of Hitler should the United States become involved in the European hostilities through carrying out its present policy of self-defense. The tenor of recent public statements gratuitously made by spokesmen of the Japanese Government emphasizing Japan's commitments and intentions under the Tripartite Alliance exemplify an attitude which cannot be ignored. So long as such leaders maintain this attitude in their official positions and apparently seek to influence public opinion in Japan in the direction indicated, is it not illusory to expect that adoption of a proposal such as the one under consideration offers a basis for achieving substantial results along the desired lines?

Another source of misgiving in the Japanese proposal relates to the desire of the Japanese Government to include in its terms for a peaceful settlement to be offered to the Chinese Government a provision which would permit the stationing of Japanese troops in certain areas in Inner Mongolia and North China as a measure of cooperation with China in resisting communistic activities. While this

---

[50] At the request of the Japanese Ambassador, the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton), acting under instruction from the Secretary of State, accepted the return of this document from the Japanese Minister (Wakasugi) on July 17, 1941. See memoranda of conversations of July 16 and 17, pp. 511, 513.

Government has given careful thought to the considerations which have prompted the Japanese Government to make such a proposal, and while this Government does not desire to enter into the merits of such a proposal, it feels that the liberal policies to which the United States is committed, as explained on numerous occasions to the Japanese Ambassador and his associates, would not permit this Government to associate itself with any course which appears to be inconsistent with these policies. Furthermore, although in matters affecting only this country there might be some latitude of decision as to the qualifying of rights, the matter under discussion affects the sovereign rights of a third country, and accordingly it is felt that this Government must be most scrupulous in dealing with such a matter.

The Secretary of State has therefore reluctantly come to the conclusion that this Government must await some clearer indication than has yet been given that the Japanese Government as a whole desires to pursue courses of peace such as constitute the objectives of the proposed understanding. This Government sincerely hopes that the Japanese Government will manifest such an attitude.

NOTE: In order to bring the current discussions up to date as far as the American attitude is concerned, there is being handed the Japanese Ambassador separately a revision, bearing the date of June 21, of the document marked "Unofficial, Exploratory and without Commitment" which was handed the Japanese Ambassador on May 31.

711.94/2162$\frac{11}{14}$

Draft Proposal Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on June 21, 1941

Unofficial, Exploratory
and Without Commitment

[WASHINGTON,] June 21, 1941.

The Governments of the United States and of Japan accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement of understanding as expressed in a joint declaration for the resumption of traditional friendly relations.

Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment between their countries should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences.

It is our earnest hope that, by a cooperative effort, the United States and Japan may contribute effectively toward the establishment and preservation of peace in the Pacific area and, by the rapid consummation of an amicable understanding, encourage world peace and arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.

For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-suited and weakening. Both Governments, therefore, desire that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general understanding which would bind, meanwhile, both Governments in honor and in act.

It is the belief of the two Governments that such an understanding should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory concerns which could be deliberated later at a conference.

Both Governments presume to anticipate that they could achieve harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified or improved; to wit:

1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.
2. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European war.
3. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.
4. Commerce between both nations.
5. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.
6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.
7. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.

Accordingly, the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan have come to the following mutual understanding and declaration of policy:

I. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.

Both governments affirm that their national policies are directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of reciprocal confidence and cooperation between our peoples.

Both Governments declare that it is their traditional, and present, concept and conviction that nations and races compose, as members of a family, one household living under the ideal of universal concord through justice and equity; each equally enjoying rights and admitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound not to destroy for others; they further admit their responsibilities to oppose the oppression or exploitation of other peoples.

Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to those moral principles and concepts.

II. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European war.

The Government of Japan maintains that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact was, and is, defensive and is designed to contribute to the prevention of an unprovoked extension of the European war.

The Government of the United States maintains that its attitude toward the European hostilities is and will continue to be determined solely and exclusively by considerations of protection and self-defense: its national security and the defense thereof.

Note (There is appended a suggested draft of an exchange of letters as a substitute for the Annex and Supplement on the Part of the Government of the United States on this subject which constituted a part of the draft of May 31, 1941. For discussion of the fundamental question underlying this whole section, *vide* the Oral Statement handed the Japanese Ambassador on June 21.)

III. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.

The Japanese Government having communicated to the Government of the United States the general terms within the framework of which the Japanese Government will propose the negotiation of a peaceful settlement with the Chinese Government, which terms are declared by the Japanese Government to be in harmony with the Konoe principles regarding neighborly friendship and mutual respect of sovereignty and territories and with the practical application of those principles, the President of the United States will suggest to the Government of China that the Government of China and the Government of Japan enter into a negotiation on a basis mutually advantageous and acceptable for a termination of hostilities and resumption of peaceful relations.

Note (The foregoing draft of Section III is subject to further discussion of the question of cooperative defense against communistic activities, including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory, and the question of economic cooperation between China and Japan. With regard to suggestions that the language of Section III be changed, it is believed that consideration of any suggested change can most advantageously be given after all the points in the annex relating to this section have been satisfactorily worked out, when the section and its annex can be viewed as a whole.)

IV. Commerce between both nations.

When official approbation to the present understanding has been given by both Governments, the United States and Japan shall assure each other mutually to supply such commodities as are, respectively, available and required by either of them. Both Governments further consent to take necessary steps to resume normal trade relations as formerly established under the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan. If a new commercial treaty is desired by both Governments, it would be negotiated as soon as possible and be concluded in accordance with usual procedures.

V. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.

On the basis of mutual pledges hereby given that Japanese activity and American activity in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations, the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States agree to cooperate each with the other toward obtaining non-discriminatory access by Japan and by the United States to commercial supplies of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which each country needs for the safeguarding and development of its own economy.

VI. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.

Both Governments declare that the controlling policy underlying this understanding is peace in the Pacific area; that it is their fundamental purpose, through cooperative effort, to contribute to the maintenance and the preservation of peace in the Pacific area; and that neither has territorial designs in the area mentioned.

VII. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.

The Government of Japan declares its willingness to enter at such time as the Government of the United States may desire into negotiation with the Government of the United States with a view to the conclusion of a treaty for the neutralization of the Philippine Islands, when Philippine independence shall have been achieved.

[Annex 1]

ANNEX AND SUPPLEMENT ON THE PART OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

III. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.

The basic terms as referred to in the above section are as follows:

1. Neighborly friendship.

2. (Cooperative defense against injurious communistic activities—including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory.) Subject to further discussion.

3. (Economic cooperation.) Subject to agreement on an exchange of letters in regard to the application to this point of the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.

4. Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories.

5. Mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation cooperating as good neighbors and forming an East Asian nucleus contributing to world peace.

6. Withdrawal of Japanese armed forces from Chinese territory as promptly as possible and in accordance with an agreement to be concluded between Japan and China.

7. No annexation.

8. No indemnities.

9. Amicable negotiation in regard to Manchoukuo.

[Annex 2]

Annex and Supplement on the Part of the Government of the United States

IV. Commerce between both nations.

It is understood that during the present international emergency Japan and the United States each shall permit export to the other of commodities in amounts up to the figures of usual or pre-war trade, except, in the case of each, commodities which it needs for its own purposes of security and self-defense. These limitations are mentioned to clarify the obligations of each Government. They are not intended as restrictions against either Government; and, it is understood, both Governments will apply such regulations in the spirit dominating relations with friendly nations.

[Annex 3]

Suggested Exchange of Letters Between the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador

The Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador:

Excellency: In Section II of the Joint Declaration which was entered into today on behalf of our two Governments, statements are made with regard to the attitudes of the two Governments toward the European war. During the informal conversations which resulted in the conclusion of this Joint Declaration I explained to you on a number of occasions the attitude and policy of the Government of the United States toward the hostilities in Europe and I pointed out that this attitude and policy were based on the inalienable right of self-defense. I called special attention to an address which I delivered on April 24 setting forth fully the position of this Government upon this subject.

I am sure that you are fully cognizant of this Government's attitude toward the European war but in order that there may be no misunderstanding I am again referring to the subject. I shall be glad to receive from you confirmation by the Government of Japan that, with regard to the measures which this nation may be forced to adopt in defense of its own security, which have been set forth as indicated, the Government of Japan is not under any commitment which would require Japan to take any action contrary to or destructive of the fundamental objective of the present agreement, to establish and to preserve peace in the Pacific area.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

The Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State:

EXCELLENCY: I have received your letter of June—.

I wish to state that my Government is fully aware of the attitude of the Government of the United States toward the hostilities in Europe as explained to me by you during our recent conversations and as set forth in your address of April 24. I did not fail to report to my Government the policy of the Government of the United States as it had been explained to me, and I may assure you that my Government understands and appreciates the attitude and position of the Government of the United States with regard to the European war.

I wish also to assure you that the Government of Japan, with regard to the measures which the Government of the United States may be forced to adopt in defense of its own security, is not under any commitment requiring Japan to take any action contrary to or destructive of the fundamental objective of the present agreement.

The Government of Japan, fully cognizant of its responsibilities freely assumed by the conclusion of this agreement, is determined to take no action inimical to the establishment and preservation of peace in the Pacific area.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my most distinguished consideration.

[Annex 4]

SUGGESTED LETTER TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR IN CONNECTION WITH THE JOINT DECLARATION

EXCELLENCY: In the informal conversations which resulted in the conclusion of a general agreement of understanding between our two Governments, you and your associates expressed fully and frankly views on the intentions of the Japanese Government in regard to applying to Japan's proposed economic cooperation with China the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations. It is believed that it would be helpful if you could be so good as to confirm the statements already expressed orally in the form of replies on the following points:

1. Does the term "economic cooperation" between Japan and China contemplate the granting by the Government of China to the Japanese Government or its nationals of any preferential or monopolistic rights which would discriminate in favor of the Japanese Government and Japanese nationals as compared with the Government and nationals of the United States and of other third countries? Is it contemplated that upon the inauguration of negotiations for a peaceful settlement between Japan and China the special Japanese companies, such as the North China Development Company and the Central China Promotion Company and their subsidiaries, will be divested, in so far as Japanese official support may be involved, of any monopolistic or other preferential rights that they may exercise in fact or that may inure to them by virtue of present circumstances in areas of China under Japanese military occupation?

2. With regard to existing restrictions upon freedom of trade and travel by nationals of third countries in Chinese territory under Japanese military occupation, could the Japanese Government indicate approximately what restrictions will be removed immediately upon the entering into by the Government of Chungking of negotiations with the Government of Japan and what restrictions will be removed at later dates, with an indication in each case in so far as possible of the approximate time within which removal of restrictions would be effected?

3. Is it the intention of the Japanese Government that the Chinese Government shall exercise full and complete control of matters relating to trade, currency and exchange? Is it the intention of the Japanese Government to withdraw and to redeem the Japanese military notes which are being circulated in China and the notes of Japanese-sponsored regimes in China? Can the Japanese Government indicate how soon after the inauguration of the contemplated negotiations arrangements to the above ends can in its opinion be carried out?

It would be appreciated if as specific replies as possible could be made to the questions above listed.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

711.94/2162$\frac{12}{14}$

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] June 22, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador called on the Secretary at the Secretary's apartment by appointment made at the Ambassador's request.

The Ambassador said that he was communicating to his Government the oral statement given him by the Secretary on the previous day. The Ambassador said, since presenting the proposed understanding to the Secretary, that he had been acting all along in accordance with instructions from his Government, in whose decisions the Foreign Office, the Army and Navy had participated. He said that he was at a loss to account for the existence in Japan of any disagreement over policy in regard to this matter, such as was referred to in our oral statement.

The Secretary inquired whether it might be possible that Matsuoka's intention was on the one hand to have us subject China to pressure to come to an agreement with Japan and on the other hand to leave Japan free to take action with reference to the European war as indicated in Matsuoka's message to Mussolini. The Ambassador replied as he had on previous occasions that Japan did not want war with the United States, but that Japan did not wish to bind itself in advance with regard to some future eventuality.

The Ambassador then handed the Secretary an oral statement[51] which he asked Mr. Ballantine to read to the Secretary. In the oral statement the suggestion was made that, as the proposed exchanges of letters attached to the draft presented by the Secretary on June 21 contained points which the Ambassador found difficult to recommend to his Government for approval, the letters either be omitted or modified.

The Secretary said that he did not wish to cause embarrassment to the Japanese Government, and he hoped that at the same time the Japanese Government would not want to cause this Government embarrassment. He remarked that he might have difficulty here over the proposed understanding unless the Japanese Government could find some way of clarifying its attitude in view of the public statements that had been made in Japan. The Secretary asked whether Germany's declaration of war against the Soviet Union might not affect the situation in such a way as to render it more easy for the Japanese Government to find some way along the lines indicated.

The Ambassador said that the Japanese Government did not wish to be placed in the position of repudiating its obligations under the Tripartite Pact. He said, however, that he would refer the matter to his Government with a view to its studying what might be done.

Mr. Ballantine asked whether the Ambassador objected also to the draft letter in regard to the application to Japan's economic cooperation with China of the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations. The Ambassador replied in the affirmative, stating that he felt that it would take too long for the purposes of the present understanding to go into all the details involved, and he suggested that this matter be taken up at a later time.

The Secretary referred to the Japanese proposal that the question of the stationing of Japanese troops for defense against communism be left for negotiation between Japan and China. He pointed out that if Japan and the United States should reach an agreement and if then China and Japan should not come to an agreement and the matter of a settlement between China and Japan be thus left hanging in the air, we would be placed in an embarrassing position.

---

[51] *Infra.*

The Ambassador said that insistence upon the stationing of Japanese troops in China for the purpose indicated was a long-established policy of the Japanese Government, that the matter had been one of the provisions in the Wang Ching-wei treaty, approved by the Throne, and that he was not able to say whether the Japanese Government could reconsider this matter. The Ambassador said he would, however, inform his Government in regard to what the Secretary had said and ask it to give further study to this matter.

The Secretary said nothing to indicate that we would withdraw the exchanges of letters, but the sense of what was said was that the Japanese Ambassador would refer to his Government the points involved in the letters, and the door was thus left open for us to consider any alternative or modified suggestion that the Japanese Ambassador might offer.

The Secretary said that in view of the importance of the proposed understanding he hoped that the Ambassador and his associates would keep in touch with the Secretary's associates, who in turn would keep the Secretary informed of developments.

[JOSEPH W.] BALLANTINE

711.94/2162$\frac{13}{14}$

Informal and Unofficial Oral Statement Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State on June 22, 1941

The Japanese Ambassador appreciates deeply the earnest endeavors by the Secretary of State and his associates toward the restoration of the traditional friendly relations between Japan and the United States; he desires especially to convey his sincere respect for the unflagging efforts exerted by the Secretary of State despite his illness.

The Ambassador has studied carefully the draft of the proposed understanding under the date of June 21, 1941. In view of the fact that the letters of exchange attached to the Annex and Supplements contain points which the Ambassador feels it difficult to recommend to his Government for approval, it is submitted that the letters either be omitted or be suitably modified with the necessary changes in the Annex and Supplements.

[WASHINGTON,] June 22, 1941.

711.94/2178 1/16

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] July 2, 1941.

Mr. Ballantine and Mr. Schmidt, who were later joined by Mr. Hamilton, called at the apartment of Colonel Iwakuro and Mr. Wikawa by arrangement[51a] following an intimation . . . that the Japanese would like to meet us for further discussion. Mr. Wikawa said that he understood . . . it was desirable that we go on with the conversations and asked if we had read the recent report of the interview which Prime Minister Konoe had given a representative of the American press. The Prime Minister, he said, had intended this interview to be in response to the position taken by the Secretary in his oral statement of June 21; and had therefore emphasized that Japan had no intention to participate in or to assist any German program of world conquest, and had further emphasized that he could foresee no reason for war between the United States and Japan. Mr. Ballantine remarked that according to our information this interview had been granted by Prince Konoe to a Paramount Newsreel representative in Japan who had in turn passed on the remarks of the Prime Minister to the United Press correspondent who cabled a report to the United States. Our information further indicated that the Prime Minister's remarks were not published in Japan; and as reported in this country, contained statements differing only very slightly from those which had been made previously by Japanese statesmen. Mr. Schmidt, referring to the Secretary's oral statement of June 21, added that there had been published so many remarks by leading Japanese emphasizing Japan's commitments and intentions under the Tripartite Alliance, in addition to accumulating evidence from other sources, that the people of the United States could not but believe that certain elements in the Japanese Government wholeheartedly supported Nazi Germany in its policies of conquest and those elements could therefore hardly be expected to support an understanding with the United States which would prevent Japan's fighting on the side of Hitler should the United States, in defense of its security, be forced to take up arms against Germany. Mr. Wikawa replied that we should give attention only to statements of the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary, and said that he believed that we were under some misapprehension regarding the unanimity of the Japanese Government in supporting the instructions given to Admiral Nomura. Mr. Wikawa was supported by Colonel Iwakuro in the assertion that officials of the Japanese Army, Navy and Foreign Office are united in their support of Admiral Nomura in this instance.

[51a] Mr. Matsudaira was also present.

Mr. Ballantine emphasized that we were not raising any question of the unanimity of the Japanese Government in the matter of the proposal which had been presented to us, but that we felt we should have some clearer indication than the Japanese Government has yet given us of its peaceful intentions in order to counteract the effect of previous manifestations of Japanese policy; and that we were not undertaking to suggest the method by which the Japanese Government might present such concrete evidence.

In a plea for mutual confidence, Mr. Wikawa stated that he had learned recently that the banking firm of Morgan and Company in New York, which had control of a Japanese sinking fund to purchase Japanese Government bonds at a price favorable to Japan, had learned from sources within the State Department that these conversations had been very politely but firmly and on technical grounds closed by the United States and that the freezing of Japanese funds in the United States could be expected in the near future. Morgan and Company had accordingly begun the purchase of Japanese Government bonds indiscriminately and had forced the price of those bonds to rise considerably to the detriment of the Japanese Government's sinking fund. Mr. Wikawa said they were embarrassed by an implication in the Secretary's oral statement of June 21 of division within the Japanese Government.

Colonel Iwakuro and Mr. Wikawa both contended, as Colonel Iwakuro had done earlier in the discussion, that once an agreement had been reached with the United States, it would be easier for Japan to give evidence, such as we sought, of Japan's intentions; and there would then be forthcoming in succession indications showing that Japan's purposes were in harmony with the spirit of the agreement. In the meantime, however, the Japanese Government was obliged to act with caution. Colonel Iwakuro suggested that present world conditions were such as to call for quick action, and that for this reason we should avoid taking up in detail all matters at issue. The unanimity of the Japanese Government in support of the proposal was again stressed by both Colonel Iwakuro and Mr. Wikawa.

Mr. Ballantine once more pointed out that we did not wish to question the united support of the Japanese Government of the proposal which Admiral Nomura made on May 12; but that the evidence which we had indicated a desire on the part of at least certain elements in Japan to support Nazi Germany and its program of world conquest and domination; and that we merely sought some clearer indication than has yet been given that the Japanese Government as a whole desires to pursue courses of peace. In an effort to discount political differences in Japan, Colonel Iwakuro said that there are naturally in all countries various political groups and referred to the groups within the United States favoring opposing programs in foreign relations. In reply, Mr. Schmidt pointed out that the United States is unanimous in its desire for strong defense against aggressors and that the position of the people and of the Government of the United States repeatedly has been made clear. There has been no intimation of any threat to any nation in that position but only the clearest evidence of support for defense against aggression.

The Japanese again returned to their argument that it was difficult at this time to make a clear-cut statement, and that the understanding should be reached first. Mr. Ballantine repeated that what we had in mind was not a matter of a statement or of particular words but rather some practical evidence of Japan's peaceful intentions. Mr. Ballantine emphasized that Secretary Hull desired to be helpful in any way possible. After further statements of the desirability of reaching an understanding promptly, Mr. Wikawa suggested that the "concept of the character of nations" as contained in the draft agreement clearly portrayed Japan's desire to pursue peaceful courses.

Mr. Wikawa said these conversations were being kept very secret in Japan owing to the opposition which could be expected from third countries and from certain groups in Japan. Mr. Matsuoka's statements and the statements of other individuals were often largely for home consumption.

Mr. Hamilton replied that these conversations were also kept very secret here; and brought to Mr. Wikawa's attention the fact that the President and the Secretary of State in the administration of matters of policy were able at times judiciously "to apply the brakes". It seems to us, Mr. Hamilton said, the Japanese Government, if it so desired, could pursue a similar course to indicate more clearly that Japan is now committed to a peaceful policy. He added that we do not expect the impossible, of course, and do not ask Japan to repudiate contractual obligations. Colonel Iwakuro again observed that in view of Japan's political agreement with Germany and Italy, it would be difficult to take such steps until after an understanding had been reached with the United States. Speaking frankly, the Colonel suggested that the delay in these conversations was contributing to a feeling in both Japan and the United States that each country was "insincere" and was "playing with the other". Colonel Iwakuro urged the fundamental consideration was to dispose of any possibility of hostilities between the United States and Japan. He said he felt strongly that it would be most foolish for the United States and Japan to go to war and suggested with considerable emphasis that first an agreement be reached to preclude that possibility, and then that all other problems between the United States and Japan be settled in the favorable atmosphere created by such an agreement.

Mr. Ballantine pointed out that essential points in that fundamental consideration were the questions of the attitude of Japan toward the European war and of Japan's desire to pursue courses of peace.

Colonel Iwakuro made the suggestion that mutual and reciprocal recognition of the right of self-defense might satisfactorily obviate any necessity we might feel for an exchange of letters such as contained in our draft of June 21. Colonel Iwakuro followed this suggestion by reference again to the desirability of reaching promptly an understanding with the United States in order that a favorable atmosphere might be created for the later settlement of all other questions.

In replying to those remarks Mr. Hamilton pointed out that if the Japanese Government intends to move toward courses which, in the opinion of this Government, furnish a sound basis for relations between nations there need arise no question of war between Japan and the United States. He agreed with Colonel Iwakuro that if we can reach an agreement on fundamentals, the solution of other problems will be facilitated. Mr. Hamilton then went on to say that the Secretary had given his personal attention and had devoted considerable time and effort to this question; but that as a responsible statesman, the Secretary could not ignore the evidence from Japan, Europe and other sources which indicates that important elements in Japan desire to go in other directions than along the lines of peaceful courses which we have been discussing. Mr. Hamilton said that Mr. Hull is both an idealist and a practical man and therefore a statesman. He added that before a responsible statesman may take action there must be some evidence that the desired results of that action will have at least a fair chance to materialize. Colonel Iwakuro made a brief plea for mutual confidence, and then merely returned to his original contention that it was difficult for Japan to go any further until an understanding with the United States had been reached.

After remarking that the offer of assistance to Russia by the United States was not pleasing to Japan, Colonel Iwakuro suggested as his personal opinion and without knowing the views of his Government, that the question of China and dealing with the "China incident" might be dropped altogether until after the United States and Japan had reached an agreement for peace in the Pacific.

Mr. Hamilton brought out the fact that "peace in the Pacific" is not just a question involving only the United States and Japan, but that many other countries are concerned; and that there could be no peace in the Pacific should certain elements in Japan be able to force an attack on the United States at some future stage in the development of the hostilities in Europe. There followed further discussion of the same character, in which the Japanese urged that an understanding be reached and that questions of a detailed character be set aside in order to assure, if possible, that war between Japan and the United States would be avoided; and in reply to which Mr. Hamilton said that should Japan follow courses of peace there was no danger of war.

After expressing our appreciation of the sincere statements which had been made, Mr. Hamilton brought the discussion to a close by stating our desire to be helpful in any way possible and by asking the Japanese once more to study the Secretary's most recent oral statement to see whether there were any ideas or suggestions which might occur to them in the light of today's conversation.

M[AX] W. S[CHMIDT]

711.94/2178$\frac{2}{18}$

The Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State[52]

WASHINGTON, July 4, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am glad to inform you that I am now authorized by the Foreign Minister to assure you that there is no divergence of views in the Government regarding its fundamental policy of adjusting Japanese-American relations on a fair basis.

Yours very sincerely, K. NOMURA

711.94/2178$\frac{2}{18}$

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] July 5, 1941.

The Secretary having directed that Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine endeavor to see the associates of the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine ascertained that Mr. Wikawa was out of town, and, as Colonel Iwakuro does not speak English, after consulting Mr. Welles,[53] made an appointment to see the Japanese Ambassador. Through some misunderstanding on the part of the Ambassador's Secretary, Colonel Iwakuro was not asked by the Ambassador to be present and could not be reached when we arrived.

Mr. Hamilton said that the Ambassador's letter of July 4 addressed to the Secretary was communicated to the Secretary this morning and that the Secretary had asked us to make a number of comments to the Ambassador. In the first place, the Department, under directions from the President, had telegraphed to Ambassador Grew asking him to communicate to the Prime Minister a message in which reference was made to various reports which we had received to the effect that Japan had decided to attack the Soviet Union, to our efforts to see peace maintained in the Pacific, and to the encouragement which statements by Japanese leaders and by the Japanese Ambassador had given us to hope that Japan shares our desire that the peace of the Pacific might be preserved. The message to Mr. Grew contained the statement that we found it difficult to credit these reports which were so entirely inconsistent with the statements mentioned and that we would appreciate assurances that the reports were without foundation.[53a]

---

[52] Notation on original: "This letter was handed to Mr. Ballantine by the Japanese Ambassador on July 4, 1941 with the request that its contents be telephoned to the Secretary as soon as possible. The contents of the letter were telephoned to the Secretary on July 5 by Mr. Renchard."

[53] Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State.

The Ambassador listened attentively but made no comment.

Mr. Hamilton went on to say that the foregoing telegram was sent before the receipt by us of the Ambassador's letter of July 4. He then observed that we were always gratified to receive assurances of friendliness from another government, but, presuming that the Ambassador's letter of July 4 was intended to be responsive to the Secretary's oral statement of June 21, which dealt with fundamentals affecting the peace of the Pacific, it was felt that it would be helpful if the Japanese Government should wish to respond in some way that might suggest itself as appropriate to the Japanese Government by way of meeting the fundamental points brought out in the Secretary's oral statement. Mr. Hamilton added that in the oral statement we had not intended to imply that there was any divergence of views in the Japanese Government in regard to the matter of the proposal; but what we adverted to was evidence which had reached us that certain elements of the Japanese Government favored courses of support of Hitler in his movement of world conquest and not courses of peace such as was the spirit of the proposed understanding.

The Ambassador replied that the Japanese Government recognized from a comparison of the Japanese proposal and our revision that there were material differences in our respective views and that it was the Japanese Government's purpose to convey in the letter the Japanese Government's desire to continue conversations until we had ironed out these differences on a mutually satisfactory basis. He added that the question of China was a matter of much more vital importance to Japan than to the United States and that in view of the effects upon public opinion in Japan of decisions on China policy it was necessary for the Japanese Government to move very cautiously in this matter. He said, however, that he would refer our observations on these points to his Government for its consideration.

[53a] See statement of July 6, 1941, by the Ambassador in Japan, *infra*.

Mr. Hamilton said that a third point which he wished to bring up related to press reports to the effect that Japan was planning to acquire naval and air bases in French Indochina and Thailand to enable Japan to threaten the Burma Road, Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies. Mr. Hamilton read to the Ambassador a press clipping from the *New York Times* of this morning containing a press despatch from Shanghai on the subject (attached).[54] He asked the Ambassador how does the Japanese Government expect to go forward with a peace settlement for the Pacific area while reports indicated that Japan is moving in exactly the opposite direction? Mr. Hamilton suggested that it would be advantageous at this juncture to have either a prompt denial or frank confirmation of those reports.

The Ambassador replied that the Japanese Government was faced with the necessity of preparing itself against possible eventualities. He observed that one had only to take up the paper to read suggestions by commentators in the United States on plans for the encirclement of Japan; that America was aiding Chiang Kai-shek in various ways, including the despatch of American pilots to Chungking; that American supplies were being sent to Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies; that there were visits of American squadrons to Australia which to a naval man like himself were of greater significance than mere courtesy visits; and that commentators were discussing the prospects of American aid to the Russian Far East and of the acquisition of American air bases in Siberia. He alluded also to the possibility of an executive order being issued stopping the shipment from the United States of petroleum products to Japan, and he remarked that, if Japan should thus be shut off from American sources of oil, Japan must obtain them elsewhere and that, under the circumstances, it was necessary for Japan to take appropriate preparatory measures.

Mr. Hamilton observed that he had seen no statement from any authoritative source indicating that this Government was preparing to acquire bases in Siberia. He suggested also that there was a considerable difference between a government's taking preparatory defense measures in its own country and acquiring bases by pressure methods in some other country.

The Ambassador declared that there was no doubt in his mind that the Japanese Government desired peace; he said casually that he did not think that the Japanese Government had any intention at the present juncture to embark upon military movements against Russia or to the southward. He pointed out that in the present state of relations between the United States and Japan action by one country led to counteraction by the other; and it was with this idea in view that he felt that we should conclude the present understanding as speedily as possible, as this would tend to set currents in motion away from aggravation of the present tension.

---

[54] Not printed.

Mr. Hamilton commented that the view just expressed by the Ambassador in regard to the desirability of arresting trends which lead to an aggravation of international friction was very statesmanlike.

Mr. Hamilton then said that we had been orally informed that the associates of the Japanese Ambassador had mentioned . . . something about Japan's being now willing to withdraw all their troops from China within two years.

The Ambassador replied that he was not conversant with the details of this matter. He observed, however, that Japan's treaty with Wang Ching-wei provided for the retention of Japanese troops in China for defense against Communism during the period of the validity of the Anti-Comintern Pact, which he said might last only two years, but perhaps much longer.

Mr. Hamilton in conclusion said that we regretted the arising of difficulties in the course of our conversations, but that we thought it desirable when such difficulties arise to discuss them frankly with the Japanese Ambassador and his associates who throughout these conversations have been animated by a sincere desire to bring about better relations with the United States. We also said that we appreciated the frankness which they in turn had consistently manifested in talking with us.

In response to a question by the Ambassador, Mr. Hamilton said that our telegram to Mr. Grew related only to the question of a Japanese attack on Siberia and that we expected a reply. The Ambassador said that he would inform his Government of what we had said.

NOTE: Throughout the conversation, Mr. Hamilton made clear that he was speaking under express authorization from the Secretary.

J[OSEPH] W. B[ALLANTINE]

740.0011 European War 1939/14615

Statement Handed by the American Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to Mr. Tomohiko Ushiba, Private Secretary of the Japanese Prime Minister (Prince Konoye), on July 6, 1941

Message Sent by the Secretary of State at the Specific Request of the President for Delivery to His Excellency the Prime Minister of Japan, Prince Fumimaro Konoye . . .

From a variety of sources reports are reaching the Government of the United States that it is the intention of the Japanese Government to enter upon hostilities against the Soviet Union.

As is well known to the Japanese Government, the maintenance and preservation of peace in the area of the Pacific has been the earnest desire of the American Government, which has contributed its greatest efforts to the achievement of that high purpose.

From statements made in recent months by the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, Admiral Nomura, to the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, in the course of conversations between them, as well as from the utterances of responsible Japanese officials, the Government of the United States has derived the hope that it was also the desire of the Government of Japan to maintain and preserve peace in the area of the Pacific. The reports which are now reaching the American Government are so completely contrary to those statements and utterances that the Government of the United States finds it very difficult to believe in the truth of those reports.

Should Japan enter upon a course of military aggression and conquest it stands to reason that such action would render illusory the cherished hope of the American Government, which it understood was shared by the Japanese Government, that peace in the Pacific area, far from being further upset, might now indeed be strengthened and made more secure.

It is the earnest hope of the Government of the United States that the reports of Japan's decision to enter upon hostilities against the Soviet Union are not based upon fact, and an assurance to that effect from His Excellency the Prime Minister of Japan would be deeply appreciated by the Government of the United States.

TOKYO, July 6, 1941.

740.0011 European War 1939/14615

Statement Handed by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Matsuoka) to the American Ambassador in Japan (Grew), on July 8, 1941

Message in Reply Sent by H. I. M.'s Foreign Minister at the Request of the Prime Minister for Delivery to the President of the U. S. A., Dated July 7th, Showa 16 (Translation)

At a time like this all sorts of rumours are abundantly bred not only in Japan but in all countries.

It is hardly necessary to state that the prevention of the European War from spreading to the regions of Greater East Asia and the maintenance and preservation of peace in the area of the Pacific have always been the sincere and genuine desire of the Japanese Government which have consistently contributed their earnest efforts toward achieving that high purpose.

The Japanese Government wish to state, in reply to the last paragraph of the Message, that they have not so far considered the possibility of joining the hostilities against the Soviet Union. The position of the Japanese Government vis-à-vis the Soviet-Axis war was made clear in the Oral statement of July 2nd, 1941 of H. I. M.'s Foreign Minister to the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo. One can do no better than attach hereto a copy of this Oral statement for the President's perusal in order to bring home the course of policy Japan has been compelled to pursue in the present circumstances. Of course, it is understood that the American Government will treat it as strictly confidential. Incidentally, the Japanese Government would like to avail themselves of this opportunity for definitely ascertaining whether it is really the intention of the President or the American Government to intervene in the European war as they are naturally and very deeply concerned at the prospect, disturbed as they sincerely are, by reports reaching them from a variety of sources.

[Annex]

ORAL STATEMENT HANDED BY H. I. M.'S FOREIGN MINISTER TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN TOKYO ON JULY 2, 1941 (TRANSLATION)

I take pleasure in informing Your Excellency that Japan necessarily feels deep concern with the German-Soviet war that has unfortunately broken out. To be frank, Japan finds herself in the most awkward position faced with the war between Germany and Italy, her allies, on one hand, and the U. S. S. R. on the other, with whom she has but recently begun to improve relations in sincere desire to promote and maintain good neighbourliness. Japan is, therefore, most anxious to see the termination of the hostilities at the earliest possible date, earnestly wishing that they may at least be confined to regions not immediately adjacent to the Far East where she possesses vital interests.

The Japanese Government take this opportunity to state that they do not at present feel compelled to modify their policy towards the U. S. S. R. except to the extent of their natural desire not to give rise to misunderstandings to their allies. It is their sincere hope that they will be able to pursue a course of policy carefully calculated at once to serve their own interests and to preserve the spirit of mutual trust among the allies, while maintaining good relations with the U. S. S. R. I need hardly add that their Excellencies, Messieurs Stalin and Molotoff,[54a] may rest assured that I will do my best but that future developments will largely decide if the Japanese Government can consistently abide by this policy.

TOKYO, July 2, 1941.

[54a] Joseph Stalin, Soviet Premier (President of the Soviet Peoples' Commissars of the U. S. S. R.); V. M. Molotov, Soviet Vice Premier and Peoples' Commissar of Foreign Affairs.

740.0011 European War 1939/14626

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[TOKYO,] July 8, 1941.

During my interview with the Foreign Minister today I read to Mr. Matsuoka the following:[55]

"According to reports emanating from Tokyo, Japan is uncertain of and misunderstands American policy with respect to the recent hostilities between the Soviet Union and Germany. For example, the press quoted the War Minister as stating on June 24 that as American future policy could not be predicted, Japan was at the crossroads. The *Yomiuri* reportedly feared that the United States and Great Britain contemplated using Russian territory for military purposes, thereby menacing Japan; the same journal saw unfriendliness toward Japan in American gestures toward Russia, and the *Hochi* believed such friendliness implied military threats against Japan.

"The attitude of the Government of the United States regarding the war in Europe has been clearly stated many times; its purpose is to protect the security of the nation and of the Western Hemisphere; the Nazi armies are considered as being the chief threat to that security; accordingly the United States has adopted the policy of aiding Great Britain and any other nation in opposition to those armies, and will welcome any further such opposition. Therefore, any steps which the American Government may consider in aid of Russia will have as its sole aim the defense of American security, and will in no manner threaten the security of nations which have not joined the conflict on Hitler's side."

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

711.94/2178$\frac{16}{18}$

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] July 14, 1941.

Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine called on the Japanese Ambassador by appointment made at their request.

Mr. Hamilton said that we had called at the direction of the Secretary who had wished us to express his regrets that being under doctor's orders he had been unable to see the Japanese Ambassador the previous day when the Ambassador had called at the Secretary's hotel in White Sulphur Springs. Mr. Hamilton also said that the Secretary had asked us to inform the Ambassador that we desired to place ourselves at the Ambassador's disposal for conveying to the Secretary any new impressions or views that the Ambassador might have in mind to communicate.

The Ambassador said that he had seen Mr. Gray[56] at the Greenbrier

---

[55] Statement made by direction of the Secretary of State.

[56] Cecil W. Gray, Assistant to the Secretary.

Hotel and had asked Mr. Gray to mention to the Secretary that the Ambassador had received instructions from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to say that there was no divergence in views among the important Government leaders, including the Prime Minister, and the Ministers of War, Navy, Home Affairs and Foreign Affairs, in regard to the desire to improve relations with the United States.

Mr. Hamilton remarked that we had not raised any question on that point, but that what the Secretary had had in mind in his oral statement of June 21 was evidence which had come to us that there were important elements in the Japanese Government which supported a policy inconsistent with the policy of peace which is the underlying purpose of the proposed understanding with the United States. Mr. Hamilton said that the Secretary also had in mind the question whether the Japanese Government was willing to assert control over those elements in such a way as to ensure the Government's pursuing in the future a policy of peace.

The Ambassador said the Secretary had previously mentioned that aspect of the situation and that while there might be reports circulated in diplomatic circles in Tokyo to the effect that there were differences of opinion on policy in the Japanese Government he (the Ambassador) believed that the Japanese Government as a whole was in favor of a policy of peace.

As the Ambassador did not indicate that he had anything further to impart to us, we took our leave after a few minutes of general conversation. More than once in the course of the conversation the Ambassador expressed his appreciation of the Secretary's action in asking us to call on the Ambassador. J[OSEPH] W. B[ALLANTINE]

11.94/2178$\frac{16}{18}$

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] July 15, 1941.

Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine called on the Japanese Ambassador by appointment made at their request.

Mr. Hamilton said that he had been directed by the Secretary to call and to make communication to the Ambassador, as from the Secretary, on three points. First, he desired to express regret that no reply had been made to the oral statement which the Secretary handed the Japanese Ambassador on June 21.

The Ambassador replied that the letter which he addressed to the Secretary on July 4 was intended by the Japanese Government to meet our oral statement of June 21. He explained that he had taken the oral statement as having been addressed to himself but that nevertheless he had referred it to his Government, and his Government had instructed him that this Government was not warranted in raising questions as to the attitude of any particular individuals in the Japanese Government, for although there were discussions on policy within the Japanese Government the Japanese Government was acting as a unit. The Ambassador also said in Japanese that his Government had considered that our oral statement contained an import amounting to interference in Japan's internal affairs in that it raised the question of a reconstruction of the Japanese Cabinet. Subsequently, the Ambassador repeated substantially the same statement in English. Mr. Hamilton expressed the view that the Japanese Government had misinterpreted the import of our oral statement; that it was not directed at inquiring into the attitudes of individuals or groups within the Japanese Government; but that it raised the question, in view of the fact that the purpose underlying the proposed understanding was based upon a policy of peace, of the statements made by the Ambassador that he was committed to such a policy, and of the evidence which this Government had received that certain leaders desired to support Nazi Germany in its movement of world conquest, whether the Japanese Government as a whole intended to support a policy of peace such as constituted the purpose of the proposed understanding. Mr. Hamilton disclaimed any idea on our part of interfering in Japan's internal affairs, and commented that non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries was a basic policy of the United States.

The Ambassador maintained that, while it was true that the Japanese Government was in an alliance with Germany and Italy and was bound to remain faithful to it, the Japanese Government desired to pursue courses of peace. He said that the Japanese Government had unquestionably misinterpreted the import of our oral statement.

Mr. Hamilton asked whether the Ambassador had interpreted our oral statement in the way his Government had. Mr. Hamilton also explained that in referring to peace in the Pacific area we had in mind not only peace between Japan and the United States but peace among all countries in the Pacific area. He also adverted in this connection to what he had said on July 5 to the Ambassador, at the direction of the Secretary, in regard to our view that the Ambassador's letter of July 4 to the Secretary was too narrow in scope and that we thought it would be helpful if a full and comprehensive reply could be made covering the broad points set forth in the oral statement.

The Ambassador replied that the intent of the oral statement in his opinion was to seek clarification of the Japanese Government's broad intentions in regard to peace. The Ambassador explained that he had had seventeen conferences with the Secretary as a result of which the Ambassador had clearly in mind the Secretary's aims on peace. Mr. Hamilton suggested that the Ambassador might care to explain the situation to his Government with a view to clearing away all misunderstanding.

Mr. Hamilton said that in the second place he had been directed to inquire specifically as to any basis in fact for recurrent rumors and press reports to the effect that Japan is planning to acquire naval and air bases in French Indochina.

The Ambassador replied that he was without information from his Government in regard to its intentions on this point, but that he would refer our inquiry to his Government. Judging from Japanese news reports and from considerations of the general situation, involving the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands East Indies, China and the Soviet Union, the Ambassador said he believed that Japan might have intentions such as press reports indicated. He explained that Japan was concerned over possible encirclement, and that the Japanese people had been especially alarmed over reports of an alliance between China and Great Britain. He referred also to increased aid by the United States to the Chungking Government and to reported plans for strengthening the Burma road. He affirmed that Japan was obliged to take appropriate precautionary measures, and he referred to our military occupation of Iceland [57] and to reports that we might take Dakar and the Azores.

Mr. Hamilton observed that in our opinion no country was menacing Japan and that it was difficult for us to reconcile the reports to which he had referred with the professed desire of Japan to pursue courses of peace. Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine elaborated on this point at some length.

The Ambassador expressed the view that if the United States were in Japan's place we might be quicker to take action than Japan has been. He said he personally failed to understand why so many Americans felt their security threatened by Germany, as he felt that no country could be more secure than we were.

Mr. Hamilton said that the concern of the American people for their security was based upon the judgment of our highest authorities, both civil and military, and upon the actual record of Hitler's movement of conquest.

The conversation having turned to the friendly relations between the United States and the other American Republics, the Ambassador expressed his admiration for the way we managed our relations with our neighbors. He voiced the hope that Japan might be able to conduct its relations with its neighbors in a similar way.

Mr. Hamilton said that, lastly, he had been directed by the Secretary to inquire whether the Japanese Government regards itself as definitely obligated under the Tripartite Treaty or otherwise to take any specific courses of action on behalf of Germany or Italy, and whether the Japanese Government is under any pledge, in case the United States should become involved in the European war through acts of self-defense, to take any hostile action against the United States.

---

[57] See Department of State, *Bulletin*, July 12, 1941 (vol. v, No. 107), p. 15.

The Ambassador said that he believed that Japan retained freedom of action under the Tripartite Pact and was under no commitment which would call for Japan's taking up arms against the United States in the event of the involvement of the United States in the European war, except as provided in Article 3 of the Tripartite Pact. He asserted that thus, while the obligations of that article do not arise if the United States should become involved in the European war through acts of self-defense, Japan could not give a blank check for anything that we might call self-defense but in case the provisions of Article 3 of the Pact should be invoked Japan would have to reach its own judgment in the light of the actual circumstances whether the provisions of that article were applicable. He said that, of course, Japan hoped that the United States would not enter the European war, but that nevertheless he felt sure that there was nothing incompatible between Japan's obligations under the alliance and friendly relations with the United States. The Ambassador expressed his belief that no useful purpose would be served by referring this inquiry to his Government.

Although we questioned the Ambassador further on the subject of this inquiry he did not go beyond his first answer. He repeated again and again his view that in this critical world situation when things were moving rapidly the conclusion of the proposed understanding between our two Governments would tend to arrest the deterioration of the situation.

As we were leaving, we expressed our appreciation of the Ambassador's giving us so much of his time. The Ambassador showed no irritation or impatience with our inquiries, and the atmosphere throughout the conversation was cordial and amicable.

J[OSEPH] W. B[ALLANTINE]

740.0011 European War 1939/14615

Oral Statement Handed by the American Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs (Ohashi) on July 16, 1941

In the communication handed to me by His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the request of His Excellency the Prime Minister, Prince Fumimaro Konoye, for delivery to the President of the

United States dated July 7, 1941, the request was made, "incidentally, the Japanese Government would like to avail themselves of this opportunity for definitely ascertaining whether it is really the intention of the President or the American Government to intervene in the European war as they are naturally and very deeply concerned at the prospect, disturbed as they sincerely are, by reports reaching them from a variety of sources."

In reply to the foregoing request of the Japanese Government, I am instructed by my Government to state that the attitude of the United States in the face of movement which the utterances and acts of the leaders of Nazi Germany have made abundantly clear is directed toward conquest of the world by force, is based on the inalienable right of self-defense in pursuance of which the United States will of course and of necessity take such measures of self-defense as may be deemed necessary in order to resist this movement. Such measures of self-defense and protection as may be adopted in conformity with this policy will be determined by the acts of aggression which may be taken or which are likely to be taken by the aggressor nations.

Inasmuch as the policy of the United States is based upon the necessity of protecting its own security in the face of the clearly revealed plan of the aggressor nations for world conquest information as to what future steps of aggression may be contemplated by those countries would assist the Japanese Government in reaching an estimate as to what steps of self-defense the Government of the United States may be forced to take in order to safeguard its own security in the future. It should be obvious that in the light of the experience of some fifteen countries in Europe which were given categoric assurances by the leaders of Germany that their security and territorial integrity would not be molested it would be suicidal and absurd of the American Government to neglect any reasonable precaution necessary to insure the present or future security of the United States.

It can hardly be expected therefore that the United States Government will stand idly by and permit Germany to obtain control of the seas or any other strategic advantages which would directly threaten the security of the United States. Any intimations or suggestions that the United States should desist from its policy of self-defense and protection would in actual fact range those making such suggestions or intimations on the side of those favoring or facilitating the aims of the aggressor nations to conquer the world by force.

Tokyo, July 16, 1941.

711.94/2178$\frac{17}{18}$

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton)

[WASHINGTON,] July 16, 1941.

Mr. Wakasugi, the Japanese Minister, called at 4:15 this afternoon at his request. He referred to the conversation which Mr. Ballantine and I had had with the Japanese Ambassador yesterday evening at which time the Ambassador had told us that the Oral Statement had been misunderstood by the Japanese Government as indicative of an attempt on the part of the American Government to cause a change in the Japanese cabinet and of interference by the American Government in the internal affairs of Japan. Mr. Wakasugi said that he understood what the Secretary of State had in mind in the statements made in the Oral Statement but that in as much as his Government had misunderstood the statement and in as much as a governmental crisis had now occurred in Japan, the Ambassador had asked Mr. Wakasugi to call and to leave with me the Oral Statement handed to the Ambassador by the Secretary on June 21. Mr. Wakasugi said that the Ambassador, in view of the circumstances, wished to dispose of this matter in this simple, informal way and to continue with his informal exploratory talks with the Secretary. Mr. Wakasugi then took from his pocket a document which I assume was the original copy of the Oral Statement of June 21.

I commented that in as much as the Secretary of State had handed the Oral Statement in person to the Japanese Ambassador, I did not feel at liberty to accept it from Mr. Wakasugi without first reporting the matter to the Secretary and obtaining his instructions. I said that I would of course be glad to refer the matter to the Secretary. I said that last evening we had explained to the Japanese Ambassador the real meaning and purpose of the Oral Statement; that we had been told that some Japanese leaders earnestly desire to follow courses of peace; that concurrently we saw manifestations in various quarters of attitudes of other Japanese officials which we could not regard as representing a desire on the part of those officials to follow courses of peace; that in view of the fact that the fundamental purpose of the proposed understanding between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States was to make manifest the desires of the two Governments to follow courses of peace, we had raised the question whether the Japanese Government as a whole wished to follow courses of peace and, if so, whether the Japanese Government could not make manifest in some way its desire to follow such courses. I said that I was positive that there had been no thought whatsoever on the part of the Secretary of State or anyone here that this Government should interfere or was in the Oral Statement endeavoring to interfere in the internal affairs of Japan. I called for a copy of the Secretary's statement of July 16, 1937 (copy attached).[58] I took a copy of that statement and underlined the words "We advocate abstinence by all nations . . . from interference in the internal affairs of other nations". I said that the principle represented in the quoted statement was one of the fundamental principles followed by this Government and by Mr. Hull. I said that this Government had made very clear in its relations with the countries of this hemisphere as well as in its relations with other countries the fact that it supported wholeheartedly and with entire consistency the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations. I gave Mr. Wakasugi the marked copy of the July 16, 1937 statement and I told him that I felt warranted in saying that the Ambassador could without any question whatsoever report to his Government that this Government was definitely and fundamentally committed to support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and that this Government would not have included in the Oral Statement anything which would be inconsistent with that fundamental principle.

I suggested that in as much as Mr. Wakasugi had said that the Ambassador interpreted the Oral Statement in substantially the same way as we did the simplest way of disposing of the matter would be for the Ambassador to make report of his conception to his own Government. Mr. Wakasugi said that the Ambassador had already done this. He asked whether he might take with him the marked copy of the July 16, 1937 statement. I replied emphatically in the affirmative.

In reply to Mr. Wakasugi's further request, I told Mr. Wakasugi that I would report the matter to the Secretary and would expect thereafter to get in touch with him. He said that the Ambassador might send the Oral Statement to the Secretary under cover of a letter. I asked that the Ambassador not do this until I had had an opportunity to report to the Secretary and I told Mr. Wakasugi that after making such report I would expect to get in touch with him.

Several times during the course of his call, Mr. Wakasugi indicated that the matter was urgent.[58a]

M[AXWELL] M. H[AMILTON]

---

[58] See vol. I, p. 325.

[58a] The Konoye cabinet resigned July 16, 1941. On July 18 Prince Konoye formed a new cabinet, with Admiral Teijiro Toyoda replacing Minister Matsuoka.

740.0011 European War 1939/14615

Oral Statement Handed by the Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs (Ohashi) to the American Ambassador in Japan (Grew) on July 17, 1941

On behalf of the Japanese Government, I beg to acknowledge the receipt of the reply, dated July 16, 1941, of the American Government to the inquiry made in the communication handed to Your Excellency at the request of the Prime Minister Prince Konoye for delivery to the President of the United States on July 7, 1941 and wish to thank the American Government for the troubles they have kindly taken.

The Japanese Government do not feel disposed to enter into discussion regarding the points raised in the reply of the American Government. They cannot, however, pass unnoticed any intimation or suggestion on the part of the American Government, or, for that matter, any Governments, to invoke unlimitedly the so-called right of self-defence, claiming the right to extend it wherever they like. Neither can they concur in the indictment of Germany nor can they persuade themselves to acceed [*sic*] to the claim of the American Government that "any intimations or suggestions that the United States should desist from its policy of self-defense and protection would in actual fact range those making such suggestions or intimations on the side of those favoring or facilitating the aims of the aggressor nations to conquer the world by force."

TOKYO, July 17, 1941.

711.94/2178$\frac{11}{18}$

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton)

[WASHINGTON,] July 17, 1941.

Mr. Wakasugi, the Japanese Minister, called this afternoon in further reference to the desire of the Japanese Ambassador to return the Oral Statement of June 21. I told Mr. Wakasugi that I was in position to make a reply to him and that in an endeavor to avoid misunderstanding I had written out the reply. I then read to him a statement (copy attached) as follows:

[Here follows text of the statement printed *infra*.]

After reading the statement, I went over it again with Mr. Wakasugi. I called special attention to the last two sentences in which it was stated that this Government is seeking and is hoping to find in the attitude, utterances and acts of the Japanese Government as a whole that the Japanese Government desires and is endeavoring to follow courses of peace and rely upon methods of peace, and that it is the broad general question of the attitude of the Japanese Government as a whole, as manifested in utterances and acts, that necessarily concerns this Government and regarding which light is being sought.

Mr. Wakasugi said that he fully understood the statements which I had made to him. I told him that he was at liberty to make notes in regard to those statements if he so desired but he did not feel that there was need for this. He then gave me the original copy of the Oral Statement of June 21 (attached)[59] which had been handed by the Secretary to the Japanese Ambassador.

Mr. Wakasugi expressed appreciation of our attitude in the matter.

M[AXWELL] M. H[AMILTON]

711.94/2178 11/18

Statement by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) to the Japanese Minister (Wakasugi) on July 17, 1941

In view of the impression received from the Ambassador and Mr. Wakasugi that the Oral Statement of June 21 has been misunderstood by the Japanese Government and may therefore be a source of embarrassment, the Secretary has authorized me to accept from you the Oral Statement which he handed the Ambassador on June 21. In so doing we are mindful of the fact that the document of June 21 is not in itself an official communication but is simply a record of a statement made orally, of the statements which we have made to the Japanese Ambassador and to you in exposition of the real meaning and purport of the Oral Statement, and of the Ambassador's statement that he understands what the Secretary had in mind in the Oral Statement. This Government is seeking and is hoping to find in the attitude, utterances and acts of the Japanese Government as a whole that the Japanese Government desires and is endeavoring to follow courses of peace and rely upon methods of peace. It is the broad general question of the attitude of the Japanese Government as a whole, as manifested in utterances and acts, that necessarily concerns this Government and regarding which light is being sought.

---

[59] *Ante*, p. 485.

740.0011 European War 1939/14438

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] July 18, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador called to see me this evening at his request. The Ambassador said that Japan now found herself isolated and that for that reason the chief responsibility as to the future of Japan rested upon the Japanese Navy. He said that if the Japanese Navy could have the cooperation of the navy of the other great power of the Pacific, Japan would not feel that her situation was really one of isolation. He said that under the Tripartite Pact, so long as the Trans-Siberian railroad remained open there was at least the possibility that Germany could give assistance to Japan, but that now with the Trans-Siberian railroad closed for a period no one could predict, Japan could get no assistance in that way.

I inquired of the Ambassador whether it was not true that Japanese foreign policy during the past year or so had been based upon the belief that Germany and Russia would not be at war. The Ambassador said that this of course was the fact and that he knew positively that Mr. Matsuoka had had no knowledge that Germany was going to attack Russia and had even at the last moment attempted to mediate between the two powers. I expressed to the Ambassador my surprise that Japan, as a member of the Tripartite Pact, should not have been given prior notice by Germany of the latter's intention to attack the Soviet Union, particularly in view of the fact that only a short time before that Japan had entered into a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. The Ambassador replied that so far as he knew, no prior notification had been given.

I inquired whether this was not in fact the second time that Germany had omitted to notify Japan of her intentions, since, if I remembered correctly, in 1939 when Japan and Germany had been members of the Anti-Communist Pact, Germany had suddenly entered into a far-reaching non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union without prior notification to Japan.

The Ambassador said that of course this was true and that Baron Hiranuma, then Prime Minister, had resigned because of this action on the part of Germany.

I said that it was exactly for this sort of reason that more than ninety-nine percent of the people of the United States didn't believe that any pact that Hitler signed was worth the paper it was written on. I said that this Government felt that it could only undertake negotiations with a power which kept its obligations and whose word could be regarded as sacred.

I said, however, that the policy of this Government had been so fully set forth to the Ambassador, and through him to the Japanese Government, by the Secretary of State during recent months that I felt sure there was nothing I could add.

The Ambassador thereupon immediately said that he felt more sanguine with regard to the improvement of relations between our two countries in view of the installation of the new government than he had felt previously. He said he had immediately telegraphed his new Government, as soon as it had been constituted, asking urgent instructions with regard to the informal conversations he had been having with the Secretary of State. He expressed the belief that he would soon receive full instructions with regard thereto.

As the Ambassador left I said that in view of the new situation which he told me had arisen by reason of the creation of the new Government in Tokyo, I earnestly hoped that no new developments would take place in the Pacific which would bring about any disturbance in the maintenance of peace. The Ambassador said he also earnestly hoped so.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

711.94/2216

The Director of the War Plans Division of the Navy Department (Rear Admiral Turner) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Admiral Stark)[60]

Op-12-CTB
(SC)EF
Serial 083412
Memorandum

WASHINGTON, July 21, 1941.

1. On July 20, 1941, about 3 P. M., Ambassador Nomura called on me at my residence. After some general conversation, he informed me that on Friday or Saturday[61] he had gone to Virginia Hot Springs [*White Sulphur Springs*] to call on Mr. Hull, but the latter's physician had not permitted an interview. Subsequently, as I understand, Ambassador Nomura had a conversation with Mr. Welles. Prior to coming to my residence, he had called at Admiral Stark's house, but he had not found him in. He did not say whether he had then tried to get in touch with Admiral Ingersoll;[62] I understand the latter was not at home at that hour.

2. Ambassador Nomura indicated that he desired to have a conversation with Admiral Stark as soon as convenient; he intended to go to

---

[60] Transmitted to President Roosevelt and to the Secretary of State by Admiral Stark.

[61] July 18–19, 1941.

[62] Rear Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations.

New York the 21st or 22d but will return shortly. I informed the Ambassador that I would convey his request to Admiral Stark, and assured him that the latter would be glad to talk with him.

3. The Ambassador then explained at considerable length what he proposed to discuss with Admiral Stark. He said that he is not a professional diplomat, and is occupying his present position because none of the trained diplomats in whom the government had confidence had been willing to accept the Washington Mission; he had demurred for a considerable period, and had accepted the duty only after great insistence by his friends, particularly high ranking naval officers and the more conservative groups of Army officers. He noted that Admiral Toyoda, now Foreign Minister, had been more than insistent that he accept the Mission; it was evident that he felt he had a greater measure of Toyoda's confidence than of Matsuoka's. He stated that he particularly wished to discuss the international situation with Admiral Stark because, if the United States and Japan could not remain at peace, it was obvious that a devastating naval war would ensue.

4. Ambassador Nomura stated that for some weeks he had had frequent conferences with Mr. Hull, in an endeavor to seek a formula through which the United States and Japan could remain at peace. He no longer hoped for 100% agreement on all points, but would be content if a partial agreement could be reached which would prevent war between the two countries. Such an agreement would necessarily be informal, since Japan is now committed by treaty to Germany, and this treaty could not be denounced at this time. However, he noted that the decision as to when the military clauses of the treaty would come into effect lies entirely in Japan's hands, and that these would be invoked only if Germany were to be the object of aggression by another power. He stated that Japan entered the Axis solely because it seemed to be to Japan's interest to do so. Japan's future acts will be dominated solely by Japan, and not by any other power. Whatever military action Japan takes will be for her own ultimate purposes.

5. He then talked at length on the points which Japan considered essential for an agreement between the United States and Japan. The fundamental basis of such an agreement necessarily would be that either Power would be free to take such steps as seem to be required by its own responsibility for self defense. He mentioned that, owing to export restrictions against Japan by the United States and the Philippines, and owing to a reduction in shipping tonnage available for trade, Japan's present economic position is bad and steadily getting worse. It is essential that Japan have uninterrupted access to necessary raw materials, particularly iron ore and iron

products, oil, rubber, cotton and food. There are other important items as well.

6. The second point is that the United States is constantly providing greater support to China. If China is left without industrial and military support, it will not be long before the Chungking regime will be unable to continue the present "China Incident"; Japan will then be able to withdraw from the greater part of China. However, Ambassador Nomura noted that the United States is improving the Burma Road, and is supplying airplanes and pilots to be sent to Chungking. He understands that there are over a hundred American pilots now en route, who have been supplied from the armed forces of the United States. Japan must make some arrangement through which support of this nature will be reduced, rather than increased. The British are also contributing more and more to measures designed to sustain the Chungking regime.

7. The third point which the Ambassador mentioned as essential for Japan's security is the more or less permanent stationing of Japanese troops in Inner Mongolia in order to break the connection between Russia and China, and in order to suppress the extensive Chinese Communist elements in that general region. Japan has an agreement with Wang Ching Wei which will permit Japanese forces to remain in Inner Mongolia; how long such measures will continue necessary can not be foretold. I inferred that, were this agreed to, Japanese troops would be withdrawn from the greater part of China.

8. He then informed me that within the next few days Japan expects to occupy French Indo-China. How the occupation would be made he is not informed; presumably, it would be chiefly by an over-land march from Hanoi southward, but on this he is not yet informed. In any case, for the immediate future security of Japan, both against a possible attack from the south and for a better control over the activities of Chungking, this occupation has become essential.

9. It was evident that Ambassador Nomura had some apprehension that the United States would take further action against Japan, either economically or militarily, as soon as Japanese troops were known to be occupying French Indo-China. He anticipates an intensification of the present press campaign against Japan in the United States. It seems, though he did not so state categorically, that Japan contemplates no further move to the south for the time being. He made no mention of possible activity against Siberia.

10. Ambassador Nomura indicated that these points were essential to any informal agreements which might be made between the United States and Japan. Rather cautiously he conveyed the impression that were the United States to accept these conditions, any action it might take in the Atlantic would not be a matter of great concern to Japan.

The one great point on which agreement might be reached, he again emphasized as the inherent right of self defense.

11. The Ambassador set forth all the foregoing without interruption on my part. I informed him that I would present these points to Admiral Stark's attention. However, I desired to point out one important thing to him, speaking solely from a personal viewpoint, and as one naval officer to another, on a certain broad strategic aspect of the situation which I envisaged. I agreed that there would be a decidedly adverse reaction in the United States to Japanese occupation of Indo-China. Entirely aside from matters of policy, it would be evident to him that this move had an important bearing on the strategic position of the United States.

12. I pointed out that, speaking from the standpoint of self defense, the greatest danger to the United States in the future lies in the continued military success of Germany. The United States has been able to live in peace because powerful military nations in Europe have checked each other and prevented a military penetration by any of them in the Western Hemisphere. If Great Britain were to collapse, German military power might very well be directed against South America, and such moves would cause great difficulties for the United States. So long as the United Kingdom continues to exist as a military and naval power, the problems of the United States as regards its security will not be very great. Therefore, aside from racial and social ideals, it is decidedly against the military interests of the United States to permit the United Kingdom to be overcome by Germany. For this reason any action which the United States could take against Germany is necessarily one of self defense and could never be considered as aggression. Furthermore, anything that affects the future security of the United Kingdom, in any part of the world, also is of interest to the United States from the defensive viewpoint.

13. The occupation of Indo-China by Japan is particularly important for the defense of the United States since it might threaten the British position in Singapore and the Dutch position in the Netherlands East Indies. Were they to pass out of their present control, a very severe blow would be struck at the integrity of the defense of the British Isles, and these Isles might well then be overcome by the Germans. It can thus be seen what a very close interest, from a military viewpoint, the United States has in sustaining the *status quo* in the southern portion of the Far East.

14. I suggested that Japan really has very little to fear from American, British or Dutch activities in the Far East. It might well be, were these Powers to be displaced, Japan would find Germany facing her in that region, which would put an entirely different complexion on the military situation there.

15. Ambassador Nomura stated that, regardless of his own personal opinions in the matter (which were clearly sympathetic to the above point of view) he was bound to support the policies of his government, which at present include collaboration with the Axis.

16. The interview then closed after the Ambassador again reiterated his desire to discuss these matters with Admiral Stark.

R. K. TURNER

740.0011 Pacific War/475

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] July 21, 1941.

Owing to the absence of the Japanese Ambassador from Washington, the Minister of the Embassy, Mr. Wakasugi, came in to see me this evening at my request.

I expressed the hope to Mr. Wakasugi that the Ambassador's absence from Washington at this time was not due to illness. Mr. Wakasugi replied that the Ambassador had left this morning by automobile to go to Maine to stay with Admiral Pratt,[63] expecting to return to Washington on Saturday of this week.[64] He had left word, however, that he would return to Washington at a moment's notice should he be needed here.

I said that I wished to preface my conversation by saying that what I was about to say represented Secretary Hull's views, as well as my own.

I stated that I was fully familiar, of course, with the details of the informal conversations which Secretary Hull had been carrying on with the Japanese Ambassador over a period of several months. I said that the maintenance of peace in the Pacific, the abandonment of the utilization of force or conquest in the national policies of the several governments vitally interested in the Pacific and the consecration of the rights of equality of opportunity and of equality of treatment to all of the powers concerned constituted the very foundation of the possible ultimate agreement between our two Governments which was the objective of those conversations.

I went on to say that in a recent conversation which I had had with the Japanese Ambassador he had referred to Japan's fear of encirclement and I stated to Mr. Wakasugi, as I had to the Ambassador, that from the reiterated expositions of United States policy which had been made to the Japanese Ambassador by Secretary Hull in such detailed fashion upon so many occasions, I felt sure that the Japanese

---

[63] Admiral William V. Pratt, U.S.N., retired, Chief of Naval Operations, September 17, 1930–July 1, 1933.

[64] July 26, 1941.

Government could not have the remotest belief that the United States Government had had in mind any such policy towards Japan as would be represented by a policy of encirclement.

I stated that in view of all of these facts I had requested Mr. Wakasugi to call in order to tell him quite frankly that from reports which had reached me during the past few days from many different sources, I could only assume that the Japanese Government had it in mind in the near future to occupy Indochina. I said that the carrying out of a step of this character would, in the opinion of this Government represent a policy so utterly at variance with the foundation stones of the agreement which had been under discussion as the objective of the informal conversations which had taken place and so completely divergent from the kind of policy which the Japanese Government would in fact pursue if it were undertaking the course which had been clearly defined in the informal conversations between the Ambassador and Secretary Hull, that I felt it necessary frankly to ask what the real facts might be.

I said that this Government fully appreciated the fact that the new government so recently installed in Tokyo had public opinion in Japan to reckon with and that, in view of the shaping of public opinion in Japan which had been taking place during the past year, we could fully understand that some time might be required before the new government could undertake the carrying out of new policies of the nature which had been under discussion in Washington. I said that if the Japanese Government was sincerely desirous of reaching the kind of agreement which had been under discussion and which required time because of the state of public opinion to which I had referred, this Government was willing to be most patient and understanding. I said, however, that should the Japanese Government embark upon a policy of the kind which would be demonstrated by the occupation of Indochina, the United States and all other peace-loving nations interested in the Pacific must necessarily be forced to reconsider their own individual positions.

Mr. Wakasugi looked me squarely in the eye and said that the Japanese Embassy had no knowledge whatever of any intention on the part of the Japanese Government of occupying Indochina or of taking any step which would be at variance with the policies indicated in the informal conversations which had taken place. He stated that he had assumed that it was too early for Admiral Toyoda, the new Foreign Minister, to have determined upon any questions of foreign policy, since, as the Minister had publicly stated in the press, he must first engage in the task of "learning diplomacy".

I interjected by saying that Admiral Nomura had been good enough, in my last conversation with him, to speak of the intimate friendship and close relationship between himself and Admiral Toyoda and had clearly indicated that the policies of the Ambassador and of the new Foreign Minister would be identical.

Mr. Wakasugi then said that he was quite sure this was the case since the Ambassador had received immediately after the installation of the new Foreign Minister a most affectionate message from him urging the Ambassador to pursue with diligence the conversations with Secretary Hull to a successful conclusion.

Mr. Wakasugi then inquired point-blank whether, in my judgment, the occupation of Indochina by Japan would interfere with the successful conclusion of the conversations which Secretary Hull had been carrying on with Admiral Nomura. I replied that it seemed to me completely illogical for one party to these conversations to be carrying on discussions on a basis predicated upon the maintenance by the parties to the conversations of a policy of peace, no resort to force or conquest, et cetera, and at the same time for the other party to the conversations to be undertaking in practice policies utterly and hopelessly at variance therewith.

Mr. Wakasugi then said that he would immediately telephone the Ambassador of our conversation and he believed that the Ambassador would wish to return immediately to Washington to talk with me himself.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

711.94/2176½

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] July 23, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador called to see me this afternoon at his request.

Admiral Nomura commenced the conversation by saying that as soon as he had received from Mr. Wakasugi the report of his conversation with me two days ago, he had immediately returned to Washington in order to speak with me personally.

The Ambassador then commenced his exposition, which I did not interrupt until he had concluded.

The Ambassador said that he had now received from press reports, but not as yet officially, information that the Japanese Government had concluded with the Vichy Government an agreement whereunder the Japanese Government would send military forces to occupy certain portions of southern Indochina. The Ambassador said that he understood this agreement entailed no violation of the inherent sovereignty of French Indochina. He stated that I was well aware of the critical economic situation of Japan and of the great difficulty which Japan had in procuring raw materials, particularly food supplies, from abroad. He stressed the question of lack of fertilizer which Japan had been accustomed to importing from Germany and said that consequently additional rice must be imported from abroad. He stated that Japan was now importing a million tons of rice a year from Indochina. He went on to say that one of the two reasons for the step taken was to assure to Japan an uninterrupted source of supply of rice and other food stuffs, which Indochina afforded, as well as an uninterrupted supply of other raw materials which they required from that region. He stated that Japan believed that de Gaullist French agents were stirring up trouble in southern Indochina and that of course there were many Chinese agitators in that region and the Japanese Government feared that at some time in the near future a situation might develop which would cut off Japan's supplies from these territories.

The Ambassador then said that the second reason for the occupation undertaken was the need for military security. He stated that Japan believed that certain foreign powers were bent upon a policy of encirclement of Japan and that the step taken was purely a precautionary measure in the nature of a safeguard.

The two situations which the Ambassador had set forth above, he stated, had occasioned great "uneasiness" to Japan.

The Ambassador then said that from the tone of the press in this country and from observations which had been made to him by various Americans in whom he placed reliance, these recent developments were creating a condition of great excitement and perturbation in the United States. He said that of course the question of the measures which the United States might take was something which the United States alone could determine, but he urged most urgently that this Government should not "reach hasty conclusions" and should permit a little time to elapse in the hope that a friendly adjustment between Japan and the United States might be found. He said that any measures restricting oil exports to Japan would undoubtedly inflame Japanese public opinion exceedingly and he hoped, in view of his own belief that friendly relations could be maintained between the two countries, that full consideration might be given to his views in this connection.

The Ambassador concluded his exposition by saying that one of the first messages he had received from the new Cabinet was an urgent instruction to him to press for an understanding with the United States along the lines he had been discussing with Secretary Hull. These instructions, he said, were not as yet given to him in full detail but made it completely clear that the new Government fully supported the policies which he had been representing throughout the course of the conversations.

He said that I would of course realize that "third powers" were doing everything within their power to prevent the reaching of an agreement with the United States. He expressed the hope that this Government would bear this fact fully in mind in reaching any decisions it might contemplate.

I replied to the Ambassador that in view of his statement to me that Mr. Wakasugi had fully reported his conversation with me to the Ambassador, I felt I need not cover the same ground again in my conversation with the Ambassador this afternoon. I said that I had made it clear to Mr. Wakasugi that if the Japanese Government was now determined to pursue a policy diametrically opposed to the policy laid down by the Japanese Ambassador in his conversation with Secretary Hull as the policy which would result from the reaching of an agreement with the United States, this Government must reconsider its own position in the matter.

I said it was very clear to this Government that any agreement which Japan might have reached with the Vichy Government could only have been reached as a result of pressure brought to bear upon the Vichy Government by Berlin. Since that was the case in our judgment, the reaching of this agreement by Japan could only be regarded as offering assistance to Hitler in his obvious policy of world conquest and of world domination, which, I emphasized, in the opinion of the United States, would, if successful, prove equally deleterious to Japan and to the United States.

The Ambassador had referred to the desire of Japan, by occupying Indochina, to assure itself of supplies of food and raw materials from that territory. I said that if the agreement which Secretary Hull and the Ambassador had been discussing were concluded, the Ambassador must fully realize that a far greater measure of economic security would be afforded Japan since the whole agreement was predicated upon equal economic opportunity and equal economic security for all of the nations directly concerned in the Pacific region. With regard to the statement made by the Ambassador that the measure taken was in the nature of a military precaution, I inquired as to what possible justification there could be for such a step on the part of Japan when the Japanese Government had been fully informed, through the Ambassador by Secretary Hull, of the policy of this Government in the Pacific, which was a policy of the maintenance of peace, of non-aggression and of the refusal to carry out any policy of conquest or of physical force. I said the policy of this Government was the reverse of a policy of encirclement or of a policy which would constitute any threat to Japan. Furthermore, I said, this Government was equally confident that the policy of Great Britain constituted no menace to Japan and that if an agreement of the kind which had been under discussion were concluded, the United States would have been joined, together with Japan, in support of the underlying principles for which this Government stood, by the Governments of Great Britain, of the Dominions, of the Netherlands, and, I was confident, by the Government of China as well.

I said the Ambassador could hardly expect me to take seriously the Ambassador's statement that Japan was concerned by the activities of Chinese agitators or de Gaullist sympathizers in southern Indochina. I said I believed we could both agree to pass that by without further reference.

I said I thought the time had now come to speak with the complete frankness which the Ambassador would expect from a member of his own naval profession and I would consequently take the liberty of doing so. I said that the movement now undertaken by Japan could only be regarded by the United States as having two probable purposes, neither of which purpose this Government could ignore.

First, the United States could only assume that the occupation of Indochina by Japan constituted notice to the United States that the Japanese Government intended to pursue a policy of force and of conquest, and, second, that in the light of these acts on the part of Japan, the United States, with regard to its own safety in the light of its own preparations for self-defense, must assume that the Japanese Government was taking the last step before proceeding upon a policy of totalitarian expansion in the South Seas and of conquest in the South Seas through the seizure of additional territories in that region.

This Government could not see that there was any fact or factual theory upon which Japan could possibly fill Indochina with Japanese military and other forces for purposes of defending Japan. The only consequent alternative was to regard the occupation of Indochina by Japan as being undertaken because of the Japanese realization of its value to Japan for purposes of offense against the South Sea area.

I said that in view of all of these considerations, which I believed I had set forth very clearly to the Ambassador, I was now in a position where I must tell him, at the request of Secretary Hull, that the latter could not see that there was any basis now offered for the pursuit of the conversations in which he and the Ambassador had been engaged. This Government, in the opinion of Secretary Hull, had made it thoroughly clear to the Government of Japan that it was entirely ready to go forward with Japan on the basis of peaceful adjustment of the relations between the two countries in accordance with the principles and policies set forth in the agreement which it had been proposed should be concluded. This Government had already shown the utmost measure of patience in its dealings with Japan—and at this stage the Ambassador emphatically nodded his head—and had been prepared, as I had emphasized to Mr. Wakasugi, to continue to be patient in the event that the Government of Japan had required time in order to deal with its own public opinion but had at the same time refrained from embarking upon measures which were fundamentally opposed to the principles which both parties here in Washington had been endeavoring to establish. I repeated again that in the judgment of the United States if such an agreement had been reached, the Government of Japan would have obtained an infinitely greater amount of security, both military and economic, than it could obtain through its embarkation upon a policy of conquest by force.

The Ambassador then said that he fully realized that this Government had been exceedingly patient. He urged that it continue, at least for a short time, to be patient and he said most emphatically that he was willing to assure me that if the agreement which had been under discussion had been concluded, the present steps would not have been taken by the present Government of Japan. He said he felt that the procrastination which had taken place—and for this he did not attempt to place the blame—had been responsible for the creation of conditions with which the new Government was confronted when it took office and from which it could not immediately free itself.

The Ambassador concluded by saying that he would report to Tokyo what I had said.

I concluded the interview by saying that I was happy to say that Secretary Hull was now almost completely restored to health and that he hoped he would be able to return to Washington in the near future and in such event I was sure that he himself would wish to talk again with the Ambassador.

The Ambassador gave me the impression of being greatly disturbed and sincerely concerned by the possibility that a situation might now develop which would make utterly impossible any understanding between the two countries. His manner was exceedingly conciliatory throughout the interview and when he spoke about his hope that the United States would not reach "hasty conclusions", he said three or four times that, of course, he had no right to interfere or to give the impression that he was intervening in the decisions which might be made by this country, but that he made the remark solely because of his belief that a friendly adjustment could still be found.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

711.94/2177

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] July 24, 1941.

At the request of the Japanese Ambassador, the President received the Ambassador for an off-the-record conference in the Oval Room at the White House at five o'clock this afternoon. At the President's request, Admiral Stark and I were present.

At the outset of the conference the President made approximately the following statement to the Ambassador. The President said, referring to a talk which he had made this morning to a home defense group under the leadership of Mayor LaGuardia,[65] that for more than two years the United States had been permitting oil to be exported from the United States to Japan. He said that this had been done because of the realization on the part of the United States that if these oil supplies had been shut off or restricted the Japanese Government and people would have been furnished with an incentive or a pretext for moving down upon the Netherlands East Indies in order to assure themselves of a greater oil supply than that which, under present conditions, they were able to obtain. The United States had been pursuing this policy primarily for the purpose of doing its utmost to play its full part in making the effort to preserve peace in the Pacific region. At the present time, the President said, the Ambassador undoubtedly knew that there was a very considerable shortage in the oil supply in the eastern part of the United States and the average American man and woman were unable to understand why, at a time when they themselves were asked to curtail their use of gasoline oil, the United States Government should be permitting oil supplies to continue to be exported to Japan when Japan during these past two years had given every indication of pursuing a policy of force and conquest in conjunction with the policy of world conquest and domination which Hitler was carrying on. The average American citizen could not understand why his Government was permitting Japan to be furnished with oil in order that such oil might be utilized by Japan in carrying on her purposes of aggression. The President said that if Japan attempted to seize oil supplies by force in the Netherlands East Indies, the Dutch would, without the shadow of a doubt, resist, the British would immediately come to their assistance, war would then result between Japan, the British and the Dutch, and, in view of our own policy of assisting Great Britain, an exceedingly serious situation would immediately result. It was with all of these facts in mind, the President said, that notwithstanding the bitter criticism that had been leveled against the

---

[65] For President Roosevelt's informal remarks, see Department of State, *Bulletin*, July 26, 1941 (vol. v, No. 109), p. 72.

Administration and against the Department of State, the President up to now had permitted oil to be shipped by Japan from the United States.

The President then went on to say that this new move by Japan in Indochina created an exceedingly serious problem for the United States. He said that, as I had stated to the Ambassador yesterday, insofar as assuring itself that it could obtain foodstuffs and raw materials from Indochina, Japan, of course, had it reached an agreement with the United States along the terms of the discussions between Secretary Hull and the Ambassador, would have been afforded far greater assurances of obtaining such supplies on equal terms with any other nation. More than that, the President said, the cost of any military occupation is tremendous and the occupation itself is not conducive to the production by civilians in occupied countries of food supplies and raw materials of the character required by Japan. Had Japan undertaken to obtain the supplies she required from Indochina in a peaceful way, she not only would have obtained larger quantities of such supplies, but would have obtained them with complete security and without the draining expense of a military occupation. Furthermore, from the military standpoint, the President said, surely the Japanese Government could not have in reality the slightest belief that China, Great Britain, the Netherlands or the United States had any territorial designs on Indochina nor were in the slightest degree providing any real threats of aggression against Japan. This Government, consequently, could only assume that the occupation of Indochina was being undertaken by Japan for the purpose of further offense and this created a situation which necessarily must give the United States the most serious disquiet.[65a]

The President said that he had been following in complete detail the conversations which had been progressing between Secretary Hull and the Ambassador and that he was confident that the Ambassador would agree that the policies now undertaken in Indochina by the Japanese Government were completely opposed to the principles and the letter of the proposed agreement which had been under discussion.

At this point the Ambassador took out of his pocket two sheets of notes which he had prepared and asked the President's permission to refer to them in order to make a statement of his Government's position.

In this exposition the Ambassador covered exactly the same ground which he had covered in his conversation with me last night.

The only points of difference were that at the outset of the conversation, the Ambassador very clearly and emphatically stated that the move by Japan into Indochina was something which he personally deplored and with which he personally was not in agreement.

[65a] See the Department's press release of July 24, 1941, p. 315.

After the Ambassador had made this exposition, the President said that he had been glad to learn that the new Foreign Minister, Admiral Toyoda, was an intimate friend of the Ambassador. The Ambassador replied that that was the fact; that they both had grown up in the same surroundings and that the relationship between them was very close.

The President then said that he had a proposal to make to the Ambassador which had occurred to him just before the Ambassador had come in and which he had not had time to talk over with me before making his proposal to the Ambassador.

The President said that it might be too late for him to make this proposal but he felt that no matter how late the hour might be, he still wished to seize every possible opportunity of preventing the creation of a situation between Japan and the United States which could only give rise to serious misunderstandings between the two peoples. The President stated that if the Japanese Government would refrain from occupying Indochina with its military and naval forces, or, had such steps actually been commenced, if the Japanese Government would withdraw such forces, the President could assure the Japanese Government that he would do everything within his power to obtain from the Governments of China, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and of course the United States itself a binding and solemn declaration, provided Japan would undertake the same commitment, to regard Indochina as a neutralized country in the same way in which Switzerland had up to now been regarded by the powers as a neutralized country. He stated that this would imply that none of the powers concerned would undertake any military act of aggression against Indochina and would refrain from the exercise of any military control within or over Indochina. He would further endeavor to procure from Great Britain and the other pertinent powers a guarantee that so long as the present emergency continued, the local French authorities in Indochina would remain in control of the territory and would not be confronted with attempts to dislodge them on the part of de Gaullist or Free French agents or forces.

If these steps were taken, the President said, Japan would be given solemn and binding proof that no other power had any hostile designs upon Indochina and that Japan would be afforded the fullest and freest opportunity of assuring herself of the source of food supplies and other raw materials in Indochina which she was seeking to secure.

The Ambassador then reiterated concisely and quite clearly what the President had suggested. He then made some statement which was not quite clear to the effect that such a step would be very difficult at this time on account of the face-saving element involved on the part of Japan and that only a very great statesman would reverse a policy at this time.

The President then mentioned the fact that in the United States the belief was apparent that such policies as those which Japan was now pursuing were due to German pressure upon Japan. To this the Ambassador reacted by saying that Japan was, of course, an independent country and that while such pressure might be exercised, decisions on the policy she was pursuing were solely her own and no one else had any responsibility for them. The President then said that one thing the Japanese Government did not understand as clearly as this Government was the fact that Hitler was bent upon world domination and not merely the domination of Europe or of Africa. The President said that if Germany succeeded in defeating Russia and dominating Europe and then dominating Africa, there wasn't the slightest question in his mind that Germany thereafter would turn her attention to the Far East and likewise to the Western Hemisphere, and that while such a development might not take place for many years, perhaps even ten years, the laws of chance made it easily possible that in such contingency, the navies of Japan and of the United States would be cooperating together against Hitler as the common enemy. The President reemphasized his belief that what Hitler had in mind was complete domination of the entire world.

To this the Ambassador replied that he would like to quote an old Chinese proverb in which he had great faith, namely, "He who continuously brandishes the sword eventually kills himself."

The Ambassador said that he would immediately report his conversation to his Government in Tokyo. He seemed to be very much impressed with what the President had said but I did not gather from his reactions that he was in any sense optimistic as to the result.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

711.94/2178$\frac{12}{18}$

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] July 25, 1941.

At the invitation of Colonel Iwakuro and Mr. Wikawa, Mr. Ballantine lunched with them at their apartment. Mr. Wikawa was late in arriving and the greater part of the conversation that ensued took place before Mr. Wikawa arrived. Colonel Iwakuro expressed regret that from the point of view of relations between Japan and the United States the situation has developed the way it has. He said that the question of Japanese occupation of bases in Indochina had been before the Japanese Government before he left for this country in February, and the underlying purpose of the effort to reach an understanding was to set in motion a trend away from southward advance and thus avert the possibility of such a step as had just now been taken. He thought that if there had not been a delay in reaching the understanding, which had raised in the minds of many Japanese leaders a suspicion that this Government was not acting in good faith—and Colonel Iwakuro hoped that I would understand that the Ambassador and his associates here had no doubt whatever of our good faith, the Japanese action in Indochina would not have occurred. He said that the British Government had recently put an embargo on the export of rice from Burma to Japan and that Japan has only French Indochina and Thailand to rely upon for imports of this foodstuff. He declared that his Government was apprehensive of the DeGaullist activities in south Indochina and that there was real danger of Japan's supply of rice being cut off by disturbances created there.

Colonel Iwakuro went on to say that the Embassy had again last night received a third instruction from his Government urging that an effort be made to resume conversations with this Government looking to an understanding. He said that while the resumption of conversations would not have any effect in influencing the Japanese Government to revoke its action in Indochina, the establishment of an understanding would be effective in stopping Japan from moving further south, providing that this Government did not take measures in the nature of embargoes or freezing of assets against Japan. If such measures were invoked by the United States [65b] he believed that Japan would have no alternative but sooner or later to go south to Malaya and the Dutch East Indies in order to obtain essential supplies. Colonel Iwakuro observed that the Ambassador, being of a gentle disposition, would not have expressed these views as positively as Iwakuro had. He suggested that, while he did not wish to be understood as making any request, he would be glad to talk himself with the Acting Secretary or the President if we should so desire. He said he and Mr. Wikawa had already obtained passage on the *Tatuta* sailing from San Francisco on July 31, although there was a possibility that their sailing would be deferred until the *Asama Maru* sailed early next month. He added, however, that they would be glad to stay longer if we should desire to resume conversations.

Mr. Ballantine said that our position on the matter of the Japanese occupation of Indochina had already been made quite clear and that he could not add anything to what the Acting Secretary had already told the Japanese Ambassador in regard to the position of this Government.

Colonel Iwakuro said that the Japanese Government had no intention whatever to interfere with the internal affairs of French Indochina and he could not understand why we regarded their action as any different from our occupation of Iceland, which, he said, was a puppet country following the German occupation of Denmark.

[65b] See press release issued by the White House on July 25, 1941, p. 266.

Mr. Ballantine said that there was no point in his arguing over the facts connected with the Japanese step in relation to Indochina, but he desired to point out that Iceland was a fully independent country and not a dependency of Denmark, although up to the time of the German occupation the King of Denmark was also King of Iceland. Mr. Ballantine said that according to his understanding the Icelandic Parliament had full constitutional authority to enter into agreements with foreign countries. Colonel Iwakuro suggested that we had been influenced by propaganda of third powers interested in preventing the consummation of an agreement between Japan and the United States.

Mr. Ballantine replied that this was not the case, but that, as stated in the Secretary's oral statement of June 21, we had accumulating evidence that important elements in the Japanese Government desired Japan to pursue a course supporting Hitler in his movement of world conquest and that the only kind of an agreement with the United States which they desired would allow Japan to pursue such a course.

Colonel Iwakuro then went on to say that even though we could not profitably pursue conversations at the present time an opportunity might arise again in future, perhaps if Germany should vanquish Russia and move over to the Far East. He thought that under such circumstances the basis of our conversations might be different.

Colonel Iwakuro and Mr. Wikawa spoke warmly of our courtesies to them and expressed the hope that the Secretary would have no doubts about their sincerity and earnest desire to improve Japanese relations with the United States.

Mr. Ballantine obtained the impression that Colonel Iwakuro and Mr. Wikawa had no real expectation that conversations would be resumed and that their principal purpose was to fulfill their ideas of propriety. Accordingly Mr. Ballantine made no effort to argue with them at length.[66]

J[OSEPH] W. B[ALLANTINE]

740.0011 Pacific War/547

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[TOKYO,] July 26, 1941.

At the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs I called on him again today and we discussed at length the situation which had come about as a result of the establishment by Japan of bases in southern Indochina and the reported action of the American Government in freezing Japanese assets in the United States,[67] concerning which I have up to the present received no official confirmation from Washington. In view of our complete divergence of opinion upon the subject under discussion, there could be no meeting of minds between the Minister and myself, and since our conversation consisted largely of a reiteration of the views brought out in my conversation with him last night[68] I shall not in this report outline our conversation in detail. Mention may, however, be made of the following points which arose in our discussion.

---

[66] On July 26, 1941, Mr. Hamilton noted: "It is Mr. Ballantine's and my view that in view of the circumstances no reply to Colonel Iwakuro's approach is called for and that the matter should rest with the statements made by Mr. Welles and by the President to the Japanese Ambassador."

The Department's telegram No. 423, July 24, 7 p. m.[69] reporting the Acting Secretary's conversation with the Japanese Ambassador[70] having been decoded immediately prior to this interview, I conveyed the substance thereof to Admiral Toyoda so that he might know exactly what the Acting Secretary had said to Admiral Nomura. The Minister for Foreign Affairs was particularly anxious to ascertain the exact words of the Secretary's statement to the effect that he was unable to see that there was now any basis for continuing the Washington conversations. The Minister requested my interpretation of the Secretary's statement. I told him in reply that we could do no more than accept the statement at its face value. The Minister gave obvious indications of being profoundly concerned at the rupture of the Washington conversations, and as I have ground for believing that immediately prior to our interview he had been received by the Emperor I regard it as likely that he was reflecting the concern of the Emperor.

Admiral Toyoda told me that he particularly regretted the Acting Secretary's remark to the Japanese Ambassador regarding German pressure on the French Government and told me that the Japanese negotiations with the French Government in regard to Indochina had been carried on without any pressure from any outside source.

Admiral Toyoda, as he had done with the British Ambassador, endeavored to draw a comparison between Japanese action with respect to Indochina and the measures undertaken by England in Syria, in reply to which I emphasized the complete dissimilarity of the two cases.

Admiral Toyoda continually reiterated the view that the present deplorable situation between the United States and Japan was due solely to a misunderstanding on the part of the United States of Japan's real purposes, to which I replied that this entirely unfounded allegation had been exploited *ad nauseam* for many years both by Japanese officials and in the Japanese press, and I recapitulated to him a number of bitter lessons which we had learned from experience as a result of the assurances and promises of previous Japanese governments in regard to the true aims of Japan. I made it clear to him why finally it had become impossible for the Government and the people of the United States to give credence to Japanese pledges and explanations of Japan's "true intentions".

---

[67] For text of Executive Order No. 8832, July 26, 1941, see p. 267.
[68] See memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan, July 25, 1941, p. 317.
[69] Not printed.
[70] See memorandum of July 23, 1941, p. 522.

The Minister inquired with every indication of concern whether the United States Government intended to adopt further retaliatory measures in addition to the freezing of Japanese assets in the United States, to which I replied that I had received no information in the premises.

Admiral Toyoda told me that he had hardly slept at all during recent nights and he appeared greatly discouraged at the turn of events and especially distressed that the present situation should have arisen at the very time of his assumption of the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs. I reviewed in detail my endeavors over many years, with particular reference to my efforts with the Yonai Cabinet,[71] to place Japanese-American relations on a sound and enduring basis and referred in this connection to Admiral Nomura's work in that direction in Washington recently.

In conclusion, after stating that I was reluctant to end our talk in an atmosphere of defeatism, I emphatically urged him to use his best efforts with the view to preventing the further deterioration of relations between the United States and Japan, which would inevitably attend any future aggressive moves on the part of Japan in the Pacific area.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

740.0011 Pacific War/502

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[TOKYO,] July 27, 1941.

As a result of the delay which is at present being encountered in the delivery of telegrams, the Department's no. 428, July 25, 9 p. m.,[72] was received only on the morning of July 27. As it would appear that the element of time is of first importance and the Foreign Minister was received by the Emperor last evening, it would have been of great advantage to me to have had the account of the President's proposal to Admiral Nomura prior to my interview with the

---

[71] Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, Japanese Prime Minister January 16, 1940–July 16, 1940.

[72] Not printed; but see memorandum of July 24, 1941, p. 527.

Foreign Minister yesterday. Nevertheless, with a view to neglecting nothing which might bring about an acceptance of the President's proposal, I at once requested an appointment with the Foreign Minister and called on him at 11.30 this morning.

I told Admiral Toyoda that I was not calling on him under instructions from my Government but to have a private "off-the-record" conversation on my own initiative in connection with a subject of such prime importance that I felt that the circumstances warranted my requesting an immediate appointment. I then conveyed orally to Admiral Toyoda the gist of the President's proposal to the Japanese Ambassador as outlined in the Department's telegram so that there could be no possibility of any misunderstanding of the President's remarks due to faulty or inadequate reporting by the Japanese Ambassador to his Government. I left no written statement with the Minister.

Admiral Toyoda to my amazement told me that he had received no report from the Japanese Ambassador concerning the President's suggestion and having left the room for the obvious purpose of verifying this statement with the Foreign Office he returned to confirm that no report on this subject had been received from the Japanese Embassy at Washington. As I read to him in paraphrase the various points of the President's proposal, the Minister examined them with close attention. He then stated that he was afraid that the President's suggestion had come too late and that in any event, until Japanese public opinion which had been greatly exercised against the United States as a result of the action of the United States Government in freezing Japanese assets had had an opportunity to cool, nothing could be accomplished along the lines of the President's proposal. He, however, agreed that before an answer could be given to the President's proposal it would have to be carefully examined and discussed with other high officials of the Japanese Government.

I was careful to point out to the Minister that I myself did not expect an answer and that the reply of the Japanese Government would of course be conveyed through the Japanese Ambassador in Washington following the receipt of the latter's report of his conversation with the President. I took occasion at this point in the conversation to make it abundantly clear to the Minister that the purpose of my call on him was not to communicate to him the proposal of the President, which I assumed he had already received, nor to request an answer but merely to urge upon him, on my personal initiative, certain considerations in regard to this proposal which appeared to me to be of the greatest importance. I pointed out to the Minister that this proposal clearly and directly met the

Japanese contention that the occupation of bases in Indo-China was caused by the necessity of protecting and of forestalling an alleged encirclement of Indo-China by third countries and that, therefore, if the President's proposal could be accepted and put into effect it would adequately solve the problem from the point of view of Japan. The Minister gave careful study to the President's reference to full and free access to food supplies and raw materials and inquired whether this reference was also applicable to the Dutch East Indies, to which I replied that for the moment the question at issue was exclusively that of Indo-China but that as the Minister was fully aware the conversations recently held in Washington had dealt with the question of equal opportunity and free movement of trade throughout the entire area of the Pacific. I then told the Minister that although I had no authority whatsoever to touch on this question and was therefore merely voicing certain personal observations, the acceptance of the President's proposal in regard to Indo-China might conceivably lead to the establishment of a new basis for the continuance and successful conclusion of these conversations.

At this point the Minister again reverted to the resentment which was felt in Japan at the freezing of Japanese assets. I told him that I had little knowledge of the intention of my Government in regard to the administration of the Executive Order freezing Japanese assets but that I believed, again speaking unofficially and personally, that there might be considerable flexibility in the administration of the Order. I reminded the Minister in this connection of the very liberal treatment which had been granted to Japanese interests after the expiration of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, and told him that I personally believed that if the Japanese Government would shape its actions and policy in accordance with those principles which the American Government desired to see in effect in the Pacific area, there would be no reluctance on the part of my Government to facilitate any Japanese efforts to that end.

I then urged the Minister with all the strength and earnestness at my command to take advantage of the President's statesmanlike and far-seeing suggestion for obviating further and serious deterioration of Japanese-American relations and indeed of the whole Far Eastern situation. I told him that I fully recognized that the element of "face-saving" must of necessity enter into the question, but that the Minister was now presented with an opportunity to rise above such considerations and to act in conformity with the highest statesmanship and to take a decision which would not only permit him to be relieved of the truly appalling situation with which he was confronted at the very beginning of his office, but which might well result in his being regarded by history as one of the greatest statesmen of Japan. The

Minister, I believe, was deeply impressed by my words and it is possible that this appeal may affect his presentation of the President's suggestion to the Emperor and to the Prime Minister.

I am fully aware that in seeking this interview with the Foreign Minister, and in making this approach to him, I have been acting without any authority from my Government but I was led to undertake this approach on my own initiative and responsibility after careful consideration of the following three factors:

1. The vital importance of making sure that the Japanese Foreign Minister should receive an accurate and complete report of the President's proposal;
2. The time element, which is of equal importance, prevented my seeking prior authority; and
3. The certainty of my belief that having made his farseeing and statesmanlike proposal to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, the President would desire that nothing should be neglected to ensure that the far-reaching importance of this proposal should be fully understood by the Japanese Government and should be given the most careful and serious consideration. The acceptance or rejection of the President's proposal may well determine the future peace in the Pacific.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

711.94/2178

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] July 28, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador came in to see me this afternoon at his request. The Ambassador first of all said that he would greatly appreciate it if I would tell him what the policy of this Government was, with regard to the freezing order, in connection with Japanese vessels in American territorial waters. He said that this question was giving his Government great uneasiness and, in view of his sincere desire to avoid any further difficulties between the two countries and to do what he could to contribute to an easing of the present situation, he would appreciate any information I could give him.

I replied to the Ambassador that for the time being and under present conditions (and I repeated these phrases twice), the Treasury Department would grant prompt clearance to any Japanese vessels in American ports which desired to clear. The Ambassador seemed greatly relieved at this reply and then asked what the attitude would be with regard to the purchase by these vessels of food supplies which they needed for their crews and of fuel supplies which they required in order to make it possible for them to return to their own ports. I told the Ambassador that all of these transactions would, of course, require specific licenses from the Treasury Department itself, but that for the time being and under present conditions licenses would be granted for these transactions so as to make it possible for these ships to clear from American ports when they so desired. The Ambassador expressed great satisfaction at the replies I had made to him.[73]

The Ambassador then expressed his hope that by the exercise of the powers of statesmanship, both in Japan and in the United States, the present difficult situation would be passed without further deterioration in the relations of our two countries. I reminded the Ambassador of the extraordinary patience which the United States had demonstrated in its relations with Japan during recent years and particularly during the past six months. I said that time and again the Ambassador must have been struck with that fact throughout the course of his talks with Secretary Hull. I said that if any additional confirmation had been required that confirmation had been afforded in the exceedingly important proposal which the President had made to the Ambassador on July 24. I stated that in view of the Ambassador's statements, I felt it due him to say in an extremely frank way that I had been greatly surprised by receiving a report this morning from Ambassador Grew relating his conversation with Foreign Minister Toyoda yesterday, July 27,[74] in which Ambassador Grew informed me that the President's proposal had not yet, at that time, reached Admiral Toyoda.

Admiral Nomura did not look particularly surprised. He said, however, that he had immediately telegraphed a brief summary of the President's proposal; that he had then gone to New York and that yesterday, the evening of July 27, he had telegraphed a very full and detailed account of the President's proposal to his Foreign Minister.

The Ambassador then went on to say that he felt that what should now be the objective, in view of the divergence of national policy between Japan and the United States, was some compromise solution which would prove acceptable to both sides. I said that I regretted that I must differ from the Ambassador. I said that our policy, as the Ambassador was well aware, was a policy of the maintenance of peace, of a renunciation of force and conquest in the dealings between each other of the nations of the Pacific area and of equal commercial and economic opportunity for all of these nations on nondiscriminatory and equal terms. I said that as the Secretary of State and as the President had repeatedly made clear to the Ambassador, there was no desire on the part of this Government to prevent Japan from receiving the assurances of an economic and commercial character which she desired, provided the policy which we had laid down was pursued by all of the nations involved. Furthermore, I said, the President's proposal provided a complete ratification of what Secretary Hull had so often said to the Ambassador, namely, that none of the other powers mentioned—Great Britain, the Netherlands, the United States, the British Dominions, and, we were sure, China—could conceivably be regarded as having any aggressive designs upon Japan and that I believed Secretary Hull had even gone so far as to say that were Japan to be confronted by any real menace from Indochina, the United States fleet would be sent in order to make it evident that this Government was opposed to the operation of any such menace against Japan.

---

[73] For further details on this subject, see pp. 201 ff.

[74] See memorandum of July 27, 1941, *supra*.

In view of all of these facts and of the policy which we had not only preached but practiced, I did not see that there was the slightest ground for any compromise solution of the kind the Ambassador had in mind. I said it seemed to me we had come to the point where Japan had now undertaken a policy completely different from that which had been under discussion with this Government; the Ambassador now requested that Japan continue her policy and we modify our policy. The compromise the Ambassador suggested amounted merely to an abandonment by this Government of the principles and policies for which we stood, which Japan had been discussing with us, and which we believed alone could afford Japan the economic safety and the national security she alleges she is seeking.

Upon leaving the Ambassador asked whether the President would be able to receive Colonel Iwakuro before the latter left on July 31. I told the Ambassador that since the Ambassador himself made the request, I would submit it to the President, but that I felt sure the Ambassador realized the great number of demands which were now being made upon the President's time. The Ambassador was very emphatic in saying that he by no means wished to intrude upon the President's time.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

792.94/135½

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] July 31, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador called to see me this evening.

I stated to the Ambassador that the President desired me to inform the Japanese Government through him that reports had now been received by the Government of the United States which indicated that Japan was making the same kind of economic and military demands upon the Government of Thailand which it had recently made upon the French Government with regard to Indochina. The

President desired me to say that, with regard to Thailand, in the judgment of the Government of the United States there was not the remotest threat of danger to Japan nor the slightest justification for Japan alleging that she desired to obtain such concessions from Thailand as a means of assuring a source of raw supplies or as a measure of military precaution. The President therefore desired the Japanese Government to know that the previous proposal which he had made to Japan with regard to Indochina be regarded as embracing Thailand as well, and that should the Government of Japan accede to the proposal of the President and abandon its present course with regard to Indochina, the President would request of the other powers which he had mentioned in connection with his proposal concerning Indochina the same guarantee and measure of security with regard to Thailand. The Ambassador stated that he would at once transmit this proposal to his Government.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

711.94/2273

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] August 4, 1941.

Mr. Wakasugi, Minister of the Japanese Embassy, called to see me at his request.

Mr. Wakasugi commenced the conversation by stating that as I had been informed by his Ambassador, he was leaving Washington tonight in order to report by instruction of his Government. He stated that he would report personally and directly to Prince Konoye, and likewise personally and directly to the Foreign Minister, Mr. Toyoda. He stated categorically that he represented the Prime Minister's personal establishment here in the United States; and that owing to his intimate association with Admiral Toyoda from the time they were both stationed in the Japanese Embassy, London in 1922 and 1923, he was in direct communication with the Foreign Minister likewise. He said that what he wished to ask me to be good enough to give him was my analysis of the present state of relations between the United States and Japan.

He said that he felt it was necessary for his Government without a moment's delay to realize what the policies of the Government of the United States actually were and what the feeling of the people of the United States actually was, since he felt that nothing was more needed in Tokyo today than a clear vision on the part of the responsible leaders of the Japanese Government of the two points he had asked me to discuss with him.

I said that I would be glad to respond to his request because I shared his point of view in one regard, at least, completely. I said I was sure, of course, that the Japanese Ambassador and he himself had been reporting accurately and fully to their Government, but that I wondered whether perhaps from other sources the Japanese Government might not have obtained a partial and prejudiced or distorted point of view with regard to public opinion in the United States and with regard to the policy which this Government was intending to carry out in its relations with the nations of the Pacific.

I said that perhaps Mr. Wakasugi was not aware of the fact that I had had the privilege myself of living three years in Japan in the old days [74a] and that I had then had the opportunity of knowing well at least some of the Japanese statesmen and intellectual leaders of an earlier period, and that I had throughout the intervening years always remembered with keen appreciation the personal benefits I had derived from those friendships. I said that for this reason I had always personally stood for the maintenance of very friendly relations between our two countries, not only because of my own knowledge and appreciation of Japan and the Japanese people, but also because of my conviction that there was no real fundamental reason, in so far as the best interests and desirable objectives of the two countries were concerned, for the two nations ever to be involved in conflict. I said that as I now looked back it seemed to me incredible that the relations which existed in those happier days between Japan and the United States could have degenerated into the relations which unfortunately existed between our two countries today. I stated that I had felt warranted in making this personal digression because I wished Mr. Wakasugi to appreciate that what I had to say was being said in a friendly spirit and because of my belief that at this late moment the truest evidence of friendship on my part was complete and unmitigated frankness in speech.

Mr. Wakasugi then said that he himself had been educated in this country and had spent, off and on, the better part of 30 years in the United States. He said that he felt very much about this country as I said I felt about his own nation, and that he felt bound to say in response to my frankness that in all of the 30 years of his experience, relations between the two nations had never at any time approached the critical point to which they had now unfortunately come.

I then resumed the conversation and said that Mr. Wakasugi had asked me what the policies of this Government might be. I said that the policies of my Government had been made clear time and again in our interchanges with and in our communications to the Government of Japan since the spring of 1933. I referred to letters exchanged between the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister, to public statements made by the Secretary of State and by the President and other officials, and by innumerable other clear-cut and detailed analyses of our position with regard to the Pacific and more specifically, vis-à-vis Japan. I said that in addition to all of this, the policy of this Government had been made completely clear in the most painstaking way by the Secretary of State himself in the conversations which he had held during the past five months with the Japanese Ambassador. Finally, I said, the policy of this Government was clarified and summarized to the fullest extent possible by the proposal which the President himself had made to the Japanese Ambassador on July 24 and to which this Government had not as yet received any reply.

[74a] Mr. Welles was Secretary of Embassy in Japan in 1915–17.

I said that I doubted whether in the history of the past 50 years any great power in its dealings with another great power had consistently shown such utter and complete patience as had the Government of the United States in its dealings with Japan.

At this point Mr. Wakasugi nodded his head.

I said that if Mr. Wakasugi nevertheless desired me once more to summarize the policy of this Government, I should define it succinctly as a policy which contained, as its fundamental premise, the maintenance of peace in the Pacific; the renunciation by all of the powers interested in the Pacific of force and of conquest as their national policy; the recognition of the rights of independent and autonomous peoples of the Pacific to independence and integrity; and equal opportunity and fair treatment for all, and exclusive preference or privilege for none. I added that it seemed to me that the policy of the United States made it fully clear to the Government of Japan that the American Government and people desired in no way to impede or to limit the equal rights of the Japanese people to economic and commercial opportunity, either in the Pacific or, for that matter, throughout the world, or the enjoyment of equal opportunity in obtaining free access to raw materials and food supplies required in the national economy of Japan; and afforded Japan complete assurance that so long as Japan adopted similar policies the United States could never remotely be regarded as endangering by military or naval force the national security of the Japanese Empire.

I said that I wished to emphasize by repeating the fact that American policy, if Japan followed an identical course, afforded Japan the fullest measure of security both physical and material. However, I said, at the same time that this policy had been enunciated over and over again to Japan, Japan had been following more and more openly a completely diametrical tendency.

The result was that during these recent years our national policies, instead of converging, had been moving steadily apart and the result was that today this Government was forced to the conclusion that the policy finally and definitely adopted by Japan was a policy of expansion through the use of force and by conquest. I said that I wished, therefore, to make it very clear to Mr. Wakasugi that in my considered judgment, if Japan continued on an aggressive policy of force and undertook moves of expansion which would result in acts of aggression upon additional peoples in the Far East, in the south or in other regions of the Pacific, the aim of Japan could only be regarded by the United States as the creation of a military overlordship of the Japanese Empire imposed over all of the peoples of the Far East, the Southern Pacific, and perhaps over other areas as well. If this were in reality the objective of the Japanese Government, I thought it necessary at this stage to say that in my judgment such a situation as that would inevitably be regarded as intolerable by the United States and by other peace-minded nations having direct interests in the Pacific, and that, consequently, whether it came tomorrow, or next month, or next year, or even later, the pursuit of such an objective by Japan would inevitably result in armed hostilities in the Pacific.

At this point Mr. Wakasugi interjected to say that what I had stated confirmed his own fears that the situation would now reach an exceedingly critical stage. He said that there were certain underlying factors which the Japanese people could never explain to themselves. He said that when Japan first awoke in the middle of the last century from her long sleep of isolation, she found herself completely surrounded by the imperialistic encroachments which occidental nations had made, not only in China, but in all the Pacific region as well. He said that the United States had been a rapidly expanding and growing country but that Japan was likewise a rapidly expanding country, obviously not on the same scale as the United States, but nevertheless on the same general trend. He said that the Japanese people could not indefinitely be confined to their own poor land and that they had to find, in view of their ever increasing birth rate and their rapidly rising power as a great nation in the world, some means of expanding outside of their own territories. At the very moment that the Japanese people were beginning to realize their situation along these lines, he said, the other great powers of the world had been undertaking exactly the same kind of action, by acquiring colonies and dominating other less advanced peoples, which we, the United States, were now reproaching the Japanese people for undertaking.

I said it would be ludicrous for me to attempt to argue with regard to the policies and measures undertaken by the great powers of the world in the last century but that I was certain that in the years when I had first known Japan, Japan and the United States both agreed that a new and better era in the world was possible and that while, unfortunately enough, a better era had not been realized, I saw no reason for a retrogression in international policy which Mr. Wakasugi seemed to be recommending as a justification for the policy of conquest upon which his country now seemed to be embarked. I said that if it came to a question of expansion, I could quite understand the need for an energetic, able, and rapidly growing race like the Japanese to undertake in their own national interest certain forms of expansion outside of their own national boundaries, but I said that in the considered judgment of this Government the people of Japan would be infinitely more benefited and rendered infinitely more secure by the kind of expansion for which this Government stood than by the policy of expansion for which the present Government of Japan stood. I said that the kind of expansion which I had in mind was the kind of peaceful and productive expansion which resulted in the expansion of Japanese commercial activities in other countries along the lines of equality and non-discrimination which had been for so many years now upheld by the United States. I said I could conceive of no way in which greater prosperity, and contentment and security could come to the Japanese people than by utilizing their great gifts for commercial enterprise and thereby enjoy the great markets which China and other nations of the Far East as well as other nations in other sections of the world offered for peaceful commercial enterprise of this character. I asked him to compare the situation of Japan today, bled as she had been by the militaristic efforts she had been making in one form or another since 1931, with the position which Japan would occupy today if she had embarked upon the other course which I had indicated. I said surely there was great accuracy in what the Japanese Ambassador himself had stated a few days ago when he said that by the occupation of China, Japan had been putting everything into China and getting nothing out. I said that almost inevitably that was the sole result which Japan could gain from her present militaristic course and that the eventual outcome would be, I felt, economic prostration, and possibly social and financial collapse.

Mr. Wakasugi did not appear to differ from the opinions I expressed but merely stated that he feared it would be very difficult for the Japanese people to comprehend the truths involved in my statements to him.

He then suddenly said "The main task of statesmanship on both sides today is for us to avoid being drawn into conflict. How far can Japan now expand without running the risk of war with the United States?"

I replied in as clear a statement as possible that it was quite impossible for me to answer this question categorically and precisely. I said that it was not, in my judgment a question of exactly where the line would be drawn by this country because, for that matter, the implementation already undertaken by Japan of her expansionist policy of conquest might, in my judgment, create a situation where the vital interests of this country might be directly affected. I said the problem was not what this country would agree to in the way of occupation by Japan of other independent countries, but the fact that Japan was bent upon a policy of conquest which, if pursued and persisted in, would, in my opinion, inevitably result in a situation where the vital interests of the United States and of other great powers directly interested in the Pacific would be directly involved. I stated that he was mistaken if he thought that this Government would say to the Japanese Government "You can occupy this, that, or the other country, but you can go no further." I said that the issue was the fact that Japan appeared to be bent upon pursuing a policy which would result in the creation of a military overlordship by Japan of the Pacific area and that it was the policy itself which, in my judgment, prejudiced the security of the United States.

Mr. Wakasugi then changed the subject and said that he had been unable to understand at all from his Ambassador the proposal which the President had made. He asked if I would clarify the matter for him. I therefore repeated to him clearly and precisely exactly what the President's proposal had been as covered in the memorandum of my conversation between the President and the Ambassador of July 24, and Mr. Wakasugi then said that he now understood for the first time clearly exactly what the President had in mind. He added of his own volition that he could not deny that what the President proposed, if consummated, would give security to his own country and to the other nations interested in the Far East.

Mr. Wakasugi then said that he had one final question to ask me and that was what the opinion of this Government might be concerning the solution of postwar problems.

He said that he had read with a great deal of interest the address which I had made which touched upon that subject [75] and that since he himself had attended so many meetings of the League of Nations he wanted to express his own belief that a new league of nations, set up on the foundations utilized by the old League of Nations would not prove practical nor successful. He said he did not now want to argue about what nation or nations had been responsible for the failure of the old League of Nations, but he thought the time had certainly come to consider what better world order might be set up when peace again was restored.

---

[75] For remarks by the Acting Secretary of State on July 22, 1941, at the laying of the cornerstone of the new wing of the Norwegian Legation, see Department of State, *Bulletin*, July 26, 1941 (vol. v, No. 109), p. 75.

He said as he envisaged it, the most practical solution was the creation of regional federations, one to consist of Europe and Africa, one of the Western Hemisphere, one of the Far East, and one of Russia.

I said that I had heard a similar point of view expressed by many others, but that I wondered if one took this approach as a solution for the problem how one could possibly anticipate that such matters as disarmament or equality of economic enjoyment could be solved by the creation of regional federations. I said, to be perfectly specific and conceive of a Far Eastern federation and a Western Hemisphere federation, how could the regional federation of the new world ever be satisfied that a real limitation of armament could be undertaken unless it was confident that the Far Eastern federation was in actual practice limiting its armaments of all categories to exactly the same lines as those undertaken by the Western Hemisphere federation? In exactly the same way, I said, unless one undertook a universal approach, how could the economic difficulties from which the world had been so long suffering be solved through regional federation control. I said, however, that as he knew, I had never at any time been willing to express any opinion with regard to the precise mechanism that might be employed by the powers of the world when the appropriate opportunity was presented, but that I thought it was in fact highly desirable for all peace-minded nations to be considering these matters and exchanging views between themselves with regard thereto. I said I wanted to make it very clear, however, that of one thing I was completely confident and that was that no "new orders", were they Hitler-inspired or Japanese-inspired, would tend to solve this problem, but rather quite the contrary.

Mr. Wakasugi then left, expressing his appreciation for the opportunity he had had of talking with me and expressing the hope that he might be back in Washington before many weeks had passed.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

711.94/2244$\frac{3}{11}$

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] August 6, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador called upon the Secretary at the Secretary's apartment by appointment made at the Ambassador's request.[76]

---

[76] Mr. Okumura was also present.

In the course of a brief interchange of general remarks the Secretary observed that both he and the Ambassador were deserving of sympathy because of the developments which had led to a breakdown in their arduous efforts to bring about a better understanding between the United States and Japan. The Ambassador nodded assent and then came to the business at hand. He said that he had promptly referred to his Government the proposal which had been made to him by the President on July 24, but explained that as it took the Japanese Government a longer time than it did this Government to reach decisions on important matters it had not been until the previous evening that he had received instructions from his Government in reply thereto. He then drew out a paper which he proceeded to read. Subsequently he gave a copy of this paper to Mr. Ballantine. A copy is attached.[77] After reading the paper, in which reference was made to a proposal by the Japanese Government, he handed the Secretary a document marked "Strictly Confidential. Proposal by the Japanese Government".[78]

The Japanese Ambassador seemed disposed to discuss the contents of the proposal, but the Secretary suggested that he thought that time would be saved all around if we postponed any discussion of it pending study of the document. The Secretary then proceeded to put the proposal in his pocket without reading it. The Secretary then said that he was frankly pessimistic over the prospect of getting anywhere with a proposal such as that referred to in the oral statement which the Japanese Ambassador had made. He dwelt on the arduous efforts which the Ambassador and he had made covering a period of months to try to bring about better relations between Japan and the United States and to lay the foundation of peace in the Pacific. He said that while these conversations had been going on we had been receiving continually reports of the agitation in the press of Japan, which was Government-controlled, in favor of a policy of force and of conquest. We had also received reports of statements by Japanese leaders advocating a course the very opposite of that which underlay the spirit of the conversations between the Ambassador and the Secretary. The Secretary also referred to the fact that the Government-controlled Japanese press was now talking about encirclement of Japan by the United States and Japanese leaders were voicing similar views. The Secretary remarked that the Germans, while waging their campaign in Russia hundreds of miles from their own territories, were speaking of acting in self-defense against aggression. Similar apologies were being made in connection with their military activities in other parts of Europe outside of their borders. The Secretary said that he did not see how we could usefully pursue any conversations or discuss proposals premised on the contention that the United States was endeavoring to encircle Japan. The Secretary observed that while on the one hand he and the Japanese Ambassador had been making sincere efforts to reach an understanding based upon the idea of peace throughout the Pacific area, on the other hand the Secretary was being charged in Japan with machinations to encircle Japan. In view of these circumstances the Secretary reiterated that he felt very discouraged indeed and felt doubtful that there was any prospect of being able to deal at this time with any proposal of the Japanese Government relating to the establishment of peaceful relations in the Pacific such as the Japanese Government appeared to have in mind. The Ambassador offered no particular comment and the matter was left that the Secretary would examine the proposal.

---

[77] *Infra*.

[78] *Post*, p. 549.

J[OSEPH] W. B[ALLANTINE]

711.94/2244 $\frac{3}{11}$

Oral Statement Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State on August 6, 1941

The purport and nature of the measures taken by the Japanese Government in effecting a joint defense of French Indo-China has already been explained by the Japanese Foreign Minister to the United States Ambassador in Tokio as well as by myself to the President and the Acting Secretary of State. To summarise, the measures are of entirely peaceful character and for self-defense, and an intervention by any third Power would be wholly unwarranted. They were absolutely necessary in order to prevent from getting beyond control the Japanese public opinion which had been dangerously aroused because of the successive measures taken by the United States, Great Britain and Netherlands East Indies against Japan, and consequently in order to preserve peace in the Pacific.

As the United States Government has nevertheless manifested certain anxiety over the situation in regard to French Indo-China, the Japanese Government, with a view to dispelling any such misgiving, has instructed me to transmit a proposal and to enter into negotiations in strict confidence and on an "off record" basis. The proposal is intended to serve as a reply in a way to the suggestion made by the President on July 24 during his conversation with me, and to provide a fresh basis for Japanese-American understanding on which informal conversations have been carried on during the past months. I have to add that any accord of views which may result from the present negotiations is to be incorporated in the general formula for the adjustment of the relations between our two countries.

At all events, the Japanese Government is convinced that it is more than ever necessary to examine calmly and with a spirit of understanding toward the standpoint of each other the diverse causes which have been responsible for the strained relations between Japan and the United States, and to endeavor for the removal and alleviation of such causes and conditions as will upset the military, political and economic equilibrium that should normally exist between the two countries. The Japanese Government believes that its views in this respect are fully shared by the Government of the United States.

[WASHINGTON,] August 6, 1941.

711.94/2244$\frac{3}{11}$

Proposal by the Japanese Government Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State on August 6, 1941

I. The Japanese Government undertakes:—

(A) that, in order to remove such causes as might constitute a menace of a military character to the United States, it will not further station its troops in the Southwestern Pacific areas except French Indo-China and that the Japanese troops now stationed in French Indo-China will be withdrawn forthwith on the settlement of the China Incident, and

(B) that, in order to remove such causes as might constitute a menace of political and military character to the Philippine Islands, the Japanese Government will guarantee the neutrality of the islands at an opportune time on the condition that Japan and the Japanese subjects will not be placed in any discriminatory positions as compared with other countries and their nationals including the United States and its nationals, and

(C) that, in order to remove such causes as might be responsible for the instability of the economic relations between Japan and the United States,[79] the Japanese Government will cooperate with the Government of the United States in the production and procurement of such natural resources as are required by the United States.

II. The Government of the United States undertakes:—

(A) that, in order to remove such causes as might constitute a direct menace of military character to Japan or to her international communications, the Government of the United States will suspend its military measures in the Southwestern Pacific areas, and also that, upon a successful conclusion of the present conversations, it will advise the Governments of Great Britain and of the Netherlands to take similar steps, and

---

[79] On August 7, 1941, the Japanese Embassy requested that a correction be made at this point by the insertion of three words, omitted through a typographical error, as follows: "in East Asia."

(B) that, in order to remove such causes as might be responsible for military, political and economic friction between Japan and the United States, the Government of the United States will cooperate with the Japanese Government in the production and procurement of natural resources as are required by Japan in the Southwestern Pacific areas, especially in the Netherlands East Indies, and

(C) that, in conjunction with the measures as set forth in (B) above, the Government of the United States will take steps necessary for restoring the normal relations of trade and commerce which have hitherto existed between Japan and the United States, and

(D) that, in view of the undertaking by the Japanese Government as set forth in I. (A) above, the Government of the United States will use its good offices for the initiation of direct negotiations between the Japanese Government and the Chiang Kai-shek régime for the purpose of a speedy settlement of the China Incident, and that the Government of the United States will recognise a special status of Japan in French Indo-China even after the withdrawal of Japanese troops from that area.

[WASHINGTON,] August 6, 1941.

711.94/2244$\frac{4}{11}$

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] August 8, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador called at the Secretary's request.

The Secretary handed the Japanese Ambassador a document marked strictly confidential and dated August 8, 1941 [80] in reply to the proposal of the Japanese Government contained in the document handed by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary on August 6. The Secretary suggested that the Ambassador might care to glance over the document.

The Japanese Ambassador read the document and stated that he understood its import. He said that the Japanese Government was very desirous of adjusting relations with the United States and was anxious to find means of doing so. He asked whether it might not be possible for the responsible heads of the two Governments to meet, say in Honolulu, as was suggested in the original Japanese proposal presented to us, with a view to discussing means whereby an adjustment could be brought about.

The Secretary said that if an understanding of the nature which the Secretary and the Ambassador had been discussing for these last several months had been reached the two countries by now would have been able to go forward along a course of peace and of mutual benefit. The Secretary went on to say that this Government had been prepared to be patient and to move gradually and to be of all possible help it could to the Japanese Government in order to enable the Japanese Government to assert control over all groups in Japan so that the Japanese Government as a whole and public opinion could be brought into line to support policies such as those which the Ambassador and the Secretary had in mind. The Secretary pointed out that while this Government was proceeding along this patient course the Secretary had, at a time when he was recuperating from illness in the country, received word of measures taken by the Japanese Government which made it clear that those elements in the Japanese Government which favored peaceful courses had lost control and that accordingly he had directed officers of the Department to inform the Japanese Ambassador that, in the opinion of this Government, the measures now taken by the Japanese Government had served to remove the basis for an understanding such as the Ambassador and he had had in mind. Thus, the Secretary said, the understanding which the Secretary and the Ambassador had hoped to reach and which he felt that they had nearly reached failed of realization.

---

[80] *Infra.*

The Secretary went on to say that the Japanese press was being constantly stimulated to speak of encirclement of Japan by the United States. He said that today he had told press correspondents that there is no occasion for any nation in the world that is law-abiding and peaceful to become encircled by anybody except itself. The Secretary said that while in Japan the press was being officially inspired in ways calculated to inflame public opinion this Government was not treating Japan in any such way but was doing all that it could to deprecate agitation.

The Ambassador replied that he thought that the efforts being made to inspire the press in Japan were motivated purely by a desire to invigorate the Japanese people and were not inconsistent with a sincere desire on the part of the Japanese Government to improve relations with the United States.

He asked whether what the Secretary had said could be taken as the Secretary's reply to the suggestion he had made for a meeting of the responsible heads of the two Governments.

The Secretary went over once more the points which he had previously brought out and suggested that, in the light of what he had said and of the reply which he had handed the Ambassador, it remained with the Japanese Government to decide whether it could find means of shaping its policies accordingly and then endeavor to evolve some satisfactory plan.

J[OSEPH] W. B[ALLANTINE]

711.94/2244$\frac{4}{11}$

Document Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on August 8, 1941

[WASHINGTON,] August 8, 1941.

The President's proposal was that, if the Japanese Government would refrain from occupying Indochina or establishing bases there with its military and naval forces, or, in case such steps had already actually been begun, would withdraw such forces, the President would do everything in his power to obtain from the Chinese Government, the British Government and the Netherland Government, and the Government of the United States would of course itself give, a binding and solemn declaration, provided the Japanese Government would make the same commitment to regard French Indochina as a "neutralized" country in the same way in which Switzerland had up to now been regarded by the powers as a neutralized country; that such a binding and solemn declaration on the part of each of the Governments mentioned would imply that none of these Governments would undertake any military act of aggression against French Indochina and that each of those Governments would refrain from the exercise of any military control within or over French Indochina. The President's proposal contemplated further that the Government of the United States would endeavor to obtain from Great Britain and the other interested powers a guarantee that, so long as the present emergency continues, the local French authorities in Indochina would remain undisturbed in control of the territory of French Indochina. Subsequently, the President's proposal with regard to French Indochina was extended to include Thailand as well, and the Japanese Government was informed that, should the Japanese Government accept the proposal of the President and abandon its present course with regard to French Indochina, the President would request of the other Governments which he had mentioned in connection with his proposal concerning French Indochina the same declaration and guarantee with regard to Thailand.

The Government of the United States feels that its views in regard to a broad understanding which would be calculated to establish and maintain peace in the Pacific area to the benefit of each and every country concerned in that area have been made abundantly clear in various official utterances and acts and in the course of the long series of conversations which the Secretary of State has had during recent months with the Japanese Ambassador. It feels that the Japanese Government is well aware of its attitude, of what it is able and willing to do, and of what it cannot do. It therefore feels that the proposals advanced in the document handed to the Secretary by the Japanese Ambassador on August 6 are lacking in responsiveness to the suggestion made by the President, the specifications of which have been for convenience of reference reiterated above.

711.94/2185

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] August 16, 1941.

The Ambassador of Japan called at his request. He proceeded to say that he had again read over the documents that he and I had had under discussion, that he had been in communication with his Government, and that he believed there were grounds for progress in the conversations. He said that his Government was very desirous of working out peaceful relations between our two countries and he elaborated further along this line and against the idea of war. He stated that he would favor concessions in order to avoid war and that from what he heard from his Government, it would make concessions in order to avoid war. He said that in fact it would be glad to have a high Japanese official meet a high American official half way between the two countries in order to take up the matter in its final form.

The Ambassador then pointedly inquired of me whether conversations such as he and I had been conducting could be resumed between our two Governments. I proceeded to reiterate and repeat the circumstances leading up to the cessation of our conversations and the reasons which I set forth through Mr. Welles for their discontinuance. I did not pass further on the question which he propounded but left it as it was. The Ambassador remarked that the situation was critical and it was very important in his judgment for suitable steps to be taken to avoid serious developments but I still revealed no sign whatever of saying anything favorable about his request for a resumption of conversations. I said that as the matter stands Japan with her Army, Navy and air forces was establishing many bases in and about French Indochina under her continued policy of conquest by force, that this would mean about the last step prior to a serious invasion of the South Sea area if it should be decided upon by Japan, that such an invasion would be a serious menace to British success in Europe and hence to the safety of the Western Hemisphere, including the United States, and that, therefore, this Government could not for a moment remain silent in the face of such a threat, especially if it should be carried forward to any further extent. The Ambassador remarked that the people of Japan did not have enough foodstuffs and went to Indochina to secure such needed commodities as rice. To this I promptly replied that if Japan had been willing to go forward with a peaceful settlement of the Pacific area in line with the principles and policies the Ambassador and I had discussed, Japan would have been able peacefully and without the use or threat of force to have equal access with every other nation to world markets for rice and all other foodstuffs.

The Ambassador repeatedly said that his country was very desirous of peaceful relations with this country in the future as well as now and that he believed his Government would make some concessions in order to resume conversations to this end. I expressed interest in this and again referred to Japan's continuing policy of conquest by force and of bitter denunciation of this country by the Government controlled press which is loudly supporting such a policy, and again I said that I would not be in a position to say anything relative to his request in addition to what I had said some days ago when he first brought up the matter.

I suggested to the Ambassador that the situation was very serious and that if he desired to talk to any others on this subject or to the President it would be perfectly agreeable with me and I would not consider it as in any way going around me, et cetera. The Ambassador said that he would not be in a position to talk to the President until he first telegraphed his country for instructions as to what concessions it might be willing to make in connection with a resumption of conversations.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

711.94/2184

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] August 17, 1941.

The Ambassador of Japan called to see the President at the latter's request. Following some few exchanges of preliminary remarks, the President then became serious and proceeded to refer to the strained relations between our two countries. He referred to the Ambassador's visit to me and the latter's request for a reopening of the conversations between our two Governments. The President commented briefly on the policies and principles that this Government has been standing for in its relations with Japan, and he made some contrast to Japan's opposite course of conquest by force, et cetera. He concluded by saying that our attitude of opposition to Japan's course has been made well known, and that the next move is now up to Japan. The President inquired of the Ambassador if he had anything in mind to say in connection with the situation. Thereupon the Ambassador drew out of his pocket an instruction which he said was from his Government, in which the Japanese Government set forth some generalities and asserted very earnestly that it desired to see peaceful relations preserved between our two countries; that Prince Konoye feels so seriously and so earnestly about preserving such relations that he would be disposed to meet the President midway, geographically speaking, between our two countries and sit down together and talk the matter out in a peaceful spirit.

The President thereupon said that this Government should really bring the matters between the two Governments literally up to date and that he would, therefore, offer certain observations about the position of this Government; he added that he regretted the necessity of so doing but that he had no other recourse. The President said he had dictated what he was about to say and that he would read it to the Ambassador and then hand him the written instrument containing the oral conversation. This the President proceeded to do as follows:

[Here follows text of the oral statement printed *infra.*]

The President, after some little delay in the conversation so as to set apart the first statement which he read to the Ambassador, then proceeded to turn to the Ambassador's request to the Secretary of State and to himself for a resumption of the conversations. The President made further references to Japan's opposing course of conquest by force and bitter denunciation of this country by the Japanese Government-controlled press and then coming to the request for a reopening of the conversations he repeated our former statements to the Japanese Government that, of course, we could not think of reopening the conversations if the Japanese Government is to continue its present movement of force and conquest supported by its bitter press campaign against this country.

Thereupon the President proceeded to read to the Ambassador the following statement, which is self-explanatory:

[Here follows text of the statement printed on page 557.]

The Ambassador received each paper in writing and said he would communicate both to his Government. He reiterated from time to time that his Government was very desirous of preserving peaceful relations between the two countries and he took no issue with the President relative to the reasons set forth by this Government for discontinuing conversations with Japan.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

711.94/2184

Oral Statement Handed by President Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on August 17, 1941

During past months the Governments of the United States and of Japan, through the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, have engaged in protracted conversations directed toward exploring the possibility of reaching a sound basis for negotiations between the two countries relative to the maintenance of peace with order and justice in the Pacific. The principles and policies which were under discussion in these conversations precluded pursuit by either Government of objectives of expansion by force or by threat of force.

On July 24 last the President of the United States informed the Japanese Government through the Japanese Ambassador in Washington that he was willing to suggest to the Governments of Great Britain, of The Netherlands and of China that they make a binding and solemn declaration that they had no aggressive intentions with regard to Indochina and that they would agree that the markets and raw materials of Indochina should be available to all Powers on equal terms. The President stated further that he would be willing to suggest to the Powers mentioned that they undertake this declaration, in which the United States would be willing to join, upon the understanding that the Government of Japan would be disposed to make a similar declaration and would be further disposed to withdraw its military and naval forces from Indochina.

Notwithstanding these efforts, the Government of Japan has continued its military activities and its disposals of armed forces at various points in the Far East and has occupied Indochina with its military, air and naval forces.

The Government of the United States is in full sympathy with the desire expressed by the Japanese Government that there be provided a fresh basis for amicable and mutually profitable relations between our two countries. This Government's patience in seeking an acceptable basis for such an understanding has been demonstrated time and again during recent years and especially during recent months. This Government feels at the present stage that nothing short of the most complete candor on its part, in the light of evidence and indications which come to it from many sources, will at this moment tend to further the objectives sought.

Such being the case, this Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States.

711.94/2184

Statement Handed by President Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on August 17, 1941

Reference is made to the question which the Japanese Ambassador raised on August 8 during a conversation with the Secretary of State whether it might not be possible for the responsible heads of the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States to meet with a view to discussing means whereby an adjustment in relations between the United States and Japan might be brought about. The thought of Prince Konoe and of the Japanese Government in offering this suggestion is appreciated.

Reference is made also to the desire expressed by the Japanese Ambassador during a call on the Secretary of State on August 16 that there be resumed the informal conversations which had been in progress between the two Governments toward ascertaining whether there existed a basis for negotiations relative to a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation.

When the Japanese Ambassador brought up these suggestions, the Secretary of State reminded the Ambassador that the Government of the United States had shown great patience and had been prepared to continue in that course of patience so long as the Japanese Government manifested a desire to follow courses of peace. It was pointed out to the Ambassador that while proceeding along this course this Government had received reports indicating clearly that the Japanese Government was adopting courses directly the opposite of those on which the recent conversations between the Ambassador and the Secretary of State had been predicated. It was pointed out also that the Japanese press was being constantly stimulated to speak of encirclement of Japan by the United States and was being officially inspired in ways calculated to inflame public opinion. The Secretary of State made it clear that he did not see how conversations between the two Governments could usefully be pursued or proposals be discussed while Japanese official spokesmen and the Japanese press contended that the United States was endeavoring to encircle Japan and carried on a campaign against the United States.

On two occasions officers of the Department of State, pursuant to instructions from the Secretary of State, called on the Japanese Ambassador to indicate concern over the reports that Japan intended to acquire by force or threat of force military and naval bases in French Indochina. Subsequently, on July 21 and July 23 the Acting Secretary of State raised with the Japanese Minister and with the Japanese Ambassador the question of Japan's intentions with regard to French Indochina and pointed out that the Government of the United States could only assume that the occupation by Japan of French Indochina or the acquisition of military and naval bases in that area constituted notice to the United States that Japan had taken by forceful means a step preparatory to embarking on further movements of conquest in the South Pacific area. The Acting Secretary pointed out further that this new move on Japan's part was prejudicial to the procurement by the United States of essential raw materials and to the peace of the Pacific, including the Philippine Islands.

The Government of the United States accordingly had no alternative but to inform the Japanese Ambassador that, in the opinion of this Government, the measures then being taken by the Japanese Government had served to remove the basis for further conversations relative to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area.

Informal discussions between the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States directed toward ascertaining whether there existed a basis for negotiations relative to a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation would naturally envisage the working out of a progressive program attainable by peaceful methods. It goes without saying that no proposals or suggestions affecting the rights and privileges of either the United States or Japan would be considered except as they might be in conformity with the basic principles to which the United States has long been committed. The program envisaged in such informal discussions would involve the application in the entire Pacific area of the principle of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment. It would thus make possible access by all countries to raw materials and to all other essential commodities. Such a program would envisage cooperation by all nations of the Pacific on a voluntary and peaceful basis toward utilizing all available resources of capital, technical skill, and progressive economic leadership for the purpose of building up not only their own economies but also the economies of regions where productive capacity can be improved. The result would be to increase the purchasing power of the nations and peoples concerned, to raise standards of living, and to create conditions conducive to the maintenance of peace. If such a program based upon peaceable and constructive principles were to be adopted for the Pacific and if thereafter any of the countries or areas within the Pacific were menaced, the policy of aiding nations resisting aggression would continue to be followed by this Government and this Government would cooperate with other nations in extending assistance to any country threatened.

Under such a program for the Pacific area Japan would, in the opinion of the Government of the United States, attain all the objectives which Japan affirms that it is seeking. This program would not enable any country to extend its military or political control over other peoples or to obtain economic rights of a definitely monopolistic or preferential character. In those cases where the production and distribution of essential commodities are vested in monopolies, the Government of the United States would expect to use its influence to see that all countries are given a fair share of the distribution of the products of such monopolies and at a fair price.

If the Japanese Government is seeking what it affirms to be its objectives, the Government of the United States feels that the program above outlined is one that can be counted upon to assure Japan satisfaction of its economic needs and legitimate aspirations with much greater certainty than could any other program.

In case the Japanese Government feels that Japan desires and is in position to suspend its expansionist activities, to readjust its position, and to embark upon a peaceful program for the Pacific along the lines of the program and principles to which the United States is committed, the Government of the United States would be prepared to consider resumption of the informal exploratory discussions which were interrupted in July and would be glad to endeavor to arrange a suitable time and place to exchange views. The Government of the United States, however, feels that, in view of the circumstances attending the interruption of the informal conversations between the two Governments, it would be helpful to both Governments, before undertaking a resumption of such conversations or proceeding with plans for a meeting, if the Japanese Government would be so good as to furnish a clearer statement than has yet been furnished as to its present attitude and plans, just as this Government has repeatedly outlined to the Japanese Government its attitude and plans.

711.94/2622

Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)

[Tokyo,] August 18, 1941.

As requested by Mr. Terasaki,[80a] I called on him at the Foreign Office at three o'clock this afternoon. Mr. Terasaki said that he would appreciate my conveying to the Ambassador a private message from him, as follows:

The interview between the Foreign Minister and the Ambassador, to be held at four o'clock this afternoon would be of the greatest importance. He hoped that it would initiate a series of conversations between them which would eventually yield a satisfactory adjustment of American-Japanese relations. If these conversations should prove unsuccessful, he did not believe that another attempt could be made. If a Cabinet under the leadership of Prince Konoye should prove unable to adjust relations with the United States, it would be inconceivable for any other Japanese statesman to succeed where he had failed.

[80a] Director of the American Bureau of the Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

The prime requisite in accomplishing the end which he had in mind was high statesmanship on both sides—an undue alertness on the part of either side to criticize the actions and policies of the other should be avoided and each should make effort to appreciate the position of the other.

The third point stressed by Mr. Terasaki was that whereas Japan was ready to respond to any action by the United States intended to bring the conflict in the Far East to an end, it will under no circumstances give in to any form of pressure.

Mr. Terasaki concluded by requesting that I inform the Ambassador that high hopes were being held in all influential quarters with regard to the outcome of the conversations which would be initiated by today's interview between the Ambassador and the Foreign Minister. He hoped that the Ambassador would do everything possible to bring these hopes to full fruition.

E[UGENE] H. D[OOMAN]

NOTE: Mr. Terasaki explained that the conversations would be "off the record", by which he meant that there would be no commitment on either side in regard to any question which might arise during the conversations.

711.94/2339

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[TOKYO,] August 18, 1941.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to call at 4 o'clock this afternoon and in an oral statement which took two hours and a half to be delivered, interpreted from Japanese into English and transcribed by me, Admiral Toyoda set forth a proposal of prime importance for solving the present critical situation between Japan and the United States. He pointed out the supreme importance of avoiding any leakage, especially he said to the Germans or Italians, and he hoped that in my report to Washington no risk would be incurred of my telegram being read by others. I said that the telegram would be sent in a code which I hoped and believed was unbreakable. I said that so far as I was concerned the only persons who would be informed of the proposal would be Mr. Dooman and my confidential secretary, Miss Arnold, who would transcribe the conversation. The Minister seemed to be entirely satisfied with these assurances.

The Minister commenced by stating that this was to be a long and strictly confidential talk on a very important matter in which he asked for my cooperation. He said that he would speak to me frankly as a naval officer and not as a career diplomat. I replied that I myself had no use for Old World diplomacy and was accustomed to speaking also with the utmost frankness and straight from the shoulder.

1. The stationing of Japanese forces in Indochina, resulting from the protocol for the joint defence of Indochina, was a peaceful and protective step taken for the purpose of solving the China affair. It was an independent step taken on Japan's own initiative and no German or any other pressure had been exerted.

2. In spite of the foregoing assurances conveyed to me and also to Admiral Nomura, the United States had assumed that this was the exercise of armed force at the instigation of Germany and had taken an economic step which had brought our countries very near to a complete severance of economic relations and had left a big black spot on the long history of peaceful relations between the United States and Japan.

3. The Japanese people, said the Minister, share his opinion and public opinion has become extremely excited but the Government has done all in its power to repress this excitement by prohibiting posters, public gatherings and hostile press comment.

4. The reply of the Japanese Government to the President's proposal of July 24, was sent immediately to Washington and when Secretary Hull returned to Washington on August 6 Ambassador Nomura had handed him the reply. This reply had been drafted after careful and complete study and with a view to meeting as far as possible the intentions of the American Government.

5. The Japanese reply contains important proposals which would bind both governments; Japanese forces in Indochina would be immediately withdrawn when the China affair is settled; it contains three points binding each party.

6. Nevertheless the President's proposal was an independent one dealing exclusively with the joint defence measure of Indochina. The Japanese reply was also accordingly restricted to that subject and was to be dealt with independently of the general adjustment of relations which had been discussed between Secretary Hull and Admiral Nomura.

7. On August 8 Admiral Nomura had received from Secretary Hull the American reply to the Japanese proposal reiterating the substance of the President's proposal of July 24 and Admiral Toyoda regretted that the American reply seemed to attach too little importance to the profound consideration given by the Japanese Government to the President's proposal.

8. In other words, the American proposal, it seems, suggested the withdrawal of Japanese forces from Indochina as a prerequisite although the Japanese Government had definitely affirmed its intention to withdraw immediately after the China affair had been settled because the China affair is the obstacle to peace in the Far East.

9. If the United States really desires peace in the Far East the Japanese Government hopes that it will give full consideration to the Japanese Government's declaration and will cooperate for the settlement of the China affair which is the obstacle to peace in the Far East.

10. As the Ambassador is fully aware, both the present and the last cabinet of Prince Konoye have had the sincerest wish to adjust relations with the United States and it is the Minister's firm conviction that there is no room for doubt that this wish has been equally shared by President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull.

11. Admiral Toyoda says this because the breakdown of peace between both countries which has long been cherished with the accomplishment of cordial friendship between both peoples would itself be an extremely miserable matter, and not only that but because both Japan and the United States which are the last two countries which hold the key for maintaining world peace in their hands under the present world situation would proceed to the worst situation without showing statesmanship; that would leave the greatest black spot on human history and would be nothing but making future historians unable to understand the nature of the breakdown, and lastly because allowing the situation to come to that pass would mean that we as statesmen had not fully fulfilled our responsibility for the benefit of both peoples.

12. The Minister believes that both Japan and the United States must do their duty as saviours of the world in the present crisis, and for that purpose the problems lying between the two countries must be considered in a calm and friendly atmosphere on an equal basis as between two great powers facing the Pacific Ocean; the Minister further believes that it would be possible to come to an adjustment of relations between both countries in that spirit.

13. The Minister cannot but recognize the fact that in spite of the points just mentioned the present relations between the United States and Japan have become extremely strained as a result of misunderstanding between the two countries and sinister designs by third powers, and that if the situation should be left without trying to prevent it from getting worse it would lead to a most critical situation.

14. The only way to eliminate this critical situation is, the Minister thinks, that the responsible people of both countries should directly

meet each other and express their true intentions toward each other and thus to study the possibility of remedying the present situation, trying to discover the methods for contributing toward mankind and the peace of the world.

15. In other words, the Minister thinks that it would be most opportune if the leaders of both countries, animated by the above mentioned desires, could have talks most frankly in order to dispose of American-Japanese relations in the aforesaid spirit and also from a broadminded point of view, and in view of his conviction that it would be highly desirable that Prince Konoye should proceed to Honolulu and have talks personally with President Roosevelt if the President would consent to this suggestion, the Minister sent an instruction on August 7 to Ambassador Nomura about this matter. He intended that Admiral Nomura should personally see President Roosevelt on his return to Washington.

16. According to news reports the President returned to Washington yesterday. In view of the seriousness of the matter the Minister desired to make this statement to me on this suggestion and he wished to ask for my cooperation towards the realization of this proposal.

17. The Minister firmly believed that I would give him my cooperation with the more sincerity and vigor in order to make this plan succeed when he remembers my ever continuing sincere effort for the improvement of American-Japanese friendly relations during the past nine long years.

18. Needless to say the Premier's going abroad would have no precedent in Japanese history and the Prime Minister, Prince Konoye, has made up his mind with an extremely strong determination to meet the President notwithstanding the fact that he is fully aware of the objections in certain parts of this country. This determination of Prince Konoye is nothing but the expression of his strongest desire to save the civilization of the world from ruin as well as to maintain peace in the Pacific by making every effort in his power, and the Minister firmly believes that the President will also be in harmony with this thought and will give his consent to the proposal of the Japanese Government.

19. It is firmly believed that in the conversations between the Prime Minister and the President it will be possible to reach a just and equitable agreement on the general question of Japanese-American relations from the broadminded point of view as a result of the expressions of the highest degree of statesmanship of both leaders, Japan not being necessarily bound by her reply to the President's proposal of July 24 made through Admiral Nomura on August 6 and in this connection the Minister wishes to call my attention to the fact that it is absolutely necessary to avoid arousing misunder-

standing or giving an impression both inside and outside this country that the Japanese Government has entered into negotiation with the American Government as a result of American pressure. Based upon this point of view the Minister deems it desirable that various measures of economic pressure against Japan be immediately stopped or highly moderated and the Japanese Government is of course ready to reciprocate at once in this respect. The Minister wishes to draw the attention of the American Government to this point.

20. The foregoing is the substance of the highly serious and absolutely secret proposal for which the Minister especially asked me to visit him today. In view of its importance and delicate nature he does not need to ask me to keep this only to myself as it is not difficult to imagine what would occur if it should leak out. This is the reason why he has so far been instructing only Admiral Nomura to discuss and to dispose of the matter in the United States, but in order to make this proposal realized he has most frankly expressed his opinion to me so that he may have my helpful cooperation and, if there should be any question concerning this proposal he will be very glad to talk it over with me.

In the early part of the Minister's oral statement, before he had come to the proposed meeting in Honolulu, I spoke of Japan's progressive southward advance and the fact that in spite of all peaceful assurances the American Government, in the light of the steps taken by Japan, could only be guided by facts and actions and not by words. I noted also the fact that whereas in previous conversation the Minister had ascribed the Japanese move into Indochina as brought about by the threatened encirclement by other powers including the United States and Great Britain he now ascribed it exclusively to the settling of the China affair. To these comments the Minister made no reply.

I furthermore repeated to him the statement which the Under Secretary had made to the Japanese Ambassador on July 23 to the effect that Mr. Hull could not see that any basis was now offered for continuing the conversations which had been carried on in Washington between the Secretary and Admiral Nomura and I also spoke of Mr. Hull's statement to Admiral Nomura on August 8 to the effect that in the view of the American Government the proposal handed by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State on August 6 failed in responsiveness to the proposal advanced by the President on July 24.

At the end of his presentation I said that I would withhold comment until my Government had had an opportunity to study the proposal which the Minister had advanced but I said that in the interests of peace I would give the proposal my own personal support.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

711.94/2182 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

[Substance—Extract]

TOKYO, August 18, 1941—10 p. m.
[Received August 19—12:55 a. m.[81]]

1268. The Ambassador reports as follows for Secretary Hull and Under Secretary Welles:

. . . .

He says that naturally he is not aware of the reaction President Roosevelt will have to the proposal made today orally by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Ambassador urges, however, with all the force at his command, for the sake of avoiding the obviously growing possibility of an utterly futile war between Japan and the United States, that this Japanese proposal not be turned aside without very prayerful consideration. Not only is the proposal unprecedented in Japanese history, but it is an indication that Japanese intransigence is not crystallized completely owing to the fact that the proposal has the approval of the Emperor and the highest authorities in the land. The good which may flow from a meeting between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt is incalculable. The opportunity is here presented, the Ambassador ventures to believe, for an act of the highest statesmanship, such as the recent meeting of President Roosevelt with Prime Minister Churchill at sea,[81a] with the possible overcoming thereby of apparently insurmountable obstacles to peace hereafter in the Pacific.

. . . .

GREW

711.94/2211

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] August 23, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador called at his request. He proceeded rather earnestly to thank me for the meeting between him and the President and myself on last Sunday and for the things that were said and done on that occasion as they related to American and Japanese relations. He then said that his Government was considering the communications that were given him by the President and myself to send to his Government; that his Government could not proceed rapidly with the consideration of such matters, and that it would require some days yet for it to make its decisions. He then proceeded to say that in his opinion his Government was very desirous of keeping war out of the Pacific and that, of course, he himself was using his best efforts to that end, and that, therefore, he felt that ways could be found, as they should be, to bring about this peaceful situation.

---

[81] Telegram in twelve sections.

[81a] See Department of State, *Bulletin*, August 16, 1941 (vol. v, No. 112), p. 125; also *ibid.*, August 23, 1941 (vol. v, No. 113), p. 147.

I expressed my interest in and appreciation of what the Ambassador had said. I then reiterated with emphasis the main points in the position of the United States at present and heretofore in support of peace in the Pacific area and said that this Government has nothing new to say or do except to pursue its present course of proclaiming the basic principles of peace and law and justice and equality and fair play alike in the entire Pacific area, to say nothing of the world as a whole, whereas Japan having pursued a different course during recent years is in a situation where she must change vital phases of that course if she really seeks a peaceful settlement in the Pacific such as the Ambassador himself and I personally favor. I said that during the several months of conversation between the Ambassador and myself last Spring and up into June and July the Government controlled press of Japan was fairly shouting the bitterest denunciations against the United States and in favor of going forward with all sorts of so-called "new orders" and "greater new orders" in the Pacific area, while the war element, seemingly led by Matsuoka, were almost shouting their heads off about the Tripartite Agreement, against the United States, and in favor of going forward with force on a program of unlimited expansion to establish the so-called "new order". I then added that, of course, during those months I could not induce Americans or the English or the Chinese to believe that the Government of Japan was really in earnest about discussing and bringing about a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area and that the President and I have constantly kept the Ambassador and the Japanese Government reminded of this situation, as we did as late as our conversation with the Ambassador on last Sunday and in the message sent to the Government of Japan on that day. I stated that I hoped to keep his Government continuously reminded of this phase, as well as others that have been brought up in writing, if his Government seriously seeks to make a real contribution to a peaceful settlement.

The Ambassador said that while it had not become a diplomatic incident thus far, the shipment of oil to Vladivostok through Japanese waters would naturally give the Japanese real concern at an early date; that they are faced with large Russian forces in the Vladivostok area and that they cannot be satisfied or content to see what they would firmly believe would be a great building up of Russian military supply bases just across the line from Japan and that, naturally, it would call for discussion in all probability. I remarked jocularly that I wondered whether the stationing of large armies by Japan and Russia facing each other across the border in the Vladivostok-"Manchukuoan" area was a method of administering and maintaining the late non-aggression pact entered into between Japan and Russia with great enthusiasm on the part of Matsuoka. The Ambassador only laughed but did so rather significantly. I then said that, of course, this Government at this time is only concerned to see Russia get these and other military supplies in European Russia for the purpose of resisting the German Armies; that this Government has no other motive or purpose than that, and hence the question of building up supplies for the Russian Army in the Far East is not in any sense in view. I stated that this Government is convinced that Hitler is strenuously endeavoring to conquer and destroy everything worthwhile in the Western world, and that we are determined to aid every country—to the fullest extent and as quickly as possible—that is resisting Hitler and that relates to the present situation. I said the Ambassador must be aware of the sincerity of our position and our purpose and that we consider it a compelling one. The Ambassador nodded his head as though he acquiesced at least in our sincerity and our objective whether he agreed with it or not.

I said to the Ambassador that, of course, if Japan, which I hoped she would not do, should project herself militarily into the Russian-German situation or into other military situations that would directly affect this Government, an entirely different question would be presented. I then inquired whether the Ambassador had spoken to the Russian Ambassador here on the subject and he replied in the affirmative but seemed to have gotten no particular satisfaction either way out of the conversation.

The Ambassador then said that he supposed we had abandoned the sale of any oil at all to Japan under the freezing system which requires licenses and thus far no licenses have been issued for the sale of oil. I replied that I had not checked fully on the details of this matter; that it ramifies through other departments of the Government. I then stopped long enough to inquire if the Ambassador knew what was taking place between Great Britain and Japan in this respect and he said he did not. I replied that I did not either, but that I would soon check this and our own situation as it related to his inquiry.

The Ambassador then departed, again emphasizing his hope for better relations between the two countries.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

711.94/2210

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] August 23, 1941.

The Ambassador of Japan called at my apartment. He said that since talking with me earlier in the day he had received a despatch from his Government relative to the meeting of responsible heads of the two Governments. The President had indicated if such meeting was to be held, that it might be arranged for about October fifteenth. The Ambassador said that his Government desired to have this meeting earlier than October fifteenth, which he said in all frankness is due to the coming reported military and other conferences with Soviet Russia in Moscow at an earlier date and probably in the first part of September. He indicated that his Government was afraid that some agreements might be entered into at Moscow that would be detrimental to Japan and to Japan's plans and policies. I replied to his general suggestion by saying that the non-aggression pact between Japan and Soviet Russia would undoubtedly give Japan all of the assurance of Russia's peaceful attitude towards Japan as Japan could desire. The Ambassador laughed very heartily at this. I said further that I did not know just when the meeting at Moscow was to be held or the complexion of its personnel. I made no promises of any kind in regard to a meeting of responsible heads of the American and Japanese Governments or when it would be held, if it should be held at all.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

711.94/2624

Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)

[TOKYO,] August 27, 1941.

DESPATCH OF TANKERS CARRYING SUPPLIES OF OIL FROM THE UNITED STATES TO VLADIVOSTOK

This afternoon the Director of the American Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, delivered orally to me the following message to be conveyed to the Ambassador:

The Japanese Ambassador in Washington was instructed by telegraph late last night to call on the Secretary of State and to inform him that the trend of the internal situation in Japan is causing the most serious concern and may develop into one of the utmost gravity largely as a result of the despatch by the American Government of supplies of oil to the Far Eastern ports of the Soviet Union. The Ambassador was urgently to request that the American tankers now en route be recalled pending the decision on the proposal recently made by the Japanese Government for a meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister, and also to urge upon the United States Government the desirability of giving favorable consideration to the holding of such a meeting as soon as possible.

The Foreign Minister expressed the hope that the American Ambassador would find it possible to support the request that the Japanese Ambassador had been instructed to make to the Secretary. If Mr. Grew did not consider it possible to support the recommendation that the tankers be recalled, the Foreign Minister hoped that the Ambassador would feel in a position to recommend that the tankers be routed so as to avoid passing through the Straits of Soya and Tsugaru and to proceed to Vladivostok through the Kurile Straits running between Kamchatka and the most northerly of the Kurile Islands and thence between the island of Saghalien and the continent via the Straits of Tartary. The Foreign Minister was much disturbed by the strong resentment felt among certain elements in Japan at the anticipated passage of tankers bearing supplies of gasoline which might be employed against Japan through waters contiguous to Japan and he hoped that Mr. Grew would realize that Japan, entirely apart from the relations between Japan and the Soviet Union established by the Neutrality Pact, would be placed in an awkward position through the shipment under the nose of Japan of supplies to the Soviet Union.

Having delivered the foregoing message to be transmitted to the Ambassador, the Director of the American Bureau in emphasizing its importance stated that the internal situation in Japan was extremely grave and that should there be any premature disclosure at this time of the recent Japanese proposal while these tankers were en route to Vladivostok it would probably bring about further attempts on the lives of leading members of the Japanese Government.

In concluding the conversation Mr. Terasaki mentioned that the Minister for Foreign Affairs would probably ask the Ambassador to call on him either on the following day August 28 or on August 29.

E[UGENE] H. D[OOMAN]

711.94/22_3

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] August 27, 1941.

The Ambassador of Japan called at his request. He said that he was having decoded a message from his Government to the President in reply to the recent message sent by the President some ten days ago to the Prime Minister of Japan relative to the general state of relations between our two countries. I thanked the Ambassador and said that I would be glad, since he has requested it, to arrange for him to see the President tomorrow morning, if possible, in order that he might deliver this message in person to the President, according to what he says are his instructions from Tokyo.

I made one or two general remarks to the effect that progress in our relations depended on whether the Japanese Government has seriously decided to abandon its policy of conquest by force and turn in the opposite direction of peace based on a peaceful settlement of relations in the entire Pacific area such as our two Governments may be able to work out. The Ambassador said that he felt that the note would mark an improvement in the relations of the two countries and would offer opportunities for a gradual increase of these improved relations.

The Ambassador then took up the matter of our two oil tanker shipments to Soviet Russia through Vladivostok. I said that his protest did not have a thing to stand upon; that these shipments are entirely legitimate under all laws of commerce; that they are also supported by the Japanese-Russian agreement of Portsmouth;[82] that they are just as valid acts of commerce as the shipment of vast quantities of oil from this country to Japan; that the amount of these two tankers is microscopic—that is 100,000 or 200,000 barrels compared with the hundred million barrels and more which Japan has bought from this country during the past four years; and that it is, therefore, greatly surprising that the Japanese press, much less the Japanese Government, would attempt thus to make a mountain out of a molehill.

I then inquired of the Ambassador whether Japan would, as a condition preceding to dealing further with their protest, agree in the future to acquiesce in any objection Soviet Russia may make to Japanese purchases of any oil from the United States. The Ambassador made no reply except to say that the reasons I offered were strong but that the masses of the people in Japan are being required to use charcoal instead of oil and that they are being harangued by the press and public agitators with the reminder that they are not getting any oil from this country while they point to the American tankers passing Japan loaded with oil for Russia. I said this, of course, was purely spurious as an economic or business fact.

I then inquired of the Ambassador just what they wanted us to do, whether in fact they were asking us to turn the ships squarely around and sail them back to the United States, and I proceeded to answer for him by saying that would be preposterous. The Ambassador then said the answer was to let the two Japanese tankers that were leaving this country monthly be loaded with oil to take back to Japan. I inquired whether they could not use some of their free money both in this country and South America to pay for the oil to go in these two tankers. He said he would look into that. I requested him to be sure to do so and let me know further.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

---

[82] Treaty of peace of September 5, 1905, *Foreign Relations*, 1905, p. 824.

711.94/2244$\frac{5}{11}$

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] August 27, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador called at the Secretary's apartment at the Ambassador's request and gave the Secretary a copy of a statement which the Ambassador said he desired to present to the President on the following day.[83] The Ambassador expressed himself as hopeful of the prospects of reaching a satisfactory agreement with the United States on the basis of the statement in question, which statement the Ambassador felt represented the maximum in concessions which the Japanese Government under present circumstances was in position to make.

The Secretary took the document handed him by the Ambassador and said he would be glad to give it careful study.

J[OSEPH] W. B[ALLANTINE]

711.94/2227

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] August 28, 1941.

The Ambassador of Japan called on the President at the former's request. The Secretary of State was present. The Ambassador expressed his usual appreciation of certain courtesies and considerations shown him and his Government.

He then handed to the President a communication from the Prince Premier of Japan to the President of the United States (copy attached).[84] The President read it with interest and complimented the tone and spirit of it.

The President then spoke somewhat as he did at the last meeting a week ago Sunday about the idea suggested by the Japanese Prime Minister of a personal meeting between the President and the Prime Minister at as early a date as possible for the purpose of having a frank discussion of all important affairs existing between the two countries. The President again spoke of the difficulty of going as far as Hawaii and elaborated on the reasons why it would be difficult to get away for twenty-one days. He then turned to Juneau, Alaska, as a meeting place, which would only require some fourteen or fifteen days, allowing for a three or four days conversation with the Japanese Prime Minister. The only point raised by the Ambassador in this connection was that the conversation be held as early as possible.

---

[83] *Post*, p. 572.

[84] *Infra.*

The Ambassador then handed to the President a communication from his Government in reply to the communication of the President to the Japanese Government, dated August 17, 1941 (copy attached).[85] The President expressed his keen interest to get this reply and proceeded to read it. At two or three stages he stopped to comment briefly and, as he stated each time, study would later, of course, be given to the subject. For example, he remarked that there was nothing in the note to prevent the Japanese from reinforcing their Army and Navy in the Indochina area while the conversations were going on, even though there was no advance whatever by the Japanese forces. At another point he injected some oral comment to the effect that Japan is in no possible danger from Russia at the present time and he emphasized this very strongly. At still another point he referred critically to the Japanese oil complaints and their baseless nature. He then reminded the Ambassador that under the oil quota allowed Japan by this Government, Japan was in a position to have a number of tankers loaded with oil and transported to Japan if and when it so desired.

At the conclusion of the reading of the communication, the President said to the Ambassador that he could say to his Government that he considered this note a step forward and that he was very hopeful. He then added that he would be keenly interested in having three or four days with Prince Konoye, and again he mentioned Juneau.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

711.94/2227

The Japanese Prime Minister (Prince Konoye) to President Roosevelt[86]

I deeply appreciate the courtesy of Your Excellency in delivering personally to Ambassador Nomura the reply of the United States Government to the proposal of the Japanese Government regarding a meeting between Your Excellency and myself.

In the face of universal warlike turmoil Japan and the United States are the last two major Powers who hold the key to international peace. That the two nations should fall in the worst of relations at this time would mean not only a disaster in itself, but also the collapse of world civilization. Japan is solicitous for the maintenance of the peace of the Pacific and the peace of the world and she desires therefore to improve Japanese-American relations.

The present deterioration of the Japanese-American relations is largely due, I feel, to a lack of understanding which has led to mutual suspicions and misapprehensions, and also encouraged the machinations and maneuvers of Third Powers.

---

[85] *Post*, p. 573.

[86] Handed to President Roosevelt by the Japanese Ambassador on August 28, 1941.

Without first eliminating such causes, it is impossible to expect adjustment of Japanese-American relations. This is why I wish to meet Your Excellency personally for a frank exchange of views.

The preliminary informal conversations, disrupted July last, were quite appropriate both in spirit and content. But the idea of continuing those conversations and to have their conclusion confirmed by the responsible heads of the two Governments does not meet the need of the present situation which is developing swiftly and may produce unforeseen contingencies.

I consider it, therefore, of urgent necessity that the two heads of the Governments should meet first to discuss from a broad standpoint all important problems between Japan and America covering the entire Pacific area, and to explore the possibility of saving the situation. Adjustment of minor items may, if necessary, be left to negotiations between competent officials of the two countries, following the meeting.

Such is my aim in making the present proposal. I sincerely hope my views in this regard are fully understood and reciprocated by Your Excellency.

Because of the nature of the meeting as stated above, I would prefer that it will take place as soon as possible.

[Tokyo,] August 27, 1941.

711.94/2227

Statement by the Japanese Government Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to President Roosevelt on August 28, 1941

The Japanese Government has received the communication conveyed by the Secretary of State and the President of the United States to the Japanese Ambassador on August 17, 1941. The Japanese Government desires to state its views as follows:

The Japanese Government profoundly regrets that despite the pledge it has given heretofore as well as its repeated explanations concerning Japan's actions and measures in the foreign field, the United States Government continues to entertain misgivings.

The United States Government mentions certain situations and measures which it regards as inimical to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area. In an atmosphere of world crisis and international confusion, it is sometimes difficult to ascertain when an event is a cause and when it is a consequence.

When a nation is obstructed in the path of natural and peaceful development or when the means of its existence is threatened, not only is it imperative that that nation should take defensive measures, but it is also required to do so for the maintenance of a just peace. This was the motivating policy of the Japanese Government.

Meanwhile, the United States had taken certain measures which could be interpreted in Japan as indicative of a continuing unfriendly pressure at variance with the then current amicable conversations.

The United States Government certainly regards some of its actions as merely counter-measures against Japan's policy and procedures which were considered as conflicting with American interests and principles. On the other hand, to the Japanese Government those procedures were determined by considerations of self-protection for meeting national requirements or removing environmental and political obstacles against national security.

With admirable modesty of mind, the Government of the United States has seemed frequently unaware that its words and policies are automatically weighted with the immense power of America's accomplished facts, natural endowment and potential might. The President of the United States, and the Secretary of State, in their own unquestioning adherence to the ways of peaceful procedures, might find it difficult to believe that other nations, anywhere, could consider themselves threatened by the United States.

Yet, as long as there is lacking the assuagement of that possible threat, there will be some less favorably endowed (especially in essential resources) who will feel compelled to consider defensively their relations with the United States.

In consequence, the Japanese Government welcomes the invitation by the Government of the United States to an exchange of views in regard to basic policies and attitudes as the foundation of an understanding that will condition lasting and extensive peace in the Pacific area. For such peace, the Government of Japan is ready: for such a united effort toward a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation the Government of Japan, like the Government of the United States, would be proud to make sacrifices.

Japan's measure in Indo-China was intended to accelerate the settlement of the China Incident; and at the same time it was calculated to remove all menace to the peace of the Pacific and to secure to Japan an equitable supply of essential materials. It was a measure of self-defense the Japanese Government felt obliged to take. But the Japanese Government has no intention of threatening thereby other countries.

Therefore, the Japanese Government is prepared to withdraw its troops from Indo-China as soon as the China Incident is settled or a just peace is established in East Asia.

Furthermore, in order to remove all possible doubt in this regard, the Japanese Government reaffirms herewith its repeated declaration that its present action in Indo-China is not a preparatory step for military advance into neighboring territories. The Japanese Government believes the above pledge will suffice to clarify also Japan's intentions toward Thailand.

As regards Soviet-Japanese relations, the Japanese Government declares likewise that Japan will take no military action as long as the Soviet Union remains faithful to the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty and does not menace Japan or Manchoukuo or take any action contrary to the spirit of the said treaty. On the other hand, the Japanese Government sincerely hope that the United States Government will avoid any action that might give rise to a fear of menace to Japan through collaboration with the Soviet Union.

In a word, the Japanese Government has no intention of using, without provocation, military force against any neighboring nation.

Quite properly, discussions between the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States directed toward ascertaining if there existed a basis for negotiations for a peaceful settlement covering the entire situation,—such discussions would naturally envisage the working out of a progressive program, obtainable by peaceful methods. The Japanese Government shares fully that view with the Government of the United States.

It is also stated by the United States Government that no proposals or suggestions affecting the rights and privileges of either the United States or Japan would be considered except as these might be in conformity with the basic principles to which the United States has long been committed. The fundamental national policy long cherished by the Japanese Government is again in full agreement on that point.

Regarding the principles and directives set forth in detail by the American Government and envisaged in the informal conversations as constituting a program for the Pacific area, the Japanese Government wishes to state that it considers these principles and the practical application thereof, in the friendliest manner possible, are the prime requisites of a true peace and should be applied not only in the Pacific area but throughout the entire world. Such a program has long been desired and sought by Japan itself.

The Japanese Government now confidently hopes that from the larger viewpoint of a constructive world peace, and in the light of the current international situation, past differences may be merged in an agreement of principles and a cooperative effort based on order and justice. The meeting of the responsible heads of our respective Governments would confirm and give such sanction to our purposes that peace in the Pacific would be instituted by that meeting.

711.94/2244$\frac{8}{11}$

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] August 28, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador called by appointment made at his request at the Secretary's apartment. He expressed his appreciation for the Secretary's having arranged to have the Ambassador see the President that morning. The Ambassador said that he felt much encouraged from his interview with the President to hope for a successful outcome of our common effort to bring about an improvement in the relations between the two countries, and he added that he has telegraphed a full account of that interview to his Government.

The Ambassador said that it was his personal opinion that the suggestion of the President that the meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister be held at Juneau would be agreeable to his Government and that the Prime Minister would probably proceed thither by a Japanese warship, making the journey in about ten days. The Ambassador thought that the Prime Minister would be assisted by a staff of about twenty persons, of whom five each would be from the Foreign Office, the Army, the Navy and the Japanese Embassy at Washington. The Ambassador thought that the inclusion of army and navy representatives in the delegation would be especially beneficial in view of the responsibility which they would share for the settlement reached. He said his Government was very anxious that the meeting be held at the earliest possible moment in view of the efforts of a third country and fifth columnists in Japan, who are now behind a press campaign against the United States, to disturb Japanese-American relations. He suggested the period between September 21 and 25 as suitable. He said that the question of publicity was something which the two Governments should agree upon, and that involved in the question of timing of any announcement was the fact that the Prime Minister would necessarily have to leave Tokyo about five days before the President left Washington.

The Secretary said that he would refer these points to the President for his consideration.

The Secretary then pointed out to the Ambassador the desirability of there being reached in advance of the proposed meeting an agreement in principle on the principal questions which were involved in a settlement of Pacific questions between the two nations. He dwelt upon the serious consequences from the point of view of both Governments which would ensue if the meeting failed to result in an agreement as a consequence of issues arising which could not be resolved, and he expressed the view that the meeting should therefore have as its purpose the ratification of essential points already agreed to in principle. The Secretary pointed out that in the conversations which had taken place last spring difficulties had been encountered in regard to certain fundamental points which had caused delays which finally culminated in Japan's taking action contrary to the spirit which had animated both the Ambassador and himself in those conversations. The Secretary also pointed out that it would be unfortunate if now, while one half of the Japanese Government was disposed to go along a course of peace the other half should be pulling in the opposite direction.

The Ambassador reviewed the points in regard to which difficulties had been encountered in the conversations, namely: (1) Japan's relations to the Axis, (2) the question of the retention of Japanese troops in North China and Inner Mongolia, and (3) the question of the application of the principle of nondiscrimination in international commercial relations. He noted that only in regard to the question of the retention of Japanese troops in North China, concerning which he had no information that his Government had modified its attitude, did he anticipate real difficulty. He observed that with regard to Japan's relations with the Axis there should be no difficulties, as the Japanese people regarded their adherence to the Axis as merely nominal and as he could not conceive of his people being prepared to go to war with the United States for the sake of Germany. He said he thought our attitude in regard to self-protection was entirely reasonable. The only difficulty that he saw was that to ask that Japan give a blank check for action that the United States might take against Germany in the name of self-defense was equivalent to asking for a nullification of the Tripartite Pact.

The Secretary commented that the Japanese Government had entered into the Tripartite Pact at a most critical moment in our efforts to extend aid to England, and Japan's action therefore was given particular emphasis in this country. In addition, Mr. Matsuoka kept reasserting gratuitously Japan's alignment with the Axis. The Secretary said he felt that unless something was done to counteract the effect upon the American people, it might prove a source of serious embarrassment to the President upon his return from the proposed meeting. The Secretary went on to refer to the actual situation in our relations with Germany, to the fact that although no shooting is taking place we are maintaining patrols all the way to Iceland.

The Japanese Ambassador said that with regard to the China question it was the idea of the Japanese Government that we exercise our good offices in bringing the Chinese and Japanese together leaving China and Japan to reach a direct settlement among themselves whereas the United States Government desired to discuss with Japan the basic terms on which peace was to be concluded.

The Secretary said that we were involved in this matter through Japan's requesting this Government to exercise its good offices. In order to exercise such good offices it was necessary for us to have the confidence and friendship of the Chinese Government before and after exercising those good offices. We could not, he said, propose that the Chinese negotiate with Japan until we knew what the basic terms were which Japan intended to propose and it can be imagined what a difficult situation would be created if, after a meeting between Prince Konoye and the President, an explosion should take place in China as a result of dissatisfaction with the results of that meeting. The Secretary explained further that we could not now afford to have the Chinese think that we were ignoring their interests in going ahead with any arrangements and that it was our idea to help the Japanese achieve the purpose of establishing friendship with China on a solid basis. In this way the Secretary said we could work together, Japan and the United States, in order to make the most of the potentialities of the 500,000,000 people of China as a trading nation.

The Ambassador commented that of course the China question was a very important matter but in view of the wide-spread press comments to the effect that the situation had now come to a show-down between Japan and the United States were there not other questions pending between the United States and Japan even apart from the China question which could be disposed of at the meeting with a view to tiding over a critical situation.

The Secretary replied that it was quite true that there were these other questions but that the China question was one of the pivotal questions underlying relations between the United States and Japan and if this question remained unsettled to the satisfaction of all there would remain the roots of future instability and trouble. The Ambassador said that he recognized the soundness of what the Secretary said especially in view of the French Indochina situation. Mr. Ballantine said he assumed that what the Ambassador had reference to was the Japanese assurance that they would withdraw their troops from French Indochina as soon as the China affair was settled.

The Ambassador then recapitulated briefly what the Secretary had said, namely, that the Secretary considers that there should be an agreement in principle on the outstanding questions of importance prior to the holding of the meeting, that the meeting would serve the purpose of ratifying agreement in principle already reached, that the Secretary considered that the Chinese question was one of the pivotal subjects calling for settlement, and that this Government in exercising its good offices between China and Japan would have to consider the basic terms on which Japan proposed to negotiate. The Secretary said that this represented his views. The Ambassador said that he recognized that what the Secretary said was quite reasonable. The Ambassador had misgivings as to how far the Japanese Government could go on account of the internal political difficulties in Japan. He said, however, that Prince Konoye was a man of great courage and was prepared to assume great risks in bringing to a successful conclusion an effort to improve relations.

J[OSEPH] W. B[ALLANTINE]

711.94/2221 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

TOKYO, August 29, 1941—4 p. m.
[Received August 29—8:30 a. m.]

1342. The following official statement was released to the press by the Information Board at 2:30 p. m. today:

"Ambassador Nomura called on the American President on August 28 and in view of the international conditions of the time he delivered, in the form of a message from Premier Konoye, Japan's view regarding Pacific problems which are pending between Japan and the United States."

GREW

711.94/2244$\frac{9}{11}$

The Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, August 29, 1941.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have just received word from Tokyo to avoid publicity as much as possible concerning our conversations.

I am told that my Government, for various considerations, feels that secrecy at this time is essential for the success of the conversations. I desire, therefore, to request your cooperation in this regard.

Yours faithfully, K. NOMURA

711.94/2624

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[TOKYO,] August 29, 1941.

The Director of the American Bureau telephoned me this afternoon shortly before three o'clock to tell me that although the Foreign Minister had asked me to call upon him at three o'clock this afternoon, in view of a recent development the Minister was afraid of attendant publicity should I visit him and had requested Mr. Terasaki to deliver to me the Foreign Minister's message on his behalf.

Mr. Terasaki accordingly called at the Embassy and on behalf of the Minister conveyed to me for my information the text of the communication from the Japanese Prime Minister to the President which had been delivered by Admiral Nomura in Washington on August 28.

Mr. Terasaki's visit was substituted for my call on the Foreign Minister because the Japanese press had learned from Washington that a message from the Japanese Prime Minister had been delivered to the President and the news had reached Japan in such a form that it was impossible for the Government to conceal the fact of such a message from the Japanese public and as a result the Japanese Government felt compelled to issue the statement cabled in my telegram no. 1342, August 29, 4 p. m.

Mr. Terasaki, speaking on behalf of the Foreign Minister, dwelt on the unfortunate effect of the publicity which had been given to this matter in Washington since, although the reports had not disclosed the contents of the Prime Minister's message to the President, they did reveal to the Japanese public and to the pro-Axis and extremist elements that Prince Konoye had taken the initiative in what was obviously a conciliatory move at a time when indignation was high in Japan as a result of the progressive steps recently taken by the American Government which included the initial order freezing Japanese assets in the United States, the announcement that American tankers bearing oil to the Soviet Union had departed from Californian ports, and the decision to send a military mission headed by General Magruder to Chiang Kai-shek.[87] Mr. Terasaki pointed out that the publicity given to the Prime Minister's message is consequently of direct advantage to the extremist and pro-Axis elements in this country and has not only rendered further moves in the direction of conciliation very difficult but has in addition immeasurably augmented the possibility of an attempt on the life of Prince Konoye. He added that the Chief of Police this afternoon had indicated the increased risk to the Prime Minister's life.

The Director of the American Bureau conveyed to me from Admiral Toyoda an appeal for transmission to my Government to take the following three steps without which the Foreign Minister feared that Prince Konoye would meet with serious obstacles in his efforts to bring about an understanding between the United States and Japan:

(1) The meeting between the two responsible heads of the American and Japanese Governments should take place without delay. Delay would afford those elements who oppose any attempt to conciliate the United States an opportunity to organize their adherents and to spread the idea to the Japanese public that Prince Konoye is yielding

---

[87] For the White House press release of August 26, 1941, regarding the military mission to China, see Department of State, *Bulletin*, August 30, 1941, (vol. v, No. 114), p. 166.

to American pressure and, in seeking to reach an understanding with the United States in the teeth of what is publicly regarded as American provocative measures, is exposing Japan to humiliation.

(2) The United States Government should postpone the sending of tankers to the Soviet Union at least pending the outcome of the proposed meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister. Mr. Terasaki told me that the Foreign Minister felt that the dangerous temper of public opinion on the question of the tankers could not be exaggerated. He added in this connection that according to information reaching Japanese authorities five American tankers destined for Vladivostok have already passed through Tsugaru or Soya Straits.

(3) The American Government, pending the proposed meeting between the heads of the two Governments, should suspend the order freezing Japanese assets in the United States.

Mr. Terasaki, again speaking for the Minister, emphasized to me that the Japanese Government has dealt in complete frankness with the American Government and has assured us that upon the settlement of the China Incident Japanese troops at present in French Indochina would be withdrawn; that the Japanese troops in Indochina would make no further move in that area; and that Japan would observe the treaty of neutrality with the Soviet Union so long as that country adhered equally to the letter and spirit of the treaty. He explained that these were the maximum assurances and commitments which the Japanese Government was in a position to assume at the present time. Since the Japanese Government has gone the limit in giving these assurances, the Foreign Minister believes that the American Government for its part should make a maximum effort, along the lines of the three points outlined above, in order to assist the Prime Minister in the course which he is pursuing, a course which is now fraught with extreme difficulties and dangers as a result of the Washington publicity. Mr. Terasaki told me that the Foreign Minister was appealing to me in an endeavor to have the situation confronting the Prime Minister fully explained to the President and the Secretary and to request that the United States Government approach the suggested concessions not from a legalistic but from a psychological point of view. When Mr. Terasaki concluded the foregoing outline I acquainted him first of all with the substance of the first section of the Department's telegram no. 544, August 28, 6 p. m.,[88] which had just been received, setting forth the Secretary's views upon the objections raised by the Japanese Government to the shipment of oil to the Soviet Union and I took occasion to emphasize the logical and compelling force of the position adopted by the Secretary on this matter. In order that there might be no misunderstanding in regard to the accuracy of the Japanese Ambassador's reports of his recent conversations in Washington, I communicated orally to Mr. Terasaki the substance of the Department's telegrams reporting these conversations.

---

[88] Not printed.

In touching on the question of the reciprocal freezing regulations now in force I emphasized once more to Mr. Terasaki the disparity between the very liberal administration of the freezing regulations in the United States in respect to Japanese nationals and the exacting and harsh treatment meted out to American citizens and interests in Japan. Mr. Terasaki in reply merely reiterated that the Foreign Minister's request had been that such questions be dealt with from the point of view of their psychological effect in Japan since at this period of intense crisis in relations between our two countries the psychological effect was an especially strong one. I then drew Mr. Terasaki's attention to the mounting anti-American attitude of the Japanese press, to which Mr. Terasaki replied that he could tell me in strictest confidence that certain members of the Cabinet Information Board which was charged with matters relating to publicity are distinctly pro-Axis in their sentiments and that the Japanese Government is encountering real difficulties in handling this question.

In discussing with Mr. Terasaki the three points outlined above raised by the Foreign Minister, I left him under no illusion that the United States Government would find it possible to agree to either of the preposterous requests contained in points (2) or (3) above.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

711.94/2624

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[TOKYO,] August 30, 1941.

With reference to Mr. Terasaki's expression of regret, during his conversation with Mr. Grew on August 29, over the unfortunate publicity which had been given in Washington to the delivery by Ambassador Nomura of a message from Prince Konoye to President Roosevelt, Mr. Grew on August 30 conveyed to Mr. Terasaki for communication to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the following excerpt from the Secretary of State's press conference on August 28 (Radio Bulletin No. 205, August 28, 1941):

"A correspondent remarked that the Japanese Ambassador when he left the White House said that he had delivered a personal message from the Head of his Government to the President. The Correspondent inquired whether the Secretary could say anything concerning the nature of the message. The Secretary replied that he thought he should leave that for the Ambassador to handle with the press as his Government desired it to be handled and that he had not conferred with him on that point. Asked whether the delivery of the message eased the situation in the Far East Mr. Hull said that that was something he could not undertake to speak about definitely. He pointed out that he had remarked to the press as he came out of the White House that there had been a general interchange of information and views relating to affairs pending between the two Governments, that the conversation was of interest and that there may be another or others later. To a question whether they were looking toward some sort of a written agreement or a verbal arrangement Mr. Hull said that he could not tell at this time. Asked if a letter would be sent in answer to the letter which the Japanese Ambassador delivered today the Secretary replied in the affirmative saying that naturally he assumed the President will make due acknowledgment. To a question whether in the exchange of ideas this morning the position of both countries was again made plain he said that he did not think he could say more than what he had on that precise point. In response to an inquiry whether the message from the Japanese Government could be described as anything in the nature of a warning to us the Secretary said that he would not be in a position to go into either the pros or cons of the discussion that took place and as to the communication from the Prime Minister to the President that was as he had said a matter between the correspondents and the Ambassador of Japan."

711.94/2344 21/6

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] September 1, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador called at his request at the Secretary's apartment and introduced Mr. Obata [89] who, he said, was educated in America and whose knowledge of English might enable Mr. Obata to help the Ambassador in making sure that the Ambassador understood clearly what the Secretary said.

The Ambassador first expressed the hope that an early reply might be given to the message from Prince Konoye which the Ambassador had delivered to the President on August 28. The Secretary replied that the President expected to be back in Washington on the following day and the Secretary would talk with the President again about the matter.

The Secretary then reviewed briefly what he had said to the Japanese Ambassador on the evening of August 28 and the Ambassador, in reply to the Secretary's inquiry, stated that he had telegraphed a report to his Government of what the Secretary had said.

The Secretary said that he had been endeavoring to feel out the situation with respect to China in an attempt to inform himself as to how the Chinese might react toward the question of a settlement with Japan and he pointed out that, notwithstanding the feeling expressed by the Ambassador that the Japanese did not expect difficulties with the Chinese Government in reaching a settlement, the

---

[89] Mr. Shigeyoshi Obata.

Chinese were in fact far from receptive to the idea of such a settlement. The Ambassador said he felt that the only reason that the Chinese were adopting such an attitude was because of the assistance that the United States was rendering China and that if the United States should discontinue that assistance the Chinese would no longer set themselves against Japan. The Secretary pointed out that it would not make for a stabilized peace in the Far East if the Chinese should become embittered and that the Secretary was impressed with the need of retaining the good-will of China in order that this Government might be of maximum assistance in contributing to a settlement which would result in reconciliation between Japan and China.

Mr. Obata referred to the three fundamental points upon which difficulties had been encountered in reconciling our respective views during the course of the conversations which had been held last spring. He said that while some of the younger officers might hold out on the question of retention of Japanese troops in North China and Inner Mongolia for defense against communism, he thought that agreement on this point and on the other two points, namely the question of the application to Japan's proposed economic cooperation with China of the principle of non-discrimination in international relations and the question of Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact as they affected our program of self-defense, could easily be adjusted when the meeting took place between the heads of our respective Governments. The Secretary asked what would happen if such an agreement was not reached and repeated his suggestion that we endeavor to reach an agreement in principle on fundamental questions before the meeting should take place.

The Japanese Ambassador then emphasized the urgent need of making provision for a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area which, he pointed out, was just as much for the interest of the United States as of Japan.

Mr. Obata raised the question of publicity in regard to the proposed meeting between the heads of our respective Governments, and observed that Prince Konoe could not absent himself from Tokyo without exciting public comment. He suggested that the two Governments might consider making a public announcement about the proposed meeting at an early date. The Secretary replied that this was a point to which we should give appropriate attention.

The Ambassador then mentioned that he had been criticized by his Government for having told the press of his having delivered a message to the President from Prince Konoe, and added that nevertheless the press reaction in Japan had been favorable, which indicated that public opinion in Japan would support a *rapprochement* between Japan and the United States.

The Secretary said he was glad to hear this, as press despatches from Tokyo which have been appearing in the press in this country and reporting statements by Japanese spokesmen and publicists emphasizing Japan's determination to establish for itself a so-called co-prosperity sphere in the Far East and a special economic and political position for herself had prompted many people to make inquiry of him as to whether there was any way in which what Japan demanded could be reconciled with the position of the United States. He said that these expressions of Japan's objectives and the constant agitation in the Japanese press against the United States created a source of difficulty to this Government in connection with the proposal of a meeting such as the Japanese Government proposed. The Secretary noted that just as the Japanese Government had to reckon with the Japanese public opinion, this Government had to reckon with public opinion in this country and he added that the Japanese press campaign was not only making it difficult to deal with American public opinion but it would also militate against our bringing China, Great Britain and the Dutch East Indies into line with a plan for the establishment of a general program of peace in the Pacific area.

The Secretary pointed out that, if the Japanese Government now found it difficult to influence the Japanese public and press against agitation in favor of a policy of conquest by force and against conducting a campaign prejudicial to the success of a peaceful settlement with the United States, there was no assurance that the Japanese Government could obtain public support for any such settlement after it had been concluded, and then there might occur in Japan some new political crisis. The Secretary therefore suggested that it would be a part of wisdom for the Japanese Government to exercise its influence with the Japanese press and to point out the benefits that would flow to Japan from a peaceful program such as the Secretary and the Japanese Ambassador had had in mind. The Secretary asked the Ambassador whether he could not urge upon his Government immediate efforts in this direction. The Secretary pointed out that the Japanese Government would have nothing to lose by such a course, even though no agreement with the United States was reached as the Japanese Government would have to its credit efforts to proceed along a peaceful course. The Ambassador said that he would communicate the Secretary's suggestion to his Government.

J[OSEPH] W. B[ALLANTINE]

711.94/2244$\frac{8}{11}$

The Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)

WASHINGTON, September 2, 1941.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: Thank you for your letter of August 29 in which you say that your Government "for various considerations feels that secrecy at this time is essential for the success of the conversations"; and that you therefore request my cooperation in this regard.

I shall be glad to conform to the desires of yourself and your Government in the foregoing respect, to every practical extent.

Sincerely yours, [CORDELL HULL]

711.94/2624

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[TOKYO,] September 3, 1941.

Having called by appointment, the Director of the American Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs this evening transmitted to me on behalf of the Foreign Minister the request that I convey to the Secretary of State a message of which the following is the substance:

Reports appearing in the American press of the proposed meeting between the responsible heads of our two Governments have reached Japan, and although the necessary measures have been adopted to prevent the appearance of these reports in the Japanese press it is inevitable that the news of the meeting will be rapidly circulated in Japan.

I here interposed my opinion that the reports of the proposed meeting were not, in all probability, the result of any disclosure of the American Government but more likely the result of the customary guess-work on the part of certain newspaper correspondents. The Director of the American Bureau answered that according to information received by the Foreign Office Mr. Wilfrid Fleisher[90] was in possession of the actual facts, but that irrespective of its source the result of this publicity would be to increase the opposition to the Japanese Government on the part of rightist elements since it would be alleged that the Government was yielding to American pressure. Mr. Terasaki went on to say that while the Japanese Government does not fear those elements, nevertheless in view of Japan's association with the Axis powers in the Tripartite Pact it would be desirable to be in a position as soon as possible to produce, for their effect in uniting the nation, definite results from the Prime Minister's approach, since it is believed that if the pro-Axis elements promptly could be confronted with a *fait accompli* any mobilization of these elements against the Japanese Government could be halted.

---

[90] Correspondent of the New York *Herald Tribune*.

The Director of the American Bureau said that Admiral Toyoda considered it extremely important that an official announcement of the meeting and its approximate date should be issued as soon as possible. Mr. Terasaki further stated that the Foreign Minister on behalf of Prince Konoye wished to inquire whether the President would find it possible to meet Prince Konoye on or about the twentieth of September or as soon thereafter as possible at the place which the President mentioned in his last conversation with Admiral Nomura, and also whether the Government of the United States would agree to make a joint public announcement with the Japanese Government of this meeting in the immediate future. The Foreign Minister, according to Mr. Terasaki, suggests that the two Governments jointly agree on the text of the announcement and that the words "somewhere in the Pacific" be used to designate the place of the meeting. Terasaki then stated on behalf of the Foreign Minister that Admiral Nomura in Washington is being informed of this inquiry but that the Minister desired that it be conveyed through me. He added incidentally that the Foreign Minister has been much disturbed by the fact that the Japanese Ambassador in Washington had revealed to the press that he had delivered to the President a letter from Prince Konoye.

Mr. Terasaki continued that should the projected meeting between the President and the Prime Minister fail to materialize, the Japanese Government would be forced to inform public opinion in Japan (1) the reasons for which the Prime Minister had sent a message to President Roosevelt, and (2) the spirit in which the Prime Minister desired to confer with the President. Mr. Terasaki added that he was unable to amplify these two points but he desired to emphasize that they should be regarded merely as a statement of what the Japanese Government would be forced to do and should in no manner be regarded as anything in the nature of a threat. In conclusion Mr. Terasaki stated that the Foreign Minister hoped for an early answer to the above inquiry.

Having listened to the statements of the Director of the American Bureau made on behalf of the Foreign Minister, I told him that I seriously doubted whether the President would find it desirable to agree to an announcement before the proposed meeting took place since it had been the original understanding that the fact of the meeting was in itself to be held in strict confidence. I promised, however, to transmit immediately to my Government the Foreign Minister's inquiry.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

711.94/2267

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] September 3, 1941.

At the request of the President, the Japanese Ambassador called at the White House this afternoon. The President proceeded at once to read the written oral statement (copy attached)[91] which had been prepared in reply to the communication recently sent to the President by the Japanese Prime Minister. He emphasized certain points as he read. He particularly emphasized the fact that he appreciated the difficulties of Prince Konoye in connection with the Japanese internal situation, but he added that he has difficulties here which he hopes that Prince Konoye and his Government would appreciate. The President referred to his recent conversations with Prime Minister Churchill, especially that portion relating to plebiscites at the end of the war as the best means of settling many differences and as the soundest policy of dealing with conditions existing between different races. He cited several instances existing at the end of the World War, which were effectively dealt with by plebiscites.

The President then proceeded to read his letter to Prime Minister Konoye, a copy of which is hereto attached.[93] The Ambassador inquired if the President was still favorable to a conference and the President replied that he was, but that it was very important to settle a number of these questions beforehand, if the success of the conference was to be safeguarded to the extent warranted by the holding of such a meeting. It was also emphasized that if and when we had secured sufficient assurances from the Japanese Government that it stands earnestly for all of the principles which this Government has been proclaiming as applicable to the Pacific area, it would be necessary for us to discuss the matter fully with the British, the Chinese and the Dutch, since there is no other way to effect a suitable peaceful settlement for the Pacific area; that any settlement must be on a basis that will restore confidence and friendliness among the nations concerned; in no other way can a suitable economic structure be rebuilt for that area. The Ambassador seemed to appreciate this viewpoint. Both the President and I repeatedly emphasized the necessity for his Government to clarify its position on the question of abandoning a policy of force and conquest and on three fundamental questions concerning which difficulties had been encountered in our discussion of the Japanese proposal of May twelfth and the discussion of which we had not pursued after the Japanese went into Indochina. The Ambassador said that Prince Konoye, while preferring to go to Hawaii, would be disposed to go to any place in the Pacific where there was suitable anchorage.

---

[91] *Infra.*

[93] *Post*, p. 591.

The Ambassador then proceeded to say that he had a despatch from Tokyo referring to the fact that certain elements of opposition to the proposals of the Prime Minister existed and were active in their opposition. He said that the Government, however, is determined to overcome such opposition. He stated that a meeting between the President and the Prime Minister would enable Japan to overcome these disagreements at home and that the opposition would gradually get in line with the Government. He said that Konoye thinks that he and the President can discuss the three questions which were left untouched when the Japanese went into Indochina in July, mainly the question relating to the complete evacuation of Japanese troops from China, the question of non-discrimination in commerce, et cetera, et cetera, and the Tripartite Pact.

It was made clear to the Ambassador that several days should be consumed by his Government both in clarifying and stating strongly its position on the principles already referred to and their application so far as China is concerned, and also that their Government should by word and act in every way possible devote some time at once to the education and organization of public opinion in support of the proposals for a peaceful settlement, as already set forth.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

711.94/2227

Oral Statement Handed by President Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on September 3, 1941

Reference is made to the proposal of the Japanese Government communicated on August 28, 1941, by the Japanese Ambassador to the President of the United States that there be held as soon as possible a meeting between the responsible heads of the Government of Japan and of the Government of the United States to discuss important problems between Japan and the United States covering the entire Pacific area in an endeavor to save the situation and to the reply of the President of the United States,[94] in which the President assured the Prime Minister of the readiness of the Government of the United States to move as rapidly as possible toward the consummation of arrangements for such a meeting and suggested that there be held preliminary discussion of important questions that would come up for consideration in the meeting. In further explanation of the views of the Government of the United States in regard to the suggestion under reference observations are offered, as follows:

---

[94] *Infra.*

On April 16, at the outset of the informal and exploratory conversations which were entered into by the Secretary of State with the Japanese Ambassador, the Secretary of State referred to four fundamental principles which this Government regards as the foundation upon which all relations between nations should properly rest. These four fundamental principles are as follows:

1. Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations.
2. Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
3. Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity.
4. Non-disturbance of the *status quo* in the Pacific except as the *status quo* may be altered by peaceful means.

In the subsequent conversations the Secretary of State endeavored to make it clear that in the opinion of the Government of the United States Japan stood to gain more from adherence to courses in harmony with these principles than from any other course, as Japan would thus best be assured access to the raw materials and markets which Japan needs and ways would be opened for mutually beneficial cooperation with the United States and other countries, and that only upon the basis of these principles could an agreement be reached which would be effective in establishing stability and peace in the Pacific area.

The Government of the United States notes with satisfaction that in the statement marked "Strictly Confidential" which was communicated by the Japanese Ambassador to the President of the United States on August 28 there were given specific assurances of Japan's peaceful intentions and assurances that Japan desires and seeks a program for the Pacific area consistent with the principles to which the Government of the United States has long been committed and which were set forth in detail in the informal conversations already referred to. The Government of the United States understands that the assurances which the Japanese Government has given in that statement exclude any policy which would seek political expansion or the acquisition of economic rights, advantages or preferences by force.

The Government of the United States is very desirous of collaborating in efforts to make effective in practice the principles to which the Japanese Government has made reference. The Government of the United States believes that it is all-important that preliminary precautions be taken to insure the success of any efforts which the Governments of Japan and of the United States might make to collaborate toward a peaceful settlement. It will be recalled that in the course of the conversations to which reference has already been made, the Secretary of State on June 21, 1941, handed the Japanese Ambassador a document marked "Oral, Unofficial and Without Commitment" which contained a redraft of the Japanese Government's proposal of May 12, 1941. It will be recalled further that in oral discussion of this draft it was found that there were certain fundamental questions with respect to which there were divergences of view between the two Governments, and which remained unreconciled at the time the conversations were interrupted in July. The Government of the United States desires to facilitate progress toward a conclusive discussion, but believes that a community of view and a clear agreement upon the points above-mentioned are essential to any satisfactory settlement of Pacific questions. It therefore seeks an indication of the present attitude of the Japanese Government with regard to the fundamental questions under reference.

It goes without saying that each Government in reaching decisions on policy must take into account the internal situation in its own country and the attitude of public opinion therein. The Government of Japan will surely recognize that the Government of the United States could not enter into any agreement which would not be in harmony with the principles in which the American people—in fact all nations that prefer peaceful methods to methods of force—believe.

The Government of the United States would be glad to have the reply of the Japanese Government on the matters above set forth.

711.94/2227

President Roosevelt's Reply to the Japanese Prime Minister (*Prince Konoye*), *Handed to the Japanese Ambassador* (*Nomura*) *on September 3, 1941*

I have read with appreciation Your Excellency's message of August 27, which was delivered to me by Admiral Nomura.

I have noted with satisfaction the sentiments expressed by you in regard to the solicitude of Japan for the maintenance of the peace of the Pacific and Japan's desire to improve Japanese-American relations.

I fully share the desire expressed by you in these regards, and I wish to assure you that the Government of the United States, recognizing the swiftly-moving character of world events, is prepared to proceed as rapidly as possible toward the consummation of arrangements for a meeting at which you and I can exchange views and endeavor to bring about an adjustment in the relations between our two countries.

In the statement which accompanied your letter to me reference was made to the principles to which the Government of the United States has long been committed and it was declared that the Japanese Government "considers these principles and the practical application thereof, in the friendliest manner possible, are the prime requisites of a true peace and should be applied not only in the Pacific area but throughout the entire world" and that "such a program has long been desired and sought by Japan itself ".

I am very desirous of collaborating with you in efforts to make these principles effective in practice. Because of my deep interest in this matter I find it necessary that I constantly observe and take account of developments both in my own country and in Japan which have a bearing upon problems of relations between our two countries. At this particular moment I cannot avoid taking cognizance of indications of the existence in some quarters in Japan of concepts which, if widely entertained, would seem capable of raising obstacles to successful collaboration between you and me along the line which I am sure we both earnestly desire to follow. Under these circumstances, I feel constrained to suggest, in the belief that you will share my view, that it would seem highly desirable that we take precaution, toward ensuring that our proposed meeting shall prove a success, by endeavoring to enter immediately upon preliminary discussion of the fundamental and essential questions on which we seek agreement. The questions which I have in mind for such preliminary discussions involve practical application of the principles fundamental to achievement and maintenance of peace which are mentioned with more specification in the statement accompanying your letter. I hope that you will look favorably upon this suggestion.

711.94/2624

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[TOKYO,] September 4, 1941.

Mr. Terasaki called me by telephone this afternoon to inform me that both Prince Konoye and the Minister for Foreign Affairs wished to retract that portion of the Foreign Minister's message conveyed to me last night by Mr. Terasaki which dealt with the statement which the Japanese Government would be forced to publish in the event that the projected meeting between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt did not take place. Mr. Terasaki stated that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister both felt that the statement of intention contained in that portion of the Foreign Minister's message under reference might be misunderstood by the American Government and that any misunderstanding might have an adverse effect upon the proposed meeting between the Prime Minister and the President.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

711.94/2624

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[TOKYO,] September 4, 1941.

I called on the Foreign Minister this afternoon at his request and during the long conversation which ensued he emphasized to me the intention of Prince Konoye and himself to leave no stone unturned to arrange the suggested meeting at an early date between the Prime Minister and the President and to ensure the success of that meeting since, should it fail to achieve its basic aim, he was afraid that further efforts would be useless. Having in view these objectives, the Government of Japan is prepared to state its intentions with complete frankness and to undertake provisionally certain commitments and to set forth, likewise provisionally, certain reciprocal undertakings which the Japanese Government would expect from the Government of the United States. These reciprocal commitments would then serve as a basis for discussion at the proposed meeting between the representative heads of the two Governments. Admiral Toyoda informed me that he had this afternoon cabled this proposal to Admiral Nomura at Washington but he requested that I also convey it to my Government by telegraph in order to obviate any possibility of inaccuracy which he feared might arise through misunderstanding of the English language.

The Foreign Minister stated that the Japanese Government was prepared to accept the points on which a tentative agreement had already been reached in the informal and preliminary conversations which had been carried on in Washington and he pointed out, furthermore, that points (*c*), (*d*), and (*e*) of the proposals set forth below furnish a basis of agreement for three of the chief points which had not been disposed of in these preliminary conversations. The Minister laid particular emphasis on the importance of point (*c*) by reason of the fact that it contemplates an interpretation of Article 3 of the Tripartite Pact at variance with the interpretation which Mr. Matsuoka had given thereto. The importance that the Foreign Minister attached to this point is revealed by the fact that he returned to it several times during the course of our conversation.

The Foreign Minister then handed me in writing the Japanese proposals, which are copied below. He requested me urgently to transmit these proposals to Washington in our most secret code and they were accordingly closely paraphrased for transmission to the Department.

After a brief examination of the Japanese proposals, I told the Minister that I personally felt that certain of the points outlined would appear to be susceptible to very broad interpretation. The

Minister in reply stated that of course these suggested commitments would be discussed at the proposed meeting, from which I gathered that they were being advanced by the Japanese Government primarily as an indication of the sincerity of Japan's efforts to work out a basic settlement.

The Foreign Minister then proposed that the reciprocal undertaking as finally agreed upon should be embodied in an agreement to be kept secret, and that following the meeting between the President and the Prime Minister a statement in general terms would be agreed upon and released to the press. I explained to the Foreign Minister that under our democratic system of Government it would be difficult if not impossible to conceal from the people of the United States such results as might be achieved at the proposed meeting, but we did not pursue the subject.

Admiral Toyoda told me that while he understood that the President had received the Japanese Ambassador again yesterday he had had no report as yet from Admiral Nomura on this subject. I told the Minister that likewise I had received no information on this reported conversation.

The proposal of the Japanese Government follows:

[Here follows text of the draft proposal printed on page 608.]

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

[Annex]

Comment by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)[95]

In connection with the proposals submitted by the Japanese Government it occurs to me that it would not be possible, within the short time which of necessity could be allowed for the proposed meeting between the Prime Minister and the President, to work out a detailed agreement with regard to each one of the points advanced by the Japanese Government in the provisional proposal which would be required before any definite announcement of a concrete nature could be issued to the American people.

With regard to the question of publicity following the meeting it seems to me that this problem might be dealt with for the time being by means of a statement that the Government of Japan had subscribed to the principles of international relations which the Secretary of State has enunciated and that a wide program for the reconstruction of the problems affecting the Pacific area which would put those principles into force was being worked out. This announcement might in addition contain the reference to the efforts of both the Japanese and the American Governments looking toward the establishment of a world based on freedom as outlined by the President, and in conclusion the suggested announcement might state that it was a source of gratification that both Japan and the United States had advanced toward that goal without the sacrifice of their legitimate and fair aspirations and aims.

---

[95] This was transmitted to the Secretary of State in telegram No. 1384, September 4, 1941, 9 p. m. (711.94/2449).

There is an obvious difference between the Foreign Minister's proposals conveyed to me today and the statements transmitted on behalf of the Prime Minister by Mr. Terasaki on August 29, and I believe that this difference in tone and substance is indicative of the earnest wish of the Japanese Government to achieve a basic settlement with the United States.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

11.94/2344$\frac{4}{26}$

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] September 4, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador called at the Secretary's apartment at his request.[96]

The Secretary inquired how the Ambassador felt about the general situation. The Ambassador replied that he was pleased over the tone and contents of the President's reply. With reference to the Oral Statement handed to him by the President he said he felt that our request for information in regard to the Japanese Government's attitude on the three fundamental questions on which our views remained unreconciled at the time conversations were interrupted last July had already been largely disposed of, in spirit at least, by the statement which the Ambassador had given the President on August 28. He said he thought that there was now no essential difference of views between the two governments in regard to the fundamental principles of peace.

The Secretary repeated to the Ambassador what he had said many times before in regard to the necessity before entering into any formal negotiations of consulting with the Chinese, the British and the Dutch in order to enlist their support for a broad program of peace in the Pacific area. He pointed out that this was especially necessary with the Chinese who might otherwise be apprehensive lest we betray them. He felt that before we are in a position to go to the Chinese the American and Japanese Governments should reach a clear understanding in principle on the various points to be discussed affecting China. The Secretary said he believed that after these points were cleared up it would enable us to move more rapidly toward taking up arrangements for the proposed meeting.

---

[96] Mr. Obata accompanied the Ambassador.

The Ambassador said that with regard to one of the points at issue, namely Japan's obligation under the Tripartite Alliance, as those obligations affected and were affected by our self-defense program, he felt that as the Tripartite Alliance was purely defensive and was designed to prevent the entry of the United States into the war he felt sure there was no question of Japan's attacking the United States should the United States enter the war.

The Secretary pointed out that if we went into an agreement with Japan without obtaining explicit assurances on that point difficulties might arise when he went before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

In reply to further questions by the Ambassador in regard to the Secretary's views on preliminary discussions, the Secretary suggested the desirability of further broadening our proposed commitments affecting trade. He observed that our original proposed formula covering this subject had been successively narrowed down by the Japanese, which he felt was contrary to Japan's own interest, especially in the light of the exigencies of the problems of economic reconstruction which would arise after a peace settlement has been reached. He said he had been looking into this matter with the economic experts of the Department.

The Ambassador said that he had asked his government for instructions in regard to its present attitude toward the three fundamental points at issue and was awaiting his government's instruction. He then handed the Secretary a new complete draft of the Japanese proposals, which he said was a redraft of ours of June 21, and the Secretary said he would study it.

As the Ambassador rose to go he said he had been asked by his Government to take up the question of a public announcement in regard to the proposed meeting as the Japanese Government considered this urgent in view of the publicity which had already been given. The Secretary said that, while he had no objection to an announcement that formal exploratory conversations were taking place, he felt strongly that any announcement in regard to negotiations should be deferred until we had completed our preliminary discussions and had approached the other interested governments.

J[OSEPH] W. B[ALLANTINE]

711.94/2344$\frac{8}{11}$

Statement Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State on September 4, 1941 [97]

Unofficial, Exploratory
and Without Commitment

The Governments of the United States and of Japan accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement of understanding as expressed in a joint declaration for the resumption of traditional friendly relations.

Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment between their countries should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences.

It is our earnest hope that, by a cooperative effort, the United States and Japan may contribute effectively toward the establishment and preservation of peace in the Pacific area and, by the rapid consummation of an amicable understanding, encourage world peace and arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.

For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-suited and weakening. Both Governments, therefore, desire that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general understanding which would bind, meanwhile both Governments in honor and in act.

It is the belief of the two Governments that such an understanding should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory concerns which could be deliberated later at a conference.

Both Governments presume to anticipate that they could achieve harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified or improved; to wit:

1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.
2. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European War.
3. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.
4. Commerce between both nations.
5. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.
6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.
7. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.

Accordingly, the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan have come to the following mutual understanding and declaration of policy:

---

[97] This document was submitted without the approval of the Japanese Government and was subsequently withdrawn by the Japanese Ambassador.

I. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.

Both Governments affirm that their national policies are directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of reciprocal confidence and cooperation between our peoples.

Both Governments declare that it is their traditional, and present, concept and conviction that nations and races compose, as members of a family, one household living under the ideal of universal concord through justice and equity; each equally enjoying rights and admitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound not to destroy for others; they further admit their responsibilities to oppose the oppression or exploitation of other peoples.

Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to those moral principles and concepts.

II. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European War.

The Government of Japan maintains that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact was, and is, defensive and is designed to contribute to the prevention of an unprovoked extension of the European War.

The Government of the United States maintains that its attitude toward the European hostilities is and will continue to be determined solely and exclusively by considerations of protection and self-defense; its national security and the defense thereof.

III. Action toward a peaceful settlement between Japan and China.

The Government of Japan having declared that the general terms, within the framework of which the Government of Japan will propose the negotiation of a peaceful settlement of the China Affair, are *implied* in the Konoe principles and in the practical application of those principles, the President of the United States, *relying upon the policy of the Government of Japan to establish* a relation of neighborly friendship with China, will suggest to the *Government at Chungking* that it enter with the Government of Japan into a negotiation for a termination of hostilities and resumption of peaceful relations.

(Note: Words underscored[98] not contained in the U. S. draft of June 21st. The other differences are simply by omission of certain phrases contained in the American draft.)

---

[98] Printed in italics.

IV. Commerce between both nations.

When official approbation to the present understanding has been given by both Governments, the United States and Japan shall assure each other mutually to supply such commodities as are, respectively, available and required by either of them. Both Governments further consent to take necessary steps to resume normal trade relations as formerly established under the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan. If a new commercial treaty is desired by both Governments, it would be negotiated as soon as possible and be concluded in accordance with usual procedures.

V. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.

On the basis of mutual pledges hereby given that Japanese activity and American activity in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations, the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States agree to cooperate each with the other toward obtaining non-discriminatory access by Japan and by the United States to commercial supplies* of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which each country needs for the safeguarding and development of its own economy.

VI. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.

Both Governments declare that the controlling policy underlying this understanding is peace in the Pacific area; that it is their fundamental purpose, through cooperative effort, to contribute to the maintenance and the preservation of peace in the Pacific area; and that neither has territorial designs in the area mentioned.

VII. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.

The Government of Japan declares its willingness to enter at such time as the Government of the United States may desire into negotiation with the Government of the United States with a view to the conclusion of a treaty for the neutralization of the Philippine Islands, when Philippine independence shall have been achieved.

[Annex 1]

ANNEX AND SUPPLEMENT ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN

III. Action toward a peaceful settlement between Japan and China.

The basic terms as implied in the Konoe principles and the practical application of those principles are as follows:

---

*for the production and procurement. [Footnote in the original.]

1. Neighborly friendship.

2. Cooperation to prevent the extension of injurious subversive activities which threaten national security.

3. Economic cooperation. Japan does not intend (*a*) to exercise economic monopoly in China; (*b*) nor to limit the interests of third powers in China.

4. Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories.

5. Mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation cooperating as good neighbors and forming an Eastern Asia nucleus contributing to world peace.

6. Withdrawal of Japanese armed forces from Chinese territory *as promptly as possible with the restoration of peace, within a period of two years* and in accordance with an agreement to be concluded between Japan and China.

(NOTE A.—Under Clause 2—The question of stationing troops has been entirely dropped in accordance with the suggestion of the American Government.)

(NOTE B.—Under Economic Cooperation—It should be sufficient to refer to the general statement in Clause 5 of the Understanding. The economic relations of Japan with China shall be conducted in the same fashion and according to the same rules which the United States would use in dealing with China, and any third power would use in dealing with China.)

[Annex 2]

ANNEX AND SUPPLEMENT ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

IV. Commerce between both nations.

It is understood that during the present international emergency Japan and the United States each shall permit export to the other of commodities in amounts up to the figures of usual or pre-war trade, except, in the case of each, commodities which it needs for its own purposes of security and self-defense. These limitations are mentioned to clarify the obligations of each Government. They are not intended as restrictions against either Government; and, it is understood, both Governments will apply such regulations in the spirit dominating relations with friendly nations.

711.94/2624

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[TOKYO,] September 5, 1941.

This afternoon Prince Konoye conveyed an invitation to me to meet him in secret tonight at a private house but subsequently he sent word that circumstances had rendered it desirable to postpone the meeting until the following day. I believe that the Prime Minister had wished to talk over with me the reply of the President to his message and the oral statement made to the Japanese Ambassador on September 3 but had on further thought deemed it advisable for Admiral Toyoda to receive me first.

I called on the Foreign Minister late this afternoon at his request and he asked me if I had received the text of the President's reply to the Prime Minister's letter and the text of the oral communication which was given to Admiral Nomura on September 3, to which I answered that up to the time I left the Embassy only the third section of the telegram from the Department of State on that subject had come in. Admiral Toyoda then showed me the text in English of the two documents referred to above, which had been received by the Foreign Office this morning at two o'clock. He asked for my views concerning the divergencies of opinion between the American and Japanese Governments which had not been brought into conformity when the conversations in Washington were interrupted in July. In reply I told the Minister that when the Department of State had telegraphed me the report of the President's conversation with the Japanese Ambassador, my own telegram reporting our conversation yesterday afternoon could not have been received in Washington. In view of the fact that the Minister had stated to me his belief that his proposal made yesterday contained the solutions to the divergence of views which had not been solved up to the time the conversations in Washington had been interrupted, I told him that I did not feel free to examine with him these points until I had been informed of the reaction of my Government to his proposal. I undertook, however, at the Minister's expressed and earnest request to convey to the Secretary an expression of my hope that the opinion of my Government concerning the proposal put forward by the Japanese Government would be sent to me at the earliest possible moment.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

[Annex]

Comment by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)[99]

[TOKYO, September 5, 1941.]

In my meeting tomorrow with the Foreign Minister I shall confine myself to carrying out the explicit instructions contained in the Department's telegram No. 562, September 4, 8 p. m.,[1] and shall avoid discussion of the questions at issue pending a reply from the Department to my 1384, September 4, 9 p. m.[1a]

---

[99] This was transmitted to the Secretary of State in telegram No. 1405, September 5, 1941, 10 p. m. (711.94/2256).

[1] Not printed; see note at end of document printed *infra*.

Admiral Toyoda has told me that he would like to have any further conversations which may be necessary before the proposed meeting between the Prime Minister and the President carried on in Tokyo rather than in Washington because, as he said, certain language difficulties appear to have arisen in Washington. I told him, however, that I could not make any such recommendation since I felt that it was up to my Government to decide where and by whom such conversations should be carried on.

After having carefully gone over the reports of the oral discussions which took place concerning our redraft of the original proposals advanced by the Japanese, it was apparent to me that there are four substantial points on which no agreement has been reached, i. e., (1) the question of equal opportunity and non-discrimination in China, (2) the maintenance of Japanese garrisons in China, (3) the respective attitudes of the United States and Japan toward the war in Europe, and (4) the question of military bases. It is pertinent to examine whether or to what degree the commitments which the Japanese Government is prepared to accept as set forth in points (*e*), (*d*), (*c*), and (*b*), in that order, of the latest Japanese proposal[1b] are considered by our Government as satisfactory in regard to the four points outlined above, and whether these new provisional commitments afford an adequate basis for the proposed meeting between the President and the Prime Minister.

It is obvious in this connection that no Japanese undertakings whether oral or in written form can be accepted as giving a complete guarantee that such undertakings can or will be carried out to our entire satisfaction. It is clear that the first step toward a return to the *status quo ante* in the Far East or the establishment of a situation in that area which would conform to the principles which we believe should govern decent relations between states involves the cessation on the part of Japan of its progressive acts of aggression. It would appear that the commitments contained in the latest Japanese proposal, if implemented, would fulfill this requirement. Since it is presumed that a detailed formulation of a general plan of reconstruction of the Far East could not probably be worked out in advance, it would be eminently desirable that the military and economic measures of the United States which are now inexorably pressing on Japan be relaxed point by point *pari passu* with the actions of the Japanese Government in the direction of implementing its proposed commitments. If our Government followed this suggested course it would always retain in its hands the leverage which would contribute to Japanese implementation of its commitments. If an adjustment of relations is to be achieved some risk must be run, but the risk taken in the pursuance on our part of a course which would not only provide inducements to the Japanese to honor their undertakings but would also leave to the United States Government a certain leverage of compulsion would appear to be relatively less serious than the risk of armed conflict entailed in the progressive application of economic sanctions which would result from a refusal to accept these proposals.

[1a] Not printed; it reported the conversation described in the Ambassador's memorandum of September 4, 1941, p. 593.

[1b] For text of proposal, see p. 608.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

711.94/2624

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (*Grew*)

[TOKYO,] September 6, 1941.

Following my conversation this morning with Admiral Toyoda during which I carried out the instructions embodied in the Department's telegram No. 562, September 4, 8 p. m.,[2] I had a long conversation with the Director of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office, of which the following is a summary.

The Germans and Italians are endeavoring in every way through subordinate officials in the Foreign Office and the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs to obtain knowledge of the character and progress of the conversations between the United States and Japan. Every precaution, however, is being taken to ensure secrecy despite the regrettable publicity which has been given to the Prime Minister's letter to the President and the reports which have been circulated concerning the projected meeting between Prince Konoye and the President. During Mr. Matsuoka's tenure of office the Director of the American Bureau was not permitted to see or to exercise any control over the instructions sent to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, but since Admiral Toyoda has become Foreign Minister this situation has been corrected. It is still true, however, that there are large numbers of Germans in Tokyo, some of whom are located in Government organizations and strategic positions, and that the German influence is consequently considerable.

The Director of the American Bureau told me that the Foreign Office, on the basis of confidential reports, had information that extremist and pro-Axis elements are plotting some form of coup on the anniversary of Japan's adherence to the Axis on September 27, and since Admiral Toyoda will be host on that evening at a formal dinner to the diplomats of the Axis powers and will be obliged to make a speech, disagreeable and even dangerous incidents may take place. Mr. Terasaki voiced the opinion, as I have pointed out in previous telegrams to the Department, that to confront those opposed to an understanding with the United States with a *fait accompli* would be the most efficacious way to forestall their plans. The Japanese Government is apparently confident that the announcement of a *fait accompli* will be accorded a favorable reception by Japanese public opinion and that such concrete agreements as might be reached will be supported by the great majority of the people.

---

[2] Not printed; see note at end of this document.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

NOTE: The instructions contained in the Department's telegram No. 562 mentioned in the first paragraph above directed me to inform the Foreign Minister that the American Government could not accede to the two suggestions of the Minister that we (1) suspend the sailing of American tankers to Vladivostok and (2) suspend the freezing order pending the proposed meeting of the representative heads of our two countries.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

711.94/2624

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[TOKYO,] September 6, 1941.

This evening the Prime Minister invited me to dine at a private house of a friend. Only Mr. Dooman and Mr. Ushiba, the Prime Minister's private secretary, were also present. The conversation lasted for three hours and we presented with entire frankness the fundamental views of our two countries. The Prime Minister requested that his statements be transmitted personally to the President in the belief that they might amplify and clarify the approach through diplomatic channels which he had made in Washington through Admiral Nomura. The following is a brief summary of the salient points as they emerged in the course of our discussion.

1. Prince Konoye, and consequently the Government of Japan, conclusively and wholeheartedly agree with the four principles enunciated by the Secretary of State as a basis for the rehabilitation of relations between the United States and Japan.

2. Prince Konoye recognizes that the responsibility is his for the present regrettable state of relations between our two countries but, with appropriate modesty as to his personal capabilities, he likewise recognizes that only he can cause the desired rehabilitation to come about. In the event of failure on his part no succeeding Prime Minister, at least during his own lifetime, could achieve the results desired.

Prince Konoye is therefore determined to spare no effort, despite all elements and factors opposing him, to crown his present endeavors with success.

3. The Prime Minister hopes that as a result of the commitments which the Japanese Government is prepared to assume as communicated to me by Admiral Toyoda, a rational basis has been established for a meeting between the President and himself. The Prime Minister, however, is cognizant of the fact that certain points may need clarification and more precise formulation, and he is confident that the divergencies in view can be reconciled to our mutual satisfaction, particularly by reason of the favorable disposition on the part of Japanese naval and military leaders who have not only subscribed to his proposals but who will also be represented at the suggested meeting. The Prime Minister stated that both the Ministers of War and of the Navy have given their full agreement to his proposals to the United States.

4. The reports which the Prime Minister has received from the Japanese Ambassador concerning the latter's conversations with the President and the Secretary have led the Prime Minister to think that the Administration in Washington entertains serious doubts as to the strength of the present Cabinet and that the Administration is not certain that in the event that the Cabinet should adopt a peaceful program it could successfully resist the attacks of opposing elements. Prince Konoye told me that from the inception of the informal talks in Washington he had received the strongest concurrence from the responsible chiefs of both the Army and the Navy. Only today he had conferred with the Minister of War who had promised to send a full General to accompany the Prime Minister to the meeting with the President; the Minister of the Navy had agreed that a full Admiral should accompany the Prime Minister. Prince Konoye added in confidence that he expected that the representative of the Navy would probably be Admiral Yoshida, a former Minister of the Navy. In addition the Premier would be accompanied by the Vice Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Navy and other high ranking officers of the armed services who are in entire accord with his aims. He admitted that there are certain elements within the armed forces who do not approve his policies, but he voiced the conviction that since he had the full support of the responsible chiefs of the Army and Navy it would be possible for him to put down and control any opposition which might develop among those elements.

5. Prince Konoye repeatedly stressed the view that time is of the essence. It might take half a year to a year to work out all the details of the complete settlement and since resentment is daily mounting in Japan over the economic pressure being exerted by other coun-

tries, he could not guarantee to put into effect any such program of settlement six months or a year from now. He does, however, guarantee that at the present time he can carry with him the Japanese people to the goal which he has selected and that should difficulties be encountered in working out the details of the commitments which he may assume, these difficulties can be overcome satisfactorily because of the determined intention of his Government to see to it that its present efforts are fully successful.

6. In the course of our discussion I outlined in general terms the bitter lessons of the past to our Government as the result of the failure of the Japanese Government to honor the promises given to me by former Japanese Ministers for Foreign Affairs apparently in all sincerity, as a result of which the Government of the United States had at long last concluded that it must place its reliance on actions and facts and not on Japanese promises or assurances. The Prime Minister did not attempt to refute this statement but stressed the fact that his Government now wished to bring about a thoroughgoing reconstruction of American-Japanese relations and he assured me that any commitments which he would undertake would bear no resemblance to the "irresponsible" assurances which we had received in the past and that such commitments if given would be observed. The Prime Minister concluded his presentation of this point by giving me to understand that given the will the way can be found.

7. Prince Konoye stated that should the President desire to communicate any kind of suggestion to him personally and confidentially he would be glad to arrange subsequent secret meetings with me, but he expressed the earnest hope that in view of the present internal situation in Japan the projected meeting with the President could be arranged with the least possible delay. Prince Konoye feels confident that all problems and questions at issue can be disposed of to our mutual satisfaction during the meeting with the President, and he ended our conversation with the statement that he is determined to bring to a successful conclusion the proposed reconstruction of relations with the United States regardless of cost or personal risk.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

11.94/2344$_{2}{}^{7}\!/_{8}$

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] September 6, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador called at his request at the Secretary's apartment.[3] He handed the Secretary a document, the contents of which he said had already been communicated to Ambassador Grew for communication to the Department. The Secretary said that we had received it yesterday. A copy of the document which contains Japanese proposals relating to adjustment of American relations is attached hereto.[4]

---

[3] Mr. Obata accompanied the Ambassador.

The Ambassador said that the document had been prepared by the Japanese Government before the receipt by it of the President's answer delivered on September 3 to Prince Konoye's message delivered on August 28 but that the Japanese Government felt that the contents of this communication constituted a reply to our statement of September 3, having in mind also the spirit of the statement which the Ambassador communicated to the President on August 28. The Ambassador also referred in this connection to the proposal which he had presented on August 6. The Ambassador said that when the Secretary had spoken to the Ambassador on the evening of August 28 of the desirability of reaching an agreement in principle on the fundamental questions involved before making arrangements for the meeting between the heads of the Governments, the Ambassador had referred the Secretary's views to his Government and that the proposal which he was now presenting was in response to the Ambassador's representations to his Government. The Ambassador said he wished to emphasize especially Items B and C in Japan's proposed commitments as being responsive to our expressed attitude and stressed also his opinion that in the light of circumstances in Japan this was the maximum by way of concessions that Japan could offer at this time.

The Secretary said that he and his associates would during the week-end go over the document presented by the Japanese Ambassador as he was naturally anxious to proceed as rapidly as possible. The Secretary then repeated what he had said many times in regard to the desirability of preparing the public in matters of this kind in order to insure public support. The Japanese Ambassador then said that not only was it necessary to hasten the matter of preliminary discussions but also the matter of an announcement. The Secretary then said that he perceived no objection to the Japanese Government letting it seep out that informal and exploratory conversations were proceeding.

J[OSEPH] W. B[ALLANTINE]

---

[4] *Infra.*

711.94/2344$\frac{7}{25}$

Draft Proposal Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State on September 6, 1941[5]

The Government of Japan undertakes:

(*a*) that Japan is ready to express its concurrence in those matters which were already tentatively agreed upon between Japan and the United States in the course of their preliminary informal conversations;

(*b*) that Japan will not make any military advancement from French Indo-China against any of its adjoining areas, and likewise will not, without any justifiable reason, resort to military action against any regions lying south of Japan;

(*c*) that the attitudes of Japan and the United States towards the European War will be decided by the concepts of protection and self-defense, and, in case the United States should participate in the European War, the interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact by Japan shall be independently decided;

(*d*) that Japan will endeavour to bring about the rehabilitation of general and normal relationship between Japan and China, upon the realization of which Japan is ready to withdraw its armed forces from China as soon as possible in accordance with the agreements between Japan and China;

(*e*) that the economic activities of the United States in China will not be restricted so long as pursued on an equitable basis;

(*f*) that Japan's activities in the Southwestern Pacific Area will be carried on by peaceful means and in accordance with the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce, and that Japan will coöperate in the production and procurement by the United States of natural resources in the said area which it needs;

(*g*) that Japan will take measures necessary for the resumption of normal trade relations between Japan and the United States, and in connection with the above-mentioned, Japan is ready to discontinue immediately the application of the foreigners' transactions control regulations with regard to the United States on the basis of reciprocity.

The Government of the United States undertakes:

(*a*) that, in response to the Japanese Government's commitment expressed in point (*d*) referred to above, the United States will abstain from any measures and actions which will be prejudicial to the endeavour by Japan concerning the settlement of the China Affair;

---

[5] This proposal was also handed to the American Ambassador in Japan (Grew) by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Toyoda) on September 4, 1941.

(*b*) that the United States will reciprocate Japan's commitment expressed in point (*f*) referred to above;

(*c*) that the United States will suspend any military measures in the Far East and in the Southwestern Pacific Area;

(*d*) that the United States will immediately [upon settlement] reciprocate Japan's commitment expressed in point (*g*) referred to above by discontinuing the application of the so-called freezing act with regard to Japan and further by removing the prohibition against the passage of Japanese vessels through the Panama Canal.

711.94/2624

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[Tokyo,] September 8, 1941.

The Director of the American Bureau called on me this morning at the request of the Foreign Minister and on the latter's behalf conveyed to me a message of which the following is a brief summary.

The Foreign Minister is concerned over the recent incident in which the American destroyer *Greer* is involved since he feels that the German Government, which is said to be asserting that this incident constitutes an unprovoked aggressive act by the United States, may claim that it falls within the purview of article 3 of the Tripartite Pact. Admiral Toyoda mentions this incident as further proof of the necessity of expediting the suggested meeting between the Prime Minister and the President.

I told the Director of the American Bureau that I was sending for the record a letter to the Foreign Minister setting forth the main points of the official statements made by the President and the Navy Department concerning the incident involving the *Greer*. I likewise told Mr. Terasaki that I had already brought to the attention of the Secretary of State Admiral Toyoda's views, which he had expressed to me several times, concerning the importance of holding the proposed meeting with the least possible delay.

Admiral Toyoda through Mr. Terasaki expressed to me the hope that officials of the American Government would refrain from making any public mention of the conversations between the United States and Japan which had been carried on in Tokyo and in Washington because any such publicity would make it much more difficult for the Foreign Minister to control dissident groups and opposing influences in Japan.

J[oseph] C. G[rew]

711.94/2624

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[TOKYO,] September 10, 1941.

I called on Admiral Toyoda this evening at six o'clock and carried out the instructions contained in the Department's telegram No. 573, September 9, 11 a.m.[6] I made it clear to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the inquiries made were of an exploratory and preliminary nature and that further questions might emerge from additional study on the part of my Government of the proposals submitted by Japan. Admiral Toyoda listened carefully to my remarks and to the questions presented and answered that before giving me a reply he would examine the points in question.

The Foreign Minister told me that he did not have in his possession the text of the draft proposal delivered on September 4 by the Japanese Ambassador in Washington to the Secretary of State. The Minister and also Mr. Terasaki who attended the meeting said that they could not entirely understand question number one since they understood that the draft of September 4 did not supersede and cancel out any of the terms (as, for example, the use of good offices by the President of the United States in regard to bringing the hostilities between Japan and China to a close) on which previous agreement had been reached during the conversations in Washington. Admiral Toyoda and Mr. Terasaki both made it clear that their remarks in this connection were off the record and unofficial.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

711.94/2624

Statement Handed by the American Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Toyoda) on September 10, 1941

The Government of the United States is at present examining the proposals communicated to the American Ambassador by His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs on September 4, and also communicated to the Secretary of State by His Excellency Admiral Nomura on September 6.

The American Government has in view an agreement conforming to the principles and methods which it has put forward; an agreement under the terms of which China would receive just and equitable treatment; in which the rights and interests of all Pacific powers would be given due consideration; and which would make a substantial contribution toward the establishment and maintenance of a just, stable and orderly peace. Since the hostilities existing between Japan and China are a basic factor in the problem of reaching a general settlement in the Pacific area, a fair and just settlement of their controversies by China and Japan is an essential condition to any general solution of the Far Eastern problems which might be expected to provide for the future peace and stability of that area.

---

[6] Not printed; it directed the presentation of the statement, *infra.*

The proposal as originally advanced by the Japanese Government provided for the exercise of good offices by the President of the United States, and the Japanese Government was informed that the Government of the United States was not prepared to suggest to the Chinese Government that it undertake negotiations with the Japanese Government unless the Government of the United States was convinced that the terms which the Government of Japan had in mind were consistent with the principles to which the American Government is committed. A deadlock was reached in the informal discussions between our two Governments in regard to these terms as a result of the insistence on the part of the Japanese Government that Japanese troops were to be stationed in Inner Mongolia and North China for an unspecified period, and also because of the fact that the Government of the United States was not able to elicit from the Japanese Government specific assurances that the principles of non-discrimination in commercial relations between nations would be applicable to the program of economic collaboration with China which Japan proposed to adopt. The Government of the United States has consistently sought an agreement the aim and terms of which shall lead to an all-embracing and durable peace in Eastern Asia and in the area of the Pacific.

The latest proposals submitted by the Japanese Government, it would appear, seek to break the deadlock, not by responding to the desires of the United States Government on the above points, but by proposing that Japan shall negotiate with China directly, on the premise that, since the good offices of the President are not to be sought, the Government of the United States would not be concerned with the character of the terms of peace which Japan intends to propose to China or with the progress of the conflict between China and Japan. Any such premise as the foregoing passes over or ignores the intention of the United States Government, which has been repeatedly impressed upon the Japanese Ambassador, to confer with the Government of China, Great Britain, The Netherlands, et cetera, before it could agree to embark on any definitive negotiations with the Japanese Government regarding a settlement involving the Pacific area. This intention of the Government of the United States is based on its view that the peace of the Pacific is not a question which can be decided by the United States and Japan alone but is a question in which other powers having interests in the Pacific have a legitimate concern and unavoidable responsibilities.

Nor would the Government of the United States be prepared to conclude any agreement which would restrict the degree of assistance that it is now rendering or may in the future wish to render to nations which are engaged in resisting aggression. It is possible to assume that the Government of China, to no less a degree than the Government of Japan, desires to effect a peaceful solution of its controversies with Japan, and that, therefore, provided the Japanese Government is ready to propose equitable and just terms to the Chinese Government, the two nations should find it possible to settle their difficulties. In the event of such an occurrence the need for any provision such as that embodied in point (*a*) of the commitments which it is proposed that the Government of the United States undertake would appear to be eliminated.

In the light of the considerations set forth above it is clear that some further initiative from the Japanese Government is required in order to effect a solution of the above-mentioned difficulties. It would be of assistance to the Government of the United States if an answer could be obtained from the Japanese Government to the following questions which have arisen as the result of the discussions:

1. In point (*a*) of the provisional commitments which the Japanese Government is to undertake it is indicated that Japan is prepared to subscribe to the points upon which tentative agreement had already been reached during the informal preliminary conversations held in Washington. Does the Japanese Government have in mind the points whose formulation as set forth in the draft of the Government of the United States of June 21 are identical to those appearing in the draft which was handed to the Secretary of State by the Japanese Ambassador on September 4, or to those appearing in some prior draft?

Should the answer to the first question propounded in paragraph 1 be in the affirmative it would seem that certain of the stipulations contained in the proposals conveyed to the American Ambassador by the Japanese Foreign Minister on September 4 are more limited than are the undertakings provided for in the formulae on which tentative agreement had been previously reached. As an example, in point (*f*) the Japanese Government undertakes to refrain from discrimination in matters of international commerce in the area of the southwest Pacific.

2. With relation to the example above cited affecting point (*f*), is it the intention of the Japanese Government not to undertake similar commitments in regard to its economic activities in other regions notably in China?

3. In regard to the general question of international commerce, further clarification would be desirable with regard to the meaning

of the provisions of point (*e*) relating to American economic activities in China, namely, the precise meaning of the term "equitable basis" and whether this term is intended to mean that Japan shall be the sole judge in determining what constitutes an equitable basis.

4. Is the Government of the United States to understand that the terms of peace which Japan intends to propose to China will be in conformity with the several points appearing in the Annex to Section 3 of the draft submitted by the Japanese Ambassador on September 4 which is referred to above?

In connection with the formula outlined under point (*c*) dealing with respective attitudes of the United States and Japan towards the European war, while the American Government considers that this formula does not fully meet the requirements of the situation since it leaves Japan free to interpret independently any commitment on this score, the Government of the United States would like to examine the question further before putting forth any suggestion.

711.94/2344$\frac{8}{25}$

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] September 10, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador called at his request at the Secretary's apartment.[7] He said that he had been instructed by his Government to express the hope that the President in his forthcoming speech would not touch upon Japanese-American relations in a way that might give ammunition for pro-Axis elements in Japan to conduct agitation likely to embarrass the Government. The Ambassador said that the Japanese Government of course recognized that this was a matter which lay entirely within the discretion of the American Government, but that incidents like the *Greer* incident were arousing feeling among the pro-Axis elements in Japan. The Secretary replied that he could not undertake to say what the contents of the President's forthcoming speech were and that the only answer he could give was that the President's speech was already prepared. The Secretary added that he understood that the Japanese Ambassador's suggestion was along the lines of a point which had frequently come up in their conversations in regard to the desirability of avoiding anything that might exacerbate Japanese-American relations.

The Ambassador then inquired what the Secretary's reaction was to the Japanese Government's proposals of September 6. The Secretary commented that it seemed to us that whereas our previous conversations had related to a broad and liberal understanding covering the entire Pacific area, the present proposals had narrowed down the spirit and the scope of the proposed understanding. The Secretary also observed that, in regard to the matter of the Tripartite Pact, as this was a military alliance and as Germany was engaged in a movement of world conquest the situation presented real difficulties for this Government which he did not see how the new proposals met.

---

[7] Mr. Obata accompanied the Ambassador.

Mr. Obata said that as the Japanese Government concurred in all the points in which tentative agreement had been reached in our previous conversations the Ambassador and he felt that the new proposals did not serve to narrow the scope and the spirit of the original proposals. The Secretary then suggested that if we were under a misunderstanding, the misunderstanding should be cleared up and suggested that Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine meet with the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Obata in an endeavor to clear up all doubtful points. The Ambassador expressed fear lest further delay arise through carrying on conversations in regard to details. The Ambassador said that the Japanese Government had emphasized to Mr. Grew the desirability of proceeding as rapidly as possible. The Secretary said that Mr. Grew had been instructed that he might discuss the subject with the Japanese Government by way of explaining points that might not be clear in regard to our attitude and in obtaining clarification of Japanese points of view, but that this Government desired to conduct the conversations here at Washington.

After a little further discussion the Ambassador concurred in the Secretary's suggestion. It was then left to Mr. Ballantine to get in touch with Mr. Obata by telephone after Mr. Ballantine had consulted Mr. Hamilton.

J[OSEPH] W. B[ALLANTINE]

711.94/2344$\frac{8}{36}$

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] September 10, 1941.

Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Ballantine and Mr. Schmidt called at the Japanese Embassy in pursuance to an arrangement which the Secretary of State made with the Ambassador earlier this morning.[8]

Mr. Obata opened the conversation by saying that both he and the Ambassador had been surprised to learn this morning of the "misapprehension" of the American Government that the proposals communicated by the Japanese Ambassador on September 6 represented a new approach by the Japanese Government and superseded the progress which had been made in the informal conversations held before that time Mr. Obata said that the Japanese Government, he believed, intended all points previously tentatively agreed upon were "to stand" and that in addition the other assurances which the Japanese Government has made, in particular the communications which Prince Konoye had sent through Ambassador Nomura to the President, were also to be considered as representing the attitude and intent of the Japanese Government. Ambassador Nomura confirmed Mr. Obata's remarks. Mr. Ballantine asked if this meant those portions of our June 21 draft which were identical with earlier Japanese drafts were still to be considered as representing a part of the proposed agreement between our two Governments. Mr. Obata replied that he believed that to be so but added that the document which Ambassador Nomura had given the Secretary on September 4 represented merely the Ambassador's personal views and had not been referred to the Japanese Government and therefore did not represent, necessarily, the views of the Japanese Government. Mr. Ballantine then observed that we might take the draft of June 15 which the Japanese Ambassador had given the Secretary as a basis for comparison and that if the points in that draft together with the other assurances mentioned were to stand, there appeared to be certain inconsistencies between the September 6 proposals and earlier Japanese proposals or drafts.

---

[8] Mr. Obata and Mr. Matsudaira were also present.

Reference was made by Mr. Ballantine to the provisional commitment on the part of the Japanese Government labeled (*b*) in the document received September 6, in which Japan undertakes not to make "any military advancement from French Indochina against any of its adjoining areas". He mentioned that Prince Konoye had previously given assurances concerning the withdrawal of Japanese troops from French Indochina as well as broad assurances regarding the peaceful intent of the Japanese Government. Mr. Obata replied that of course the assurances of Prince Konoye were not in the least modified by this latest proposal. Mr. Ballantine pointed out that in the report forwarded by Mr. Grew of these Japanese proposals, Japan had undertaken not to attack, "without any justifiable reason" any regions lying north of Japan, whereas in the document handed to the Secretary on September 6 the Japanese had given the same undertaking against regions south of Japan and not north. Mr. Obata said that they would immediately inquire of the Japanese Government whether "north" or "south" was meant. Mr. Obata also agreed to ask his Government whether the qualification "without any justifiable reason" applied to any military advancement against areas adjoining Indochina as well as to regions lying south (or north) of Japan. Mr. Obata referred to the assurances given by Prime Minister Konoye that Japan did not intend to use military force against any nation without provocation and indicated that in his opinion those assurances covered this question entirely.

Mr. Ballantine then took up the question of the Japanese commitment (*d*) and observed that the Japanese undertaking to withdraw its armed forces from China after the "rehabilitation" of general and normal relationship between Japan and China was vague and indefinite. He inquired whether the Japanese still intended, as they had proposed originally on May 12, that the President of the United States would use his good offices in bringing the Chinese and Japanese Governments together for direct negotiations. Mr. Obata said that he believed that that was still the intention of the Japanese Government. The Japanese Ambassador was not positive but said that he also believed his Government still intended to request the President to suggest to the Chinese Government that it enter into direct negotiations with the Japanese Government.

Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine pointed out that, as the Secretary had said early in the conversations, if this Government were to approach the Chinese Government with such a suggestion the Chinese Government would naturally ask us on what basis the Japanese Government proposed to negotiate peace. We would therefore want to be in a position to inform the Chinese Government of the basic peace terms of the Japanese Government and to indicate to the Chinese Government that those peace terms were in harmony with the fundamental principles to which the people and the Government of the United States are committed. Mr. Hamilton added that, as the Secretary had already told the Japanese Ambassador, we had long believed that Japan's best interests as well as the best interests of this country and other countries interested in the Pacific would be served by avoiding any possibility of bitterness on the part of China. He pointed out that for the past nine years we have realized that far more can be accomplished by broad, liberal and progressive policy in international relations than by a narrow or conservative policy, and suggested indirectly that it would be in Japan's best interests to follow policies and procedure along those lines toward China. Mr. Hamilton went on to say that, to speak with complete frankness, there were many critics of Japan in this country who believed the Japanese Government would or could not observe its commitments and who were outspoken in their criticisms of Japan's previous acts in breaking treaties and agreements. He suggested that it would be of great value in disarming such critics and in proving to the world the good intentions of Japan were the Japanese Government, immediately following the conclusion of agreement, actually to take some action, such as withdrawal of troops, which would clearly demonstrate that the Japanese Government now intends to follow courses of peace and broad, liberal policies. He observed that with regard to the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, we had in the past endeavored to obtain some indication of an approximate schedule which the Japanese Government might have in mind for such withdrawal. Mr. Obata agreed entirely with what was said and expressed the view that the Japanese Government had drafted these proposals made on September 6 in an effort to provide a basis for settling the three questions which remained outstanding when the informal conversations were disrupted last July and to provide one or two other points for discussion.

With regard to the provision for the withdrawal of Japanese armed forces from China, Mr. Obata remarked that this question represented a very difficult problem and suggested that this Government prepare a draft for submission to the Japanese Government of the commitment which it would be desirable to obtain from Japan on this subject. Mr. Ballantine suggested that we had on numerous occasions made clear our belief that a successive withdrawal of Japanese armed forces from China as speedily as possible until complete was desirable. He observed that the Japanese Government was obviously in a better position than this Government to state explicitly its intentions and capabilities in regard to this question—in other words, the Japanese Government is far more able than this Government to draft a concrete formula. Mr. Hamilton remarked that at the present time we should first dispose of the general questions which we had brought up today before going on to the next step.

Mr. Ballantine observed that the undertaking marked (*e*) on the part of the Japanese Government, that economic activities of this country in China would not be restricted "so long as pursued on an equitable basis", was not clear. Mr. Obata agreed that the phraseology was bad and indicated that in his opinion this was meant to apply to present conditions and areas now under Japanese military occupation and control. Mr. Hamilton pointed out that the wording in this paragraph suggested that Japan had a special position or special right in China and added that we were not concerned primarily with the present situation in China but were endeavoring to draft a clear picture of what the situation in China and in the Pacific area in general would be following a general settlement.

Mr. Ballantine remarked that under commitment (*f*) the Japanese had limited the application of the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce to the "southwestern Pacific area" and inquired whether it was the intention of the Japanese Government that this principle should be applied to the entire Pacific area. Mr. Obata said again that he believed that the previous tentatively agreed upon commitment given in Section 5 of the June 21 draft would be concurred in by the Japanese Government and that, as indicated by Prince Konoye, Japan desired to see those principles applied not only to China but to the entire Pacific area. Mr. Ballantine recalled that the Secretary of State had told the Ambassador a few days ago that he had instructed economic experts in the Department to study the question of cooperation between the United States and Japan in economic affairs in the Pacific area. As a result of that study a new draft of Section 5 of the proposed agreement had been prepared. Mr. Ballantine gave a copy to Mr. Obata for his reference. (Copy attached.) It was pointed out that in our estimation the adoption of a formula such as contained in this new draft would be to the interests of the Japanese. Mr. Hamilton stated that this redraft of Section 5 was of course entirely tentative and merely intended for the consideration of the Japanese.

In reply to a question as to what was meant by the provisional commitment on the part of the Government of the United States marked (*a*), the Japanese Ambassador said that he believed the Japanese Government desired that that Government cease giving aid to China. Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine pointed out that the fundamental purpose of the proposed understanding was peace in the Pacific, that presumably peace would be arranged between Japan and China, and that this would make unnecessary any reference to the question of aid by this Government to China. Mr. Ballantine remarked that we assumed the Chinese Government to be equally interested in a just peace and therefore if the Japanese Government were to offer a just and equitable settlement to China there was no reason to expect the Chinese Government would not accept such an offer. Mr. Hamilton went on to say that, as the Secretary had previously informed the Ambassador, this Government, before completing any agreement with Japan, would expect to discuss the question with the Chinese Government and with other governments interested in the Pacific area for the reason that the question of peace in the Pacific and a general settlement of Pacific problems is not one which can be determined by Japan and the United States alone, but is one in which other governments are interested and share the responsibilities.

Mr. Ballantine remarked that we had sent a telegram to Ambassador Grew covering the main points which had been brought up in today's discussion.

Mr. Hamilton said that we desired this afternoon merely to present certain points which were not entirely clear to us and that we believed that once we had received clarification of these points from the Japanese Government we could make further progress in our study. Mr. Obata suggested that this Government prepare a complete draft on the basis of earlier drafts by this Government and by the Japanese

Government and also taking into consideration the Japanese earlier proposals in regard to Indochina and the communications which Prince Konoye has made. Mr. Obata said that he believed in view of the agreement on principle, as already expressed by Prince Konoye, we should have no difficulty in phraseology. Mr. Hamilton replied that he believed it would be more desirable to wait until questions which we had raised today had been clarified before attempting a new redraft of the proposed agreement. Mr. Obata concurred and said that they would telegraph the Japanese Government immediately and would expect to have a reply by tomorrow afternoon.

(COMMENT: We came away from the conversation with the distinct feeling that Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Obata themselves were somewhat vague in regard to the intent of the Japanese Government and the meaning of the various points in the proposals given to the Secretary on September 6. They appeared to be positive on only the one point that the Japanese Government desired to arrange a meeting between the heads of states as soon as possible.)

M[AX] W. S[CHMIDT]

[Annex]

Draft Statement Given to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on September 10, 1941

V. ECONOMIC ACTIVITY OF BOTH NATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AREA

The Japanese Government and the Government of the United States hereby mutually pledge themselves that the Japanese and the American activity in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of non-discrimination in international commercial relations. In pursuance of this policy, the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States agree to cooperate each with the other toward the creation of conditions of international trade and international investment under which Japan and the United States will have a reasonable opportunity to secure through the trade process the means of acquiring those goods and commodities which each country needs for the safeguarding and the development of its own economy. They furthermore agree to cooperate each with the other especially toward obtaining commercial access, on a non-discriminatory basis, by each of them to supplies of such basic commodities as oil, rubber, tin, nickel, and any other commodity the importation of which is essential to each country for the maintenance of its economic life.

711.94/2624

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (*Grew*)

[Tokyo,] September 13, 1941.

I called on the Foreign Minister this evening at his request for an interview which lasted one and a half hours. Mr. Terasaki and Mr. Inagaki of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office, and Mr. Dooman also attended.

Admiral Toyoda first read and then handed me the text of the instructions which the Minister said were to be telegraphed that night to Admiral Nomura in Washington, setting forth replies to a number of questions which Admiral Toyoda told me Mr. Hamilton, under instruction from the Secretary of State, had asked the Japanese Ambassador on September 10. A copy of these instructions to the Japanese Ambassador, which I cabled in paraphrase this evening to the Department, is attached[9] to this memorandum.

Mr. Terasaki, at the request of the Foreign Minister, began by reading in English from a paper written in Japanese a statement of which the following is a summary:

(*a*) It had been the Minister's intention that the tentative proposals which he had delivered to Mr. Grew on September 4, and which had been handed to the Secretary of State by the Japanese Ambassador on September 6, should embrace every one of the points upon which preliminary agreement had been reached in the informal conversations in Washington. Concurrently it was the Minister's desire to obviate long drawn out discussions of details which might delay or in other ways impede the holding of the suggested meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister since the time element was essential.

(*b*) It is not the intention of the Japanese Government to reduce or curtail in any way whatever the points on which preliminary agreement had been reached in the aforesaid conversations. In actual fact the undertakings which Japan is now willing to assume transcend in scope the points on which agreement had been reached in Washington. The Japanese Government has in mind a program which is certainly far more extensive than the previously agreed points. While the present proposals are designed to obviate long drawn out discussion of details at the present time, the Japanese Government is willing to discuss such details once it is agreed that the responsible heads of the American and Japanese Governments shall hold a meeting.

(*c*) The Government of the United States has indicated its desire to confer with the Governments of Holland, Great Britain, and other countries concerning the matters under discussion between Japan and the United States. Although the Japanese Government feels compelled to state that any agreement which may be achieved between the United States and Japan must be of a bilateral nature, it entertains no objection whatsoever to the Government of the United States carrying on any consultations which it may desire to hold with other interested nations.

---

[9] *Infra.*

(*d*) It was the Minister's understanding that the proposals which he had handed to me on September 4 had as yet not been seen by the President, and it was the Minister's earnest hope that they might be brought to the attention of the President as soon as possible. In reply to this, I stated that the Secretary of State was in constant communication with the President in regard to the conversations in progress and that it was up to the Secretary to decide what data should be brought to the President's attention and at what time.

After listening to the Preamble outlined above, I stated that the Government of the United States had up to the present made no definite answer to the proposals which the Minister had delivered to me on September 4 and that they were still being discussed. I said that it was the hope of my Government that preliminary conversations would make it possible to clear up those points of the proposals submitted by the Minister which are susceptible of broad construction and thereby to ensure that the meeting between the President and Prince Konoye, if and when it took place, would be a success. I pointed out that should the meeting fail of success, appalling consequences would ensue.

Admiral Toyoda then gave me orally answers to the questions which I had on September 10 put to him as instructed in the Department's telegram No. 573, September 9, 11 a. m.[10] In giving me these replies the Minister drew my attention to the fact that although certain of his replies which were in answer to the questions asked the Japanese Ambassador by Mr. Hamilton and to those which I had put to him were either identical or mutually inclusive, he had considered it advisable, in order to avoid possible confusion, to draw up separately the answers to the two groups of questions. The answers of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the questions which I had put to him on September 10 are as follows:

First. The Japanese Ambassador had presented to the Secretary of State on September 4 a draft statement which represented the Ambassador's personal and private views and it was consequently an unofficial document. The Foreign Office had subsequently been informed by Admiral Nomura that he had withdrawn this statement. As a consequence the Minister for Foreign Affairs did not think it would be necessary to go into the question of the effect of Admiral Nomura's draft statement of September 4, which he subsequently withdrew, on the points on which tentative agreement had already been reached.

Second. In so far as the question relating to item (*f*) of the Minister's proposal is concerned, there is no intention on the part of the Japanese Government to discriminate in commercial matters in the area of the southwestern Pacific and in other regions, in particular China. However, in regard to China it is necessary to consider this question in the light of observations set forth in the reply to be given to Mr. Hamilton in response to his question on this point.

---

[10] Not printed.

Third. As to the significance of the words "equitable basis", these words refer to activities of an economic nature which are not discriminatory in nature and which are non-monopolistic, non-exploitive, and non-exclusive, modified, however, by the natural unavoidable factors referred to in point (*e*) of the answer to be given to Mr. Hamilton. It follows therefore that Japan alone is not to decide what is meant by "equitable basis".

Fourth. In so far as the formula set forth in point (*c*) of Admiral Toyoda's proposal is concerned, the reply in substance would be similar to that set forth above in "First". In regard to the wish of the Government of the United States further to study the formula in question, Admiral Toyoda stated that in consequence thereof he would refrain from further comment on this point until such time as the Government of the United States would desire to raise some question in regard to that formula. The Minister "deemed it advisable" that a further elucidation of the formula proposed by the Japanese Government should be discussed by the President and Prince Konoye at the projected meeting.

Admiral Toyoda in conclusion again emphasized the urgency of a meeting between the responsible heads of our two Governments with the least possible delay. He said that attempts were being made to prevent this meeting being held. He said that while many of these obstacles arose out of the internal situation in Japan, more dangerous still are the indications of third Powers aimed to forestall the holding of the meeting. The Minister again made reference to the fact that on September 27 would fall the anniversary of the Tripartite Pact. In adverting again to the opposition to the suggested meeting which is being manifested by certain elements in Japan, he earnestly and seriously expressed the hope that the Government of the United States would very soon find it possible to decide the question in the affirmative. I told the Minister that although I had already drawn the attention of my Government to the considerations which he had just outlined, in view of the great weight which he attributed to the urgency of speedy action I would again transmit his views to the Secretary of State.

I also told Admiral Toyoda of the substance of the final paragraph of the Department's telegram No. 573, September 9, 11 a.m., regarding the continuance in Washington of any definitive discussions concerning the reaching of an agreement on principle.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

711.94/2624

Proposed Instructions to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura), Handed by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Toyoda) to the American Ambassador in Japan (Grew) on September 13, 1941[11]

I.

(*a*) The proposed draft of an understanding which has been constituting a basis for informal negotiations between [the] Japanese and the United States Governments will continue to be a basis for further discussions.

The points upon which we deem a tentative agreement has already been reached during the informal preliminary conversations in Washington comprise the preamble to the proposed understanding, the concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations, and the matter concerning the good offices of the United States to the relations between Japan and China.

Although it seems that there is a misunderstanding on the part of the United States that Japan does not want [the] good offices of the United States in the settlement of China affairs, the Japanese Government has by no means refused the good offices of the President of the United States and is still, as before, wishing for them.

(*b*) The terms "without any justifiable reason" applies [*sic*] merely to the latter part of point (*b*) of the undertaking to which Japan is ready to commit itself.

(*d*) For the purpose of preventing communistic and other subversive activities threatening the safety of both Japan and China and also of maintaining the peace and order in China, Japan and China will cooperate in the form of common defense. The execution of the common defense by Japan and China will contain the stationing of Japanese troops for a certain period in accordance with the agreements between both countries. The Japanese troops which have been sent to China with the object of executing the China affairs will be withdrawn when the said affairs have been settled.

(*e*) The reason why the Japanese Government inserted point (*e*) as a matter to be undertaken by Japan is because the Japanese Government, in view of the apprehension on the part of the Government of the United States that Japan might violate the American rights and interests in China, wishes to show her intention of not obstructing any just and equitable economic activities of the United States in China. The Government of Japan will not only admit the principle of non-discrimination with regard to commerce in China as well as in [the] Southwestern Pacific Area, but also it fully respects the established rights and interests of the United States in China. However, it considers that the especially close economic relations between Japan and China natural from their geographical propinquity are the same kind of relations as those which exist between any other two neighboring countries. Indeed, there will be no reason why the principle of close economic relationship owing to the geographic propinquity shall not be applied to Japan's economic relations with China. Accordingly, the close and especial economic cooperation between Japan and China within this limit will not establish so-called monopolistic or preferential rights and interests for Japan. Moreover, it is firmly believed that such is a natural phenomenon in our human life, and the observance of this law of nature is not only a factor of bringing about economic prosperity of the world, but the surest way for the firm establishment of the world peace.

---

[11] In presenting this Japanese reply to the American communication of September 10, 1941, the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on September 23, 1941, added a note: "The original text, as received by the Embassy, was found to be imperfect. A few corrections and emendations have been entered in the present text without referring the matter back to Tokyo."

(*f*) Since matters relating to China, as has been stated above, are covered under point (*e*), the matter concerning Japan's economic activities in the Southwestern Pacific Area was clarified under point (*f*) in view of the fact that among other areas of the Pacific the United States is most concerned with the Southwestern Area of the Pacific.

II.

(*a*) The measures and actions referred to in point (*a*) among the proposed undertakings by the United States are meant to indicate acts of the United States in aid in various forms for the Chiang Kai-shek regime. As for the "Good Offices" of the President of the United States they were referred to above.

711.94/2624

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[TOKYO,] September 17, 1941.

Mr. Shigemitsu, the Japanese Ambassador to England, called today and we discussed the current conversations between the United States and Japan. I gathered the impression that Mr. Shigemitsu had called on me with the knowledge of Prince Konoye or the Foreign Minister. Mr. Shigemitsu reviewed the Japanese attitude toward these conversations roughly as follows: (1) the present Japanese Government is united in support of the current endeavors to bring about an adjustment of relations with the United States; (2)

the time factor, however, is of the greatest importance since groups in Japan who are against any adjustment of relations with the United States and the efforts being made in that direction are progressively mobilizing their forces; (3) should the efforts of the Prime Minister toward an understanding with the United States end in failure, there is no other statesman in Japan who would be able to bring about the desired solution since from both a political and a social point of view the present position of the Prime Minister is unusually strong.

I explained to Mr. Shigemitsu the grave dangers of embarking upon official negotiations without and prior to the establishment through preliminary talks of an adequate and agreed basis. I mentioned as well the broad construction which could be placed upon some of the points in the proposals put forward by the Japanese Government, and took occasion also to refer to the past experiences of the American Government as a result of the failure of Japan to carry out a number of assurances and promises which a succession of Japanese Foreign Ministers had made to me. Mr. Shigemitsu, while admitting the soundness of my remarks, told me that the situation at the present time was different from any in the past when the Japanese military had declined to carry out undertakings which the Foreign Minister had made. At present, Mr. Shigemitsu said, the responsible chiefs of the armed forces are supporting the policy of the Government and as a result of this support Prince Konoye is able to bring about a new course of policy. To illustrate his point Mr. Shigemitsu said that the Japanese Government could be compared with someone who had scaled a high fence and had his feet planted on the other side on new ground. He said in addition that although it was a physical impossibility to set down ahead of time all details relative to the carrying out by Japan of the undertakings which the Japanese Government might assume, the sincerity and will of the Konoye Government is such that the faithful execution in the course of time of any agreement which may be reached can be counted on with complete confidence.

Mr. Shigemitsu told me in the strictest confidence that the initiative in the direction of an understanding with America and England had come from the Emperor personally and that his own recall from London was related to this general subject. Mr. Shigemitsu told me that he had been received for two hours by the Emperor and could assure me that even during Mr. Matsuoka's tenure of office and Japan's adherence to the Axis the Emperor's wishes for the development of friendly relations with the United States and Great Britain had never wavered.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

711.94/2624

Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)

[Tokyo,] September 18, 1941.

Mr. Ushiba[11a] called me on the telephone yesterday afternoon at my house, asking whether he could call on me immediately. I told Mr. Ushiba that I had gone to bed with a cold, but that if he wished to risk the chances of an infection I would be glad to see him for a short while. Mr. Ushiba arrived at about five o'clock and stayed until shortly before seven.

Mr. Ushiba asked whether the Ambassador had received any comment from Washington on his report of the meeting which recently took place between the Ambassador and the Prime Minister. I replied that the Secretary of State had telegraphed in appreciative terms concerning the attitude and views of Prince Konoye, but that a paper which Admiral Nomura had handed in to the State Department on September 4 had so confused matters that the Ambassador had not felt that he had sufficient material to warrant his asking for a further meeting with the Prime Minister.

Mr. Ushiba said that the Cabinet had been completely upset by the information which Mr. Grew gave Admiral Toyoda on September 10 with regard to the action of Admiral Nomura. He said that Admiral Nomura had received from Prince Konoye a draft which was responsive to the American draft of June 21, but that in view of the Cabinet crisis in Japan Admiral Nomura had not handed in that document. He had instead written a brief letter to the Secretary of State which was not in any way helpful. Mr. Ushiba gathered that the Nomura paper of September 4 was not the draft received from Tokyo, for the reason that one of the basic ideas of the Japanese Government has been right along to have recourse to the good offices of the President in opening up a path between Japan and China—and apparently Admiral Nomura's paper of September 4 made no reference to the good offices of the President.

I then explained to Mr. Ushiba the combination of circumstances which had led to difficulty in Washington in understanding precisely what the position of the Japanese Government was, say as of September 4. I hoped that we were succeeding in untangling the crossed wires, but the loss of a week or more in straightening matters out was due in no part to any action of ours.

Mr. Ushiba remarked with surprising candor that he did not blame our Government in any way for wanting to know precisely what the aims and objectives of the Japanese are before committing itself to such a dramatic move as that of a meeting between the heads of Government of the United States and Japan. After all, the crux of the problem was China. He felt that the Japanese Government had shown very clearly that it proposed to maintain the principle of the Open Door in China, but that it had failed thus far to indicate clearly the terms which it would propose to China for settlement of the China conflict. Months had dragged on in conversations in Washington, and the Secretary of State had all along shown very clearly that he did not intend to commit the American Government in any decision until he knew in advance what the Japanese peace terms were and was satisfied that those terms were in conformity with the principles which he advocated for the regulating of relations between nations. Mr. Ushiba suggested that our Government should ask the Japanese Government to disclose those terms, as he could assure me that his Government would immediately respond to any such request. I said that I was unable to follow him in those observations: as Mr. Ushiba had himself suggested, we had long expressed desire to know the character of the Japanese peace terms; in our draft of June 21, Section III, we had inserted a phrase which was designed to indicate that the Japanese Government would have communicated those terms to the American Government before any approach was to be made by the President to the Chinese Government. I had therefore assumed that failure on our part to be apprised of the Japanese peace terms was caused by refusal on the part of the Japanese Government to disclose them to us. Mr. Ushiba said that he did not know precisely how the present situation arose, but that he could assure me that the Japanese Government would be only too glad to communicate the terms to the President and to have the President show them to the Chinese and other interested Governments. After some discussion, it seemed desirable that the initiative with regard to communication to us of the peace terms come from the Japanese side. Mr. Ushiba would suggest to Prince Konoye that he communicate the terms to Mr. Grew as further evidence of the good faith of the Japanese Government and of its eagerness to enter into formal negotiations with the American Government. It was also agreed that if Prince Konoye should feel that some further initiative should come from the American side, Mr. Grew—if he felt that he was in a position to do so—would express to Prince Konoye desire to be apprised of the character of the Japanese peace terms.

[11a] Private Secretary to the Japanese Prime Minister.

We then discussed the question of the attitude of the United States and Japan respectively toward the European war. Mr. Ushiba said that it was impossible for Japan to give to the United States a prior undertaking that it would interpret as a defensive act any action on the part of the United States against Germany which might lead to war between the United States and Germany. He thought that the formula which had been communicated by Admiral Toyoda to Mr. Grew was about as far as the Japanese Government could go prior to the proposed meeting. He added, however, that an understanding had been reached among the various influential elements in Japan which would enable Prince Konoye to give orally and directly to the President an assurance with regard to the attitude of Japan which, he felt sure, would be entirely satisfactory to the President. Another matter which troubled him very much in this connection was precisely in what terms the Japanese Government would explain to Germany any understanding which might be reached with the United States on this point. I remarked that the United States, which was committed to supporting the principle of the sanctity of treaties, could not well request Japan to betray its treaty commitments. It seemed to me, however, that there was a very definite difference between the Treaty of Alliance, with its rights and obligations, and the formulation of policies by the concerned allies. It followed as a matter of course that allies pursued policies which served their common end, but there was no obligation arising out of the Three Power Alliance which required Japan to follow policies which would serve exclusively the ends of Germany. Could not, therefore, Japan inform Germany that Japan had undertaken to pursue policies conformable to those of the United States, although Japan was prepared to fulfill its obligations under Article III of the treaty? Technically the Alliance is a defensive alliance; and it is clear from the rescript issued by the Emperor at the time of the signing of the Alliance that it was then considered by the Japanese Government as an instrument for peace. Mr. Matsuoka informed certain of the Ambassadors in Tokyo upon his return from Moscow that, in the event of a war occurring between Germany and the United States, Japan would consult its allies with regard to the antecedent circumstances, and that he felt confident that the Japanese Government would decide, in almost every conceivable instance, to enter the war on the side of Germany. Mr. Ushiba expressed amazement. He said that he knew that Mr. Matsuoka had interpreted Article III of the Alliance in a sense which was entirely contrary to Prince Konoye's interpretation, but that he did not know that he (Mr. Matsuoka) had disclosed his interpretation to representatives of foreign Governments. Apropos, he said that Mr. Matsuoka had told the Prime Minister that Mr. Grew had reported to Washington that the last Cabinet change was due to American pressure on Japan. I told Mr. Ushiba that we had reported nothing of the sort. I said that I could tell him in confidence that we had reported that the Cabinet change was due chiefly to two causes: first, the German attack on Soviet Russia, which upset Japanese expectation, when signing the

Alliance, that peace would be maintained between Germany and Russia; and, second, the conflict of interpretations by the Prime Minister and Mr. Matsuoka with regard to the scope and significance of the Triple Alliance. Mr. Ushiba said that we had been entirely correct.

The concluding portions of the conversation were devoted largely to Mr. Ushiba's stressing the importance of the American Government's returning a favorable reply to the Japanese proposal as soon as possible. Mr. Ushiba reverted again and again to the approach of the 27th of September, the first anniversary of the signing of the Alliance.[12]

E[UGENE] H. D[OOMAN]

711.94/2344$\frac{18}{26}$

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] September 19, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador called at his request at the Secretary's apartment. The Ambassador said that he had received nothing further from his Government than that the Foreign Minister had made to Mr. Grew an explanatory statement in regard to the Japanese proposals, and that the Ambassador had received a report of that explanatory statement.

The Secretary said that we had received Mr. Grew's report of his interview on September 13 with the Foreign Minister and of the explanatory statement which had been made to Mr. Grew. We had subsequently received a telegram from Mr. Grew stating that he had been informed that the Japanese Government was going to communicate to him the basic peace terms which the Japanese Government proposed offering to China. The Secretary added that we had hoped that the Ambassador might communicate those terms to us this evening.

The Ambassador said that he had not yet received any instructions on this point; that he had reported carefully to his Government our views but that he had received nothing beyond what had been communicated to Mr. Grew. He asked whether the explanatory statement made to Mr. Grew cleared up matters so as to place us in position to go ahead.

The Secretary said that the explanatory statement did not in our opinion advance us materially and that we still felt the proposals of September 6 narrowed down the original program.

---

[12] On September 18, 1941, the Counselor wrote the following memorandum: "Mr. Ushiba today telephoned to me to say that Prince Konoye would within the next day or two convey to the Ambassador the terms of peace which the Japanese Government is willing to offer to China."

The Ambassador asked whether it was not a fact that the principal difficulty was the question of the withdrawal of the Japanese troops from China.

The Secretary replied that it was an important difficulty, but that there was also the question of getting the proposal back to the broad basis covering the entire Pacific area along the lines that we had consistently talked about throughout the course of our informal discussions. He added it would be inconsistent with such a purpose if Japan should be proceeding along a peaceful course in one direction while pursuing an opposite course in another direction. This, he said, would not serve our ends or Japan's.

The Ambassador asked whether we had yet proposed any new suggestions with reference to the question of the relations of the two countries to the European war. The Secretary replied that we had not yet expressed any views on the formula contained in the Japanese proposals on this point.

The Ambassador said that he had informed his Government of our views in regard to the question of the withdrawal of the Japanese troops from China, but that he was still without instructions.

The Secretary said that he hoped we would soon hear from the Japanese Government, but that he realized that the Japanese Government had more difficulties than we had to encounter in determining their position. He added that we were no less desirous than they were in moving as rapidly as possible, and that while awaiting further word from the Ambassador we were continuing to study the proposals.

The Ambassador said that his Government wanted to make it clear that while it did not have anything to say in the matter of this Government's consulting third governments, its proposal to us was for a bilateral agreement. The Secretary said that, as he had on frequent occasions indicated to the Ambassador, we had no idea of bringing other countries in on our proposed agreement with Japan, but desired to work out independently with those powers programs which would be consistent with and supplement our arrangement with Japan.

The Secretary inquired whether the Ambassador anticipated any developments in Japan on the occasion of the anniversary (September 27) of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. The Ambassador gave no indication that he was apprehensive of any untoward developments. In reply to a further question of the Secretary he replied that he did not think that more than one-tenth of one per cent of the population of Japan desired to enter the war on Germany's side. He said it was true that the Japanese Army was very influential and that many officers were German-trained and admired German military technique, but that this did not mean that the Army as a whole desired to go into the war on the side of Germany.

The Ambassador, after saying again that he had nothing new to present but had merely dropped in for a general chat, took his leave.

J[OSEPH] W. B[ALLANTINE]

711.94/2624

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (*Grew*)

[TOKYO,] September 22, 1941.

I called on the Foreign Minister this afternoon at his request. After reading from a document in Japanese which was then translated into English, he made substantially the following oral statement:

1. The suggestion that the President meet with Prince Konoye was contained by implication in the message received by the President from the Prime Minister.

2. The Japanese Government had intended that at the proposed meeting there should be discussed the questions at issue between the two countries requiring agreement, and that subsequently through normal diplomatic channels the details for executing the understanding reached at the meeting should be worked out. The Government of the United States, however, had adopted the view that the problems which had emerged from the preliminary and informal conversations should be agreed on in advance of the meeting.

3. The Foreign Minister had explained that in his statement made to me on September 4 he had replied to all of the questions raised by the Government of the United States and that his statement of September 4 had widened rather than reduced the subject matter of the negotiations which the Japanese Government is willing to undertake.

4. The Foreign Minister then gave me the basic terms of peace which Japan is prepared to offer China to be communicated to the Secretary of State.[13] The Minister emphasized that these terms should not be regarded as a new proposal but as in relation and supplementary to his statement to me of September 4 when he confirmed that the Japanese Government still desired to seek the good offices of the President in bringing the conflict with China to an end.

5. Admiral Toyoda told me that there had been great changes in the internal situation here since a month ago due to the publicity which had been given abroad to the suggested meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister and due to the published reports and references on radio broadcasts abroad in regard to the conversations in progress between Japan and the United States. As a result of the efforts of the Japanese Government, public opinion in Japan and the Japanese press in the main are not aware of the developments referred to above, but the publicity abroad is known to certain groups in Japan and has had the effect of increasing the activities of those elements in Japan who are opposed to an understanding with the United States.

---

[13] *Infra.*

6. The Government of Japan will attempt to guard against any incidents or special occurrences in connection with the anniversary on September 27 of Japan's adherence to the Axis and will allow its anniversary to be celebrated by private organizations. However, should a considerable lapse of time occur following the anniversary without any sign as to the attitude of the United States, the groups referred to above who are against an understanding with the United States and who are informed of the Japanese-American conversations might find it possible to so enflame public opinion in Japan as to render very difficult the continuation of these talks.

7. Admiral Toyoda pointed out that the Japanese Government is still awaiting the American answer to the various points set forth by him in his statement of September 4 and expressed to me his belief that in that statement the Japanese Government had with complete frankness revealed to the American Government its intentions and desires. (End of Minister's statement.)

In reply to the Minister's question whether any further information had been received from Washington, I conveyed to him the substance of the Department's 603, September 20, 4 p. m.,[14] which had been decoded immediately prior to my call on the Minister. Admiral Toyoda was especially struck by the Secretary's remark to the Japanese Ambassador that the Government of the United States fully shared the desire of the Japanese Government to hasten matters. The Minister expressed the thought that although the desire of the United States Government to confer with other Governments in regard to the suggested agreement was clearly recognized, the element of delay which would be involved in such consultations might have a most unfortunate effect.

With reference to the lack of concern felt by the Japanese Ambassador in Washington regarding the anniversary on September 27 of Japan's adherence to the Axis, Admiral Toyoda expressed the view that Admiral Nomura was not close enough in touch with the situation in Japan to be cognizant of the dangers in this respect. I told the Minister that I was surprised that he had not conveyed to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington his own concern on this point.

With reference to the terms of peace between Japan and China, I told the Minister that I wished to avoid any comment until the Government of the United States had had a chance to examine these terms but that for purposes of clarification I would like to know the exact meaning of the words "existing agreements and usages" mentioned in point three. The Minister in reply stated that these words must be understood as written; however, he referred in this connection to the presence in China of American marines merely by way of an illustration of the phrase in question.

---

[14] Not printed; it reported the conversation of September 19, 1941; see memorandum, p. 629.

I promised the Minister that I would communicate to the Secretary immediately his statement given above and also the terms of peace between Japan and China which he had handed to me. But I added that in view of the communications which had been exchanged between the Governments of Japan and the United States I could not be optimistic that a decision on these important matters could be reached before the 27th of September.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

711.94/2624

The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Toyoda) to the American Ambassador in Japan (Grew)[15]

TEXT OF BASIC JAPANESE TERMS OF PEACE WITH CHINA

1. Neighborly friendship.

2. Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.

3. Cooperative defense between Japan and China.

Cooperation between Japan and China for the purposes of preventing communistic and other subversive activities which may constitute a menace to the security of both countries and of maintaining the public order in China.

Stationing of Japanese troops and naval forces in certain areas in the Chinese territory for a necessary period for the purposes referred to above and in accordance with the existing agreements and usages.

4. Withdrawal of Japanese armed forces.

The Japanese armed forces which have been dispatched to China for carrying out the China Affairs will be withdrawn from China upon the settlement of the said Affairs, excepting those troops which come under point 3.

5. Economic cooperation.

(*a*) There shall be economic cooperation between Japan and China, having the development and utilization of essential materials for national defense in China as its principal objective.

(*b*) The preceding paragraph does not mean to restrict any economic activities by third Powers in China so long as they are pursued on an equitable basis.

6. Fusion of the Chiang Kai-shek regime and the Wang Ching-wei Government.

7. No annexation.

8. No indemnities.

9. Recognition of Manchoukuo.

---

[15] Handed to the Ambassador in Japan on September 22, 1941. Points 1–5 were handed to the Secretary of State by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on September 23, while points 6–9 were added on October 1.

711.94/2624

Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)

[Tokyo,] September 23, 1941.

I was called to the Foreign Office this afternoon by the Director of the American Bureau who orally made a statement, which he stressed was being conveyed to me at the direction of the Foreign Minister, for communication to the Ambassador and for transmission by Mr. Grew to the Government of the United States. This statement, Mr. Terasaki said, is to be considered supplementary to the statements which Admiral Toyoda made to the Ambassador during their conversation yesterday.

The attached text has been prepared from the full notes which I took while Mr. Terasaki made the oral statement.[16]

E[ugene] H. D[ooman]

711.94/2344 18/27

Memorandum of a Conversation

[Washington,] September 23, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador called at his request at the Secretary's apartment. The Ambassador read from notes an oral statement substantially the same as that contained in Tokyo's 1497, September 22, 8 p. m.[17] He then handed to the Secretary two papers, copies of which are attached hereto. One of these papers was headed "Basic Terms of Peace between Japan and China"[18] and the other marked "Strictly Confidential" was captioned "Reply to the American Communication of September 10, 1941. Delivered to the American Ambassador by the Japanese Foreign Minister in Tokyo September 13".[19]

The Ambassador said that what he had now placed before us was a full expression of what the Japanese Government desired to say to us and that the question of anything further by way of clarification in regard to Japan's relations to the Tripartite Pact might best be left to the proposed meeting between the heads of our two Governments. He hoped that this Government would be able as soon as possible to give a reply to the Japanese Government's proposals. The Secretary replied that we would, of course, study the papers which the Japanese Ambassador had given us as expeditiously as possible with a view to making a reply. He asked the Ambassador what the Ambassador's impressions were in regard to the situation.

---

[16] Not printed. For translation submitted by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on September 27, 1941, see p. 640.

[17] Not printed; see memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan, September 22, 1941, p. 631.

[18] For text of terms, see p. 633.

[19] See text, p. 623.

The Ambassador replied that of course he understood very well the position of the American Government and he also appreciated the difficulties in the domestic situation in Japan. He said his hope was, however, that if we should proceed to have a meeting it would have a psychological effect in Japan in setting Japan on a new course. The Secretary referred to suggestions he had previously made of the desirability of the Japanese Government's being allowed time to assert control of public opinion and thus attain support for a liberal program such as we had discussed in our conversations. He asked the Ambassador whether the Ambassador thought that a meeting between the heads of states would contribute more to setting Japan upon a new course than the taking of the steps which the Secretary had suggested. The Ambassador said that he had not failed to communicate to his Government the Secretary's suggestion and he thought that the Japanese Government had already taken steps in that direction and that these steps had produced good results. He said that, as he had noted on previous occasions, perhaps not more than one-tenth of one percent of the Japanese people desired war with the United States, although of course if ordered to go to war the Japanese people would be ready. He felt that the holding of a meeting such as suggested would be of great value in counteracting the influence of the pro-Axis elements in the Japanese Government and in providing support for those elements desiring peaceful relations with the United States.

The Secretary brought up again the great opportunity that was now presented for Japan and the United States to work together along peaceful and progressive lines and he said he could not emphasize too much his view that by following such a course both countries would stand to gain more than through any other course. He referred to the fact that for the last ten years the youth in Germany had received no other training than for war and that no country could benefit from the staggering burden of armaments that warlike policies were imposing upon the world. The Ambassador said that he fully shared the Secretary's views on these points.

The Secretary went on to say that as this country had been following courses of peace and was committed to these courses there was very little that we could offer Japan in the way of bargaining. He then repeated that he would give careful and expeditious study to the papers which the Japanese Ambassador had presented and would communicate with the Ambassador as soon as possible.

J[OSEPH] W. B[ALLANTINE]

711.94/2344$\frac{19}{25}$

Document Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State on September 23, 1941

"equitable basis" means economic activities of a non-discriminatory character which are not monopolistic, exclusive and exploitative, qualified, however, by the inevitable natural limitations referred to in (*e*) of the reply to questions put by Mr. Hamilton under instructions of Mr. Hull on September 10. Accordingly it goes without saying Japan is not the sole judge in determining what constitutes "Equitable Basis."

711.94/2344$\frac{22}{25}$

The Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State[21]

The Japanese Ambassador, under instructions from his Government, has the honor to transmit to the Honorable the Secretary of State the accompanying document, the original copy of which was delivered to the United States Ambassador at the American Embassy in Tokyo on September 25, 1941.

For the information of the Secretary of State the Japanese Ambassador desires to add that, in handing the document to the United States Ambassador, Mr. Terasaki, Chief of the Bureau of American Affairs, said somewhat to the following effect:

> The Foreign Minister has already conveyed most fully to Your Excellency how eagerly the Japanese Government is now waiting for a reply from the American Government regarding the meeting of the responsible heads of the two Governments. I should like to inquire, though I am not specially instructed to do so today, if your Embassy has received any word from Washington.
>
> I am submitting to Your Excellency a document which has been prepared along the lines of the American Draft Understanding of June 21, both in form and contents, and in which is incorporated all that we have since communicated to the American Government.
>
> This is not, of course, intended to be a rigid formula like a treaty. Its wording is not inflexible. It has been put in the present form only to make all matters clearer. Accordingly, this is by no means a new proposal but rather a document prepared for the convenience of the American Government.

It may be further added that, decoded and slightly edited at this Embassy, the present text of the document may not agree exactly with the one transmitted directly to the State Department from the American Embassy in Tokyo, though it is not believed there can be between the two any important differences in substance.

[WASHINGTON,] September 27, 1941.

---

[21] Handed to Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine by the First Secretary of the Japanese Embassy (Matsudaira) on September 27, 1941, under instruction from the Japanese Ambassador.

[Enclosure 1]

Japanese Proposals Submitted to the American Ambassador in Japan (Grew) on September 25, 1941

[Tokyo,] September 25, 1941.

The Governments of Japan and of the United States accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement of understanding as expressed in a joint declaration for the resumption of traditional friendly relations.

Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of the amicable sentiment between their countries should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences.

It is the earnest hope of both Governments that, by a cooperative effort, Japan and the United States may contribute effectively toward the establishment and preservation of peace in the Pacific area and, by the rapid consummation of an amicable understanding, encourage world peace and arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.

For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-suited and weakening. Both Governments, therefore, desire that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general understanding which would bind, meanwhile, both Governments in honor and in act.

It is the belief of both Governments that such an understanding should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory concerns which could be deliberated later at a conference.

Both Governments presume to anticipate that they could achieve harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified or improved; to wit:

1. The concepts of Japan and of the United States respecting international relations and the character of nations.
2. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European War.
3. Action toward a peaceful settlement between Japan and China.
4. Commerce between both nations.
5. Economic problems in the Southwestern Pacific area.
6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.

Accordingly, the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have come to the following mutual understanding and declaration of policy:

I. The concepts of Japan and of the United States respecting international relations and the character of nations.

Both Governments affirm that their national policies are directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of reciprocal confidence and cooperation between the peoples of both countries.

Both Governments declare that it is their traditional, and present, concept and conviction that nations and races compose, as members of a family, one household living under the ideal of universal concord through justice and equity; each equally enjoying rights and admitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound not to destroy for others; they further admit their responsibilities to oppose the oppression or exploitation of other peoples.

Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to those moral principles and concepts.

II. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European War.

Both Governments maintain it their common aim to bring about peace in the world, and, when an opportune time arrives, they will endeavor jointly for the early restoration of world peace.

With regard to developments of the situation prior to the restoration of world peace, both Governments will be guided in their conduct by considerations of protection and self-defense; and, in case the United States should participate in the European War, Japan would decide entirely independently in the matter of interpretation of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy, and would likewise determine what actions might be taken by way of fulfilling the obligations in accordance with the said interpretation.

III. Action toward a peaceful settlement between Japan and China.

Both Governments, taking cognizance of the fact that the settlement of the China Affair has a vital bearing upon the peace of the entire Pacific area and consequently upon that of the world, will endeavor to expedite a rapid realization of the settlement of the said Affair.

The Government of the United States, recognizing the effort and the sincere desire on the part of the Japanese Government concerning the peaceful settlement of the China Affair, will, with the intention of facilitating the realization of the settlement, render its good offices in order that the Chungking Government may promptly enter into negotiations with the Government of Japan for a termination of hostilities and a resumption of peaceful relations, and will refrain from resorting to any measures and actions which might hamper the measures and efforts of the Government of Japan directed toward the settlement of the China Affair.

The Government of Japan maintains that the basic general terms of peace for the settlement of the China Affair will be in harmony with the principles embodied in the Konoye statement, and those agreements between Japan and China and those matters which have been put into effect in accordance with the said statement; that the economic cooperation between Japan and China will be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in the international commercial relations and also with the principle of especially close relationship which is natural between neighboring countries; and that the economic activities of third Powers in China will not be excluded so long as they are pursued on an equitable basis.

NOTE: There is appended a draft of the basic terms of peace between Japan and China.

IV. Commerce between Japan and the United States.

Both Governments agree to take without delay measures necessary for resuming normal trade relations between the two countries.

Both Governments guarantee each other that they will, as the first of the measures envisaged in the preceding paragraph, discontinue immediately the measures of freezing assets now being enforced, and that they will supply mutually such commodities as are, respectively, available and required by either of them.

V. Economic problems in the Southwestern Pacific area.

Both Governments mutually pledge themselves that the economic activities of Japan and the United States in the Southwestern Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in the international commercial relations in pursuance of the policy stated in the preceding paragraph, both Governments agree to cooperate each with the other towards the creation of conditions of international trade and international investment under which both countries will have a reasonable opportunity to secure through the trade process the means of acquiring those goods and commodities which each country needs for the safeguarding and development of its own economy.

Both Governments will amicably cooperate for the conclusion and execution of agreements with the Powers concerned in regard to the production and supply, on the basis of non-discrimination, of such specific commodities as oil, rubber, nickel, and tin.

VI. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.

Both Governments, taking cognizance of the fact that it is a matter of vital importance to stabilize promptly the situation in the Southwestern Pacific area, undertake not to resort to any measures and actions which may jeopardize such stabilization. The Government of Japan will not make any armed advancement, using French Indo-China as a base, to any adjacent area thereof (excluding China), and, upon the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area, will withdraw its troops which are now stationed in French Indo-China.

The Government of the United States will alleviate its military measures in the Southwestern Pacific area.

Both Governments declare that they respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Thailand and Netherland East Indies, and that they are prepared to conclude an agreement concerning the neutralization of the Philippine Islands when its independence will have been achieved.

The Government of the United States guarantees non-discriminatory treatment of the Japanese nationals in the Philippine Islands.

[Here follows text of basic terms of peace between Japan and China. For text, see page 633.]

[Enclosure 2] [22]

Oral Statement Made to the Counselor of the American Embassy in Japan (Dooman) by the Director of the American Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office (Terasaki)

Tentative translation from the Japanese original received by the Embassy

[Tokyo,] September 23, 1941.

The need of stationing armed forces in certain areas of China for a necessary period after the restoration of peace between Japan and China is recognized by the Japanese Government from the considerations of (1) the construction of a peaceful China toward which Japan is to cooperate, and also (2) the security and defense of Japan itself that must be insured.

(1) The uncertainty of China's internal stability even in ordinary times is a fact proven by history. Far greater is the danger of disorders of various sorts following a war, and such disorders are apt to be attended by intrigues and maneuvers from external sources, producing friction between China and Japan or other foreign Powers. Thus has the internal instability of China frequently led to international conflict. It is well known how intense, and how detrimental to the maintenance of peace and order, are the activities of Communist elements in China today. If such conditions are to

---

[22] Not mentioned in the covering document on p. 636; but see footnote 16, p. 634.

recur in the future, it will be out of the question to stabilize China's national life or to promote the welfare of the Chinese people. Accordingly, what is most needed upon the conclusion of peace between China and Japan is to ensure the maintenance of peace and order in China, which is desired in order that the Chinese Government may be enabled to concentrate its efforts toward a speedy achievement of the stabilization of China's national life. While the Japanese Government would like to see this task undertaken by China alone, it realizes the actual difficulties in the present circumstances. Moreover, Japan has reasons of its own (2), which render imperative cooperation between the two countries. This is why Japan proposes the stationing of required armed forces for a necessary period in certain prescribed areas.

(2) From the economic standpoint alone it is obvious that the conditions of peace and order in neighboring territories importantly affect the existence of Japan. It is even more obvious that the conditions of China after the restoration of peace, viewed from the military standpoint, such as prevail at the present time after four years of modern warfare on a gigantic scale, affect directly and vastly the existence of Japan. In these times when almost the entire world is engulfed in the turmoil of war, there is no telling what serious situations may arise in China through internal or external causes. In order to prevent such eventualities, that is to say, in order to safeguard the existence and defense of Japan itself, the Japanese Government is obliged to station armed forces in China.

For the reasons stated above, stationing of armed forces is an absolute necessity. However, the Japanese Government is prepared to withdraw the armed forces whenever their presence is no longer required. Any proposal such as that of maintaining peace by the stationing of international armed forces is unacceptable because of public opinion in Japan and also because of the direct and vital bearing the internal conditions of China have upon Japan.

711.94/2624

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[Tokyo,] September 27, 1941.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs requested me to call upon him this afternoon and for some two hours we discussed in broad outline and in detail various aspects of relations between Japan and the United States. Throughout Admiral Toyoda manifested his determination and desire to cut through the maze of Japanese bureaucracy which has been and in a great number of instances is still hindering the solution of certain problems. In connection with the treatment of American nationals within the Japanese Empire and Japanese-occupied areas the Minister's obviously sincere efforts have already proved effective, and I am led to believe from his assurances that the early future may show further progress in this direction. . . .

Admiral Toyoda began the conversation by remarking that, today being the anniversary of the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance, he had had a tiring day with a long program of attending functions and delivering speeches, but he said that he had asked me to call this afternoon, in order that he might present to me certain thoughts in an "off the record" conversation, as he did not wish to lose any time in stressing again the urgency of receiving with as little delay as possible the reply of the American Government to the proposal put forward by the Japanese Government for a meeting of the responsible leaders of the United States and Japan.

Admiral Toyoda then asked whether I had received any information indicative of the views and attitude of my Government with regard to the proposal. I replied that I had not, but that the Secretary of State had telegraphed me that he had conferred with Admiral Nomura on September 23, that Admiral Nomura had handed to the Secretary certain written material, and that the Secretary had informed Admiral Nomura that he would have the material examined as expeditiously as possible with a view to making an early reply to the proposal of the Japanese Government. Admiral Toyoda made the brief observation that he was gratified to receive that information.

The Foreign Minister's main purpose in conversation with me today, however, was to have conveyed to the President, through the Secretary of State and myself, the anxiety of Prince Konoye and the entire Cabinet lest the proposed meeting between the heads of our two Governments might be indefinitely delayed, and orally to present various considerations regarding the position of the Japanese Government in connection with the present informal conversations, as follows.

(Begin Minister's statement.)

1. The whole Atlantic area is engulfed in war and the European continent is in tumult. The Pacific area fortunately has not yet been touched by similar catastrophe. Whether or not the Pacific also is to become involved in the war is a question to which the United States and Japan hold the solution. Not only are the endeavors of Japan to adjust its relations with the United States directed against the spread of war into the Pacific, but also Japan is mindful of its desire for contributing toward the welfare of all mankind by the reestablishment of good relations between our two countries and by their cooperation for the restoration of world peace. The replacing of American-Japanese relations onto their traditional friendly basis has been the object of the Foreign Minister's continuous thought and effort since his assumption of office some two months ago. Japan's membership in the Tripartite Pact, however, is a consideration which renders susceptible to serious misunderstanding on the side of

Japan's allies any approach which the Japanese Government might make to the United States, particularly so important an event as a meeting between the responsible heads of the Japanese and American Governments. However, in spite of this risk and in spite of the lack of precedent in Japanese history for a Prime Minister to go abroad to confer with the head of a foreign Government, Prince Konoye is nevertheless determined to meet with President Roosevelt. In thus seeking to adjust its relations with the United States, for the welfare of humanity as a whole as well as for the sake of the two countries directly concerned, Japan's sincerity is evident.

2. Since there is by no means any thought in Japan that the sacrifice of everything by Japan is required for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific, it would be a most unfortunate conjecture for anyone to assume that Japan, despite its national characteristic of reacting strongly to outside influence, had surrendered to American pressure in making this approach to the United States, an approach which actually is prompted by Japan's desire to contribute toward the welfare of the whole world. The Minister was bringing up this point because of past suggestions to this effect appearing in American newspapers. At present, happily, this was not the case. Indeed, the Minister recalled that the Secretary of State had made mention in conversation with the Japanese Ambassador in Washington of the improvement in the tone of the Japanese press, an improvement which was in fact one of considerable degree.

3. Many problems must be solved in facing the question of the reestablishment of good relations between Japan and the United States. Nobody in Japan has any idea that a single meeting between the Prime Minister and the President will resolve these problems. Such readjustment will require time. But the political effects of the very meeting of the heads of Governments would be important. An epochal improvement in Japanese-American relations would evolve from the meeting which, although Admiral Toyoda is of the opinion that divergencies of attitude and policy have been eliminated, nevertheless would remove any differences still outstanding.

4. No objection in principle has been raised by the Government of the United States to the proposed meeting. The favorable atmosphere and auspicious opportunity obtaining at present, however, would be subverted and would not soon recur if response by the American Government should be long delayed or various obstructions should intervene.

5. So far as the current preliminary conversations are concerned, the position of the Japanese Government has been completely set forth. A document embodying a résumé of that position, prepared for the convenience of the American Government and drawn up along the lines of the American draft statement of June 21, was presented to the American Ambassador on September 25.[23] Admiral Toyoda was confident that the American Government would give earnest and careful study to the Japanese position.

6. All details of preparation for the proposed meeting have been completed by the Japanese Government: the personnel of the Prime Minister's suite, including full admirals and generals, have been confidentially appointed and the ship to carry the party has been put

---

[23] *Ante*, p. 637.

into momentary readiness to sail. (Admiral Toyoda here remarked that Mr. Hull had mentioned to the Japanese Ambassador his fear that the Japanese Government might not be allowed by the Japanese Navy and Army to venture upon any course of peace. The Foreign Minister stated that in order to dissipate doubt as to the collaboration of the Japanese Navy and Army with the Prime Minister's undertaking, high-ranking naval and military officers would accompany Prince Konoye.) A reply from the United States Government is being momentarily awaited. The first anniversary of the concluding of the Tripartite Pact chances to be celebrated today. A highly delicate situation is being created within Japan by opposition groups who, hoping that this very day might be a turning point in the history of Japan, are moving against the policy of the Cabinet in its endeavors to bring about an improvement in relations with the United States.

7. Weather conditions along the Alaskan coast and in the northern Pacific will worsen with the advent of the season of storms and fog.

8. That from every point of view time is of the essence has been repeatedly stated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. It is his belief that there is every reason to expedite the decision to hold the proposed meeting. He was glad to hear that Mr. Hull had told Admiral Nomura on September 23 that he would with good will and expediency study the papers given him by the Japanese Ambassador. The Foreign Minister would be very grateful to have from the American Government at its earliest convenience an explicit reply in which the place and date of the meeting would be indicated. It would be greatly appreciated by the Japanese Government if the American Government would be pleased to assign some date between October 10 and 15 for the meeting as the Japanese mission is ready to leave at any time.

9. Admiral Toyoda wanted to emphasize the essential necessity for mutual confidence and faith. He was aware that the American Ambassador well knew of the Prime Minister's feelings, his character and past career, his faith and sincerity. Prince Konoye and the entire Cabinet are of the opinion that if advantage is not taken of the present favorable opportunity another equally propitious occasion could not be expected in the early future. Consummation of the proposed meeting, it was felt, was of the greatest importance.

10. His statement concluded, the Minister remarked that he hoped nothing he had said would be construed as setting a time limit upon the reply awaited from the American Government or as indicating that there would not be given, if requested, further explanation of the position of the Japanese Government. Having regard, however, for the grave situations at present obtaining throughout the world as well as within Japan, the Minister declared an early consummation of the proposed meeting between the heads of the two Governments to be a matter of prime importance. Admiral Toyoda reiterated his hope that his statement would not be misinterpreted.

(End Minister's statement.)

I informed the Foreign Minister that, although I had already communicated to the Department of State the principal points which he again brought out today, I nevertheless would report to my Government the substance of his statement as completely and precisely as possible.

It may be significant that my appointment with Admiral Toyoda followed almost immediately after the luncheon which he tendered today for the Axis diplomats and at which he made a relatively innocuous speech celebrating the anniversary of the Three Power Pact which was concluded last year. Perhaps by this meeting with me he wished to emphasize to us the fact that Japan's membership in the Tripartite Pact would not be allowed to obstruct a readjustment of Japanese-American relations, or he may have desired to counteract any adverse effects which his speech might have caused in the United States.

711.94/2319 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

[Substance]

TOKYO, September 29, 1941—noon.
[Received 2:25 p.m.[24]]

1529. The Ambassador reports for Secretary Hull and Under Secretary Welles as follows:

(1) In regard to the preliminary conversations taking place at Washington and Tokyo, the Ambassador points out that a review of telegraphic correspondence on this subject since last spring reveals the Japanese Government's efforts, increasing steadily and intensified lately, to arrange a meeting between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt without further delay. While admitting his role to be chiefly that of a transmitting agent in these conversations, the Ambassador naturally wishes to aid in any constructive way, particularly by endeavoring to appraise accurately for the President and the Secretary of State the Japanese factors and conditions having direct or indirect bearing on the subject and also by trying to bring the Japanese Government to adopt measures and policies such as the United States Government deems to be essential for a mutual understanding or agreement between Japan and the United States. Since the fall of Admiral Yonai's Cabinet in July of 1940, American diplomacy in Japan has been in eclipse temporarily through force of circumstances. However, when the Konoye-Toyoda regime began last July, American diplomacy obtained a very active new lease of life. The Ambassador expresses his earnest hope therefore that so propitious a period be not permitted to slip by without a new foundation having been laid with enough stability to warrant a reasonable

---

[24] Telegram in thirteen sections.

amount of confidence that the structure to be erected gradually and progressively thereon can and will endure.

(2) The Ambassador recalls his statements in the past that in Japan the pendulum always swings between moderate and extremist policies; that it was not then possible under the existing circumstances for any Japanese leader or group to reverse the program of expansion and expect to survive; that the permanent digging in by Japanese in China and the pushing of the Japanese advance to the south could be prevented only by insuperable obstacles. The Ambassador recalls likewise his views that the risks of taking positive measures to maintain United States security in the future were likely to be far smaller than the risks of not taking such measures; that only respect for potential power of the United States has deterred Japan from taking more liberties with American interests; and that Japan's program of forcible expansion could be brought to a halt only by a show of force and by a demonstration of American willingness to use this force if necessary. The Ambassador recalls also his statement that if Japan's leadership could be discredited eventually by such American action, there might take shape in Japan ultimately a regeneration of thought which would allow Japan to resume formal relations with the United States, leading to a readjustment of the entire problem of the Pacific.

(3) The Ambassador suggests that the United States has been following very wisely precisely this policy which, furthered by other developments in the world, has helped to discredit Japanese leadership, notably that of former Foreign Minister Matsuoka. The Ambassador cites as world developments arousing a positive reaction from the United States the conclusion by Japan of the Tripartite Alliance and Japan's recognition of the Wang Ching-wei regime at Nanking, which preceded Germany's attack on the Soviet Union. Germany's action upset the basis for the Tripartite Pact, Japan having joined the Italo-German Axis in order to obtain security against Russia and thereby to avoid the peril of being caught between the Soviet Union and the United States. At the present time Japan is attempting to correct this miscalculation by getting out of an extremely dangerous position. The Ambassador recalls his reports to the Department to the effect that Japanese foreign policies are inevitably changed by the impact of events abroad and that liberal elements in Japan might come to the top in due course as a result of the trend of events. He considers that such a time has arrived. He sees a good chance of Japan's falling into line if a program can be followed of world reconstruction as forecast by the declaration of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. American policy—of forbearance, patient argumentation, efforts at persuasion, followed for

many years, plus a manifest determination of the United States to take positive measures when called for—plus the impact of world developments upon Japan, has rendered Japan's political soil hospitable to the sowing of new seeds which, the Ambassador feels, if planted carefully and nourished, may bring about the anticipated regeneration of Japanese thought and a complete readjustment of relations between Japan and the United States.

(4) Certain quarters have advanced the thought—and no doubt it is prominently in the mind of the United States Government—that at this juncture an agreement between Japan and the United States will serve merely as a breathing spell to Japan. During such a breathing spell, Japan, having successfully untangled itself with American aid from the China conflict, will recoup and strengthen its forces in order to resume at the next favorable opportunity its expansionist program. This thought cannot be gainsaid with certainty. The same school of thought also holds that Japan will be forced to relinquish its expansionist program because of the deterioration of Japanese domestic economy and because of the threat of financial, economic, and social collapse due to a progressive intensifying of economic measures by the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands against Japan. The Ambassador adds that should this thesis be accepted as reasonably sound, the position will confront the United States of choosing one of two methods to approach its objective, namely, either the method of progressive economic strangulation or the method of constructive conciliation, not so-called appeasement. The Ambassador sees the second method as the definite choice of the United States Government following the beginning of the Washington preliminary conversations and President Roosevelt's acceptance in principle of the Japanese Prime Minister's proposed meeting. Indeed, the Ambassador remarks, the United States has never departed from its readiness to negotiate on any issues with Japan (see the American note dated December 30, 1938 [25]), despite the fact that Japan already had embarked at that time on its expansion by force program. He feels that, from the viewpoint of farseeing statesmanship, the wisdom of the American choice seems to be beyond cavil. Should failure greet the constructive, conciliatory method of approach now or later, there will always be available the other method, the application of progressive economic sanctions. In the opinion of the Ambassador, whether the trend of American relations with Japan is for better or for worse, the United States obviously will have to remain for a long time to come in a state of preparedness. The thought that eventual British victory in the world war will solve automatically many problems may, meanwhile, afford whatever degree of encouragement is justified.

---

[25] Vol. I, p. 820.

(5) The Ambassador, while admitting that risks will inevitably be involved no matter what course is pursued toward Japan, offers his carefully studied belief that there would be substantial hope at the very least of preventing the Far Eastern situation from becoming worse and perhaps of ensuring definitely constructive results, if an agreement along the lines of the preliminary discussions were brought to a head by the proposed meeting of the heads of the two Governments. The Ambassador mentions his previous expressions of opinion that the principal point at issue between the United States and Japan is not whether the former must call a halt to the expansionist program of the latter, but when. He raises the questions whether the United States is not now given the opportunity to halt Japan's program without war, or an immediate risk of war, and further whether, through failure to use the present opportunity, the United States will not face a greatly increased risk of war. The Ambassador states his firm belief in an affirmative answer to these two questions.

(6) Certain quarters hold the view that it is altogether improbable under existing circumstances that counteraction will be deliberately taken by Japan in response to any American action likely to be taken in the Pacific which would bring about war with the United States. The Ambassador states his inability to agree that war may not supervene following actions, whether irrational or deliberate, by elements either in Japan or in the United States tending so to inflame public opinion in the other country concerned as to make war unavoidable. He recalls in this regard the cases of the *Maine* and the *Panay*.

(7) The Ambassador stresses the importance of understanding Japanese psychology, fundamentally unlike that of any Western nation. Japanese reactions to any particular set of circumstances cannot be measured, nor can Japanese actions be predicted by any Western measuring rod. This fact is hardly surprising in the case of a country so recently feudalistic. The Ambassador conceives his chief duty to be an attempt to interpret accurately Japanese psychology, and he states that he has aimed to do this in his numerous reports during the last several months and years to the Department. Keeping this thought constantly before him, the Ambassador ventures at the risk of repetition to advance the considerations set forth below.

(8) Should the United States expect or await agreement by the Japanese Government, in the present preliminary conversations, to clear-cut commitments which will satisfy the United States Government both as to principle and as to concrete detail, almost certainly the conversations will drag along indefinitely and unproductively until the Konoye Cabinet and its supporting elements desiring *rapprochement* with the United States will come to the conclusion that the outlook for an agreement is hopeless and that the United States Govern-

ment is only playing for time. If the abnormal sensitiveness of Japan and the abnormal effects of loss of face are considered, in such a situation Japanese reaction may and probably will be serious. This will result in the Konoye Government's being discredited and in a revulsion of anti-American feeling, and this may and probably will lead to unbridled acts. The eventual cost of these will not be reckoned, and their nature is likely to inflame Americans, while reprisal and counter-reprisal measures will bring about a situation in which it will be difficult to avoid war. The logical outcome of this will be the downfall of the Konoye Cabinet and the formation of a military dictatorship which will lack either the disposition or the temperament to avoid colliding head-on with the United States. There is a question that such a situation may prove to be more serious even than the failure to produce an entirely satisfactory agreement through the proposed meeting between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye, should it take place as planned. Worded otherwise, the question remains whether it will not prove to be a less serious case for the negotiations undertaken in good faith to fail of complete success than for the United States to demonstrate its unwillingness to enter any such negotiations.

(9) The Ambassador continues by stating that he has been emphatically told on numerous occasions—and such declarations he considers must be accepted at their face value—that prior to the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting and formal negotiations it is impossible for the Japanese Government to define its future assurances and commitments more specifically than hitherto stated. The Ambassador explains that one reason for this Japanese position, as given him very confidentially, is that former Foreign Minister Matsuoka, after his retirement in July, recounted in complete detail to the German Ambassador in Japan the course of the Washington conversations up to that time. Because many supporters of Matsuoka remain in the Tokyo Foreign Office, the fear has been expressed that these men will not scruple to reveal to both the Germans and the Japanese extremists any information which would render the present Cabinet's position untenable. Although certain basic principles have been accepted provisionally by the Japanese Government, the definitions and formulae of Japan's future objectives and policy, as advanced so far during the preliminary conversations, and the statements supplementary to those definitions, are so abstract or equivocal and are open to such wide interpretation that they rather create confusion than clarify commitments which the Japanese Government is ready to undertake. The Ambassador states that at the same time he has been told that Prince Konoye is in a position in direct negotiations with President Roosevelt to offer him assurances which, because of their far reaching

character, will not fail to satisfy the United States. The truth of this statement cannot be determined by the Ambassador, who, however, points out that, in regard specifically to Japan's Axis relations, the Japanese Government, though refusing consistently to give an undertaking that it will overtly renounce its alliance membership, actually has shown a readiness to reduce Japan's alliance adherence to a dead letter by its indication of willingness to enter formally into negotiations with the United States. The Ambassador therefore does not consider unlikely the possibility of Prince Konoye's being in a position to give President Roosevelt directly a more explicit and satisfactory engagement than has already been vouchsafed in the course of the preliminary conversations.

(10) In the opinion of the Ambassador, on the basis of the above observations which he has every reason to regard as sound, American objectives will not be reached by insisting or continuing to insist during the preliminary conversations that Japan provide the sort of clear-cut, specific commitments which appear in any final, formal convention or treaty. Unless a reasonable amount of confidence is placed by the United States in the professed sincerity of intention and good faith of Prince Konoye and his supporters to mould Japan's future policy upon the basic principles they are ready to accept and then to adopt measures which gradually but loyally implement those principles, with it understood that the United States will implement its own commitments *pari passu* with the steps which Japan takes, the Ambassador does not believe that a new orientation can be successfully created in Japan to lead to a general improving of Japanese-American relations and to the hope that ultimate war may be avoided in the Pacific. The sole way to discredit the Japanese military machine and army is through wholesale military defeat, and the Ambassador sees no present prospect of this. The only alternative (and the only wise one in the view of the Ambassador) is an attempt to produce a regeneration of Japanese thought and outlook through constructive conciliation, along the lines of American efforts at present. The Ambassador inquires whether the better part of wisdom and of statesmanship is not to bring such efforts to a head before the force of their initial impetus is lost, leaving it impossible to overcome an opposition which the Ambassador thinks will mount inevitably and steadily in Japan.

(11) In submitting the foregoing discussion, the Ambassador does so in all deference to the much broader field of view of President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull and in full awareness that the Ambassador's approach to the matter is limited to the viewpoint of the American Embassy in Japan.

GREW

711.94/2344$\frac{24}{35}$

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] September 29, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador called at his request at the Secretary's apartment. He handed the Secretary a document (copy of which is attached hereto)[26] containing the gist of what the Foreign Minister said in his conversations with the American Ambassador at Tokyo on September 27.

The Ambassador said with an apparent touch of embarrassment that he was very well aware of the attitude of this Government and had made this Government's position very clear to his own Government, and that notwithstanding this his Government had instructed him to press for an answer on the Japanese Government's proposal. The Ambassador added that he had been asked by his Government to seek a further meeting with the President, but that the Ambassador realized the situation here and that was why he was laying the matter before the Secretary.

The Secretary replied that, as the Ambassador knew, the President's brother-in-law had died last week, that the President went to Hyde Park over the weekend, and that consequently the Secretary had not been able to see the President for the last three or four days. The Secretary said, however, that he expected to see the President today. The Secretary went on to say that he expected to be able to give the Ambassador within two or three days a memorandum having a bearing upon the Japanese Government's proposal. The Secretary pointed out that just as the Japanese Government had its difficulties we had our difficulties, that the whole effort of our conversations had been to narrow the gap between our respective views, and that we had felt that time was necessary in order to enable the Japanese Government to educate its public opinion to accept a broad-gauge program such as we advocated.

The Ambassador commented that he himself was in favor of a broad-gauge program, but that he knew very well the psychology within the Japanese Army. He said that even the highest-ranking generals had a simplicity of mind which made it difficult for them to see why, as they saw the situation, when the United States should be asserting leadership on the American continent with the Monroe Doctrine the United States should want to interfere with Japan's assuming leadership on the Asiatic continent. The Secretary asked why the Japanese Government could not educate the generals. The Ambassador replied that this would take twenty years.

---

[26] *Infra.*

The Secretary then asked whether the Japanese public as a whole desired a speedy settlement of the conflict with China. The Ambassador replied that for the last two or three years the Japanese public desired such a settlement but felt that under existing circumstances they had no alternative to continuing fighting. The Secretary observed that there have been a number of our marine guards who did not want to leave China and he supposed that in the case of the Japanese occupationary forces there were many who would not like to be recalled. The Ambassador laughed and replied that this was quite true, and he observed that when an Army general in China was clothed with the authority of a viceroy, naturally he did not welcome the prospect of being shorn of that authority.

The Ambassador, in reply to a further question by the Secretary, stated that he believed that the Japanese Government was in a stronger position internally than it had been, but that, nevertheless, in his own personal opinion, he judged that if nothing came of the proposal for a meeting between the chiefs of our two Governments it might be difficult for Prince Konoye to retain his position and that Prince Konoye then would be likely to be succeeded by a less moderate leader. He suggested that this was one reason why the Japanese Government desired to move as speedily as possible. The Secretary repeated that we would expect to communicate with the Japanese Ambassador in two or three days.

J[OSEPH] W. B[ALLANTINE]

711.94/2344$\frac{24}{25}$

Document Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State on September 29, 1941

GIST OF WHAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE, TOKYO, SEPTEMBER 27, 1941

Strictly Confidential

1. The war in Europe, involving many major Powers, has spread to the Atlantic. Fortunately, it has not yet touched the Pacific Ocean, where the key to peace or war lies in the hands of Japan and the United States. Should these two countries go to war, it would mean the destruction of world civilization and a dire calamity to mankind.

In recent times various events have occurred in rapid succession, tending to destroy the friendly relations between the two countries.

An adjustment of Japanese-American relations at this time and the enhancement of the friendship of the two countries will redound not only to the benefit of Japan and America but also to the cause of world peace. The Japanese Government seeks such adjustment not solely for the sake of the two countries but also for the purpose of paving the way for a general peaceful settlement throughout the world.

2. For the past two months since my appointment as Foreign Minister I have striven night and day toward obtaining an amicable settlement between Japan and America. It is also with the same purpose in view that Prince Konoye himself has decided to come to the front and proposed a meeting with President Roosevelt.

3. Japan is bound in alliance with Germany and Italy. The very idea that the Head of my Government should meet the President of the United States is liable to give rise to misunderstandings regarding Japan's ties with those two countries. Such a step would entail really a great sacrifice on the part of the Japanese Government. Moreover, from Japan's domestic standpoint, it will be an event unprecedented in history for the Prime Minister to go out of the country on a diplomatic mission. This fact alone should be a sufficient testimony to the sincerity of the Japanese Government in its desire for an adjustment of Japanese-American relations and for the preservation of peace in the Pacific.

4. If there are those who would interpret Japan's attitude as an indication not of her solicitude for peace but of her submission to American pressure, they are grossly mistaken. Eager as we are for peace, we will not bow under the pressure of another country, nor do we want peace at any price. It is a characteristic trait of our people to repel, rather than to submit to, external pressure. I repeat this point in view of certain comments that have appeared in American newspapers, although I am told they are showing nowadays signs of moderation.

5. Japanese-American relations are so complex and complicated that they are not capable of being adjusted at one stroke. The proposed meeting of the heads of the two Governments may not succeed in effecting a general solution of all difficulties. However, this meeting is bound to have a vast political significance. Moreover, it is certain that at least those problems yet to be settled (assuming that there will remain such problems) that had been the subject of our negotiations by cable will be readily solved at the conference. It will mark an epochal turn for good in Japanese-American relations. The American Government has already agreed in principle to the proposed meeting between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt. Should it fail to take place there will never be another opportunity combined with such an auspicious setting for such a

conference. Besides, the repercussions of the failure might be most unfortunate.

6. The policy and aims of my Government have been fully communicated to the American Government. A resumé of these, put in the form of the American Draft Understanding of June 21, 1941, has also been submitted to Your Excellency. I trust that the views of my Government are being given careful consideration by the American Government.

7. On our side, the ship to carry the Prime Minister is ready. The members of his suite including a full General and a full Admiral have been privately appointed. The party is prepared to depart at any moment.

8. In the circumstances such as I have described, the Japanese Government is now anxiously looking forward to receiving a reply from the American Government at the earliest date possible. As I have spoken to Your Excellency at our last meeting, any further delay—especially after today's anniversary of the Tripartite Pact—would put my Government in a very delicate position.

Furthermore, the climatic conditions in the Northern Pacific and the vicinity of the Alaskan coast are likely to become unfavorable for the proposed meeting.

9. Time, as I have often said, is a vital factor from both internal and international viewpoints. The decision must be made as soon as possible. So I desire to ask for the most speedy and sincere consideration of the American Government.

I may add that, as regards the date for the meeting, October 10–15 will suit the Japanese Government.

Finally, by way of a conclusion, I should like to say that negotiations of this sort require sincerity and mutual confidence. I need not dwell on the character, the convictions and faith of Prince Konoye as well as his political position, all of which are well known to Your Excellency. Without Prince Konoye and the present Cabinet under him, an opportunity for Japanese-American *rapprochement* is likely to be lost for some time to come. I wish to emphasize again the urgent necessity of having the proposed meeting at the earliest possible date.

711.94/2406 1/11

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] October 2, 1941.

The Ambassador called at the Secretary's apartment at the request of the Secretary. The Secretary handed the Ambassador a strictly confidential statement[27] containing the views of this Government with respect to the Japanese Government's proposals.

After the Ambassador had read the statement the Secretary invited the Japanese Ambassador to comment. The Ambassador said that he feared that his Government would be disappointed because of its very earnest desire to hold the meeting. He said he wished to assure the Secretary that he was convinced that the Japanese Government was entirely sincere in this matter and had no ulterior purpose. He added, however, that in view of the difficulties of the internal situation in Japan he did not think his Government could go further at this time. The Secretary replied that he was fully convinced of the sincerity of the Prime Minister and others in the Japanese Government. He said that so far as this Government was concerned we had our difficulties, too; that we had to meet the objections of critics; and that in view of past developments it was not possible in one day to remove their misgivings. For this reason, as the Secretary had often remarked, we felt it necessary to have an agreement that would speak for itself: one that would on the face of it make manifest the purposes of both Governments consistently to pursue courses of peace. The Ambassador referred to a press report that he had seen yesterday of a speech by a member of the American Cabinet in which there was a reference to bringing about the defeat of Japan. His comment implied that such statements would have a bad effect in Japan as it would be assumed that what a member of the Cabinet said represented the views of the administration. He said that certain persons in Japan might have made unfortunate statements, but he did not think that such persons were members of the Cabinet and that anything a member of the Japanese Cabinet might say would be taken as representing the views of the Japanese Government.

The Secretary referred to the fact that all the time the Ambassador and he were holding conversations in regard to our proposed understanding Mr. Matsuoka was making public statements of a character inconsistent with the spirit of those conversations. He noted that the Ambassador had continued their conversations despite those statements.

The Secretary went on to say that we had felt that we could not proceed through indirect courses to attain the objects which our two Governments are seeking, that we must proceed directly, and that no patchwork arrangement would meet the situation of establishing peace in the Pacific area. It was for that reason the Secretary felt that we should endeavor to reach a meeting of minds on essential points before holding the proposed meeting. We had no desire whatever, he emphasized, to cause any delay. The Secretary further pointed out that we had tried the effects of both secrecy and of publicity and that we already were able to gauge public reaction to the proposed understanding between the two Governments as a result of our letting it be known that informal and exploratory conversations were proceeding. Thus the important thing for us now was to endeavor to reach a meeting of minds on essentials in order to insure the success of any meeting that we might hold.

---

[27] *Infra.*

As the Ambassador did not appear to understand the foregoing point made to him, Mr. Ballantine repeated in Japanese what the Secretary had said.

The Ambassador said that he felt that the only point on which he anticipated difficulty in the two Governments reaching an agreement was in regard to the question of retention of Japanese troops in China. He thought that, with regard to the question of non-discrimination, the Japanese Government would meet us. The Secretary emphasized that in his opinion no country would stand to gain more than Japan from the general universal application of this principle. The Secretary added that he would like to give the Ambassador a report of the Lima Conference containing the resolutions adopted in regard to economic matters and he suggested that the Japanese Government might be interested in adopting similar policies in the Far East. The Ambassador said that Japanese present-day thought with respect to regional economic blocs was the result of circumstances, that is to say, of measures taken by other countries such as the Empire preferences introduced at Ottawa. The Secretary replied that he had been fighting such measures as those taken at Ottawa and he would like to have Japan join with the United States in fighting for liberal economic policies.

In conclusion, the Ambassador commented that he thought that the Konoye Cabinet was in a comparatively strong position and that he did not anticipate that there was a likelihood of reactionary groups coming into power. He repeated his conviction that the Konoye Cabinet was extremely desirous of reaching an agreement with the United States.

[JOSEPH W.] BALLANTINE

711.94/2406$\frac{1}{11}$

Oral Statement Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on October 2, 1941

[WASHINGTON,] October 2, 1941.

Reference is made to the proposals of the Japanese Government communicated on September 6, 1941, by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State, and to statements relating thereto subsequently communicated to this Government by the Japanese Government.

Thoughtful study has been given to the communications to which reference is made, and in connection with that study careful review has been made of other communications previously received from the Japanese Government on the same subject. On the basis of this study observations are offered as follows:

The Government of the United States welcomed, as affording a possible opportunity for furthering the broad-gauge objectives and principles of a program of peace, the Japanese Government's suggestions made through its Ambassador here in the early part of August that there be held a meeting of the responsible heads of the Japanese Government and of the Government of the United States to discuss means for bringing about an adjustment of relations between the United States and Japan and that there be resumed the informal conversations which had been in progress between the two countries to ascertain whether there existed a basis for negotiations relative to a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation.

Accordingly, in the reply made by the President on August 17, 1941, to the Japanese Ambassador the view was expressed that such informal conversations would naturally envisage the working out of a progressive program attainable by peaceful means; that such a program would involve the application in the entire Pacific area of the principle of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment, thus making possible access by all countries to raw materials and to all other essential commodities, and there were described the advantages which would flow to all countries, including Japan, from the adoption of such a program. In conclusion, it was stated that if the Japanese Government were in position to embark upon a peaceful program for the Pacific along the lines of the program and principles to which the United States is committed, this Government would be prepared to consider resumption of the informal exploratory discussions and would be glad to endeavor to arrange a suitable time and place to exchange views.

In the light of the broad purposes and fundamental principles which this Government holds, it was gratifying to the President and the Government of the United States to receive the message of the Prime Minister and the statement of the Government of Japan on August 28, 1941, containing statements expressing Japan's desire and intent to pursue courses of peace in harmony with the fundamental principles to which the people and Government of the United States are committed. In its statement the Japanese Government gave, with some qualifications, broad assurances of its peaceful intent, including a comprehensive assurance that the Japanese Government has no intention of using without provocation military force against any neighboring nation. The Japanese Government declared that it supported the program and principles which had been briefly outlined by the President not only as applicable to the Pacific area but also as a program for the entire world.

The Government of the United States, while desiring to proceed as rapidly as possible with consideration of arrangements for a meeting between the heads of state, felt it desirable, in order to assure that that meeting would accomplish the objectives in view, to clarify the interpretation of certain principles and the practical application thereof to concrete problems in the Pacific area. It has not been the purpose of this Government to enter into a discussion of details; this Government has felt, however, that the clarification sought would afford a means of expediting our effort to arrive at a meeting of minds.

On September 3, 1941, the President in giving reply to the Japanese Ambassador expressed the earnest desire of the Government of the United States to collaborate in efforts to make effective in practice the principles to which the Japanese Government made reference. The President reiterated the four principles regarded by this Government as the foundation upon which relations between nations should properly rest. Those principles are:

1. Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations.
2. Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
3. Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity.
4. Non-disturbance of the *status quo* in the Pacific except as the *status quo* may be altered by peaceful means.

The President pointed out that in order to bring about any satisfactory settlement of Pacific questions it was highly important to reach a community of view and a clear agreement upon certain points with respect to which fundamental differences of opinion between our two Governments had developed in the informal conversations; and the President requested an indication of the present attitude of the Japanese Government with regard to those fundamental questions.

On September 6, the Prime Minister of Japan in a conversation with the American Ambassador at Tokyo stated that he subscribed fully to the four principles above mentioned.

The foregoing developments and assurances, together with other statements made by the Japanese Government, seemed to justify this Government in concluding that the Japanese Government might be expected to adhere to and to give practical application to a broad progressive program covering the entire Pacific area. It was therefore a source of disappointment to the Government of the United States that the proposals of the Japanese Government presented by the Japanese Ambassador on September 6, 1941, which the Japanese Government apparently intended should constitute a concrete basis for discussions, appeared to disclose divergence in the concepts of the two Governments. That is to say, those proposals and the subsequent explanatory statements made in regard thereto serve, in the opinion of this Government, to narrow and restrict not only the application of the principles upon which our informal conversations already referred to had been based but also the various assurances given by the Japanese Government of its desire to move along with the United States in putting into operation a broad program looking to the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the entire Pacific area.

As has already been said, the various broad assurances given by the Japanese Premier and the Japanese Government are highly gratifying. In putting forward its attitude of peaceful intent toward other nations, the Japanese Government qualified its assurances with certain phrases the need for which is not easily understood. It is difficult to conceive of there developing under present circumstances in any of the territories neighboring French Indochina, in Thailand or in the Soviet Union any aggressive threat or provocation to Japan. The inalienable right of self-defense is of course well recognized by all nations and there could arise in some minds a question as to just what the Japanese Government has in view in circumscribing its assurances of peaceful intent with what would seem to be unnecessary qualifying phrases.

In the informal conversations there was tentatively arrived at a formula in regard to economic policy (Section V of the draft understanding), which provided that Japanese activity and American activity in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations. In the Japanese Government's proposals of September 6 and in subsequent communications from the Japanese Government the commitments contained in that formula were restricted to the countries of the Southwest Pacific area (not the Pacific area as a whole). In reference to China, the Japanese Government states that it will respect the principle of non-discrimination, but the explanation given in regard to this point would seem to be open to the implication that the Japanese Government has in mind some limitation upon the application of this principle occasioned by reasons of Japan's geographical propinquity to China.

Obviously, it would not be likely to serve the purposes affirmed by the Japanese Government or by this Government if either the United

States or Japan were to pursue one course or policy in certain areas while at the same time pursuing an opposite course or policy in other areas.

This Government has noted the views of the Japanese Government in support of its desire to station troops for an indeterminate period in certain areas of China. Entirely apart from the question of the reasons for such a proposal, the inclusion of such a provision in the proposed terms of a peaceful settlement between Japan and China at a time when Japan is in military occupation of large areas in China is open to certain objections. For example, when a country in military occupation of territory of another country proposes to the second country the continued stationing of troops of the first country in certain areas as a condition for a peaceful settlement and thus for the withdrawal of the occupationary forces from other areas, such procedure would seem to be out of keeping with the progressive and enlightened courses and principles which were discussed in the informal conversations and thus would not, in the opinion of this Government, make for peace or offer prospects of stability.

It is believed that a clear-cut manifestation of Japan's intention in regard to the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and French Indochina would be most helpful in making known—in particular to those who might be inclined to be critical—Japan's peaceful intentions and Japan's desire to follow courses calculated to establish a sound basis for future stability and progress in the Pacific area.

With reference to the attitude of each country toward the European war, this Government has noted with appreciation the further step taken by the Japanese Government to meet the difficulties inherent in this aspect of the relations between the two countries. It is believed that it would be helpful if the Japanese Government could give further study to the question of possible additional clarification of its position.

In the exchanges of views which have taken place between the two Governments in an effort to reach an agreement in principle upon fundamental questions in order to prepare the ground for the proposed meeting of the responsible chiefs of government, this Government has endeavored to make clear that what it envisages is a comprehensive program calling for the application uniformly to the entire Pacific area of liberal and progressive principles. From what the Japanese Government has so far indicated in regard to its purposes this Government derives the impression that the Japanese Government has in mind a program which would be circumscribed by the imposition of qualifications and exceptions to the actual application of those principles.

If this impression is correct, can the Japanese Government feel that a meeting between the responsible heads of government under such circumstances would be likely to contribute to the advancement of the high purposes which we have mutually had in mind?

As already stated, this Government welcomed the assurances contained in the statement of the Japanese Government which accompanied the Japanese Prime Minister's message to the President of the United States that the Japanese Government subscribed to the principles which have long been advocated by this Government as the only sound basis for stable international relations. This Government believes that renewed consideration of these fundamental principles may be helpful in our effort to seek a meeting of minds in regard to the essential questions on which we seek agreement and thus lay a firm foundation for a meeting between the responsible heads of the two Governments. The subject of the meeting proposed by the Prime Minister and the objectives sought have engaged, and continue to engage, the close and active interest of the President of the United States, and it is the President's earnest hope that discussion of the fundamental questions may be so developed that such a meeting can be held. It is also the President's hope that the Japanese Government shares the conviction of this Government that, if the Governments of Japan and of the United States are resolved to give those principles practical and comprehensive application, the two Governments can work out a fundamental rehabilitation of the relations between the United States and Japan and contribute to the bringing about of a lasting peace with justice, equity and order in the whole Pacific area.

11.94/2406$\frac{3}{11}$

Memorandum of a Conversation

[Washington,] October 3, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador called at his request and after having taken up with the Secretary other matters which are dealt with in a separate memorandum stated that he had communicated to his Government yesterday the Secretary's reply to the Japanese Government's proposals and the Japanese Government had informed the Ambassador that it was now preparing a statement for public release. The Ambassador said that he hoped to receive a copy of the statement in advance of publication so that he could lay it before the Secretary.

The Secretary made no comment.

J[oseph] W. B[allantine]

711.94/2624

Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)

[TOKYO,] October 7, 1941.

In reply to a request by telephone yesterday from Mr. Ushiba, I suggested that he breakfast with me this morning at my house. Mr. Ushiba arrived promptly at the appointed time. Owing to the presence of the servant during the meal, that part of our conversation which needs to be recorded was brief and was substantially as follows:

Mr. Ushiba said that the Prime Minister's position had been made difficult by the failure of the preliminary conversations with the United States to make any progress. Prince Konoye was at a loss to know what further he could do, the opposition had now something concrete to use in their attacks on the Cabinet, and the future looked dark. He said that, unless we fully appreciated the circumstances in which his chief had assumed responsibility for initiating these conversations, we would not be able to understand the full implications of the situation. The Army was anxious to bring the conflict with China to an end but it would never take the responsibility for initiating a liquidation of the conflict. When Prince Konoye had taken that responsibility, the Army gave him full and unqualified support, and if his high hopes are not fulfilled he will have to "assume responsibility", and there would be no one who would have the courage to take the risks which the Prince has taken or with sufficient prestige and political position to gain the support of the Army in any undertaking so vital to the nation as settlement of the China conflict by process of negotiation.

Mr. Ushiba went on to say that pessimism in Japanese official quarters had been strengthened by failure on the part of the American Government to lay any of its cards on the table. It was true that the American Government had given a full presentation of its principles, but it had not precisely specified what it wanted the Japanese Government to undertake. Although several months had elapsed since the conversations began, the apparently great care being taken by the American Government not to give the Japanese any specifications was extremely discouraging. Since the receipt of the last American memorandum (October 2) an increasing number of persons in Japanese Government circles were of the opinion that Japan had fallen into a trap, the argument running somewhat as follows—the United States never had any intention of coming to any agreement with Japan; it has now got from Japan an exposition of Japanese policies and objectives; those policies and objectives are not in line with American policies and objectives; and there is therefore justification for refusing to make an agreement with Japan and for continuing to maintain an attitude of quasi-hostility against Japan.

I told Mr. Ushiba that there was no basis for any such conjecture. I recalled that the memorandum of October 2 referred to the reaction of the American public to reports that conversations with Japan were taking place and that the statement was made that, although the American Government was no less eager than the Japanese Government to have brought about settlement of Pacific problems, public opinion in the United States was such as to render necessary a meeting of minds on certain fundamental points prior to the opening of formal negotiations.

Mr. Ushiba asked whether we had received the actual text of the memorandum. The summary (which I had allowed him to read on October 4) shown to him by me was business like and objective in tone, but the actual memorandum was, he said, "extremely disagreeable". It was argumentative and preceptive, it was quite uncompromising, and it contained no suggestion or indication calculated to be helpful to the Japanese Government toward meeting the desires of the American Government. Citing the reference to attitudes toward the European war, he put the rhetorical question, Why was there not provided some indication of the kind of undertaking the Japanese Government was expected to give?

In conclusion, Mr. Ushiba expressed the thought that the only thing left for the Japanese Government was to ask the American Government to give specifications with regard to the character of the undertakings which Japan was desired to give, and that if a clear-cut reply was not forthcoming to bring the conversations to an end.

E[UGENE] H. D[OOMAN]

711.94/2624

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (*Grew*)

[TOKYO,] October 7, 1941.

When I called upon the Foreign Minister at his request this morning he first informed me that the text of the memorandum handed to the Japanese Ambassador on October 2 by the Secretary of State had been received and was being carefully studied. In reply to the Minister's question whether I could make any comments on the memorandum I said that until I had had an opportunity to study the full text, the Embassy having received a résumé only, I would prefer to make no observations.

Admiral Toyoda then told me that he was informed of my private meeting with the Prime Minister on September 6 and was aware that I had communicated to President Roosevelt through the Secretary of State, as a "personal and private message", the substance of Prince

Konoye's statements to me at that meeting. The Foreign Minister said he wanted me clearly to understand that he harbored no objection to my contact with Prince Konoye; rather he was desirous that by such meetings between the Prime Minister and myself a helpful exchange of views might be effected. Admiral Toyoda stated that the private records of the Prime Minister with regard to the September 6 meeting revealed that, although Prince Konoye had "in principle" accepted the four points which the Secretary of State had continuously stressed, the Prime Minister had indicated that some adjustment would be required in the matter of applying the four points to actual conditions. However, a statement that the Prime Minister "fully subscribed" to the four points was contained in the memorandum given to the Japanese Ambassador on October 2. Admiral Nomura had therefore, in view of this disparity in the records, been instructed to inform the Secretary of State that the phrase "in principle" should replace the words "fully subscribed" in attributing to the Prime Minister the statement, which had been made privately.

The Foreign Minister declared that the statements made to me by the Prime Minister on September 6 were of a purely private and informal nature and were intended merely to acquaint me with the personal views of an individual who held an important position in the moulding of the decisions and policies of the Government of Japan. The thought of authorizing me to communicate the substance of his observations as a personal message to the President had only occurred to Prince Konoye during the course of our meeting. Accordingly there had been no expectation, said Admiral Toyoda, that there would be incorporated into a public document, which had to be circulated among various Japanese Government officials who had no knowledge of my meeting with Prince Konoye, any statement made to me by the Prime Minister under these circumstances. Thus, since an attribution of views to the Prime Minister had appeared in an official document of the United States Government, it had been deemed necessary, in view of the absence of previous comparison between the Foreign Minister and myself of notes relating to what might have been stated by Prince Konoye at the time of his meeting with me on September 6, to clarify the Japanese record of the Prime Minister's statement. (There is no doubt whatsoever that the observations of the Prime Minister, which were made in Japanese and translated by Dooman to me, were correctly and accurately set forth in my telegram No. 1413, September 6, 10 p. m.,[28] reporting my meeting with Prince Konoye. The Prime Minister doubtless is referring to his remark made subsequently that "he is convinced that divergences of view can be satisfactorily met" and that he "realizes that certain points may require elucidation and precision".)

---

[28] Not printed; see memorandum of September 6, 1941, p. 604.

Admiral Toyoda stated at this point that he hoped to be able to comment following the completion of his examination of the Secretary's memorandum of October 2, and in the meantime he felt that it would be helpful if discussion of items arising from what he termed "technical procedure" could be avoided. He had in mind such differences of understanding as that relating to Prince Konoye's statement of September 6, and to certain material delivered to the Department by the Japanese Ambassador which either had no official standing or was incomplete as in the case of the Ambassador's draft statement of September 4. Admiral Toyoda believed that any efforts to clear up details of this character arising out of questions of technical procedure would only tend to complicate the discussions, but once some real progress had been made he would be prepared to take up such questions. The Foreign Minister said that in so far as the Secretary's memorandum of October 2 was concerned, he would like to make one brief comment, namely, that it was his impression that the Government of the United States wished the Japanese Government to revert at once and unqualifiedly to the *status quo* which prevailed four years ago. Since that time Japan had been involved in warfare on a large-scale demanding hardships and sacrifices of the people of Japan who had been led to support such trials as a patriotic duty. The Japanese Government was willing and prepared to return to the situation prevailing four years ago but it was essential that the Government of the United States should understand that to undo virtually at a moment's notice the work of the past four years is an undertaking of tremendous scope and one entailing basic adjustments.

Admiral Toyoda then inquired whether unofficially and privately I felt able to offer an opinion on the position of the United States Government as outlined in the Secretary's memorandum of October 2. In reply I told him that it was the desire of the United States Government to establish conditions in the Far East on a sure and enduring foundation and that no lasting arrangements could be made except on such a basis. I told him that my personal reaction to the Secretary's memorandum of October 2 was that the American Government was endeavoring to assure itself that Japan would genuinely and fully observe those principles without which no sure basis for a lasting peace in the Pacific area could be achieved.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

711.94/2624

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[Tokyo,] October 8, 1941.

Mr. Terasaki, Chief of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office, called on me this afternoon, at his request, and asked if I had read the full text of the Department's memorandum of October 2 which he had lent us for perusal. I replied in the affirmative. Mr. Terasaki then asked if I would tell him in an entirely personal way and off the record my impressions of the memorandum. I said that I thought the memorandum was friendly in tone and helpful in substance and that it indicated a clear desire on the part of our Government to make progress in the conversations.

Mr. Terasaki then asked what particular points impressed me in connection with the desires of the United States for action by Japan in order to reach a mutual agreement. I replied that without having the actual document before me I could not undertake to cover all the points presented, but that personally and off the record I might say that three of the points which had particularly caught my eye were (1) the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China; (2) application to the entire area of the Pacific of certain of the Japanese assurances which appeared to be limited to the southwestern Pacific and (3) the special privileges claimed by Japan as a result of her geographical propinquity to China. In connection with the third point mentioned above I took the occasion to say that many prominent Japanese were comparing our Monroe Doctrine and our relationship to the countries of Latin America with Japan's position in the Far East and her relationship with the neighboring countries, and I wished to say that in my opinion there was no more comparison between these two situations than between black and white. Mr. Terasaki said that he was obliged to disagree with me and we did not pursue that subject.

Mr. Terasaki then pointed out that the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and Indochina must necessarily take time as it could not physically be done all at once and he wanted to know my opinion as to whether our Government intended to insist on the actual departure of all Japanese troops from China and Indochina before the proposed meeting of the President and the Prime Minister could be held and in this connection he asked my interpretation of the Department's phrase "manifest intention". I replied that I was not in a position to interpret the phrase under reference except to say that in my personal opinion the Department desired concrete evidence that these troops would be withdrawn. In the conversations it had developed that it was the desire of the Japanese Government to leave troops for a stated period in North China, Mongolia and possibly other areas and I pointed out to Mr. Terasaki the unfortunate experiences which we had met in times past through the failure of various Japanese Governments to carry out assurances given us in apparent good faith. It therefore seemed to me obvious and reasonable that my Government should seek concrete evidence of the Japanese Government's "manifest intention", and this would be my personal, off the record interpretation of the phrase.

I then pointed out to Mr. Terasaki that I had no authority from my Government to interpret the memorandum of October 2 and as I had said to the Foreign Minister in a previous conversation, in connection with his suggestion that the conversations be transferred from Washington to Tokyo, it was Mr. Hull's wish, in view of the active interest of the President in these conversations, that they continue to be held in Washington although parallel conversations might be held concurrently in Tokyo. Mr. Terasaki at first seemed a little surprised by this statement but I reiterated that I had already clearly conveyed this fact to Admiral Toyoda. I therefore suggested that if the Japanese Government was still uncertain of the meaning of any statements contained in the memorandum of October 2 it might be well for Admiral Nomura to seek an interview with Mr. Hull and to put these questions to him.

In the course of the conversation reference was made by Mr. Terasaki to our Government's suggestion that the Japanese Government might helpfully consider the advantage of making a public declaration with regard to its expressed intention to withdraw its troops from China and Indochina so that it was evident that this point had been clearly understood but this particular point was not pursued in our conversation.

At the end of our talk it was once more made clear both by Mr. Terasaki and myself that our conversation had been entirely personal and off the record.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

711.94/2624

Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)

[TOKYO,] October 9, 1941.

I called this morning on Mr. Terasaki at his request.

Mr. Terasaki said that he was very anxious to obtain "off the record" my impressions of the memorandum handed by the Secretary of State to Admiral Nomura on October 2. I said that the Ambassador told me that Mr. Terasaki had already called on the Ambassador and had received the latter's private and informal observations on the memorandum, and that I did not see that I was in a position to add anything. Mr. Terasaki then briefly summarized his conversation of last night with the Ambassador, laying special emphasis on the Ambassador's observations that, in our view, the memorandum was friendly in tone and helpful in substance. He went on to say that he was especially interested in that portion of the memorandum which makes mention of the need for Japan's manifesting evidence of intention to withdraw its forces from Indochina and China. He pointed out that the paragraph under reference might be open to the interpretation that the American Government expected that Japan should withdraw its forces from the areas mentioned before the proposed meeting of the heads of Government could be held. After remarking that possibly the passage which he had in mind was open to such interpretation, I said that there was obviously another one. The Japanese military forces in Indochina were acting as though they were in permanent occupation of French Indochina and had converted that area into a Japanese colony. It stood to reason that the American Government would hesitate to make the slightest move toward agreeing to the opening of formal negotiations so long as the actions of the Japanese forces in Indochina constitute a complete negation of the spirit and letter of the undertakings which the Japanese Government expresses willingness to assume.

Mr. Terasaki said that he was not aware of the situation in French Indochina to which I referred. I told him that it was extremely important that he should bring himself completely up to date on recent developments, and I suggested that he confer with the Director of the South Seas Bureau. I referred to the actions of the Japanese military forces, such as the arrests of French and Chinese nationals, seizure of private property, seizure of air fields and military barracks, threats to seize the Customs, etc. I expressed the belief that he would agree, in view of the extremely difficult position created in Indochina by the Japanese forces, that there was sound reason for assuming that the American Government would not want to have the conversations progress at this time.

In reply to Mr. Terasaki's question whether the Japanese formula with regard to the application of the principle of equality of treatment in the southwestern Pacific constituted a serious obstacle, I said that it was my opinion, based on what he had said to me on various occasions, that the Japanese formula under reference was not designed to be taken as an expression of intention on the part of the Japanese Government to confine the application of the principle of equality of opportunity to the southwestern Pacific—that it was intended as an affirmation of a positive intention with regard to an area in part of which the Japanese Government now exercise *de facto* control, namely, French Indochina, but that it was not intended by implication to exclude the application of the principle from other areas under which the Japanese exercised control. Mr. Terasaki said that that was precisely the case, and that it was evident that the intentions of the Japanese Government had not been clearly expressed. He thought also that the Japanese explanation with regard to equality of opportunity in China, particularly the reference to conditions created by geographical propinquity, were open to implications the giving of which the Japanese Government had especially desired to avoid.

Mr. Terasaki reverted to the reference in the October 2 memorandum to the question of withdrawal of troops from China. He said that it was impossible for Japan to manifest evidence, by withdrawing its troops from China, of intention to effect such withdrawal, until agreement had been reached between Japan and China. How then was it possible for Japan to meet this requirement of the American Government? I said that I could not pretend to interpret the passage under reference, but there could be several ways in which the Japanese Government could demonstrate the sincerity of its desire to evacuate China. It might be possible, for example, to provide a time schedule of withdrawal of troops; or, again, the Japanese Government might indicate willingness to consider the establishment of a military police force by the Chinese Government, possibly with the assistance of foreign military experts, as a satisfactory substitute for the Japanese troops which Japan proposed to station in Inner Mongolia and North China for the specific purpose of maintaining law and order.

Mr. Terasaki was summoned at this point by the Foreign Minister, and in bringing our conversation to an end he expressed his appreciation for my courtesy in calling on him this morning and giving him the benefit of my views.

E[UGENE] H. D[OOMAN]

711.94/2624

Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)

[TOKYO,] October 9, 1941.

I called upon the Director of the American Bureau late this afternoon and told him that the Embassy was informed that the Japanese military were preparing to land on or about the 15th of October some 50,000 additional troops in Tonking, French Indochina. At the direction of the Ambassador I requested that Mr. Terasaki convey to the Foreign Minister the personal and private opinion of Mr. Grew that the Japanese Government should expect the current conversations to suffer seriously adverse effects if it is prepared to grant permission for such forces to be landed. Recalling to Mr. Terasaki that the conversations between our two Governments had been suspended because of the despatch of Japanese troops to Indochina in July, and bringing to mind again the circumstances of the renewal of these conversations, I stated on my own responsibility that, were the proposed landing of forces carried out, I should expect a termination of the conversations. Mr. Terasaki, obviously much disturbed, said that he knew nothing about the matter and would immediately convey to Admiral Toyoda the information which I had communicated to him.

E[UGENE] H. D[OOMAN]

711.94/2406$\frac{4}{11}$

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] October 9, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador called at his request at the Secretary's apartment.[29] He said first of all he wished to express his appreciation of the action of this Government in regard to the matter of the visit to the United States of three requisitioned Japanese ships.

The Ambassador then went on to say that he had communicated to his Government our statement of October 2. He said that while he thoroughly understood the position of this Government he had been instructed three times during the last few days to obtain from the Secretary an expression of the Secretary's views in regard to the points on which there remains a divergence of view between our two Governments. He was, therefore, making this inquiry at the express and repeated instruction of his Government. The Ambassador said that he understood there were three points of divergence, namely: the question of the relation of the two countries to the European war; the question of the stationing of Japanese troops in certain areas of China; and the question of application of the principle of non-discrimination to the entire Pacific area.

The Secretary pointed out that during our conversations up to the time that the conversations were interrupted by Japan's action in Indochina, we had been talking about an understanding in regard to a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area; that he felt that only on the basis of a broad-gauge program of universal application could we expect to establish peace and stability in the Pacific area; that the Japanese Prime Minister, in his statement to the President, had indicated that he subscribed to the principles upon which our conversations have been based; and that then came the Japanese proposals which appeared to us to narrow down the application of these principles. For example, the Secretary noted that we had talked about the application to the entire Pacific area of the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations, whereas the Japanese proposal seemed to call for narrowing it down to the southwest Pacific area, and that it was not clear what the Japanese meant when they suggested some limitation of the principle of non-discrimination on account of Japan's relations of propinquity to China. The Secretary then went on to say that he would be glad to have Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine see the Japanese Ambassador in an endeavor to see whether any points in our respective documents could be further clarified and shades of meaning brought out. The Secretary added that Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine would then report to the Secretary thereon.

---

[29] Mr. Obata accompanied the Ambassador.

Mr. Ballantine said to the Japanese Ambassador that we would be glad to be at his disposal at his convenience. (A little later on the Japanese Ambassador asked Mr. Ballantine whether we could come right away and Mr. Ballantine suggested that it might be better to wait until this afternoon. That seemed agreeable to the Japanese Ambassador, and Mr. Obata said to Mr. Ballantine, "Then we will get in touch with each other later.")

The Ambassador said that the Japanese Prime Minister had told Ambassador Grew that the Prime Minister personally subscribed in principle to the four principles to which the Secretary had referred. The Ambassador said, with regard to the question of stationing troops in certain areas of China, that this presented to the Japanese Government a very difficult question; that chaotic conditions might be expected to prevail in China following the withdrawal of Japanese troops and a serious question would be presented by the lack of adequate protection for Japanese commercial enterprise in China. The Ambassador added that at the present time there were conflicting groups within China with the Kuomintang on one side and the Communists on another and that the only thing that was holding the Chinese together was a common desire to resist Japan.

The Secretary asked the Ambassador whether he thought the Chinese Government would agree to such a proposal as that of stationing Japanese troops in China. The Ambassador made no definite reply and the Secretary went on to ask whether the Ambassador did not think it possible that there were sufficient number of trained Chinese troops who could be counted upon to maintain order in China. The Secretary pointed out that according to the experience of this country we had found maintenance of troops in Latin American countries only aroused ill will and perpetuated a situation of instability.

For this reason he felt that, even though some losses and sacrifices might have to be faced at the outset, in the long run the gains would justify them. The Secretary referred to the situation in the South after the Civil War when northern troops were stationed in southern states and to the bitter resentment aroused in the South by the presence of these troops. The Ambassador indicated his personal belief in the soundness of what the Secretary said.

The Ambassador then said that what he wished now to say to the Secretary was not as coming from the Japanese Ambassador but as expressing in confidence his own personal views. He said that he had talked with a great many people in this country and all of them, including Republican leaders, agreed as to the complete integrity of the Secretary. The Secretary said that he hoped that the Ambassador would feel free to say anything that he might wish to say and that the Secretary, for his part, had always felt that he could talk in complete confidence and with frankness to the Ambassador. The Ambassador then said that Japan was now at the crossroads and the Japanese Government was in a very difficult position. He remarked that it was quite true that 99 per cent of the Japanese people did not want trouble with the United States but that they were a disciplined people and would fight if commanded to do so. The Ambassador said that there were agitators in Japan who were trying to cause trouble in our relations and they were probably being assisted with funds from other countries. The Ambassador then pointed out that war between the United States and Japan, whatever might be the final outcome, would be a very serious undertaking, as undoubtedly the President, from his long experience in the Navy Department, fully realized. The Ambassador, therefore, felt that both from the point of view of Japan and of the United States everything possible should be done by both sides to avert the possibility of a conflict between the two countries. The Secretary thanked the Ambassador for having expressed his views freely.

[JOSEPH W.] BALLANTINE

11.94/2406$\frac{5}{11}$

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] October 9, 1941.

Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Ballantine and Mr. Schmidt called on the Japanese Ambassador[80] conformably with an arrangement made earlier in the day at the suggestion of the Secretary in response to questions which had been raised by the Japanese Ambassador.

---

[80] Mr. Wakasugi, Mr. Okumura, Mr. Matsudaira, and Mr. Obata were also present.

The Japanese opened the conversation by stating that they desired to inquire, as they had been instructed by the Japanese Government to do, wherein and on what points the Japanese proposals made on September 25 (a redraft of our document given the Japanese on June 21) were objectionable, unsatisfactory or unacceptable to this Government. They desired to go over the proposals point by point.

Following this introduction and again later in the conversation, we stated that in coming to the Japanese Embassy today we had expected that they would wish to go over our October 2 document in order that we might be able to clarify and elaborate any points in that document which were not entirely clear to them. We added that in the document of October 2 it was pointed out that we believed that renewed consideration of the fundamental principles long advocated by this Government might prove helpful in our effort to find a meeting of minds on essential questions. We remarked that we were still of that belief and that we felt the October 2 document along with previous documents and statements by officers of the American Government should give the Japanese Government a clear outline of our thoughts. There were given, we said, in the document of October 2, some examples of instances wherein we felt the Japanese proposals and explanations of September 6 and subsequent dates served to narrow and to restrict the broad-gauge principles we had been discussing and the general assurances we had received from the Japanese Government.

The Japanese stated that the Prime Minister had accepted "in principle" the four fundamental principles which had been enumerated on several occasions by the Secretary. (The Japanese Ambassador brought out this point several times during the conversation.) They maintained that we were therefore in agreement on principles, and that the Japanese Government accepted those principles "in principle"; but that it was desirable to determine wherein the American Government found objection to the Japanese proposals in order that the Japanese Government could consider the question of meeting, if possible, the desires of the American Government.

This same approach to the problem was repeated by the Japanese numerous times throughout the conversation lasting almost two hours. On each occasion we endeavored in reply to point out the general desirability of laying a firm foundation for any agreement or meeting between heads of state by trying to reach a mutual understanding of what each Government has in mind as relating not only to fundamental principles and general assurances but also as to our concepts of the program and policies to be followed in the practical application of those principles and assurances. We tried in our discussion in so far as possible to point to the October 2 document as embodying the thoughts of our Government, and wherever possible we employed the language of that document. We suggested that it might be desirable from the viewpoint of the Japanese Government for that Government itself to go over its recent proposals in the light of the fundamental principles referred to and the general assurances already given by the Japanese Premier and the Japanese Government. We brought out the desire of our Government to seek a broad general settlement of Pacific problems. On several occasions as opportunity arose in the conversation we referred to previous discussions which we had had, documents which we had exchanged with the Japanese and points which we had made in the informal exploratory conversations. We stated that we believed the Japanese Government, by reviewing those documents, statements and conversations would be able clearly to understand and to visualize the position of this Government. We pointed out that the Secretary had informed the Japanese Ambassador that the position of this Government in regard to the fundamental principles in its relations with other nations was clearly portrayed in the record of those relations, and that we had not from the first held anything back, but had placed our position squarely on those principles.

The Japanese Ambassador stated that when he had talked with the President some weeks ago he (the Ambassador) had expressed his understanding that there were outstanding three points of difference between the American and Japanese Governments as developed in the informal conversations. Those points were, the Ambassador said, enumerated by him to the President and the Secretary as: (1) The question of the Tripartite Pact and the inalienable right of self-defense; (2) the question of the application of the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial affairs; and (3) the question of the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory. The Ambassador said that he had expressed his own personal opinion to the President to the effect that only one of those questions would probably present especial difficulty. He went on to say that he believed that Prince Konoye would be able to present some formula in a meeting with the President which would solve the difficult question of the stationing of Japanese troops in China. He suggested indirectly that the Prime Minister would find it most difficult to evolve such a formula prior to such a meeting. The Ambassador went on to say that the Secretary of State had pointed out at the time of the meeting with the President that in addition to the three questions which Ambassador Nomura had enumerated there were certain problems of phraseology and the question of bringing the document (our draft of June 21) up to date.

We pointed out to the Japanese that following the interruption of the conversations in July there had developed certain conditions and situations in the world with respect to areas north of Japan as well as French Indochina and other areas and that therefore certain new questions had in fact arisen. We expressed the belief, however, that when the Secretary had mentioned the desirability of bringing the document up to date and of making certain changes in phraseology, the Secretary merely had in mind, in addition to these new situations which had arisen, such changes as we had suggested on September 10 when we gave them a redraft of Section V of the proposed understanding. This redraft, we believed, served to broaden the purport of the document and was to the advantage of Japan. We pointed out that in our belief there had been no substantial change in the attitude of this Government toward questions which had been tentatively agreed upon in the draft of June 21.

The Ambassador then stated that he understood from what we had said that in addition to the three questions which remained outstanding there had arisen the question of Siberia and the Japanese attitude toward Russia and Japanese activities in Indochina.

We pointed out that there was also the more general and fundamental question of peace in the entire Pacific area. We referred again to the initial reaction of the Secretary upon receiving the Japanese proposals of September 6 and added that the more we studied those proposals and subsequent explanations which we had received, the stronger our feeling became that those proposals and subsequent explanations narrowed and restricted the broad-gauge principles and general assurances which we had had in mind.

The Ambassador digressed for a moment and spoke of the attitude of Japan toward the Tripartite Pact. He said that the Japanese Government fundamentally desires peace in the Pacific. The Japanese Government has indicated its willingness to give a commitment that it will independently interpret the obligations of the Tripartite Pact, and the Ambassador suggested that as the Japanese Government has this fundamental desire for peace in the Pacific the implication in that commitment is clear.

The Japanese, as they did several times during the conversation, pointed out the difficult position in which the Japanese Government will be placed, if it were to meet the position of the American Government on the outstanding questions and then the United States were to raise new questions. They pointed out on several occasions that the principles which we had outlined were "inherently good", as were the Ten Commandments and other moral precepts, the soundness of which could not be controverted; but that, as a matter of practicality, there were occasions when it was necessary to discuss the question of adjustments in the practical application of those principles to concrete problems.

The Ambassador referred to the Versailles conference, which he said he had attended, and to the proposal of fourteen points by President Wilson, which proposal, he said, led to discussions lasting a half a year. The Ambassador expressed the opinion that there were no insurmountable difficulties in the present situation if both sides were of a mind to overcome differences. He added that he himself had noted some contradictions of "the four principles" in the Japanese proposals of September 6 and inquired whether if a reexamination of those proposals were made, there would possibly arise new points requiring further discussion. He emphasized the necessity of informing Tokyo exactly of the position of this Government.

Mentioning that the Japanese public had suffered the sacrifices of four years of war, the Ambassador said that his Government would necessarily have to present to the Japanese people some reward for that sacrifice or some attractive alternative gain. We replied that, as we had often told the Japanese, our experience led us to believe that Japan stood to gain more by following a progressive and constructive program of peace in the entire Pacific than by any other course. We mentioned that our desire was to build for future stability. We said that we had sought to avoid being placed in a position of possible criticism for having tried to tell the Japanese Government what it must do or must not do.

We agreed that the procedure suggested by the Japanese of taking each question point by point was possibly one way of handling the situation. We pointed out, however, that just as the Japanese had emphasized difficult questions of domestic politics we also were faced with similarly difficult questions in this country. We mentioned that the Japanese had themselves suggested the desirability of avoiding becoming lost in a maze of details; and spoke of the fact that the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs had informed Ambassador Grew that he was studying the October 2 document and would later make observations on that document. We pointed out that, on the other hand, another way of approaching this problem, which might serve to avoid becoming lost in a maze of details and minutiae and to get back to fundamental principles, might be to take the October 2 document and to study it in the light of other statements which this Government had made and conversations which the Secretary has had with the Ambassador. We pointed out again the desire of this Government to accomplish a broad-gauge general settlement of Pacific problems based upon the fundamental question of peace in the Pacific.

The Ambassador mentioned that he had received from his Government certain instructions in regard to the June 21 draft which we had given him but that he had been unable to deliver a document based on those instructions owing to the interruption in the conversations.

The Ambassador again expressed a desire to obtain concrete information of the views of this Government in regard to outstanding questions and differences. We once more went over the position of this Government as expressed in the October 2 document and referred to previous exchanges and conversations in which the views of the American Government had, we believed, been extensively set forth.

In concluding the conversation the Japanese Ambassador suggested in Japanese to members of his staff that a report should be sent to Tokyo stating that the American Government had no concrete counter-proposal to make and that it would seem that the Japanese Government could either redraft its proposals or could prepare a new document on the basis of additional consideration of the fundamental principles which we had discussed.

The Japanese seemed disappointed that we had avoided taking up point by point their proposals of September 6 or the redraft of the proposed agreement which was given Ambassador Grew on September 25. The Japanese, however, expressed their appreciation of our discussion and indicated that they now understood more clearly what the American Government had in mind in its document of October 2 and its suggestion that "renewed consideration" of fundamental principles might be helpful. We expressed our readiness to meet the Ambassador and his associates at any time and to be helpful in any way that we could.

Throughout the foregoing conversation we brought out our views in regard to basic principles and policies, including those relating to the application of the principle of equality of opportunity throughout the Pacific area and to the stationing of troops of one country in the territory of another country.

[MAX W.] SCHMIDT

711.94/2624

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[TOKYO,] October 10, 1941.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to call this afternoon.

The Minister began by saying that although he had given careful study to the Secretary's memorandum of October 2 he had encountered some difficulty in seizing the point of the memorandum. He had, however, come to the conclusion that the three questions concerning which the American and Japanese Governments held divergent views were as follows: (1) the maintenance of Japanese armed forces in China, (2) the respective attitude of the United States and Japan in regard to the war in Europe, and (3) equal opportunity in China. The Minister added that on October 3 he had instructed the Japanese

Ambassador in Washington to ask the Secretary whether the United States Government would set forth in precise terms the obligations which the United States Government wished the Japanese Government to undertake with reference to the three questions mentioned above. Having heard nothing from the Japanese Ambassador, he had again on October 6 instructed Admiral Nomura to approach the Secretary in the above sense. On October 9 the Japanese Ambassador had telegraphed the Foreign Minister that he had seen the Secretary on that date but that the Ambassador was unable to provide the information which had been requested by the Foreign Minister. Admiral Toyoda added that a week of very valuable time had been wasted in an endeavor to elicit through the Japanese Ambassador information which, had it been received, would have measurably accelerated the present conversations. The Foreign Minister had today sent further instructions to Admiral Nomura to continue his efforts to obtain the desired information, but at the same time, in order to prevent further delay, he was requesting that I ask my Government to provide the desired information in reply to the following statement:

> The Government of Japan has submitted to the Government of the United States with reference to certain questions proposals which are apparently not satisfactory to the Government of the United States. Will the American Government now set forth to the Japanese Government for its consideration the undertakings to be assumed by the Japanese Government which would be satisfactory to the American Government?

At this point in the conversation I took occasion to reply to the criticism in the Japanese press concerning the absence of progress in the present conversations, by stressing to Admiral Toyoda that the American Government in the determination and execution of its policy continuously considers and gives due worth to the development and state of American public opinion. Admiral Toyoda remarked that public opinion even in Japan could not be disregarded but that it would be a comparatively easy matter to control public opinion in this country provided, as a result of the suggested meeting between Prince Konoye and the President, some agreement were arrived at. The Minister gave me his assurances that the Japanese Government would find it possible to make commitments of a far-reaching character at such a meeting but that under present conditions the full extent of the undertakings which the Japanese Government was willing to assume could not be set forth prior to the meeting. He reiterated his concern lest the Government be unable to control extremist groups in Japan if matters remain in their present undetermined conditions.

The Minister having at the beginning of the conversation expressed his appreciation of the message which I had sent him yesterday concerning the reported plan to send additional Japanese forces into French Indochina, I reverted to this point and strongly emphasized to him that the despatch of Japanese reinforcements to Indochina at this juncture while the conversations were in progress between our two Governments would create a very delicate situation and in my opinion could not but seriously and adversely affect these conversations. I told the Foreign Minister that the arrival of additional Japanese forces in Indochina at this time, in the light of recent activities of the Japanese authorities in Indochina to which I had already drawn his attention, such as threats to take over the telegraph, post, and customs, and the demands for additional air bases, would inevitably give rise to the most serious suspicions in regard to Japan's aims in respect of French Indochina. The Minister replied that he was giving most careful study to my private and informal message on the subject and had already conferred with the Minister of War and hoped to be able to give me a reply in a few days. He added that he had also discussed with the War Minister the activities of the Japanese authorities in Indochina to which I had drawn his attention and had asked the Minister to take immediate steps to remedy the situation.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs then told me that since he had the impression that the Japanese Ambassador in Washington was apparently very fatigued, serious consideration was being given to the question of sending to Washington a diplomat of wide experience to assist the Ambassador in carrying on the present conversations. Admiral Toyoda said he had in mind a high-ranking diplomatic official with the personal rank of Ambassador, but he had not yet approached the official in question and was therefore uncertain as to whether he would agree to undertake to accept the mission. It would be of great assistance to the Minister to ascertain whether the Government of the United States, in the event that it was decided to send the official in question to Washington, would be prepared to make available a reservation for him on the airplane from Manila to San Francisco. Admiral Toyoda said that the official in question would not be accredited to the Government of the United States but would be temporarily and unofficially attached to the Japanese Embassy in Washington. I told the Foreign Minister that I would transmit his inquiry to my Government.

In concluding the conversation, the Minister several times stressed to me, in view of the importance of the time factor, the necessity of expediting the progress of the conversations.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

711.94/2406$\frac{6}{11}$

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[Washington,] October 13, 1941.

Mr. Wakasugi, the Minister-Counselor of the Japanese Embassy, called to see me this afternoon at his request.

After the usual preliminaries Mr. Wakasugi told me that he had spent exactly two weeks in Japan when he was summoned home last month. He said that he wished to be completely frank in giving me an account of his impressions during the time he was in his own country and he told me in detail of the persons he had seen and the situation as he found it.

The Minister said that as soon as he arrived he was summoned immediately by Prince Takamatsu, the brother of the Emperor and who is now the closest adviser of the Emperor. Immediately thereafter he was summoned to interviews with two others in the Imperial family and he mentioned specifically Prince Higashi Kuni. He was then summoned to the Prime Minister with whom he had several conferences and then to Marquis Kido, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and likewise one of the closest advisers of the Imperial family. He said that he also, of course, had several conferences with the Foreign Minister and with high ranking officers of the Army and of the Navy.

The Minister said that on the part of all of the personages mentioned above he had found the unanimous desire for the maintenance of peace between Japan and the United States and the earnest and sincere hope that the present conversations between the two Governments might reach a satisfactory result. He said, however, that there existed, particularly among the younger elements in the Army and to a lesser degree in the Navy and in other spheres of activity in Japan, a small but very powerful group that had placed its fortunes on the side of the Axis powers and was determined to move heaven and earth to prevent the reaching of any understanding between Japan and the United States and to bring Japan squarely into full activity on the side of Germany. He said quite frankly that German representatives and German agents in Japan were exceedingly powerful and most effective in their propaganda and were undoubtedly increasing their activities because of developments in Europe. He said that while the present Japanese Government had the bulk of public opinion behind it and was backed in its present policies by the controlling elements in the Japanese Army and in the Japanese Navy, it could not indefinitely continue the conversations with the United States. It would have to show some results. He said he need not remind me of the physical danger to which the members of the Japanese Government were exposed in view of the kind of incident which had unfortunately taken place in Japan so frequently in the past and particularly in recent years. He said that if the present Japanese Government fell as a result of a *coup d'état*, because of assassination or because it could see no hope of reaching any satisfactory adjustment with the United States, there was no telling what the result might [be]. He said that in all probability it would be replaced by a cabinet composed of military representatives responsive solely to German pressure and that in such event any hope of adjusting relations between Japan and the United States must vanish at least for the time being. He said that he wished to express very sincerely the situation as he saw it and to emphasize the fact that while a Japanese did not speak lightly of the Imperial family, the references he had made to me at the outset of our conversation should make it clear that the Imperial family, as well as the present Cabinet, was earnestly desirous of maintaining peace with the United States and of adjusting rapidly the problems which had arisen between Japan and this country.

He said that as I knew Prince Konoye had suggested a meeting between himself and the President. He said that notwithstanding every effort on the part of the Japanese Government to expedite the reaching of a friendly understanding and notwithstanding the fact that the Japanese Government had believed when it came into power in July that the fundamental principles necessary for an understanding had been found, an interminable time had elapsed without the reaching of any agreement and that it seemed impossible for the Japanese Government to find out what in reality were the desires of the United States and what in reality was the agreement which the United States desired to achieve. He said that acting under personal instructions from the Prime Minister, but nevertheless at this stage acting unofficially and without requesting any commitment from me, he would greatly appreciate it if I could tell him what the reasons for the delay might be or what the points of clarification were which this Government still desired to obtain from his Government.

I said to the Minister that it seemed to me impossible to believe that the Japanese Government did not in fact have a very clear and specific understanding of the position of this Government. I said that the views of this Government had been fully set forth not only in the innumerable conversations which the Secretary of State had had with the Japanese Ambassador, but more specifically in the presentation of our views in the documents given to the Japanese Ambassador on June 21. I said that after that date this Government had believed that very satisfactory progress was being made and that the two Governments were finding common bases for understanding when, through the statement given this Government on September 6, it appeared to our regret that the Japanese Government seemed to restrict, to limit and to modify very materially the broad principles upon which we had thought a basis for an understanding had already been reached. Subsequent to September 6, I said, it was my understanding that the Secretary of State had had several clarifying conversations with the Japanese Ambassador and that the views of this Government with regard thereto had again been very clearly set forth in an oral statement given the Japanese Ambassador on October 2.

I said therefore that since I was sure Mr. Wakasugi had fully familiarized himself since his return to Washington with all of these conversations and the more recent statements to which I had referred, there was nothing more that I could add which would clarify the issues in any useful manner beyond the clarifications already advanced.

I said that one of the chief difficulties from the standpoint of this Government in appreciating the position of the Japanese Government throughout the course of these conversations had been the fact that while the whole foundation upon which the striving for the reaching of an agreement had been predicated, namely, the maintenance of peace in the Pacific, the Japanese Government, as I had emphasized to Mr. Wakasugi just before he left for Japan, had undertaken military action in Indochina and had undertaken military activities in the north which would seem to belie entirely the main purpose for which the reaching of an agreement was sought. Only recently, I said, I had regretted to receive reports which would seem to indicate that the Japanese Government was contemplating further military activities in Indochina. From this standpoint I said it seemed unfortunately that the overt actions of the Japanese Government did not correspond to the purposes which the Japanese Government assured us they were seeking in their conversations with the United States.

The Minister then said that the Axis agents in Japan had sedulously, and to a certain extent successfully, spread the belief that this Government was deliberately delaying negotiations in order to delay them with no desire on its part to reach an understanding with Japan. I replied that it happened that only this morning I had seen a newspaper article alleging that the Government of Japan was adopting exactly this same policy in order to gain time for its own interests. I said that I could assure the Minister that this Government was sincerely desirous of exploring every possible field in order to reach a satisfactory understanding and that I felt that the two Governments, since they had pursued the conversations this far, must recognize the sincerity of the other party to the conversations in desiring to find a real understanding.

The final and very insistent question of the Minister was whether this Government had any other major demands to make as a part of the present conversations and which had not yet been submitted to the Japanese Government. I said that with regard to this question I could only reiterate what I had said at the outset of our talk, namely, that I believed that the views of this Government had been fully set forth in the documents of June 21 and in the oral statements subsequently transmitted to the Japanese Government and that it was not the policy of the Government of the United States, in an important negotiation of this type, to attempt to deceive or to mislead the other party to the negotiation.

Mr. Wakasugi said that of course he recognized that the action taken by his Government in Indochina seemed at variance with the policies which both Governments desired to pursue. He said, however, that Japanese opinion in governmental circles felt that the action taken in Indochina had been for purposes of defense and was entirely analogous to the action taken by the United States in Iceland. He said that the occupation of Indochina had been undertaken through agreement with a government which was occupied by Germany and that the occupation by the United States of Iceland had likewise been undertaken through an agreement with Denmark, a country also occupied by Germany.

I replied that the Minister was in error. I said that the Government of the United States had had no conversations with the Government of Denmark concerning Iceland, which was a country divorced from Denmark, and that the agreement for occupation of Iceland had been reached through a free agreement on the part of the Government of Iceland and on the part of the Government of the United States. Furthermore, I said, as I had already in an earlier conversation pointed out to Mr. Wakasugi, no one could possibly maintain that the Japanese Government feared any threat of aggression on the part of any other power through Indochina, whereas the Government of the United States, confronting a situation in Europe in which the Government of Germany was steadily and increasingly threatening the vital interests of the United States, was obliged to enter into the agreement which it had reached with the Government of Iceland as a means of self-defense against Germany and as a means of averting the imminent peril to the United States which would result from the occupation by Germany of Iceland or of any other region in the Atlantic which was vitally necessary for the defense of this country.

The Minister then went on to say that he felt that in some of the fundamental principles which this Government thought had been restricted by the Japanese Government in the statement of September 6 there had been unnecessary misunderstanding through the use of unfortunate phraseology. He said that the Japanese Government was entirely willing to commit itself to undertake no aggressive moves either to the south or to the north. He said that although the Japanese Government in its statement of September 6 with regard to a possible move against Russia had used the phrase that it would not undertake aggressive action in the north "save for justifiable reasons", this latter phrase was entirely unnecessary and could readily be withdrawn. He said it had been intended solely to indicate that if the Stalin government collapsed and some other foreign power undertook to operate in eastern Siberia or if a complete case of anarchy broke out in eastern Siberia as had been the case in 1919 and 1920, the Japanese Government in that event would find it necessary to defend its own interests in the interest of "Manchukuo" against such aggression from that source. He repeated, however, that this phrase could be eliminated and that the Japanese Government was prepared to make a full commitment to undertake no aggressive activities to the north, south or anywhere else in the Pacific region.

I said that this was a very interesting and gratifying statement on his part and that I believed it tended to clarify a question which to us was of the utmost importance. He further went on to say that it was evident that this Government had been disturbed by the phraseology employed with regard to equal treatment and nondiscrimination in commercial relations in the Pacific and that the Japanese statement of September 6 had apparently given the impression that China was omitted from this commitment and that it applied only to the southwestern Pacific region. He said further that on this point the Japanese Government would be entirely willing to undertake to reach an agreement along the broad and general lines which we had in mind.

He then asked, with regard to the obligations of Japan under the Axis pact, whether this Government could not agree to leave the "discretion" of Japan as to the interpretation of its obligations under such pact to the determination of the Japanese Government. He said he realized fully that any new Cabinet that came in might determine Japan's obligations in a manner different from that in which the present Japanese Cabinet would determine its obligations, but that as a matter of practical fact the present Japanese Cabinet was the only Cabinet which could be set up which would desire to maintain peace with the United States should the United States go to war. I said that on this point I felt that the position of this Government had already been made fully clear by the Secretary of

State and that I would have to refer this question to the Secretary of State to determine whether any further clarification was necessary.

The Minister then brought up the question of evacuation of Japanese troops from China. He said that the Japanese Government was willing to evacuate all of its troops from China. (Thinking I had misunderstood him I asked him to repeat this statement which he did, in the same terms, twice.) He said, however, that it was impossible for the Japanese Government after four years of military operations in China to undertake to withdraw its entire troops from China within twenty-four hours. I said that of course nobody expected miracles in this modern age. I said with regard to this question that here again the views of this Government had been made known very clearly to the Japanese Government and that the Secretary of State had frequently referred to our own experience and to our own policies in the Western Hemisphere as an indication of what we believed the policy which would bring about peace and stability in the Pacific region should be. The Minister then asked whether, in the event that the President of the United States agreed to mediate between Japan and China, this Government would insist on passing upon the peace terms proposed by Japan before they were submitted to China. I said that once more in this case our views had been made known very clearly and that I was not in a position to give him any more specific opinion on this point without consulting the Secretary of State. I said that in general, as I had frequently explained, the point of view of this Government was that should this Government undertake the task of mediating, it could not undertake to transmit to the Chinese Government peace terms which in its judgment were inequitable and not conducive to the maintenance of a stable peace in the Pacific region.

The Minister then asked whether, if it were possible to reach a basis for an understanding with regard to all of the other major principles which this Government regarded as fundamental, the two Governments could not go ahead and leave the China question in abeyance. I said it seemed to me that this question was very much like asking whether the play of "Hamlet" could be given on the stage without the character of Hamlet. The Minister laughed loudly and said he fully understood my point.

The Minister said that he would make every effort to expedite a clarification of the point of view of his Government. He said he believed that the underlying principles as set forth by this Government on June 21 could be accepted by the Japanese Government. He said there was nothing he himself desired more earnestly than the reaching of a satisfactory agreement between the two countries. I said that I fully corresponded to his expressed desire in that regard. He said he believed that within twenty-four or forty-eight hours his Government must reach a final decision on the basic questions involved. He emphasized the fact that he was speaking unofficially. Before he left he said that he wished me to know that all of the controlling Generals in the Japanese Army and all of the controlling Admirals in the Japanese Navy were supporting fully the position of the Japanese Government in desiring to conclude a comprehensive and satisfactory agreement with the United States. He said this Government should be in no doubt that if an agreement could be reached before it was too late the control of the Army and of the Navy under present conditions was such as to make it sure that the Government would be able to carry out and implement the terms of such agreement.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

711.94/2624

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[TOKYO,] October 15, 1941.

I was invited to lunch alone with the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs today and we had a long talk together for two hours and a half which he requested should be regarded as off the record. We discussed, along lines largely parallel to the Under Secretary's conversation on October 13 with Mr. Wakasugi (Department's telegram 661, October 14, 10 p. m.[32]) and previous conversations in Tokyo and Washington, the present status of the exploratory conversations now progressing in Washington.

During my meeting with the Vice Minister today the only point of importance which emerged was the observation of Mr. Amau that the German Government is insistently pressing for the issuance of a statement by the Japanese Government in confirmation of the interpretation given to the Tripartite Pact by Mr. Matsuoka, to the effect that Japan will declare war on the United States in the event of war occurring between Germany and the United States. As a reply, although it has not yet been decided when or whether such reply will be rendered to the German Government, the Japanese Government is considering a formula of a noncommittal nature to the effect that maintenance of peace in the Pacific is envisaged in the Tripartite Pact and that the attention of the American Government has been sought for its earnest consideration of Japan's obligations under the Pact.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

---

[32] Not printed; see memorandum by the Under Secretary of State, October 13, 1941, *supra*.

711.94/2393

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] October 16 and 17, 1941.

Mr. Wakasugi, Japanese Minister, called by appointment on October sixteenth and seventeenth on the Under Secretary. By prearrangement, Mr. Welles brought him to my office for a conversation which lasted on each occasion for some two hours. The conversation consisted mainly of a rehash of conversations I have had from time to time with Ambassador Nomura. There were elaborations here and there with respect to certain phases of the two documents which had been exchanged between the Ambassador and myself representing our respective Governments. Our document of June twenty-first and an elaboration of it on October second had both been given to the Japanese Ambassador in an informal way with the definite understanding that no stage of negotiations had been reached and that these were really exploratory oral conversations reduced to writing. The Minister referred to the more recent communications from his Government, especially the ones received in September, and to the communication sent to this Government at the time the Prime Minister sent his personal message to the President requesting a meeting between the two to discuss American-Japanese relations.

The Minister sought to keep in harmony with his talks with Under Secretary Welles some days ago, but it was apparent that he was hedging more or less on these phases, especially on the three principal points of difference relating to bringing troops out of China, to applying a non-discrimination commercial policy to the entire Pacific area and to further clarification of the Japanese attitude towards the Tripartite Pact as it might relate to the relations between Japan and the United States.

I emphasized that the proposed peaceful settlement should apply to the entire Pacific area and not to just a part of it, just as United States commercial policy based on the principle of equality and non-discrimination applies to the entire world, and just as similar utterances apply to the entire world alike, including Japan. I then referred to the different points in Japanese statements to us at the time of and since the communication which accompanied the Prime Minister's communication to the President requesting a meeting wherein the Japanese were narrowing both the letter and the spirit of their attitude, as clearly expressed to me from March until July by Ambassador Nomura. This narrowing attitude related to the range of the Pacific area to be included in a settlement, to the scope and breadth of the formula prescribing commercial policy based on the rule of non-discrimination, to their interpretation of the application of the Tripartite Pact as it relates to the United States, and to the breadth and spirit and implications of Ambassador Nomura's many conversations with respect to bringing troops out of China, and to the limitation of Japanese commitments against conquest to the north and south only instead of a broad basic commitment on principles and programs for a satisfactory peaceful settlement pertaining to the entire Pacific area.

The effect of the Minister's numerous attempts at interpretation of the foregoing and of their application did not indicate progress—certainly not progress as compared with the attitude existing with respect to these questions, as set forth by Ambassador Nomura prior to the disruption of our conversations resulting from the occupation by Japan of Indochina.

The Minister spent much time attempting an unsatisfactory interpretation of the Tripartite Pact as it might affect us, by urging that it was a peace instrument and very slightly implying that, therefore, it was not aimed at us. I reminded him that for months it was proclaimed as intended principally to keep this country out of war with Germany and that it was a joint movement on the part of Japan and Germany to this end. It was, therefore, no easy matter for us to convince this country that it was a harmless document; that Japan herself must say and do the things necessary to disabuse the public mind in this country of the very unfriendly implication of the Tripartite Pact. There the matter rested despite the Minister's labored effort to give it a different interpretation.

The Minister strove for some time to show the necessity for Japanese troops being retained in China. I brought up the many facts and circumstances showing the great benefit it would be to Japan to get her troops out and mark off some temporary losses in one way or another and begin the work of restoring friendship and trade between the two countries under the broad principles of friendly international relations which underlie the peaceful settlement proposals of the United States. I reminded the Minister that the Japanese invasion has resulted in the establishment of many monopolies in China and many special privileges and benefits in various ways, which probably accounts for the main desire of Japan to keep troops in China, that Japan can never regain the friendship of China while she keeps troops there, that a settlement of the Chinese situation necessarily dovetails into the formula which this Government has suggested for a peaceful settlement for the entire Pacific area, and that the Chinese phase must be included in any such wide settlement. We went over many of the phases that had been discussed between Ambassador Nomura and myself with respect to bringing troops out of China and the Chinese situation generally.

On the question of a broad basic liberal commercial policy such as this Government stands for and has proposed to Japan along with all other nations, the Minister and I discussed numerous phases, pro and con, without anything especially new being brought out, except that I emphasized the earnest desire of this Government for such a provision to be included in any Pacific area settlement by pointing to our recent trade agreement with the Argentine,[32a] which gives Japan and all other countries equal access with ourselves to the markets there, and also to the numerous discussions this Government is having with the British and the British Dominions with respect to the removal of empire preferences and other discriminations, including the narrow policy of bilateral trade, and suggested strongly that Japan was more interested in this course than almost any nation, and yet she was opposing the application of the policy of non-discrimination in the Pacific. The Minister finally said that he was not disagreeing and that he would communicate at once with his Government to see if it would not accept this broad proposal. I said that was good and asked him to let me know when he hears from his Government. The upshot of our exploratory conversations left us with the view that the new Japanese Government[33] would have to speak next and before we had further serious conversations with their representatives here. We also derived the definite impression that there were no present signs of the Japanese Government coming back anywhere near the position it occupied in our exploratory conversations when they were temporarily abandoned at the time Japan went into Indochina. We are not very expectant in this line so far as future conversations are concerned, but we shall give them a full opportunity to say what they may have in mind to say.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

711.94/2624

Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)

[TOKYO,] October 17, 1941.

Mr. Ushiba telephoned me early this morning while I was still dressing and asked whether he might call on me at my house. He arrived as I was having breakfast. He is normally well composed, but this morning he was nervous and excited. He said that he had been up all night helping Prince Konoye to make arrangements for the transfer of office to the incoming Prime Minister.

[32a] Signed at Buenos Aires, October 14, 1941; Department of State, *Bulletin*, October 18, 1941, supp. (vol. v, No. 121A).

[33] The Government headed by Prince Konoye resigned October 16, 1941; a new Government was formed under General Hideki [or Eiki] Tojo as Prime Minister, with Shigenori Togo as Minister for Foreign Affairs, on October 18.

Mr. Ushiba then handed me, unopened, a personal letter from the Prime Minister to the American Ambassador and asked that I deliver it to Mr. Grew. (Copy of Prince Konoye's letter and copy of the Ambassador's reply thereto are attached to this memorandum.) He suggested that I read it, as he had been instructed to tell me in the strictest confidence certain thoughts which his chief had in mind. The substance of Mr. Ushiba's statement was as follows:

The Secretary's memorandum of October 2 which had been handed to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington had been a great disappointment to the Konoye Cabinet and the impression had been created inside the Cabinet that the road had been blocked to any hopes that the present conversations could be successfully concluded. Prince Konoye about a week ago had decided to resign in view of the internal situation in Japan. At that time it appeared inevitable that the succeeding Cabinet would be one of an extremist nature but Prince Konoye through intensive effort and "by a miracle" had in recent days been successful in ensuring that the government to succeed him would be composed of persons who did not subscribe to the principle that the conversations with the United States should be broken off.

No Japanese civilian statesman will undertake the task in which Prince Konoye has failed and consequently the succeeding Cabinet must be headed by an Army officer and will be composed primarily of military men. The new Cabinet may even appear to be extremist to persons unacquainted with the set-up of the various groups within the Japanese Army and other factions having influence in the Government. However, Prince Konoye entertains the hope that the Ambassador will stress to the Government of the United States that too great importance should not be given to the outward appearance of the new Cabinet. Prince Konoye also desires the Ambassador to understand that he would not have tendered his resignation at this moment without having convinced himself that the succeeding Prime Minister would be equally desirous of adjusting Japanese-American relations.

The Ambassador would readily appreciate, Mr. Ushiba added, that it would be impossible at the present time to form a civilian Cabinet with a liberal tinge: there is in Japan no civilian of adequate eminence to take over the office of Prime Minister, and even if such a civilian government should be formed, sufficient opposition to bring about its downfall would rapidly arise. Consequently the succeeding Cabinet must be composed primarily of military men by reason of the fact that a Cabinet of this complexion would represent the only element in Japan which at the present time would be capable of bringing about the downfall of the government. Mr. Ushiba emphasized that only as the result of the intensive and miraculous labors of Prince Konoye will the next government not be a military dictatorship bound to the most militaristic and drastic policy.

Mr. Ushiba concluded that Prince Konoye, although out of the government, will from the background continue to use his influence and to devote his best efforts to the achievement of the aims sought for in the conversations between the United States and Japan and he is hopeful that these conversations will be resumed very shortly.

I said that it was a great pity that Prince Konoye had felt it necessary to resign as the conversations in Washington were still in progress, the recent call of Mr. Wakasugi on the Under Secretary of State having had, in my opinion, good results toward further clarifying the position of the Japanese Government. Mr. Ushiba said that he hoped some day to be able to tell me of the events which had led to the Cabinet's resignation, but that all that he could say for the present was that Prince Konoye had taken the decision in the confident belief that he could thus bring the conversations to a successful conclusion.

I said that it was a great pity that the Japanese Army did not have a great leader, such as Prince Yamagata, who could insure unity within the Army. Mr. Ushiba agreed. He said that General Sugiyama, Chief of the General Staff, was being touted as such a leader, but that actually General Sugiyama was too pliant an instrument for his subordinates. In his opinion, General Umedzu, chief of the Kwantung Army, was the most influential man in the Army and would come forward when needed.

As Mr. Ushiba was about to leave, I asked that he convey to Prince Konoye my assurance that I would immediately see the Ambassador.

E[UGENE] H. D[OOMAN]

[Annex 1]

The Retiring Japanese Prime Minister (Prince Konoye) to the American Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

OGIKUBO, TOKYO, October 16, 1941.

MY DEAR AMBASSADOR: It is with great regret and disappointment that my colleagues and I have had to resign owing to the internal political situation, which I may be able to explain to you sometime in the future.

I feel certain, however, that the cabinet which is to succeed mine will exert its utmost in continuing to a successful conclusion the conversations which we have been carrying on up till today. It is my earnest hope, therefore, that you and your Government will not be too disappointed or discouraged either by the change of cabinet or by the mere appearance or impression of the new cabinet. I assure you that I will do all in my power in assisting the new cabinet to attain the high purpose which mine has endeavored to accomplish so hard without success.

May I take this opportunity to express my heartfelt gratitude for your most friendly cooperation which I have been fortunate enough to enjoy and also to convey to you my sincere wish that you will give the same privilege to whomever succeeds me.

With kindest [etc.] P. KONOYE

[Annex 2]

The American Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Retiring Japanese Prime Minister (Prince Konoye)

TOKYO, October 17, 1941.

MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER: Your friendly letter of October 16th is very deeply appreciated and I hasten to thank you heartily for your generous expressions and for the encouragement which you have given me in your confidence that the coming cabinet will make every effort to continue to a successful conclusion the conversations carried on between our two Governments. It gives me keen gratification to know that you yourself will assist the new cabinet in attaining the high purpose for which you and your colleagues have striven, and I need hardly assure you that your successor may count fully on my own earnest cooperation in a continuance of the mutual efforts of our respective Governments to achieve a successful outcome.

Please permit me to express the hope that you yourself, if you are about to lay down for a time the cares of your high office, will now find some degree of welcome relaxation and respite after your long, arduous and most distinguished official service to your country.

With expressions [etc.] JOSEPH C. GREW

711.94/2406$\frac{8}{11}$

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[WASHINGTON,] October 24, 1941.

The Japanese Minister, Mr. Wakasugi, called to see me this afternoon at his request.

The Minister first of all stated that he had instructions from the Japanese Government to inform this Government that in its relations with the United States it desired to pursue the policy of the preceding Government and desired to continue without delay the conversations which had taken place between the two Governments with a view to finding a satisfactory agreement to both Governments.

The Minister stated that, in his belief, the new Japanese Government had taken office under such circumstances and was pressed by tense public opinion to such an extent as to make it imminently desirable that the conversations be pressed to a satisfactory conclusion speedily.

The Minister further stated that he was instructed to inquire whether this Government had as yet any counterproposals to make to the suggestions offered by the Japanese Government on September 27.

I stated that I felt it necessary to speak openly and entirely frankly in reply to this message.

I said that the United States had made it fully clear during the past seven or eight months that it was glad to hold these conversations with the Japanese Government and that it desired to find the basis for an equitable agreement between the two Governments and that they desired to attain such a desirable objective as rapidly as possible. I said, however, that the Minister must recognize, as clearly as I did, that recent statements made by prominent officials of the Japanese Government and the Japanese Army and the Japanese Navy were not conducive to the creation of that kind of atmosphere which would be conducive to the reaching of any satisfactory understanding between the two Governments for the furtherance of the conversations which the two Governments had in mind. I said that, when a responsible officer of the Japanese Navy publicly announced that the Japanese Navy was "itching to fight" with the United States Navy, the result was disastrous in its effects upon public opinion here and particularly in its effects upon the American Navy. I said that I had, to my regret, seen very few statements if any, by high authorities of Japan during the past two weeks which could be interpreted as meaning that the Japanese Government had any sincere desire to reach a friendly and satisfactory understanding with the United States as a result of the present conversations. Furthermore, I said, the whole tone of the Japanese press, as well as articles and editorials appearing in the Japanese press, during the same period could only be interpreted as meaning that the Japanese press was not interested in the furtherance of any satisfactory understanding between our two countries. I said I felt it necessary to make these facts very clear in as much as Mr. Wakasugi would undoubtedly agree that the situation to which I referred created an additional and serious obstacle to any satisfactory outcome of the conversations which have been in progress.

The Minister replied by saying that he had seen only an hour ago on the ticker a statement attributed to Secretary Knox which said war between Japan and the United States was inevitable and that, consequently, the United States Navy was on a 24-hour basis. I stated that I had not seen any statement by Secretary Knox indicating his belief that war was inevitable between our two countries, but that I had seen and read statements attributed to him which implied that the situation was such that some incident might occur and that, consequently, the United States Navy was on a 24-hour basis. I said that the Minister's reference to these statements attributed to Secretary Knox clearly emphasized the truth of what I had just stated to him. If the Japanese Navy announced to the world that it was "itching for a fight" with the United States, he could hardly underestimate the effect which this would have upon the American Navy.

I said that I felt I must make it very clear that this Government would have to take into serious account statements and press campaigns of the kind to which I have referred in considering the utility of trying to find a successful outcome of the present conversations.

With regard to the second point he had mentioned by instruction of his Government I said that I was confident I had made it entirely plain in my first conversation with him after his return to the United States and that Secretary Hull, in our two succeeding conversations, had made it even more plain that the point of view of this Government had been set forth with complete clarity in communications handed to the Japanese Government on June 21, in the succeeding conversations between the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador, and in the statement delivered to the Japanese Embassy on October 2. I said that it did not seem to me that any counterproposals were called for from this Government. In our last conversation with the Secretary of State I said the latter had impressed upon the Minister the value from Japan's own standpoint of the economic principles this Government had offered as one of the bases for an understanding between our two countries. The Minister had then said that he would transmit this to his Government and let us have their reply.

Mr. Wakasugi said that he had in fact transmitted to his Government the statements of Secretary Hull in the fullest detail, but that he had not yet heard from his Government with regard thereto.

I said that the Secretary of State and I had both said with regard to the Minister's statement earlier made to me that the phraseology employed in the Japanese project of September 27 had perhaps given rise to misunderstandings and could undoubtedly be modified so as to make it clear that the Japanese point of view corresponded much more nearly to the position of this Government as set forth in its communications on June 21, that we would be glad to sit down with the Minister and consider any such changes in phraseology as he might be willing to suggest. I said that I was optimistic enough to believe that an effort of this kind might result in our ascertaining that the point of view of the Japanese Government was far more nearly identical to the point of view of the United States Government than would appear from the Japanese proposals of September 27.

The Minister said that he had not as yet received any detailed instruction from his Government, but that he was hopeful he would receive such detailed instructions in the immediate future. He then said that as far back as last April he had urged his Ambassador to try and find practical and concrete bases for agreement with the United States Government on all phases of the situation affecting the Pacific region. He said that certain American gentlemen who were unofficial and certain Japanese gentlemen who were unofficial, and who had (undoubtedly sincerely, as he put it) been endeavoring to further friendly relations between our two countries, had stepped into the picture and devised certain formulas and, he was afraid, had succeeded in obscuring the picture rather than clarifying it. He said he thought these efforts had resulted in a good deal of delay. He consequently wondered whether it would not be advantageous to make a fresh approach and, with full regard for the principles set forth by this Government, to undertake the development of new formulas. I said to the Minister that I thought this suggestion might be very helpful and, if he would prepare the new formulas which he had in mind, they would receive immediate consideration here. I said that everyone, from the Secretary of State down, had made it clear that we would be only too glad to contribute as much time and thought as might be necessary in order to further a satisfactory solution.

I stated that it seemed to me that from the standpoint of expediency and wisdom it might be well to see if we could not, first of all, reach an agreement on the economic principles involved. I wondered, I said, if the statesmen in the new Japanese cabinet understood as fully as he did what the practical advantages to Japan would be if it adopted the economic policies as set forth by Secretary Hull. Surely, I said, they must recognize, if they understood it, how much Japan would profit if, for example, British imperial preferences were abolished and Japan could trade with all of the Pacific nations, including Canada, Australia and New Zealand, on the same terms on which England could trade.

Mr. Wakasugi seemed to be very sincere in emphasizing his own belief in the desirability of Japanese wholehearted agreement in the nondiscrimination commercial policy proposed by this Government. I said that if we could reach an agreement on this front we could then pass with more encouragement to finding a satisfactory agreement with regard to the other principles advanced by the United States. I emphasized my belief that it would be wise to take up the more knotty problems after we had reached an agreement on what perhaps was the principle on which both Governments could agree now.

The Minister then went back to the thread-bare issue of the belief on the part of the Japanese people that their failure to possess certain natural resources under their own sovereignty made them the victims of economic aggression and economic encirclement at the will of other powers. I asked the Minister if he, or any other Japanese, could deny that, during the period of their modern history up to the year 1930, when Japan had a most friendly relationship with both Great Britain and the United States, through that relationship and because of the fact that their national policy was in general alignment with the policy of the two Governments I had mentioned, Japan had not rapidly become one of the great powers of the world and had enjoyed a period of great prosperity. The Minister said that of course that was the case. I said it seemed to me that Japan had never even thought of alleging economic encirclement until the sinister slogan brought forward by Hitler of "have and have not nations" had been dinned into the ears of the peoples of the world and until Japan herself had departed from her traditional friendships and had engaged upon new adventures and policies.

The Minister said that, while it was true that the younger generation in Japan had been responsive to the pernicious disease which was spreading over the world, Japan nevertheless was pursuing her own independent policies and was not to be regarded as being subservient in her national determinations of policy to either Germany or Italy. I said that this might be the case but that Japan nevertheless formally and officially and publicly had placed herself in the Axis camp and that no friend of Japan could deny that, so far as practical results were concerned and so far as the well-being and prosperity of the Japanese people were involved, Japan had not only gained nothing therefrom but had been gravely prejudiced.

Mr. Wakasugi made no denial of this. He remained quiet.

Mr. Wakasugi then changed the subject and said that in his last conversation with Secretary Hull the latter had inquired whether he had any contacts with Chinese friends here in this country. The Minister reminded me that he had replied that while he knew the Chinese Ambassador, Dr. Hu Shih, he was not seeing him on account of the situation between his country and China. The Minister said that it seemed to him all important that every approach be undertaken in order to bring about a settlement of the conflict between China and Japan, since nothing would be more conducive than this to a settlement of all of the Pacific problems. He inquired whether—and he stated that this was to be regarded as entirely unofficial—I would be willing to meet with himself and the Chinese Ambassador or any other Chinese officials who might be able to speak for their country. He said that if any official effort was ever to be made by the President of the United States to further the reaching of a peaceful solution between Japan and China it must certainly first be ascertained whether the Government of Chiang Kai-Shek would be disposed to reach an agreement with Japan.

I replied that obviously the Minister did not expect me even personally and unofficially to give him any response to this suggestion without very careful consideration and the opportunity to study this possibility. I said that I would, however, give the matter the most careful thought and that I would be prepared to discuss with him in one of our next conversations what my individual views might be as to the feasibility of the suggestion he had made.

The Minister made no reference to any plans for departure on the part of the Ambassador and I did not question him with regard thereto. He did, however, specifically state that as soon as more detailed instructions were received from his Government the Ambassador would be taking part in the conversations between the two Governments.

The Minister said that as soon as these instructions were received he would immediately let me know and that he would urge his Government to expedite the sending of such instructions.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

711.94/2625

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[TOKYO,] October 25, 1941.

The informant[34] called on me at his own request this evening. He told me that just prior to the fall of the Konoye Cabinet a conference of the leading members of the Privy Council and of the Japanese armed forces had been summoned by the Emperor, who inquired if they were prepared to pursue a policy which would guarantee that there would be no war with the United States. The representatives of the Army and Navy who attended this conference did not reply to the Emperor's question, whereupon the latter, with a reference to the progressive policy pursued by the Emperor Meiji, his grandfather, in an unprecedented action ordered the armed forces to obey his wishes. The Emperor's definite stand necessitated the selection of a Prime Minister who would be in a position effectively to control the Army, the ensuing resignation of Prince Konoye, and the appointment of General Tojo who, while remaining in the Army active list, is committed to a policy of attempting to conclude successfully the current Japanese-American conversations.

---

[34] "A reliable Japanese informant."

The informant emphasized to me that the recent anti-American tone of the Japanese press and the extreme views expressed by pro-Axis and certain other elements gave no real indication of the desire of Japanese of all classes and in particular of the present political leaders that in some way or other an adjustment of relations with the United States must be brought about. He added in this connection that Mr. Togo, the new Foreign Minister, had accepted his appointment with the specific aim of endeavoring to pursue the current conversations to a successful end and it had been understood that should he fail in this he would resign his post.

The belief is current among Japanese leaders that the principal difficulty in the way of an understanding with the United States is the question of the removal of Japanese armed forces from China and Indochina, but these same leaders are confident that, provided Japan is not placed in an impossible position by the insistence on the part of the United States that all Japanese troops in these areas be withdrawn at once, such a removal can and will be successfully effected.

The informant, who is in contact with the highest circles, went on to say that for the first time in ten years the situation at present and the existing political set-up in Japan offer a possibility of a reorientation of Japanese policy and action.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

711.94/2625

Memorandum of Comment by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[TOKYO,] October 25, 1941.

The Japanese press has given prominence to the remarks made by the American Secretary of the Navy to the effect that the Government of the United States has become convinced that Japan does not intend to abandon its policy of expansion and that should this policy be pursued a conflict with the United States is unavoidable. From the vantage point of this Embassy it is apparent that while the widespread conviction in the United States and abroad that Japan has no intention of giving up its policy of expansion may be logical, nevertheless the fallacy of this view may be found in the fact that the present Japanese leaders are willing to give up their expansionist plans through armed force if a workable understanding can be reached with the United States.

In relation to the informant's observations, there is little that can be added to the analysis set forth in my telegram to the Department No. 1529 of September 29, noon, and the suggestions advanced therein, particularly in paragraphs 5 and 10, still obtain despite the fact that the procedure of negotiations anticipated in the suggested meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister may now have to be changed. If, as I have no reason to doubt, the informant's statement that the Emperor is for the first time actively engaged in the formulation of policy in Japan and the announced aim of reaching an agreement with the United States is true, some more positive attempt by General Tojo and the new Foreign Minister to render the current conversations more concrete than has heretofore been the case may be anticipated, an opinion, however, which must be mere speculation until I have seen the new Foreign Minister. In this connection, whatever may be the character of the Foreign Minister's approach, in our first conversation I shall of course initiate nothing and shall make it clear that my Government desires that the conversations be continued in Washington and only paralleled here.

From the available information I am quite convinced that had the Emperor not taken the positive stand which he did on this issue, the situation mentioned in paragraph 8 of my 1529, September 29, noon, would probably have developed.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

711.94/2625

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[TOKYO,] October 30, 1941.

The diplomatic chiefs of mission were received this afternoon by Mr. Shigenori Togo, the new Foreign Minister. Mr. Kase acted as interpreter. The usual press photographs having been taken and appropriate amenities exchanged, Mr. Togo remarked that the relations between the United States and Japan, which had not been very good when he formerly was in the Foreign Office several years ago, had since then progressively worsened to the present situation which, if this deterioration were not terminated, was fraught with the gravest dangers. Referring to the informal conversations which had been carried on since last spring between the Japanese and the American Governments, the Minister declared his desire that the conversations be continued and without delay be successfully brought to a conclusion. He requested my cooperation in accomplishing this objective.

Mr. Togo said that in order to make progress, the United States should face certain realities and facts and he thereupon cited the stationing in China of Japanese armed forces. Other nations, he said, at present maintained troops in certain areas of China, for instance the Soviet soldiery stationed in Outer Mongolia. The Minister made no further allusion to the preliminary conversations but stated that he hoped to have subsequent talks with me in due time.

After assuring the Minister, in reply, of my desire to cooperate with him, I described the wish of the Secretary of State that, because of the President's close and active interest therein, the conversations should be carried on in Washington. However, as parallel talks in Tokyo were often helpful in that they afforded an opportunity for rendering more complete and more precise the reported views of the United States Government, I had on certain occasions in the past conveyed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the substance of the conversations in Washington which were reported to me directly from the Secretary of State. Hereupon I gave to Mr. Togo a paraphrase of the Department's telegram reporting the Under Secretary's conversation with Mr. Wakasugi on October 24 (Department's 689, October 25, 5 p. m.[35]), as I felt that the Foreign Minister would derive therefrom a clear understanding of the attitude of the Government of the United States toward these preliminary conversations.

I told Mr. Tojo that, as it was of course impossible for the Foreign Minister personally to read all of the correspondence directed by the American Embassy to the Foreign Office, it had been in the past my practice to bring in separate letters to the direct attention of Admiral Toyoda, with the latter's approval, those matters which I had considered of especial importance. In reply to my question whether Mr. Togo would approve of my observing the same practice with him, the Minister replied in the affirmative and the interview was brought to a close.

As I was leaving, Mr. Kase told me that he had been designated Chief of the First Section of the American Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and that he would be happy to serve as a direct avenue of communication between the Foreign Minister and myself whenever I might desire. In thanking Mr. Kase I said that, recalling our former pleasant association, I was glad once again to find him in the role of interpreter during my conversations with the Foreign Minister.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

711.94/2625

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[TOKYO,] November 3, 1941.

I received a visit today from the same reliable Japanese informant who called on me on October 25. He informed me that he had seen the Foreign Minister yesterday with a view to ascertaining the prospects of a resumption of the conversations between Japan and the United States. The Foreign Minister had told him that during the past few days he had been constantly in conference day and night with the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Navy, and that as a result the Government had reached a definite decision as to how far it was prepared to go in implementing the desires of the Emperor for an adjustment of relations with the United States. This decision, which was being held in strictest secrecy, had been communicated by the Prime Minister to the Emperor on the afternoon of November 2. The Foreign Minister had conveyed to my informant the impression that he expected to ask me to call for an extended conversation within a few days.

---

[35] Not printed; see memorandum by the Under Secretary of State, October 24, 1941, p. 692.

According to my informant this was the first time for many years that a Japanese Foreign Minister had been in a position to assume obligations with the entire support and approval of the Prime Minister, who was an Army officer on the active list and who held as well the portfolios of the War and Home ministries, and also the support of the Navy Minister. My informant was of the opinion that the Foreign Minister would ask me to call not later than November 7 since the question of relations with the United States would have to be clarified before the Diet meets on November 15 at which time a report would have to be delivered. The forthcoming meeting of the Diet, according to my informant, would be carefully organized by the Government and no loose or irresponsible talk would be permitted.

I thanked my informant for his information and repeated to him what I had told the Foreign Minister, namely, that the actual conversations were to be carried on in Washington and only paralleled in Tokyo.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

711.94/2408 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

[Substance]

TOKYO, November 3, 1941—3 p. m.
[Received 4:19 p. m.[36]]

1736. The Ambassador reports for Secretary Hull and Under Secretary Welles as follows:

(1) He cites a leading article from the Tokyo *Nichi Nichi* of November 1 (reported in telegram No. 1729 of that date[37]), adding that a banner headline declaring "Empire Approaches Its Greatest Crisis" introduced a despatch from New York with a summary of a statement the Japanese Embassy reportedly gave to the *New York*

---

[36] Telegram in seven sections.

[37] Not printed.

Times regarding the need of ending the United States–Japanese economic war. Both the article and the *Nichi Nichi* editorial (see telegram of November 1, 7 p. m.[37a]) are believed to be close reflections of Japanese sentiments at present.

(2) The Ambassador refers to his various telegraphic reports during several months past analyzing the factors affecting policy in Japan and says he has nothing to add thereto nor any substantial revision to make thereof. In his opinion, a conclusive estimate may be had of Japan's position through the application to the existing situation and the immediate future of the following points:

(*a*) It is not possible for Japan to dissociate either Japan or the conflict with China from the war in Europe and its fluctuations.

(*b*) In Japan political thought ranges from medieval to liberal ideas and public opinion is thus a variable quantity. The impact of events and conditions beyond Japan may determine at any given time which school of thought shall predominate. (In the democracies, on the other hand, owing to a homogeneous body of principles which influence and direct foreign policy and because methods instead of principles are more likely to cause differences of opinion, public opinion is formed differently.) For example, in Japan the pro-Axis elements gained power following last year's German victories in Western Europe; then Japanese doubt of ultimate German victory was created by Germany's failure to invade the British Isles, this factor helping to reinforce the moderate elements; and finally Germany's attack on the Soviet Union upset the expectation of continued Russo-German peace and made the Japanese realize that those who took Japan into the Tripartite Alliance had misled Japan.

(*c*) An attempt to correct the error of 1940 may be found in the efforts to adjust Japanese relations with the United States and thereby to lead the way to conclusion of peace with China, made by Prince Konoye and promised by the Tojo Cabinet. If this attempt fails, and if success continues to favor German arms, a final, closer Axis alinement may be expected.

(*d*) The Embassy in Japan has never been convinced by the theory that Japan's collapse as a militaristic power would shortly result from the depletion and the eventual exhaustion of Japan's financial and economic resources, as propounded by many leading American economists. Such forecasts were unconsciously based upon the assumption that a dominant consideration would be Japan's retention of the capitalistic system. The outcome they predicted has not transpired, although it is true that the greater part of Japan's commerce has been lost, Japanese industrial production has been drastically curtailed, and Japan's national resources have been depleted.

[37a] Not printed.

Instead, there has been a drastic prosecution of the process to integrate Japan's national economy, lacking which there might well have occurred the predicted collapse of Japan. What has happened to date therefore does not support the view that continuation of trade embargoes and imposition of a blockade (proposed by some) can best avert war in the Far East.

(3) The Ambassador mentions his telegram No. 827, September 12, 1940[38] (which reported the "golden opportunity" seen by Japanese army circles for expansion as a consequence of German triumphs in Europe). He sent this telegram under circumstances and at a time when it appeared unwise and futile for the United States to adopt conciliatory measures. The strong policy recommended in the telegram was subsequently adopted by the United States. This policy, together with the impact of world political events upon Japan brought the Japanese Government to the point of seeking conciliation with the United States. If these efforts fail, the Ambassador foresees a probable swing of the pendulum in Japan once more back to the former Japanese position or even farther. This would lead to what he has described as an all-out, do-or-die attempt, actually risking national hara-kiri, to make Japan impervious to economic embargoes abroad rather than to yield to foreign pressure. It is realized by observers who feel Japanese national temper and psychology from day to day that, beyond peradventure, this contingency not only is possible but is probable.

(4) If the fiber and temper of the Japanese people are kept in mind, the view that war probably would be averted, though there might be some risk of war, by progressively imposing drastic economic measures is an uncertain and dangerous hypothesis upon which to base considered United States policy and measures. War would not be averted by such a course, if it is taken, in the opinion of the Embassy. However, each view is only opinion, and, accordingly, to postulate the correctness of either one and to erect a definitive policy thereon would, in the belief of the Embassy, be contrary to American national interests. It would mean putting the cart before the horse. The primary point to be decided apparently involves the question whether war with Japan is justified by American national objectives, policies, and needs in the case of failure of the first line of national defense, namely, diplomacy, since it would be possible only on the basis of such a decision for the Roosevelt administration to follow a course which would be divested as much as possible of elements of uncertainty, speculation, and opinion. The Ambassador does not doubt that such a decision, irrevocable as it might well prove to

---

[38] Not printed.

be, already has been debated fully and adopted, because the sands are running fast.

(5) The Ambassador emphasizes that, in the above discussion of this grave, momentous subject, he is out of touch with the intentions and thoughts of the Administration thereon, and he does not at all mean to imply that Washingon is pursuing an undeliberated policy. Nor does he intend to advocate for a single moment any "appeasement" of Japan by the United States or recession in the slightest degree by the United States Government from the fundamental principles laid down as a basis for the conduct and adjustment of international relations, American relations with Japan included. There should be no compromise with principles, though methods may be flexible. The Ambassador's purpose is only to ensure against the United States becoming involved in war with Japan because of any possible misconception of Japan's capacity to rush headlong into a suicidal struggle with the United States. While national sanity dictates against such action, Japanese sanity cannot be measured by American standards of logic. The Ambassador sees no need for much anxiety respecting the bellicose tone and substance at present of the Japanese press (which in the past several years has attacked the United States intensely in recurrent waves), but he points out the shortsightedness of underestimating Japan's obvious preparations to implement an alternative program in the event the peace program fails. He adds that similarly it would be shortsighted for American policy to be based upon the belief that Japanese preparations are no more than saber rattling, merely intended to give moral support to the high pressure diplomacy of Japan. Action by Japan which might render unavoidable an armed conflict with the United States may come with dangerous and dramatic suddenness.

GREW

711.94/2625

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[TOKYO,] November 4, 1941.

Before leaving for Hong Kong via Canton by Japanese plane early tomorrow morning, Mr. Kurusu [38a] called to see me this evening. He said that he has been studying the official papers in connection with his mission to the United States ever since he had been told, only yesterday, of the Foreign Minister's desire that he proceed to Washington. Mr. Kurusu informed me that he is going simply to help the Japanese Ambassador in the present difficult situation by bringing a fresh point of view and in order that no possible stone be left unturned in the endeavor to bring to a successful conclusion the conversations being conducted between the Japanese and American Governments.

[38a] Saburo Kurusu, former Japanese Ambassador in Germany.

Mr. Kurusu said that he was taking with him as his secretary Mr. Shiroji Yuki who, as Chief of the First Section of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office, has been most helpful to the Embassy and is familiar with the development of the conversations in Washington.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

711.94/2625

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)[39]

[TOKYO,] November 7, 1941.

I received a visit today from a leading Japanese[40] who maintains close contacts with the present government and who said he was calling at the request of Mr. Togo, the Foreign Minister. My informant told me that inasmuch as the Foreign Minister felt he could not express himself to me with the freedom which he desired, he was taking this means of sending me indirectly a suggestion along the following lines: The Tojo government has decided the limits to which it will be possible to go in an endeavor to meet the desires of the United States, but nevertheless should these concessions be regarded as inadequate by the Government of the United States it is of the highest importance that the Washington conversations be continued and not permitted to break down.

My informant then went on to express what he declared were his own personal opinions but which may or may not reflect the opinions of the Foreign Minister. He stated that if the present situation which was having a calamitous effect upon Japan were continued, the Japanese Government in the course of time would be compelled to agree to accept the views of the United States if only in order to prevent the breakdown of the conversations in Washington. I told my informant, and requested him to pass it on to Mr. Togo, that the present bellicose and violent tone of the Japanese press in regard to the United States, such as in particular the editorial published in the *Japan Times and Advertiser* on November 5 and the article in the evening *Nichi Nichi* yesterday which charged that the United States was talking like a harlot, and others, were rendering more difficult our efforts to adjust relations between our two countries in view of public opinion in the United States which naturally regards these truculent articles, and especially those of the *Japan Times and Ad-*

---

[39] The information contained in this memorandum was transmitted to the Department in telegram No. 1769, November 7, 1941, 11 p. m.

[40] "A leading Japanese and reliable informant."

vertiser which is known to express the attitudes of the Japanese Foreign Office, as accurately reflecting the opinion of the Japanese Government. My informant promised to repeat my observations to Mr. Togo and to draw his attention to the articles in question.

My informant said that too much attention should not be paid to Japanese newspapers and added metaphorically that frightened dogs bark and the greater the fright the louder the bark, and that at present the military party in Japan are frightened by the prospects opening up before them. He went on to say that it is a mistake for the United States to regard the Japanese as adults. In reality they are children and should be treated accordingly. Their confidence can be gained by a friendly gesture or word. The Germans have correctly diagnosed this aspect of Japanese psychology and have utilized it successfully.

In conclusion my informant again urged that irrespective of future developments the Washington conversations must not be permitted to break down since in such an event he was fearful of some drastic and fateful results.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

711.94/2540$\frac{3}{36}$

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] November 7, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador called at his request at the Secretary's apartment.[41] Before the Ambassador had said anything in regard to the purpose of his call the Secretary took up with the Japanese Ambassador the question of three American missionaries who had been taken into custody by the Manchurian authorities at Harbin, as referred to in a separate memorandum.[42]

The Secretary then went on to say that situations like that relating to the missionaries referred to and the publication in this country of various press reports of utterances in the Japanese press advocating extremist policies increased our difficulties over here in connection with our discussions with the Japanese Government. He said that various people keep coming to him, refer to these reports and then ask how this Government can expect to improve relations with Japan in view of a situation such as the reports under reference revealed.

The Ambassador said that since the advent of the new Cabinet he had not sought to talk with the Secretary as he had had no definite instructions and as he consequently did not wish to take up the Secretary's time. He said that he had now received instructions and that in accordance therewith he desired to resume the conversations.

---

[41] Mr. Wakasugi accompanied the Ambassador.

[42] Not printed.

The Ambassador said that the new Cabinet in Japan had deliberated very carefully upon the various provisions of a proposed settlement between our two Governments and had examined very carefully our draft of June 21 with a view to making the utmost concessions that they could make, having due regard for the situation in the Far East and of the attitude of public opinion in Japan. He referred to the three principal questions on which our respective views had diverged and he said that, with regard to two of those questions, namely, Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact and non-discrimination in international commercial relations, he thought that it would not be difficult to reconcile our views. In regard to the question of the desire of the Japanese Government to retain for some time a certain number of troops in north China and Inner Mongolia, he said he realized that difficulties of reaching an agreement were greater.

The Ambassador then went on to say that in view of the gravity of the situation he was very conscious of his responsibility and in order to minimize the possibility of any blunder on his part he had asked the Japanese Government for the assistance of an experienced diplomatist and that in accordance with his request the Government was sending Mr. Kurusu to assist him. The Ambassador expressed the hope that in view of Mr. Kurusu's personal ambassadorial rank the President would receive Mr. Kurusu.

The Ambassador then handed the Secretary a document, copy of which is attached,[43] containing formulas captioned as follows:

"*Disposition of Japanese forces*
(A) Stationing of Japanese forces in China and the withdrawal thereof:
(B) Stationing of Japanese forces in French Indochina and the withdrawal thereof:
Principle of non-discrimination"

The Secretary glanced over the document and inquired what proportion of the Japanese troops now in China Japan would propose to retain there. The Japanese Ambassador replied that, as the Secretary was aware, Japan already had the right under the Boxer Protocol to station troops in the Peiping and Tientsin areas; that as the Soviets had troops in Outer Mongolia the stationing of Japanese troops in Inner Mongolia was desired as an "equipoise" to those troops. The Ambassador, without making any direct reply to the Secretary's specific question, went on to refer to armed forces maintained by other countries in China and he said also that when Chiang

---

[43] *Infra.*

Kai-shek first entered Shanghai[44] the British had asked the Japanese to take joint action with them at Shanghai, but that the Japanese had declined to do so. He said that notwithstanding the moderate attitude of the Japanese, the Japanese soon thereafter became the object of a bitter Chinese boycott campaign.

The Secretary said that, although he had told the Chinese Ambassador that we were having exploratory conversations with the Japanese, he had not acquainted the Chinese Ambassador with any of the substance of the points we were discussing. He then recalled to the Japanese Ambassador that, as he had on numerous occasions said to the Japanese Ambassador, we proposed before entering into any formal negotiations to discuss the matter with the Chinese and the British and the Dutch. The Secretary said that an idea had just occurred to him which he had so far discussed with no one, namely, supposing the Chinese were now to say that they desired a real friendship with Japan and would do everything in their power to work together along peaceful ways, would not this be a wonderful opportunity for Japan to launch forth on a real new order, an order in which Japan would gain her real moral leadership in the Far East? At a time when Hitler was leading his people over a precipice and when Europe was threatened with anarchy, would not the adoption by Japan of a new policy of conciliation and friendship with China not maintained at a sword's point provide Japan with a real opportunity for progressive leadership in which Japan and the United States could cooperate to save the world? The Ambassador and Mr. Wakasugi appeared to be very much impressed with this suggestion and said that they would refer it to their Government for its consideration. The Ambassador said that he was personally convinced of the wisdom of the Secretary's policies and that when he went back to Japan and retired he would use his influence in a direction away from outmoded ideas such as would call for the retention of Japanese troops in China. The Secretary reviewed again the advantages which this Government had derived from renouncing its previous policies of stationing armed forces in Latin-American countries. He mentioned the great increase that had taken place in United States trade with those countries. He expressed the conviction that if Japan should adopt a broad-gauge liberal policy in relation to China Japan would derive incalculable advantage in the way of trade and prosperity.

With reference to the question of Japan's relations to the Axis powers, the Secretary expressed the hope that some concrete statement could be worked out which would help us. The Ambassador expressed the view that, considering the attitude of the Japanese Government which manifestly desired to maintain peace in the Pacific area, it did not seem to him that any further statement was necessary than had already been made. The Secretary pointed out that such manifestations of the attitude of the present Japanese Cabinet might not cover the situation should some new government come into power in Japan.

---

[44] In March 1927.

The Ambassador expressed the hope that, in view of the urgency of the matter, as the Japanese Government considered the situation critical at home, we would expedite our study of the document which the Ambassador had left with us. The Ambassador added that he had been instructed to present his views to the President and asked the Secretary if he would be so kind as to arrange an appointment. The Ambassador said that he would not take up much of the President's time but would present him with a written document in order to conserve the President's time. The Secretary said that he would be glad to comply with the Ambassador's request. He asked the Ambassador whether the document which the Ambassador had presented was to be taken in conjunction with the previous documents which had been exchanged. The Ambassador replied in the affirmative. The Ambassador said that there was our document of June 21 and their document of September 25. The Secretary added "and our document of October 2".

J[OSEPH] W. B[ALLANTINE]

11.94/2540$\frac{3}{35}$

Document Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State on November 7, 1941

(Tentative translation)

DISPOSITION OF JAPANESE FORCES

(*A*) *Stationing of Japanese forces in China and the withdrawal thereof:*

With regard to the Japanese forces that have been despatched to China in connection with the China Affair, those forces in specified areas in North China and Mengchiang (Inner Mongolia) as well as in Hainan-tao (Hainan Island) will remain to be stationed for a certain required duration after the restoration of peaceful relations between Japan and China. All the rest of such forces will commence withdrawal as soon as general peace is restored between Japan and China, and the withdrawal will proceed according to separate arrangements between Japan and China and will be completed within two years with the firm establishment of peace and order.

(*B*) *Stationing of Japanese forces in French Indo-China and the withdrawal thereof:*

The Japanese Government undertakes to guarantee the territorial sovereignty of French Indo-China. The Japanese forces at present stationed there will be withdrawn as soon as the China Affair is settled or an equitable peace is established in East Asia.

PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION

The Japanese Government recognizes the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations to be applied to all the Pacific areas, inclusive of China, on the understanding that the principle in question is to be applied uniformly to the rest of the entire world as well.

711.94/2625

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[TOKYO,] November 10, 1941.

The Foreign Minister[45] recalled the conversation which he had had with me on October 30, when he said that he was firmly of the opinion that the maintenance of friendly relations between the United States and Japan was a practicable proposition. He went on to say that he had given constant thought to this matter and that he had determined to put forward every effort to re-establish relations between the two countries on a friendly basis and to maintain peace in the Pacific. It was the purpose of the present Cabinet to continue with the project of establishing a "Greater East Asia" as a contribution toward world peace. Mr. Togo said that ever since he has assumed office he had been intensively studying the documents relating to the conversations which have thus far taken place. Fresh proposals had been formulated and had been sent to Admiral Nomura, who had been instructed to enter into negotiations with the President and the Secretary of State. I interrupted the Foreign Minister to say that our Government had been careful to emphasize that it was engaged in "preliminary and exploratory conversations" with the Japanese Government. Mr. Togo replied that he was well aware of that fact, but that he wondered whether the time had not come to enter into formal and official negotiations. However, he said that he did not wish to press the point.

Mr. Togo went on to say that only recently Mr. Kurusu had been despatched to Washington to assist Admiral Nomura in conducting the conversations. He recalled in this connection that he had asked me to facilitate Mr. Kurusu's journey to the United States, and that the American Government and I had responded in a manner which was most gratifying. He said that it was everywhere known in Japan that I had striven to promote friendly relations between our two countries and that my efforts in this regard were highly appreciated throughout the country. He intended on his part to spare no effort to cooperate with me with a view to opening up a way for the solution of the problems confronting the two countries which would be mutually acceptable.

---

[45] The Counselor of the American Embassy in Japan (Dooman) and the Chief of the First Section of the American Bureau, Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Kase), were also present.

What he most keenly felt, the Foreign Minister continued, from reviewing the documents recording conversations which have thus far taken place was that the knowledge and appreciation of the United States with regard to the realities of the situation in the Far East are unfortunately inadequate. Although Mr. Hull had admitted that Japan is a stabilizing force in the Far East, the position taken by the United States throughout the conversations had not been in harmony with that fact. Unless the American Government should take full cognizance of the fact that Japan has been engaged in hostilities with China for four and a half years, then the admission of Japan's being a stabilizing force in the Far East would have in actuality no meaning. Mr. Togo said that Mr. Hull, in a conversation with Mr. Wakasugi on October 16, recalled that he had told former Ambassador Saito that he recognized Japan as a stabilizing force and would be prepared to express such recognition in an official manner.[45a] The Minister went on to say that the population of this country is steadily and rapidly increasing; it was now about one hundred million; and it was necessary to assure raw materials necessary for their existence. It was his opinion that unless the American Government realizes this fact as among the realities of the situation, successful conclusion to the conversations would be difficult. During the conversations carried on for a period of more than six months, the Japanese Government had repeatedly made proposals calculated to approach the American point of view, but the American Government for its part had taken no step toward meeting the Japanese position and had yielded nothing—it had perhaps taken a more advanced position. Those being the facts, "we in Japan are led to wonder what is the degree of sincerity of the American Government in continuing with the conversations." He said that national sentiment will not tolerate further protracted delay in arriving at some conclusion. Referring to the fact that the Diet is shortly to meet, he emphasized that the position is daily becoming more pressing. He expressed the hope that the American Government would take a statesmanlike position and view the problems to be resolved from the broadest possible viewpoint—that it would try to settle these problems "with one sweep". It was his opinion that otherwise the prospects of overcoming the present difficulties would be small.

[45a] But see memorandum by the Secretary of State of conversation, p. 687.

The Foreign Minister went on to say that Japan had already made what were believed to have been the greatest possible concessions. However, the position had been examined by the new Cabinet and the new proposal now being made comprises the maximum possible concessions by Japan. The Minister at this point handed me two pieces of paper (attached hereto)[46] which he described as the new Japanese proposals, and he said that he wished to make two observations as follows:

1. The new Japanese draft corresponds to the American draft of June 21. It contains the elements of the proposals put forward in the Japanese documents of September 6 and 25, with modifications to meet as far as possible the American position as set forth in the American memorandum of October 2.

2. The Japanese draft of September 25 was largely based on the American draft of June 21. In the Foreign Minister's opinion it contains many unsatisfactory features with regard to both text and substance. However, to expedite the conversations, the Minister had decided to make use of that draft as a basis for a fresh start. He reiterated that this new proposal includes the maximum concessions.

By way of commentary he said:

(*a*) With regard to the attitudes of the American and Japanese Governments towards the European war, it is the understanding of the Japanese Government that there has been an agreement of views based on the Japanese draft of September 25;

(*b*) With regard to the question of non-discrimination in economic matters, it is the belief of the Japanese Government that its new proposal adequately covers the desires of the American Government;

(*c*) With regard to the stationing in and withdrawal of troops from China, which have been the greatest obstacle in bringing the conversations to a successful end, the Japanese Government has, notwithstanding grave domestic difficulties, made a further and what must be regarded as the maximum possible concession. The Japanese Government believes that the American Government will appreciate this further manifestation of Japan's desire to come to an amicable settlement with the United States:

(*d*) Mr. Hull has intimated that he has already consulted the British Government with regard to the conversations and that he proposes to continue such consultation. British interests in the Far East are admittedly large and would be deeply affected by matters now under discussions between the United States and Japan. The Foreign Minister regards it as necessary that in the event of the sought-for agreement being reached between the United States and Japan there should simultaneously be concluded a similar instrument between Japan and Great Britain. The Foreign Minister expressed the hope that the American Government will persuade the British Government to agree to such simultaneous signature.

---

[46] For texts, see document handed to the Secretary of State on November 7, 1941, p. 709.

The Minister concluded his observations by repeating that he solicited my cooperation to bring about a speedy and satisfactory end to the negotiations. He referred to the question of conversations being carried on in Tokyo paralleling those taking place in Washington, which was touched on at our last meeting. The Minister said that he had no intention of merely duplicating here what would be said in Washington. He believed that there would be no objection on the part of the American Government to holding parallel conversations in Tokyo, but in his view such parallel conversations should be designed to supplement exchanges in Washington of information and of opinion with a view to expediting the progress of the conversations.

At the end of the Minister's presentation I said that I had no authority to debate the questions approached by the Minister which would be discussed in Washington but that I wished to raise three points as pertinent to those discussions, as follows:

(1) In connection with the Minister's observation that my Government does not understand the realities of the situation in the Far East I ventured to disagree on the ground that the American Government had been given a perfectly clear conception of the situation and its various factors by this Embassy and, I assumed, by the Japanese Ambassador in Washington;

(2) The term "stabilizing force in East Asia" as applied by the Minister to Japan is open to very wide interpretation;

(3) The Minister's observation that Japan must have access to necessary supplies penetrates to the center of the whole problem since one of the fundamental purposes of the current conversations is to open a way for Japan to obtain such necessary supplies, together with a free flow of trade and commerce and markets for her industries, but by peaceful means as opposed to the use of force, and that Mr. Hull's program visualizes precisely these desiderata which are aimed to ensure Japan's future welfare, prosperity and contentment.

The Foreign Minister remarked that he was quite prepared to admit that the Embassy is endeavoring to report accurately on the situation in the Far East, but that, in view of the position which is being taken by the American Government, he wondered whether the American Government has in fact a correct appreciation of the realities. To illustrate his point, he wished to cite the question of the stationing of Soviet troops in Outer Mongolia, which was universally recognized to be a part of China. So far as he knew no one had objected to the presence of Soviet troops in Outer Mongolia. With regard to my comment on the phrase "stabilizing force in East Asia," the Foreign Minister said that there should be a satisfactory interpretation of that phrase from a common-sense point of view. With regard to my observations on the question of assuring to Japan sources of raw materials the Foreign Minister said that this was a question which had been debated over a period of years at Geneva and elsewhere. He did not wish to go into the fundamentals of the question, but he thought that he could advert briefly to the importance of commercial and economic relations between the United States and Japan. The freezing by the United States of Japanese assets had stopped supplies of many important raw materials to Japan. Economic pressure of this character is capable of menacing national existence to a greater degree than the direct use of force. He hoped that the American Government would take into consideration circumstances of this character and realize the possibility that the Japanese people, if exposed to continued economic pressure, might eventually feel obliged resolutely to resort to measures of self-defense.

The Minister went on to say that Japan had been engaged in extensive hostilities for a period of more than four years, and that if Japan were called upon to sacrifice the fruits of such protracted hostilities she must inevitably collapse. If the American Government realizes this fact a speedy conclusion to the conversations will be easy.

I pointed out the apparent inconsistency between the Minister's emphasis on the insistence of Japan that she retain the fruits of hostilities and Japan's acceptance of the principle of refraining from aggression and the use of force.

The Foreign Minister replied that Japan is not conducting a war of aggression and that therefore no question arises of her retaining the fruits of aggression. It is his impression that the American Government is now resorting, under the plea of self-defense, to measures over and beyond those that are generally recognized by international law. He expressed the opinion that it might not be out of place for Japan to ask the United States not to put too liberal a construction on the principle of self-defense. In any event, it was his opinion that theoretical discussions would not promote the conversations, which he thought should be pursued along realistic lines.

The conversation then turned to another matter which is covered by a separate memorandum.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

711.94/2460

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] November 10, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador, accompanied by Minister Wakasugi, called on the President. The Secretary of State was present at the express wish of President Roosevelt. The Ambassador, after a few preliminary remarks, proceeded to read as under instruction from his Government the following communication:

"I am now going to explain to you the salient points of the proposals which my Government has instructed me to submit to your Government. As you will recall, it was on the 25th of September that the Japanese Government, last made its proposals to the United States Government, and, gathering from the observations which the Secretary of State made on them on the 2nd of October and also from the views which were subsequently expressed by the Secretary of State and the Under-Secretary of State Mr. Welles, the greatest difficulties arose from three points, that is:—

1. The application of the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations,
2. The attitude of our two Governments toward the European war, and
3. The question of the stationing and withdrawal of Japanese forces.

"In regard to the first question, that is, the principle of non-discrimination, my Government has now decided to accept its application in all the Pacific areas, including China, as your Government desires, on the understanding that the principle is to be applied uniformly to the rest of the world as well. The Secretary of State has repeatedly pointed out to me that it has been his long-cherished scheme to see the application of the principle throughout the whole world. I therefore hope that the assurance to be given by my Government in this connection will be gratifying to you.

"As to the second question, the attitude of our two Governments toward the European war, my Government proposed, in the draft of September 25th, that

'both Governments will be guided in their conduct by considerations of protection and self-defense.'

In this connection I have to inquire if the United States Government is in a position to give an assurance that it has no intention of placing too liberal an interpretation on the term 'protection and self-defense' that may lead to an abuse of the recognized right based upon it. The Japanese Government would be ready to give a similar assurance on the basis of reciprocity, that is, if the assurance is forthcoming from the United States Government.

"In the draft of September 25th referred to, my Government proposed that

'in case the United States should participate in the European war, Japan would decide entirely independently in the matter of interpretation of the

> Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy, and would likewise determine what actions might be taken by way of fulfilling the obligations in accordance with the said interpretation.'

It will hardly be necessary to point out in this connection that the fundamental motive for initiating the present conversations was the preservation of peace in the Pacific by all possible means. The present circumstances under which Japan is placed do not permit my Government to go any further to write in black and white than what it proposed in the draft of September 25th which I have just quoted. ~~All I have to ask you is to 'read between the lines' and to accept the formula as satisfactory.~~ (Deleted by Ambassador Nomura.) You will agree with me that where there is no mutual confidence and trust, a thousand words or letters would not be a satisfactory assurance.

"In regard to the third question, the stationing and withdrawal of Japanese forces, the formula which my Government wants to submit is as follows:

> 'With regard to the Japanese forces which have been despatched to China in connection with the China Affair, those forces in specified areas of North China and Mengchiang (Inner Mongolia) as well as in Hainan-tao (Hainan Island) will remain to be stationed for a certain required duration after the restoration of peaceful relations between Japan and China. All the rest of such forces will commence withdrawal as soon as general peace is restored between Japan and China and the withdrawal will proceed according to separate arrangements between Japan and China and will be completed within two years with the firm establishment of peace and order.'

"In submitting this formula, the Japanese Government has gone a great deal further than it went previously in that the formula specifies not only the areas in, but also the duration for, which the Japanese Government desires to have its forces remaining in China, clearly indicating that the stationing of the Japanese forces in China is not of a permanent nature. You will readily agree that, while complete and immediate withdrawal of all the Japanese forces from China may be desirable, it is impracticable under the present circumstances. I therefore earnestly hope that you will give favorable consideration from a practical standpoint.

"I have been instructed to add that, in regard to the Japanese forces in French Indo-China, the Japanese Government proposes the following formula:

> 'The Japanese Government undertake to respect the territorial sovereignty of French Indo-China. The Japanese forces at present stationed there will be withdrawn as soon as the China Affair is settled or an equitable peace is established in East Asia.' "[47]

The Ambassador then read the following manuscript which he said was an oral statement by him:

"I am very glad to be able to see you to-day, because since the resignation of the Cabinet of Prince Konoye, the conversations between the Secretary of State and myself had to be left alone for nearly three weeks—three weeks, even three days, are very precious time under the present circumstances. I am sure you will agree with me that the situation between Japan and the United States must not be left alone to take its own course and drift away beyond rescue.

---

[47] The Japanese Ambassador also handed to President Roosevelt a copy of the document given the Secretary of State on November 7, 1941, p. 709.

"It is more than six months since the present informal conversations were started. From the very beginning the Japanese Government was very anxious to reach the earliest possible conclusion and the Japanese people placed a great deal of hope on it, but the conversations dragged on and on and, on the other hand, the relations between our two countries became more and more strained, the people of my country becoming more and more impatient.

"As viewed from the Japanese side, the Japanese Government has made not a few concessions in its assertion at various stages while the United States Government has, it seemed to the Japanese, remained adamant on its contention and has shown little sign of reciprocation, and thus I must frankly inform you that in certain quarters in my country some skepticism has arisen as to the true intention of the United States Government. Personally I do not like to say it, but it is true. People in my country take the freezing of the assets as an economic blockade and they go even so far as to contend that the means of modern warfare are not limited to shooting. No nation can live without the supply of materials vital to its industries. Reports reaching me from home indicate that the situation is serious and pressing and the only way of preserving peace is to reach some kind of amicable and satisfactory understanding with the United States without any unnecessary loss of time. In the face of these mounting difficulties, the Japanese Government bent all its efforts to continue the conversations and bring about a satisfactory understanding solely for the purpose of maintaining peace in the Pacific. My Government therefore is now submitting certain proposals as its utmost effort for that purpose, and I shall feel very grateful if I can have the views of your Government on them at the earliest possible opportunity. Suppose we come to an understanding with this country, the psychological effect of it upon our people will mean much more than what is actually written upon the paper, and the policy of our Government will necessarily be guided and dictated thereby. I confidently hope that the views and desires entertained by the Japanese Government are fully shared and reciprocated by your Government.

"I may add for your information that in view of the serious situation now prevailing in the relations between our two countries, the Japanese Government is sending over here Ambassador Kurusu to assist me in the present conversations and also that the conversations will be taken up by Foreign Minister Togo with Ambassador Grew in Tokio in a parallel line.

"I am afraid I may have used to-day some words which a trained diplomat must not use, but I hope you will kindly forgive my transgression, for it was only because of my earnest wish to keep and direct the relations of our two countries in the course which I believe is best for both of us."

The Ambassador appeared very much in earnest in reading the statement.

The Ambassador made some reference to commercial policy as discussed and proclaimed by the President and Prime Minister Churchill at their sea conference some months ago. He referred complainingly to the fact that the Japanese went into Shantung and were only allowed to remain there some six years, at the end of which time they were requested to move out their troops.

The President then read the following oral statement in reply:

> "The entire world has been placed in a precarious position as a result of the havoc which has been wrought by the forces of aggression. Our common sense tells us of the extreme need that the world come back to ways of peace. It is the purpose of this Government to do its best in the spirit of fair play to contribute to establishing a basis for peace, stability, and order in the Pacific area. As a means of achieving these objectives it is essential that emphasis be laid upon giving practical effect to a sound philosophy of human welfare. We have often and quite recently made clear publicly what we have in mind in this regard. We hope that our exploratory conversations will achieve favorable results in the way of providing a basis for negotiations. We shall continue to do our best to expedite the conversations just as we understand that the Japanese Government is anxious to do. We hope that the Japanese Government will make it clear that it intends to pursue peaceful courses instead of opposite courses, as such clarification should afford a way for arriving at the results which we seek."

The President also referred orally to his opinion that nations must think one hundred years ahead, especially during the age through which the world is passing, and that the Chinese Government for the past thirty years has been passing through a new experience. He referred to extraterritorial courts and other unusual conditions that had accompanied this new experience of China. If I understood the Ambassador correctly, he said it took three years to develop and dispose of the Shantung problems. The President thereupon replied that the Ambassador, Secretary Hull and himself had only consumed some six months in discussing a solution of our relations and those of other countries in the Pacific and that patience was necessary. The President spoke of a *modus vivendi* as being not merely an expedient and temporary agreement, but also one which takes into account actual human existence. The Ambassador dwelt briefly again on the question of the Japanese getting out of China by degrees and adding that there would be no annexation, no indemnity, et cetera.

There was nothing said about when the next conversation would take place. The President brought up his program to visit Warm Springs at the end of this week for some ten days. The Ambassador said that Kurusu would be here about Saturday.[47a] The President said that, of course, he expected to see Kurusu and confer with the

---

[47a] November 15, 1941.

Ambassador and the Minister and their associates. The Ambassador said that Kurusu was only coming to assist him and coming at his request and that he did not have anything new to bring so far as the Ambassador knew.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

711.94/2540⅘

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] November 10, 1941.

Mr. Wakasugi, Japanese Minister, called by appointment made at his request. Mr. Wakasugi said that the Japanese Ambassador had it in mind this morning to say something to the Secretary which he did not have an opportunity to say because of an interruption and the Japanese Ambassador therefore desired to have an appointment to see the Secretary either this evening or tomorrow morning to take up with the Secretary two points. The first point related to the desire of the Japanese Government to hasten the conversations in view of the pressing situation in Japan and the forthcoming Diet session. The second point related to the suggestion which the Secretary made on November 7 in regard to means for the development on the basis of mutual pledges by China and Japan of a new relationship of conciliation and friendship. Mr. Wakasugi said that the Ambassador had communicated to the Japanese Government the Secretary's comments on this point, that the Japanese Government had replied that it was very much interested in this suggestion and wondered if it would be possible for the Secretary to develop more fully just what he had in mind.

Mr. Ballantine said that after consulting with the Secretary he would communicate again with Mr. Wakasugi.

[JOSEPH W.] BALLANTINE

711.94/2625

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[TOKYO,] November 12, 1941.

Mr. Kase[47b] called this morning at the request of Mr. Togo to say that while the Foreign Minister of necessity could not with entire freedom tell me certain things directly, he regarded it as of great importance that the Government of the United States should have in mind a completely clear understanding of the situation in this country in so far as it affects the present endeavors of the Japanese Government to reach a settlement of the relations with the United States and for this reason the Minister had asked Mr. Kase to convey to me the following.

[47b] Chief of the First Section, American Bureau of the Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Togo had been "shocked" (a term which Mr. Kase later changed to "concerned") to receive the impression from the latest reports of the Japanese Ambassador in Washington of his talks with the President and the Secretary of State that the Government of the United States does not fully grasp the urgency of successfully concluding the current conversations in the shortest possible time. Mr. Kase told me that not only does Mr. Togo consider that the preliminary conversations have now entered the stage of negotiation but also that he considers that these negotiations have now reached their final stage since the Japanese Government has already made the greatest possible concessions.

Mr. Kase then went on to say that the last government of Prince Konoye had conducted the conversations with the support of the country as a whole but that the long period of time which had elapsed since their inception without any clear indications of progress had given rise to the opinion in Japan that the Government of the United States was endeavoring to utilize the conversations as a means of concealing the preparations which it was carrying on to complete the encirclement of Japan. While the present Cabinet does not agree with this opinion, however, it has undertaken its present task of reaching an agreement with the United States against a considerable body of opposition and, although despite this opposition it has had the courage to embark on its present efforts and is according its unanimous support to the Foreign Minister in this respect, a very critical and dangerous state of affairs will result should any appreciable delay be encountered in successfully concluding the negotiations. Those elements who are opposed to a continuance of efforts to reach an adjustment with the United States will seize upon any such delay as evidence of the correctness of their views. Mr. Kase was emphatic in his statement that his remarks in this connection contained no implication of threat whatsoever and should not be so regarded, but should be taken only as a factual statement. Mr. Kase added that Mr. Togo entirely realizes that his own life is at stake, to say nothing of his official position, but that nevertheless he has had the courage to make this final attempt in full cognizance of the consequences of failure.

I told Mr. Kase that his observations were virtually the same both in general and in particular as those which had been made to me during the last Konoye Cabinet both by Admiral Toyoda and by Prince Konoye himself and which of course had been reported in full to my Government. Mr. Kase replied that there was a considerable difference between the present situation and that which had obtained previously, and he again emphasized the vital importance of concluding the negotiations without further delay and reiterated his previous statement that the Japanese Government considered that the final stage of the negotiations had already begun.

At this point I permitted Mr. Kase to read the Department's telegram No. 728, November 8, 8 p. m.,[48] which set forth the Secretary's interview with Admiral Nomura on November 7. After reading the telegram Mr. Kase said that the account of the conversation contained therein followed very closely Admiral Nomura's report. He added that Mr. Togo had taken especial note of the suggestion of the Secretary contained in paragraph eight of the Department's telegram concerning an expression on the part of China of its desire to establish genuinely friendly relations with Japan and the readiness of the Chinese Government to make every effort toward peaceful cooperation with Japan. Mr. Togo was now wondering how this suggestion might be put into actual effect. I told Mr. Kase that, since the point would seem to me to be directly linked with the general program which Mr. Hull envisages for an adjustment of the whole Pacific problem, the Japanese Ambassador might care to discuss the suggestion fully with the Secretary of State.

Mr. Kase then inquired if I had received an account of the conversation on November 10 between the President and the Japanese Ambassador, to which I replied that I had not, adding that the failure of the Department to send me a report probably meant that there had been little difference between the conversation on November 10 with the President and that of the Ambassador with the Secretary of State on November 7. Mr. Kase said that the tenor of the two conversations had been different, to which I replied that I should then probably in due time receive an account of the conversation with the President on November 10.

I then allowed Mr. Kase to read my telegram No. 1782, November 10, 8 p. m.,[49] setting forth my interview with Mr. Togo of that date. Mr. Kase said that with the exception of the last sentence in paragraph one the account was completely accurate. With reference to the sentence in question Mr. Kase said that it was not his recollection that Mr. Togo had stated that "he did not wish to press the point" regarding the transference of the conversations into "negotiations", particularly as Mr. Togo felt strongly that the vital stages of the actual negotiations had begun. (According to Mr. Dooman, who was present at that interview and who had noted down the Minister's remarks, the latter did make, in Japanese, the comment reported in my telegram referred to above, but quite likely this observation did not appear in the official transcript made by Mr. Kase as interpreter.)

---

[48] Not printed; see memorandum of November 7, 1941, p. 706.

[49] Not printed; see memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan, November 10, 1941, p. 710.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

711.94/2625

Memorandum of Comment by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew), November 12, 1941

My conversation with Mr. Kase casts doubt as to the credibility of the alleged message which was passed on to me from the Foreign Minister by a prominent Japanese on November 7, as reported in my telegram 1769, November 7, 11 p. m., paragraph numbered one.[50] In view of my conversation today with Mr. Kase, it is possible that the so-called message had been conveyed to me by my informant in somewhat unclear and misleading form. At the time of its delivery it had struck me as somewhat surprising, but as I had not yet at that time had my first real interview with the Foreign Minister I had no grounds on which to question its accuracy. Although it is possible that the alleged message from my informant accurately reflected the Minister's remarks, which were to be conveyed to me in a purely personal fashion and were not designed to form a part of the official record, even this interpretation is subject to doubt. While it would appear obvious that a continuation of the talks is greatly to be preferred to a complete break-down, nonetheless for the conversations to drag on for a considerable time with no definite progress being made in reconciling the respective positions of the two Governments may well accelerate the creation of the dangerous situation referred to in my various reports of recent months, particularly in my 1736, November 3, 3 p. m. Although I entirely realize that it is still up to Japan to provide the initiative to make possible such progress in the conversations, I do not feel in a position to state whether as asserted by the Japanese Government the proposals which were submitted on November 7 to the Secretary constitute the maximum Japanese concessions.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

711.94/2540$\frac{4}{11}$

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] November 12, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador called in response to a request made by him on November 10 at the Secretary's apartment.[51] The Secretary referred to the request which had been communicated to him by Mr. Ballantine from the Japanese Minister for a further elaboration of the Secretary's views in regard to the development of a real friendship between China and Japan, and he said that in response to that request, he had prepared a statement which he then proceeded to hand to the Japanese Ambassador.[52]

---

[50] Not printed; see memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan, November 7, 1941, p. 705.

[51] Mr. Wakasugi accompanied the Ambassador.

The Secretary then said that the general position of this Government in regard to a Pacific settlement had not changed and he assumed that although a new ministry had been formed in Japan, the position of the Japanese Government had not changed. He had said that with a view to there being no misunderstanding, we had drawn up a recapitulation of statements which the Japanese had given us in regard to their position, and we would appreciate it if the Japanese Government could confirm that our assumption was correct. The Secretary then handed the Japanese Ambassador the statement which we had prepared on this subject.[53]

The Ambassador said that his new Government desired him to emphasize the desire of the Japanese Government to expedite a settlement because the internal situation in Japan was difficult, people becoming impatient and a session of the Diet impending. He therefore hoped that within a week or ten days some agreement could be reached. The Secretary commented that we were working as rapidly as possible on the matters which the Japanese Ambassador had presented to the President on November 10 and suggested that it was our view that as soon as we reached a good basis in our exploratory conversations, we could approach the Chinese Government and sound out their attitude. In regard to commercial policy, the Secretary said that there were points in the Japanese Government's proposal which we did not fully understand, and we assumed that what the Japanese Government had in mind was the same as what we had in mind, namely, to have Japan, Great Britain and other countries get together on a basis of equality and fair treatment. The Secretary went on to say that he expected much difficulty in explaining to the people here the Tripartite alliance situation. The Ambassador replied that Japan's obligation under the Tripartite alliance was limited, that it was not an offensive and defensive alliance, and that during the time of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, Great Britain remained neutral during the war between Japan and Russia.

The Secretary said he would like help in order to enable him to explain Japan's relationship to the Axis powers, for even though we understood clearly the Ambassador's attitude and that of the present Japanese Cabinet, there must be considered the possibility of another Government coming into power in Japan. The Secretary went on to point out the increasing gravity of the situation in Europe and the growing distress of European populations, which raised the question how long could Hitler keep those populations crushed down. For this reason, he said, the time was approaching for preparing for a post-war program, a matter in which he felt that the Japanese Government must be interested. He suggested that Japan would want to play a part in a constructive program to meet the after-the-war situation, and that for this reason Japan would probably not want to be tied in with Hitler. He noted that we are trying to keep out of trouble and to that end are making efforts to unite peaceful forces to avert disaster for ourselves.

---

[52] *Infra.*

[53] *Post*, p. 727.

The Ambassador commented that he anticipated that as time went on Japan would be less and less affected by the Axis ties, just as the importance of the Anglo-Japanese alliance waned after the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese war.

The Secretary commented that so many statements had been made about the Tripartite Pact that it should be made clear if we are going to start the world on the right course that we are going ahead on a basis of peace.

The Ambassador said in reply that if the proposed agreement were made and applied there would be no question of the use of force by Japan to gain access to materials and markets which she desired.

The Secretary commented that the matter of the Tripartite Pact relationship ought not to be a problem with Japan if we could work out our proposed agreement in other ways.

The Ambassador asked whether it was the Secretary's idea that the United States would leave to Japan and China to work out their peace terms by themselves. The Secretary replied that we had not yet talked the subject over with the Chinese or the British or Dutch, but we have told them that if we get matters beyond an exploratory stage we should be glad to talk with them. He added that we first want to have something substantial to present to them and that he had said that if we reach a stage of negotiations we will talk with the other Governments and will then talk again with Japan.

The Japanese Minister referred to the two documents which the Secretary had handed the Ambassador and which both the Ambassador and the Minister had just read. With regard to the document relating to mutual conciliation between China and Japan, he asked what the Secretary had in mind as to how the exchange of pledges would come about, as, for example, whether it would be as a result [of] our bringing the Japanese and Chinese together. The Secretary replied that when two neighbors have not been on speaking terms, sometimes they make up as a result of an initiative taken by one or the other and sometimes they are brought together by a mutual friend. One cannot plan always in advance what each of a number of persons will in succession do or say. He said he felt that the main thing now was to dispose of basic matters in regard to the provisions of a peace settlement and that questions of procedure could thereafter be more satisfactorily settled. These points were gone over two or three times, as the Japanese appeared to find difficulty in understanding them, possibly because of a preconception that the Secretary's suggestion contained more than appeared on its face.

With regard to the second document which related to the question of the present Japanese Government's general position on the question of peace, the Minister said that we had referred to the Japanese Government's statement of August 28, whereas the Japanese Government had indicated that it desired to use their September 25 document as the basis for discussions. He said that, with reference to our statement that in conversation with the Under Secretary he had expressed the willingness of the Japanese Government to omit the qualifying phrases contained in the assurances which we had quoted from the August 28 statement, this was a misunderstanding on our part. He said that he was not referring to the August 28 statement but to the September 25 statement and that what he had said to the Under Secretary was that there might have been some unfortunate phraseology in translation which could be improved after comparison with the original Japanese text. He asked whether we would withdraw what we had said in that connection.

The Secretary said he would be glad to do so, and was glad to have the Minister call attention to any misunderstanding.

The Ambassador said that if the proposed agreement was held in abeyance and the United States continued to aid Chiang Kai-shek while Japan was negotiating with Chiang the Chinese would be certain to keep negotiations dragging for an interminable period.

The Secretary said that if we got the China matter started to move it would soon gain momentum, for if Japan should propose terms which seem reasonably fair everybody would want to get aboard. He felt sure that ways could be found for safeguarding each other's rights by agreement.

The Ambassador commented that if we failed to reach an agreement simply over an unwillingness on the part of China to agree to the Japanese proposals in regard to troops, the situation would then be one in which China held the key to future relations between Japan and the United States which might result in war.

The Secretary replied that whether we exercised our good offices or whether Japan approached China directly we felt that the nature of the settlement which Japan reached with China was one which should be in harmony with the proposed Pacific settlement as a whole. One of the principles, he said, upon which we were proceeding was non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations, and the permanent retention of troops of one country in another country was inconsistent with that principle.

The Ambassador disclaimed any desire on the part of Japan to station troops in China permanently.

The Secretary said he felt that the same consideration applied to the retention of Japanese troops in China indefinitely. The Ambassador disclaimed any desire to keep troops in China indefinitely, but he did not offer anything definite on this point.

The Japanese Minister repeated what the Ambassador had earlier said about the desire of the Japanese Government to hear from us as soon as possible in regard to the Japanese proposals. The Secretary replied that we were working as hard as we could on the matter, and after consulting with Mr. Ballantine, said that we hoped we could have something for them day after tomorrow (November 14).

[Joseph W.] Ballantine

711.94/2540$\frac{7}{35}$

Oral Statement Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on November 12, 1941

Reference is made to the Japanese Ambassador's request for any further amplification that the Secretary of State might have in mind in connection with the suggestion made by him in informal conversation on November 7 in regard to mutual exchanges of pledges between China and Japan for the establishment of real friendship and collaboration between the two countries.

It will be recalled that the suggestion under reference was prompted by the observation of the Japanese Ambassador that should the Japanese Government agree to withdraw its troops within a definite period from all areas of China the Japanese people would feel that they had nothing to show for the four years and more of heavy sacrifice that they had made and that such an agreement would be regarded as having caused Japan a loss of prestige. The Secretary, in reply to the Japanese Ambassador's observation, commented that the present world crisis, in which Europe finds itself threatened with anarchy, affords Japan a unique opportunity to enhance its national prestige on a basis of moral force in a way that military might could never accomplish. That is, if the Chinese Government were now to say, either as a result of Japanese initiative or on its own initiative, that China desired a real friendship with Japan and would do everything it reasonably could to collaborate with Japan along peaceful and mutually beneficial lines, could not Japan find it possible to reciprocate in a policy of mutual friendship and conciliation with China? Would not such a policy enable Japan to make a contribution of inestimable value toward arresting the destructive forces which now menace world civilization and to assume a leadership in the world which every peaceful nation would welcome.

What is envisaged would be an implementation of the kind of constructive, liberal and peaceful world program concerning which we have been talking in our exploratory conversations. That program contemplates practical application of basic principles directed toward preservation of order under law, peace with justice, and the social and economic welfare of mankind. It contemplates peaceful collaboration among nations, mutual respect for the rights of all, no aggrandisement, and the adopting of broad-gauge economic policies which would provide liberalization of trade, afford fair access to and development of natural resources and raise living standards to the betterment of all peoples.

Full association by Japan in such a program at this critical moment in world history would give Japan an undoubted position of moral leadership and be a tribute to the far-sighted and enlightened character of its statesmanship.

711.94/2540$\frac{7}{25}$

Oral Statement Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on November 12, 1941

It will be recalled that the documents communicated by the Japanese Ambassador to the President of the United States on August 28, 1941 contained a statement of the position of the Japanese Government in regard to its desire and intention to pursue peaceful courses. That position was set forth in excerpts taken from those documents as follows:

"... Japan is solicitous for the maintenance of the peace of the Pacific and the peace of the world and she desires therefore to improve Japanese-American relations ..."

"... In consequence, the Japanese Government welcomes the invitation by the Government of the United States to an exchange of views in regard to basic policies and attitudes as the foundation of an understanding that will condition lasting and extensive peace in the Pacific area. For such peace, the Government of Japan is ready: for such a united effort toward a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation the Government of Japan, like the Government of the United States, would be proud to make sacrifices ..."

With reference to the stationing of Japanese troops in Indochina, it was stated:

"... the Japanese Government has no intention of threatening thereby other countries.

"Therefore, the Japanese Government is prepared to withdraw its troops from Indochina as soon as the China Incident is settled or a just peace is established in East Asia.

"Furthermore, in order to remove all possible doubt in this regard, the Japanese Government reaffirms herewith its repeated declaration that its present action in Indochina is not a preparatory step for military advance into neighboring territories."

The statement was made specifically applicable to Thailand as follows:

"The Japanese Government believes the above pledge will suffice to clarify also Japan's intentions toward Thailand."

Specific reference was also made to the Soviet Union by the Japanese Government as follows:

"As regards Soviet–Japanese relations, the Japanese Government declares likewise that Japan will take no military action as long as the Soviet Union remains faithful to the Soviet–Japanese neutrality treaty and does not menace Japan or Manchukuo or take any action contrary to the spirit of the said treaty . . ."

There was also a comprehensive statement, as follows:

"In a word, the Japanese Government has no intention of using, without provocation, military force against any neighboring nation."

With reference to the general program in view, it was stated:

". . . such discussions would naturally envisage the working out of a progressive program, obtainable by peaceful methods. The Japanese Government shares fully that view with the Government of the United States.

". . . Regarding the principles and directives set forth in detail by the American Government and envisaged in the informal conversations as constituting a program for the Pacific area, the Japanese Government wishes to state that it considers these principles and the practical application thereof, in the friendliest manner possible, are the prime requisites of a true peace and should be applied not only in the Pacific area but throughout the entire world. Such a program has long been desired and sought by Japan itself . . ."

In as much as subsequent to the giving by the Japanese Government of the foregoing statement of its position a new cabinet has come into office in Japan, this Government believes that it would be helpful, in order to avoid the possibility of any misunderstanding, if the Japanese Government could at this time confirm that the position of the Japanese Government has not changed.

This Government, in its statement to the Japanese Government of October 2, 1941, pointed out that, although we were gratified to receive the statement of the position of the Japanese Government, we found it difficult to understand the need for the qualification by the Japanese Government of its statements of peaceful intent with what would seem to be unnecessary qualifying phrases. We had in mind such phrases as:

> "As long as the Soviet Union remains faithful to the Soviet–Japanese neutrality treaty and does not menace Japan or Manchukuo or take any action contrary to the spirit of the said treaty."
>
> "Without provocation."
>
> "Without any justifiable reason."

On October 13 the Japanese Minister, in a conversation with the Under Secretary of State, said that such qualifications were the result of unfortunate phraseology and that the Japanese Government would be willing to omit them. As this conversation took place before the present Japanese Cabinet came into office, it is believed that it would be helpful if the position of the Japanese Government on this point could be clarified and the statement of the Japanese Minister be confirmed.

The foregoing observations are not directed to the new proposals put forward by the Japanese Ambassador on November 7 and November 10, but are set forth merely in an effort to make abundantly clear the basis on which we are proceeding in order that there may be avoided any misunderstanding on the part either of the Japanese Government or of this Government. It has not been and is not the purpose of this Government to enter needlessly into a discussion of details. While presenting these preliminary observations toward ensuring a common understanding, this Government will expect to do everything it can to expedite consideration of the latest proposals of the Japanese Government.

711.94/2540⁂

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] November 13, 1941.

Mr. Wakasugi called at his request. Mr. Wakasugi referred to the President's statement to the Ambassador that the President would be glad to receive Mr. Kurusu and stated that the Embassy had received a telegram from Mr. Kurusu dispatched from Midway stating that he was arriving in Washington Saturday afternoon.[54]

Mr. Wakasugi referred to his statement yesterday to the Secretary that there had been a misunderstanding on our part as to what Wakasugi had said to the Under Secretary on October 13 to which reference was made in the oral statement handed the Japanese Ambassador yesterday. He said that what he had said to Mr. Welles was: "There may be some unfortunate phraseology in the English translation of our instructions as we are not very sure of our English. If there are such phrases the wording might be adjusted." He said that he had the September 25 document in mind and not the document of August 28 which was delivered while he was away in Japan. He said that the Japanese Embassy had referred the contents of that memorandum to the Japanese Government, deleting therefrom the last four lines on page 3 and the first sentence beginning on page 4 through the word "office" and the last two words in line 4 and all of line 5.

---

[54] November 15, 1941.

The Minister tried to impress upon Mr. Ballantine the pressing nature of the situation in Japan as the public is becoming impatient and almost desperate. The parliament is meeting Saturday and they hope for some concrete understanding with the United States at once. He said he understood yesterday that we were to give them an answer tomorrow. Mr. Ballantine said that the Secretary had not said this, that what he had said was that we hoped to be in a position to have ready to take up with them some further matters tomorrow. Mr. Wakasugi said he hoped that the Secretary could give the Ambassador tomorrow a clear-cut answer in black and white as to whether the United States Government will accept or not the Japanese proposal of September 25 as modified by their proposals of November 7 and November 10 or whether we want to have some points changed therein or whether our June 21 proposal is our final proposal. He said that time is so pressing that the Japanese wanted to avoid any further interchange of comments on their proposals. Mr. Ballantine said, what are we going to do if we need further clarification as to the intent of your proposals? He referred to the fact that the Secretary had said yesterday that he did not understand what was meant by the latter part of the Japanese proposal in regard to commercial policy. Mr. Wakasugi said that what the Japanese Government meant by saying that they would agree to non-discrimination as applied to China provided that it will be made applicable to all the world was that the principle would be applied by the United States and by Japan and did not refer to the universal application of those principles by all countries. Mr. Ballantine asked whether this was not a very important point to be brought out clearly and authoritatively.

Mr. Wakasugi then said that in all of our documents we had stated that we were still in a stage of informal exploratory discussions whereas the Japanese Government considered that we had now entered formal negotiations especially since, on November 10, the

Ambassador had formally presented as under instruction a statement to the President. Mr. Ballantine said that Mr. Wakasugi was fully aware of our position as mentioned again by the Secretary yesterday, that we felt that when our talks had reached a stage where we had something of substance to discuss with China and the other governments concerned we expected to talk with them and then come back to the Japanese, and that then only would a stage of negotiations be reached. Mr. Wakasugi did not seem to be disposed to argue any of these points with Mr. Ballantine but simply asked that they be referred to the Secretary.

J[OSEPH] W. B[ALLANTINE]

711.94/2540½

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] November 15, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador called by appointment made at his request at the Secretary's apartment.[55] The Secretary referred to the Japanese proposal in regard to commercial policy which the Ambassador had presented on November 7 and November 10 and offered oral comment along the line of the oral statement which, together with the draft of a joint United States–Japanese declaration on economic policy, he then handed to the Ambassador.[56] The Secretary emphasized the advantageous and worthwhile character to Japan of participation by Japan in a program such as that envisaged in the draft. The Japanese Ambassador said that he could not comment upon that matter but that he would refer it to his Government. The Japanese Minister asked whether this proposal constituted our answer to the Japanese Government on the question of non-discrimination in international commercial relations which had been outstanding in our conversations. The Secretary replied in the affirmative. The Japanese Minister then said that the Japanese Government desired our reply on the two other outstanding questions, namely, the question of Japan's relations with the Tripartite Pact and the question of the stationing of Japanese troops in China. The Ambassador then stated that he also wanted to bring up the point that the Japanese Government considered that we were now engaged in actual negotiations and not in merely exploratory conversations as the American Government had contended. The Secretary, after asking the Japanese Minister to make accurate note of what the Secretary was about to say, replied that if we are to work out a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area he could do this only on the basis of carrying on exploratory conversations until we reached a stage when he could go to Great Britain, to China and to the Dutch and say to them that he believes that the attitudes of Japan and the United States are such as to afford a basis for negotiation and that we could call what took place thereafter a negotiation. He said also that it would be impossible for him to collaborate with those other countries until we had got things on a satisfactory basis; that otherwise they might read in the newspapers that he was negotiating with Japan on matters affecting them without their being consulted. The Ambassador made no comment.

---

[55] Mr. Wakasugi accompanied the Ambassador.

[56] *Infra.*

The Secretary went on to point out that notwithstanding the fact that the conversations between the Secretary and the Ambassador had related to a settlement covering the entire Pacific area and our draft of June 21 had made this clear, the Japanese proposals of September 25 narrowed the application of nondiscrimination and of peace to the southwestern Pacific area. The Ambassador replied that the question of peace in the entire Pacific area was covered in the preamble of their draft, but the Secretary pointed out that what was said in the body of the document rather than in the preamble governed. The Secretary added that he would like to know the attitude of the Japanese Government on this point.

The Secretary then said that the Japanese Foreign Minister in his conversation with Ambassador Grew on November 10 had indicated that the Japanese Government desired to conclude an agreement with the British simultaneously with concluding an agreement with this country, and yet the Japanese Government expected us to answer at once the Japanese Government's proposals. He suggested that there was some inconsistency between the instructions which the Japanese Ambassador was being asked to carry out here and what the Foreign Minister had in mind in regard to the British. The Secretary then commented that the Ambassador said that Japan wants an answer now, but that the Secretary felt that the Japanese Government ought to come and tell us whether it intends to adopt peaceful courses. The Ambassador said that there was no doubt about the desire of the Japanese Government to have peace in the Pacific and that Japan had freedom of decision and would make its own interpretation of its obligations under the alliance.

The Secretary asked whether if the Japanese Government should enter into agreement with us the alliance would be automatically abandoned. Mr. Wakasugi inquired whether we were asking that the Tripartite Pact be denounced. The Ambassador said that he understood what the Secretary had said to mean abandoned in the sense of becoming a dead letter. The Secretary rejoined that, just as the Ambassador had suggested, could we assume that if the Japanese

Government entered into an agreement with us the Tripartite Pact would automatically become a dead letter, for supposing that he went to the British and the Dutch and said that Japan was willing to enter on a peaceful program but at the same time desired to adhere to a fighting alliance with Germany, what would the British and Dutch say? He asked how he could make the British believe in Japan's peaceful intentions while Japan was proclaiming its adherence intact to a military alliance with Germany. He pointed out that it would be very difficult for him to make the people of this country and the people of all peaceful nations believe that Japan was pursuing a peaceful course so long as Japan was tied in an alliance with the most flagrant aggressor who has appeared on this planet in the last 2,000 years. The Ambassador commented that the public had so much confidence in the Secretary that they would accept the agreement with us if the Secretary recommended it. The Secretary replied that if we went into an agreement with Japan while Japan had an outstanding obligation to Germany which might call upon Japan to go to war with us this would cause so much turmoil in the country that he might well be lynched. The Secretary pointed out that, notwithstanding the existence of a neutrality pact between Japan and Russia, large Japanese armies in Manchuria were facing Russian armies in Siberia. The Secretary said that what we had in mind was an agreement which would promote mutual trust and enable us to get away from the expansion of military preparations, and what he desired was a clear-cut unequivocal agreement which would remove the doubts that Japan was trying to face two ways in order that we could remove distrust between nations in the Pacific area. The Secretary said that, so long as Japan insisted that it would make its own interpretation of its obligations under the Tripartite Pact in the event that the United States through self-defense was obliged to take up arms against Germany, it would be very difficult for the world to see that Japan's clear intention was to adopt peaceful courses. The Secretary said he would like to know whether, when an agreement is reached with us, Japan's connection with the Tripartite Pact would automatically disappear.

The Japanese Minister asked the Secretary whether what he had said was the answer of this Government on the question of Japan's relations with the Tripartite Pact. The Secretary replied that when we got an answer from the Japanese Government in regard to its attitude on the point that he had raised about the Tripartite Pact becoming automatically a dead letter in case we entered into an agreement with Japan we would be better able to make reply. The Japanese Ambassador said that he was afraid that the American Government did not trust the Japanese Government whereas there was no material difference between the policies of the present Japanese Government and the previous Japanese Government, notwithstanding the fact that the Prime Minister was a military man. The Secretary replied that the new Government in Japan seems to take the attitude that we must reply at once to their points, but that we do not feel that we should be receiving ultimatums of such a character from the Japanese Government under circumstances where the United States has been pursuing peaceful courses throughout and the Japanese Government is the one which has been violating law and order. The Secretary said, in conclusion, that when we hear from the Japanese Government concerning its position on the points we had raised with them two days ago on their peaceful intentions and when we could clear up the question of non-discrimination, as suggested in our proposal of today, and also in regard to the Tripartite Pact, he believed that we could sit down like brothers and reach some solution of the question of stationing Japanese troops in China. The Secretary emphasized at the same time that we did not desire any delay and that we were working as hard as we could to bring about a wholly satisfactory and broad settlement.

J[OSEPH] W. B[ALLANTINE]

711.94/2540$\frac{11}{15}$

Oral Statement Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on November 15, 1941

The Japanese Government has stated that it "recognizes the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations to be applied to all the Pacific areas, inclusive of China, on the understanding that the principle in question is to be applied uniformly to the rest of the entire world as well". (Underlining added.)

The underlined portion of the statement sets forth a condition the meaning of which is not entirely clear. It is assumed, however, that it is not the intention of the Japanese Government to ask the Government of the United States to assume responsibility for discriminatory practices in areas outside of its sovereign jurisdiction, or to propose including in an arrangement with the United States a condition which could be fulfilled only with the consent and cooperation of all other Governments.

The principle of unconditional most-favored-nation treatment has for many years been the cornerstone of the commercial policy of the United States. Since the first World War this principle has been embodied in virtually every commercial treaty concluded by this Government. Since 1934, when the United States embarked upon an extensive program of commercial agreements for the reduction of trade barriers, it has constantly applied this principle. In twenty-two agreements this Government has on its part reduced duties on over a thousand classifications of the American tariff, and it has extended these reductions to Japan and all other countries of the world with only two exceptions. These exceptions have been countries whose commercial practices represented a flagrant departure from the principle of non-discriminatory treatment. The withholding of trade-agreement concessions from those countries was itself a step in furtherance of the policy of non-discrimination since the purpose was to create inducement for the abandonment of discriminatory practices. One of the countries from which the benefit of such concessions had been withheld abandoned its flagrant discriminatory measures, and the United States at once extended to that country the benefit of the duty reductions made in its trade agreements.

The Government of the United States has not only placed its own trade relations with foreign countries on an unconditional most-favored-nation basis, but has sought consistently to further the application of that policy throughout the world. On every appropriate occasion it has urged upon other countries the adoption of non-discriminatory policies and has sought to bring about the progressive elimination of preferences and discriminations of all kinds.

In the twenty-two trade agreements above referred to, the Government of the United States has obtained from foreign countries commitments respecting the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers on thousands of products. These concessions affect products which are imported not only from the United States but from other countries as well. The Government of the United States has neither sought nor accepted commitments whereby these benefits would be restricted to imports from the United States. On the contrary, it has obtained these reductions in the trade barriers of foreign countries on the assumption and expectation that they would be extended to other supplying countries. Indeed, as part of its general policy of non-discrimination in international trade, it has advocated the extension to all countries of the concessions made in such agreements. In this way the reduction of trade barriers which results from a program of trade agreements such as that pursued by the United States is given the widest possible effect and makes the maximum contribution to the building up of world trade from which all nations benefit.

It is believed that, if Japan would devote itself to wholehearted cooperation in furthering the policy of non-discrimination as practiced and advocated by the Government of the United States and as practiced and advocated for many years by the Government of Japan, a long forward step would be taken toward attaining the objective which the Japanese Government's statement under reference has in view.

In the light of the foregoing, the Government of the United States raises question whether in the view of the Japanese Government there is need of the proviso under discussion, namely, "on the understanding that the principle in question is to be applied uniformly to the rest of the entire world as well", and whether the proviso might not be omitted.

As a practical manifestation of the way in which the Government of the United States has applied and is prepared to apply the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations, there is offered for consideration as a purely tentative suggestion a draft of a possible United States–Japanese declaration on economic policy. It is understood, of course, that agreement as to such a declaration is subject to agreement on the other points involved in a peaceful settlement covering the Pacific area as a whole and that this Government would expect, before entering into negotiations on such a possible United States–Japanese declaration on economic policy, to discuss the matter with the British Government and with other specially interested governments.

[Annex]

Draft Document Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on November 15, 1941

Unofficial, Exploratory and Without Commitment

JOINT DECLARATION BY THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN ON ECONOMIC POLICY

I. GENERAL POLICY

1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan undertake to cooperate fully in urging all nations to reduce trade barriers, to eliminate all forms of discrimination in international commercial relations, and in general to work toward the creation of conditions of international trade and international investment under which all countries will have a reasonable opportunity to secure, through peaceful trade processes, the means of acquiring those goods and commodities which each country needs for the safeguarding and development of its economy.

2. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan undertake that each of them shall make its appropriate contribution toward the creation of the type of international economic relations envisaged above.

3. As important steps in that direction, the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan shall establish between themselves and shall seek to establish in the Pacific area the economic relationships indicated below.

II. THE UNITED STATES–JAPAN RELATIONSHIP

1. The United States and Japan undertake to inaugurate, as rapidly as practicable, measures toward restoring the commercial, financial and other economic relationships between them to a normal basis.

2. The United States and Japan agree to enter into discussions looking toward the negotiation of a reciprocal trade agreement between the two countries.

3. It is understood that during the present international emergency Japan and the United States each shall permit export to the other of commodities for its own use subject to such restrictions or limitations as may be required by each for its own security and self-defense. It is understood that both governments will apply any such restrictions or limitations in the spirit dominating relations with friendly nations.

III. POLICY IN THE PACIFIC AREA

1. Complete control over its economic, financial and monetary affairs shall be restored to China.

2. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan undertake not to seek in China any preferential or monopolistic commercial or other economic rights for themselves or their nationals, but to use all their influence toward securing from China commercial treatment for themselves no less favorable than that accorded to any third country and full cooperation in the promotion of the general policy stated in the first paragraph of this Declaration.

3. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan undertake to suggest to the Chinese Government that it inaugurate, with foreign assistance where necessary, a comprehensive program of economic development, a full opportunity to participate in which shall be accorded the United States and Japan on terms no less favorable than those accorded any third country.

4. The relations which the United States and Japan, respectively, will seek to establish with other countries of the Pacific area shall be governed by the basic principles set forth in this Declaration; and the Governments of the United States and of Japan agree to urge those countries, wherever feasible, to undertake comprehensive programs of economic development with full opportunity to participate in such programs, in so far as foreign assistance may be requested, accorded to the United States and to Japan on terms no less favorable than those accorded any third country.

711.94/2540$\frac{14}{18}$

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] November 17, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador called at the Secretary's office to present Mr. Kurusu in pursuance of an appointment made at the Ambassador's request.

After the Ambassador had presented Mr. Kurusu and appropriate amenities had been exchanged, the Secretary complimented Mr. Kurusu upon the way he had handled his relations with the public since coming to this country. The Secretary then spoke highly of the respect and confidence in which the Secretary and his associates hold the Japanese Ambassador.

The Secretary then went on to say that, from the point of view of the long-swing interests of both Japan and the United States, he felt that there should be no conflict in the real interests of the two countries. He referred then to the short-sighted nationalistic statesmanship that developed in Europe and in the United States after the World War which he said was responsible for the troubles from which the world is now suffering. He expressed the hope that our two countries could pursue a wise, far-sighted statesmanship and in this way do something to contribute to put the world back on peaceful courses. He pointed to the fact that Hitler was holding down one or two hundred million people in Europe at the point of the bayonet and observed that this was a situation we do not like to see perpetuated in this world.

Mr. Kurusu said that there appeared to be an unfortunate impression that in certain quarters in this country the new Prime Minister, being a military man, had an outlook and attitude which was different from that of the previous Prime Minister, but that Kurusu himself had been agreeably surprised when he discussed policies with General Tojo and found him to be sincerely desirous of reaching an agreement with the United States. He said he wished to tell the Secretary off the record that when General Tojo had been commanded to form a cabinet, Tojo had invited Kurusu to take an important position in the cabinet but that Kurusu had declined because he had thought, having read the announcement that the Konoye cabinet had fallen on account of important differences within the cabinet as to methods of executing national policy, that General Tojo intended to discontinue the conversations with the United States. Kurusu said that later on he had discussed with General Tojo the matter of his present mission and he was fully reassured of the General's desire to reach a peaceful settlement with the United States. Kurusu said that in the three important points on which differences have developed in our conversations General Tojo seemed to be optimistic in regard to the prospects of eliminating the differences in respect to nondiscrimination and the relations of the two countries toward the European war, but that the General felt that on account of the difficulty of withdrawing Japanese troops from China in a short time this problem would be one which would present greater difficulties.

The conversation was interrupted at this point owing to the approach of the hour for the President's reception of the Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu.

The Ambassador handed the Secretary two documents which the Ambassador said were the Japanese Government's reply to the points we had raised on (1) Japan's peaceful intentions[57] and (2) on narrowing down the scope of the proposed understanding.[58]

J[OSEPH] W. B[ALLANTINE]

711.94/2540$\frac{14}{35}$

Oral Statement Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State on November 17, 1941

[WASHINGTON,] 17–11–1941.

Reference is made to the oral statement handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador on November 12, 1941 and, under instructions from his Government, the Japanese Ambassador states as follows:—

1. The all [*sic*] points contained in the excerpts which the Secretary of State quoted in the oral statement are embodied in the proposals which the Japanese Government made to the United States Government on the 6th and 25th of September last and the present Japanese Cabinet also has no objection whatever to confirming these points as expressing its general purport. It is, however, to be taken for granted that such confirmation has the successful conclusion of the present negotiations between the Japanese and United States Governments as its prerequisite, and that is, failing by any chance such successful conclusion, the Japanese Government is naturally not to be left bound by its commitment on the points above mentioned.

2. In regard to the phrases quoted in the oral statement as modifying the peaceful intent of the Japanese Government, it is to be explained that the phrases in question were after all for the purpose of expressing one and the same intent and that, in the case of Soviet Russia in particular, a more or less detailed stipulation was made out of considerations of the existing Soviet–Japanese neutrality treaty and its relation to the war between Germany and Soviet Russia.

---

[57] *Infra.*

[58] *Post*, p. 740.

These phrases were used only in order to express the qualification which is due to and necessary for an [*sic*] sovereign state and were not intended to limit or narrow down in any way the peaceful intentions of the Japanese Government.

711.94/2466

Oral Statement Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State on November 17, 1941

[WASHINGTON,] 17–11–1941.

The Japanese Ambassador has been authorized to state that the Japanese Government has no objection whatever to apply the principle of political stabilization to the entire area of the Pacific and that the Japanese Government is willing to eliminate the word "southwestern" from the text of Article VI of its proposal of September 25th.

711.94/2466

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] November 17, 1941.

I accompanied Ambassador Nomura and Ambassador Saburo Kurusu to the White House in order that the latter might be received by the President.

Following several minutes of an exchange of courtesies and formalities, the President brought up the more serious side by referring to the misunderstandings and matters of difference between our countries and made clear the desire of this country, and he accepted the statement of the Japanese Ambassador that it was the desire of Japan equally, to avoid war between our two countries and to bring about a settlement on a fair and peaceful basis so far as the Pacific area was concerned.

Ambassador Kurusu proceeded with one line of remarks that he kept up during the conversation and that was that we must find ways to work out an agreement to avoid trouble between our two countries. He said that all the way across the Pacific it was like a powder keg, and again he repeated that some way must be found to adjust the situation.

Ambassador Kurusu made some specious attempt to explain away the Tripartite Pact. I replied in language similar to that which I used in discussing this matter with Ambassador Nomura on November fifteenth, which need not be repeated here. I made it clear that any kind of a peaceful settlement for the Pacific area, with Japan still clinging to her Tripartite Pact with Germany, would cause the President and myself to be denounced in immeasurable terms and the peace arrangement would not for a moment be taken seriously while all of the countries interested in the Pacific would redouble their efforts to arm against Japanese aggression. I emphasized the point about the Tripartite Pact and self-defense by saying that when Hitler starts on a march of invasion across the earth with ten million soldiers and thirty thousand airplanes with an official announcement that he is out for unlimited invasion objectives, this country from that time was in danger and that danger has grown each week until this minute. The result was that this country with no other motive except self-defense has recognized that danger, and has proceeded thus far to defend itself before it is too late; and that the Government of Japan says that it does not know whether this country is thus acting in self-defense or not. This country feels so profoundly the danger that it has committed itself to ten, twenty-five or fifty billions of dollars in self-defense; but when Japan is asked about whether this is self-defense, she indicates that she has no opinion on the subject—I said that I cannot get this view over to the American people; that they believe Japan must know that we are acting in self-defense and, therefore, they do not understand her present attitude. I said that he was speaking of their political difficulties and that I was thus illustrating some of our difficulties in connection with this country's relations with Japan.

The President remarked that some time ago he proclaimed a zone around this hemisphere, 300 miles out in the sea in some places and 1,100 miles in others. The President added that this was self-defense.

I then said that Ambassador Nomura and I have been proceeding on the view that the people of the United States and Japan alike are a proud and great people and there is no occasion for either to attempt to bluff the other and we would not consider that bluffing enters into our conversations, which are of genuine friendliness.

The President brought out a number of illustrations of our situation and the Japanese situation as it relates to Germany and our self-defense which serve to emphasize our position and to expose the sophistry of the Japanese position.

Ambassador Kurusu said that Germany had not up to this time requested Japan to fight; that she was serving a desirable purpose without doing so,—this must have meant that she was keeping the American and British Navies, aircraft, et cetera, diverted.

The further question of whether the United States is on the defensive in the present Pacific situation came up by some general discussion in reference to that situation by Ambassador Kurusu, and the President and I made it clear that we were not the aggressors in the Pacific but that Japan was the aggressor.

At another point I said that the belief in this country is that the Japanese formula of a new order in greater East Asia is but another name for a program to dominate entirely, politically, economically, socially and otherwise by military force all of the Pacific area; that this would include the high seas, the islands and the continents and would place every other country at the mercy of very arbitrary military rule just as the Hitler program does in Europe and the Japanese in China. The Ambassador made no particular comment.

There was some effort by Ambassador Kurusu to defend their plan of not bringing the troops out of China. Placing the Japanese on the defensive, the President said that the question ought to be worked out in a fair way considering all of the circumstances and relative merits of the matters involved; and that at a suitable stage, while we know that Japan does not wish us to mediate in any way, this Government might, so to speak, introduce Japan and China to each other and tell them to proceed with the remaining or detailed adjustments, the Pacific questions having already been determined.

Ambassador Kurusu strongly stated that it would be most difficult to bring all the troops out of China at once.

Ambassador Kurusu said that we, of course, desired to bring up both sides of matters existing between our two countries and he said that we would recall that when the Japanese went into Shantung during the World War, this Government insisted that she get out. I replied that my own country opposed a policy of this seizure of new territory by any country to the fullest extent of its ability to do so; that it declined to take a dollar of compensation or a foot of territory for itself; that it insisted that the world must turn over a new leaf in this respect or nations would be fighting always for territory and under modern methods of war would soon destroy and utterly impoverish each other; that in any event his country fared well in this respect.

The question of our recent proposal on commercial policy was brought up by us and Ambassador Kurusu said he had not examined it and that he had forgotten much of the technical side of commercial policy since he was in the Foreign Office. The President made very pertinent and timely reference to the destructive nature of armaments and the still more destructive effects of a permanent policy of armaments which always means war, devastation and destruction. He emphasized the point that there is from the long-term point of view no difference of interest between our two countries and no occasion, therefore, for serious differences.

All in all, there was nothing new brought out by the Japanese Ambassador and Ambassador Kurusu. Ambassador Kurusu constantly made the plea that there was no reason why there should be serious differences between the two countries and that ways must be found to solve the present situation. He referred to Prime Minister Tojo as being very desirous of bringing about a peaceful adjustment notwithstanding he is an Army man. The President expressed his interest and satisfaction to hear this. The President frequently parried the remarks of Ambassador Nomura and also of Ambassador Kurusu, especially in regard to the three main points of difference between our two countries. There was no effort to solve these questions at the conference. The meeting broke up with the understanding that I would meet the Japanese representatives tomorrow morning.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

711.94/2447 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

[Substance]

TOKYO, November 17, 1941—8 p. m.
[Received November 17—2:09 p. m.]

1814. The Ambassador, referring to his previous telegram No. 1736 of November 3, 3 p. m., final sentence, emphasizes the need to guard against sudden Japanese naval or military actions in such areas as are not now involved in the Chinese theater of operations. He is taking into account, therefore, the probability of the Japanese exploiting every possible tactical advantage, such as surprise and initiative. He advises his Government accordingly of the importance of not placing the major responsibility in giving prior warning upon the Embassy staff, the naval and military attachés included, since in Japan there is extremely effective control over both primary and secondary military information. The Embassy would not expect to obtain any information in advance either from personal Japanese contacts or through the press; the observation of military movements is not possible by the few Americans remaining in the country, concentrated mostly in three cities (Tokyo, Yokohama, Kobe); and with American and other foreign shipping absent from adjacent waters the Japanese are assured of the ability to send without foreign observation their troop transports in various directions. Japanese troop concentrations were reported recently by American consuls in Manchuria and Formosa, while troop dispositions since last July's general mobilization have, according to all other indications available, been made with a view to enabling the carrying out of new operations on the shortest possible notice either in the Pacific southwest or in Siberia or in both.

The Ambassador expresses the Embassy's full realization that the present most important duty perhaps is to detect any premonitory signs of naval or military operations likely in areas mentioned above and states that every precaution is being taken to guard against surprise. He adds that the Embassy's field of naval or military observation is restricted almost literally to what could be seen with the naked eye, and this is negligible. Therefore, the United States Government is advised, from an abundance of caution, to discount as much as possible the likelihood of the Embassy's ability to give substantial warning.

GREW

711.94/2540 $\frac{18}{36}$

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] November 18, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called on the Secretary, by appointment made at their request, at the Department.

After some preliminary remarks the Secretary took up the question of Japan's relations with the Axis. He pointed out that the public would place their own interpretation upon the implications of a situation wherein on the one hand Japan had an agreement with us and on the other was in an alliance with the Axis powers. He said that our people do not trust Hitler and furthermore we feel that it would be inevitable that Hitler would eventually, if he was successful, get around to the Far East and double-cross Japan. The Secretary cited the instance when Germany, after having concluded an anti-Comintern pact with Japan had surprised Japan later on by entering into a non-aggression pact with Russia and finally went back on the non-aggression pact by attacking Russia. The Secretary said that he presumed Japan did not know in advance what Germany's intentions were any more than we did. The Secretary expressed great doubt that any agreement into which we entered with Japan while Japan at the same time had an alliance with Hitler would carry the confidence of our people and he emphasized that we would have to have a clear-cut agreement making self-evident our peaceful purpose, for otherwise there would be a redoubled effort by all nations to strengthen their armaments. He pointed out that we are coming out of the Philippines in 1946 and that we are now bringing our marines out of China and in this way we are trying to make a contribution to the establishment of a peaceful world based on law and order. He said that this is what we want to work out with Japan; that we had nothing to offer in the way of bargaining except our friendship. Our commercial program was one, he said, calling for a maximum production and distribution of goods. The Secretary pointed out also that we are even now engaged in efforts to induce the British Empire to reduce its Empire preferences. He said that what we desire is to put our people back to work in a way that can never be accomplished through permitting armies to overrun countries. The Secretary observed that many Japanese spokesmen had spoken of Japan's desire to have a controlling influence in Eastern Asia, but the only kind of controlling influence which was worth anything was one that could not be achieved or maintained by the sword. He dwelt briefly upon what we have accomplished in South America through our peaceful policies and through renouncing the employment of gunboats and armed forces. The Secretary made it clear that we recognized that under present emergency conditions we cannot carry out to perfection our commercial policy which must be modified to meet war conditions, but we can at least establish the principles. The Secretary said, going back to the situation with regard to Japan's relations with the Axis, that a difficult situation was created thereby as far as our public was concerned—as, for example, when telegrams of congratulations were sent to Hitler by Japanese leaders when he commits some atrocity.

The Japanese Ambassador observed that the United States and Russia were not pursuing parallel courses and yet we are aligned with Russia at the present time. He also said he appreciated very well the relations we had developed with South America but that, although Japan would like to imitate us, Japan was not in a position to be so magnanimous—as, for example, in the matter of extending substantial lend-lease aid to other countries. . . . The Secretary then added that he frankly did not know whether anything could be done in the matter of reaching a satisfactory agreement with Japan; that we can go so far but rather than go beyond a certain point it would be better for us to stand and take the consequences. The Ambassador then said that Japan is now hard-pressed and that the Secretary was well aware of how desirous Japan was to reach some agreement with the United States.

Mr. Kurusu said that he had served five years as Director of the Commercial Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office and that he was familiar with the developments in Japan's commercial policy. He said that the situation with respect to the Empire preferences was one of the factors which had influenced Japan to go into the Axis camp. He said that the United States was an economically powerful country and that the United States was, therefore, in a much better position than was Japan to enter into commercial bargaining. Furthermore, Japan was much more dependent than was the United States upon foreign trade. He felt that what the two Governments should now do would be to achieve something to tide over the present abnormal situation. He referred, for example, to the exchange control situation which had been developed in Japanese-occupied China and expressed the view that that situation could not be done away with in a short time. He said that perhaps after the war was over it might be possible to adopt a more liberal policy but that he was unable to promise anything on the part of his Government. The Secretary asked whether Japan could not now agree in principle on commercial policy. Mr. Kurusu made no direct reply but went on to say that in the early years of American intercourse in the Far East our main interest was in commerce and not religious and cultural activities; that we had pursued a course of idealism, but with American occupation of the Philippines the situation changed somewhat and the United States tied itself in with the European concert of nations.

Turning to the question of the Tripartite Pact, Mr. Kurusu said that he could not say that Japan would abrogate the Tripartite Pact but that Japan might do something which would "outshine" the Tripartite Pact.

The Secretary pointed out that unless peacefully minded nations now start their program of reconstruction it will be impossible to get such a program started later on because the selfish elements would get control of the situation and prevent the materialization of a liberal policy. Therefore, he said it was necessary to get the fundamental principles established so that we might begin to enable the peaceful forces, which were now demoralized, to assert a leadership. Unless we pursue such a course, the Secretary noted, we shall not be able to obtain the confidence of peacefully minded people when the time for putting into effect a reconstruction program arrives. Mr. Kurusu asked whether the Secretary had a concrete formula for dealing with Japan's relations with the Axis alliance. The Secretary made it clear that this was a matter for Japan to work out. He said that if we could get a peaceful program firmly established, Hitler ought to be asked not to embarrass us too much. He asked whether Japan could not work it out in some way which would be convincing to the American people. He said that if it goes the wrong way every peaceful nation will redouble its defensive efforts. The Secretary emphasized again that the public would be confused in regard to a survival of a relationship between Japan and the Axis while Japan had an agreement with the United States.

The Ambassador asked whether it was not important now to make some understanding to save the situation. The Secretary said he agreed but that he felt that the Tripartite Pact was inconsistent with the establishment of an understanding.

Mr. Kurusu asked what could the Secretary suggest. The Secretary said that if we mix the Tripartite Pact with an agreement with the United States it will not be possible to get many people to follow us. The Secretary said that the question arises whether Japanese statesmen desire to follow entirely peaceful courses with China or whether they desire to face two ways. The Secretary went on to say that if the Japanese should back away from adopting a clear-cut position with regard to commercial policy, with regard to a course in China consistent with peaceful principles and with regard to Japanese relations to the European war this would leave us in an indefensible position in regard to the proposed agreement. We would have to say that the Japanese Government is unable to get its politicians into line.

The Ambassador repeated that the situation in Japan was very pressing and that it was important to arrest a further deterioration of the relations between the two countries. He suggested that if this situation could now be checked an atmosphere would develop when it would be possible to move in the direction of the courses which this Government advocated. He pointed out that big ships cannot turn around too quickly, that they have to be eased around slowly and gradually.

The Secretary replied that if we should sit down and write an agreement permeated with the doctrine of force it would be found that each country would be entirely distrustful and would be piling up armaments, as countries cannot promote peace so long as they are tied in in any way with Hitler.

Mr. Kurusu pointed out that a comprehensive solution cannot be worked out immediately, that he could make no promises. He said that our freezing regulations had caused impatience in Japan and a feeling that Japan had to fight while it still could. If we could come to some settlement now, he said, it would promote an atmosphere which would be conducive to discussing fundamentals. The Secretary asked if he did not think that something could be worked out on the Tripartite Pact. The Ambassador said that he desired to emphasize that Japan would not be a cat's-paw for Germany, that Japan's purpose in entering into the Tripartite alliance was to use it for Japan's own purposes, that Japan entered the Tripartite Pact because Japan felt isolated. The Secretary observed that it would be difficult to get public opinion in this country to understand the situation as Mr. Kurusu had described it.

He then asked what the Ambassador had in mind in regard to the Chinese situation and whether the Japanese stood for no annexations, no indemnities, respect for China's sovereignty, territorial integrity and the principle of equality. The Ambassador replied in the affirmative.

The Secretary then said that while he had made this point already clear to the Ambassador he wished to make it clear also to Mr. Kurusu, that whereas the Japanese Government desired to consider our talks negotiations rather than exploratory conversations, the Secretary felt that without having first reached a real basis for negotiations, he was not in a position to go to the British or the Chinese or the other governments involved, as these governments had a rightful interest in these problems. Mr. Kurusu tried to get the Secretary to specify in just which problems each of the respective governments were interested but the Secretary said that he had not yet, for manifest reasons, discussed these problems with these other governments and anything that he might say would be just an assumption on his part. Mr. Kurusu then said that under such circumstances United States-Japanese relations would be at the mercy of Great Britain and China. The Secretary replied that he believed and must repeat that we must have something substantial in the way of a basis for an agreement to take to these governments for otherwise there would be no point in talking to them. Mr. Kurusu said that the situation was so pressing that it might get beyond our control. The Secretary agreed that that was true but he pointed out that the fact that Japan's leaders keep announcing programs based upon force adds to our difficulties. He said he would like to leave the Hitler situation to the Japanese Government for consideration.

Turning to the China situation the Secretary asked how many soldiers the Japanese wanted to retain in China. The Ambassador replied that possibly 90 per cent would be withdrawn. The Secretary asked how long the Japanese intended to keep that remaining 10 per cent in China. The Ambassador did not reply directly to this but he invited attention to the fact that under the existing Boxer Protocol Japan was permitted to retain troops in the Peiping and Tientsin area. The Secretary pointed out that the question of the Japanese troops in China was one in which there were many elements of trouble. American interests even had suffered severely from the actions of the Japanese forces and we had a long list of such instances. The Secretary made mention of the great patience this Government had exercised in the presence of this situation. He said the situation was one in which the extremists seemed to be looking for trouble and he said that it was up to the Japanese Government to make an extra effort to take the situation by the collar. He said also that the United States and Japan had trusted each other in the past, that the present situation was one of Japan's own making and it was up to the Japanese Government to find some way of getting itself out of the difficulty in which it had placed itself. The Secretary went on to say that the situation was now exceptionally advantageous for Japan to put her factories to work in producing goods which are needed by peaceful countries if only the Japanese people could get war and invasion out of mind. The Ambassador said that our conversations had been protracted and if the American Government could only give the Japanese some hope with regard to the situation it might be helpful. He added that our country was great and strong. The Secretary replied that our Government has not made any threats and he has exercised his influence throughout to deprecate bellicose utterances in this country. He added that the Japanese armed forces in China do not appear to realize whose territory they are in and that the people in this country say that Hitler proposes to take charge of one-half of the world and Japan proposes to take charge of the other half and if they should succeed what would there be left for the United States? Mr. Kurusu suggested that Japan would have to move gradually in China, that one step might lead to another and that what was important now was to do something to enable Japan to change its course. The Secretary asked what was in Mr. Kurusu's mind. In reply to a suggestion that it was felt in Japanese circles that we have been responsible for delay the Secretary pointed out that we could more rightly accuse the Japanese of delays, that he had met with the Japanese Ambassador promptly every time the latter had asked for a meeting and had discussed matters fully with him. The Secretary added that when Japan's movement into Indochina in July took place this had caused an interruption of our conversations and it was then that the Secretary could no longer defend the continued shipments of petroleum products to Japan, especially as for the past year he had been under severe criticism in this country for not having cut off those shipments. Mr. Kurusu asked whether we wanted the *status quo ante* to be restored or what we expected Japan to do. The Secretary replied that if the Japanese could not do anything now on those three points—getting troops out of China, commercial policy and the Tripartite agreement—he could only leave to Japan what Japan could do. The Secretary said that it is our desire to see Japan help furnish a world leadership for a peaceful program and that he felt that Japan's long-swing interests were the same as our interests. The Ambassador said that he realized that our Government was suspicious of the Japanese Government but he wished to assure us that Japan wanted to settle the China affair notwithstanding the fact that Japan desired to keep a few troops in China for the time being. The Secretary then asked again what the Japanese had in mind. Mr. Kurusu said that it was Japan's intention to withdraw Japanese troops from French Indochina as soon as a just Pacific settlement should be reached and he pointed out that the Japanese Government took the Burma Road situation very seriously. The Secretary asked, if there should be a relaxation of freezing, to what extent would that enable Japan to adopt peaceful policies. He explained that what he had in mind was to enable the peaceful leaders in Japan to get control of the situation in Japan and to assert their influence. The Ambassador said that our position was unyielding and that it was Japan's unyielding attitude toward Chiang Kai-shek which had stiffened Chinese resistance against Japan. He asked whether there was any hope of a solution—some small beginning toward the realization of our high ideals. The Secretary replied that if we do not work out an agreement that the public trusts the arming of nations will go on; that the Japanese Government has a responsibility in the matter as it has created the conditions we are trying to deal with. The Ambassador then suggested the possibility of going back to the status which existed before the date in July when, following the Japanese move into southern French Indochina, our freezing measures were put into effect. The Secretary said that if we should make some modifications in our embargo on the strength of a step by Japan such as the Ambassador had mentioned we do not know whether the troops which have been withdrawn from French Indochina will be diverted to some equally objectionable movement elsewhere. The Ambassador said that what he had in mind was simply some move toward arresting the dangerous trend in our relations. The Secretary said that it would be difficult for him to get this Government to go a long way in removing the embargo unless this Government believed that Japan was definitely started on a peaceful course and had renounced purposes of conquest. The Ambassador said that the Japanese were tired of fighting China and that Japan would go as far as it could along a first step. The Secretary said that he would consult with the British and the Dutch to see what their attitude would be toward the suggestion offered by the Japanese Ambassador. In reply to a question by the Secretary the Ambassador replied that the Japanese Government was still studying the questions of commercial policy involved in our proposal of November 15. He said he assumed that what we had in mind was a program for dealing with the situation after the war. The Secretary replied in the affirmative, so far as the full operation of a sound program is concerned, but added that it should now be agreed upon as to principles.

When asked by the Secretary as to when the Ambassador would like to confer with us again the Ambassador said that he would get in touch with his Government and would communicate to the Secretary through Mr. Ballantine.

[Joseph W.] Ballantine

711.94/2540½

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] November 19, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called at their request at the Secretary's apartment. After about fifteen minutes of general conversation the Ambassador said that he and Mr. Kurusu had reported to their Government their conversation of yesterday with the Secretary and were momentarily expecting instructions, and that in fact a telegram had already come in but it had not yet been decoded. They said that they would wish to confer with the Secretary perhaps tomorrow, but would at least expect to communicate with him tomorrow in regard to a further appointment. They expressed satisfaction with what the Secretary had said to the press in regard to yesterday's conversation and the Secretary remarked that the press seemed to be satisfied.

The Secretary then asked how the Ambassador felt about the possibilities. The Ambassador said that yesterday he had made the suggestion in regard to a restoration of the status which prevailed before the Japanese move into south Indochina in the latter part of July because he felt that, as this action had precipitated our freezing measures which in turn had reacted in Japan to increase the tension, if something could be done on his suggestion, it would serve to relieve that tension and tend to create a better atmosphere in our relations. The Secretary asked whether the Ambassador contemplated that if a proposal such as the Ambassador had suggested were carried out we would go on with the conversations. The Ambassador replied in the affirmative. The Secretary expressed the view that this might enable the leaders in Japan to hold their ground and organize public opinion in favor of a peaceful course. He said that he recognized that this might take some time.

The Ambassador said that what was in his mind was that both sides now appeared to be preparing for eventualities and that nevertheless the Japanese desired a quick settlement, especially in view of our freezing measures. The Secretary said that he presumed that the Ambassador had in mind, in connection with the continuation of our conversations, further efforts to iron out the important points on which our views had not so far diverged. The Ambassador agreed. He observed, however, that the views of the Japanese Government with regard to the Tripartite Pact had been fully expressed by the Japanese Government; that is to say, that their intentions to maintain peace in the Pacific were already made clear in their draft statement of September 25, but that they could not abrogate the Tripartite Alliance and were bound to carry out their obligations. The Secretary suggested that one way in which the Japanese could be helpful would be to let the Russian forces in the Far East and the British forces at Singapore go back to Europe. The Secretary said that his suggestion was by way of illustration how much Japan was hindering us. The Secretary added that if Hitler were helping the world the situation would be different, but the fact was that he was injuring all of us.

The conversation then turned for a few minutes to the situation in Russia and Germany's prospects. The Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu expressed the view that there seemed to be no likelihood of an early Russian defeat or of a collapse of Stalin's regime. The Ambassador said that he had been much surprised at the strength Stalin had shown in holding his government together and he also spoke with admiration of the stubbornness of Russian defense. The Ambassador also expressed the view that he saw no prospect of Germany's being able in the future to launch a successful invasion of England. The Secretary asked, if Germany could not conquer Stalin, could not invade England, and was faced with the hostility of the many millions in Europe which were being held in subjection by Germany, what would be the outcome for Germany. The Ambassador expressed no clear-cut views on this point. The Secretary suggested that if the Japanese Government could prevail over the views of the Japanese war party it should be possible to work out something with us. The Ambassador made a further reference to Japan's being bound by the Tripartite Pact, whereupon the Secretary asked whether Japan was not equally bound by the neutrality pact with Russia. The Ambassador replied that if Japan was faithful to the Tripartite Pact it must be equally faithful to the neutrality pact as they were both equally binding. The Ambassador dwelt at some length upon the point that Japan was getting nothing out of the Tripartite Pact except American resentment. Mr. Kurusu then expressed the view that although he did not see any prospect of another Brest-Litovsk[59] in the Russo-German situation, Japan would be very apprehensive of such a development as it would mean a combined Russo-German advance on the Far East.

The Secretary referred to the need of looking forward to the time for rebuilding the world and said that, if the Japanese militant leaders keep control of Japanese policy, they would deprive us of a chance of stabilizing the world and laying down a progressive program. The Ambassador said that the United States was likely at the end of the war to be in a position of overwhelming strength, but he intimated that we might impair our strength if we sent forces to Africa. There then ensued some discussion of Hitler's efforts to gain control of the seas and the Secretary emphasized that this country is determined to keep Hitler from getting control of the seas no matter how long it took us.

---

[59] Treaty of peace between Germany and Soviet Russia, March 3, 1918, *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. I, p. 442.

He expressed the view that if Hitler had striven only for limited objectives he might have had a better chance for success than he now has because of his unlimited program of conquest. The Secretary said that if the Japanese could tell Hitler to be reasonable—Mr. Kurusu interrupted at this point and said that he thought that Hitler would be willing to enter into peace negotiations. The Secretary replied that he was speaking figuratively; that what he meant was abandonment entirely by Hitler of his program of conquest. The Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu then rose to take leave and as they did so the Secretary emphasized again that all we can do is to stand firm on our basic principles.

J[OSEPH] W. B[ALLANTINE]

711.94/2540 11/12

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] November 20, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called at their request at the Department. Mr. Kurusu said that they had referred to their Government the suggestion which the Ambassador had made at a previous meeting in regard to a return to the status which prevailed prior to the Japanese move into south Indochina last July, and said that they had anticipated that the Japanese Government might perceive difficulty in moving troops out of Indochina in short order, but that nevertheless the Japanese Government was now prepared to offer a proposal on that basis. He said, however, that the proposal represented an amplification of the Ambassador's suggestion. He then read the proposal to the Secretary which was as follows:

[Here follows text of the proposal printed *infra.*]

The Secretary said that he would later examine the proposal, and that he would give sympathetic study to the proposal speaking generally, but that the comments which he was about to make were not directed specifically to the proposal but to the general situation. The Secretary said that Japan had it in its power at any moment to put an end to the present situation by deciding upon an all-out peaceful course; that at any moment Japan could bring to an end what Japan chose to call encirclement. He said that we want to have Japan develop public opinion in favor of a peaceful course. Mr. Kurusu said that if we could alleviate the situation by adopting a proposal such as the Japanese Government had just made it would help develop public opinion. The Ambassador said that the Japanese Government was clearly desirous of peace and that it was trying to show this peaceful purpose by relieving the pressure on Thailand which adoption of the proposal would accomplish.

The Secretary asked what the Ambassador thought would be the public reaction in this country if we were to announce tomorrow that we had decided to discontinue aid to Great Britain. He said that in the minds of the American people the purposes underlying our aid to China were the same as the purposes underlying aid to Great Britain; that the American people believed that there was a partnership between Hitler and Japan aimed at enabling Hitler to take charge of one-half of the world and Japan of the other half; and that the fact of the Tripartite Alliance and the continual harping by Japanese leaders upon slogans of the Nazi type such as "new order in East Asia" and "co-prosperity sphere" served to strengthen the public in their belief. What was therefore needed, the Secretary pointed out, was the manifestation by Japan of a clear purpose to pursue peaceful courses.

The Ambassador replied that there was no doubt of Japan's desire for peace, as this was clear from the eagerness of the Japanese Government to reach a settlement of the China affair—and indeed adoption of the Japanese Government's proposal that he had just presented was designed to bring about speedy settlement of the China affair. He said that the Japanese people after four years of fighting were jaded and that the slogans to which the Secretary had made reference were intended to encourage the Japanese people to push on to victory.

The Secretary said that we of course are anxious to help work this matter out for if we should get into trouble everybody was likely to get hurt.

Mr. Kurusu said that if we could go ahead with the present proposal the Japanese idea would be that we could go on working at fundamentals. He said that Japan has never pledged itself to a policy of expansion. The Secretary observed that the Chinese might have an answer to that point. The Secretary said that our people desired to avoid a repetition in east Asia of what Hitler was doing in Europe; that our people oppose the idea of a "new order" under military control. He said also that the public in this country thinks that Japan is chained to Hitler. Mr. Kurusu asked how Japan could eradicate such a belief as Japan could not abrogate the Tripartite Pact. The Secretary said that he did not want to be disagreeable, but he felt he must observe that Japan did not talk that way about the Nine Power Treaty.[60] Mr. Kurusu said something about the Nine Power Treaty being twenty years old and being outmoded. The Secretary said that of course he did not wish to argue the matter. He said that when the Japanese complained about our helping China the public in this country wonders what is underneath the Comintern Pact. He emphasized that Japan is doing this country tremendous injury in the Pacific;

---

[60] *Foreign Relations*, 1922, vol. I, p. 276.

that Japanese statesmen ought to understand that we are helping China for the same reason that we are helping Britain; that we are afraid of the military elements led by Hitler. He added that the methods adopted by the Japanese military leaders in China were not unlike Hitler's methods. The Ambassador asked how we could save the situation at this juncture. The Secretary replied that he agreed upon the urgent importance of saving it, but he asked whether the Ambassador thought that the Japanese statesmen could tone down the situation in Japan. Mr. Kurusu said, with reference to the fifth point in the Japanese proposal, that he did not know whether his Government would agree but he thought that that point might be interpreted to mean that American aid to China would be discontinued as from the time that negotiations were started. The Secretary made no comment on that point but noted that in the last few days there had been marked subsidence in warlike utterances emanating from Tokyo, and he felt that it was indeed a great tribute to the Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu that so much had been accomplished in this direction within a short space of two days as he felt sure that it was their efforts which had brought this about. He said that if so much had been accomplished within the course of two days, much more could be accomplished in the course of a longer period.

No time was set for the next meeting.

J[OSEPH] W. B[ALLANTINE]

711.94/2540$\frac{22}{26}$

Draft Proposal Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State on November 20, 1941

1. Both the Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to make any armed advancement into any of the regions in the South-eastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area excepting the part of French Indo-China where the Japanese troops are stationed at present.

2. The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw its troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area.

In the meantime the Government of Japan declares that it is prepared to remove its troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of the present arrangement which shall later be embodied in the final agreement.

3. The Government of Japan and the United States shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition of those goods and commodities which the two countries need in Netherlands East Indies.

4. The Governments of Japan and the United States mutually undertake to restore their commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of the assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan a required quantity of oil.

5. The Government of the United States undertakes to refrain from such measures and actions as will be prejudicial to the endeavors for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

711.94/2474

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[Washington,] November 21, 1941.

Ambassador Kurusu called at my hotel apartment at his request. He had no business to take up with me except to refer to the Japanese interpretation of the Tripartite Pact and handed me a draft of a paper which he proposed to sign by way of attempted clarification. I looked at the paper and then asked Mr. Kurusu whether he had anything more on the whole subject of a peaceful settlement to offer. He replied that he did not. I said that I did not think this would be of any particular help and so dismissed it. This was virtually all that was said of importance.

C[ordell] H[ull]

[Annex]

Draft Letter Handed by Mr. Saburo Kurusu to the Secretary of State on November 21, 1941 [61]

Washington, November 20, 1941.

Mr. Secretary: Through several conversation[s] I have had the honor of holding with Your Excellency, I was rather surprised to learn that a deep-seated misconception prevails among your people about the obligation which Japan assumed under the Tripartite Pact.

As Your Excellency is fully aware I am the one who signed the said treaty under the instructions of my Government; and I am very happy to make the following statement which I trust will serve to eradicate the aforesaid false impression:

It goes without saying that this treaty can not and does not infringe, in any way, upon the sovereign right of Japan as an independent state.

---

[61] Filed separately under file No. 762.9411/323.

Besides, as Article III of the Pact stands, Japan is in a position to interpret its obligation freely and independently and is not to be bound by the interpretation which the other high contracting parties may make of it. I should like to add that my Government is not obligated by the aforementioned treaty or any other international engagement to become a collaborator or cooperator in any aggression whatever by any third Power or Powers.

My Government would never project the people of Japan into war at the behest of any foreign Power; it will accept warfare only as the ultimate, inescapable necessity for the maintenance of its security and the preservation of national life against active injustice.

I hope that the above statement will assist you in removing entirely the popular suspicion which Your Excellency has repeatedly referred to. I have to add that, when a complete Understanding is reached between us, Your Excellency may feel perfectly free to publish the present communication.

I have [etc.]

711.94/2540 $\frac{27}{35}$

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] November 22, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called at the Secretary's apartment by appointment made at the request of the Ambassador. The Secretary said that he had called in the representatives of certain other governments concerned in the Pacific area and that there had been a discussion of the question of whether things (meaning Japanese peaceful pledges, et cetera) could be developed in such a way that there could be a relaxation to some extent of freezing. The Secretary said that these representatives were interested in the suggestion and there was a general feeling that the matter could all be settled if the Japanese could give us some satisfactory evidences that their intentions were peaceful.

The Secretary said that in discussing the situation with the representatives of these other countries he found that there had arisen in their minds the same kind of misgivings that had troubled him in the course of the conversations with the Japanese Ambassador. He referred to the position in which the Japanese Government had left the Ambassador and the Secretary as they were talking of peace when it made its move last July into Indochina. He referred also to the mounting oil purchases by Japan last Spring when the conversations were in progress, to the fact that he had endured public criticism for permitting those shipments because he did not wish to prejudice a successful outcome to the conversations and to the fact that that oil was not used for normal civilian consumption.

The Secretary went on to say that the Japanese press which is adopting a threatening tone gives him no encouragement and that no Japanese statesmen are talking about a peaceful course, whereas in the American press advocacy of a peaceful course can always get a hearing. He asked why was there not some Japanese statesman backing the two Ambassadors by preaching peace. The Secretary pointed out that if the United States and other countries should see Japan coming along a peaceful course there would be no question about Japan's obtaining all the materials she desired; that the Japanese Government knows that.

The Secretary said that while no decisions were reached today in regard to the Japanese proposals he felt that we would consider helping Japan out on oil for civilian requirements only as soon as the Japanese Government could assert control of the situation in Japan as it relates to the policy of force and conquest. He said that if the Ambassador could give him any further assurances in regard to Japan's peaceful intentions it would help the Secretary in talking with senators and other persons in this country.

Mr. Kurusu said it was unfortunate that there had been a special session of the Diet at this time, as the efforts of the Government to obtain public support had brought out in sharp relief the abnormal state of the present temper of the Japanese people who had been affected by four years of war and by our freezing measures.

The Secretary asked to what extent in the Ambassador's opinion did the firebrand attitude prevail in the Japanese army. Mr. Kurusu said that it took a great deal of persuasion to induce the army to abandon a position once taken, but that both he and the Ambassador had been pleasantly surprised when the Japanese army acceded to their suggestion in regard to offering to withdraw the Japanese troops from southern Indochina. He said he thought this was an encouraging sign, but that nevertheless the situation was approaching an explosive point.

The Secretary asked whether it was not possible for a Japanese statesman now to come out and say that Japan wanted peace; that while there was much confusion in the world because of the war situation Japan would like to have a peace which she did not have to fight for to obtain and maintain; that the United States says it stands for such ideas; and that Japan might well ask the United States for a show-down on this question.

The Ambassador said he did not have the slightest doubt that Japan desired peace. He then cited the popular agitation in Japan following the conclusion of the peace settlement with Russia in 1905, as pointing to a difficulty in the way of publicly backing a conciliatory course.

The Secretary asked whether there was any way to get Japanese statesmen to approach the question before us with real appreciation of the situation with which we are dealing including the question of finding a way to encourage the governments of other powers concerned in the Pacific area to reach some trade arrangement with Japan. He pointed out that Japan's Indochina move, if repeated, would further give a spurt to arming and thus undo all the work that he and the Ambassador had done. He suggested that if the United States and the other countries should supply Japan with goods in moderate amounts at the beginning those countries would be inclined to satisfy Japan more fully later on if and as Japan found ways in actual practice of demonstrating its peaceful intentions. He said that one move on Japan's part might kill dead our peace effort, whereas it would be easy to persuade the other countries to relax their export restrictions if Japan would be satisfied with gradual relaxation.

Mr. Kurusu said that at best it would take some time to get trade moving. The Secretary replied that he understood this but that it would be difficult to get other countries to understand until Japan could convince those countries that it was committed to peaceful ways. Mr. Kurusu said that some immediate relief was necessary and that if the patient needed a thousand dollars to effect a cure an offer of three hundred dollars would not accomplish the purpose. The Secretary commented that if the Japanese Government was as weak as to need all that had been asked for, nothing was likely to save it.

Mr. Kurusu said that Japan's offer to withdraw its forces from southern Indochina would set a reverse movement in motion.

The Secretary said that the Japanese were not helping as they should help in the present situation in which they had got themselves but were expecting us to do the whole thing.

Mr. Kurusu asked what was the idea of the American Government.

The Secretary replied that although the Japanese proposal was addressed to the American Government he had thought it advisable to see whether the other countries would contribute and he found that they would like to move gradually. The effect of an arrangement between these countries and Japan would be electrifying by showing that Japan had committed herself to go along a peaceful course.

Mr. Kurusu asked what Japan could do. The Secretary replied that if, for example, he should say that he agreed to enter into a peaceful settlement provided that there should be occasional exceptions and qualifications he could not expect to find peaceful-minded nations interested.

The Secretary then asked whether his understanding was correct that the Japanese proposal was intended as a temporary step to help organize public opinion in Japan and that it was intended to continue the conversations looking to the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement. Mr. Kurusu said yes.

Mr. Kurusu asked whether the Secretary had any further suggestions. The Secretary replied that he did not have in mind any suggestions and that he did not know what amounts of exports the various countries would be disposed to release to Japan. He said that Japan made the situation very difficult, for if Japan left her forces in Indochina, whether in the north, east, south or west, she would be able to move them over night, and that therefore this would not relieve the apprehensions of neighboring countries. The British, for example, would not be able to move one warship away from Singapore.

The Ambassador argued that it would take many days to move troops from northern Indochina to southern Indochina, and he stated that the Japanese desired the troops in northern Indochina in order to bring about a settlement with China. He said that after the settlement of the China affair Japan promised to bring the troops out of Indochina altogether.

The Secretary emphasized again that he could not consider this, that also uneasiness would prevail as long as the troops remained in Indochina, and commented that Japan wanted the United States to do all the pushing toward bringing about a peaceful settlement; that they should get out of Indochina.

Mr. Kurusu observed that the Japanese Foreign Minister had told Ambassador Grew that we seemed to expect that all the concessions should be made by the Japanese side.

The Secretary rejoined that Mr. Kurusu had overlooked the fact that in July the Japanese had gone into Indochina. He added that the United States had remained from the first in the middle of the road, that it was the Japanese who had strayed away from the course of law and order, and that they should not have to be paid to come back to a lawful course.

Mr. Kurusu said that this country's denunciation of the commercial treaty had caused Japan to be placed in a tight corner.

The Secretary observed that Japan had cornered herself; that we had been preaching for the last nine years that militarism was sapping everybody and that if the world were to be plunged into another war there would not be much left of the people anywhere. He said that in 1934 he had told Ambassador Saito that Japan was planning an overlordship in East Asia. The Secretary added that he had tried to persuade Hitler that participation by him in a peaceful course would assure him of what he needed. The Secretary said it was a pity that Japan could not do just a few small peaceful things to help tide over the situation.

Mr. Kurusu asked what the Secretary meant. The Secretary replied that the major portion of our fleet was being kept in the Pacific and yet Japan asked us not to help China. He said we must continue to aid China. He said it was little enough that we were actually doing to help China. The Ambassador commented that our moral influence was enabling Chiang to hold out.

The Secretary said that a peaceful movement could be started in thirty or forty days by moving gradually, and yet Japan pushed everything it wanted all at once into its proposal. The Ambassador explained that Japan needed a quick settlement and that its psychological value would be great.

The Secretary said that he was discouraged, that he felt that he had rendered a real contribution when he had called in the representatives of the other countries, but that he could only go a certain distance. He said he thought nevertheless that if this matter should move in the right way peace would become infectious. He pointed also to the danger arising from blocking progress by injecting the China matter in the proposal, as the carrying out of such a point in the Japanese proposal would effectually prevent the United States from ever successfully extending its good offices in a peace settlement between Japan and China. He said this could not be considered now.

There then ensued some further but inconclusive discussion of the troop situation in Indochina, the Secretary still standing for withdrawal, after which the Ambassador reverted to the desire of the Japanese Government to reach a quick settlement and asked whether we could not say what points in the Japanese proposal we would accept and what points we desired to have modified.

The Secretary emphasized that there was no way in which he could carry the whole burden and suggested that it would be helpful if the Japanese Government could spend a little time preaching peace. He said that if the Japanese could not wait until Monday[62] before having his answer there was nothing he could do about it as he was obliged to confer again with the representatives of the other governments concerned after they had had an opportunity to consult with their governments. He repeated that we were doing our best, but emphasized that unless the Japanese were able to do a little there was no use in talking.

The Ambassador disclaimed any desire to press the Secretary too hard for an answer, agreed that the Secretary had always been most considerate in meeting with the Ambassador whenever an appointment had been requested, and said that the Japanese would be quite ready to wait until Monday.

The Secretary said he had in mind taking up with the Ambassador sometime a general and comprehensive program which we had been engaged in developing and which involved collaboration of other countries.

---

[62] November 24, 1941.

The Ambassador said that the Japanese had in mind negotiating a bilateral agreement with us to which other powers could subsequently give their adherence.

J[OSEPH] W. B[ALLANTINE]

711.94/2470 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

[Substance]

TOKYO, November 24, 1941—8 p. m.
[Received 8:47 p. m.[63]]

1839. The Ambassador reports for Secretary Hull and Under Secretary Welles concerning his call on Foreign Minister Togo this afternoon at the request of the latter as follows:

(1) The Foreign Minister asked the Ambassador if he was familiar with the Japanese proposal which was presented on November 20 to the Department and if he was informed of the conversation in substance on November 22 when the proposal was discussed during a call on the Secretary of State by the Japanese Ambassador and Saburo Kurusu. In reply the Ambassador stated that the Japanese proposal had been reported to him, though not the conversation of November 22 as yet. Togo then informed the Ambassador that Secretary Hull had said he had been consulting with the representatives of other interested Governments and the item respecting withdrawal from Southern Indochina of Japanese troops was not satisfactory. Togo continued that Japan made the offer out of sincere solicitude to maintain peace in the Pacific and from anxiety for a way to be found out of the existing difficult situation. Togo said Japan could not withdraw its forces at this time from Northern Indochina because they were despatched there to hasten the China affair's conclusion. The Minister recalled that the United States and Great Britain had instituted the freezing orders because the stationing in Southern Indochina of Japanese troops was looked upon as a threat to British and American security. He remarked that withdrawing Japanese troops to Northern Indochina evidences Japanese desire for the promotion of a successful conclusion of what he called "negotiations" with the United States. Togo said the withdrawal of Japanese troops at present stationed in French Indochina to the northern part is in any event the maximum concession Japan can make.

(2) The Minister proceeded to comment that one of the serious obstacles to concluding the present negotiations successfully is undeniably the divergence of views of the United States and Japan

---

[63] Telegram in two sections.

regarding settlement of the China affair. Togo recalled President Roosevelt's query sometime ago of the Japanese Ambassador as to what Japan's attitude would be should General Chiang Kai-shek issue a statement of desire to restore peace with Japan, whereupon the Japanese Government answered that it would be glad for the United States to act as an "introducer" to open the way for direct Japanese-Chinese negotiations. Minister Togo then said if Chiang Kai-shek made a statement as suggested, the Japanese Government's response would be a statement in similar vein. Japan would be ready thereupon at once to enter into negotiations with China, with the understanding that then the United States would refrain from action prejudicial to restoring peace between China and Japan. Togo stated his inability to appreciate the reasons given by the Secretary of State for not accepting the recent Japanese proposal. Remembering Japan's sacrifices to date, Togo declared it is not possible successfully to conclude the negotiations without reaching an understanding regarding the cessation by the United States of activities which obstruct a restoration of peace. At this point the Ambassador interrupted the Foreign Minister to say it was not clear to him at what point Japan expects such American activities to cease. Togo replied that he would like President Roosevelt's suggestion to become a reality. The Foreign Minister wished it to be made clear that Japan expects the cessation of the activities to which he referred as soon as China and Japan begin negotiations, which would occur immediately after General Chiang Kai-shek makes the statement outlined above and after an affirmative response thereto by Japan. Togo said he was unfamiliar with military matters, but it appeared to him that normally hostilities would cease as soon as negotiations were started looking to peace being restored, thereby logically bringing about a situation when it would be unnecessary to have American action which is calculated to aid Chinese military forces.

(3) Togo informed the Ambassador that he was the one who formulated and became responsible for the Japanese proposal presented on November 20 to the United States Government. This proposal was presented as a manifestation of Japan's desire for cooperation with the American policy of peace. Togo assured the Ambassador that the same cooperative spirit is to prompt Japan's future policy, which is to be conducted with growing clarity in pursuit of peaceful aims.

(4) The Ambassador reports that the only statement he made to the Foreign Minister was to assure him that his observations would be promptly transmitted to the United States Government.

(5) By way of comment, the Ambassador offers the suggestion that, in case the Japanese Government does not expect suspension of United States aid to China prior to the commencement of Chinese-

Japanese peace negotiations, point 4 in the Japanese proposal (i. e., non-interference by the United States in the efforts of Japan to settle the China affair) would appear to be largely to save face.

GREW

711.94/2504

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] November 26, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called by appointment at the Department. The Secretary handed each of the Japanese copies of an outline of a proposed basis of an agreement between the United States and Japan[64] and an explanatory oral statement.[65]

After the Japanese had read the documents, Mr. Kurusu asked whether this was our reply to their proposal for a *modus vivendi.* The Secretary replied that we had to treat the proposal as we did, as there was so much turmoil and confusion among the public both in the United States and in Japan. He reminded the Japanese that in the United States we have a political situation to deal with just as does the Japanese Government, and he referred to the fire-eating statements which have been recently coming out of Tokyo, which he said had been causing a natural reaction among the public in this country. He said that our proposed agreement would render possible practical measures of financial cooperation, which, however, were not referred to in the outline for fear that this might give rise to misunderstanding. He also referred to the fact that he had earlier in the conversations acquainted the Ambassador of the ambition that had been his of settling the immigration question but that the situation had so far prevented him from realizing that ambition.

Mr. Kurusu offered various depreciatory comments in regard to the proposed agreement. He noted that in our statement of principles there was a reiteration of the Stimson doctrine.[66] He objected to the proposal for multilateral non-aggression pacts and referred to Japan's bitter experience of international organizations, citing the case of the award against Japan by the Hague tribunal in the Perpetual Leases matter.[67] He went on to say that the Washington Conference Treaties had given a wrong idea to China, that China had taken advantage of them to flaunt Japan's rights. He said he did not see how his Government could consider paragraphs (3) and (4) of the proposed agreement and that if the United States should expect that Japan was to take off its hat to Chiang Kai-shek and propose to recognize him Japan could not agree. He said that if this was the idea of the American Government he did not see how any agreement was possible.

---

[64] *Post,* p. 768.

[65] *Infra.*

[66] See telegram No. 7, January 7, 1932, noon, to the Ambassador in Japan, vol. I, p. 76.

[67] See *Foreign Relations,* 1905, p. 692.

The Secretary asked whether this matter could not be worked out.

Mr. Kurusu said that when they reported our answer to their Government it would be likely to throw up its hands. He noted that this was a tentative proposal without commitment, and suggested that it might be better if they did not refer it to their Government before discussing its contents further informally here.

The Secretary suggested that they might wish to study the documents carefully before discussing them further. He repeated that we were trying to do our best to keep the public from becoming uneasy as a result of their being harangued. He explained that in the light of all that has been said in the press, our proposal was as far as we would go at this time in reference to the Japanese proposal; that there was so much confusion among the public that it was necessary to bring about some clarification; that we have reached a stage when the public has lost its perspective and that it was therefore necessary to draw up a document which would present a complete picture of our position by making provision for each essential point involved.

The Secretary then referred to the oil question. He said that public feeling was so acute on that question that he might almost be lynched if he permitted oil to go freely to Japan. He pointed out that if Japan should fill Indochina with troops our people would not know what lies ahead in the way of a menace to the countries to the south and west. He reminded the Japanese that they did not know what tremendous injury they were doing to us by keeping immobilized so many forces in countries neighboring Indochina. He explained that we are primarily out for our permanent futures, and the question of Japanese troops in Indochina affects our direct interests.

Mr. Kurusu reverted to the difficulty of Japan's renouncing its support of Wang Ching-wei. The Secretary pointed out that Chiang Kai-shek had made an outstanding contribution in bringing out national spirit in China and expressed the view that the Nanking regime had not asserted itself in a way that would impress the world. Mr. Kurusu agreed with what the Secretary had said about Chiang, but observed that the question of the standing of the Nanking regime was a matter of opinion. His arguments on this as well as on various other points were specious, and unconvincing.

The Ambassador took the occasion to observe that sometimes statesmen of firm conviction fail to get sympathizers among the public;

that only wise men could see far ahead and sometimes suffered martyrdom; but that life's span was short and one could only do his duty. The Ambassador then asked whether there was no other possibility and whether they could not see the President.

The Secretary replied that he had no doubt that the President would be glad to see them at any time.

Mr. Kurusu said that he felt that our response to their proposal could be interpreted as tantamount to meaning the end, and asked whether we were not interested in a *modus vivendi*.

The Secretary replied that we had explored that. Mr. Kurusu asked whether it was because the other powers would not agree; but the Secretary replied simply that he had done his best in the way of exploration.

The Ambassador when rising to go raised the question of publicity. The Secretary replied that he had it in mind to give the press something of the situation tomorrow, and asked what the Ambassador thought. The Ambassador said that they did not wish to question the Secretary's right to give out what he desired in regard to the American proposal. The Ambassador said he would like to have Mr. Wakasugi call on Mr. Ballantine on Thursday to discuss further details.

[JOSEPH W.] BALLANTINE

711.94/2504

Oral Statement Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on November 26, 1941

WASHINGTON, November 26, 1941.

The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a settlement if possible of questions relating to the entire Pacific area based upon the principles of peace, law and order and fair dealing among nations. These principles include the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in reference to the general principles which constitute the basis of a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Recently the

Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Government is desirous of continuing the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; that it would be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the conversations if a temporary *modus vivendi* could be agreed upon to be in effect while the conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific were continuing. On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary of State proposals in regard to temporary measures to be taken respectively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to accomplish the purposes above indicated.

The Government of the United States most earnestly desires to contribute to the promotion and maintenance of peace and stability in the Pacific area, and to afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of peace throughout the Pacific area. The proposals which were presented by the Japanese Ambassador on November 20 contain some features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under consideration and to which each Government has declared that it is committed. The Government of the United States believes that the adoption of such proposals would not be likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives of ensuring peace under law, order and justice in the Pacific area, and it suggests that further effort be made to resolve our divergences of views in regard to the practical application of the fundamental principles already mentioned.

With this object in view the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a program which this Government envisages as something to be worked out during our further conversations.

The plan therein suggested represents an effort to bridge the gap between our draft of June 21, 1941 and the Japanese draft of September 25 by making a new approach to the essential problems underlying a comprehensive Pacific settlement. This plan contains provisions dealing with the practical application of the fundamental principles which we have agreed in our conversations constitute the only sound basis for worthwhile international relations. We hope that in this way progress toward reaching a meeting of minds between our two Governments may be expedited.

711.94/2504

Document Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on November 26, 1941

Strictly Confidential,
Tentative and Without
Commitment.

WASHINGTON, November 26, 1941.

OUTLINE OF PROPOSED BASIS FOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

SECTION I

Draft Mutual Declaration of Policy

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial designs in that area, that they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using military force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations with each other and with all other governments are based:

(1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.
(2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
(3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.
(4) The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:

(1) The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.
(2) The principle of international economic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.
(3) The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies.
(4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.

(5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries.

SECTION II

Steps To Be Taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows:

1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.

2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherland and Thai Governments an agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indochina.

3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indochina.

4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support—militarily, politically, economically—any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.

5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

6. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both

countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.

7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan.

8. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.

9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement.

711.94/2507

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] November 27, 1941.

The two Japanese Ambassadors called at their request. The President opened the conversation with some reference to German international psychology. Ambassador Nomura then said that they were disappointed about the failure of any agreement regarding a *modus vivendi.* The President proceeded to express the grateful appreciation of himself and of this Government to the peace element in Japan which has worked hard in support of the movement to establish a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area. He made it clear that we were not overlooking for a moment what that element has done and is ready still to do. The President added that in the United States most people want a peaceful solution of all matters in the Pacific area. He said that he does not give up yet although the situation is serious and that fact should be recognized. He then referred to the conversations since April which have been carried on here with the Japanese Ambassador in an attempt to deal with the difficulties. The President added that some of these difficulties at times have the effect of a cold bath on the United States Government and people, such as the recent occupation of Indochina by the Japanese and recent movements and utterances of the Japanese slanting wholly in the direction of conquest by force and ignoring the whole question of a peaceful settlement and the principles underlying it. The President then made the following points:

(1) We have been very much disappointed that during the course of these very important conversations Japanese leaders have continued to express opposition to the fundamental principles of peace and order which constitute the central spirit of the conversations which we have been carrying on. This attitude on the part of Japanese leaders has naturally created an atmosphere both in this country and abroad which has added greatly to the difficulty of making mutually satisfactory progress in the conversations.

(2) We have been very patient in our dealing with the whole Far Eastern situation. We are prepared to continue to be patient if Japan's courses of action permit continuance of such an attitude on our part. We still have hope that there may be worked out a peaceful settlement in the entire Pacific area of the character we have been discussing. The temper of public opinion in this country has become of such a character and the big issues at stake in the world today have become so sharply outlined that this country cannot bring about any substantial relaxation in its economic restrictions unless Japan gives this country some clear manifestation of peaceful intent. If that occurs, we can also take some steps of a concrete character designed to improve the general situation.

(3) We remain convinced that Japan's own best interests will not be served by following Hitlerism and courses of aggression, and that Japan's own best interests lie along the courses which we have outlined in the current conversations. If, however, Japan should unfortunately decide to follow Hitlerism and courses of aggression, we are convinced beyond any shadow of doubt that Japan will be the ultimate loser.

The President emphasized that the leaders in Japan had obstructed this whole movement involved in the conversations here. He said that having been in war for four years the Japanese people need to have a peace tempo; that war does not help us nor would it help Japan.

Ambassador Kurusu proceeded to say that he had been here for ten days in an endeavor to discuss and develop a peaceful arrangement; that the trouble was not with the fundamentals so much as with their application. Referring to a recent remark of the President about introducing Japan and China, Kurusu asked to know who would request the President to introduce these two governments. The President promptly replied "both sides". He then gave an illustration of his dealing with some strike conditions when neither side desired to request the Mediation Board to bring up the matter but were anxious, without saying so, for the President to do so. I referred to the 250,000 carpetbaggers that had gone into north China following the army and said that they had seized other peoples' rights and properties and located there as the carpetbaggers had done in the south after the Civil War and added that they had no rights over there and ought to give up the property they took from other people and get out.

The President, referring to the efforts of Japan to colonize countries that they conquer, said that Germany would completely fail because she did not have enough top people to govern the fifteen or more conquered countries in Europe and that this would cause Germany to fail in her present movements; that second class people cannot run fifteen captured countries.

The President further referred to the matter of encirclement that Japan has been alleging. He pointed out that the Philippines were being encircled by Japan so far as that is concerned.

I made it clear that unless the opposition to the peace element in control of the Government should make up its mind definitely to act and talk and move in a peaceful direction, no conversations could or would get anywhere as has been so clearly demonstrated; that everyone knows that the Japanese slogans of co-prosperity, new order in East Asia and a controlling influence in certain areas, are all terms to express in a camouflaged manner the policy of force and conquest by Japan and the domination by military agencies of the political, economic, social and moral affairs of each of the populations conquered; and that so long as they move in that direction and continue to increase their cultural relations, military and otherwise with Hitler through such instruments as the Anti-Comintern Pact and the Tripartite Pact, et cetera, et cetera, there could not be any real progress made on a peaceful course.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

711.94/2594½

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] December 1, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called at their request at the Department. Mr. Kurusu said that he noted that the President was returning to Washington in advance of his schedule and inquired what the reason for this was. The Secretary indicated that one of the factors in the present situation was the loud talk of the Japanese Prime Minister.[67a] The Secretary added that the Prime Minister seemed to be in need of advice which would deter him from indulging in such talk at a time when the Ambassador was here talking about good relations. The Secretary then asked the Japanese how they felt about the general trend in the world situation, especially the situation in Libya and Russia. The Japanese Ambassador replied to the effect that their attention had been largely engrossed in the situation as between the United States and Japan. The Secretary observed that from our point of view we felt much interest in and were very much encouraged about the news from Libya and Russia and it looked as if we might be turning the corner into a more favorable situation.

[67a] For speech by General Tojo, see telegram No. 1869, December 1, 1941, 3 p. m., from the Ambassador in Japan, p. 148.

The Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu endeavored to convince the Secretary that in this country we seem to take a more serious view of the Japanese Prime Minister's utterances than was warranted. Mr. Kurusu said that what the Prime Minister had done was nothing more than a ten-minute broadcast. The Secretary pointed out that a broadcast was all the more effective. Mr. Kurusu said that the Prime Minister had been misquoted and asked whether we had heard anything from Ambassador Grew. The Secretary replied that we had heard nothing from Ambassador Grew and that we felt that the Associated Press was reliable and that we should give credence to its reports of what the Prime Minister said. Mr. Kurusu said that Japanese news services did not always correctly translate statements into English.

The Secretary said that he had been talking peace for nine months with the Japanese Ambassador, both of them acting in entire good faith. He said that during all the time that Matsuoka was holding forth on the Tripartite Alliance and engaging in general bluster, the Secretary had ignored all of that. Then while the talks were in progress last July the Japanese moved suddenly into Indochina without any advance notice to this Government, and possibly the Ambassador was not informed of the Japanese Government's intention in advance. Then, too, the Secretary said, the Japanese press had been conducting a blustering campaign against the United States. The Secretary said that this Government had no idea of trying to bluff Japan and he saw no occasion for Japan's trying to bluff us, and he emphasized that there is a limit beyond which we cannot go further and that one of these days we may reach a point when we cannot keep on as we are.

Mr. Kurusu said that the Japanese Government had been very much surprised at the reaction in this country to the Prime Minister's statements and he would see to it that the Secretary was given a correct translation of the Prime Minister's statements. He said he hoped we would get something from Ambassador Grew. He then said that he was pleased to inform the Secretary that the document we had given them on November 26 had been communicated to the Japanese Government, that the Japanese Government is giving the case study, and that within a few days the Japanese Government's observation thereon would be communicated to us. He then said that the Japanese Government believed that the proposal which they submitted to us on November 20 was equitable and that full consideration had been given therein to the points of view taken by both sides in the conversations; that the Japanese Government finds it difficult to understand the position taken by the Government of the United States; and that the proposal which we had communicated to them seemed to fail to take cognizance of the actual conditions in the Far East. He said that his Government directed him to inquire what was the ultimate aim of the United States in the conversations and to request this Government to make "deep reflection of this matter". Mr. Kurusu said that the Japanese offer to withdraw its troops from southern Indochina still stands; that Japan has shown its extreme desire to promote a peaceful settlement.

The Secretary replied that we had to take into account the bellicose utterances emanating from Tokyo and that never would there be possible any peaceful arrangements if such arrangements have to be based upon principles of force. He pointed out that the methods the Japanese are using in China are similar to those which are being adopted by Hitler to subjugate Europe. The Secretary said that he had called attention to that during the progress of our conversations and that we cannot lose sight of the movement by Hitler to seize one-half of the world. He said that we believe that the Japanese militarists are moving in a similar direction to seize the other half of the earth, and that this Government cannot yield to anything of that kind. He explained that this is why we desire to work things out in a way that would promote peace, stability and prosperity and that this is why he has thus far made no complaint, notwithstanding the fact that the Japanese press has heaped filthy abuse on this country.

The Ambassador expressed the view that as a matter of fact there is not much difference between Japan's idea of a co-prosperity sphere and Pan-Americanism, except that Japanese methods may be more primitive. He denied that it was Japan's purpose to use force. The Secretary asked whether, when the Japanese Government was moving on the territory of other countries, inch by inch by force, the Ambassador thought that this was a part of our policy. The Ambassador replied that Japan was motivated by self-defense in the same way as Britain had been motivated by her acts, for example, in Syria; that Japan needed rice and other materials at a time when she was being shut off by the United States and other countries and she had no alternative but to endeavor to obtain access to these materials.

The Secretary observed that the Japanese are saying that the United States has no right to interfere with what Japan is doing in eastern Asia; that when the Japanese keep their troops in Indochina this constitutes a menace to the South Sea area, irrespective of where in Indochina the troops are stationed; that the stationing of these troops in Indochina is making it necessary for the United States and its friends to keep large numbers of armed forces immobilized in east Asia, and in this way Japan's acts were having the effect of aiding Hitler. The Secretary reminded the Ambassador that he had made it clear to the Ambassador that we could not sit still while such developments were taking place.

The Ambassador commented that today war is being conducted through the agency of economic weapons, that Japan was being squeezed, and that Japan must expand to obtain raw materials. The Secretary pointed out that we were selling Japan oil until Japan suddenly moved into Indochina; that he could not defend such a situation indefinitely; and that the United States would give Japan all she wanted in the way of materials if Japan's military leaders would only show that Japan intended to pursue a peaceful course. The Secretary emphasized that we do not propose to go into partnership with Japan's military leaders; that he has not heard one whisper of peace from the Japanese military, only bluster and blood-curdling threats. The Secretary added that he had been subjected to very severe criticism for his policy of patience but that he would not mind if only the Japanese Government could back him up.

The Secretary went on to enumerate various points in the Japanese proposal of November 20. He reminded the Ambassador that on November 22 he had promptly told the Ambassador that we could not sell oil to the Japanese Navy, although we might be prepared to consider the release of some oil for civilian purposes. He made it clear that this Government was anxious to help settle the China affair if the Japanese could reach a settlement in accordance with the basic principles which we had discussed in our conversations, and that under such circumstances we would be glad to offer our good offices. The Secretary went on to say that under existing circumstances, when Japan was tied in with the Tripartite Pact, Japan might just as well ask us to cease aiding Britain as to cease aiding China. He emphasized again that we can't overlook Japan's digging herself into Indochina, the effect of which is to create an increasing menace to America and her friends; that we can't continue to take chances on the situation; and that we will not allow ourselves to be kicked out of the Pacific. The Secretary called attention to reports that we have received from the press and other sources of heavy Japanese troop movements into Indochina and endeavored to make it clear that, when a large Japanese army is anywhere in Indochina, we have to give that situation all the more attention when Japanese statesmen say that they will drive us out of east Asia. He pointed out that we cannot be sure what the Japanese military leaders are likely to do, that we do not know where the Japanese Army intends to land its forces, and that for this reason we cannot sit still but will have to puzzle these things out in some way. The Secretary explained that this situation had been very painful to him and he did not know whether the Ambassador could do anything in the matter of influencing the Japanese Government. Mr. Kurusu said that he felt it was a shame that nothing should come out of the efforts which the conversations of several months had represented. He said he felt that the two sides had once been near an agreement except for two or three points, but that our latest proposals seem to carry the two sides further away than before.

The Secretary pointed out that every time we get started in the direction of progress the Japanese military does something to overturn us. The Secretary expressed grave doubts whether we could now get ahead in view of all the threats that had been made. He pointed out that the acts of the Japanese militarists had effectively tied the hands of the Ambassadors and he did not know whether the Ambassadors could succeed in having anything accomplished toward untying their hands. Mr. Kurusu brought up again his contention made on previous occasions that China had taken advantage of the Washington Conference treaties to flaunt Japan, and commented that if we don't look out China will sell both the United States and Japan down the river. The Secretary observed that he has been plowing through various contradictions in Japanese acts and utterances. He pointed out that the Japanese had been telling us that if something quick is not done something awful was about to happen; that they kept urging upon the Secretary the danger of delay, and kept pressing the Secretary to do something. He said that in view of all the confusion, threats and pressure, he had been brought to the stage where he felt that something must be done to clear the foggy atmosphere; that his conclusion was that he must bring us back to fundamentals; and that these fundamentals were embodied in the proposal which we had offered the Japanese on November 26. He said that we have stood from the first on the points involved in this proposal. He pointed out that everything that Japan was doing and saying was in precisely the opposite direction from the course we have been talking about in our conversations, and that these should be reversed by his government before we can further seriously talk peace.

Mr. Kurusu endeavored to make some lame apology for the direct military mind of the Japanese Army and commented that General Tojo was in position to control the situation. The Secretary asked what possibility there was of peace-minded people coming out in Japan and expressing themselves. He expressed doubt whether anybody in Japan would be free to speak unless he preached conquest. The Ambassador commented that the Japanese people are not talking about conquest. The Secretary pointed out that we all understand what are the implications of such terms as "controlling influence", "new order in east Asia", and "co-prosperity sphere". The Secretary observed that Hitler was using similar terms as synonyms for purposes of conquest. The Secretary went on to say that there was no reason for conflict between the United States and Japan, that there was no real clash of interests. He added that Japan does not have to use a sword to gain for herself a seat at the head of the table. He pointed out that equality of opportunity is in our opinion the key to the future peace and prosperity of all nations.

Mr. Kurusu disclaimed on the part of Japan any similarity between Japan's purposes and Hitler's purposes. The Ambassador pointed out that wars never settle anything and that war in the Pacific would be a tragedy, but he added that the Japanese people believe that the United States wants to keep Japan fighting with China and to keep Japan strangled. He said that the Japanese people feel that they are faced with the alternative of surrendering to the United States or of fighting. The Ambassador said that he was still trying to save the situation. The Secretary said that he has practically exhausted himself here, that the American people are going to assume that there is real danger to this country in the situation, and that there is nothing he can do to prevent it.

The Ambassadors said that they understood the Secretary's position in the light of his statements and they would report the matter to the Japanese Government with a view to seeing what could be done.

[JOSEPH W.] BALLANTINE

711.94/2594⅝

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] December 2, 1941.

After calling on Mr. Ballantine by appointment Mr. Terasaki [67b] asked if he might have a short chat with Mr. Schmidt.

Mr. Terasaki said that he had been greatly distressed by the newspaper reports of the so-called Tojo speech on November 30 and handed Mr. Schmidt a copy of the document he had previously given Mr. Ballantine (a copy is attached).[68] Mr. Terasaki said that he had, immediately after noticing the press reaction in this country to the statements attributed to Premier Tojo, telegraphed to his Government deprecating remarks of that sort by the Prime Minister during the course of conversations here in Washington. Mr. Terasaki said that both he and his Government had been "flabbergasted" and went on to say that he had been greatly relieved to receive last night from Tokyo the message he had given Mr. Ballantine and Mr. Schmidt.

Stating that his remarks were confidential and off the record Mr. Terasaki said that when Mr. Kurusu had talked with Mr. Yamamoto, Chief of the American Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office, last Sunday night and had referred to the speech which General Tojo had made, Mr. Yamamoto had been nonplused and had asked "What speech".

[67b] First Secretary of the Japanese Embassy.

[68] *Infra.*

Mr. Terasaki referred to his request to Mr. Ballantine that Mr. Ballantine inform him as to the manner in which the Department desired the Japanese explanation of General Tojo's speech to be made public. Mr. Terasaki asked Mr. Schmidt if he would remind Mr. Ballantine to get in touch with Mr. Terasaki as soon as he had any information on this subject.

M[AX] W. S[CHMIDT]

711.94/2594$\frac{4}{8}$

Statement Handed by the First Secretary of the Japanese Embassy (Terasaki) to Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine on December 2, 1941

The so-called speech of Premier Hideki Tojo was originally drafted by members of the office staff of the East Asia Restoration League, a non-governmental organization of which Mr. Tojo happens to be President, as a congratulatory address to be delivered on November 30, on the occasion commemorating the first anniversary of the conclusion of the Treaty Concerning the Basic Relations between Japan and China,[68a] under the auspices of the said League.

However, November 30 happened to be Sunday; the League staff gave out the manuscript to the newspaper reporters upon their request on the night of November 29 (Saturday), before the said draft was examined by either the Premier himself or other Government officials, and this unapproved manuscript was printed in the metropolitan newspapers.

As a matter of fact, the Premier himself made no speech of any kind on the 30th. Moreover, neither the Premier nor other government authorities had any knowledge as to the content of the said speech.

It should further be noted that the reported statement "For the honor and pride of mankind we must purge this sort of practice from East Asia with a vengeance" is a mistranslation of the original text. There is, in the original text, no such expression as "purge" or "with a vengeance." The correct translation of the statement should be "For the honor and pride of mankind, this sort of practice must be removed."

711.94/2594$\frac{5}{8}$

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] December 2, 1941.

The Under Secretary said that the Secretary was absent from the Department because of a slight indisposition and that the President had therefore asked Mr. Welles to request the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu to call to receive a communication which the President wished to make to them. Mr. Welles then read to Their Excellencies the following statement (a copy of which was handed to the Ambassador):

[68a] Treaty signed with Wang Ching-wei at Nanking, November 30, 1940, p. 117.

> "I have received reports during the past days of continuing Japanese troop movements to southern Indochina. These reports indicate a very rapid and material increase in the forces of all kinds stationed by Japan in Indochina.
>
> "It was my clear understanding that by the terms of the agreement—and there is no present need to discuss the nature of that agreement—between Japan and the French Government at Vichy that the total number of Japanese forces permitted by the terms of that agreement to be stationed in Indochina was very considerably less than the total amount of the forces already there.
>
> "The stationing of these increased Japanese forces in Indochina would seem to imply the utilization of these forces by Japan for purposes of further aggression, since no such number of forces could possibly be required for the policing of that region. Such aggression could conceivably be against the Philippine Islands; against the many islands of the East Indies; against Burma; against Malaya or either through coercion or through the actual use of force for the purpose of undertaking the occupation of Thailand. Such new aggression would, of course, be additional to the acts of aggression already undertaken against China, our attitude towards which is well known, and has been repeatedly stated to the Japanese Government.
>
> "Please be good enough to request the Japanese Ambassador and Ambassador Kurusu to inquire at once of the Japanese Government what the actual reasons may be for the steps already taken, and what I am to consider is the policy of the Japanese Government as demonstrated by this recent and rapid concentration of troops in Indochina. This Government has seen in the last few years in Europe a policy on the part of the German Government which has involved a constant and steady encroachment upon the territory and rights of free and independent peoples through the utilization of military steps of the same character. It is for that reason and because of the broad problem of American defense that I should like to know the intention of the Japanese Government."

The Japanese Ambassador said that he was not informed by the Japanese Government of its intentions and could not speak authoritatively on the matter but that of course he would communicate the statement immediately to his Government. Mr. Kurusu said that, in view of Japan's offer of November 20 to transfer all its forces from southern Indochina to northern Indochina, it was obvious no threat against the United States was intended. Both Mr. Kurusu and the Ambassador endeavored to explain that owing to lack of adequate land communication facilities in Indochina a rapid transfer of forces from northern to southern Indochina for purposes of aggression against countries neighboring southern Indochina could not be easily effected. Mr. Kurusu asked whether the reports to which the President referred were from our authorities. Mr. Welles said that he was not in position to say any more on that point than was contained in the statement.

The Ambassador said that it appeared to him that the measures which Japan was taking were natural under the circumstances, as the strengthening of armaments and of military dispositions by one side naturally leads to increasing activity by the other side. Mr. Welles stated that, as the Japanese Ambassador must be fully aware, this Government has not had any aggressive intention against Japan. The Ambassador said that, while he did not wish to enter into a debate on the matter, he wished to point out that the Japanese people believe that economic measures are a much more effective weapon of war than military measures; that they believe they are being placed under severe pressure by the United States to yield to the American position; and that it is preferable to fight rather than to yield to pressure. The Ambassador added that this was a situation in which wise statesmanship was needed; that wars do not settle anything; and that under the circumstances some agreement, even though it is not satisfactory, is better than no agreement at all.

Mr. Welles pointed out that the settlement which we are offering Japan is one which would assure Japan of peace and the satisfaction of Japan's economic needs much more certainly than any other alternative which Japan might feel was open to her.

Mr. Kurusu said that having just recently arrived from Japan he could speak more accurately of the frame of mind which is prevalent in Japan than could the Ambassador. He dwelt briefly upon the reaction which has been caused in Japan by our freezing measures and he said that this produces a frame of mind which has to be taken into account.

Mr. Welles pointed out that, as the Ambassadors must fully understand, there is a frame of mind in this country also which must be taken into account, and that frame of mind is produced by the effect of four years of the measures taken by Japan in China causing the squeezing out of American interests in Japanese-occupied areas. Mr. Kurusu then repeated what he had said two or three times previously about the effect of the Washington Conference treaties upon China which had caused China to flaunt Japan's rights. He said that in view of the actual situation in the Far East there were points in our proposal of November 26 which the Japanese Government would find it difficult to accept. Mr. Welles asked whether we may expect shortly a reply from the Japanese Government on our proposal. The Ambassador replied in the affirmative, but said that it might take a few days in view of the important questions which it raised for the Japanese Government. Mr. Kurusu expressed the hope that the American Government would exercise cool judgment in its consideration of questions under discussion between the two Governments. Mr. Welles said that we are asking for cool judgment on the part of Japanese statesmen.

Then Mr. Kurusu said that the Japanese felt that we had made real progress in our discussions and that the Japanese Government had been hopeful of being able to work out with us some settlement of the three outstanding points on which our draft of June 21 and the Japanese draft of September 25 had not been reconciled. He asked whether the Secretary would be willing to consider resuming our efforts to reconcile our differences on those three points, in view of all the progress that had been made, instead of approaching the problem from a new angle as we had done in our latest proposal which seemed to the Japanese Government to require a completely fresh start.

Mr. Welles said that our proposal of November 26 represented an effort to restate our complete position, as it has always stood. He said, however, that he would be glad to refer to the Secretary Mr. Kurusu's suggestion.

J[OSEPH] W. B[ALLANTINE]

711.94/2594$\frac{6}{8}$

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] December 5, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called at their request at the Department. The Ambassador handed to the Secretary a paper which he said was the Japanese Government's reply to the President's inquiry in regard to Japanese troops in French Indochina. The paper reads as follows:

[Here follows text of the statement printed *infra.*]

The Secretary read the paper and asked whether the Japanese considered that the Chinese were liable to attack them in Indochina. He said, so Japan has assumed the defensive against China. He said that he had heard that the Chinese are contending that their massing troops in Yunnan was in answer to Japan's massing troops in Indochina. Mr. Kurusu said that that is all that they have received from their Government in regard to this matter. The Ambassador said that as the Chinese were eager to defend the Burma Road he felt that the possibility of a Chinese attack in Indochina as a means of preventing Japan's attacking the Burma Road from Indochina could not be excluded.

The Secretary said that he had understood that Japan had been putting forces into northern Indochina for the purpose of attacking China from there. He said that he had never heard before that Japan's troop movements into northern Indochina were for the purpose of defense against Chinese attack. The Secretary added that it was the first time that he knew that Japan was on the defensive in Indochina.

The Ambassador said that the Japanese are alarmed over increasing naval and military preparations of the ABCD powers in the southwest Pacific area, and that an airplane of one of those countries had recently flown over Formosa. He said that our military men are very alert and enterprising and are known to believe in the principle that offense is the best defense. The Secretary asked whether the Ambassador's observations applied to defensive measures we are taking against Hitler. The Ambassador replied that he did not say that, but that it was because of Japan's apprehensions in regard to the situation that they had made their November 20 proposal.

The Secretary asked whether, if the Chinese are about to attack Japan in Indochina, this would not constitute an additional reason for Japan to withdraw her armed forces from Indochina. The Secretary said that he would be glad to get anything further which it might occur to the Japanese Government to say to us on this matter.

The Ambassador said that the Japanese Government was very anxious to reach an agreement with this Government and Mr. Kurusu said that the Japanese Government felt that we ought to be willing to agree to discontinue aid to China as soon as conversations between China and Japan were initiated. The Secretary pointed out that when the Japanese bring that matter up it brings up the matter of the aid Japan is giving to Hitler. He said that he did not see how Japan could demand that we cease giving aid to China while Japan was going on aiding Hitler. Mr. Kurusu asked in what way was Japan aiding Hitler. The Secretary replied that, as he had already made clear to the Japanese Ambassador, Japan was aiding Hitler by keeping large forces of this country and other countries immobilized in the Pacific area. (At this point the Ambassador uttered *sotto voce* an expression in Japanese which in the present context means "this isn't getting us anywhere".) The Secretary reminded the Ambassador of what the Secretary had said to the Ambassador on this point on November 22 as well as on our unwillingness to supply oil to Japan for the Japanese Navy which would enable Japan to operate against us in the southern Pacific and also on our attitude toward continuing aid to China. The Ambassador said that he recalled that the Secretary had said that he would almost incur the danger of being lynched if he permitted oil to go to Japan for her navy. The Ambassador said that he believed that if the Secretary would explain that giving of oil to Japan had been prompted by the desirability of reaching a peaceful agreement such explanation would be accepted. The Secretary replied that senators and others are not even now desisting from criticizing the Secretary for the course that he had hitherto taken.

The Secretary then recapitulated the three points on which he had orally commented to the Japanese Ambassador on November 22, with reference to the Japanese proposal of November 20, namely one, our difficulty with reference to the Japanese request that we discontinue aid to China, two, our feeling that the presence of large bodies of Japanese troops anywhere in Indochina caused among neighboring countries apprehensions for their security, and, three, public attitude in this country toward supplying Japan with oil for military and naval needs. He asked the Ambassador whether he had not set forth clearly his position on these points to the Ambassador on November 22. The Ambassador agreed.

The Ambassador said that this Government blames Japan for its move into Indochina but that if Indochina was controlled by other powers it would be a menace to Japan. The Secretary replied that as the Ambassador was aware we could solve matters without delay if only the Japanese Government would renounce courses of force and aggression. The Secretary added that we were not looking for trouble but that at the same time we were not running away from menaces.

Mr. Kurusu said that he felt that if we could only come to an agreement on temporary measures we could then proceed with our exploration of fundamental solutions. He said that such a fundamental agreement would necessarily take time and that what was needed now was a temporary expedient. The Secretary replied that the Japanese were keeping the situation confused by a malignant campaign conducted through the officially controlled and inspired press which created an atmosphere not conducive to peace. The Secretary said that we knew the Japanese Government could control the press and that therefore we did not understand what the motives are of the higher officials of the Japanese Government in promoting such a campaign. Mr. Kurusu said that on the American side we were not free from injurious newspaper propaganda. He said that for example there was the case of a newspaper report of the Secretary's interview with the press which created an unfortunate impression in Japan. The Secretary replied that he had been seeing for months and months that Japanese officials and the Japanese press had been proclaiming slogans of a bellicose character and that while all this was going on he had kept silent. He pointed out that now he was being jumped on by the Japanese if he said a single word in regard to his Government's principles. Mr. Kurusu then referred to a press report casting aspersions on Kurusu to the effect that he had been sent here to check on the Ambassador, et cetera, et cetera. The Secretary replied that he had heard only good reports in regard to Mr. Kurusu and the Ambassador. At this point the Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu took their leave after making the usual apologies for taking so much of the Secretary's time when he was busy.

J[OSEPH] W. B[ALLANTINE]

711.94/2594$\frac{6}{8}$

Statement Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State on December 5, 1941

Reference is made to your inquiry about the intention of the Japanese Government with regard to the reported movements of Japanese troops in French Indo-china. Under instructions from Tokyo I wish to inform you as follows:

As Chinese troops have recently shown frequent signs of movements along the northern frontier of French Indo-china bordering on China, Japanese troops, with the object of mainly taking precautionary measures, have been reinforced to a certain extent in the northern part of French Indo-china. As a natural sequence of this step, certain movements have been made among the troops stationed in the southern part of the said territory. It seems that an exaggerated report has been made of these movements. It should be added that no measure has been taken on the part of the Japanese Government that may transgress the stipulations of the Protocol of Joint Defense between Japan and France.

740.0011 Pacific War/856

President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State

THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON [December 6, 1941].

DEAR CORDELL: Shoot this[69] to Grew—I think it can go in gray code—saves time—I don't mind if it gets picked up.

F. D. R.

740.0011 Pacific War/856

President Roosevelt to Emperor Hirohito of Japan[70]

[WASHINGTON,] December 6, 1941.

Almost a century ago the President of the United States addressed to the Emperor of Japan a message extending an offer of friendship of the people of the United States to the people of Japan.[71] That offer was accepted, and in the long period of unbroken peace and friendship which has followed, our respective nations, through the virtues of their peoples and the wisdom of their rulers have prospered and have substantially helped humanity.

---

[69] See document *infra*.

[70] This message was transmitted in telegram No. 818, December 6, 1941, 9 p. m., to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew), with instructions to communicate the President's message to the Japanese Emperor in such manner as deemed most appropriate by the Ambassador and at the earliest possible moment, addressed to "His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of Japan." The telegram added that the press was being informed that the President was despatching a message to the Emperor.

[71] See letter from President Fillmore to the Japanese Emperor, May 10, 1851, Miller, *Treaties*, vol. 6, p. 517.

Only in situations of extraordinary importance to our two countries need I address to Your Majesty messages on matters of state. I feel I should now so address you because of the deep and far-reaching emergency which appears to be in formation.

Developments are occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to deprive each of our nations and all humanity of the beneficial influence of the long peace between our two countries. Those developments contain tragic possibilities.

The people of the United States, believing in peace and in the right of nations to live and let live, have eagerly watched the conversations between our two Governments during these past months. We have hoped for a termination of the present conflict between Japan and China. We have hoped that a peace of the Pacific could be consummated in such a way that nationalities of many diverse peoples could exist side by side without fear of invasion; that unbearable burdens of armaments could be lifted for them all; and that all peoples would resume commerce without discrimination against or in favor of any nation.

I am certain that it will be clear to Your Majesty, as it is to me, that in seeking these great objectives both Japan and the United States should agree to eliminate any form of military threat. This seemed essential to the attainment of the high objectives.

More than a year ago Your Majesty's Government concluded an agreement with the Vichy Government by which five or six thousand Japanese troops were permitted to enter into Northern French Indo-China for the protection of Japanese troops which were operating against China further north. And this Spring and Summer the Vichy Government permitted further Japanese military forces to enter into Southern French Indo-China for the common defense of French Indo-China. I think I am correct in saying that no attack has been made upon Indo-China, nor that any has been contemplated.

During the past few weeks it has become clear to the world that Japanese military, naval and air forces have been sent to Southern Indo-China in such large numbers as to create a reasonable doubt on the part of other nations that this continuing concentration in Indo-China is not defensive in its character.

Because these continuing concentrations in Indo-China have reached such large proportions and because they extend now to the southeast and the southwest corners of that Peninsula, it is only reasonable that the people of the Philippines, of the hundreds of Islands of the East Indies, of Malaya and of Thailand itself are asking themselves whether these forces of Japan are preparing or intending to make attack in one or more of these many directions.

I am sure that Your Majesty will understand that the fear of all these peoples is a legitimate fear in as much as it involves their peace and their national existence. I am sure that Your Majesty will understand why the people of the United States in such large numbers look askance at the establishment of military, naval and air bases manned and equipped so greatly as to constitute armed forces capable of measures of offense.

It is clear that a continuance of such a situation is unthinkable.

None of the peoples whom I have spoken of above can sit either indefinitely or permanently on a keg of dynamite.

There is absolutely no thought on the part of the United States of invading Indo-China if every Japanese soldier or sailor were to be withdrawn therefrom.

I think that we can obtain the same assurance from the Governments of the East Indies, the Governments of Malaya and the Government of Thailand. I would even undertake to ask for the same assurance on the part of the Government of China. Thus a withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Indo-China would result in the assurance of peace throughout the whole of the South Pacific area.

I address myself to Your Majesty at this moment in the fervent hope that Your Majesty may, as I am doing, give thought in this definite emergency to ways of dispelling the dark clouds. I am confident that both of us, for the sake of the peoples not only of our own great countries but for the sake of humanity in neighboring territories, have a sacred duty to restore traditional amity and prevent further death and destruction in the world.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

711.94/2594⅞

Memorandum of a Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] December 7, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador asked for an appointment to see the Secretary at 1:00 p. m.,[72] but later telephoned and asked that the appointment be postponed to 1:45 as the Ambassador was not quite ready. The Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu arrived at the Department at 2:05 p. m. and were received by the Secretary at 2:20.

The Japanese Ambassador stated that he had been instructed to deliver at 1:00 p. m. the document which he handed the Secretary, but that he was sorry that he had been delayed owing to the need of more time to decode the message. The Secretary asked why he had specified one o'clock. The Ambassador replied that he did not know but that that was his instruction.

---

[72] The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, took place on December 7, 1941, at 1:20 p. m., Washington time (7:50 a. m., Honolulu time), which was December 8, 3:20 a. m., Tokyo time. On December 8 at 6 a. m., Tokyo time (December 7, 4 p. m., Washington time), the Japanese imperial headquarters announced that war began as of "dawn" on that date.

The Secretary said that anyway he was receiving the message at two o'clock.

After the Secretary had read two or three pages he asked the Ambassador whether this document was presented under instructions of the Japanese Government. The Ambassador replied that it was. The Secretary as soon as he had finished reading the document turned to the Japanese Ambassador and said,

> "I must say that in all my conversations with you (the Japanese Ambassador) during the last nine months I have never uttered one word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record. In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions—infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any Government on this planet was capable of uttering them."

Cordell Hull

The Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu then took their leave without making any comment.

A copy of the paper which was handed to the Secretary by the Japanese Ambassador is attached.[73]

J[OSEPH] W. B[ALLANTINE]

711.94/2594⅞

Memorandum Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State at 2:20 P. M. on December 7, 1941

1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific Area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific Area.

The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.

2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace and

---

[73] *Infra.*

thereby to enable all nations to find each its proper place in the world.

Ever since China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extention of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy.

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking régime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia. Exerting pressure on the Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defence of French Indo-China, both American and British Governments, wilfully misinterpreting it as a threat to their own possessions, and inducing the Netherlands Government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the Empire.

Nevertheless, to facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, the American Government, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental and essential questions.

3. Subsequently, on September 25th the Japanese Government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American Government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American Government, adhering steadfastly to its original assertions, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.

Therefore, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points:

> (1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.
>
> (2) Both Governments shall cooperate with the view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.
>
> (3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.
>
> The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.
>
> (4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.
>
> (5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific Area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as "introducer" of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.

The American Government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as so-called "introducer" of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally on November 26th, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese Government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American Government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.

4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties. As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude. As for the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce,

advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific Area including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis. Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese Government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation.

It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American Government.

On the other hand, the American Government, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, caused undue delay in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American Government and the Japanese Government desires to call the attention of the American Government especially to the following points:

> 1. The American Government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese Government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.
>
> Of the various principles put forward by the American Government as a basis of the Japanese-American Agreement, there are some which the Japanese Government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual conditions, it seems only a utopian ideal on the part of the American Government to attempt to force their immediate adoption.
>
> Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between Japan, United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, the Netherlands and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.
>
> 2. The American proposal contained a stipulation which states—"Both Governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third power or powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area." It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the War in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific Area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy, two Powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific Area through peaceful means.

3. Whereas the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settle international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhumane than military pressure.

4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in coalition with Great Britain and other Powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that the countries of East Asia for the past hundred years or more have been compelled to observe the *status quo* under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice themselves to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.

The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. Thus the six countries,—Japan, the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, China and Thailand,—excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the Governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese Government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the Nine Power Treaty structure which is the chief factor responsible for the present predicament of East Asia.

5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American Government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce ignored the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American Government in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any régime other than the régime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking Government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This demand

> of the American Government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking régime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American Government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.

5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of yen and dollar exchange, or the abolition of extraterritorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the Empire's existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese Government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.

6. The Japanese Government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements to be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American Government. However, since the American Government has made the proposal of November 26th as a result of frequent consultation with Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands and Chungking, and presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking régime in the questions of China, it must be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position.

7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a new order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiation. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

[WASHINGTON,] December 7, 1941.

Statement by the Secretary of State, December 7, 1941 [74]

Japan has made a treacherous and utterly unprovoked attack upon the United States.

At the very moment when representatives of the Japanese Government were discussing with representatives of this Government, at the request of the former, principles and courses of peace, the armed forces of Japan were preparing and assembling at various strategic points to launch new attacks and new aggressions upon nations and peoples with which Japan was professedly at peace including the United States.

I am now releasing for the information of the American people the statement of principles governing the policies of the Government of the United States and setting out suggestions for a comprehensive peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area, which I handed to the Japanese Ambassador on November 26, 1941.

I am likewise releasing the text of a Japanese reply thereto which was handed to me by the Japanese Ambassador today. Before the Japanese Ambassador delivered this final statement from his Government the treacherous attack upon the United States had taken place.

This Government has stood for all the principles that underlie fair-dealing, peace, law and order, and justice between nations and has steadfastly striven to promote and maintain that state of relations between itself and all other nations.

It is now apparent to the whole world that Japan in its recent professions of a desire for peace has been infamously false and fraudulent.

Message by President Roosevelt to Congress, December 8, 1941 [75]

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

Yesterday, December 7, 1941—a date which will live in infamy—the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan.

The United States was at peace with that Nation and, at the solicitation of Japan, was still in conversation with its Government and its Emperor looking toward the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. Indeed, one hour after Japanese air squadrons had commenced bombing in Oahu, the Japanese Ambassador to the United States and his colleague delivered to the Secretary of State a formal reply to a recent American message. While this reply stated that it seemed useless to continue the existing diplomatic negotiations, it contained no threat or hint of war or armed attack.

---

[74] Issued by the Department of State as a press release; reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, December 13, 1941 (vol. v, No. 129), p. 461.

[75] Issued by the White House as a press release; reprinted from *ibid.*, p. 474.

It will be recorded that the distance of Hawaii from Japan makes it obvious that the attack was deliberately planned many days or even weeks ago. During the intervening time the Japanese Government has deliberately sought to deceive the United States by false statements and expressions of hope for continued peace.

The attack yesterday on the Hawaiian Islands has caused severe damage to American naval and military forces. Very many American lives have been lost. In addition American ships have been reported torpedoed on the high seas between San Francisco and Honolulu.

Yesterday the Japanese Government also launched an attack against Malaya.

Last night Japanese forces attacked Hong Kong.

Last night Japanese forces attacked Guam.

Last night Japanese forces attacked the Philippine Islands.

Last night the Japanese attacked Wake Island.

This morning the Japanese attacked Midway Island.

Japan has, therefore, undertaken a surprise offensive extending throughout the Pacific area. The facts of yesterday speak for themselves. The people of the United States have already formed their opinions and well understand the implications to the very life and safety of our Nation.

As Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy I have directed that all measures be taken for our defense.

Always will we remember the character of the onslaught against us.

No matter how long it may take us to overcome this premeditated invasion, the American people in their righteous might will win through to absolute victory.

I believe I interpret the will of the Congress and of the people when I assert that we will not only defend ourselves to the uttermost but will make very certain that this form of treachery shall never endanger us again.

Hostilities exist. There is no blinking at the fact that our people, our territory, and our interests are in grave danger.

With confidence in our armed forces—with the unbounded determination of our people—we will gain the inevitable triumph—so help us God.

I ask that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, December seventh, a state of war has existed between the United States and the Japanese Empire.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

THE WHITE HOUSE, December 8, 1941.

Declaration by the United States of America of a State of War With Japan, December 8, 1941[76]

Joint Resolution Declaring that a state of war exists between the Imperial Government of Japan and the Government and the people of the United States and making provisions to prosecute the same.

Whereas the Imperial Government of Japan has committed unprovoked acts of war against the Government and the people of the United States of America: Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the state of war between the United States and the Imperial Government of Japan which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared; and the President is hereby authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial Government of Japan; and, to bring the conflict to a successful termination, all of the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States.

Approved, December 8, 1941, 4:10 p. m., E. S. T.

---

[76] Reprinted from Department of State, *Bulletin*, December 13, 1941 (vol. v, No. 129), p. 475.

INDEX

INDEX

Airplanes, airplane accessories, aviation gasoline, etc., U. S. restrictions on export to Japan. *See* Economic measures.
American treaty rights and equality of commercial opportunity in occupied China (*see also under* Growing tension: *1939*, *1940:* China questions), Japanese interference with, 329–330, 411, 472–473, 480–481, 641–642
Anti-Comintern Pact. *See under* Axis powers.
Arms and munitions, restrictions on export to Japan. *See* Economic measures.
"Arsenal of democracy" address by President Roosevelt, *Dec. 29, 1940*, 173–181
Assets, Japanese, freezing of. *See* Economic measures: *1941: July 26; also* Conversations, subjects: Economic questions: Economic measures: Freezing.
Axis powers (*see also* Conversations, subjects: European war; Growing tension: *1939*, *1940*, *1941:* European situation; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), relations of Japan, 2, 2–3, 36, 116, 126, 126–127, 134, 135, 141, 143–146, 153–186, 311
  Anti-Comintern Pact and supplementary protocol between Germany and Japan, and subsequent adherence of Italy:
    Italy, adherence: Observations of Ambassador Grew, 160–161; protocol of adherence, *Nov. 6, 1937*, text, 159–160
    Japanese official statements and views, 36, 155–158, 163–164
    Texts signed *Nov. 25, 1936*, 153–155
  Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan:
    Axis efforts to aline Japan more closely, 182–183
    German implementation of pact by dispatch of commission to assist in construction of fueling bases in Japanese islands, 173; question of supply of war planes to Japan, 311
    Japanese views:
      Denial of hostile intentions, 126, 126–127, 135, 163–164, 172–173
Axis powers—Continued.
  Tripartite Pact—Continued.
    Japanese views—Continued.
      Obligations in event of U. S. entrance into European war, 134, 141, 145–146, 171, 183–185
      Official statements on occasion of signature: Address by Foreign Minister Matsuoka, 166–168; imperial rescript, 168; message of Prime Minister, 168–169
    Negotiations, 2, 2–3, 161–162, 170
    Text signed *Sept. 27, 1940*, summary, 165–166
    U. S. attitude: Disapproval, 116, 162–163, 169–171; press release by Department of State, 169; radio address by President Roosevelt on national security, *Dec. 29, 1940*, 173–181
  Visit of Foreign Minister Matsuoka to Berlin, Moscow, and Rome (*1941*), 143–145, 182–186, 311

Bombing of civilians by the Japanese and military operations endangering American lives and interests in China, 3, 5, 32, 33, 41, 42, 44, 46, 47, 49, 208–210
Boundary dispute between French Indochina and Thailand, Japanese mediation, 142, 144, 306
Burma Road, 101, 327, 508, 518, 781

Chiang Kai-shek, continued U. S. recognition and aid, and Japanese opposition, 36, 38, 59, 93, 94–95, 99, 134, 144, 148–149, 303, 314, 319, 326, 333, 344, 366, 367, 368, 376, 380, 381, 384, 423, 443, 471, 501, 508, 518, 580, 584, 612, 618, 624, 725, 754–755, 755, 761, 763–764, 765, 775, 782, 783, 788, 789, 791–792
China (*see also* Growing tension: *1939*, *1940*, *1941:* China questions; *and under* Conversations, subjects):
  Assets in the United States, freezing of. *See* Economic measures: *1941: July 26.*
  Extraterritoriality, 17

China—Continued.
  "Incidents": Liutiaokow (*Sept. 18, 1931*), 136; Marco Polo Bridge (*July 7, 1937*), 134, 135, 136; Shanghai (*July 7, 1940*), 101–104, 106–108
  Commercial treaty between the United States and Japan (*Feb. 21, 1911*), U. S. abrogation, 30–31, 32–33, 41, 43, 51, 53–54, 54–55, 58, 63, 70, 79, 88, 98–99, 189–198, 204–210, 368–369, 536, 760
    Arrangements for maintaining commercial relations upon expiration of treaty: Nonimposition of discriminatory duties on Japanese imports, 195–196, 197–198; status of Japanese treaty merchants, 196–197, 198; U. S. liberal policy, 193–194, 536
    Embargo, possibility of, 32–33, 41, 58
    Japanese desire for negotiation of a new commercial treaty, agreement, or *modus vivendi*, and U. S. attitude, 43, 51, 55, 63, 70, 79, 98–99, 190–195, 196, 197, 198, 205
    Termination of treaty on *Jan. 26, 1940*, 30–31, 32–33, 43, 51, 88, 189–190, 197, 368–369, 760; text of U. S. notice of abrogation, 189
    Violation of treaty by breach of contract between Universal Oil Co. and Japanese interests, Japanese allegations and U. S. views, 53–54, 54–55, 204–210
  Communism (*see also* Axis powers: Anti-Comintern Pact), question of joint defense by China and Japan, 333, 334, 336, 396, 423, 428, 429, 434–436, 441, 443, 444–445, 453, 460, 470, 477–478, 485–486, 493–494, 502, 623
  Conversations between the Governments of the United States and Japan, *1941* (*see also* Conversations, subjects of discussion), 325–795
    Record of conversations, documents, 387–795
    Summary of conversations, memorandum prepared in Department of State (*May 19, 1942*), 325–386
    Jan.–May 11, preliminary phase, 325–332, 387–418
      Efforts to improve Japanese-American relations, initiation: Conversations between Ambassador Nomura, Secretary Hull, and President Roosevelt, 331, 387–398, 402–418; suggestion of President Roosevelt, 387–388

Conversations—Continued.
  Jan.–May 11—Continued.
    Proposal for a general settlement in the Pacific area, presented informally by private Americans and Japanese, *Apr. 9:* Discussions, 328–332, 402–415; draft text, 398–402
  May 12–Aug. 5, consideration of Japanese proposal of *May 12* and interruption of conversations following Japanese military penetration into French Indochina, 332–343, 418–546, 551, 552
    Draft proposals:
      Agreement for a general settlement, Japanese draft proposal of *May 12:*
        Discussions, 332–337, 418–419, 425–445
        Text and annex, 420–425; amendment and errata, 425–426, 439–440
      Amended agreement, U. S. proposal of *May 31:* Discussions, 451–472; text and annexes, 446–451
      Japanese revision of *June 15:* Discussions, 472–473, 476–483; text and annex, 473–476
      Redraft by the United States, *June 21:*
        Discussions, 338–343, 483–486, 492–514
        Text and annexes, 486–492
        U. S. oral statement of *June 21* concerning need for assurance and manifestation by Japanese of intention to pursue policy of peace: Discussions, 492–493, 495–502, 505–509, 511–512, 513–514; text, 485–486; U. S. acceptance of return of oral statement as requested by Japan, 511–512, 513–514
      Suggestion by President Roosevelt, *July 24*, for neutralization of French Indochina and Thailand, 341–342, 527–530, 538, 539–540, 542, 545, 552; Japanese attitude, 534–537
      U. S. refusal to entertain compromise solution, 538–539
    Interruption of conversations following Japanese military penetration into French Indochina: Attitude of the United States, 340–341, 522, 525–526, 551; question of resumption of conversations, 531, 532, 533, 536

Conversations—Continued.
  Aug. 6–Oct. 16, 17, renewed insistence by the Japanese Government upon its peaceful purposes—resumption of conversations, 343–358, 546–689
    Draft proposals:
      Advancement by Japan, *Aug. 6*, of a limited and one-sided offer: Discussions, 343–344, 546–549, 550–553; text, 549–550, 561–562; U. S. views regarding lack of responsiveness to President Roosevelt's suggestion of *July 24*, 344, 552–553
      Japanese revised proposal of *Sept. 6*:
        Discussions, 348–349, 593–595, 600–603, 604–607, 610–636
        Text, 608–609
        Unofficial draft presented by Ambassador Nomura, *Sept. 4*, and subsequently withdrawn: Discussions, 595–596, 610, 615; text and annexes, 597–600; withdrawal, 597*n*, 621, 626
        U. S. statement of desire for further clarification, 610–613, 625, 626; Japanese reply, 620–624, 634–636
      Proposal of *Sept. 25* by Japan, combining U. S. redraft of *June 21* and Japanese revised proposal of *Sept. 6*: Discussions, 353, 636, 640–641, 651, 654, 654–669, 672–677, 684; Japanese efforts to expedite reply, 641–645; 652–654; text, 637–640
    Effect on conversations of new Japanese acts of aggression in French Indochina, 668, 669–670, 679, 682
    Formal negotiations, U. S. requirements for entrance upon:
      Consultation with British, Chinese, and Netherlands Governments, 348, 588, 595, 611–612, 618; Japanese views, 620–621, 627, 630, 632
      Insistence on reaching advance agreement in principle on fundamental issues: Discussions, 347–348, 352–353, 559, 576–579, 584, 588–592, 595, 621, 631, 654–656, 661, 673–674; Japanese views and requests for information on points of divergence, 626–627, 631, 670–678, 681; opinion of Ambassador Grew, 645–650

Conversations—Continued.
  Aug. 6–Oct. 16, 17—Continued.
    Meeting between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Konoye, proposed. *See* Roosevelt–Konoye meeting.
    Peace, renewed insistence by Japan on purposes of, 343, 345, 347, 349–350, 356, 548, 553, 554, 555, 562, 563, 566, 572–575, 584, 590, 604–605, 606, 615–616, 625, 635, 642–643, 652–653, 657–658, 672, 675, 680, 681
    Resumption of conversations:
      Japanese requests, 553, 554, 559–560
      U. S. attitude:
        Disinclination in view of continued Japanese military aggression and press campaign against the United States, 345–346, 547–548, 551, 553–555, 557–559
        Insistence on Japan's furnishing clear statement of present attitude and plans, 345–346, 559, 570; Japanese statement, 573–575
  Oct. 17–Nov. 19, advent of the Tojo cabinet and redoubling of the Japanese Government's insistence upon early acceptance of its proposals, 358–366, 370, 689–753, 788
    Draft proposals:
      Formulas presented by Japan, *Nov. 7*, concerning stationing and withdrawal of Japanese forces in China and French Indochina, and principle of nondiscrimination in international commercial relations: Discussions, 706–709, 712–714, 722, 788; texts, 709–710
      U. S. proposal for joint declaration on economic policy: Discussions, 359–361, 731, 742, 750; failure of Japan to respond, 370; text, 736–737
      U. S. suggestion for mutual pledges of conciliation between China and Japan, 708, 719, 721, 722–723, 724–725, 726–727
    Formal negotiations, question of:
      Japanese desire for, and interpretation of conversations as such, 710, 720, 721–722, 730–731, 731–732, 748

Conversations—Continued.
  Oct. 17–Nov. 19—Continued.
    Formal negotiations, etc.—Con.
      U. S. views: Insistence upon Washington as place of conversations, 700, 701; intention of consulting British, Chinese, and Netherlands Governments prior to entrance upon formal negotiations, 361, 708, 712, 724, 731–732, 733, 736, 748, 750
    Fundamental difficulties under discussion:
      Attitude of Japan and the United States toward European war: Japanese obligations under Tripartite Pact, 359, 361, 363, 364, 365, 707, 708–709, 712, 715–716, 723–724, 731, 732–734, 740–741, 744–747, 751–753; U. S. interpretation of self-defense, 361, 714, 741
      Commercial policy based on principle of nondiscrimination:
        General discussions, 359, 364, 365, 695–696, 707, 712, 713, 714, 715, 723, 730, 734–736, 744–746, 747
        Joint declaration on economic policy, U. S. proposal: Discussions, 359–361, 731, 742, 750; failure of Japan to respond, 370; text, 736–737
      Japanese armed forces, question of withdrawal from—
        China, 359, 363, 364–365, 698, 699, 707–708, 712, 715, 716, 725–726, 731, 739, 742, 748–749
        French Indochina, 365, 698, 707, 716, 727–728, 749, 750
        Thailand, 728
    Kurusu, Saburo, mission to the United States, 362, 679, 704–705, 707, 710–711, 717, 718–719, 729, 738
    Peace, Japanese position on general question of: Assurances by Tojo cabinet regarding adherence to Konoye cabinet's policies and continuance of conversations to a successful conclusion, 358, 362, 363, 689–693, 697–698, 699–700, 700–701, 705–706, 710, 738–739, 742–743; message from retiring Prime Minister Konoye to Ambassador Grew, and reply, 691–692; texts of Japanese statements, 727–729, 739–740; U. S. requests for information, and general discussion, 362, 725, 729–730, 739–740

Conversations—Continued.
  Oct. 17–Nov. 19—Continued.
    Redoubling of Japanese Government's insistence on quick decision on its proposals, 358, 362, 365, 693, 709, 711–712, 713, 716–717, 719–721, 723, 730, 747, 748, 751; views of Ambassador Grew and Department of State, 718, 722, 726, 734
  Nov. 20–Dec. 1, Japanese efforts to extort an agreement on a narrow and one-sided proposal, 366–378, 753–778, 788–789
    Draft proposals:
      Japanese proposal of *Nov. 20* for entrance into a *modus vivendi* pending arrival at a general settlement: Discussions, 366, 367–369, 369–371, 372, 376, 753–755, 757–764; text, 366–367, 755–756, 788–789
      U. S. proposal of *Nov. 26* for a general settlement: Discussions, 371–373, 375–377, 764–767, 770–777, 789; Japanese attitude, 375, 376, 764–765, 766, 789; text, 373–375, 768–770
    Fundamental difficulties under discussion:
      Attitude of Japan toward the European war and obligations under Tripartite Pact, 366, 368, 369, 370, 376, 754–755, 756–757, 771, 774, 775, 777; draft letter of interpretation by Mr. Kurusu, 369, 756–757
      China questions, 366, 367, 370, 376, 754, 754–755, 761, 763, 763–764, 764–765, 765, 771, 775, 776
      Japanese armed forces in French Indochina, 367, 368, 376–377, 753, 758, 760, 761, 762, 765, 774, 775
    Japanese insistence on need for quick decision, 761, 776
    Peace, Japanese professions of, and U. S. attitude, 367, 368, 369–370, 754, 758
  Dec. 2–7, final phase, 378–386, 778–795
    Continued Japanese troop movements into French Indochina, and President Roosevelt's inquiry to Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu as to Japanese intentions:
      Discussions, 378, 378–379, 778–780, 781–782, 783
      Text, 779; Japanese reply, 378, 781, 784

- Conversations—Continued.
  - *Dec. 2–7*—Continued.
    - Efforts to secure reply from Japan to U. S. proposal of *Nov. 26*, 780–783
    - Message from President Roosevelt to Emperor Hirohito, *Dec. 6*, 379, 784–786; reply, 385
    - War between Japan and the United States:
      - Attack by Japan upon Pearl Harbor, *Dec. 7*, 385, 786*n*
      - Final meeting between Secretary Hull, Ambassador Nomura, and Mr. Kurusu, *Dec. 7:*
        - Arrangements, 379–380, 786–787
        - Memorandum handed by Ambassador Nomura to Secretary Hull, text, 380–384, 787–792; Secretary Hull's oral reply, 384–385, 787
      - Press statement by Secretary Hull, *Dec. 7*, 793
      - Request by President Roosevelt to Congress, *Dec. 8*, for declaration of existence of a state of war with Japan, 793–794; text of declaration, 795
- Conversations, subjects of discussion:
  - Bellicose attitude of Japan:
    - Encirclement, alleged, 319, 340, 366, 380, 501, 508, 520–521, 523, 547–548, 551, 557, 696, 720, 753, 772, 788
    - Press campaign against the United States, 330, 337, 340, 355, 358–359, 375, 376–377, 387, 391, 392, 396, 398, 413, 508, 520–521, 523, 547–548, 551, 554, 555, 557, 566, 582, 585, 693–694, 696, 698, 705–706, 758, 764, 771, 773, 774, 783
    - Slogans and ideology, 363, 366, 375–376, 417, 566, 710, 711, 713–714, 742, 754, 772, 776–777
    - Speech of Prime Minister Tojo, *Nov. 30, 1941*, 376–377, 772–774, 777–778
  - China:
    - Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan, terms and issues:
      - Communism, joint defense against, 333, 334, 336, 396, 423, 428, 429, 434–436, 441, 443, 444–445, 453, 460, 470, 477–478, 485–486, 493–494, 502, 623
      - Economic cooperation and principle of nondiscrimination, 334, 338, 349, 350–351, 355, 360, 370, 382, 384, 396, 410,
- Conversations, subjects of discussion—Continued.
  - China—Continued.
    - Action toward a peaceful settlement, etc.—Continued.
      - Economic cooperation, etc.—Con. 423, 429, 452–453, 460, 461, 470, 472–473, 476–477, 479–481, 493, 577, 584, 596, 602, 611, 612–613, 617, 621–622, 623–624, 627, 636, 656, 657, 659–660, 668, 669, 677, 684, 710, 730, 734, 790, 791
      - General principles, 433, 434–436, 452–453, 459–462, 498, 500, 595, 610–611, 747
      - Immigration to China, 424, 426
      - Konoye principles, 333–334, 350, 419, 423, 429–430, 436, 439, 442, 448–449, 459, 460–461
      - "Manchukuo", 334, 409, 423, 428, 429, 461
      - Negotiations, question of U. S. good offices:
        - Discussions, 333, 336, 337, 339, 343, 344, 376, 381, 391–392, 393, 423, 427–428, 429, 433, 435, 442–443, 459–462, 465–466, 471, 577–579, 583–584, 595, 611–612, 616, 623, 626, 696–697, 725–726, 742, 761, 762–763, 764–765, 771, 789
        - Intention of the United States to discuss matter with China, 337, 430, 442, 443, 454, 471
        - Japanese terms, 627, 629, 631, 632–633; draft text, 633
        - U. S. insistence on knowing terms, 334, 336, 339, 430, 434–435, 445, 577–578, 611, 613, 616, 627, 685
      - Wang Ching-wei regime, 334, 350–351, 384, 391, 393, 439, 460, 481, 765, 791–792
      - Withdrawal or retention of Japanese troops, 333–334, 336, 337, 338, 349, 350, 355, 359, 363, 364–365, 370, 384, 416–417, 423, 434–436, 437–438, 441–443, 444–445, 453, 455, 459, 461, 470, 477–478, 485–486, 493–494, 502, 518, 577, 602, 611, 616–617, 623, 630, 640–641, 656, 660, 666–667, 668, 669, 670, 671–672, 674, 677, 685, 687–688, 688, 698, 699, 707–708, 709, 712, 716, 725–726, 726, 731, 742, 748, 791

- Conversations, subjects of discussion—Continued.
  - China—Continued.
    - American treaty rights and equality of opportunity in occupied China, Japanese interference with, 329–330, 411, 472–473, 480–481, 641–642
    - U. S. aid to China, and Japanese objections, 326, 333, 344, 366, 367, 368, 376, 380, 381, 384, 423, 443, 471, 501, 508, 518, 580, 584, 612, 618, 624, 725, 754–755, 755, 761, 763–764, 775, 782, 783, 788, 789, 792
    - U. S. suggestion for mutual pledges of conciliation between China and Japan, 708, 719, 721, 722–723, 724–725, 726–727
  - Commerce between the United States and Japan (*see also* Economic questions, *infra*), 333, 339, 424, 451, 453, 462
  - Economic questions:
    - China, economic cooperation and principle of nondiscrimination, 334, 338, 349, 350–351, 355, 360, 370, 382, 384, 396, 410, 423, 429, 452–453, 460, 461, 470, 472–473, 476–477, 479–481, 493, 577, 584, 596, 602, 611, 612–613, 617, 621–622, 623–624, 627, 636, 656, 657, 659–660, 668, 669, 677, 684, 710, 730, 734, 790, 791
    - Economic activity of the United States and Japan in the Pacific area, 333, 337, 338, 339, 346, 360, 424, 428, 430, 433–434, 436–437, 453, 462–463, 466, 468, 469–470, 524, 558–559, 577, 596, 612, 617–618, 619, 621, 623, 659–660, 668–669, 670–671, 674–675, 684, 687, 689, 695–696, 707, 710, 712, 713, 715, 723, 730, 731, 732, 734–736, 744–746, 789–790
    - Economic measures by the United States affecting trade with Japan:
      - Commercial treaty of *1911*, U. S. abrogation, 368–369, 536, 760
      - Freezing of Japanese assets: Japanese resentment, 364, 380, 496, 531, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 567, 580, 714, 717, 747, 751, 788; relaxation or removal, question of, 343, 344, 365–366, 367, 368, 375, 581, 582, 602–603, 604, 650, 749–750, 751, 757–760, 771; shipping, Japanese, arrangements concerning, 536, 537–538; U. S. action, 342, 343

- Conversations, subjects of discussion—Continued.
  - Economic questions—Continued.
    - Economic measures, etc.—Con.
      - Japanese resentment, 326, 364, 368–369, 380, 383, 392, 394, 396, 411, 441, 496, 501, 517–518, 523, 531, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 561, 567, 570, 580, 582, 714, 717, 747, 751, 760, 775, 780, 788, 791
      - Petroleum shipments and restrictions, 264–265, 366, 367, 501, 523, 527–528, 567, 570, 572, 749, 757, 758, 765, 775, 782
      - Views of Ambassador Grew, 602–603, 701–704
    - Economic policy:
      - Proposed joint declaration by the United States and Japan: Discussions, 359–361, 370, 731, 734–736, 742, 750; draft text, 736–737
      - Statements of, 390–391, 395, 397
  - European war, attitude of Japan and the United States:
    - Address by Secretary Hull (*Apr. 24, 1941*), cited, 430–432, 449–451
    - *Greer* incident, 609, 613
    - Japanese collaboration with Axis powers and obligations under Tripartite Pact, 325, 326, 330, 331, 333, 337, 338, 339, 349, 354–355, 359, 361, 363, 364, 366, 369, 370, 376, 383, 387, 392–393, 394, 395–396, 397, 404–405, 411, 413–414, 417–418, 423, 426, 427, 432–433, 433, 440–441, 443, 452, 456–458, 464, 469, 478–479, 483–484, 485, 492–493, 495–499, 500, 504, 505, 507, 508–509, 513, 515, 517, 518–519, 520, 524, 577, 584, 596, 602, 609, 613, 614, 622, 627–629, 630, 634, 642–643, 645, 646, 650, 660, 670, 674, 675, 677, 684–685, 686, 687–688, 696, 702, 707, 708, 712, 715–716, 723–724, 731, 732–734, 740–741, 744, 745, 746, 747, 751–752, 754–755, 756–757, 771, 772, 774, 775, 782, 788, 790–791
    - Self-defense, U. S. interpretation and policies, 337, 338, 339, 345, 349, 354–355, 363, 413, 414, 418, 425–426, 427, 429, 430–432, 433, 438–439, 440, 449–451, 452, 456–459, 465, 469, 478–479, 483, 485, 505, 508, 509–510, 515–516, 519, 602, 674, 683, 714, 715, 741, 752

Conversations, subjects of discussion—Continued.
  European war, etc.—Continued.
    Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, U. S. and Japanese relations. *See* Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, *infra.*
    U. S. aid to countries resisting aggression, 348, 366, 368, 427, 429, 431, 505, 558, 567, 612, 754–755, 775, 791
  Expedition of conversations, Japanese insistence on, and objections to delay, 349, 356, 357, 358, 362, 365, 369, 465, 526, 531, 576, 580–581, 586–587, 605–606, 614, 622, 625, 629, 632, 642, 644, 652, 654, 679, 680–681, 682, 686, 693, 699, 711, 716–717, 719, 720–721, 722, 723, 726, 730, 749, 751, 761, 776, 790; U. S. attitude, 655, 718, 734, 749, 761
  French Indochina and Thailand:
    Acts of aggression by Japan, and Japanese explanations, 327, 330, 339–340, 342, 343, 358, 501, 508, 518, 519, 521, 522–523, 528, 530–531, 531–532, 533, 539, 543–544, 548, 553–554, 561, 564, 574, 668, 669–670, 678–679, 683, 684, 779, 781–782, 783, 784, 788
    Multilateral pact concerning status, question of, 383, 791
    Neutralization of French Indochina and Thailand, President Roosevelt's proposal of *July 24, 1941*, 341–342, 344, 527–530, 534–537, 538, 539–540, 542, 545, 547, 552–553, 556; Japanese attitude, 534–537, 561–562
    U. S. attitude (*see also* Neutralization, *supra*):
      Concern over continuance by Japan of policy of conquest by force (*see also* Inquiry, *infra*), 367–368, 370–371, 376–377, 387, 393, 417, 519, 524–525, 528, 540–546, 553–554, 554, 555, 556–559, 682, 760, 765, 774, 775
      Inquiry by President Roosevelt, *Dec. 2, 1941*, regarding reasons for new troop movements:
        Discussions, 378–379, 778–780, 781–782, 783
        Text, 779; Japanese reply, 378, 781, 784
      Representations against Japanese action, 340–341, 521, 522, 524–526, 528, 678–679, 682
      U. S. proposal for multilateral treaty guaranteeing integrity of French Indochina, 383, 791

Conversations, subjects of discussion—Continued.
  French Indochina and Thailand—Con.
    U. S. attitude—Continued.
      Warning against further acts of aggression, 345, 556–557
    Withdrawal of Japanese forces, question of, 343–344, 347, 355, 365, 367–368, 368, 377, 382, 561, 562, 574–575, 581, 615–616, 660, 666–667, 668, 698, 710, 716, 727–728, 749–750, 753, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 774, 779–780, 782, 790
  Immigration, Japanese, 394–395, 409, 424, 426, 464, 764
  International relations and character of nations, concepts of the United States and Japan, 436–437, 452, 456, 458–459
  Kurusu, Saburo, mission to the United States, 362, 679, 704–705, 707, 710–711, 717, 718–719, 729, 738, 783
  Meeting between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Konoye, proposed. *See* Roosevelt–Konoye meeting.
  Netherlands East Indies, 394, 527–528
  Nonaggression agreements, proposals regarding—
    French Indochina, U. S. desire for multilateral treaty, and Japanese objections, 383, 791
    Pacific area, U. S. desire for multilateral treaty, and Japanese objections, 382, 620–621, 630, 761–762, 763, 764, 790
    U. S.–Japan, Japanese intimation of, and U. S. refusal to consider, 412
  Peace (*see also under* Conversations: *Aug. 6–Oct. 16, 17, Oct. 17–Nov. 19, Nov. 20–Dec. 1*):
    Japanese professions of, 332, 334, 338–339, 391, 416, 419, 426, 434, 454–455, 455–456, 471, 495–499, 501, 506–508
    Message from President Roosevelt to Emperor Hirohito, *Dec. 6, 1941*, 379, 784–786; reply, 385
    U. S. desire for manifestation by Japan of pursuit of peaceful course, 355–356, 398, 486, 496, 511, 513–514, 520, 754
  Philippine Islands, 344, 453, 464, 772
  Place of conversations, Japanese preference for Tokyo and U. S. insistence on Washington, 602, 614, 622, 667, 699, 700, 701, 713
  Policies of the United States and Japan affecting political stabilization in Pacific area, 339, 419, 424–425, 438, 453, 463–464, 481–483, 498, 602, 615–616, 630, 659, 684, 687–688, 740

Conversations, subjects of discussion—Continued.
  Political situation in Japan:
    Cabinet changes, 343, 358, 516, 521–522, 523–524, 534, 689–693, 697, 700–701, 738, 742
    German influence, 326, 356, 530, 603, 630, 680, 686
    Military element, 350, 351, 352, 353, 356–357, 386, 388–389, 392, 395, 416, 434, 471, 495, 516, 605, 625, 644, 651, 662, 680–682, 686, 690, 697, 701, 706, 752, 758, 775, 776
    Public opinion, 335, 356, 521, 551, 561, 613, 632, 635, 651, 652
    Tripartite Pact, anniversary of signature, 603–604, 622, 629, 630, 632, 644, 645, 654
    U. S. implication of divergency of views within Japanese Government, 485–486, 498, 500, 511–512; Japanese denial, and allegation of U. S. interference in internal affairs, 493, 495–497, 499, 506–507, 511
  Preamble of proposed agreement between the United States and Japan, 451–452, 455–456, 623
  Secrecy or publicity of conversations and proposed agreement, 346, 351, 425, 453–454, 497, 576, 579, 580, 582–583, 584, 586, 587, 592, 594, 594–595, 596, 603, 607, 609, 631, 655–656, 661, 766, 793
  Southward advance of Japan (*see also* French Indochina and Thailand *and* Netherlands East Indies, *supra*), question of abandonment by Japan of policies of aggression and conquest by force, 349, 354, 355, 367, 403, 407, 417, 419, 426, 575, 615–616, 659, 684, 728, 774
  Tripartite Pact (*see also* European war: Japanese collaboration with Axis powers, *supra*), anniversary of signature, 603–604, 622, 629, 630, 632, 644, 645, 654
  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, relations with Japan:
    General discussions, 325–326, 347, 515, 567, 568, 575, 581, 684, 728, 729, 733, 739, 752
    Nonaggression pact with Japan, cited, 325, 347, 406, 515, 567, 568, 569, 575, 581, 733, 752
    U. S. aid in resisting German aggression, and Japanese opposition, 498, 501, 505, 568, 575; question of petroleum shipments to Vladivostok, 566–567, 568–569, 570, 572, 580, 581–582, 604

Conversations, subjects of discussion—Continued.
  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, relations with Japan—Contd.
    U. S. inquiry of Japan regarding intentions of attacking Soviet Union, 500, 502–503; Japanese denial, counterinquiry regarding U. S. intentions of entering European war, and further correspondence, 501, 503–504, 509–510, 513
  U. S. consultation with Chinese, British, Netherlands and other governments prior to entering into negotiations with Japan, U. S. insistence, 348, 361, 366, 384, 588, 595, 611, 618, 620–621, 630, 632, 708, 712–713, 724, 731, 731–732, 736, 748, 750, 757, 759, 762, 792
  U. S. policy concerning aid to countries resisting aggression, 348, 366, 368, 427, 429, 431, 505, 558, 567, 612, 754–755, 775, 791
  U. S. principles of international relations, 332, 372, 373, 390–391, 396–397, 404, 407–409, 411, 414, 538–539, 542, 590, 658, 734–736, 766; Japanese adherence, 349–350, 575, 590, 604, 658, 664, 673, 675–676, 685
  War between the United States and Japan, possibility of: Defensive preparations by the United States, 359, 370, 377–378; views of U. S. Secretary of the Navy, 693–694, 698; warning to Department of State by Ambassador Grew regarding Embassy's inability to give advance notification of possible Japanese military action, 743–744

Economic measures by the United States affecting trade with Japan (*see also* Commercial treaty *and under* Conversations, subjects: Economic questions), 53–54, 54–55, 115, 201–273, 537–538
  1937, prohibition against transport of arms, ammunition, or implements of war to China and Japan by Government-owned vessels, 201
  1938–1939, moral embargo on export of airplanes, airplane accessories, aerial munitions, aviation gasoline and technical processes for manufacture thereof, to countries guilty of aerial bombing and machine-gunning of civilian populations:

Economic measures by the United States, etc.—Continued.

- *1938–1939*, moral embargo, etc.—Continued.
  - *July 1, 1938*, communication from Department of State to manufacturers and exporters of airplanes and airplane accessories, 201–202
  - *Dec. 2, 1939*, statement by President Roosevelt, 202
  - *Dec. 15, 1939*, communications from Department of State to—
    - Manufacturers and exporters of airplanes, airplane accessories, and aerial munitions, 202–203
    - Producers of aluminum and molybdenum, 203
  - *Dec. 20, 1939*, communication from Department of State to oil companies, regarding plans, manufacturing rights, or technical processes for manufacture of aviation gasoline, 203–204; Japanese protests, alleging violation of *1911* treaty through nonfulfillment of Universal Oil Co. contract with Japanese interests, and U. S. attitude, 53–54, 54–55, 204–210
- *1940*, export control by President Roosevelt under Act of *July 2*:
  - *July 2*:
    - Appointment of Administrator of Export Control, 216
    - Proclamation *2413* covering arms, ammunition, implements of war; aluminum, molybdenum, certain other basic materials and products; certain chemicals; certain aircraft parts and other products; certain machine tools:
      - Regulations governing exportation and licensing procedure, 213–215; amendment (*Jan. 29, 1941*), 241
      - Text, 211–213
  - *July 26*, proclamation *2417* covering petroleum products, tetraethyl lead, *No. 1* iron and steel scrap:
    - Regulations (*see also Sept. 30, infra*), 217–218
    - Text, 216–217
  - *July 31*, announcement of limitation to Western Hemisphere of aviation gasoline exports: Japanese protest against discriminatory treatment, and U. S. reply, 218–220; text of White House announcement, 218

Economic measures by the United States, etc.—Continued.

- *1940*, export control—Continued.
  - *Sept. 12*, proclamation *2423* covering equipment, manufacturing processes, plans, etc., for aviation gasoline, tetraethyl lead, and airplane engines: Amendment (*Mar. 4, 1941*), 255; text, 220–221; White House announcement, *Sept. 13*, 221–222
  - *Sept. 30*, regulations amending proclamation *2417* of *July 26* to include all grades of iron and steel scrap: Additional amendment (*Mar. 4, 1941*), 255; Japanese protest against discrimination and U. S. reply, 115, 223–228, 229; text, 223; White House announcement and notice of restriction of licenses to Western Hemisphere and Great Britain, 222–223
  - *Oct. 15*, issuance of Executive Order *8567* governing requisition by Army and Navy of equipment, munitions, machinery, machine tools, etc.: Announcement by White House, 228–229; Japanese representations and protests against denial of export licenses for machine tools, and U. S. replies, 229–232, 235
  - *Dec. 10*, proclamation *2449* covering iron ore, pig iron, ferro alloys, and certain iron and steel manufactures and semimanufactures:
    - Announcement by White House and notice of restriction of licenses to Western Hemisphere and British Empire, 232
    - Japanese protest against discrimination, and U. S. reply, 237–238
    - Regulations (E. O. *8607*), 233–235; additional regulations (E. O. *8669*, *Feb. 4, 1941*), 243–248
    - Text, 232–233
  - *Dec. 20*, proclamation *2451* covering bromine, ethylene, cobalt, and other materials; certain machinery; equipment and plans for production of aviation lubricating oil: Amendment (*Mar. 4, 1941*), 255; text, 236
- *1941*, extension of export control and ultimate freezing of Japanese assets:
  - *Jan. 10*, proclamation *2453* covering copper, brass and bronze, zinc, nickel, and potash: Regulations (E. O. *8631*), 239–240; text, 238

- Economic measures by the United States, etc.—Continued.
  - *1941*, extension of export control, etc.—Continued.
    - *Jan. 29*, general regulations regarding affidavits for export of certain products to other than British Empire destinations, 241
    - *Feb. 4:*
      - Executive Order *8669* prescribing additional regulations governing proclamation *2449* of *Dec. 10, 1940*, 243–248
      - Proclamation *2456* covering well and refining machinery, radium, uranium, calf and kip skins: Regulations (E. O. *8668*), 242–243; text, 241–242
    - *Feb. 25*, proclamations:
      - *2460*, covering belladonna, atropine, sole leather and belting leather: Regulations (E. O. *8693*), 249–250; text, 248–249
      - *2461*, covering beryllium, graphite electrodes, and aircraft pilot trainers: Regulations (E. O. *8694*), 251–252; text, 250–251
    - *Mar. 4*, proclamations:
      - *2463*, covering cadmium, carbon black, coconut oil, fatty acids, shellac, etc.: Amendment (*Mar. 27*), 259; regulations (E. O. *8702*), 255–257; text, 252–253
      - *2464*, covering jute, lead, borax, and phosphate: Regulations (E. O. *8703*), 257–258; text, 253–254
      - *2465*, covering plans, specifications, and technical information for use in producing any articles under export control, 254–255
    - *Mar. 27*, proclamation *2468*, covering animal, fish, and vegetable oils; fatty acids; nylon, kapok; certain chemicals, etc.; text, 258–260
    - *Apr. 14*, proclamations:
      - *2475*, covering machinery, text, 260
      - *2476*, covering vegetable fibers and manufactures, theobromine, caffein, sodium cyanide, calcium cyanide, and casein, text, 261
    - *May 28*, proclamation *2488*, extending export control to the Philippines: Announcement by Department of State, 261–262; text, 262–263
    - *July*, delay in transit of Japanese shipping through Panama Canal, 263–264

- Economic measures by the United States, etc.—Continued.
  - *1941*, extension of export control, etc.—Continued.
    - *July 26*, Executive Order *8832* freezing Chinese and Japanese assets in the United States:
      - Announcement by White House, 266–267
      - Japanese shipping, effect on: Arrangements regarding cargoes and clearances of Japanese vessels in American ports, 266, 267–272, 537–538; immunity from court proceedings for vessels requisitioned by Japanese Government, Japanese request and U. S. consent, 272–273
      - Text, 267
- Economic questions. *See* Economic measures by the United States; *also under* Conversations, subjects.
- Embargoes. *See* Economic measures.
- Encirclement, Japanese allegation of, 319, 340, 366, 380, 501, 508, 520–521, 523, 547–548, 551, 557, 696, 720, 753, 772, 788
- European situation. *See* Axis powers; Conversations, subjects: European war; *and under* Growing tension: *1939, 1940, 1941.*
- Export control. *See* Economic measures: *1940, 1941.*
- Extraterritoriality, 17

- France (*see also* French Indochina; Growing tension: *1939, 1940, 1941:* European situation), Japanese nonrecognition of French claim to Spratly Islands group, and Japanese annexation thereof, 4–5, 277–281, 387
- Freezing of Japanese and Chinese assets in the United States. *See* Economic measures: *1941: July 26; and under* Conversations, subjects: Economic questions: Economic measures by the United States.
- French Indochina. *See under* Conversations, subjects *and under* Southward advance of Japan; *see also* Growing tension: *1939, 1940, 1941:* Southward advance of Japan.

- Germany (*see also* Axis powers; Conversations, subjects: European war; Growing tension: *1939, 1940, 1941:* European situation; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): Influence in Japan, 326, 356, 530, 603, 630, 680, 686; U. S. attitude toward Nazi aggression, 116, 173–181, 404–405, 414, 415, 430–432, 465, 510, 515, 519, 524, 530, 741, 752–753, 754–755

- Good-neighbor policy of the United States, 395, 397, 404, 408, 414, 437, 482, 508
- Good offices (*see also* Conversations, subjects: China: Action toward a peaceful settlement: Negotiations, question of U. S. good offices), 70
- Great Britain (*see also* Growing tension: *1939*, *1940*, *1941:* European situation): Economic restrictions on exports, U. S. nonimposition on shipments to Great Britain, 218, 222–223, 232, 241; Japanese attitude, 3–4, 147, 308, 712–713, 732, 792; military alliance with Soviet Union, possibility of, 2; U. S. aid in resisting Axis aggression, 138–139, 146, 147, 334–335, 366, 368, 376, 427, 429, 505, 519, 754, 755, 775
- Greenland, U. S. action in, 284, 406
- *Greer* incident, 609, 613
- Grew, Joseph C. (Ambassador):
  - Addresses before America-Japan Society, Tokyo:
    - *Oct. 19, 1939:* Discussions, 29–30, 32; text, 19–29
    - *Dec. 19, 1940,* text, 129–130
  - Report of rumored plans of Japanese for surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, 133
  - Roosevelt–Konoye meeting, proposed, views concerning, 564–565, 645–650
  - Warning to Department of State regarding Embassy's inability to give advance notification of possible Japanese military action, 743–744
- Growing tension between the United States and Japan arising from Japanese military aggression, 1–149, 172, 204–210, 225, 226, 292, 319
  - *1939,* 1–52, 90, 91
    - Address by Ambassador Grew before America-Japan Society, *Oct. 19,* reporting American public opinion with regard to the Far Eastern situation:
      - Foreign Office comment, 29–30
      - Text, 19–29; omitted portions, oral presentation to Foreign Minister, 32
    - China questions:
      - American treaty rights and equality of commercial opportunity in occupied China, Japanese interference:
        - Currencies and exchange control, 39, 48, 52
        - Monopolies, 33, 41, 48, 52
        - Shipments of wood oil and embroidery, 41, 47–48

Growing tension between the United States and Japan, etc.—Continued.

1939—Continued.

China questions—Continued.

American treaty rights, etc.—Continued.

- U. S. requests for Japanese implementation of assurances regarding maintenance of open door and noninterference with American rights, 3, 32, 33, 37–38, 39; Japanese attitude, 3–4, 33, 36–37, 39, 40–41, 42, 44–45
- Yangtze River, question of reopening to navigation, 30, 33, 50–51

- Bombing of civilians by the Japanese and military operations endangering American lives and interests in China: Japanese attitude, 5, 41, 42, 44, 46, 49; U. S. representations and views, 3, 32, 33, 47; warning by Japan concerning danger from military operations in Kwangtung, 5
- International settlements in occupied China, Japanese attitude, 3, 49
- Naval vessels and troops of European belligerents. *See under* European situation, *infra.*
- Wang Ching-wei regime, proposed establishment, 34–35, 35–36, 38, 45

- Commercial treaty between the United States and Japan (*1911*), U. S. abrogation, effective *Jan. 25, 1940,* and possible imposition of embargo against Japan, 30–31, 32–33, 41, 43, 51
- Efforts to restore good relations between the United States and Japan (*see also* Address by Ambassador Grew, *supra*):
  - Conversation between retiring Japanese Counselor of Embassy and Secretary Hull, *Aug. 30,* 8–9; between Japanese Foreign Minister and American Chargé, 15
  - Informal exploratory conversations between—
    - Ambassador Grew and Japanese Foreign Minister, 31–34, 40–43, 48–52; views and instructions of Department of State, 47

Growing tension between the United States and Japan, etc.—Continued.
  1939—Continued.
    Efforts to restore good relations, etc.—Continued.
      Informal exploratory conversations between—Continued.
        Embassy and Foreign Office officials in Tokyo, 42, 43–46; views and instructions of Department of State, 47
        Secretary Hull and Ambassador Horinouchi, 36–39, 43–44
    European situation, effect in the Far East:
      Anglo-Soviet military alliance, Japanese apprehension over possibility of, 2
      Message from Prime Minister Hiranuma to Secretary Hull suggesting efforts to prevent outbreak of European war: Cited, 90, 91; text and reply, 1, 5–8
      Naval vessels and troops of European belligerents in occupied China, "friendly advice" of Japan for withdrawal: Japanese note, *Sept. 5*, and explanations, 9–10, 14, 15, 15–16, 18, 19; U. S. disapproval and representations, 11–14, 16–19
      Noninvolvement policy of Japan (*see also* Naval vessels and troops of European belligerents, *supra*), 2, 9, 10, 15, 16, 52
      Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan, preliminaries, 2, 2–3
    Southward advance of Japan, denial of territorial designs on South Seas and Philippines, 4–5
  1940, 53–130, 172, 204–210, 225, 226, 292, 319
    Address by Under Secretary Welles at Cleveland, *Sept. 28*, on U. S. policy in the Far East, 112–114
    China questions:
      American treaty rights and equality of opportunity in occupied China, Japanese interference:
        Currencies, exchange control, and monopolies, 63, 75–76
        U. S. representations and requests for Japanese implementation of assurances regarding maintenance of open door and noninterference with American rights, 54, 63, 69, 75–76, 82, 226; Japanese attitude, 55, 59, 61, 62, 89
        Yangtze River, question of reopening to navigation, 55
      Bombing by Japanese of civilians and American property in China, 208–210
      Burma Road, statement by Secretary Hull (*July 16*) concerning temporary closing, 101
      Chinese Government at Chungking:
        Continued U. S. recognition and aid, 60, 94–95, 99, 101; Japanese objections, 59, 62, 80, 93, 94–95
        Negotiations between Japan and Chiang Kai-shek, exploration by Japanese Foreign Minister of possibility of U. S. good offices, 70
        Statement declaring Wang Ching-wei regime illegal and treaty with Japan of *Nov. 30* invalid, 122–123
      International settlements in occupied China, U. S. desire for Japanese assurances of respect for integrity of, 80–81
      Naval vessels and troops of European belligerents. *See under* European situation, *infra.*
      Wang Ching-wei regime:
        Chinese Government at Chungking, statement declaring Wang Ching-wei regime illegal and treaty of *Nov. 30* with Japan invalid, 122–123
        Japanese views and official statements, 56–57, 60–61, 127
        Treaty and agreements with Japan, signed *Nov. 30:* Basic relations, treaty concerning, annexed protocol, and agreed terms of understanding concerning protocol, texts, 117–121; joint declaration by Japan, "Manchukuo", and Wang Ching-wei regime concern-

Growing tension between the United States and Japan, etc.—Continued.
  1940—Continued.
    China questions—Continued.
      Wang Ching-wei regime—Con.
        ing new order in East Asia, text, 122; statement by Chinese Government at Chungking declaring treaty invalid, 122–123
        U. S. refusal to recognize: Attitude preliminary to establishment, 53, 54; statement by Secretary Hull, *Mar. 30*, and comments of Japanese Foreign Office, 59–60, 61–62
    Commercial relations, U. S.–Japan:
      Embargoes against Japan, U. S.: Aviation gasoline and manufacturing processes, Japanese protest against nonfulfillment of private contract, and U. S. attitude, 53–54, 54–55, 204–210; scrap iron and steel, 115; total embargo, Japanese views on possible imposition of, 58, 114, 172, 225, 319
      Remarks by Ambassador Grew, 95–99
      Treaty, question of conclusion of a new treaty or *modus vivendi*, 55, 63, 70, 79, 88, 98–99
    Efforts to restore good relations between the United States and Japan:
      Admiral Nomura (Appointed Ambassador), addresses at America-Japan Society luncheon, Tokyo (*Dec. 19*), concerning his mission and Japanese foreign policy in general: Address of Foreign Minister Matsuoka, 123–128; remarks of Admiral Nomura, 128–129; response of Ambassador Grew, 129–130
      Informal exploratory conversations between Ambassador Grew and Japanese Foreign Minister, continuance of, 53, 62–65, 66, 67–76, 79–80, 81–87, 88–92, 94–100, 105
      U. S. policy, statement by Under Secretary Welles, *June 8*, 66–67
      Views of Foreign Minister Matsuoka on world peace and message to President Roosevelt, *July 26*, 104–106; informal reply, 108

Growing tension between the United States and Japan, etc.—Continued
  1940—Continued.
    European situation, effect in the Far East:
      Axis powers, Japanese relations with, 69, 88–89, 95, 126, 126–127; U. S. views, 100, 116
      Naval vessels and troops of European belligerents in occupied China:
        Agreement for maintenance of peaceful *status quo*, 65–66, 80, 87–88; Japanese displeasure at initiative of U. S. commander in securing, 78
        "Friendly advice" of Japan for withdrawal, note of *June 11*, 77–78, 78
        Withdrawal of British forces at Shanghai and Japanese dissent from proposed assignment of British sectors to U. S. and Japanese forces, 111–112, 292
      Possessions and territories of European belligerents in the Pacific, U. S. proposal for exchange of notes with Japan regarding maintenance of peaceful *status quo*, 86–87, 88, 98, 100; Japanese nonacceptance, 88, 90, 92
      Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan (*Sept. 27*), 116, 126, 126–127
    Incident of *July 7* at Shanghai, correspondence between U. S. and Japanese commanders regarding alleged mistreatment of Japanese gendarmes by U. S. marines, 101–104, 106–108
    Japanese foreign and national policies: Official statements, 55, 56–59, 92–94, 108–111; relations with the United States, 55, 58–59, 62, 104–105, 126, 127–128, 128–129; war in China and establishment of a new order in East Asia, 55, 56–57, 59, 93–94, 99, 108–111, 113, 116, 125–128; South Seas territories and Southern Asia, 66, 69–70, 93–94, 97–98, 113
    Southward advance of Japan (*see also* European situation: Possessions and territories of European belligerents, *supra*), 66, 69–70, 79, 93–94, 97–98, 113
    U. S. citizens, advice by Department of State for withdrawal from the Far East, and Japanese concern, 114, 114–115

Growing tension between the United States and Japan, etc.—Continued.
  1940—Continued.
    War between the United States and Japan, possibility of: Japanese views, 69–70, 105, 115, 126, 127; U. S. views, 115
  1941 (*see also* Conversations), 131–149
    Bellicose attitude of Japan:
      Press campaign against the United States, 146–147
      Remarks of Foreign Minister Matsuoka, *May 14*, 145–146, 148
      Speech by Prime Minister Tojo, *Nov. 30*, 148–149; by Foreign Minister Togo, *Nov. 30*, 149
    China questions: Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan, possibility of, 144; Japanese policy based on a new order in East Asia, 132–133, 133–134, 135, 136, 140–141, 148–149; U. S. aid to China, Japanese objections, 134, 148–149
    Economic measures by the United States affecting trade with Japan (*see also* Economic measures: *1941*), 139, 142
    Efforts to restore good relations between the United States and Japan, informal conversations between—
      Ambassador Grew and Foreign Minister Matsuoka, 143, 145–148
      Ambassador Steinhardt and Foreign Minister Matsuoka, at Moscow, 143–145
      American Counselor of Embassy and Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, 137–143; approval of Ambassador Grew, 138, 143
      President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull, and Ambassador Nomura, proposed, 143
    European situation, attitudes of the United States and Japan (*see also* Statement by Secretary Hull, *infra*): Japanese collaboration with Axis powers, and obligations under Tripartite Pact, 134, 135, 141, 145–146; U. S. aid to Great Britain, and Japanese objections, 138–139, 145–146, 147, 148
    Southward advance of Japan, 132–133, 134, 136, 137–138, 139, 140–141, 142, 144, 146–147, 147, 148

Growing tension between the United States and Japan, etc.—Continued.
  1941—Continued.
    Statement by Secretary Hull on U. S. foreign policy and relations with Japan, *Jan. 15*, 131–133; Japanese criticism and denial of responsibility for crisis, 133–135
    War between the United States and Japan, possibility of:
      Japanese attitude, 134, 135, 136, 144, 145, 146; appeal to Japanese in American territory to ignore propaganda designed to prejudice Japanese-American relations, 136–137
      Report by Ambassador Grew of rumored Japanese plans to attack Pearl Harbor, 133
      U. S. attitude, 137–138, 138–139, 141–142

Hull, Cordell (Secretary of State):
  Letter to the Vice President, *Jan. 8, 1938*, on U. S. policy in the Far East, cited, 82
  Statements:
    July 16, 1937, cited, 512
    Jan. 15, 1941, 131–133, 329–330; Japanese criticism and denial of responsibility for crisis, 133–135
    Apr. 24, 1941, 430–432, 449–451
  Warning to War Council, *Nov. 25, 26, 1941*, on critical nature of U. S.–Japanese relations, 377–378

Iceland, 284, 508, 532, 683
Immigration, Japanese, 64, 97, 140, 171, 172, 196–197, 198, 283, 289, 304, 310, 394–395, 409, 424, 426, 453, 464, 764
Indochina, French. *See under* Conversations, subjects *and under* Southward advance of Japan; *see also* Growing tension: *1939, 1940, 1941:* Southward advance of Japan.
Iron and steel scrap, restrictions on export to Japan. *See* Economic measures: *1940, 1941.*
Italy. *See* Axis powers; Growing tension: *1939, 1940, 1941:* European situation.

Konoye, Prince Fumimaro (Prime Minister) (*see also* Roosevelt–Konoye meeting in the Pacific, proposed): Message to Ambassador Grew upon advent of Tojo cabinet, and reply, 691–692; principles relating to China, 35–36, 39, 56, 70, 333–334, 350, 419, 423, 429–430, 436, 439, 442, 448–449, 459, 460–461

Kurusu, Saburo. *See under* Conversations: *Oct. 17–Nov. 19; see also* Conversations: *Nov. 20–Dec. 1, Dec. 2–7.*

Liutiaokow incident (*Sept. 18, 1931*), 136
Loans to China, U. S., 59, 222, 326

Machinery and machine tools, restrictions on export to Japan. *See* Economic measures: *1940, 1941.*
"Manchukuo", 122, 132, 186, 329, 334, 409, 423, 428, 429, 461
Marco Polo Bridge incident (*July 7, 1937*), 134, 135, 136
Matsuoka, Yosuke (Foreign Minister):
  Message to President Roosevelt on world peace, *July 26, 1940*, 104–106; informal reply, 108
  Visit to Berlin, Moscow, and Rome (*1941*), 143–145, 182–186, 311
Minerals:
  Restrictions on export to Japan. *See* Economic measures: *1940, 1941.*
  Tungsten purchases from China under U. S. loan, 222
Monroe Doctrine, cited, 176, 284, 287–288, 651, 666
Moral embargo. *See* Economic measures: *1938–1939.*

National security, radio address by President Roosevelt, *Dec. 29, 1940*, 173–181
Netherlands East Indies. *See under* Conversations, subjects *and under* Southward advance of Japan; *see also* Growing tension: *1939, 1940, 1941:* Southward advance of Japan.
Netherlands West Indies, 286
Neutrality act, 201
Nomura, Admiral Kichisaburo (Ambassador) (*see also* Conversations between the Governments of the United States and Japan):
  Addresses at America-Japan Society luncheon, Tokyo (*Dec. 19, 1940*) concerning mission of Admiral Nomura and Japanese foreign policy in general: Address of Foreign Minister Matsuoka, 123–128; remarks of Admiral Nomura, 128–129; response of Ambassador Grew, 129–130
  Conversation with Rear Admiral Turner, Director of War Plans Division of Navy Department, *July 20, 1941*, on U. S.-Japanese relations, 516–520

Oil. *See* Petroleum products.

Pacific area. *See* Southward advance of Japan.
Panama Canal, 263–264
Peace. *See under* Conversations, subjects.
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii: Attack by Japan, *Dec. 7, 1941*, 385, 786*n*; Japanese apprehensions concerning U. S. fleet at Pearl Harbor, 69–70; rumored Japanese plans for attack on, 133
Penetration by Japan into Southern Asia and South Pacific territories, extension of. *See* Southward advance of Japan.
Petroleum products:
  Export to Japan:
    Restrictions, U. S. *See* Economic measures.
    U. S. policy in permitting shipments in order to forestall Japanese penetration into Netherlands East Indies, 139, 527–528; statement by President Roosevelt, *July 24, 1941*, 264–265
  Shipments to Soviet Union, Japanese objections, 566–567, 568–569, 570, 572, 580, 581–582, 604
Philippine Islands, 4–5, 64, 144, 261–263, 283, 317, 318, 340, 341, 342, 344, 345, 453, 464, 772

Red Cross supplies in French Indochina, U. S. representations against refusal of authorities to grant reexport permits, 300
Roosevelt, Franklin D. (President):
  Addresses:
    Dec. 29, 1940, national security and the United States as the arsenal of democracy, 173–181
    July 24, 1941, remarks on U. S. policy of permitting petroleum shipments to Japan in order to forestall Japanese penetration into Netherlands East Indies, 264–265, 527–528
  Atlantic conference, 345, 588, 718
  Meeting with Prime Minister Konoye, proposed. *See* Roosevelt–Konoye meeting.
  Message to Congress, *Dec. 8, 1941*, asking for declaration of existence of a state of war with Japan, 793–794
  Message to Emperor Hirohito, *Dec. 6, 1941*, 379, 784–786; reply, 385
  Proclamations and executive orders relating to export control. *See* Economic measures: *1940, 1941.*
  Statement, *Dec. 2, 1939*, concerning moral embargo, 202
Roosevelt–Konoye meeting in the Pacific, proposed:
  Advancement of suggestion by Japanese:
    Discussions, 344, 346–347, 425, 550, 551, 553, 555, 557, 559–564

- Roosevelt–Konoye meeting in the Pacific, proposed—Continued.
  - Advancement of suggestion by Japanese—Continued.
    - Message from Prime Minister Konoye to President Roosevelt, 346–347, 572–573; President Roosevelt's reply, 347–348, 591–592
    - U. S. views, 344, 557–559, 571, 591–592
  - Arrangements, discussions: Insistence of the Japanese on necessity of early meeting date, 349, 568, 569, 571, 573, 576, 580–581, 587, 603–604, 605–606, 609, 619, 620, 622, 625, 632, 636, 642–645, 651–654, 679; participation of Japanese army and navy officers, 352, 576, 605, 644, 654; President Roosevelt's preference for Juneau rather than Honolulu, 571, 572, 576; publicity, question of, 576, 584, 586–587, 592, 594–595, 596, 607
  - Japanese requests for suspension of—
    - Oil shipments to Soviet Union, 568–569, 581; U. S. refusal, 570
    - U. S. economic restrictions, 564, 568–569, 572, 581, 582; U. S. refusal, 604
  - Personal support by Ambassador Grew, 564–565, 645–650
  - Secrecy of plans, Japanese desire for, 346, 351, 560, 564, 569, 579–580, 584, 586, 587, 603–604, 609, 631; U. S. views, 582–583, 586, 607
  - U. S. insistence on reaching prior agreement in principle on fundamental questions: Discussions, 347–348, 352–353, 576–579, 584, 588–592, 607, 625, 654–656, 663, 673; Japanese views, 380–381, 581–582, 626–627, 678, 788; opinion of Ambassador Grew, 645–650

- Scrap iron and steel, U. S. restrictions on export. *See* Economic measures: *1940*, *1941*.
- Shanghai incident of *July 7, 1940*, involving U.S. marines and Japanese gendarmes, 101–104, 106–108
- Shipping:
  - Japanese vessels:
    - Delay in permission for transiting Panama Canal, 263–264
    - Effect of U.S. freezing order of *July 26, 1941:* Arrangements regarding cargoes and clearance of vessels in American ports, 266, 267–272, 537–538; immunity from court proceedings for vessels requisitioned by Japanese Government, Japanese request and U.S. consent, 272–273
- Shipping—Continued.
  - U. S. Government-owned vessels, prohibition against transport of arms, ammunition, or implements of war to China or Japan, 201
- Southward advance of Japan (*see also under* Conversations, subjects *and under* Growing tension: *1939*, *1940*, *1941*), extension of military penetration into Southern Asia and South Pacific territories, 4–5, 69, 97–98, 113, 139, 142, 144, 264–265, 277–322, 327, 387, 527–528
  - French Indochina (*see also under* Conversations, subjects), Japanese aggression and interference with American rights and interests:
    - American-owned merchandise, interference with reexport of, and confiscation by French and Japanese authorities, U.S. representations, 298–300, 302, 308, 312–313, 315; Japanese attitude, 301–302, 303, 313–315
    - Demands and ultimatums upon Indochina by Japan:
      - Issuance, 289–290, 290, 291–292, 294, 322
      - U. S. representations, 289–290, 291–292, 293, 294–295, 296–297; Japanese attitude and replies, 290, 292–293, 293–294, 295–296
    - Mediation by Japan of boundary dispute between Indochina and Thailand, 142, 144, 306
    - Treaties between Japanese and Vichy governments:
      - *Aug. 30, 1940*, 295–296, 309, 318
      - *July 21, 1941*, regarding joint protection of Indochina: Japanese views, 317, 318, 318–320, 320; U. S. attitude, 317–318, 320, 320–321
  - Netherlands East Indies (*see also under* Conversations, subjects):
    - Economic arrangements with Japan:
      - Export by Japan to Germany of Netherlands East Indies raw materials in exchange for war planes, proposed, 311
      - Negotiations regarding Japanese trade, enterprises, and immigration, 97–98, 142, 289, 304, 305, 306, 307, 319, 327; obstructive attitude of Netherlands, 304, 305, 307
      - Oil export agreement, *Nov. 12, 1940*, 297–298, 306
    - Intervention by France or Great Britain, Japanese attitude, 287

Southward advance of Japan—Con.
  Netherlands East Indies—Continued.
    Maintenance of the *status quo*, statements and declarations concerning:
      Japanese assurances, 281, 287, 288; action in Japan and statements of a contradictory nature, 287, 288, 303–307
      Secretary Hull, views, 113, 281–282, 283–284, 285, 287, 290, 291, 315–317
    Petroleum shipments to Japan by the United States in order to forestall Japanese penetration into the Netherlands East Indies: Discussions, 139, 527–528; statement by President Roosevelt, *July 24, 1941*, 264–265
  Oceania, Japanese policy, 309–310
  Singapore, Japanese attitude: Apprehension of British defensive measures, 308–309; denial of rumored intention to attack, 311
  Spratly (Sinnan) Islands group, annexation by Japan, *Mar. 30, 1939*, and refusal to acknowledge French claim, 4–5, 277–280; U. S. attitude, 280–281, 387
  Thailand (*see also* Conversations, subjects: French Indochina and Thailand): Mediation by Japan of boundary dispute between French Indochina and Thailand, 142, 144, 306; nonaggression agreement with Japan, *June 12, 1940*, 69, 301
Spratly (Sinnan) Islands group, annexation by Japan, *Mar. 30, 1939*, and refusal to acknowledge French claim, 4–5, 277–280; U. S. attitude, 280–281, 387

Thailand. *See under* Southward advance of Japan.
Tojo, General Hideki (Prime Minister), speech, *Nov. 30, 1941*, 376–377, 772–774, 777–778
Trade. *See* Economic questions.
Treaties, agreements, etc.
  Anti-Comintern Pact. *See under* Axis powers.
  Commercial treaty, U. S.–Japan (*1911*). *See* Commercial treaty.
  Franco-Japanese agreement respecting integrity of China (*1907*), cited, 296
  French Indochina, Japanese treaties with Vichy government concerning. *See* Southward advance of Japan: French Indochina: Treaties.
Treaties, agreements, etc.—Continued.
  Nonaggression agreements. *See under* Conversations, subjects; *under* Southward advance of Japan: Thailand; *and under* Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
  Tripartite Pact. *See under* Axis powers.
  Wang Ching-wei regime–Japan. *See* Growing tension: *1940:* Wang Ching-wei regime: Treaty.
  Washington Conference treaties relating to China, cited, 55, 132, 329, 754, 764, 791
Tripartite Pact. *See under* Axis powers.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (*see also under* Conversations, subjects):
  Anglo-Soviet military alliance, Japanese apprehension over possibility of, 2
  Anti-Comintern Pact, not directed against, 157
  Attack by Germany, U. S. confidential information to Soviet Ambassador, 328
  Nonaggression agreement with—
    Germany (*Aug. 23, 1939*), cited, 38, 44, 116, 325, 515, 744
    Japan (*Apr. 14, 1941*): Cited, 406, 515, 567, 568, 569, 575, 581, 733; preliminaries, 135, 170, 185, 325; signature at Moscow and issuance of declaration concerning integrity of "Manchukuo" border, 186
  Tripartite Pact, not directed against, 167
Universal Oil Co. contract, Japanese protests against breach of, and U. S. attitude, 53–54, 54–55, 204–210
U. S. citizens in the Far East, advice by Department of State for withdrawal (*1940*), and Japanese concern, 114, 114–115
U. S. Congress, declaration of a state of war with Japan: Message from President Roosevelt, *Dec. 8, 1941*, 793–794; text of joint resolution, *Dec. 8*, 795
U. S. foreign policy:
  Attitude toward aggression: Aid to countries resisting aggression, 138–139, 348, 366, 368, 427, 429, 431, 505, 558, 567, 612, 754–755, 775, 791; general, 116, 173–181, 404–405, 414, 415, 430–432, 449–451, 465, 483, 510, 515, 519, 524, 530, 741, 752–753, 754–755
  Good-neighbor policy, 395, 397, 404, 408, 414, 437, 482, 508

U. S. foreign policy—Continued.
  Japan. *See* Axis powers, relations of Japan; Commercial treaty between the United States and Japan, U. S. abrogation; Conversations; Economic measures by the United States affecting trade with Japan; Growing tension; Southward advance of Japan.
  Principles of international relations, 25–27, 113, 131–132, 190–192, 282, 332, 349–350, 372, 373, 390–391, 396–397, 404, 407–409, 414, 417–418, 512, 538–539, 541–546, 566, 590, 658, 734–736, 766–767, 782
  Self-defense, 337, 338, 339, 354–355, 413, 414, 418, 425–426, 427, 429, 430–432, 433, 438–439, 440, 449–451, 452, 456–459, 465, 469, 478–479, 483, 485, 505, 508, 509–510, 515–516, 519, 602, 674, 683, 714, 715, 741, 752
  Statements by—
    President Roosevelt: *Dec. 2, 1939*, 202; *Dec. 29, 1940*, 173–181; *July 24, 1941*, 264–265
    Secretary Hull: *July 16, 1937*, 512; *Jan. 8, 1938*, 82; *Jan. 15, 1941*, 131–133, 329–330; *Apr. 24, 1941*, 430–432, 449–451
U. S. foreign policy—Continued.
  Statements by—Continued.
    Under Secretary Welles: *June 8, 1940*, 66–67; *Sept. 28, 1940*, 112–114; *July 24, 1941*, 315–317, 341; *Aug. 2, 1941*, 320–321
U. S. marines in Shanghai, conflict with Japanese gendarmes, *July 7, 1940*, 101–104, 106–108

Vichy government. *See* Southward advance of Japan: French Indochina: Treaties.

Wang Ching-wei regime (*see also under* Growing tension: *1939, 1940:* China questions), 334, 350–351, 384, 391, 393, 439, 460, 481, 765, 791–792
War between Japan and the United States. *See under* Conversations: *Dec. 2–7; under* Conversations, subjects; *and under* Growing tension: *1940, 1941.*
Welles, Sumner (Under Secretary of State):
  Address at Cleveland, *Sept. 28, 1940*, on U. S. policy in the Far East, 112–114
  Statements to the press: *June 8, 1940*, cited, 66–67; *July 24, 1941*, 315–317, 341; *Aug. 2, 1941*, 320–321
Western Hemisphere ports, equality of access for all nations, 18, 287–288, 414, 689

VOLUME I IS INDEXED SEPARATELY

5832

[redacted]nt of [redacted]
State.
Foreign Affairs of the
United States.

[redacted]artment of State. [redacted]
oreign Affairs of the
United States.

[redacted]

IMPORTANT

1. Books may be kept for two weeks and may be renewed once for the same period.

2. A fine of five cents a day will be charged on each book which is not returned according to the above rule. No book will be issued to any person incurring such a fine until it has been paid.

3. All injuries to books beyond reasonable wear and all losses must be made good.

4. Each borrower is held responsible for all books drawn on his card and for all fines acing on the same.

P6-BFP-381